91783
(DRAFT) REGIONAL INITIATIVE IN SUPPORT OF
THE HORN OF AFRICA
WORLD BANK
REGIONAL INTEGRATION DEPARTMENT
AFRICA REGION
OCTOBER 23, 2014
Contents
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ........................................................................................................ IV
1.
INTRODUCTION..............................................................................................................1
1.1. Wide Range of Development Needs ............................................................................................................1
1.2. Assets to Build on .........................................................................................................................................3
1.3. The Horn of Africa Initiative ......................................................................................................................4
2.
REGIONAL CONTEXT AND DEVELOPMENT AGENDA .......................................4
2.1. Political and Economic Context ..................................................................................................................4
2.2. Poverty ..........................................................................................................................................................7
2.3. Drivers of Fragility and Development Challenges ..................................................................................11
2.4. Working Toward Regional Integration and Cooperation ......................................................................22
3.
WORLD BANK GROUP INITIATIVE ........................................................................26
Pillar I. Vulnerability and Resilience ................................................................................... 27
3.1. Vulnerabilities of Refugees, IDPs, Returnees, and Host Communities ............................................... 27
3.2. Support to Communicable Disease Surveillance, Diagnosis, and Treatment ..................................... 29
Pillar II. Economic Opportunity and Integration .................................................................. 30
3.3. Connectivity .............................................................................................................................................. 30
3.4. Cross-border Growth and Stability Program........................................................................................ 35
3.5. Extractives ................................................................................................................................................ 36
4.
CROSS-CUTTING THEMES ........................................................................................40
4.1. The Private Sector .....................................................................................................................................40
4.2. Youth...........................................................................................................................................................40
4.3. Security .......................................................................................................................................................41
5.
KNOWLEDGE PRODUCTS .........................................................................................42
6.
OVERVIEW OF PROPOSED WBG SUPPORT TO THE HORN OF AFRICA
INITIATIVE.....................................................................................................................44
7.
IMPLEMENTING THE REGIONAL PLAN ...............................................................47
8.
PARTNERSHIPS AND COORDINATION..................................................................47
9.
RESULTS FRAMEWORK.............................................................................................48
Annex I.
Lessons from the Great Lakes and Sahel Initiatives, and the 2011 Drought Emergency Response ..49
Annex II.
Illustrative overview of development partner projects and programs in the Horn of Africa .............51
Annex III.
Alignment with IGAD strategy and programs ...................................................................................54
Annex IV.
Overview of WBG country programs in Horn of Africa countries ...................................................55
Annex V.
Horn of Africa Regional Fragility Assessment .................................................................................61
Annex VI.
Forced Displacement in the Horn of Africa ......................................................................................76
Annex VII.
Borderlands Development, West Africa, the Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes Region ...............80
i
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
AAA
AfDB
AEC
AIDS
ALG
AMISOM
AUBP
AUC
CAR
CAS
CEWARN
CEWS
CILSS
COMESA
CPS
CSO
CVP
DFID
DRC
EAC
ECOWAS
EU
EUSR
FAO
GIZ
GFPD
HIV
HoA
ICGLR
ICT
IDA
IsDB
IDDRSI
IDP
IFC
IGAD
ISN
ISSP
JFA
LRA
MDTF
MIGA
Analytical and Advisory Assistance (World Bank Group)
African Development Bank
African Economic Community
Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
Lipatako-Gourma Development Authority
African Union Mission in Somalia
Africa Union’s Border Program
African Union Commission
Central African Republic
Country Assistance strategy
Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism
Continental Early Warning System (African Union)
Inter-States Committee on Drought Control in the Sahel
Common Market for East and Southern Africa
Country Partnership Strategy
Civil Society Organizations
Cross-border Crime and Violence Prevention
Department for International Development (UK)
Democratic Republic of Congo (The)
East African Community
Economic Community of West African States
European Union
EU Special Representative
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
The Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit GmbH
Global Program on Forced Displacement
Human Immunodeficiency Virus
Horn of Africa
International Conference on the Great Lakes Region
Information and Communications Technology
International Development Association
Islamic Development Bank
IGAD Drought Disaster Resilience and Sustainability Initiative
Internally Displaced Person
International Finance Corporation
Intergovernmental Authority on Development
Interim Strategy Note
IGAD Security Sector Programme
Joint Financial Arrangement
Lord’s Resistance Army
Multidonor Trust Fund
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency
ii
ML/TF
NGO
OFID
PPP
PRG
PSC
PSCF
REC
RFA
RPLRP
SADC
SALW
SMEs
STI
TB
TBC
UEMOA
UK
UN
UNDP
UNEP
UNFPA
UNHCR
UNICEF
UNOCHA
UNREDD
USAID
WBG
Money laundering/terrorist financing
Nongovernmental Organization
The OPEC Fund for International Development
Public-private Partnership
Partial Risk Guarantee
Peace and Security Council (African Union)
Peace, Security and Coordination Framework (Great Lakes)
Regional Economic Community
Regional Fragility Assessment
Regional Pastoral Livelihoods Resilience Project
Southern Africa Development Community
Small Arms and Light Weapons
Small and Medium-sized enterprises
Sexually Transmitted Infection
Pulmonary Tuberculosis
To Be Confirmed
West African Monetary Union
United Kingdom
United Nations
United Nations Development Programme
United Nations Environment Programme
United Nations Population Fund
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
United Nations Children’s Fund
United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
The United Nations Collaborative Programme on Reducing Emissions from
Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries
US Agency for International Development
World Bank Group
iii
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
1.
The Horn of Africa (HoA) region has many security and development challenges whose origins
and consequences go well beyond the borders of individual countries. It is also a region with many human
assets and resource endowments, and some of the most dynamic economies in the world. Despite its
numerous challenges, the Horn of Africa offers significant potential to address cross-border issues that
can help transform its countries and the region.
2.
This paper describes a World Bank Group (WBG) initiative to address some of the key drivers of
instability in the HoA and promote development in the area. The initiative is intended to build on and
complement the large country and regional programs the WBG and other partners are already supporting
in the HoA, bringing value by addressing a number of issues which demand cross-border collaborative
solutions to reducing fragility and instability. The central rationale to this initiative is that WBG cannot
effectively support the elimination of extreme poverty and boost shared prosperity in the region without
engaging more intensively and creatively in addressing very difficult development problems, including
those linked to insecurity and vulnerability. The WBG package totals $1.8 billion to be committed over
approximately 24 months, with about $600 million investments from the International Finance
Corporation (IFC) and an estimated $200 million in guarantees from the Multilateral Guarantee
Investment Agency (MIGA). The initiative builds on two previous programs aimed at similar issues in the
Great Lakes Region (May 2013) and the Sahel (November 2013)—efforts that recognize the link between
security and development, and the importance of giving hope to vulnerable citizens, including women and
children, that they can overcome poverty and deprivation.
A. Regional Context and Development Agenda
3.
Promise and Possibilities. The HoA countries has some of the world’s most buoyant
economies—Ethiopia, where GDP growth has been averaging 8.5 percent; Kenya, where GDP has been
growing at nearly 6 percent; Uganda, with 5.3 percent GDP growth in 2013, and Djibouti with 4.8 percent
in 2012. On balance, all of the countries have made some progress in cooperation on conflict prevention
and security, and also around regional infrastructure development. All have some solid assets on which to
base future progress—for example, they are rich in natural resources, including both renewable and
nonrenewable sources of energy; they have vast groundwater reserves; they have great untapped
agricultural capacity; and they have a business community that is entrepreneurial, innovative, and
increasingly vibrant. However, it is also clear that the countries of the HoA face many challenges,
individually and collectively.
4.
Ongoing Conflict. At present, the region is affected by four main ongoing conflicts: internal
conflict in Somalia and the military intervention of its neighbors; the sensitive separation of South Sudan
from Sudan; the unresolved dispute between Ethiopia and Eritrea; and most recently, the internal conflict
in South Sudan. However, no individual state in the HoA has been insulated from one or more of these
conflicts, irrespective of their distance and comparative strengths or weaknesses.
5.
Displacements. Wars and famines have triggered major displacements of people, both within
countries and across borders, so that the concentration of refugees and internally displaced people (IDPs)
in the Horn is among the highest in the world. The region has generated over 2.7 million refugees and
hosts around 2 million of them—and many of them have experienced prolonged displacement, often
lasting for decades. There are also over 6 million IDPs in the region. Host countries may not have
incentives and resources to address refugees’ needs, and tensions may arise between refugees and host
communities over land, natural resources, and livelihood opportunities.
iv
6.
Poverty. The proportion of people living on less than US$1 a day is declining only marginally,
while in many countries the absolute number of poor people is increasing. The average population growth
rate of about 3 percent means the population is doubling every 23 years, compounding efforts to reduce
absolute rates. It is a region where the most basic necessities (clean water, food, health care, and
education) are not available to much of the population, and where some countries have adult and infant
mortality rates that are among the highest in the continent. The majority of countries are not on track for
meeting the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) targets, such as reducing maternal and under-five
mortality and addressing food insecurity. Most countries will be able to halve the percentage of people
without access to safe water by 2015, but in many the baseline is so low that achieving this goal will still
leave millions without access to safe water. Disparities in education, health, and other dimensions of
human development are often evident, with particular social groups (especially the most marginalized and
vulnerable parts of the population) suffering disproportionately from income poverty, inadequate access
to quality services, and limited financial protection in case of catastrophic health expenses.
7.
Borderlands. Some borders in the HoA are contested and fought over, and are a common
conflict trigger. Resource scarcity, combined with rapid population growth, poverty, and
underdevelopment in border regions, exacerbates both communal conflict and civil wars. Border areas of
the Horn have been viewed at times as neither economically nor politically important. Sparsely populated,
often by groups who lack representation in central power structures, and offering limited economic
potential, these areas are underdeveloped, and limited investment of public resources in them has been the
norm. Because the reach of the state in these areas is limited, border communities find it particularly
difficult to cope with increasing resource scarcity or with pressures to engage in criminal or violent
activity. In the arid lowland border zones of the Horn, droughts are frequent and often devastating,
causing communal clashes over scarce pasture and water.
8.
Agriculture. Agricultural performance has a strong influence on economic growth, level of
employment, demand for other goods, food security, and overall poverty reduction. Agriculture is a
mainstay of most of the economies of the HoA, often the largest contributor to GDP. The HoA’s
agricultural potential has yet to be exploited; it has large amounts of arable land that are not yet under
cultivation. Pastoralist communities and the livestock on which they rely—despite their significant
contributions to national economies and to the maintenance of ecosystems—remain socially,
economically, and marginalized.
9.
Climate change, environment, and water. Climate change poses a considerable threat of
undermining development gains and future opportunities in the HoA. Many of the HoA countries have
been identified as being among the countries at highest climate-related risks, particularly because of the
impacts of droughts and floods. As the HoA develops, it is facing growing challenges with managing its
environmental and renewable natural resources—land, water, forests, livestock, fish, and the ecosystems
on which they depend—in a sustainable way. Water scarcity and climate change will continue to put
pressure on a region whose resources are already stretched by population growth and environmental
degradation. Efforts to manage water and make it available where it is most needed are hampered by
underdeveloped water storage infrastructure, changing climates, and the weak capacity of regional waterresource management institutions. Equitable management and development of water resources, in
particular groundwater resources, could make a significant contribution to meeting the region’s demand
for food security.
10.
Youth. As the HoA countries’ populations grow larger, most are also growing younger: the Horn
countries now have some of the most youthful populations in the world. In many countries, a majority of
14 to 19 year olds are unemployed, and research has shown a positive association between the growth of
youth unemployment and the brutality and incidence of violence. In addition, young people are not
finding ways to legitimately voice their concerns in the political arena. Instead, the outlet for their
v
frustration becomes the streets or the bush. Youth need alternatives to joining piracy, rebel groups, and
organized crime.
11.
Public health. Some HoA countries are not well prepared to respond to regional and global
public health threats. They have made limited progress on the delivery of regional public goods that are
critical for controlling or eliminating communicable diseases and promoting regional public health
security. The sub-region faces multiple challenges, with outbreak-prone diseases (cholera, meningitis,
Kala-azar, and hemorrhagic fevers), endemic diseases (multi-drug-resistant tuberculosis), and diseases
with pandemic potential (influenza). Many of these diseases are associated with or exacerbated by
poverty, displacement, malnutrition, illiteracy, and poor sanitation and housing. Increased cross-border
trade and economic activity in the HoA will necessitate simultaneous investments in strengthening
disease control efforts and outbreak preparedness.
12.
Gender. Although the benefits of empowering women during transitions out of fragility are
many, women continue to face such obstacles as limited land rights, lack of education, and antiquated
social customs that often thwart their ability to improve food security conditions for their families and
their communities.
13.
Illicit money flows and human trafficking. Corruption, piracy, trafficking in people and arms,
terrorism, and related money flows are significant and interconnected threats in the Horn of Africa. Illicit
financial flows are one of the most damaging economic problems facing Africa; it is estimated that the
continent has lost $55.6 billion each year over the past decade. Money laundering and terrorist financing
(ML/TF) are major challenges, and remittance flows are perceived as a significant ML/TF risk. People
trafficking is a growing problem in the region.
14.
Connectivity and trade issues. Limited sub-regional transport connectivity and non-tariff barriers
remain a significant impediment to formal cross border trade. A container sent from Malawi to Ethiopia is
routed through Mozambique to Beira, by sea to Djibouti, and then overland to Addis, and takes four
months to arrive. A container sent from China to Ethiopia takes a maximum of three weeks. Informal
trade is highly significant, in both volume and value. Social connections across borders will continue to
facilitate the movement of people, goods, and money that are necessary to underpin regional economic
integration. There is enormous potential for intraregional and global trade, and exploiting opportunities
for cross-border trade is likely to have a direct impact on incomes and employment in the region and to
improve outcomes for many households, particularly if the extensive informal trade relations can be
capitalized on. Most governments of the region do not rank highly on trading across borders in the Doing
Business Report. At the formal level, poor trade facilitation and weaknesses in institutions, regulations,
and currencies of some countries exact a major cost on intraregional trade. Some regional trade is taking
place; however, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) has lagged behind other
Regional Economic Communities in negotiating and interpreting trade agreements and the institutional
framework to resolve associated disputes is weak.
B. Working toward Regional Integration and Cooperation
15.
Among the countries of the HoA, there are encouraging signs of political momentum for
enhanced regional economic interdependence. Increasingly, HoA countries are members of the East
African Community, IGAD, and the Common Market for East and Southern Africa. Some countries are
showing strong political will to solve both security and development issues through increased
cooperation—for example, many have sent troops to participate in peace-keeping efforts and have
participated in diplomatic initiatives.
vi
16.
Regional infrastructure. Improving regional infrastructure connectivity can help to improve
human development and business competitiveness, and can also help to strengthen trust and cross-border
collaboration. Recognizing that cross-border cooperation is critical to more connected and competitive
markets to spur faster economic growth, several HoA countries are working to strengthen their economic
ties to their neighbors, particularly through support to cross-border infrastructure. For example, Ethiopia
is exporting its abundant hydroelectric power, Kenya is experiencing the transformational effect of
improved communications infrastructure, and Djibouti is upgrading its ports and electricity grid. The
development of transport corridors to seaports, the management of shared water resources, improved ICT
connectivity, and enhanced energy security are all potential drivers of economic integration.
17.
Oil and gas production. The region is about to undergo dramatic and lasting change when oil
production starts in Kenya, Uganda, and possibly Somalia and Ethiopia. Sudan and South Sudan are
currently the only oil producers, though almost every state in East Africa has announced that it has
substantial oil and gas reserves. To Uganda’s more than 2 billion barrels of reserves have been added oil
finds in Ethiopia’s south Omo region and in Kenya’s Turkana—discoveries that rival some of the most
productive oil fields on the continent. The secessionist state of Somaliland has signed production-sharing
agreements with foreign firms on areas yet to be drilled, and exploration companies report substantial
prospects along Somalia’s coastline that need to be tested by drilling.
C. World Bank Group Initiative
18.
Analysis and consultations confirm the need to seek more collaborative solutions among
countries to the issues of fragility, vulnerability, and insecurity in the HoA—issues that do not respect
national boundaries. There is recognition at the highest levels of government that, for development to be
both successful and sustainable, a stronger regional political dimension will need to be a key part of the
solution. This paper suggests some focused interventions that could help to do so; but the WBG cannot
and will not attempt to do everything that our analysis and consultations have concluded are important
issues that demand a regional approach. There will be considerable room for other partners to engage and
intervene. As in the Great Lakes and Sahel Initiatives, there will also be a need to learn by doing, to
mobilize additional resources, and to sustain high-level political engagement. Finally, the initiative must
complement and coordinate with ongoing WBG country programs and planned short-term programs to
provide emergency humanitarian assistance to communities in need.
19.
Selective, programmatic approach. The WBG initiative proposes supporting a selective number
of operations that are focused on the region’s challenges and that have strong country ownership. Given
the different stages of development of these countries and their relationships with international and
regional partners, the initiative will also be rolled out programmatically at the country level, as and when
an appropriate environment exists.
20.
Two pillars. The regional approach to the Horn will be built on two interrelated pillars—
vulnerability and resilience, and economic opportunity and integration.

