NORTHERN IRELAND PEACE: STAYING APART OR
COMING TOGETHER
Charles P. Kelly, Ph.D
Political Science Program
Kean University
Union, New Jersey
ckellybeacon@yahoo.com
Prepared for the 2012 Northeastern Political Science
Association Conference
November 15-17
Omni Parker House Hotel
Boston, MA
NORTHERN IRELAND PEACE: STAYING APART OR
COMING TOGETHER
Introduction
The history of Northern Ireland peacemaking has been one of staying apart or
coming together. The British Government partitioning of Ireland in 1920 clearly
illustrates the staying apart approach to resolving the ethnic conflict between the
unionists (Protestants) and the nationalists (Catholics). The Belfast/ Good Friday
Agreement in 1998 illustrates the coming together approach to resolve violent conflict.
There is no doubt the level of violence is significantly down as a consequent of the 1998
Agreement but it has not disappeared. Currently Northern Ireland seems to be moving
toward coming together, yet there are some indications that it may be falling apart. Does
the long term peace in Northern Ireland rest in the coming together or staying apart
approach to conflict resolution or does it reside in a balance of coming together and
staying apart? Is the staying apart component of this balance a temporary or permanent
factor of the Northern Ireland peace? What do social science theories such as:
modernization theory, social identity theory, contact theory, consociational theory, civil
society theory, rational choice and prospect theory offer us as answers to these questions?
Are there any lessons one can draw for other ethnic conflicts in the case of Northern
Ireland?
Background
As is in most ethnic conflicts, the origins of the conflict in Northern Ireland is a
matter of dispute. The Northern Ireland Irish nationalists and the British unionists have
different historical perspectives. Nationalists and unionists refers to groups in the
communal divide in Northern Ireland. Within the nationalists there are those who are
referred to as republicans. Both aspire to a united Ireland but the nationalists are opposed
to the use of violence to achieve it. The republicans are nationalists in aspiration but do
not reject violence as a means to achieve Irish unity. Parallel are the unionists and the
loyalists. The unionists in Northern Ireland are those who support union with the United
Kingdom and who oppose violence as a means to maintain union. The loyalists are
unionists who use militant methods to support the union which may include violence.
Both loyalists and republicans draw support largely from the working class of Northern
Ireland.
Nationalists claim that the Celts originally inhabited Ireland and the conflict
originates with the Norman invasion in the 12th Century and the plantation system in the
17th Century, which established Protestant English rule over the majority of the island's
Catholic population, and that led to the redistribution of about 95 percent of the Catholic's
land to Protestant British settlers. The unionists, in particular some loyalist historians
2
recently, argue that the Cruthin inhabited Northern Ireland before the Celts.1 The
plantation system which brought the Scottish settlers to Ulster in the 17th Century,
according to the loyalists' view , was simply a return of the Cruthin (Scottish) to their
original homeland. The unionists believe the plantation system and the Protestant
Scottish settlers brought civilization to a primitive people. The Irish Catholic rebellions
and battles fought in the 17th Century against the Protestant settlers has been
memorialized by unionists in their marches that continue today. The two greatest
unionist commemorations are the Siege of Derry and the Battle of the Boyne. In the
Siege of Derry the Protestant Apprentice Boys slammed the gates of Derry shut when
Derry's Protestant Governor Lundy proposed to surrender the city to the forces of the
Catholic King James II. The Protestants were able to ultimately prevail when Protestant
King William of Orange defeated Catholic King James at the Battle of Boyne. The Siege
of Derry is still today invoked by unionists to remind themselves that a defiant "no
surrender" posture can bring success.2 William of Orange's victory at the Battle of the
Boyne, established Protestant dominance of Ireland. A century later, the Protestant
Wolfe Tone led the United Irishmen (nationalists) combining Catholics and Presbyterians
in a rebellion to gain independence from England.3 This too was defeated and the United
Kingdom enacted in 1801 the Act of Union which integrated the Irish Parliament into the
Parliament of Great Britain and Ireland.
At the end of the 19th Century a constitutional movement for Irish Home Rule
made some headway in gaining considerable land reform for the Irish Catholics. World
War I, however, stalled Home Rule's momentum. Unionists, mainly Protestants
descendants of the plantation system, led resistance to Home Rule. The unionists who
were particularly concentrated in the northern region of Ireland, called Ulster, feared
Catholic domination in an All-Ireland Assembly. The Ulster unionists gained support
from the Conservative Party in England as well as from sections of the British military.
By 1914 England was bitterly divided over the "Irish Question." The outbreak of World
War I, however, dramatically altered the political agenda for the British.
At Easter, 1916, a small group of republicans entered the Dublin General Post
Office and declared an Irish republic. The British easily defeated the rebellion and
captured many of the republican leaders. The subsequent execution of many of the
republican leaders shocked the Irish Catholics and sympathy shifted away from Home
Rule to the republican cause of independence. In 1918 the republican political party,
Sinn Fein, easily won the all-Ireland election. The armed wing of Sinn Fein, the Irish
Republican Army (IRA) began a war for independence against the British. The war
lasted from 1919 to 1921 with the signing of a treaty that formalized the partitioning of
Ireland into Northern Ireland (6 counties of Ulster) and the Irish Free State (the remaining
26 counties). The nationalists viewed the partition as a temporary measure and saw the
1
Paul Dixon, Northern Ireland: The Politics of War and Peace (New York: Palgrave, 2001), p. 12.
Ibid., p. 13.
3
The nationalists often cite Wolfe Tone and Charles Steward Parnell as leaders for their cause of Irish
independence. Both were Protestants. The nationalists cite these leaders to argue that their cause is one for
national unity not one for Catholicism. "Catholics see the discord in nationality terms whereas Protestants
see it in religious terms . . . ." Richard Rose, Governing Without Consensus: An Irish Perspective
(London: Faber and Faber, 1971), p. 216.
2
3
treaty as a path to reunification. Unionists viewed the partition of Ireland as the South's
decision to secede from the Union. Unionists asserted that the partition is a reflection of
the people's will and a product of a power conflict not unlike the drawing of borders in
other societies.