Vulnerability and resilience. Under this pillar the primary objectives are to (a) enhance the
productive capacities and coping mechanisms of displaced populations to allow them to
contribute to the local economy in their areas of displacement, and promote durable social
and economic reintegration for voluntary returnees; and (b) provide support to communicable
disease surveillance, diagnosis, and treatment.

Economic opportunity and integration. Efforts under this pillar will (a) support connectivity
through regional transport infrastructure, and increased access to broadband, along with
improved enabling environments to encourage a competitive private sector market; (b) foster
vii
cross-border growth and stability through support for local governance, border management,
and trade facilitation; and (c) support the regional development of the extractives sector
through pipeline development and expansion of tertiary education.
In all these efforts, it will be crucial to take an integrated approach that acknowledges the need for greater
security and stability in the region. It will also be important to promote the involvement of the private
sector and give particular attention to the needs of women and youth.
21.
Knowledge products. The operational programs will be accompanied by a knowledge program
designed to provide the foundation for the operational response and the further evolution of the HoA
Initiative, and also to inform governments and partners on appropriate policy and investment choices.
22.
Regional leadership and broad ownership. In developing this initiative, the WBG has worked
very closely with IGAD and has consulted widely with the UN family, other multilateral and bilateral
institutions, and various government officials in the sub-region. Consultations and close partnership will
continue throughout implementation.
23.
Partnerships. The WBG is committed to working together with a range of partners to ensure
successful delivery of the initiative and results on the ground. The initiative strives to take advantage of
new opportunities arising from regional leadership and political developments on the ground, and the
growing resolve of the international community to support more ambitious efforts to solve problems in
the region, while giving those efforts a greater international profile. Operationally, the initiative is
expected to facilitate increased support to the region from multiple stakeholders, to promote a greater
degree of alignment and collaboration in areas of mutual interest, and, importantly, to encourage more
operations that promote more cross-border solutions to long-standing problems of poverty. Timely and
efficient operations that deliver results quickly will require effective partnerships in which some
institutions are best placed to lead, and others to contribute. The WBG is not best placed to lead on
everything; therefore, with IGAD, it will promote these partnerships.
viii
1.
INTRODUCTION
1.
This paper analyzes key factors contributing to regional instability and vulnerability in the
Horn of Africa (HoA) and proposes steps to address them. Despite the past and ongoing diplomatic,
security, and development efforts of multiple stakeholders, the Horn sub-region remains vulnerable. All
parties—countries and development partners alike—increasingly recognize that national programs alone
are not sufficient to mitigate the sub-region’s vulnerability. This understanding has led to a growing
program of regional activities under the leadership of Heads of State within the Intergovernmental
Authority on Development (IGAD), a robust response to the region’s 2011 famine crisis by multiple
parties, and growing regional collaboration and support on security and development issues. The central
rationale for the initiative set out in this paper is that we cannot eliminate extreme poverty and boost
shared prosperity in the Horn without engaging more intensively and creatively in addressing very
difficult development problems. These problems are regional in nature and therefore require regional
solutions.
2.
For the purposes of this initiative, the Horn of Africa refers to Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia,
Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, and Uganda1 (see Figure 1). With a total area of around 5.2
million square kilometers, the HoA includes some of the largest and the smallest countries in Africa.
There is sound logic in looking at regional instability and vulnerability in these countries as a group.
Despite the region’s diversity, its problems are interlinked: events in one country affect others, and the
problems of one can often be solved only with the involvement of others. Indeed, for any of the
countries, social, economic, and political development can only be achieved in a climate of enhanced
security and stability for all. Given the different stages of development of these countries and their
relationships with international and regional partners, the initiative will be rolled out programmatically at
the country level, as and when an appropriate environment exists.
1.1. Wide Range of Development Needs
3.
In the HoA, a complex set of historical, ideological, political, social, economic,
humanitarian, geographical, territorial, and environmental factors have created tensions within
and between states. One result has been interstate, intrastate, and inter-communal conflicts. At present,
the region is affected by four main ongoing conflicts: internal conflict in Somalia and the military
intervention of its neighbors; the sensitive separation of South Sudan from Sudan; the unresolved dispute
between Ethiopia and Eritrea; and most recently, the internal conflict in South Sudan. However, no
individual state in the HoA has been insulated from one or more of these conflicts, irrespective of their
distance and comparative strengths or weaknesses. This is particularly true of instability in border
areas—drivers of conflict and fragility transcend political borders, and weakly governed areas provide
refuge for criminal activity.2
4.
Wars and famines have triggered major displacements of people, both within countries and
across borders, so that the concentration of refugees and internally displaced people (IDPs) in the
Horn is among the highest in the world. The region has generated over 2.7 million refugees and hosts
over 2 million of them (see Table 1)—and many of them have experienced prolonged displacement, often
lasting for decades. There are also over 6 million IDPs in the region. Host countries may not have
1
2
All are members of IGAD, though Eritrea’s membership is currently suspended.
Horn of Africa Regional Fragility Assessment,World Bank, 2014.
1
incentives and resources to address refugees’ needs, and tensions may arise between refugees and host
communities over land, natural resources, and livelihood opportunities.
Figure 1. Regional Area Map of the Horn of Africa
Table 1. Displaced Population in the Horn of Africa
Country
Djibouti
Refugees by origin
IDPs
Refugees hosted
1,168
0
23,810
Eritrea
338,060
10,000
3,169
Ethiopia
125,779
316,090
629,718a
Kenya
10,745
412,000b
h
12,301f
Somalia
967,038
South Sudan
595,913i
1,400,000d
244,805f
Sudan
678,036
2,890,000e
170,665
Uganda
11,764
29,776
388,950g
2,728,503
6,163,866
2,024,005
Total
1,106,000
550,587a
c
Sources: All data UNHCR 2013 except where otherwise noted.
a July 2014; b January 2013; c March 2014; d September 2014; in addition, there are 20,000 IDPs in Abyei;
e June 2014; f October 2014; g June 2014; h September 2014; i October 2014.
2
5.
The region is going through substantial demographic changes. While infant and under-five
mortality rates have declined over the past two decades, fertility rates have remained high and will
continue to be the main driver of population growth. The total population of the eight HoA countries,
about 43 million in 1950, has grown to 225 million in 2010 and is projected to reach 258 million by
2015.3 In many countries the median age is as young as 16 years, and it is estimated that in 2020 there
could be 60.5 million young people aged 15-24 years in the eight countries in the Horn. The population
dynamics imply that these countries will continue to face such challenges as keeping pace with critical
investments in health and education, creating jobs, eradicating malnutrition, and reducing poverty and
vulnerability.
6.
Much of the Horn’s population remains vulnerable to shocks from environmental
degradation, harsh climate, and growing food insecurity. The frequency and severity of drought are
likely to increase as a result of climate-related change, exacerbating such factors as poverty, degraded
ecosystems, uncoordinated water resource management, conflict, and ineffective governance.
1.2. Assets to Build on
7.
There is an opportunity for the HoA to break free from its cycles of drought, food
insecurity, water insecurity, and conflict by building on some emerging trends and approaches:
(a) high-level political resolve and investment to improve regional security (including through diplomacy
and robust mechanisms for enforcement and monitoring); (b) scaled-up efforts to generate a peace or
development dividend, especially for the most vulnerable groups and the region’s growing youth
populations; and (c) cross-border cooperation in areas of mutual interest such as infrastructure and
regional public goods.
8.
Oil, electricity, water, and agriculture all present unprecedented opportunities to transform
the region over the next decade. Significant oil and gas finds in Kenya and Uganda, and possibly in
Ethiopia and Somalia, will change the face of the region dramatically. Through domestic revenue
generation, the infrastructure and services to develop and operationalize production, and the billions of
dollars that will flow in as foreign direct investment. Large-scale energy development—whether through
hydroelectric power, oil and gas, or alternative forms of generation such as geothermal and wind—has
great promise. The potential to harness groundwater resources to increase resilience in drought areas and
provide water for irrigation is great. The area has rich agricultural land for food production that has yet to
be exploited. Thus the region is well positioned to supply both itself and the economies of the Gulf and
South Asia with food and energy, if it manages the risks of instability associated with the development of
these opportunities and gives attention to governance and transparency issues.
9.
The business community, particularly in Kenya and Somalia, is entrepreneurial, innovative
and increasingly vibrant. In Kenya the diversified private sector, benefiting from a well-educated and
entrepreneurial workforce, bolsters the country’s ability to weather external shocks and drives growth and
employment in the economy. Similarly, with a long history of trade and a tradition of enterprise and
innovation, the Somali private sector has continued to grow over the last 20 years, filling the gaps as the
state retreated. Somali traders have successfully penetrated markets in neighboring countries, where they
have become an accepted part of commercial life, covering essential services like fuel stations, foreign
exchange, money transfer, supermarkets, and transportation services.
3
UN Population Division medium projection variant projection applied.
3
1.3. The Horn of Africa Initiative
10.
The HoA Initiative complements initiatives in the Great Lakes and the Sahel. The Great
Lakes Initiative was the first innovative collaboration among the World Bank, the UN, and other partners
to try to bridge the gap between peace, security and development in fragile and conflict-affected regions
of Africa. In May 2013 the World Bank President and the UN Secretary General made a historic first joint
trip in support of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the Great Lakes Region signed in
February 2013. Then, in November 2013, with the Chair of the African Union Commission (AUC), the
President of the African Development Bank (AfDB) and the Commissioner for Development of the
European Union, they launched the Sahel Initiative, designed to address the persistent socioeconomic
challenges and civil and food security vulnerabilities of the Sahel region by building resilience and
promoting economic opportunity through deeper regional integration. The HoA Initiative reflects the
lessons from these experiences,4 as well as extensive consultations with governments in the region, the
AUC, AfDB, IGAD, the United Nations system, the European Union, and other key development
partners.
11.
The World Bank Group (WBG) HoA Initiative is structured around two pillars—
(a) vulnerability and resilience, and (b) economic opportunity and integration—with close attention
to security, youth, gender and private sector development. The challenges and the high level of
regional complexity in the HoA underscore the need to work on a long-term and systematic approach to
building the resilience of vulnerable countries and populations and creating additional economic
opportunity for them.
2.
REGIONAL CONTEXT AND DEVELOPMENT AGENDA5
2.1. Political and Economic Context
12.
History and location go a long way in explaining the complex geopolitics of the region.
Located in a geo-strategic position with regard to the Red Sea, the Arabian Sea, the Indian Ocean, and the
Gulf, the HoA has a special regional and international significance, even in the post-Cold War world.6
Many economies, for example, continue to have a vital interest in keeping open the strait of Bab-elMandeb, the port of Djibouti, and the Red Sea for the free flow of international shipping, not least
because of the sheer quantity of oil that passes through them.
13.
A complex regional history has resulted in states that were created in significantly different
ways—a fact that shapes their governance systems, patterns of justice and exclusion, and the ways
they relate to one another today. For many decades, external intervention in the region has been
important in contributing to conflict and cross-border relations. 7 The resulting security interdependence
in the Horn is complex, with interstate, intrastate, and proxy forms of war. . Many ethnic groups were
divided across state boundaries and regional management of ecosystems, which is essential to many
livelihood approaches, was limited.
4
5
6
7
Reviving the Great Lakes: A World Bank Group Regional Initiative for Peace, Stability and Economic Development, March
2013; The Sahel: Towards a Regional Approach, August 2013.
This section has been informed by a regional fragility assessment carried out by the Fragility, Conflict and Violence Global
Practice of the WBG, provided as Annex IV.
Woodward, P. The Horn of Africa; State Politics & International Relations. International Library of African Studies, 2002.
Pavsic, P. The Horn of Africa: International influence as a basis for the never ending violence. Consultancy, Africa
Intelligence, 2012.
4
14.
Afro/Arab identities continue to shape interactions in the region. There is a long history of
social, cultural, and economic interaction between the Arab world and the Horn. Some of this interaction
is founded on historical trading relationships and Oman’s colonial footprint, and some on more recent
developments, such as insecurity in the Red Sea.8
15.
The economic performance of countries in the region is mixed—all countries are low income
countries except Kenya, Djibouti and South Sudan, which have lower-middle-income status (see Table 2).
8
9
10

At one end of the scale, Ethiopia was the 12th-fastest growing economy in the world in 2012,
growing at an average of 8.8 percent.9 The country’s growth was driven by agriculture and
services on the supply side and by public investment and private consumption on the demand
side. However, the policy mix adopted to promote public investment has resulted in (i) a shortterm crowding-out of the private sector due to credit and foreign exchange rationing and a very
low private investment rate; and (ii) the risk of external debt distress is rising due to substantial
non-concessional borrowing commitments.

At the other end of the scale, South Sudan experienced a deep slump in 2012: GDP plunged by
56 percent as a result of the oil shutdown, showing that overdependence on oil as the major
source of revenue comes at a real cost. South Sudan is the most oil dependent country in the
world, with oil accounting for almost the totality of exports, and for around 80% of gross
domestic product (GDP), directly and indirectly. The country had a GDP of US$ 10.2 billion in
2012, or US$ 1000 per capita - almost half the previous year’s - following the suspension of oil
production due to a dispute with neighboring Sudan. It is estimated that the conflict will cost up
to 15% of the potential GDP in FY14.

Eritrea’s GDP has risen as growth in mineral exploitation10 of gold and copper helps diversify
exports. More than 20 mining companies in Eritrea are licensed to explore for minerals, and more
foreign firms are being attracted.

In Uganda GDP growth has been much slower that historical averages due to a series of
exogenous shocks from the global economy and bad weather as well as slippages in fiscal
management. GDP growth was recorded at 4.7% percent in FY14 compared to 5.3 percent in
FY13. The medium-term growth prospects remain strong, but downside risks abound. Strong
growth is expected from the construction sector as Uganda prepares for oil production and invests
heavily in infrastructure; eventual productivity dividend from increased infrastructure
investments; and increased trade within the Great Lakes region. Risks to manage include those
emanating from weaknesses in the fiscal management regime as well as the South Sudan crisis.

Kenya. Following the rebasing of its GDP in September 2014, Kenya passed the World Bank’s
lower-middle-income country threshold. Economic growth is projected to be above 5 percent for
2014 and 2015. This growth is being driven by consumption spending and public infrastructure
investment, accompanied by rising output in industry and services. Growth prospects have been
hampered by the negative effects of poor weather on agricultural and electricity output, and
security concerns hampering tourism. Growth alone will not be enough to deliver the poverty
reduction that Kenya seeks to realize its Vision 2030; the country must address inequality by
Horn of Africa Regional Fragility Assessment, World Bank,2014.
The sub-Saharan Africa average was 6% in 2012.
IMF – World Economic Outlook, 2013
5
reaching those who consistently miss essential services while ensuring that the services they
receive are of adequate quality and contribute to building human capital.
11
12

GDP growth in Djibouti was 4.5 percent in 2012. With very few natural resources and virtually
no industry, the country is highly dependent on tax revenues from in-transit trade flow, and it
depends on foreign assistance to finance development and current account deficits. Increasing
foreign direct investment in the country’s port facilities is expected to drive accelerated growth.

Somalia’s macroeconomic framework reflects the country’s underlying fragility, and economic
data are not available. Agriculture and services are the key contributors to GDP. The livestock
sector is the backbone of the economy and the main source of livelihoods: pastoralism represents
a way of life and a livelihood for about 60 percent of the population, generating about 40 percent
of GDP.11 Somalia is eligible for HIPC debt relief and is one of only three countries not yet
qualified. As part of the path to normalization with its creditors and debt relief, Somalia will
need to receive support for debt reconciliation to assess its debt picture. Once successfully
completed this would give Somalia access to much needed IDA and other concessional resources
to help it achieve its development goals.