The division between the Protestant Northern Ireland State created by the Treaty
and what later became known (1948) as the Republic of Ireland grew. The Catholic
minority within Northern Ireland suffered discrimination in the unionist state. The
unionists deny or minimize the allegations of discrimination against Catholics or justify it
on the basis of the threat posed by the IRA in the South. The double minority complex
characterized Ireland after partition, the Catholics were the minority in Northern Ireland
and the Protestants were the minority in all of Ireland. The Protestants have
approximately a two to one majority in Northern Ireland. "Fear and suspicion of
Catholics in Northern Ireland do not correspond to these proportions," as Conor Cruise
O'Brien has pointed out, "but to the proportions between Catholics and Protestants in the
entire island of Ireland, in which Protestants are outnumbered by Catholics by more than
three to one." O'Brien further noted that Catholics not only are conscious of the
proportionality but believe they are entitled to rights this proportion suggest.4 In the
1960's Catholics began to demand for their civil rights to be respected by the unionists
regime. The denial of civil rights led to street demonstrations and then to violence. The
unionists viewed the civil rights movement as a Communist/republican inspired
campaign to re-open the border question, not an authentic reform movement. The British
Government was finally forced to intervene when the street violence got beyond the
control of the local police, the Royal Ulster Constabulary. The IRA came to the defense
of Catholic areas in Northern Ireland from attacks by the loyalists paramilitary groups,
but also seized the opportunity to try to force the British out of Ireland.
In 1972, after escalating violence, the British Government suspended the Northern
Ireland Parliament (Stormout) and introduced direct rule. The British attempted to
resolve this conflict with a proposal (the Sunningdate Agreement) for power-sharing
between the unionists and nationalists including an all-Ireland body. The unionists
vehemently and successfully defeated it and according to one observer, "the British
Government and the IRA settled down for a 'Long War'."5
In the aftermath of Sunningdale Agreement's failure, the British treated
republicans caught resisting direct rule as criminals. This led to the Hunger Strike to gain
political status for those arrested. The Hunger Strike resulted in the death of ten
republicans incarcerated by the British. One of the first hunger strikers to die was Bobby
Sands who was elected to the English Parliament at Westminster in April, 1981. Voters
were urged to vote for him to save his life. After 66 days of refusing to eat in prison,
Sands died on May 5, 1981.
4
5
Conor Cruise O'Brien, States of Ireland (London: Hutchinson, 1972), p. 11.
Dixon, op. cit., p. 5.
4
Britain and the Republic of Ireland attempted again to resolve the conflict with
the Anglo Irish Agreement (AIA) of 1985. Both governments, however, underestimated
the strength of the unionist's opposition. The unionists saw AIA as a move to unite
Ireland and the loyalists were prepared to start a civil war over it. Even moderate
unionists spoke that opposition to AIA may turn inevitably to violence. AIA and the
unionists reaction provoked by it demonstrated to everyone including the IRA the limits
of Britain's power to impose its preferred settlement on the conflicting parties.6 It
became apparent that the "unionist veto on Irish unity lay not just in the democratic
principle of consent [the majority of Northern Irish citizens would have to vote for it] but
also in the ability of unionism to make Northern Ireland ungovernable."7
The IRA continued its armed struggle for a united Ireland but also entered into
secret talks with the British from 1990 to 1993. In 1994 the IRA announced a ceasefire
and attempted to gain the acceptance of Sinn Fein, its political arm, into the all-party
negotiations with the unionists. The British insisted on some decommissioning of IRA
weapons as a condition for Sinn Fein's acceptance. The IRA refused. In February, 1996,
the IRA ended its ceasefire. A year and a half later, the IRA renewed its ceasefire
following the election of a British Labour Government and entered into negotiations with
the unionists. These negotiations led to the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement in 1998.
This treaty laid the basis and framework for the peace Northern Ireland enjoys today. 8
The Good Friday Agreement (GFA) is a classic case of allowing contentious
parties to agree to disagree and building agreement on ambiguity. The
nationalists/republicans have claimed that the treaty provides a workable path to a united
Ireland. The unionists/loyalists contend that the IRA have been effectively defeated and
that the treaty reassures Northern Ireland's union with Great Britain. The treaty does not
change the ultimate goals of the unionists/loyalists nor that of the
nationalists/republicans. It does, however, transform the tactics both sides employ to
pursue these goals. The GFA and the peace that followed it represents, in the eyes of one
observer, "a triumph for politics over the use of violence."9
6
Ibid., p. 214. The British Government held fast to its bargain with the Republic of Ireland despite the
unionists backlash. The British Conservative Prime Ministers Major and Thatcher viewed AIA as a failure
due to the unionists disenchantment.
7
Ibid.
8
According to Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, et. al., "The Expected Prospects for Peace in Northern Ireland,"
International Interactions, Vol. 27, No. 2 (2001) p. 165. Catholics refer to the 1998 peace accords as the
Good Friday Agreement and Protestants refer to them as the Belfast Agreement. The legal title is "The
Agreement: Agreements Reached in the Multi-Party Negotiations." The Good Friday Agreement is the
reference most frequently used in the United States and will be adopted here in this paper without
prejudice.
9
Paul Dixon, "In Defense of Politics: Interpreting the Peace Process and the Future of Northern Ireland,"
The Political Quarterly, Vol. 83, No. 2 (April-June 2012), p. 265.
5
What Does Political Science Offer?
In a reflective essay, Sidney Verba in 2005, a past president of the American
Political Science Association, commented that political science is open to various
approaches, methods and theories in regard to the question, "Where are we now that we
weren't several decades ago?".10 Political Science draws on such fields as economics,
psychology, sociology, history, culture studies, statistics and many more. When Verba
started his political science career in the 1960's, in the developing world the role of
ethnicity and religion as the source of identity conflict had just been uncovered. At the
time these bases for political identity were believed to be "primordial," i.e, received at
birth and extremely difficult to change, if not impossible. In contrast to this static view of
political identity was the theory of modernization. Modernization driven by technology
and economics would spread education, rationality and diminish ideology, traditional
religion and the bonds of ethnicity.
Fifty years later, Verba notes that "religious and ethnic cleavages dominates
politics across the world".11 He believes that political science today is more capable
now of understanding these phenomena than it was then. Verba attributes this enhanced
capacity to the aggregation of work performed in different disciplines. Verba specifically
credits rational choice theory (economics) as contributing to a better understanding of
political identity:
The seminal addition of rational calculation to understanding of identity in
the guise of straightforward self-interested motive for adhering to one or
another identity, for the social calculation associated with cementing
relations with others, or the strategic calculation of elite building support,
has given sharpness to a sometimes fuzzy subject.12
Verba notes, however, that identity and the role it plays in conflict is not fully explained
by rational choice theory. He concludes that socialization (sociology), the content of
belief systems (culture studies) institutional development (history), the roles of elites
(political science) are needed to provide a fuller understanding. While he does not
address the addition of prospect theory (behavioral psychology) and its debate with
rational choice calculation explicitly, he most certainly would find it consistent to his
overall conclusion. Verba concludes that political scientists do not have an agreed upon
formula for predicting or analyzing ethnic and/or religious identity and the conflicts it
stimulates, but we do have a "toolbox filled with ways of coming to grips with such
phenomena."13
10
Jennifer L. Hochschild, et. al., "APSA Presidents Reflect on Political Science: Who Knows What,
When, and How?" Perspective or Politics, Vol. 3, No. 2 (June, 2005) p. 324.
11
Ibid.
12
Ibid.
13
Ibid., p. 325.
6
Coming Together or Staying Apart
The debate of coming together or staying apart lies at the heart of many social
science theories dealing with identity conflict. The debate often exaggerates the
differences between and among theorists. In the aftermath of the end of the Cold War,
two well known political scientists attempted to address the question of coming together
or staying apart in terms of the new world order. Frances Fukuyama, in his frequently
quoted book, The End of History and the Last Man, argued that modernization,
technology and economics will ultimately bring us all together.14 Fukuyama speculated
that there is a linear path into the future with an end point in history for all humanity.
Similar to Karl Marx who argued that economic forces will ultimately lead all societies to
communism, Fukuyama believes historical forces will lead all of us to liberal democratic
capitalism. Liberal democratic capitalism will be based on the adoption of a universal set
of values of individualism, rationalism and materialism. In Fukuyama's view these
values are in and of themselves meritorious, objective and superior to all other competing
values. Like Marx, Fukuyama is taking the long view of history and is not predicting this
universal civilization and new identity in the foreseeable future.
Samuel Huntington in his Clash of Civilization theorized that the end of
ideological conflict with the collapse of the Soviet Union would unleash a multitude of
ethnic and religious conflict that had for decades been suppressed.15 These conflicts were
essentially identity conflicts driven by cultural differences. The cultural differences
(primarily associated with religion) would result in a violent world especially if policymakers ignored their significance and pursued interventionist policy. His overall
conclusion is that the world would be better off if cultural groups (regional civilizations)
stayed apart rather than interfering with one another.
Coming together or staying apart underlies many social scientific approaches to
conflict resolution and conflict management. Even the definition of conflict resolution
implies that all conflicts are resolvable and therefore with the right focus, energy, time
and resources it is possible to eliminate conflict. On the other hand conflict management
implies that not all conflicts are resolvable and therefore keeping people apart in these
situations is better than forcing them to interact because interaction may lead to violence.
It is difficult to discuss these approaches without addressing one's own bias. Most social
scientists like myself favor coming together. There is clearly this normative view in most
of our concepts of democracy, conflict resolution, and peacemaking. Regardless of this
bias there are those who do not share the coming together belief. They nonetheless
embrace the consensus of limiting, avoiding and/or managing violence destructive
capabilities. Building on this fundamental consensus, the question then is how do we as
social scientists contribute to managing violence.
In the latter half of the 20th Century, largely due to the work of Gordon Allport,
The Nature of Prejudice (1954), many social psychologists asserted that there was a way
14
Frances Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992).
Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilization and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon and
Schuster, 1996).
15
7
to address intractable conflicts between/among groups. This approach became known as
the contact hypothesis. It claims that inter-group contact would reduce inter-group
antipathy. The advocates of the contact hypothesis/theory believe that people interacting
with one another from different groups would through interaction discover similarities
they shared and that this discovery would mitigate the hostility they have over their
differences. Allport noted that certain conditions for hostility reduction were important.
He stated that "prejudice (unless deeply rooted in the character of the individual) may be
reduced by equal status contact between majority and minority groups in the pursuit of
common goals."16 Contact would improve inter-group relations because it would either
reveal interpersonal similarities or create them through the process of assimilation.
The "staying apart" challenge to contact theory is from the work of researchers
who advocate the social identity theory. According to this theory individuals have a
psychological need to belong to a group and the need "to differentiate their group
positively from others to achieve a positive social identity."17 These identities help you
define yourself to you and to others as well as define others for you. Social identity
theory focuses attention on the importance of establishing inter-group differences and the
search for distinctiveness of the in-group. In contrast to contact theory that claims a
positive result from discovery of similarities when group interact social identity theory
suggests that the discovery of similarity threatens the need for distinctiveness and will
have a repulsive effect on relations of groups.
The coming together and staying apart assumption is also a distinguishing factor
in the civil society and consociationalist approach to conflict. The civil society approach
focuses on the mid-level and grassroots of societal conflict. It attempts to build bridges
of understanding, open pipelines of communication and foster cooperation and
collaboration of antagonistic groups in society. Civil society approach also referred to as
transformational conflict resolution and peace building is premised on the contact theory
"that person-to-person contact in structural settings creates the possibility of reducing
tensions in inter-communal relationships as well as engendering solutions to structural
problems that can meet the basic needs of both communities."18
The staying apart challenge to the civil society approach is the consociationalist
approach. Consociationalists prefer a top down approach and the separation of groups as
a means to manage conflict. Arend Lijphart characterizes consociationalism by five
features: government by grand coalition, the mutual veto for ethno-national groups;
proportional representation as an electoral system; civil service based on merit with an
equitable allocation of public resources; and each segment of society running their own
affairs with a high degree of autonomy.19 He asserts that rival groups may "coexist
peacefully if there is little contact between them and consequently few occasions for
16
Gordon Allport, The Nature of Prejudice (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1954) p. 281.
J. C. Turner, et. al., Rediscovering the Social Group (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987), p. 42.
18
Landon E. Hancock, "The Northern Irish Peace Process: From Top to Bottom," International Studies
Review, Vol. 10, No. 2 (June, 2008), p. 217.
19
Arend Lyphart, Democracy in Plural Society (New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 1977), p. 25.