In Sudan the oil sector has been pivotal in the last decade, accounting for over half of
government revenues and 95 percent of exports. The secession of the South in 2011 meant the
loss of about three-quarters of oil production and a significant correction to past economic trends.
Sudan benefits from the transit fees it charges on oil from South Sudan, and it stands to lose out
from the prolonged shutdown of South Sudanese oil. The country has introduced new austerity
measures, including lifting fuel subsidies (a move that almost doubled fuel prices). Major
creditors have taken part in a World Bank-IMF Technical Working Group on Sudan’s External
Debt for the past two and a half years, but substantive progress on debt relief will require Sudan
to engage directly with major creditors. In the long term, cuts in federal transfers to the regions,
cuts in the health and education budgets, and an overall low level of development spending are
affecting the provision of basic services and the country’s development. The cost of this crisis on
the country’s human development is already evident: in the years since South Sudan seceded,
Sudan itself has slid almost 20 places down the Human Development Index. Although in the last
two years an increase in exports, particularly gold, coupled with the austerity measures, has
helped ameliorate some of the economic imbalances, Sudan is failing to attract the investment it
needs for sustainable growth.12
Interim Strategy Note (FY14 – FY16), for the Federal Republic of Somalia, World Bank, November 11, 2013.
Update on Macroeconomic Developments in Sudan, UNDP, March 2014.
6
Table 2. Recent Macroeconomic Dataa
Ethiopia
Kenya
Uganda
Djibouti d
Eritrea
South Sudan
Sudan
Somalia
GDP
growth %a
9.7
5.7
4.9c
4.8
7
-47.6
-10.1
n.a
Inflation %
7.0
5.7
5.9
3.7
GDP ($ billion)
46
55.3
21.45
1.35
3.1
9.34
58.77
2.6
47.3
37.4
n.a
GDP per
capita ($)
470
1,246
572
1,660
544
862
1,580
288
CPIA ratingb
3.4
3.9
3.7
—
2.0
2.1
2.4
-
Note: The Doing Business report for South Sudan covers only Juba, while the report for Somaliland covers Hargeisa.
a World Bank Group 2013/2014 data.
b June 2014 data. The World Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessment, carried out annually for all its borrowing
countries, has a set of criteria that are grouped in four clusters: (a) economic management; (b) structural policies; (c) policies for
social inclusion and equity; and (d) public sector management and institutions. Ratings for each of the criteria reflect a variety of
indicators, observations, and judgments. They focus on the quality of each country’s current policies and institutions – which are
the main determinant of present aid effectiveness prospects. In 2013, 3.2 was the average for IDA borrowers in SSA.
c 2013 estimate.
d 2013 data
16.
High inflation has accompanied high growth rates in the last five years. Inflation has fallen
more recently, but all countries are sensitive to global commodity prices; higher local prices may feed
social unrest or exacerbate the vulnerability of certain populations.
2.2. Poverty
17.
The region is one of the poorest in Africa. The proportion of people living on less than US$1 a
day is declining only marginally, while in many countries the absolute number of poor people is
increasing. The average population growth rate of about 3.0 percent means the population is doubling
every 23 years, compounding efforts to reduce absolute rates. It is a region where the most basic
necessities (clean water, food, health care, and education) is not available to much of the population, and
where some countries have adult and infant mortality rates that are among the highest in the continent.
The HoA’s dependence on climate-sensitive sectors makes it more vulnerable than other regions to
climate hazards. Climate-related shocks manifested by extreme weather conditions have destroyed
livelihoods and exacerbated the HoA’s food insecurity, resulting in high incidences of underweight and
stunted children, widespread hunger, and poor dietary consumption patterns.
18.
The majority of countries are not on track for meeting the MDG targets, such as reducing
maternal and under-five mortality and addressing food insecurity. Most countries will be able to
halve the percentage of people without access to safe water by 2015, but in many the baseline is so low
that achieving this goal will still leave millions without access to safe water. Disparities in education,
health, and other dimensions of human development are often evident, with particular social groups
(especially the most marginalized and vulnerable parts of the population) suffering disproportionately
from income poverty, inadequate access to quality services, and limited financial protection in case of
catastrophic health expenses.

At an average of $1,511 (2011) per capita, gross national income in Djibouti is higher than in all
neighboring states, although the figure masks extreme inequalities. With unemployment
7
estimated at 48 percent, the country has some of Africa’s worst indices of absolute and relative
poverty13.
13

In Somalia the consequences of conflict are clear and devastating: the poverty incidence is 73
percent (61 percent in urban centers and 80 percent in rural areas), with extreme poverty
estimated to be 43 percent.

Eritrea, although it is one of Africa’s fastest growing economies, is one of the least developed
countries in the world, with an average annual per capita income of US$403 in 2010. Of its
population of about 5.3 million, an estimated two-thirds live in rural areas. Eritrea is ranked 177th
out of 187 countries in the 2011 United Nations Human Development Index, and the Eritrean
diaspora is large and increasing. Official statistics on the prevalence of poverty in the country are
limited. Some social indicators have improved: falling maternal mortality (from 1,700 deaths per
100,000 live births in 1990 to 380 in 2010), increasing primary school completion (from 17
percent in 1994 to 31 percent in 2013), and higher life expectancy at birth (from 52.5 years in
1995 to 61.6 years in 2011). Some improvements have been achieved through targeted
investments in health and education in partnership with the United Nations Children’s Fund
(UNICEF), World Health Organization, United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), and United
Nations Development Programme (UNDP). However, school enrollment rates remain low at 37
percent in 2012, and girls are less likely than boys to enroll in school.
All demographic, under-five and maternal mortality rates from UNICEF country profiles, September 2014
8

Ethiopia has substantially reduced poverty in both urban and rural areas during the last decade.
Nevertheless, the poverty rate in Ethiopia as measured by international standards remains very
high: 39 percent of Ethiopians live on less than US$1.25 a day; 78 percent live on less than US$2
a day; and the Oxford Poverty and Human Development Index calculates the poverty rate in
Ethiopia to be 90 percent, the second highest after Niger of the 104 developing countries covered.
In addition, income inequality has worsened in rural areas in Ethiopia.

Kenya’s poverty level is estimated to have declined from 47 percent in 2005 to 34-42 percent,
but reliable data are unavailable because the last household survey was conducted in 2005-06.
While the average Kenyan is healthier and better educated and receives better infrastructure
services than a decade ago, a large fraction of the population continues to live in fragile
conditions with substandard access to water, sanitation, and energy—particularly in the north and
northeast, where poverty levels and vulnerability are highest.

With a per capita income of US$510 (2013), Uganda remains a poor country. With a poverty rate
down to 19.7% by 2013, Uganda is set to meet the first MDG, to eradicate extreme poverty and
hunger. However, the vast majority of its non-poor people are vulnerable. The lower poverty
9
headcount has yet to translate into gains in other welfare dimensions. There are concerns about
uneven progress, with distinct geographic patterns of unequal outcomes in health and education,
and uneven access to basic social services. In 2012, Uganda ranked 161st of 187 countries on the
UNDP’s Human Development Index.
14
15

Despite South Sudan’s great resource wealth, over half the population lives below the national
poverty line. Inequities in access to services, resources, and opportunities, combined with the
politics of exclusion and patronage, ineffective governance, and lack of transparency associated
with oil revenue, could present a serious threat to physical and economic security and undermine
the institutional transformation needed to secure South Sudan’s stability and legitimacy.14

Even after 10 years of an oil boom, Sudan continues to suffer wide and deep swaths of poverty
and stark inequality between regions. Although in 2011 Sudan was nominally a lower-middleincome country, this status was mainly due to its highly overvalued exchange rate and large oil
production; both fell short in 2012, bringing the country back to low-income-country status.
Poverty estimates set the average rate of poverty incidence at 46.5 percent (2009 National
Baseline Household Survey), indicating that some 15 million people are poor; and the poverty
rate is significantly higher in rural areas (58%) than in urban areas (26%).15
Interim Strategy Note (FY2012-FY2014) for the Republic of South Sudan, World Bank, January 2013.
World Bank, 2013.
10
19.
In the HoA, poverty is predominantly a rural phenomenon. Across the region around 70% of
the population lives in rural areas (except in Djibouti, where 70% of the population lives in urban areas);
more than half of those people live on less than US$1 per day, and smallholder farmers work in
conditions of static or declining productivity, vulnerability to drought, and environmental degradation. A
heavy dependence on low-productivity rain-fed agriculture means that yields are failing to keep pace with
population growth.
2.3. Drivers of Fragility and Development Challenges
20.
A range of continuing issues pose threats to the HoA’s stability and development: continuing
conflict; growing numbers of refugees and internally displaced people; pronounced problems of centerperiphery relations in borderlands; weak agricultural performance; water and land rights; youth
unemployment and young people’s susceptibility to radicalization; poor trade facilitation across borders;
regional and global public health threats; and illicit financial flows.
A. Continuing Conflict
21.
Insecurity, conflict, displacement, poverty, and underdevelopment are closely related.
Sustainable development cannot be achieved in an environment characterized by tensions, armed
conflicts, and unstable and weak government institutions; and at the same time, poverty and
underdevelopment help to generate conflict. Over time the ongoing conflict in Somalia has taken on an
increasingly regional character through the military intervention of the African Union Mission in Somalia
(AMISOM). The huge numbers of refugees that have long gathered in the camps of mainly Ethiopia and
Kenya are now becoming an intricate part of the regional political economy. In South Sudan and Sudan,
disputes over oil transit have been resolved, however tensions remain over delineation of borders and
support to rebel groups on either side of the border. Meanwhile, the internal conflict in South Sudan itself
has regional implications—the UN recently voiced a concern that the conflict will lead to another
humanitarian food crisis. Local conflicts over equitable access to natural resources, and between host
communities and displaced populations, are on the rise and have caused massive displacement in the
region.
B. Displacement
22.
About 2 million refugees and over 6 million other displaced peoples continue to burden
weak local and national institutions and host communities (see Figure 2), with negative development
impacts on human and social capital, economic growth, poverty reduction, and environmental
sustainability. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) recently announced that
Ethiopia has overtaken Kenya to become the largest refugee-hosting country in Africa, sheltering 629,718
11
refugees as of the end of July 2014. The conflict in South Sudan, which erupted in mid-December 2013,
has sent around 188,000 refugees into Ethiopia and 125,000 into Uganda since the beginning of 2014.
23.
The socioeconomic impacts of displacement are significant and frequently regional. Forced
displacement can itself fuel further instability, insecurity, and conflict by concentrating or diluting ethnic,
clan, religious, or political groups or fueling conflicts between refugees, IDPs, and host communities over
land, natural resources, and livelihood opportunities. Displaced people are frequently the most deprived,
vulnerable, and excluded; in addition, the considerable costs of servicing displaced populations place
significant strains on national and local governments and host communities. Issues related to the status
and return of refugees also continue to be a source of tension within the region, with host communities
often overwhelmed and cross-border conflict spillovers associated with displacement leading to
instability.
12
Figure 2.Overview of the Displacement Situation in the Horn of Africa
(Numbers of IDPs and refugees and their country of origin, as of September 2014)
12
24.
The needs of people in protracted displacement and those who eventually return to their
places of origin are largely developmental in nature; humanitarian responses are inadequate. Some
communities have received humanitarian assistance, including food aid, for over 20 years. This situation
has built dependence and an artificial aid economy that in most cases tend to prevent communities from
becoming more resilient. Drawing on the productive capacity of displaced people and equipping them and
their host or return communities with assets for recovery—for example, improving access to land,
services, and livelihoods and strengthening local governance and institutional capacity—can bring
benefits for the wider society and region. There are critical gaps in the delivery of basic health care
services, nutrition interventions, and basic education services to cross-border and mobile populations,
particularly women and children. Another area of concern is that violence against women and children is
a systemic and growing problem for displaced populations (see Box 1).
Box 1. Conflict-Related Sexual Violence: Acute Vulnerability of
Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons
Since 2009 the United Nations Security Council has maintained a consistent focus on conflict-related sexual violence,
recognizing that such violations constitute a legitimate threat to international peace and security, and thus require an
operational security, justice, and service response. Although there are significant challenges to securing comprehensive data
on the prevalence, scope, and scale of conflict-related sexual violence, in the past several years the international community
has gained a deeper understanding of this phenomenon and the multi-sectoral response that is needed to prevent and address
it.
Despite universal underreporting—because of the risks faced by survivors and witnesses who come forward, and the limited
availability of services—the reports published since 2009 by the United Nations Secretary-General on sexual violence in
conflict indicate that such violations are a consistent feature of the conflicts in a number of the HoA countries, including
Sudan (Darfur), South Sudan, Somalia, and Kenya. Refugees and IDPs, as well as women and girls in villages and towns
surrounding refugee camps and IDP settlements, are especially vulnerable to sexual violence.
Across the region the significant number of incidents has put pressure on justice and health services, highlighted their
deficiencies, and led to a lack of trust in law enforcement and justice systems, compounding survivors’ reluctance to bring
charges against perpetrators. Women and girls are subjected to sexual assaults by militiamen, bandits, or men with guns
while in transit and upon arrival in refugee camps, and when they travel outside camp perimeters to engage in routine
livelihood activities. Very often these attacks involve multiple perpetrators. Between January and November 2012, for
example, in Mogadishu UN agencies registered over 1,700 rape cases. Almost one-third of the incidents were against
children. In South Sudan the UN has received information about radio broadcasts being used to incite members of one ethnic
group to rape women of rival groups. In addition, many women and young girls are being forced into marriage with alShabaab fighters.
Beyond the devastating consequences on individual survivors, their families, and their communities, sexual violence carries
broader implications for peace-making and post-conflict recovery and development. Therefore, conflict-related sexual
violence merits priority attention in the key regional initiatives for the HoA by the WBG and other multilateral institutions
and bilateral donors.
__________________
Source: Office of the United Nations Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict,
September 2014.
C. Borderlands
25.
Some borders in the HoA are contested and fought over, and are a common conflict trigger.
Resource scarcity, combined with rapid population growth, poverty, and underdevelopment in border
regions, exacerbates both communal conflict and civil wars. Border areas of the Horn have traditionally
been viewed as neither economically nor politically important. Sparsely populated, often by groups who
lack representation in central power structures, and offering limited economic potential, these areas are
13
underdeveloped, and limited investment of public resources in them has been the norm. Because the reach
of the state in these areas is limited, border communities find it particularly difficult to cope with
increasing resource scarcity or with pressures to engage in criminal or violent activity. In the arid lowland
border zones of the Horn, droughts are frequent and often devastating, causing communal clashes over
scarce pasture and water. Where governments have ignored demands for basic services, closed avenues
for political participation, or failed to address grievances, marginalized groups may resort to violence.
(Box 2 describes the situation in one borderland area.)
26.
Borderland communities that have relied on traditional conflict management tools are
overwhelmed by well-financed armed groups or criminal networks. Indeed, the political goals of
several armed opposition movements—social change to guarantee political inclusion, services, justice,
and peace—are designed to appeal to marginalized groups. Flows of arms and of people skilled in
violence contribute to increased militarization of the borders and thus often, to an increase in both
communal conflicts and trafficking. Trans-border crime and violent extremism are becoming increasingly
regional and global in nature—they include extremism in Somalia and Kenya, with its links to al-Qaeda;
the mineral trade,16 which is driven by global demand; piracy involving financial investors in Europe and
diaspora populations; and arms and drug trafficking involving international criminal networks from as far
afield as South America and South Asia.17
16
17
There is anecdotal evidence of substantial gold and gemstone smuggling in the region, drawing on artisanal mining in the
region and in neighboring central African states: http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/10/08/us-sudan-darfur-goldidUKBRE99707G20131008; http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article47474
Horn of Africa Regional Fragility Assessment, World Bank, 2014.
14
Box 2. The Karamoja Cluster
The Karamoja Cluster is a region on the arid and semi-arid peripheries of Ethiopia, Kenya, South Sudan,
and Uganda. In the area, which hosts most of the 32 million pastoralists who live in the HoA, crossing
national borders to migrate between seasonal pastures is common. The cluster is characterized by regular
drought, insecurity, and marginalization; livestock herds are often malnourished and their pastures
overgrazed and degraded.
15
Communities living in the cluster identify insecurity as their main problema not least because of the
increasing involvement of external actors in cattle raiding. A commercial raiding economy is evolving,
comparable to a war economy and forms of organized crime. The use of small arms and light weapons
facilitates commercial raiding and makes clashes more brutal. The important link between security and
development in Karamoja is underscored by the delayed start of the WBG’s Northern Uganda Social
Action Fund Project in that region, and the inability of the airborne geological mapping of Uganda to cover
Karamoja.
Uganda’s government put the pacification and development of Karamoja among its top priorities,
developing the Karamoja Integrated Development and Disarmament Programme to address the unique
context and development challenges of Karamoja with the overall goal “to contribute to human security and
promote conditions for recovery and development in Karamoja.” Under the program, the following has
been achieved:




Comprehensive disarmament program. The army has collected over 29,000 illegal guns from the
communities, police units have been established in every sub-county to maintain law and order, and
electronic branding of about 200,000 heads of cattle helps identify cows in case of thefts. The success
of this program has led to peaceful coexistence of the communities, resettlement of the people, and
increased productivity. There is also a significant reduction in the population relying on food aid—
from 90 percent in 2009 to 10 percent in 2013—as well as increased infrastructure development and
provision of social services.
Water for human consumption and production. Over 52 valley tanks and five strategic
dams/reservoirs have been constructed in the grazing areas to provide water for livestock, especially in
the dry season, and to reduce the pastoralists’ seasonal migration.
Improved livelihoods and food security for households. The Community Empowerment and Peace
Building Programme, launched in 2011 to enhance food security and augment household income, has
procured 4,000 oxen for vulnerable households; 2000 ox ploughs; 1,000 heifers for improved milk
production and enhanced child nutrition; 1,000 goats for groups of vulnerable women; tractors; the
planting of 300 acres of maize for school feeding programs; and a supply of improved cassava
cuttings.
Improved infrastructure and education and health services. The supply of hydropower and the
construction of health and education infrastructure have spurred companies to undertake mineral
prospecting and exploration in the region, and there are plans for an industrial park.
Cross-border raids continue in the four countries. While Uganda’s efforts have led to a general
improvement in the security situation and the restoration of law and order, the refusal elsewhere to disarm
and general regional criminality need to be addressed in a more comprehensive and holistic manner by all
four affected countries working together.
In 2011, an IGAD analysis found that despite numerous development interventions by countries and
partners (often focused on emergency short-term measures), a broader and comprehensive regional
approach was lacking. In 2013 the Caucus of Karamoja Members of Parliament and Government Ministers
endorsed the following (among other IGAD recommendations): (a) creation of regional policies;
(b) strengthening of the institutions that deal with migration and livestock routes; (c) enforcement of
existing peace agreements and protocols; (d) enhanced rangeland planning and management;
(e) strengthening of alternative basic education; (f) establishment of a sub-regional peace council to
coordinate cross-border conflict early warning and response; (g) introduction of innovative financial
services; (h) encouragement of local community policing; (i) establishment of higher learning institutions
in the Karamoja Cluster; and (j) promotion of community radio for social cohesion.
____________________
a
IGAD Regional Integrated and Comprehensive Development Planning for the Karamoja Cluster, September 2012.
16
D. Agriculture
27.
Agricultural performance has a strong influence on economic growth, level of employment,
demand for other goods, food security, and overall poverty reduction. Agriculture is a mainstay of
most of the economies of the Horn of Africa. In low-income countries, such as Somalia and Ethiopia,
agriculture is often the largest contributor to GDP (60% and 50% respectively). In the past, growth in
agricultural output in the region has been driven largely by increases in factor inputs, including land
brought under cultivation; now the adoption of improved technologies and management can play a critical
role in lifting yields and output. At the same time, regular support through national safety nets has been
shown to enable the poorest households to move their livelihoods along the risk-return continuum.
28.
The HoA’s agricultural potential has yet to be exploited. South Sudan’s greatest asset is not
oil, but land: about 80 percent of its 644,000 km2 land area is considered arable, but less than 5 percent is
under cultivation. South Sudan has the potential to be a key regional production center for a range of food
staples—the breadbasket of the region. (By contrast, only 14-18 percent of Kenya’s 582,000 km2 is
considered suitable for farming.) Thus there is massive untapped potential for agricultural production and
trade, which can contribute to food security, increased employment throughout the region, and the return
of IDPs. Uganda also has a comparative advantage in agriculture: agricultural production in the north is
expected to increase, and there is growing regional demand for Uganda’s exports. Similarly, in Sudan,
agriculture, including livestock, holds the highest potential for broadly-shared growth and poverty
reduction in Sudan. Through the Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, the Government has strongly
emphasized transforming agriculture from subsistence production to a modern sector responsive to market
signals as a way to rapidly lift the majority of Sudanese out of poverty.
29.
Pastoralist communities—despite their significant contributions to national economies and
to the maintenance of ecosystems—remain socially, economically, and politically marginalized.
Pastoralism—the extensive, mobile grazing of livestock on communal rangelands—is the key production
system practiced in the region’s arid and semi-arid lands. These lands represent more than 60 percent of
the total Horn area, with a pastoral population estimated at 12-22 million and a 41 percent incidence of
extreme poverty.
E. Climate Change, Environment, and Water
30.
Climate change poses a considerable threat of undermining development gains and future
opportunities in the Horn of Africa. Many of the HoA countries have been identified as being among
the countries at highest climate-related risks, particularly because of the impacts of droughts and floods.
In addition, there are a number of indirect impacts of climate variability and change—the increased
spread of human and livestock diseases (epidemics such as the Rift Valley fever), increase in
unsustainable natural resource extraction (leading to soil nutrient depletion and deforestation), increased
conflicts and insecurity, and the breakdown of various services. All such impacts will affect highly
vulnerable groups most.
31.
As the HoA develops, it is facing growing challenges with managing its environmental and
renewable natural resources—land, water, forests, fish, and the ecosystems on which they depend—
in a sustainable way. Heating and cooking in poor households are widely dependent on the use of wood
and charcoal, which gradually reduces forest reserves, encourages soil erosion, and damages the grazing
habitat for livestock. Producing charcoal for sale is a traditional coping mechanism for pastoralists during
drought. In Somalia, the demand for wood and charcoal, boosted by the absence of alternative fuels,
appears to be drastically reducing forest reserves and providing a valuable source of income for alShabaab. The livelihoods of large numbers of people affected by extreme poverty and food insecurity in
the Horn are made worse by erratic rainfall and the severe droughts that have become more frequent.
17
Water scarcity and climate change will continue to put pressure on a region whose resources are already
stretched by population growth and environmental degradation. Efforts to manage water and make it
available where it is most needed are hampered by underdeveloped water storage infrastructure, changing
climates, and the weak capacity of regional water-resource management institutions.
32.
Equitable management and development of water resources, particularly groundwater
resources, could make a significant contribution to meeting the region’s demand for food security.
Five of the eight HoA countries share the Nile Basin, which is at the center of potential regional tensions.
Although the Nile Basin Initiative has begun laying the groundwork for investments in water storage and
power generation and transmission, more effort will be required to help preserve the Basin’s catchment
areas for future generations. However, the HoA is rich in groundwater—which is resilient to climate
change and thus has huge potential to reduce fragility in the Horn region if properly exploited (see
Figure 3). The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the
Kenya Government recently announced the discovery of one of the world’s largest underground water
aquifers in the desert north of Turkana, and similar finds are being made elsewhere in the region. Studies
are needed to evaluate the potential and the vulnerability of these new water resources and assess how
they might be exploited to benefit the region’s populations.
F. Youth
33.
Unemployed young populations and weak economies are drivers of fragility. As the HoA
countries’ populations grow larger, most are also growing younger: the Horn countries now have some of
the most youthful populations in the world. In 2010 Uganda had a median age of 15.5 years and Somalia
a median age of 16 years. But demography and the “youth bulge” is not the entire problem; it is a
question of social and economic segregation. As the importance of the traditional decision-making
institutions erodes, young people are not finding ways to legitimately voice their concerns in the political
arena. Instead, the outlet for their frustration becomes the streets or the bush. In countries with rebel
movements and religious extremism, these angry young men become a fertile recruiting ground of fresh
soldiers for the cause. More attacks similar to Westgate in Kenya could deter foreign investment and
tourism, which supports hundreds of thousands of jobs across the region.
34.
Empirical results suggest a positive association between the growth of youth unemployment
and the brutality and incidence of violence.18 In Kenya, over 60 percent of the population is under 25
years of age, and an estimated 75 percent of out-of-school youths are unemployed. The unemployment
rate for youths in Somalia is one of the highest in the world, at 67 percent of all 14- to 29-year-olds.
Growing youthful populations demand our attention, especially given the sense of exclusion many of
them feel. Youth need alternatives to joining piracy, rebel groups, and organized crime—especially in
fragile states such as South Sudan and Somalia, where 70 percent of the population is under 30 years of
age.
18
Caruso, R., and E. Gavrilova. 2012. “Youth Unemployment, Terrorism and Political Violence: Evidence from the
Israeli/Palestinian Conflict.” Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy 18.
18
Figure 3. Groundwater Storage Potential in the Horn of Africa
G. Trade Issues
35.
Informal trade19 is highly significant, in both volume and value. Regional integration is
happening in an ad hoc way and outside of formal arrangements, though it is not without the risks of poor
quality control and labor and gender exploitation. The close social and economic ties linking people
across borders underpin trading networks that play a vital part in the region’s economic life. The value of
informal trade is notoriously hard to estimate, but fragmentary information suggests it is substantial.20
Much of the small-scale trade across borders in the Horn involves essential foodstuffs and basic
requirements such as medicines, clothing and fuel. The livestock trade is very important to the regional
economy; estimated in value at over $200 million annually. At least half the animals originate in eastern
Ethiopia;21 Somalia, Sudan, and Ethiopia are also major exporters of livestock.
36.
Social connections across borders will continue to facilitate the movement of people, goods,
and money that are necessary to underpin regional economic integration. Such networks strengthen
trade and can build the foundations for business and commerce. As an example, the growth in demand
and the lack of local production capacity in South Sudan have led to a sharp increase in cross-border trade
19
20
21
Informal trade is essentially a free trade area with elements of a common market in the movement of people and capital and
is localized in border regions
Healy, S. Hostage to Conflict: Prospects for Building Regional Economic Cooperation in the Horn of Africa. A Chatham
House Report, 2011.
Healy, S. op. cit.
19
between South Sudan and Uganda. For both formal and informal trade, South Sudan has been the single
largest destination of Uganda’s exports since 2007.22
37.
Most governments of the region are ranked poorly on trading across borders in the Doing
Business Report. By nature, landlocked countries receive lower Doing Business rankings than those with
deep sea ports, such as Djibouti (see Table 3). Nonetheless, Kenya’s poor ranking seriously affects South
Sudan and Uganda, since Kenya hosts the main port of entry for goods to those countries.
Table 3. Ranking in Trading across Borders (Doing Business 2014)
Country
Djibouti
Sudan
Kenya
Uganda
Ethiopia
Eritrea
South Sudan
a Out
Ranka
60
155
156
164
166
170
187
Documents
to export
(number)
5
7
8
7
7
10
10
Time to
export
(days)
20
32
26
30
44
50
55
Cost to
export
(US$ per
container)
885
2,050
2,255
2,800
2,180
1,460
5,335
Documents
to import
(number)
5
7
9
10
10
12
12
Time to
import
(days)
18
46
26
33
44
59
130
Cost to
import (US$
per
container)
910
2,900
2,350
3,375
2,760
1,600
9,285
of 189 economies.
38.
At the formal level, poor trade facilitation and weakness in institutions, regulations, and
currencies exact a major cost on intraregional trade. There is enormous potential for intraregional and
global trade. Exploiting opportunities for cross-border trade is likely to have a direct impact on incomes
and employment in the region and to improve outcomes for many households, particularly if the extensive
informal trade relations can be capitalized on. At the forefront of these opportunities are exports to the
global market from the new oil and gas yet to be developed. Some regional trade is taking place: Sudan
has started to supply petroleum products to Ethiopia, and Port Sudan has become an outlet for Ethiopian
agricultural exports. Ethiopia has introduced a licensing system to regulate cross-border trade with Sudan,
Kenya, Djibouti, and Somalia, governing the types of goods that can be traded, how often, and how far
from border posts goods can be traded. However, IGAD has lagged behind other Regional Economic
Communities (RECs) in negotiating and interpreting trade agreements, and the institutional framework to
resolve associated disputes is weak.
H. Public Health and Gender
39.
The HoA countries are not well prepared to respond to regional and global public health
threats. They have made limited progress on the delivery of regional public goods that are critical for
controlling or eliminating communicable diseases and promoting regional public health security. The
porous nature of borders, the rise in regional and global travel, and the highly mobile and nomadic
lifestyles in the HoA elevate the risk of disease outbreaks. The subregion faces multiple challenges, with
outbreak-prone diseases (cholera, meningitis, Kala-azar, and hemorrhagic fevers, including Ebola),
endemic diseases (multi-drug-resistant tuberculosis), and diseases with pandemic potential (influenza).
Many of these diseases are associated with or exacerbated by poverty, displacement, malnutrition,
illiteracy, and poor sanitation and housing. The Ebola outbreak in West Africa has underscored the
importance of a regional approach to communicable disease control, since weak health systems and
disease control capacities in one country can have negative repercussions for neighboring countries. It has
22
Yoshino, Ngungi & Asebe. Africa Trade Policy Notes: Enhancing the Recent Growth of Cross-Border Trade between South
Sudan and Uganda. Policy Note No. 21, World Bank. July, 2011.
20
served as a wake-up call to all countries on the importance of putting in place strong disease surveillance
and laboratory systems for monitoring disease patterns; accurately and quickly diagnosing pathogens; and
containing disease outbreaks to minimize human suffering, transmission, and mortality. Increased crossborder trade and economic activity in the HoA will necessitate simultaneous investments in strengthening
disease control efforts and outbreak preparedness.
40.
The benefits of empowering women during transitions out of fragility are many. At the
national level, women bring alternate voices to political processes, while at the community level they play
a vital role in building social cohesion and crafting conflict-resolution mechanisms.23 As economic actors
they are key to raising productivity and improving livelihoods—for example, through their important role
in pastoral and agricultural value-chains and communities. However, women face such obstacles as
limited land rights, lack of education,24 and antiquated social customs that often thwart their ability to
improve food security conditions for their families and their communities.
I. Illicit Money Flows and People Trafficking
41.
Corruption, piracy, trafficking in people and arms, terrorism, and related money flows are
significant and interconnected threats in the HoA. Illicit financial flows are one of the most damaging
economic problems facing Africa; it is estimated that the continent has lost $55.6 billion each year over
the past decade.25
42.
Money laundering and terrorist financing (ML/TF) are major challenges, and remittance
flows are perceived as a significant ML/TF risk. Somalia and Kenya represent the most visible ML/TF
risk in the region: Somalia has no effective financial regulatory institutions and essentially no formal
banking system. The World Bank is working to support government-led financial sector reforms which
will help to address ML/TF risk over time. In addition, the Bank is partnering with UK to pilot a “Safer
Corridor Initiative” with the objective to provide a temporary mechanism to continue the flow of
remittances from the UK to Somalia through secure, legitimate, accessible, and affordable channels by
reducing their exposure to the risk of abuse for illicit purpose. 26 A recent WBG study found that pirates
collected up to US$413 million between April 2005 and December 2012.
43.
People trafficking27 is a growing problem in the region. Persons are often victims of such
abuses as rape, torture, debt bondage, unlawful confinement, and threats against their family or other
people close to them, as well as other forms of physical, sexual, and psychological violence. Djibouti is a
key transit and destination country for people subjected to forced labor and sex trafficking. Over 80,000
men, women, and children from Ethiopia, Somalia, and Eritrea are estimated to have transited through
Djibouti as voluntary and undocumented economic migrants en route to Yemen and other locations in the
23
24
25
26
27
Ending Conflict and Building Peace in Africa: A Call to Action. High Level Panel on Fragile States, 2014.
On average, women receive less education than men across the HoA. For example, in Somalia, 50 percent of men and only
27 percent of women can read and write. These wide divisions in education reduce the women’s ability to improve their
family’s food security. The Impact of Gender and Land Rights on Food Security in the Horn of Africa. Civil-Military Fusion
Centre and Allied Operations Command, 2013.
Global Financial Integrity, Illicit Financial Flows from Developing Countries: 2002-2011, Washington DC, 2013.
Ethiopia and Kenya were placed on the FATF International Cooperation Review Group process for lack of progress in
addressing their deficiencies. Kenya exited the process in June 2014 based on its progress; Ethiopia is due for an on-site
visit before October 2014, the last step before de-listing.
Trafficking in people is defined as “the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of persons, by means of
threat, use of force or other means of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of
vulnerability or of the receiving or giving of payment… to a person having control over another person, for the purpose of
exploitation.” (Article 3 of the UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and
Children, Supplementing the UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime).
21
Middle East28. An unknown number of these migrants are subjected to conditions of forced labor and sex
trafficking upon arriving at these destinations.29
44.
As the World Development Report 2011 reveals, illicit flows and the criminal activities that
underlie them threaten not only security but also development. Addressing crime and insecurity is
key to economic development, financial inclusion, and poverty alleviation, and tackling illicit money
flows is one element of the response. Expanding the tools to combat illicit flows will require integrated
action by all countries, and by both the public and private sectors.
2.4. Working toward Regional Integration and Cooperation
45.
Despite the challenges the HoA faces, there are encouraging signs of political momentum for
enhanced regional economic interdependence, particularly through support to cross-border
infrastructure. The development of transport corridors to seaports, the management of shared water
resources, and improved energy security are all potential drivers of economic integration.
46.
Economic interdependence in the region is complex, and different stages of economic
integration coexist. Except for Kenya, countries in the region are building from a low economic base. In
the formal sector, Kenya and Uganda are members of the East African Community (EAC) and are
implementing a common market. South Sudan has applied for membership in the EAC, and Somalia also
wants to join. All IGAD members except Somalia are members of the Common Market for East and
Southern Africa (COMESA), but only Djibouti, Kenya, Sudan, and Uganda have acceded to the
COMESA Free Trade Area; Ethiopia has not signed COMESA’s zero tariff (hence the strength of its
informal sector). Manufacturing sectors and tax bases are small in most countries, and exports are limited
to a small number of overlapping primary commodities (such as coffee, livestock, seeds, and khat) to an
erratic and unpredictable global market. Meanwhile, the HoA countries depend heavily on manufactured
goods imported from outside the region. The result is a region in a disadvantaged trading position, with
countries largely in competition with each other and therefore with little incentive for trade liberalization.
47.
Some countries are showing strong political will to solve both security and development
issues through increased cooperation, though across the region it has not yet been possible to develop a
unified early warning system between IGAD, the EAC, and the East African Standby Force for detecting
and preventing regional conflict.