17
8
conflict."20 The consociationalists hope that the separation and distinctiveness of groups
will promote internal cohesion which will in turn permit a group leader to strike bargains
with leaders from rival groups. Lijphart views such latitude as "vital in consociational
politics, because the elites have to be able to co-operate and compromise with each other
without losing the support of their own rank and file."21 Pessimistic about Northern
Ireland chances of creating a consociational democracy, Lijphart concludes that partition,
i.e. the creating of two homogenous societies of Northern Ireland may be the only
workable solution. Writing in 1975 he felt that further partition of Ireland even with the
resettling of Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland should be seriously
considered.22
Coming together and staying apart is also addressed by rational choice theory and
prospect theory. These theories claim no predisposed bias toward coming together or
staying apart per se. The basis assumption, however, is competition based on selfinterest and as such has an inherent conservative bias. The coming together according to
these theorists will occur when the payoff of one outcome "coming together" is greater
than the other staying apart. Game theorists, a version of rational choice theory, predicts
the coming together is based on expected utility. Similar to consociationalist theory in
the respect of viewing conflict resolution from a top down perspective, some theorists
employ what they refer to as the theory of moves, a dynamic version of game theory, to
show how political decision-makers may find their way to peace. Steve Brams and
Jeffrey M. Togman apply this theory to the Northern Ireland peace process and explain
how Sinn Fein used threats of violence to achieve its best interest through a peaceful
settlement..23
Prospect theory adds a psychological dimension to game theory. It asserts that
decision-making occurs in two stages: framing and choice. In the framing stage the
decision-maker selectively edits information as the basis for choice. The form, method
and order in which this information is received, effects perception of options available to
choose. Game theory assumes the information is self-evident and psychological
perception has little or no role in framing the options. The second stage is evaluation.
Prospect theory claims on the basis of experimental evidence demonstrated in
laboratories that evaluation is shaped by the value function and the weighing function.
The perception of values vary whether you are in the gains versus the domain of losses.
Outcomes that are viewed as gains are valued less than outcomes viewed in the loss
domain. Game theory judges outcomes in absolute terms making no difference between
values that are gains versus values that are losses.
The relative value of gains versus losses in prospect theory makes decisionmakers risk averse in the former and risk seeking in the later. In other words if things are
20
Arend Lijphart, "The Northern Ireland Problem: Cases, Theories and Solutions," The British Journal of
Political Science, Vol. 5, No. 1 (January, 1975), p. 101.
21
Ibid.
22
Ibid., pp. 105-106.
23
Steven J. Brams and Jeffrey M. Togman, "Cooperation Through Threats: The Northern Ireland Case,"
PS: Political Science and Politics, Vol. 31, No. 1 (March, 1998), p. 33.
9
going well, decision makers are cautious in taking chances even when high probability of
success exists. However, if things are going poorly, decision makers are more inclined to
take chances even when low probability of success exists. For example, Kahneman
illustrates this theory with the choice between accepting $800 with certainty or taking an
85% chance of winning $1,000. Most people will choose the certain $800. However, if
you had to choose the certain loss of $800 versus an 85% chance of losing $1,000, most
people would take the option where they have a 15% chance of losing nothing. The
weighting function pertains to assigning probabilities. In contrast to game theory low
probability events are given more weight in prospect theory while moderate and high
probability events are given less weight. These probability assessments effect choice in
decision-making significantly different than those choices predicted by game theory. The
authors of prospect theory, Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, are behavioral
psychologists who derive this theory based on how individuals decide.24 Political
scientists have explored the value of this theory to group decision-making and in one
case applied it to the implementation decisions regarding the Good Friday Agreement
(GFA).25
The Good Friday Agreement (1998)
The focal point of most discussions regarding the peace process in Northern
Ireland is the Good Friday Agreement (GFA) signed on April 10, 1998. The Agreement
is the tipping point in a long peace process that began with the partition of Ireland in
1920. The 1920 partition was an unhappy compromise and widely viewed as a
temporary measure until Ireland could be re-united. The GFA's significance is not in its
finality regarding unification but in it bringing the violent chapter to an apparent end.
Conflict still exists in Northern Ireland and one might refer to it as a very fragile peace
but there is little or no legitimacy for any use of political violence to address the issues of
the communal divide.
The GFA dealt with eleven sections of the communal divide. The first section of
the Agreement is the Declaration of Support setting out basic principles and committing
all signatories to the Agreement as a whole not just certain provisions. The second
section deals with constitutional issues of self-determination, majority consent and the
Republic of Ireland's claim to Northern Ireland. The Republic of Ireland agreed to hold a
referendum on changing its constitution to recognize the principle of the majority consent
of Northern Ireland before unification could take place. The next three sections of the
agreement are referred to as Strands 1, 2, and 3. Strand 1 created a 108 member
assembly, elected by proportional representation to govern over the former Northern
Ireland departments. The Assembly is structured by checks and balances to prevent
24
Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, "Choices, Values, and Frames,: an address at the American
Psychological Association Meeting, August 1983, reprinted as Appendix B in Daniel Kahneman, Thinking,
Fast and Slow (New York: Farror, Strauss and Girous, 2011), pp. 433-448.
25
Bueno de Mesquita, et.al., pp. 129-167. These authors concluded game theory has greater predictive
power than prospect theory in assessing the resiliency of the GFA.
10
majority dictatorship. For example, members of the Legislative Assembly (MLA's) have
to indicate which side of the communal divide they are from or indicate they are not from
either the nationalists or the unionists for the purpose of cross-community voting. Key
decision triggers special voting procedures: parallel consent or weighted majority.
Parallel consent requires the majority of both the unionists and nationalists for legislation
to pass. Weighted majority requires 60 percent of MLA's including 40% of both
nationalists and unionists. The executive is a shared body with the MLA's representing
the majority community deciding the First Minister and MLA's representing the minority
community the Deputy First Ministers. Despite their titles they are co-equal in power.
The rest of the executive committee are appointed on a rotational basis by party electoral
strength.
The Strand 2 establishes a North/South ministerial council to deal with transport,
agriculture, education, health, environment and tourism. Strand 3 establishes an
East/West (British/Irish) Council to promote bilateral cooperation. The treaty also
creates a Human Rights Commission charged with developing a bill of rights for
Northern Ireland. The next four sections and the ones most problematic regarding
implementations are: decommissioning of weapons, a reduction of British troops in
Northern Ireland, reform of the criminal justice system, and the release of political
prisoners. The last four, especially the decommissioning of weapons by the IRA,
threatened to unravel the treaty and took much more time to accomplish than originally
envisioned.26 The final section established the necessary approval steps legislatively to
install the necessary institutions to implement the treaty.
Actors
There are a multitude of participants in the GFA peace negotiations. For the
purpose of simplicity and clarity we will focus on seven main players: Blair, the British
Prime Minister; Ahern, Blair's Republic of Ireland counterpart; Trimble, the Ulster
Unionist Party UUP leader; Hume, Trimble's nationalist leader's counterpart (both
received the Nobel Prize in 1998 for Peace); Paisley, the Democratic Unionists Party
(DUP), leader and Trimble's competitor to represent the unionist position; and Adams,
the leader of Sinn Fein, Hume's competitor to represent the Nationalist position. Senator
George Mitchell, President Clinton's special envoy, played a meaningful role as a
mediator and skillfully brought the parties together by getting the actors to agree to a
process, principles and a deadline.
Situational factors and power positions strongly influenced each of the actors.
The GFA Treaty took a number of years to be fully implemented. One of the last
stumbling blocks was the IRA decommissioning of arms and the verification that the
26
The letter of the Agreement did not insist on IRA decommissioning before Sinn Fein, its political arm,
could participate in the new executive, but Tony Blair, the British Prime Minister, gave the impression to
the unionists that this was the spirit of the Agreement. Dixon, Northern Ireland, op. cit., p. 273.
11
weapons could not be called back in use.27 The interpretation of the peace process is still
very controversial. It is controversial not only for the future peace of Northern Ireland
but the lessons that it offers globally for dealing with terrorism and insurgency.
Paul Dixon in an insightful article in a recent issue of The Political Quarterly
entitled "In Defense of Politics: Interpreting the Peace Process and the Future of Ireland"
categorized three broad schools of thought regarding the treaty: the Enthusiasts, the
Militarists and the Sceptics (sic).28 The Enthusiasts are those mostly from the British and
Irish governments, Adam's Sinn Fein and Paisely's Democratic Unionist Party. A lesson
learned from this perspective is that governments should talk to terrorists and that peace
negotiations should be inclusive of all major actors. The second school according to
Dixon is the Militarists. This perspective is held by disaffected republicans and neoconservative elements of unionists. The dissident republicans view the GFA agreement
especially the decommissioning of arms as a sell out and a defeat for a united Ireland.
The neo-conservative unionists see the IRA decommissioning of arms as a defeat of the
IRA not due to the GFA but due in large part to the repressive measures used by the
unionist government and the British military combating the IRA. The lesson learned
from this perspective is that terrorists should only be talked to once they have
surrendered.
The Sceptics are generally supportive of the negotiated process and the
pragmatism actors demonstrated. They are critical of Militarists who threaten to bring
Northern Ireland back down the path of violence and the Enthusiasts especially the
British and Irish governments for not ensuring a better balance of concessions to keep the
moderate forces in power after the GFA. The two moderate center parties of Trimble and
Hume went into electoral decline after adopting the GFA. Dixon points out that the
"triumph of the hardliners" Adam's Sinn Fein and Paisely's DUP is preferable to the
unraveling of the GFA and the return to violence, but it is costly. Having the more
extreme parties in power is more likely to harden segregation and ignore economic
inequality.
Some, however, believe that power sharing between the two most extreme parties
may have the benefit of stabilizing the GFA because these parties are less likely to be
outflanked by republicans and loyalist rejectionists. The Enthusiasts believe that
bringing in the extreme parties leave no place for the rejectionists to go. They interpret
the growing electoral support for the extreme parties, SF and DUP as a way for voters to
protect their sectarian interest not a rejection of GFA. The Enthusiasts claim that the
peace has won and the conflict's violent stage is over.
27
One of the most important provisions in the GFA was the decommissioning of the IRA weapons. In a
statement issued September 26, 2005, the IRA leadership announced that decommissioning had taken place
and confirmed that "the process of putting our arms verifiably beyond use has been completed." See
Footnote 1, Feargel Cochrane, "Irish-America, the End of the IRA's Armed Struggle and the Utility of Soft
Power." The Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 44, No. 2 (March, 2007), p. 215.
28
Paul Dixon, "In Defense of Politics: Interpreting the Peace Process and the Future of Northern Ireland,"
The Political Quarterly, Vol. 83, No. 2 (April-June, 2012), pp. 265-276.
12
Sceptics view the GFA as an elite driven compromise that had little to do with a
shift in attitudes among the mass. The Sceptics are critical of the British Government and
others for misleading the public regarding decommissioning before the release of
political prisoners and Sinn Fein's taking its seat in the new government. The Sceptics
argue that while Sinn Fein had a difficult balancing act between the moderate leadership
and its hard line followers, that the British Government should have pushed Adams for
greater concessions. Failure to get meaningful concessions from the Sceptics' perspective
led to the electoral decline of the moderates. Electoral victories for the moderate parties
of the UUP and SDLP, Sceptics believe would result in the reduction of segregation and
social polarization. Sceptics see the ideological differences between the Calvinistic
Democratic Union Party with its social conservatism and the socialism of Sinn Fein as
inhibiting effective legislation and making for a dysfunctional government. Sceptics fear
that the elite-negotiated structure of government does not have real support of the people
of Northern Ireland.
Some Enthusiastic academics accept structural separation of the unionists and
nationalists as necessary for peace. They claim that good fences make for good
neighbors. From their perspective sectarian separation will reduce contact and the
probability of sectarian violence. The GFA clearly maintains this division in the structure
of government where it requires elected numbers of the Legislative Assembly to declare
which category they belong: unionists, nationalists or other. The GFA, nevertheless,
stated explicitly integration as a goal for society especially in the area of education and
housing. Public opinion data according to Dixon supports this goal and he believes that
"growing budgetary constraints may exert pressure to reduce the huge cost of providing
segregated services."29
Lessons Learned from Northern Ireland
Intractable conflict like the communal divide in Northern Ireland is not likely to
create consensus on lessons learned. There is a basic consensus, however, that effective
political violence, primarily produced by the republican and loyalists paramilitaries is
over. In October 2011 The Political Quarterly decided to host a symposium to address
the theme "Northern Ireland: Fragile Peace in the Age of Austerity." More than 20
experts on Northern Ireland attended. While the discussion was lively and contentious
"there was a common thread in the discussion . . . [that] a return to war is extremely
unlikely . . ."30 One participant, Henry Patterson, declared that "for the first time since
1968 unionists are not faced with . . . the coercive presence of an IRA campaign or the
threat of one . . . ."31 He concluded that the Union appears more secure than at any time
29
Ibid., p. 275.