28
29
Ethiopia has sent troops to the joint UN-AU peacekeeping force in Darfur (UNAMID) to help
maintain peace and stability in that troubled region, has deployed 4,000 troops in Abyei to
maintain peace and stability for the UN Interim Security Force for Abyei, and is cooperating
with the Somali government to fight terrorism and extremism.
Kenya has also participated in prominent regional diplomatic initiatives and provided
leadership in solving regional conflicts, as it did during the Sudan peace process and more
recently through deploying troops in neighboring Somalia. In 2012 Kenya and Ethiopia
agreed that they would work closely together to promote peace and security.
Uganda has contributed over 2,500 troops to the African Union Mission in Somalia
(AMISOM), and it also has troops in the Central African Republic.
Djibouti recently sent its second contingent in support of AMISOM.
A number of the subregion’s governments have been very actively involved in IGAD-led
mediation efforts in South Sudan.
United States Department of State, 2014 Trafficking in Persons Report - Djibouti, June 20, 2014.
United States Department of State, 2014 Trafficking in Persons Report - Djibouti, June 20, 2014.
22
48.
Normalizing relations between neighboring states is one of the greatest development
challenges in the region. Cross-border politics is characterized today by mistrust, suspicion, and in some
cases hostility. Bringing an end to active and latent conflicts and border disputes will go a long way
toward stabilizing the region and creating a better environment for cooperation and common action to
address the region’s difficult development problems. A long history of conflict is recognized as an
especially unhelpful backdrop for furthering projects of economic integration.30
49.
Economic interconnections are affected by the region’s security dynamics. Countries of the
Horn have uneven patterns of engagement that are largely driven by the security agenda. For example,
because of long-standing conflict and contestation, Eritrea and Ethiopia do not cooperate on the potential
logistics corridor from landlocked Ethiopia to Eritrea’s coastal ports; and Somalia’s instability
discourages its neighbors from making more use of its ports for export. Any regional initiatives and
agreements must consider the issue of stability: countries may be unwilling to pursue seemingly fruitful
economic partnerships—such as formalizing trade routes or developing cross-border livelihood
approaches—that are perceived as undermining their security.
50.
Improving regional infrastructure connectivity can help to improve human development
and business competitiveness, and can also help to strengthen trust and cross-border collaboration.
Trade-driven economic growth is hindered by the region’s high transport costs and prices and by the
limited physical transport links between countries and between capitals and areas of economic activity.
There has been progress on regional ICT connectivity, especially since submarine fiber-optic cables
landed at Mombasa in 2009 and high-speed internet access spread inland to Uganda and Rwanda; but
across the region its potential to enhance integration and support diversification into a broader range of
economic activities is underexploited. Recognizing that cross-border cooperation is critical to more
connected and competitive markets to spur faster economic growth, several HoA countries are working to
strengthen their economic ties to their neighbors.
30

In recent years Ethiopia has embarked on ambitious cross-border infrastructure
development. Supplying hydroelectric power to Djibouti in 2011 was the first phase of
Ethiopia’s major regional strategy to export its abundant hydroelectric power; a connection
with Sudan was made in December 2013, and the Addis-Nairobi link is under development.
A further element of bilateral infrastructure cooperation was added in January 2013 when
ministers signed a contract to construct a pipeline to supply drinking water from Ethiopia to
Djibouti City. Ethiopia has also launched extensive road and rail construction to link
producers and consumers in border cities with Sudan, South Sudan, Djibouti, Somalia,
Somaliland, and Kenya. The Government of Ethiopia has as a high priority a functioning
transport corridor to Berbera Port in Somaliland (see Box 3)—a corridor that has the potential
to enhance economic development in the eastern part of the country and Somaliland.

Kenya is central to many key regional initiatives as it seeks integration and cooperation
as a way to advance its own economic prosperity. Not only does Kenya seek to be a
maritime gateway for South Sudan, Uganda, and southern Ethiopia, but it also views these
countries as markets for its good and services. Kenya’s development of the Lamu PortSouthern Sudan-Ethiopia Transport Corridor project has the potential to bring development to
large parts of its arid and underdeveloped northern territories while proving a more costefficient alternative to Mombasa for South Sudan and southern Ethiopia; and the first phase
may involve extending an oil pipeline to Juba.
Healy, S., op. cit.
23

Djibouti has accelerated plans for regional economic integration, building on close ties
with Ethiopia. Ports are central to the country’s geo-strategic importance in military and
economic terms and are a conduit for Ethiopian trade and a platform for the transshipment of
goods. Existing port upgrades and electricity grid integration are to be enhanced by the
development of the northern port of Tadjourah. Recent agreements suggest that both Chinese
and Arab actors are also keen to back Djibouti’s economic vision as a strategic regional hub.
51.
The region is about to undergo dramatic and lasting change when oil production starts in
Kenya, Uganda, and possibly Somalia and Ethiopia. Sudan and South Sudan are currently the Horn’s
only oil producers, though almost every state in East Africa has announced that it has substantial oil and
gas reserves. To Uganda’s more than 2 billion barrels of reserves have been added oil finds in Ethiopia’s
south Omo region and in Kenya’s Turkana. Somaliland has signed production-sharing agreements with
foreign firms on areas yet to be drilled. More adventurous exploration companies also report substantial
prospects along Somalia’s coastline that need to be tested by drilling.
52.
Oil and gas discoveries are changing the regional economic geography reinformcing the
need to ensure countries and their populations are well placed to benefit from this resource
windfall. In addition to the potential revenue and investments required, the possible reorientation of oil
flows from Southern Sudan and Uganda is likely to substantially alter the political relations between these
two countries and neighboring Kenya. Uganda hopes to shake off its dependence on imports and is
looking to explore its own refining capacity and have capacity for crude exported from South Sudan.
Kenya, for its part, is aiming to secure its regional position by developing a port at Lamu, and it has
ambitious plans for regional pipeline development with which to service the needs of both Uganda and
South Sudan. For Ethiopia, Somaliland, and Puntland, excitement about oil prospects has been muted by
fears of increased conflicts—oil here is located in disputed zones where insecurity threatens the
development of the industry.31
Box 3. The Berbera – Addis Ababa Corridor
As the HoA takes off economically, import-export corridors and sea routes will become ever more important. The
Berbera-Addis Corridor extends from the Berbera Sea Port, on the south coast of the Gulf of Aden in Somaliland,
eastward through eastern Ethiopia to Addis Ababa. Of the total distance of around 940 km, 696 km are in Ethiopia
and 244 km in Somaliland.
The port and the associated road corridor are strategically important. The Government of landlocked Ethiopia is
keen to expand the country’s limited maritime access. Berbera, which is almost the same distance as Djibouti from
Addis Ababa, is well placed as an alternative port to serve Ethiopia and its neighbors. Competition between ports
can be effective in driving down costs and improving operational performance. Support to a development corridor
would better exploit the agricultural potential in the southern and eastern parts of the country, encouraging
enhanced international exports through value addition and the creation of cross-border supply chains.
The northern Somali livestock trade involves the annual export of at least $200 million worth of live animals
through the ports of Berbera, Bosasso, and Djibouti across the Gulf of Aden—said to be the largest movement of
live animal trade anywhere in the world.a The emergence of Djibouti as a major livestock export hub is in large
part due to the stamp of credibility that a sovereign country can bring to the sensitive issue of livestock health
regulations. The Somali pastoral economy is a critical platform for economic interdependence, linking the port of
Berbera with Somaliland’s interior rangelands and those of Ethiopia’s Somali Region. The people of Ethiopia’s
Somali Region, the Ogaden, will always have links to their kin and neighbors over the border as a result of ethnic
and trade connections, and a more regulated trade environment has the potential to reduce political stresses and
conflict
31
Anderson and Browne. The politics of oil in eastern Africa. Journal of Eastern African Studies, 2011.
24
Enhanced port operations in Somaliland would also support the broader macro economy. Besides having strong
potential for generating jobs, services, investment opportunities, and revenues, the Berbera corridor could serve as
a regional model for development through expanded private sector activities.
The existing road in Ethiopia connecting Addis Ababa to the border with Somaliland at Tog Wajaale is paved
throughout, but it follows a difficult alignment, passing through mountainous terrain. The Government of Ethiopia
has identified a shorter route that avoids these highlands and that would also be used by traffic to Djibouti Port. To
help mobilize external funding, a recent technical feasibility and design report funded by the European
Commissionb has prepared six different tender packages for the road segments in Somaliland that require
upgrading.
The Berbera Corridor cannot function as a transit route if the border crossing between Somaliland and Ethiopia is
not properly controlled. Strengthening the Somaliland Customs Department and improving the efficiency of the
Berbera port operation are also key objectives.
______________________
a
Livestock Trade in the Djibouti, Somali and Ethiopian Borderlands: Nisar Majid, Chatham House briefing paper, 2010.
Study and Detailed Design for Berbera – Togochale Road. Engineering Report, August 2014. Funded by the
European Commission and presented by HP Gauff Ingenieure GmbH & Co.
b Feasibility
25
3. WORLD BANK GROUP INITIATIVE
53.
Early consultation with governments in the region and with development partners has
ensured buy-in and informed the choices made by the WBG. Unlike for the Great Lakes initiative,
which was prepared in a short time, the preparation lead time for this initiative has allowed for a
structured consultative process to build consensus and to demonstrate the additionality it would bring to
the ongoing national and regional programs being supported by multiple stakeholders. The process also
informed the development of diplomatic, policy, and operational choices that were aided by efforts to
understand ongoing and planned partner activities. In addition, the consultations allowed for expectations
to be managed, not least in the context of the WBG’s relatively constrained financing envelope, set
against the wider needs of the region. The consultative process involved regular dialogue with key
development partners and visits to a number of countries in the region in partnership with the IGAD.
Annex I gives details of the lessons learned from the Great Lakes and Sahel and the 2011 drought
emergency response, which informed the process and design of this initiative; Annex II gives an
illustrative overview of key interventions by certain partners which are aligned with the themes of the
initiative; Annex III explains how the proposed program is aligned with IGAD’s strategy and ongoing
operations; and Annex IV provides highlights of ongoing WBG country programs.
54.
Analysis and consultations confirm the need to seek more collaborative solutions among
countries to the issues of fragility, vulnerability, and insecurity in the HoA—issues that do not
respect national boundaries. There is recognition at the highest levels of government that, for
development to be both successful and sustainable, a stronger regional political dimension will need to be
a key part of the solution. Through IGAD, the countries of the Horn have a well-articulated vision of their
future as a more peaceful, prosperous, and integrated region—a vision with which this initiative is fully
aligned. Governments are developing a political and diplomatic agenda to accompany the development
program, building on the WBG’s and others’ regional and country programs.
55.
The WBG initiative proposes supporting a selective number of operations that are focused
on the region’s challenges and that have strong country ownership. There will be ample room for
partners to take up other parts of this agenda. The regional approach to the Horn will be built on two
interrelated pillars—vulnerability and resilience, and economic opportunity and integration—with crosscutting themes of security, youth and private sector development.
56.
The key aims of the proposed regional approach are to:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
Reduce vulnerability in mobile cross-border populations and host communities through
collective cross-border action;
Strengthen disease control efforts in cross-border areas by improving diagnosis and
surveillance capacities;
Improve regional connectivity through support to cross-border infrastructure investments
focused on the ICT and transport sectors;
Increase the resilience of people living in extreme poverty in selected border zones; and
Promote the regional development of the extractives industry through support for developing
skills, policy, and infrastructure.
Implementation of the two pillars will emphasize youth employment as a key factor in mitigating the
causes and effects of regional insecurity and destabilization as well as the important role of the private
sector in providing solutions to the challenges identified.
26
Pillar I.
Vulnerability and Resilience
57.
Pillar I will address two main issues: (a) the acute vulnerabilities of refugees, IDPs, and returnees
in the region, as well as the impact of population displacement on host communities, and (b) the need for
better regional health outcomes.
3.1. Vulnerabilities of Refugees, IDPs, Returnees, and Host Communities
58.
The primary objectives are to:

Enhance the productive capacities and coping mechanisms of displaced populations to
allow them to contribute to the local economy in their areas of displacement,
recognizing that displacement is mostly protracted. This effort will include support to
increase livelihood opportunities for displaced populations and their host communities in a
way that promotes social cohesion and mitigates tension. Such support will be provided with
the overall aim of preparing the displaced for return, when that is possible. Support will also
aim to improve the voice and inclusion of vulnerable groups, including IDPs and refugees, in
processes for development planning and social accountability.

Promote durable social and economic reintegration for voluntary returnees. This effort
will include support for restitution of land and shelter, promotion of livelihoods, and
expanded access to services for both returnees and their receiving communities, as well as
strengthened mechanisms for local governance (with a focus on voice and social inclusion)
and the peaceful resolution of conflicts related to land and other disputes.
59.
The program focus is aligned with the Bank’s comparative advantage and would demand a
multidisciplinary response and strong partnerships for delivery, in particular with relevant UN
agencies. Strong political will between neighboring countries and across the region will be key to
ensuring that there is agreement on priority cross-border action, particularly given governments’ different
policy stances toward refugees. The following are preliminary ideas for operations developed after
consultations with UNHCR; they still need to be discussed further with Bank country teams,
governments, development partners, and potential beneficiaries.
(a)
32
The Somalia situation.
With over 2.2 million Somalis displaced inside Somalia or in the
HoA, forced displacement for extended periods is a challenge that requires urgent attention.
Finding durable solutions for the refugees and IDPs requires addressing the following
development challenges: (i) improving the delivery of services, including education and
health facilities; and (ii) improving livelihood opportunities for the IDPs, returnees, and host
communities. Since the Kenyan and Somali governments and UNHCR signed the November
2013 Tripartite Agreement, a number of efforts have been made to facilitate the voluntary
repatriation of the Somali refugees: for example, pilot projects in Baidowa, Luq, and
Kismayo are supporting the return of refugees, and regional initiatives (such as the Solutions
Alliance-Somalia and Global Initiative for Somali Refugees32) have been created.
The Solutions Alliance was launched at the Copenhagen Roundtable held on April 2-3, 2014. The roundtable brought
together a range of humanitarian actors, development organizations, affected states, donor nations, academics, the private
sector, and other actors to contribute to addressing new approaches to forced displacement. The UN Global Initiative on
Somali Refugees aims to assist in the voluntary repatriation of Somali refugees from several East African countries.
27
(b)
South Sudanese in Kenya.
Over 43,000 refugees have arrived from South Sudan to Turkana
since December 15, 2013. The WB Kenya Country Unit is preparing to undertake an
economic social impact analysis in Turkana to inform policy and development interventions
benefiting refugees and host communities in Turkana County. World Bank operations could
contribute to addressing some of the development challenges and create economic
opportunities for the host and refugee communities while UNHCR could provide minimal
humanitarian assistance to the most vulnerable. In this way refugees would become less
dependent on humanitarian handouts. The approach would also bring economic development
to the area to the benefit of the locals, even after the refugees return home. Newly discovered
water resources in the area might be used for irrigated agricultural production.
(c)
Ethiopia. With around 630,000 refugees—mainly Somali and South Sudanese—in its
territory, Ethiopia hosts the largest numbers of refugees of any country in Africa. The
situation of the refugees in Shire, Dollo Ado, and other areas of the country demonstrates the
generosity of the Ethiopian Government and the host communities. However, the presence of
a large number of refugees is leading to environmental degradation and increasing
competition over scarce resources. Although the economies of the refugee-hosting areas have
been stimulated by the presence of the refugees, as well as by international and national
agencies, increased food and fuel prices are affecting the poorer members of the host
communities. To some extent, members of the host communities are benefiting from health
and education services offered to the refugees, although there is an enormous need to extend
basic services in these very poor, underserved areas of the host country. A development
intervention addressing refugee-hosting areas in Ethiopia needs to focus on building the
resilience of host communities by addressing the negative environmental and economic
impacts while investing in infrastructure that creates better economic opportunities for the
refugees and host communities, to better prepare refugees to return to their countries of
origin.
60.
Durable solutions for the displaced are a necessity for creating peace and development.
There is a need for a broad vision that includes both host communities and displaced people in a
comprehensive social and economic development effort. There is demand for a new “financial
architecture for durable solutions.” Kenya’s new devolution policy provides a unique opportunity to
address decentralized regional development and displacement together. The new governors for Wajir,
Garissa, and Turkana have approached UNHCR and the international community requesting assistance
with the budgetary and capacity stresses of hosting many refugees. Annex VI provides background
information on the displacement situation in the Horn of Africa.
61.
Greater attention must be given to women and children and victims of gender-based
violence; in particular, they must receive the poverty reduction and livelihood support that is
largely missing from the overall response to conflict-related sexual violence. Because women who are
raped are often shunned by their husbands and communities, they and their children are often homeless
and destitute. It is therefore critical that poverty reduction strategies and programs have a specific focus
on and provision for the victims of sexual violence. The response should include the provision of basic
economic needs and livelihood support to enable survivors to pick up the pieces of their shattered lives
and care for their families.
28
3.2. Support to Communicable Disease Surveillance, Diagnosis, and
Treatment
62.
Expansion of the East Africa Public Health Laboratory Networking Project. The HoA
region is ill prepared to deal with regional and global public health threats. National capacities are highly
variable and fragmented, and regional collaboration is inadequate. High levels of migration and refugee
movements across porous borders elevate the threat of communicable disease outbreaks. The emergence
of drug-resistant strains of TB also raises serious public health concerns, given the risk of cross-border
and global transmission. The region faces new threats from emerging global epidemics, such as Ebola and
H1N1 influenza. While some countries (Kenya, Uganda) in the HoA are working closely with
neighboring countries (Rwanda, Tanzania, Burundi) to strengthen disease surveillance and diagnostic
capacity, much more needs to be done to build regional capacity for efficient cross-border disease control.
The development objective of the project is to establish a network of efficient, high-quality, accessible
public health laboratories for the diagnosis and surveillance of TB and other communicable diseases. To
this end, the project will (a) strengthen capacity to rapidly diagnose communicable diseases of public
health importance and share information to mount an effective regional response (Component I);
(b) conduct joint training and capacity building to expand the pool of qualified laboratory technicians
(Component II); and (c) carry out joint operational research and promote knowledge sharing to enhance
the evidence base for these investments (Component III). These activities are consistent with the broader
health policy documents of the participating countries, currently Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, and Rwanda.
The initiative could support the expansion of the East Africa Public Health Laboratory Networking
project to Ethiopia and possibly other HoA countries.
63.
Support to the IGAD Regional HIV/AIDS Partnership Program. The IGAD program seeks to
facilitate the delivery of needed services to targeted cross-border and mobile populations, migrants,
refugees, returnees, and IDPs to reduce the spread of HIV/AIDS, provide care, and mitigate its impact.
Through regional cooperation coordinated by IGAD, member countries are developing mechanisms for
continuity of services across borders, including referral systems in selected sites, and are developing a
regional strategy for improved and sustainable HIV/AIDS/STI prevention, treatment, and care services
directed to cross-border and mobile populations. An expansion of this project could be considered under
the initiative.
29
Pillar II.
Economic Opportunity and Integration
3.3. Connectivity
Transport
64.
Regional transport infrastructure connectivity in the subregion is weak even by the
standards of Sub-Saharan African (see Figure 4). A container sent from Malawi to Ethiopia is routed
through Mozambique to Beira, by sea to Djibouti, and then overland to Addis, and takes four months to
arrive. A container sent from China to Ethiopia takes a maximum of three weeks. Improving regional
connectivity will require a focused, coordinated approach by governments, development partners, and the
private sector. The Berbera corridor is a good example of what might be possible by creatively combining
resources and a political agreement.
Figure 4.Transport Connectivity in the Horn of Africa
65.
The initiative will support the second phase of the South-Sudan – Eastern Africa Regional
Transport, Trade and Development Facilitation Program. The overall program is focused on creating
a direct route from Juba in South Sudan through Kenya to Mombasa Port, as part of broader national- and
regional-level infrastructure planning. Upgrading the development corridor has the potential to be
30
transformative for several reasons: it will (a) encourage the development and exploitation of the massive
agricultural potential (forestry, fishery, tea, coffee, cereals, live animals, and animal products) in South
Sudan, creating jobs and livelihoods in that area and enhancing regional food security through
intraregional trade; (b) provide a more efficient corridor for goods imported to South Sudan, both
lowering the costs to consumers in that country and making South Sudan a more attractive export
destination for goods from Kenya; (c) provide critical infrastructure for the extractives industries to
support exploitation of oil in South Sudan, Uganda, and Northern Kenya in particular, and potentially of
other minerals; and (d) facilitate the delivery of social and administrative services and promotion of
commercial services, including storage facilities and roadside businesses. The road transport
infrastructure along the corridor from Eldoret in Kenya to Juba (a distance of over 1000 km) is in poor
condition and is the main focus of the program, which is being carried out in close partnership with the
AfDB, EU, Japan International Cooperation Agency, and China’s Export-Import Bank. The program will
also promote sound trade facilitation measures that will help to reduce non-tariff barriers and strengthen
the institutional and legal framework to enhance the efficiency of border management and cross-border
coordination. This should reduce the time and costs for traded goods and lower the prices that consumers
pay.
66.
Phase I of the program, approved by the World Bank Board in FY14, is an US$80 million
investment project financing for South Sudan, supporting (a) the construction and rehabilitation of
bridges between Kapoeta and Nadapal, and the upgrading of approximately 30 km of the Kapoeta-Narus
section of the Juba-Nadapal-Eldoret corridor; (b) the facilitation of regional transport, trade, and
development promotion measures to increase the efficiency of the corridor; (c) the development of
institutional capacity in roads and customs, and in program management; and (d) the construction of a
fiber-optic cable to connect Juba, Torit, and Kapoeta with high-speed broadband Internet.
67.
Phase II, to be supported by the HoA initiative, will mostly support activities in Kenya,
including financing for 300 km of road infrastructure from Nadapal to Eldoret. It will also have a strong
trade facilitation component in that sustainability will be guaranteed through the innovative use of an
output-based long-term maintenance contract.
Access to broadband
68.
Broadband connectivity boosts overall economic productivity and stimulates job creation,
enables improved service delivery by both governments and the private sector, and can help
promote resilience. World Bank research indicates a strong link between broadband and economic
growth: a 10 percent points in broadband penetration increases the GDP growth rate by 1.38 percentage
points in developing economies. Broadband connectivity provides jobs—both directly, through the
construction and operation of networks, and indirectly, by boosting entrepreneurship and selfemployment. Investment in international broadband connectivity also has a galvanizing effect on other
parts of the economy, such as trade, remittances, and mobile money, which are currently constrained by
unreliable local networks. Finally, broadband connectivity can enable better government service delivery
to remote or neglected populations, facilitate citizen feedback and engagement, and enable real-time early
warning systems for such areas as regional disease outbreak, drought risk, and conflict.
69.
Even though the Red Sea is a thoroughfare for many major international cables, some of
the HoA countries have the highest prices for bandwidth and lowest levels of broadband services
penetration of any region of the world. The challenges include inadequate international and regional
connectivity and noncompetitive markets in several of the countries in the region. The HoA’s average
broadband services (mobile and fixed) penetration of around 1.5 percent compares unfavorably to the
Africa Region’s 4 percent and the rates of some high performers—such as Morocco, with 12.5 percent,
31
and South Africa, with 9.8 percent.33 Connectivity is also unevenly distributed in the region. Countries
such as Eritrea, Somalia, and South Sudan have little or no broadband connectivity services (through
terrestrial and/or sea fiber optic) services and infrastructure, and Somalia acquired its first fiber-optic
cables in 2014. However, Kenya has benefitted from World Bank financing worth about US$200 million
under the Regional Communications Infrastructure Program34 and from investments by IFC and other
donors and private partners in the East African Submarine Cable System, and it is already demonstrating
the transformational effect that low-cost bandwidth can bring. Since 2007, when fiber-optic cables landed
for the first time, it is estimated that ICT has contributed 30 percent of Kenya’s overall GDP growth35.
(1.5% per year).36 (Box 4 describes Djibouti’s experience.)
Box 4. Broadband Infrastructure and Connectivity in Djibouti
The telecom sector in Djibouti (almost 872,000 inhabitants) is characterized by a state monopoly. All telecom
services (fixed, mobile, and Internet) are all provided by a unique state-owned operator Djibouti Telecom. For the
past 20 years, Djibouti Télécom has developed a now internationally recognized expertise in submarine cable
management and has focused on the development of its international connectivity. With six submarine cables
operational, Djibouti Télécom manages an enormous international capacity. In addition, Djibouti Télécom has
recently acquired a point of presence from the international provider Level 3. This allows Djibouti to drain most of
the Internet traffic in the sub-region, and to propose high-quality service to ISPs operating in the HoA . Djibouti is
now the only country on the African continent to own a point of presence of that capacity. Furthermore, Djibouti
continues its infrastructure development: within the next 12 months two new cables (Sea-Me-We 5 and a new
Djibouti-Yemen cable) and a terrestrial link to the Eritrea border are expected. Despite this growing international
connectivity, Djibouti has one of the lowest penetration rates for mobile and fixed broadband in the Middle East
and North Africa Region. The current ADSL subscribers base (less than 18,000 subscribers, representing 2.2% of
population) uses the service in Djibouti-city only. Penetration rate of mobile broadband in Djibouti is among the
lowest in the world, since only 1.6% of the population has access (compared to 43% in Cape Verde in 2013).
70.
The initiative will support a coordinated regional program focused on three interrelated
areas: (a) addressing key connectivity gaps; (b) improving the enabling environment, including providing
regulatory support to promote competition and private investment; and (c) leveraging improved
connectivity to improve public service delivery, business transactions, and payment systems, and to
facilitate regional integration and trade. The three areas would be addressed in each of the participating
countries, based on the country’s needs and priorities. Phase A would support Uganda and South Sudan
($100 million IDA), and Phases B and C would support Somalia and potentially Djibouti, depending on
each country’s readiness for and commitment to enabling environment reform (up to $100 million IDA +
multi-donor trust fund (MDTF) for Somalia). (Table 4 and Figure 5 show the top priorities for this work.)
Besides using IDA and Somalia MDTF funds, the costs could also be financed through private sector
contributions under public-private partnership (PPP) schemes and the contributions of other donor
partners. In addition to the main backbone links, emphasis would be placed on extending connectivity to
border and other underserved areas. In each scenario, PPPs would be leveraged to obtain maximum value
for money.
33
Adapted from Telegeography data and reports.
A third phase, estimated at US$30 million, is expected to be approved in March 2104.
35 ` McKinsey Study on the transformative impact of Internet
http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/high_tech_telecoms_internet/lions_go_digital_the_internets_transformative_potential_in
_africa
34
36
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:22779917~pagePK:64257043~piPK:437376~theSitePK:4607,00.
html
32
Table 4. Key Connectivity Gaps in the HoA and Illustrative Investments to Fill Them
Missing link
(countries)
Somalia (Somaliland,
Puntland, South
Central) – Djibouti Eritrea Submarine
Cable
Description (routing and rationale)
Undersea fiber-optic cable linking Eritrea to Djibouti to Berbera and Bosaso. The cable
would link the last unconnected coastal nation in Africa (Eritrea) and Somaliland and
Puntland in Somalia, with Djibouti, which has the single highest concentration of cables
anywhere on the continent. The cable would cover a relatively short distance but would
serve several major cities. Estimated cost: $30 million.
Somalia International
Backbone Network
National backbone network linking the new fiber that has arrived in Somaliland
(SOMcable) and Mogadishu (EASSy), south through Kismayo and ultimately providing
connection to the liquid telecom cable across the Kenyan border. The backbone network
would also link Mogadishu by terrestrial fiber to the different economic zones, including
intermediate population centers such as Garowe and Galkayo, and would add resilience to
the network through redundant connections. Estimated cost: $65 million. Since Somalia is
not IDA-eligible, funding under the Somalia MDTF could be considered donor resources
are available and the Government is in agreement, in combination with private investment
and the IFC.
Ethiopia