Eric Kaufman, "The Northern Ireland Peace Process in an Age of Austerity," The Political Quarterly,
Vol. 83, No. 2 (April-June 2012), p. 203.
31
Henry Patterson, "Unionism After Good Friday and St. Andrews," The Political Quarterly, Vol. 83, No. 2
(April-June, 2012), p. 254.
30
13
since the 1950's. This lesson that peace is possible even in the most intractable conflict
should not be understated.
Patterson feared that the new Unionism that experienced a burst of energy and
creativity in the 1990's had largely dissipated. He also noted that Unionism in the media
is weaker than ever before and was alarmed at the diminishing numbers of Protestants
completing their education in local universities. In 2009, 36% of Protestant new entrants
to the university completed their education compared to 58% of Catholics. The demise
of moderate new Unionism that advocated integration with British modernity and high
culture could work against integrating the two communities in Northern Ireland.32 The
advocates of moderate Unionism are further alarmed by the recent DUP approval of a
new tier fee structure for higher education making it more expensive for students from
outside Northern Ireland and in particular students from Britain to attend. Moderate
unionists believe that the legislation will discourage British students from attending
universities in Northern Ireland and further weaken the capacity of unionists to maintain
British cultural connections.33 Despite various reservations regarding the GFA, the 2011
symposium participants had faith in Northern Ireland's commitment to non-violence.
The conflict in Northern Ireland has been one of the longest-running processes
both in time to reach an agreement and in time to implement it. Most of the preceding
analysis look at the conflict from the top down approach. There is some disagreement
over to what extent the grass roots and middle out approach to peace building contributes
to the GFA. The civil society approach began in the 1970's with a large number of
conflict resolution activities. They included off record discussions with various parties,
community reconciliation activities, youth programs, athletics, environmental
conservation cooperation, and interfaith activities. Most of these activities were
conducted by local non-governmental organizations (NGO's).
The British Government also provided large sums of monies for improved
community relations in direct services as well as independent groups pursuing
community reconciliation. One such group was the Community Relations Commission
which operated from 1969 through 1974. It provided funding, training, and direction to
community-based groups working primarily with the nationalists community. The
Commission gave way to a growing number of informal initiatives. Some of the British
Government financed initiatives were the Cultural Tradition Group, the Northern
Voluntary Trust, the Conflict Mediation Network and the establishing within the
Northern Ireland Office the Central Community Relations Unit (CCRU) in 1987. In 1990
the British Government set up an independent agency, the Community Relations Council
(CRC) to serve as a focal point providing counsel, training and coordinating services for
the expanding community relations sectors. An independent board of trustees appointed
by community nominations and only 25 percent directly appointed by the government
was designed to meet the community as opposed to the government bureaucratic needs.
32
33
Ibid.
Ibid., p. 253.
14
Mari Fitzduff, the first director of CRC, argues that one of the major contributions
the CRC has made to Northern Ireland's reconciliation is "engendering an environment
that made the public supportive of the GFA."34 She contrasts the public reception to the
1973 Sunningdale Agreement's lack of public support and ultimate failure due to the
absence of such an environment. Academics have been divided on the general level of
effectiveness of the civil society approach in Northern Ireland. Some academics demand
proof positive to accept that the civil society approach works. The fact that after 30 years
of the civil society approach, conflict intervention continues to be a multiplicity of styles
and methods trouble these academics The standard that there is one method to be found
and that could be replicated anywhere may be an unrealistic standard. Also unrealistic is
the argument that the British Government's funding of community relations initiatives
were largely designed to bring Northern Ireland up to the standard shared by other
regions of the United Kingdom and not designed "to make the region more receptive to
peace."35 Improvement in housing, fair employment and education were at the heart of
the civil rights movements or "the Troubles." Addressing these demands in the 1970's,
1980's and 1990's certainly changed the prospect for the GFA's acceptance at the
grassroots level.
It is true that with all of civil society activities designed to improve the bicommunal relations and acceptance of peace, only a small proportion of the total
population has been directly reached. This inability of grassroots peace building to affect
directly the overwhelming numbers of disputants is the reason why some academics,
according to Landon E. Hancock, focus on what has been called "pre-influential". Preinfluential are those distanced enough from the center of power to interact with their
opposites across communal divide and are able to communicate the parameters of
disputants' willingness to make peace to those in the elite.36 Some social scientists are
skeptical of these claims of linking peace building at the mass, middle-out and elite levels
and are only willing to concede that the "resilience of the Good Friday Agreement is
merely the result of fortuitous circumstances created by complimentary, but unconnected
elements."37
Conclusion
The top down (elite decision makers) approach obviously provides us with a clear
concise model of how separation, staying apart, may be functional to the peacekeeping.
Those theorists such as Huntington, Class of Civilizations, Arend Lijphart, and the
proponents of consociationalist, the social psychologists who advance the Social Identity
Theory, as well as the game theorists can help us understand the circumstances that
staying apart is rational and predictable.. The staying apart theorists rarely argue that it is
an end in and of itself but a means to reduce violence. Huntington would argue that his
theory addresses the clash of cultural identities not the clashes within cultures even if the
34
Hancock, op. cit., p. 221.
Ibid., p. 228.
36
Ibid., p. 230. In Footnote 1, Hancock cites the body of work of Herbert Kelman.
37
Ibid., p. 231.
35
15
conflict is a clash of identity. He, nevertheless, would be skeptical of modernization as
the solution to identity conflict.
Fukuyama, on the other hand, is likely to argue that the clash of civilizations as
well as identity can be ultimately resolved with the attraction of all people to the
universal objective set of values such as materialism, rationalism and individualism
manifested by liberal democratic capitalism. The material and civil rights improvements
produced by the British government's efforts to address the economic, social and political
discrimination of the nationalists community lend some support to the Fukuyama's thesis.