International
Backbone Network
Ethiopia, which has borders with six HoA countries, has a potentially critical role in
ensuring connectivity in the region. New fiber links could include (a) reinforcement of the
Djibouti-Addis terrestrial cable, to provide redundancy and accommodate additional
regional traffic from South Sudan; (b) extension of the existing fiber-optic network in
Eastern Ethiopia, which currently serves Gambela, including a link to South Sudan
(interconnection with the fiber running from Juba to Lokichoggio in Northern Kenya, which
the World Bank is financing under the South Sudan – EA Regional Trade, Transport and
Development Facilitation Program (SS-EARTTDF); and (c) extension of the existing
network into Sudan, to provide redundancy for the gateway in Port Sudan. Estimated cost:
$70 million.
South Sudan
International
Backbone Network
Like Ethiopia, South Sudan has a strategic location that positions it to play a critical role as
a regional connectivity hub. New fiber links radiating from Juba could include connections
to Nimule on the Ugandan border, to CAR for onward connectivity to Bangui, and to
Ethiopia for onward connectivity to Addis. These links would provide diversity for the
planned link from Juba to Kenya under SS-EARTTDF, which already has financing.
Estimated cost: $38 million.
Uganda International
Backbone Network
Strengthening
New fiber-optic links to extend the reach of Uganda’s National Backbone Infrastructure to
additional border crossings and all regions of the country, and to improve its resilience and
availability by creating more rings benefiting domestic users and other countries (South
Sudan, Rwanda, and potentially DRC) using Uganda as their primary or back-up transit
routes to the submarine cables. The new links are expected to be in the northern and southwestern regions of Uganda. A study to prioritize the missing links will be completed by the
end of 2014.
33
Figure 5. Existing and Missing Broadband Links in the HoA
71.
Besides closing the physical connectivity gaps, it is perhaps even more important to address
the enabling environment to encourage a competitive private sector market for communications
services. Thriving competition, paired with quality infrastructure networks, has been shown to
dramatically improve affordability and access to ICT services in even the most rural areas in countries
such as Kenya. The proposed program will address the following critical elements and technical support
as relevant in each of the participating countries to ensure a strong enabling environment:
(a) Open-access principles in all network infrastructure investments. All government - or PPPfinanced - infrastructure must be available for use on equal terms by all operators (current and
future).
(b) Private sector participation in state-owned enterprises. Three of the IGAD countries
(Djibouti, Eritrea, and Ethiopia) currently have full state-owned monopolies, resulting in highcost, poor-quality connectivity.
(c) Sector liberalization, and the introduction of competition in monopoly markets, including by
building the capacity of the regulator, introducing new operator licenses, and supporting the
implementation of reforms.
(d) Establishing independent regulation in countries that lack a regulator, such as South Sudan
and Somalia.
(e) Regulatory frameworks and platforms for mobile money and ecommerce, to encourage the
greater use of mobile money and offer some basic level of security for users.
72.
Finally, connectivity will be leveraged to provide new and improved government services
and promote provision of new e-services by the private sector and civil society, including to
34
underserved mobile and host populations. Government service applications, to be developed, will
target vulnerable and underserved populations and will be adapted to the particular country’s context,
opportunities, and needs. Boosted connectivity and better regulation will also enable innovation by the
private sector and other actors to provide valuable new services, including mobile money (domestic
transactions and international remittances), which is especially important to mobile and displaced
populations; mobile weather and market information to boost farming and livestock productivity and
livelihoods; and improved health and education applications.
3.4. Cross-border Growth and Stability Program
73.
Trans-border trade and the creation of trans-border markets offer opportunities for
building resilience along the Horn’s unstable border zones. Economic exchanges that build on
tradition and culture could strengthen governance and address instability. In many areas, a vibrant
informal commercial economy creates shared interests and alliances across communities and borders.
Strengthening these ties and deregulating trade in such a way as to develop market-based cooperation and
economic security could bring enormous benefits. When communities are fractured across borders,
regional initiatives can enhance stability by rebuilding social trust and developing a cohesive sense of
community and identity.
74.
HoA countries are increasingly committed to building stability and strengthening
governance in the borderlands, which provide a haven for extremist groups, violent criminals, and illicit
economic activities. The region could capitalize on thriving informal trade routes and the versatility and
interconnectedness of its business communities, but it often does not because of concerns over territorial
and political control of border areas. Thus countries have largely resisted opportunities to deregulate
trade, soften borders, and develop cross-border livelihoods, seeing such activity as being at odds with
their own security agenda.
75.
A successful cross-border program would be beneficial for all the border communities,
contribute to the region’s economic stability, and manage common social, economic, and strategic
cooperation to maximize the growth potential of the local economies. Often the communities in these
areas tend to be peripheral, though they are capable of contributing greatly to regional peace and security
if their commercial potential is opened up. IGAD should be placed in a strategic role to facilitate the softborder approach, with support by the AU, World Bank, and other partners.
76.
It is necessary to take an inclusive, integrated approach to supporting local governance,
border management, and trade facilitation. This will require the development of border controls even
where local security and state actors may be ineffective or corrupt. Local populations should be actively
included, as their knowledge and networks can help to stabilize borders and address illicit trade. Local
communities have proven capacity to build informal systems of protection and use the rule of law to deter
and mitigate trans-border crime and violence.
77.
The program would provide support for a limited number of border zones that are
characterized by high levels of forced displacement and/or insecurity. It would be aligned to the
priorities identified by participating governments and the African Union’s Border Programme, which has
the general objective of preventing conflicts and promoting regional integration. Figure 6 reflects an
initial effort by the WBG to spatially map projects by key development partners; in Sudan, for example,
the UNDP works with various partners on community stabilization and the reduction of small arms
proliferation. Overall, however, as Figure 6 shows, there are very few active projects in remote
borderlands regions across the HoA; thus the WBG plans to launch a broader partnership on borderlands
35
in collaboration with IGAD and other partners to ensure that programming gaps are identified and
priorities properly set.
Figure 6. Geo-mapping of the Active Projects of the WBG, UNDP, UNOPS, and AfDB37
78.
Under this initiative, the first operations could support borderlands where there are high
concentrations of people who are forcibly displaced; subsequent operations could then be informed
by a growth and stability diagnostic of the region. Support to the Karamoja Cluster offers an
interesting test case; lessons from Uganda might be replicated in northern Kenya, South Sudan, and
southern Ethiopia. Annex VII outlines initial WBG thinking on the issue on borderlands.
3.5. Extractives
79.
The HoA is on the cusp of an oil-driven economic revolution. Over 70 years after the first
exploration well was drilled in Lake Albert (1938), a combination of improved technologies and higher
oil prices make smaller oil fields in “frontier” regions commercially viable for the first time. To reduce
37
Projects for which geo-coded data is available.
36
dependence on costly petroleum product imports, the region can look forward to supplying its own
needs38 and becoming a net exporter to international markets. Gas produced in association with oil can
potentially be harnessed for local energy generation (as is planned in Uganda), although at this stage the
gas resource base appears to be limited. The hydrocarbon potential in the HoA includes such yet-to-becommercialized gas, as well as oil prospects in the early stages of investigation in Ethiopia, and potential
oil resources offshore from Somalia.39
80.
Oil resources in Uganda, Kenya, and South Sudan need access to export markets; for this,
both regional connectivity and economic cooperation will be needed (see Figure 7). Several oil
companies are taking positions, both upstream and in potential pipeline and port facility developments.
Projects that could eventually support up to 500,000 barrels a day of crude oil for a mix of local refining
and export to the Far East are at stake (equivalent to nearly US$20 billion annually at today’s prices).
81.
Clarifying policy frameworks and building the requisite regulatory oversight are important
for progress. The scope for harnessing petroleum resources for sustainable development will depend, in
the first instance, on ensuring a stable base for investments to take place. By capturing the rents generated
by such investments, governments should be able to create the fiscal space to strengthen state institutions.
If countries manage their natural resource endowments well, they can amass the financial resources to
support smart investments in human development, infrastructure, and the promotion of new sources of
economic growth. The development of a region-wide petroleum sector and associated transport corridors
could also provide spin-off benefits more directly through supply chains and the opening up of market
channels for agricultural products. The generation and allocation of revenues, which are typically prone to
rent-seeking, and the impacts of petroleum-based development on fragility and the environment, will all
need careful management. Expectations are prone to inflation, and a realistic assessment will be needed
of how the opportunities presented by resource abundance can be seized.
82.
Oil and gas discoveries could enhance regional collaboration; but if insufficient attention is
paid now to the development of affected communities, such discoveries could be a source of future
conflict. Disputes in border zones may be intensified by discoveries of oil and gas. Collaboration and
robust arrangements for the allocation and use of benefits will be essential to avoid tensions and promote
regional cooperation. Besides having weak mechanisms for negotiating and resolving trade disputes,
countries in the region tend to engage in bilateral negotiations involving only two or maybe three
countries, rather than seeking greater regional potential and thus avoiding the establishment of
competitive initiatives (such as oil pipelines or railway routes).40
38
39
40
The very difficult logistics involved with providing the partially landlocked region with fuel for generators is increasingly
recognized as a constraint on industrial development.
Three or four international oil companies are expected to begin 2D seismic exploration campaigns in Somaliland in 2014. In
Somalia, a new UK-based oil company, Soma Oil and Gas Company, has signed a contract with the Somali Federal
Government for seismic exploration. BP and Shell, which acquired onshore and offshore exploration blocks in the 1980s,
are in talks with the Government to have their production-sharing agreements restored.
Horn of Africa Regional Fragility Assessment, World Bank, 2014.
37
Figure 7. Existing Oil Fields, Refineries, and Pipelines in the Horn of Africa
83.
Regional universities have largely ignored teaching oil and gas-related courses41 (see
Figure 8). In an annual industry HR assessment, Schlumberger estimates that Africa will require at least
an additional 4,300 petroleum professionals by 2020 to support production growth. In the same survey,
international companies report that over 75 percent of local recruitment is not achieved.42 The paucity of
petroleum professionals is a growing global problem, and the Horn region will have to compete in the
global marketplace for talent.
41
42
Kenya estimates it will require over 30,000 engineers across multiple disciplines if it is to achieve its Vision 2030 goal of
becoming a middle-income economy, and it has agreed funding from the AfDB to support education and training.
Schlumberger Business Consulting’s Oil & Gas HR Benchmark, 2012. The survey provides information on trends involving
petrotechnical professionals—geoscientists and petroleum engineers. The annual study has become a reference for
exploration and production executives seeking to understand industry trends and develop HR strategies.
38
Figure 8. Supply of Petroleum Professionals (PTPs) in Africa
Source: Schlumberger Business Consulting’s Oil & Gas HR Benchmark, 2012.
84.
The initiative will support the regional development of the extractives sector, with a focus
on oil and gas, in the following ways:
(a)
Regional pipeline development. The WBG would support interested governments in
developing an appropriate framework agreement and instruments for a regional approach to
pipeline development. This could include the establishment of a consortium, equitable
principles to allow the transport of oil through future pipelines, freedom of transit of oil,
principles for transit fees and tariffs, use of WBG partial risk guarantee (PRG) products,
lending operations, political insurance, principles regarding investment protection, and
currency and taxation commitments. This support would also include environmental and
social impact assessments for proposed pipelines. South Sudan is exploring options for an
alternative pipeline export route and has commissioned a consulting firm to develop
feasibility studies for the possible export routes: (i) connection to the Uganda-Kenya pipeline,
or (ii) a new line from Ethiopia to Djibouti. The South Sudan portion of the pipeline is
expected to cost $4-5 billion, and the total cost from Uganda to Kenya would cost an
additional $12-15 billion.
(b)
Extension of the Bank’s tertiary education project to engineering faculties in the Horn
region to train petroleum professionals. Overseas academic institutions would be
encouraged to partner with African institutions to build their training capabilities for the
sector, and government officials would be supported to study abroad or to take up
secondments—for example, with partner countries that have strong experience with
extractives. Unless there are serious attempts to build local capacity, companies will have no
qualms about importing talent from outside the region, which will mean a huge missed
opportunity for local skills development. With the anticipated expansion of ports in the
subregion, in particular in Djibouti and Somalia, this project could also support the
development of regional maritime skills.
(c)
Launch of the capacity building support for geo-mapping. This support aims to build the
capacity of African national institutions to collect, collate, and reinterpret all the geo-data that
have been produced over time, using a common technological platform and scientific
protocol. It is a geo-spatial information system that can combine many different types of
spatial data (topography, infrastructure, geological data, etc.) and that will allow users to (i)
39
provide public geo-data to a global audience and use it to accelerate and cost-reduce the
exploration process; (ii) de-risk investments to improve value assessment; (iii) improve
competitiveness and transparency in the extractives sector; (iv) improve benefits to countries
by avoiding asymmetrical information disadvantage; and (v) maximize economic
development impacts by identifying growth poles and corridors.
4. CROSS-CUTTING THEMES
4.1. The Private Sector
85.
Private sector development is an important cross-cutting theme of this initiative. The private
sector is often overlooked as a partner, but as the sector that creates jobs, it is key to the region’s youth
challenge. In countries transitioning out of conflict, the private sector is also a vital stabilizing force,
creating alternatives to conflict economies founded on predatory or illicit activity.43
86.
The private sector needs to create millions of productive, well-paying jobs, especially for
youth, to keep pace with the demographic transition and increase stability in the region. Small and
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) need to improve their productivity and competitiveness to become local
suppliers to exporters, participate in extractive value chains, and benefit from the economic growth
generated by manufacturing and agricultural exports in Ethiopia and Kenya, and by extractives in
Uganda, South Sudan, and Sudan. Any job creation program should also include safety nets, since the
average growth of the formal and informal private sector does not generate enough economic
opportunities to absorb the number of youth entering the job market.
87.
Priority programs for job creation under this initiative will include investments in
supporting regional infrastructure—particularly for ICT, border communities, and service delivery. A
second priority will be to invest in skills, especially for the extractives and maritime industries, and to
develop links among producers, traders, and consumers. In line with the recommendations of the World
Development Report 2011, Conflict, Security and Development, this initiative proposes a bold approach
to drawing together the capacities of development agencies, the private sector, foundations, and
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to galvanize investments in countries where high unemployment
and social disengagement contribute to the risks of conflict.
4.2. Youth
88.
The challenge of youth employment in the HoA is not amenable to easy solutions. The key
employment issue is that productivity, and therefore earnings, are low, while aspirations, especially those
of youth, are high. Addressing the challenge in any of the Horn countries will require country-specific
analysis.
89.
As the nature of jobs created will depend partly on the structure of growth, agriculture and
extractives look certain to be key industries. Elsewhere in Africa the extractives sector has failed to
sufficiently increase the number of wage jobs that youth most desire, though there are prospects for
reversing this trend, not least through promoting local providers of goods and services to the industry.
Likewise, the largely unexploited opportunities in farming offer great possibility at a time of high global
prices for agricultural commodities, and rising local and regional demand for food. In agriculture—unlike
43
Ending Conflict and Building Peace in Africa: A Call to Action. High Level Panel on Fragile States, 2014.
40
other sectors—the projection of new jobs (in low-income and lower-middle-income countries) is not
based on demand for labor in the sector. Instead it represents the labor force that does not find a wage job
or start a business.44
90.
The employment challenge is not to create jobs in the formal sector, important as that may
be, but to increase the productivity of the almost 80 percent of the workforce who are in the
informal sector.45 Raising the productivity of smallholder farmers in remote borderlands, pastoralists,
and displaced peoples—which was the key to structural transformation in Asia and Latin America—is
precisely what will enable the formal sector to develop and thrive and create jobs for the region’s youth.
4.3. Security
91.
A key aim of the initiative is to bring increased international attention to the
security/development nexus. Countries in the region could enjoy much greater levels of economic
interdependence and prosperity if a more benign regional security environment could be achieved. This
underlines the importance the AUC, IGAD, UN, WBG,46 EU, and other partners attach to increasing
efforts to integrate security and development issues. The EU has been a key supporter if the security
agenda in the region: its 2011 Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa underlines the need to address
the links among insecurity, poverty, and governance. An EU Special Representative (EUSR) for the Horn
has been appointed to contribute to the implementation of the Framework, working closely with the
EUSR for Sudan and South Sudan.
92.
The AUC is developing a regional approach to the challenges of peace and security in the
HoA. At the behest of the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) and in collaboration with IGAD, the
EU, the UN, and other stakeholders, the AUC has initiated consultations that would lead to a regionally
organized endeavor for peace, security, cooperation, and development in the HoA.47 At the latest meeting
of the PSC in Nairobi, the AU expressed deep concern over the worsening scourge of terrorism and
violent extremism in Africa and the growing linkages between terrorism and violent extremism, on the
one hand, and transnational organized crime, on the other—notably in the areas of drug and human
trafficking, money laundering, illicit trafficking in firearms—and the serious threats to peace, security,
stability, and development. The PSC also commended IGAD and other RECs for the important role they
are playing, particularly in developing regional strategies and common action to prevent and combat
terrorism and violent extremism. There is a deepening partnership between the UN Security Council and
the PSC.48
93.
A framework to align partner actions in the security-development nexus in the HoA would
need to build on ongoing high-level and technical partnerships. Such a framework could be overseen
by IGAD and have three key pillars: (a) peace-building, (b) crime and violence, and (c) porous borders
and marginalization.
44
45
46
47
48
Youth employment in Sub-Saharan Africa. Africa Development Forum. World Bank Group and the French Development
Agency. 2014.
Youth employment in Sub-saharan Africa op. cit.
The WBG’s Articles of Agreement constrain its direct involvement in member countries’ security sectors.
Report of the Peace and Security Council on its activities and the state of Peace and Security in Africa; see more at
http://www.peaceau.org/en/article/report-of-the-peace-and-security-council-on-its-activities-and-the-state-of-peace-andsecurity-in-africa-2#sthash.B1LFMOYW.nss1qUbn.dpuf
General Ban Ki-moon, Security Council, Remarks to African Union Peace and Security Council meeting on UN-AU
Cooperation, September 23, 2013.
41
5. Knowledge Products
94.
A knowledge program will provide the foundation for the operational response and further
evolution of the HoA Initiative, and will also seek to inform governments and partners on
appropriate policy and investment choices. There is a need to add to the existing knowledge base to
inform policy and operations choices. The development of knowledge and analytics represents a clear
value-added activity under this initiative, and an area of particular comparative advantage for the WBG.
The ongoing and proposed knowledge program is as follows:
(a)
49
A regional extractives industry assessment. The World Bank is investing heavily in
analytic work on extractives in Africa to support the development of a country-level lending
program and to explore opportunities for regional interventions and synergies, especially in
relation to infrastructure. In 2014, Country Economic Memoranda for Kenya, Uganda, and
Sudan will each include an appraisal of opportunities and challenges resulting from extractive
resources and the mineral sector. A mineral sector assessment has also been conducted in
Ethiopia. Policy advice and capacity-building programs are under way in Kenya (IDAfunded) and South Sudan (funded by the State- and Peace-building Fund) and are under
preparation in Ethiopia and Uganda with the support of bilateral donors. Early-stage
engagement with Somalia has begun. Until recently there was limited opportunity to offer
support through regional initiatives, whether linked to transboundary issues or to region wide
thematic challenges, but that has begun to change. Given the World Bank’s ongoing and
planned work on natural resources in the region, and its unique position to provide impartial
advice that draws on regional and global best practice, there is a great opportunity to draw
these strands together and provide regional solutions to countries in the HoA. The areas of
greatest potential for regional initiatives are those in which some degree of joint dependence
would help groups of countries harness the value of their mineral and hydrocarbon resources.
The proposed regional assessment would comprise the following:

A resource endowment assessment, looking at the juxtaposition of nonrenewable and
renewable natural resources, demographics, ecology and environment assets,
infrastructure, and trade routes and markets, modeled on Growth without Borders.49
There is also an opportunity to draw on similar work covering the EAC countries
(Kenya and Uganda as well as non-Horn member countries), which is due to be
launched soon.

A petroleum supply chain assessment for the region, to ensure that the regional
governments are in a position to take well-informed investment decisions for
production development and export in such areas as port capacity and expansion,
pipelines, refineries, road and rail corridors, energy and water requirements, input
and labor supply opportunities, and trade logistics and customs preparedness. Some
elements of this assessment have already been undertaken—for example, by the
consortium evaluating the exploitation and export of Uganda’s oil—but there is a
need to draw together the various strands.