The proponents of consociationalism such as Arend Lijphart defends their position of
separation as what is functional to achieving peace. Partitioning and separation of the
nationalists and unionists may be necessary because "if partition does not come by
design, it is not at all unlikely that it will happen in an unplanned way at the cost of much
greater human suffering and material cost."38
In fairness to Lijphart this observation was made in tumultuous times of the
1970's in Northern Ireland. The consociationalists would point to the compromise
reached between the Democratic Unionist Party (Paisely) and Sinn Fein (Adams) to cogovern in 2007 as evidence to show how decision-makers (elite) can resolve issues of
conflict that if left to the nationalists and unionists community rank and file might
produce violence. Paisely's about face after helping to brand Trimble of the Ulster
Unionist Party as a traitor for accepting SF in the government without verifiable
decommissioning illustrates that coming together in society may only come at the top if
all. The separation of communal groups that consociationalism institutionalizes in the
Assembly by forcing MLA's to register formally as a nationalist, unionist or other may
reflect the division in society rather than create it. Polling data seems to suggest that the
sectarian divide has not changed at the mass level. The recent electoral success of the
extreme nationalist and unionist parties is often cited as evidence supporting
consociationalism (staying apart).
The civil society approach would point to the evidence of the success of the GFA
compared to the Sunningdale Agreement in 1973 to challenge the consociationists'
interpretation. The essence of both agreements embraced power sharing for parties
representing both communities. The strong unionists reaction and the general strikes of
labor unions killed the agreement and continued direct British rule for another 25 years.
The acceptance of the GFA in 1998 and the peace for years afterwards, the civil society
proponents would argue, is a result of the peace building at the grass roots and middle-out
levels that followed Sunnydale's defeat.
The rational choice theorists predicted the coming together of Northern Ireland in
peace as a direct result of the interests of the elite decision-makers. These theorists may
help us to understand how the British Government and Sinn Fein finally agreed to adopt
of conciliatory approach to one another when both realize that military victory of one
over the other was not probable. The theory may also help us to understand that the
payoff of accepting the GFA was in the self-interest of most parties to the conflict. This
38
Lijphart, op. cit., p. 106.
16
theory, however, given the electoral decline of Trimble's Ulster Unionist Party (unionists)
and Hume's Social Democratic Labor Party (nationalists) does not explain how the GFA
was in their best interests. One may need to go beyond rational choice theory to
understand why leaders do what they think is right even if it means their parties' electoral
decline. Prospect theory predicted the staying apart was due to Sinn Fein's behavior over
decommissioning.
In a 2010 article by Eamonn O'Kane entitled "Learning from Northern Ireland?
The Uses and Abuses of the Irish Model," the author believes that more work and
justification are necessary for anyone to accurately claim that there is an exportable Irish
model for resolving intractable communal conflict elsewhere. He is unconvinced that
one can really understand the Northern Ireland case without contextualizing the five
lessons frequently cited in association with it. The lessons that the Northern Ireland case
appears to suggest are: include of all relevant (even violent) parties without
preconditions; identify and support/promote the moderates in all of the parties; accept the
support of third parties; build bi-partisan support for within governmental parties for
peace negotiations; and prepare for intense and prolonged negotiations. The author
concludes that "if we are examining the Northern Irish case as 'inspirational' for other
conflicts then that is not contentious; if we are suggesting it may be 'directional' then
more justification is needed."39
39
Eamonn O'Kane, "Learning From Northern Ireland? The Uses and Abuses of the Irish Model," The
British Journal of Politics and International Relations. Volume 12 (2010) p. 256.
17
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Allport, Gordon. The Nature of Prejudice. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1954.
Berinsky, Adam, et. al. "A Review of Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology by
David O. Sears, Leonie Huddy and Robert Jervis" Political Psychology, Volume
25, November 6 (December, 2004) pp. 969-983.
Boettcher, William A. III. "The Prospect for Prospect Theory: An Empirical Evaluation
of International Relations" Political Psychology, Volume 25, Number 3 (June,
2004) pp. 331-362.
Brams, Steven J. and Jeffrey M. Togman. "Cooperation Through Threats: The Northern
Ireland Case" PS: Political Science and Politics, Volume 31, Number 1 (March,
1998), pp. 32-39.
Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, Rose McDermott and Emily Cope. "The Expected Prospects
for Peace in Northern Ireland." International Interactions. Volume 27, Number 2
(2001) pp. 129-167.
Bulter, Christopher. "Prospect Theory and Coercivde Bargaining." The Journal of
Conflict Resolution, Volume 51, Number 2 (April, 2007) pp. 227-250.
Byrne, Sean. "Consociational and Civil Society Approaches to Peace Building In
Northern Ireland" Journal of Peace Research, Volume 38, Number 3 (May, 2001),
pp. 327-352.
________ "Israel, Northern Ireland, and South Africa At A Crossroads: Understanding
Intergroup Conflict, Peacebuilding, and Conflict Resolution." International
Journal of Group Tensions, Volume 28, Numbers 3/4 (1999) pp. 23l-253.
Cochrane, Feargal. "Beyond the Political Elites: A Comparative Analysis of the Roles
and Impacts of Community-Based NGOs in Conflict Resolution Activity," Civil
War. Volume 3, Number 2 (2000), pp. 1-22.
Coenders, Marcel and Peer Scheepers. "The Effects of Education on Nationalism and
Ethnic Exclusionism: An International Comparison." Political Psychology.
Volume 24, Number 2 (June 2003) pp. 313-343.
Curran, Daniel and James K. Sebenuis. "The Mediator as Coalition Builder: George
Mitchell in Northern Ireland." International Negotiations. Volume 8, Number 1
(January, 2003) pp. 111-147.
Delantz, Gerard. "Negotiating the Peace In Northern Ireland" Journal of Peace Research,
Volume 32, Number 3 (August, 1995) pp. 257-264.
18
Dixon, Paul "Performing Northern Ireland Peace Process on the World Stage." Political
Science Quarterly,Volume 121, Number 1 (Spring, 2006) pp. 61-91.
________ "In Defense of Politics: Interpreting the Peace Process and the Future of
Northern Ireland" The Political Quarterly. Volume 83, Number 2 (April-June,
2012) pp 265-2776.
________ "The Politics of Conflict: A Constructivist Critique of Consociational and
Civil Society Theories" Nations and Nationalism, Volume 18, Issue 1 (January,
2012) pp 98-121, 124.
________ "Is Consociational Theory the Answer to Global Conflict? From the
Netherlands to Northern Ireland and Iraq." Political Studies Review Volume 9,
Number 3, (September, 2011), pp. 309-322.
________ "Consociationalism and Northern Ireland Peace Process: The Glass Half Full
or Half Empty." Nationalism and Ethnic Politics Volume 3, Number 3 (Autumn,
1997), pp. 20-36.
________ "Paths to Peace In Northern Ireland (1): Civil Society and Consociational
Approaches" Democratization, Volume 4, Number 2 (Summer, 1997) pp. 1-27.
________ "Path to Peace IN Northern Ireland (II): The Peace Processes 1973-74 and
1994-96". Democratization, Volume 4. Number 3 (Autumn, 1997), pp. 1-25.
________ Northern Ireland: The Politics of War and Peace, 2nd ed. New York:
Palgrave, 2008.
________ "Political Skills or Lying and Manipulation? The Choreography of Northern
Ireland Peace Process." Political Studies. Volume 50, Number 3 (2002) pp. 725741.
________ "Gun First, Talk Later: Neoconservatives and Northern Ireland Peace
Process." Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History. Volume 39, Number
4 (2011) pp. 649-676.
Dowd, Lizanne, Ian McAllister, and Bernadette C. Hayes. "Integrated Education,
Intergroup Relations, and Political Identities in Northern Ireland." Social
Problems, Volume 54, Issue 4 (2007) pp. 454-482.
Fisher, Roger and William Ury. Getting to Yes. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1981.
Fukuyama, Frances. The End of History and the Last Man. New York: Free Press 1992.
19
Ganiel, Gladys and Paul Dixon "Religion, Pragmatic Fundamentalism and the
Transformation of the Northern Ireland Conflict." Journal of Peace Research.
Volume 45, Number 3 (May, 2008), pp. 419-436.
Guelke, Adrian "Civil Society and the Northern Irish Peace Process." Voluntas. Volume
141, Number 1(March, 2003) pp. 61-78.
Hancock, Landon E. "The Northern Irish Peace Process: From Top to Bottom."
International Studies Review Volume 10 Number 2 (June, 2008) pp. 203-237.
Hochschild, Jennifer, et. al. "APSA Presidents Reflect on Political Science: Who Knows
What, When and How?" Perspective on Politics. Volume 3, Number 2 (June,
2005) pp. 309-334.
Hopr, Ted. "The Promise of Constructivism In International Relations Theory."
International Security Volume 23, Number 1 (Summer, 1998) pp. 171-200.
Huntington, Samuel P. The Clash of Civilization and the Remaking of World Order.
New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996.
Kahneman, Daniel. Thinking Fast and Slow. New York: Farrar, Strauss and Girous,
2011.
Kaufman, Eric "The Northern Ireland Peace Process In An Age of Austerity." The
Political Quarterly Volume 83 Number 2 (April-June, 2012), pp. 203-209.
Lyphart, Arend. "Review Article: The Northern Ireland Problem: Cases, Theories, and
Solutions" British Journal of Political Science. Volume 5, Number 1 (January,
1975), pp 83-106.
McAllister, Ian and Richard Rose "Can Political Conflict Be Resolved By Social
Change?" The Journal of Conflict Resolution. Volume 27, Number 3 (September,
1983) pp. 533-557.
McGarry, John and Brendan O'Leary. "Consociational Theory, Northern Ireland's
Conflict, and its Agreement: Part 1, What Consociationalists Can Learn From
Northern Ireland." Government and Opposition, Volume 41, Number 1 (2006)
pp. 43-63.
________ "Consociational Theory, Northern Ireland's Conflict, and its Agreement, What
Consociationalists Can Learn From Northern Ireland." Government and
Opposition, Volume 41, Number 2 (2006) pp. 269-277.
Mitchell, George J. Making Peace. New York: Knopf, 1999.
O'Brien, Connor Cruise. States of Ireland. London: Hutchinson, 1972.
20
O'Kane, Eamonn. "Learning From Northern Ireland: The Uses and Abuses of the Irish
'Model'." British Journal of Politics and International Relations, Volume 12
Number 2 (May, 2010 pp. 239-256.
Patterson, Henry "Unionism After Good Friday and St. Andrews" Political Quarterly.
Volume 83 Number 2 (April-June, 2012), pp. 247-255.
Pruitt, Dean G. "Readiness Theory and the Northern Ireland Conflict." American
Behavioral Scientists, Volume 50, Number 11 (2006) pp. 152-154.
Rose, Richard. Governing Without Consensus: An Irish Perspective. London: Faber
and Faber, 1971.
Ross, Marc Howard. "Creating the Conditions for Peacemaking: Theories of Practice in
Ethnic Conflict Resolution." Ethnic and Racial Studies Volume 2 Number 6
(November, 200) pp. 1002-1034.
Schmid, Katharina, et. al. "The Effects of Living in Segregated vs. Mixed Areas in
Northern Ireland: A Simultaneous Analysis of Contact and Threat Effects in the
Context of Micro-Level Neighbourhoods." International Journal of Conflict and
Violence, Volume 2, Number 1 (2008) pp. 56-71.
Taylor, Rupert. "The Belfast Agreement and the Politics of Consociationalism: A
Critique. The Political Quarterly. Volume 77, Number 2 (2006), pp. 217-226.
Tilley, James, Geoffrey Evans and Claire Michelle. "Consociationalism and the
Evolution of Political Cleavages in Northern Ireland, 1989-2004." British Journal
of Political Science. Volume 38, (2008) pp. 699-717.
Todd, Jennifer, "Social Transformation, Collective Categories and Identity Change." Theory and
Society. Volume 34, Number 4 (August, 2005) pp. 429-463.
________ "The People's Peace Process in Northern Ireland." Irish Journal of Sociology. Volume
13, Number 1 (2004) pp. 129-131.
Turner, J. C. et al. Rediscovering the Social Group. Oxford: Blackwell, 1987.
Weiss, Joshua N. "Trajectories Toward Peace: Mediator Sequencing Strategies in Intractable
Communal Conflict." Negotiation Journal. Volume 19, Number 2 (2003), pp. 109-115.
Willams, Dristen P. and Neal G. Jesse. "Resolving Nationalist Conflicts: Promoting Overlapping
Identities and Pooling Sovereignty: The 199 Northern Irish Peace Agreement" Political
Psychology. Volume 22, Number 3 (September, 2001) pp. 571-599.
Wolff, Stefan. "The Road to Peace? The Good Friday Agreement and the Conflict in Northern
Ireland." World Affairs. Volume 163, Number 4 (2001) pp. 163-170.
21