A policy framework assessment that evaluates the state of policy preparedness of the
countries in the region to seize the opportunities presented by extractive resources
and the points of policy discontinuity/conflict, including political economy
underpinnings. This work would draw in part on analytic work recently launched by
Growth without Borders: A Regional Growth Pole Diagnostic for Southern Africa, Finance and Private Sector Development
Department, Africa Region, World Bank, 2013.
42
the Trade and Competitiveness Global Practice on the political economy of regional
integration.
(b)
A regional forced displacement analysis. The Global Program on Forced Displacement, in
collaboration with UNHCR, will carry out a regional study on displacement in the Horn of
Africa (similar studies have been or are being carried out in the Sahel and Great Lakes
regions). The study will profile displacement in the region, analyze displacement dynamics,
and propose policy options and operational priorities for regional assistance to displaced
populations, returnees, and their host communities. The findings could usefully inform the
Bank’s policy dialogue, governments’ policies on issues of displacement and its
consequences for vulnerability and security, and the design of future regional operations
addressing these issues.
(c)
A regional fragility assessment. This assessment was undertaken to build a common
understanding of the exact nature and magnitude of regional drivers of fragility, the elements
of resilience, and the region’s stability-development nexus. It will inform the development of
transformational regional interventions that address and/or accommodate drivers of
fragility/instability, and will provide guidance on implementation and monitoring. (The
completed assessment is attached as Annex IV.)
(d)
A borderlands diagnostic. The diagnostic’s aim is to recommend an approach that supports
cross-border development through local economic integration, social capital building, and
trade as a catalyst for reducing tension and making development interventions at the local
level. The objective of the Bank’s involvement would be to improve the socioeconomic
conditions of populations on all sides of the border. The starting point of the study would be
the African Union’s Border Programme, which is based on three pillars: (i) cooperation and
coordination, (ii) capacity building, and (iii) community involvement.
(e)
A regional groundwater assessment. The Horn of Africa has high climate variability, and
water scarcity constrains development in the region. Around 80 percent of the HoA is arid or
semi-arid, with limited precipitation, highly variable climate, high evaporation rates, and low
levels of water use. The assessment will examine the potential for developing and managing
the region’s transboundary aquifers. The Bank’s ongoing work on the Nile Basin illustrates
potential development opportunities through cooperative management of water resources.
There are no known regional initiatives to address the joint management and development of
some of the transboundary aquifer systems in the HoA, and this work would be a key
contribution to enhancing resilience and conflict mitigation.
43
6. OVERVIEW OF PROPOSED WBG SUPPORT TO THE HORN OF
AFRICA INITIATIVE
Pillar 1 – Vulnerability and Resilience
IDA (HoA)
a) Support to forced Support to enhance the productive capacities,
displacement50
livelihood opportunities (including pastoralism and
animal health) and coping mechanisms of displaced
populations and their host communities, in particular
women and children.
b) Strengthening
Strengthening regional health systems, for example,
regional health
by extending the East Africa Lab project to other
systems
countries.
c) HIV/AIDs
Expansion of the successful IGAD Regional
HIV/AIDs partnership programme.
d) Pastoralism
Expansion of the Regional Pastoral Livelihood and
Resilience Project to South Sudan
Pillar 2 – Economic Opportunity and Integration
a) Regional ICT
i) Investments in fiber optic network infrastructures,
connectivity for
through PPPs, ii) strengthening the legal and
service provision regulatory enabling environment to promote private
and esector competition and investment, and iii) develop
Transformation
government e-services applications.
b) South Sudan
Kenya road link
phase II
Mostly support activities in Kenya and include
financing for 300km of road infrastructure from
Nadapal to Eldoret.
c)
Support for feasibility study for the Ethiopia –
Somaliland energy interconnector
Expansion of South West Indian Ocean Fisheries and
Shared Growth project to Somalia
Assistance for a limited number of border zones
characterized by high levels of forced displacement,
insecurity, and limited service delivery
Regional pipeline development using WBG products
(PRG, political risk insurance etc.); and build local
capacity in relevant geological and other technical
skills.
Coordinated institutional support to the IGAD
Secretariat
IFC
Regional projects or national projects, including
PPPs, with regional implications in the HoA.
Examples of key sectors for special attention include
Financial Markets, Oil and Gas, Renewable Energy,
ICT, Transport, Mining, and Agribusiness. An
indicative list of projects for special targeting
include:
Energy
d) Fisheries
e)
Cross-border
growth and
stability
f)
Extractives
g)
Financial
Services,
Agribusiness,
Extractives
50
Delivery FY
$150m
FY16
$20m
FY15
$10m
FY15
$40m
TBD
Delivery FY
$100m
$50m
$300m
$2m
$10 m (TBC)
$300m
$35m
$5m (TBC)
FY15 (Uganda
& S. Sudan);
FY16
(Djibouti)
FY15 (Kenya)
&
FY16 (South
Sudan)
FY16
FY16
FY16
FY16
FY16
Delivery FY
$ 600 m (est)
FY17
There are about 51.2 million displaced persons globally; 75 percent live in protracted displacement. The
average duration now exceeds 18 years.
44

Support for Economic
Opportunity and
Integration:
Infrastructure,
Energy, Agribusiness
Regional pipeline and roads projects linking
Uganda, Kenya and South Sudan.
 Investment and advisory work in the extractives,
including local content.
 Possible PPPs in pharmaceutical industry;
renewable energy and transport (e.g. Port of
Berbera); PPP frameworks in the extractives and
other critical sectors.
 Agribusiness sector opportunities including
storage, processing, warehouse receipt systems,
and seeds.
 Additional advisory support to enhance market
access, ease of doing business across the region,
and access to finance.
MI MIGA GA
MIGA will continue to seek regional and national
project opportunities, to support to private
investments into HoA, building on successful
cooperation with Bank/ IFC and on international
investors’ interest in infrastructure, power, and agribusiness sectors.
An indicative list of projects for special targeting
include:
 Regional pipeline and roads projects linking
Uganda, Kenya and South Sudan.
 Renewables projects in Kenya, South Sudan,
Uganda and Ethiopia
A Regional Fragility
Assessment
Regional Forced
Displacement Study
A Regional
Extractive
Endowment
Assessment
Geo-mapping of
Mineral Resources
Transport
connectivity
Regional
Delivery FY
$200m (est)
AAA
Pillar 1: Vulnerability and Resilience
Build a common understanding on the exact nature and magnitude of
regional drivers of fragility, on the elements of resilience, and on the
region’s stability-development nexus.
This will inform the
development of regional interventions which address and/or
accommodate drivers of fragility/instability, and provide guidance on
implementation and monitoring.
Collaborate with UNHCR is carrying out a regional study on
displacement in the Horn of Africa, including the profile of
displacement, displacement dynamics, and possible operational
priorities for regional assistance to displaced populations, returnees
and their host communities.
AAA
Pillar 2: Economic Opportunity and Integration
Launch regional programmatic analytic work, building where possible
on national studies,
modeled on “Growth without Borders” ie,
juxtapositioning demographics, natural resources, ecology and
environmental assets, infrastructure and trade routes, markets, supply
chains, relevant policy reforms, etc.
Launch initiative to capacitate countries to collect, collate and
reinterpret various types of data to generate geological maps.
Launch phased development of a regional infrastructure strategic
investment plan for Somalia, including identification of some early
wins.
Regional groundwater assessment to address food insecurity, energy
45
FY17
Delivery FY
FY15
(Delivered)
FY15
Delivery FY
FY16
FY16
FY16
Groundwater
Assessment
Borderlands
diagnostic
insecurity and water insecurity, and promote regional integration
between nation states sharing water resources.
Launch programmatic borderlands diagnostic work program (in line
with African Union’s Border Programme (AUBP) which is based on
three pillars: (a) co-operation and co-ordination, (b) capacity building,
and (c) community involvement) to help identify opportunities for
local economic integration, social capital building, service delivery,
trade, local governance and peace building.
Special Partnerships
WBG/UN/other
partners
WBG/AUC/IGAD
/ICGLR/UN/EU etc
TerrAfrica51
Enhanced World Bank/UN partnership a new broad-based partnership
with UNHCR, UNOCHA and other parties, including the AUC,
Solutions Alliance, and African Governments, focused on development
approaches to IDPs and refugees. A number of partners have structural
issues which inhibit their ability to act regionally and thus initiative
could help facilitate change in this area.
Launch a new partnership on borderlands development with a
programmatic work program. Such a partnership could also begin to
address the borderland development issues in Western and Central
Africa.
TerrAfrica partnership on Sustainable Land and Water Management
will prioritize a program in the Horn of Africa
51
FY16
FY16
Delivery FY
FY15-16
FY15-16
FY16
TerrAfrica is nationally driven and depends on the leadership and commitments of Sub-Saharan African countries. The
Executive Committee consists of Sub-Saharan African governments, NEPAD, the UNCCD Secretariat, the UNCCD’s GM, the
FAO, IFAD, UNDP, the AFDB, the European Commission, bilateral donors, civil society representatives, and the World Bank.
46
7. IMPLEMENTING THE REGIONAL PLAN
95.
With the IDA17 replenishment recently finalized, regional and national IDA resources will
be made available. Given the ambitious scale of this plan, leveraging finance from other sources,
including donors and the private sector, will be a key feature of its implementation, particularly in
Somalia, Eritrea, and Sudan, which are in non-accrual status with the WBG.
96.
Managing implementation will be challenging, and the WBG is committed to ensuring that
all projects and programs announced under the initiative are committed within roughly 24 months
after the high-level visit. The implementation of the development plan will be the subject of regular
internal review and scrutiny. The first review will be initiated six months after the plan has been adopted
through a report to be submitted to the Board.
97.
Maintaining momentum on the political and diplomatic front is a key objective of the
initiative. Only the region’s leaders, working collaboratively, can solve the more intractable problems for
which political and policy change is required. The WBG will join other partners, within its mandate, to
support IGAD in facilitating this process, which will include regular meetings of the Ministers of Foreign
Affairs, in addition to regular meetings of Ministers of Finance and relevant sector ministries. It is
proposed that the inaugural meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs will take place at the time of the highlevel visit, and thereafter an appropriate framework will be put in place for follow up and monitoring.
8. PARTNERSHIPS AND COORDINATION
98.
Partnerships are critical to successful delivery. The initiative strives to take advantage of new
opportunities arising from regional leadership and political developments on the ground, and the growing
resolve of the international community to support more ambitious efforts to solve problems in the region,
while giving those efforts a greater international profile. Operationally, the initiative is expected to
facilitate increased support to the region from multiple stakeholders, to promote a greater degree of
alignment and collaboration in areas of mutual interest, and, importantly, to encourage more operations
that promote more cross-border solutions to long-standing problems of poverty. Timely and efficient
operations that deliver results quickly will require effective partnerships in which some institutions are
best placed to lead, and others to contribute. The WBG is not best placed to lead on everything; therefore,
with IGAD, it will promote these partnerships.
99.
On the security agenda, the AU, IGAD, UN, and EU are key partners and interlocutors. For
example, IGAD’s Security Sector Program of 2011 provides a framework for aligning and harmonizing
specific security and development actions agreed by the countries of the region.52 The EU continues to
play a leading role at the political level and by financing concrete peace and security initiatives in the
HoA. The EU adopted a Strategic Framework for the HoA on November 14, 2011, that underlines the
need to address the links among insecurity, poverty, and governance. An EU Special Representative
(EUSR) for the Horn has been appointed to contribute to the implementation of the Framework, working
52
An existing regional initiative on counterterrorism run by IGAD (IGAD Capacity Building Program Against Terrorism)
brings together intelligence and military agencies across the region through a capacity-building platform. The program was
transformed recently to become the IGAD Security Sector Strategy Program with an expanded mandate to include organized
crime, trafficking, piracy, and other aspects of regional security.
47
closely with the EUSR for Sudan and South Sudan. In all these contexts, development is seen as a
medium- to longer-term approach to counterterrorism and prevention of violent extremism.53
100.
Partner-led dialogue to unlock political bottlenecks and facilitate more economically sound
cross-border solutions is as important as the financial investments in concrete projects and
programs. It will require considerable technical support to ensure that high-level dialogue is well
informed and is sustained. Sustained diplomacy at the highest levels will also be required to help build
trust between neighboring governments to resolve conflicts—such as the latent conflict between Djibouti
and Eritrea, the unresolved border dispute between Ethiopia and Eritrea, and the active conflict in South
Sudan.
101.
IGAD capacity needs to be strengthened. It is important that IGAD be supported by its member
states and development partners to enable it to effectively plan, coordinate, and monitor the processes
required to further integration. Africa’s current integration landscape contains an array of RECs,
including eight considered to be the building blocks of the African Economic Community; IGAD, one of
these eight, has a stated ambition to achieve peace, prosperity, and regional integration among its member
states. IGAD has a growing influence on the regional process in the Horn—partly through its regional
peace and security activities, which continue to gain in importance and stem from the recognition that
national security interests are intimately connected across the region, but also through its important
activities and programs in support of drought disaster resilience and sustainability, and its growing
number of activities in support of economic integration. Support to IGAD will require a closer working
relationship with the WBG, which will require a great deal of dedicated time and resources. The initiative
will consider what support the IGAD Secretariat might require to enable it to deliver effectively on the
work that this initiative will bring.
9. RESULTS FRAMEWORK
102.
53
A results framework for the initiative will be developed once the operations have been agreed.
Rethinking International Counterterrorism to the Greater Horn of Africa: Toward a Regional Risk Reduction Strategy.
Matthew Schwartz, Liat Sheret, and Alister Millar. Perspectives of terrorism, Volume 7, Issue 6 Terrorism Research
Initiative and the Center for Terrorism and Security Studies, December 2013.
48
Annex I.
Applying Lessons from the Great Lakes and Sahel Initiatives, and the
2011 Drought Emergency Response
1.
This initiative needed to raise the profile of security issues, a problem which is more
complex and pronounced in the region. The region suffers from the twin problems of ongoing conflict,
border tensions, and an increasing terrorist threat from the extremists. Increased security, which is a
function of the state will have fiscal implications, and given the dynamics of violence, will demand a
more integrated and coordinated regional approach to addressing vulnerability, fragility and conflict, in
particular through the need to implement projects which bring about collective cross-border action.
Notwithstanding the timeliness of the Horn of Africa drought response package in 2011, the intervention
was a series of multi-country operations with only one regional project which is still under preparation54.
2.
The institutional context is more coherent with all target countries being members of the
Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD). IGAD has, in particular, comparative
advantage in peace and security issues and will be a key partner and driving force for the initiative
helping with its convening capacity to bring coherence to substantive political discussions which are
required to bring multiple stakeholders together to build trust and form consensus on security and
development investment plans. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has a
played a similar role under the Sahel initiative, though in the Great Lakes reaching consensus initially
proved more challenging given the overlapping mandates of multiple regional organizations
3.
The importance of a strong analytical underpinning. The challenges and opportunities of the
Horn region are relatively under-studied and are most often looked at through a national lens, in particular
on issues such as forced displacement, fragility and the security - development relationship at border
zones. The initiative has made a head start on starting to fill some of the important knowledge gaps
through the early commissioning of AAA in order to inform operational choices both of the WBG, though
also with the intention of influencing those of other development partners. In the Sahel two international
conferences, one on pastoralism and another on irrigation, performed a similar function whilst in the
Great Lakes a ‘conflict filter’ has been developed and is being applied to our investment program.
4.
The importance of engaging with the extractives industry. A wave of new natural resource
discoveries across the region has the potential to transform some economies of the region. If used well,
revenues could provide a route out of fragility, and help to build essential infrastructure and extend public
services. The oil and gas industry in particular looks certain to be very important through the development
and operation of new production sites and transport infrastructure, making engagement with the industry
as well as bilateral countries where most companies are listed will be important, for example, Arab states,
Australia, UK, Canada, Norway and South Africa.
5.
Be pragmatic and keep it simple - bigger more complex projects equal bigger problems for
both clients and the Bank. Regional projects are by their nature inherently complex for a combination of
technical, social, financial, legal, policy, organizational, time horizons, multi-sector, and often multifinancier reasons. However many countries in the Horn region have weak procurement, FM and project
management capacity and large, technically complex operations can be particularly difficult to
54
Out of 30 projects under the Horn of Africa drought response package, 9 projects have been identified for the rapid response
phase, and 21 projects for medium to long term economic recovery and drought resilience. The total response package for
Africa region now stands at $1.83 billion. The current break down is rapid response: $0.24 billion, medium term: $0.39
billion and long term: $1.2 billion. To date an estimated $233 million has been disbursed from 15 projects; $190 million for
rapid response (9 projects) and $43 million (6 projects) for medium to long term recovery.
49
implement. Reducing complexity will be important to value for money considerations, not least more
efficient delivery, and also the ability to demonstrate results.
6.
Strengthening existing partnerships and building new ones is essential to successful
delivery. IGAD has a key role to play in facilitating and advocating for political solutions, and also in
being focused and bringing coherence to on-going resilience efforts which are substantial. Certain
operational aspects of programming will demand greater collaboration between the UN and WBG
systems for delivery of rapid results, and also civil society and the private sector for the delivery of
essential services in remote regions and job creation. Unlike in the Sahel and Great Lakes the initiative
also demands a closer engagement with Arab Funds given their cultural and geo-political ties to the
region, financing envelopes and ability to operate in countries where the WBG presence is absent.
7.
Good communication is essential. The initiative will be supported by a structured
communications plan which will identify target audiences and have the objectives of i) providing
information, ii) increasing awareness, iii) encouraging action, iv) building consensus, v) influencing
behavior ,and v) promoting participation. The Great Lakes initiative in particular highlighted the
importance of early communication with careful messaging to avoid any miscommunication about WBG
financing commitments and the aims and objectives of the initiative.
8.
The initiative will have a results framework, and will learn from the challenges of ongoing
efforts to develop such frameworks for the Great Lakes and Sahel initiatives. It is important that the
WBG is able to demonstrate measurable results with clear linkages between investments and poverty
reduction, and which is aligned with its new corporate focus on linking solutions to results. The initiative
will build-in an institutional mechanism for monitoring and evaluation, mirroring the role of coordination
group for the Sahel and the role being played by the office of UN Special Envoy to the Great Lakes
region which is based in Nairobi.
50
Annex II.
Illustrative overview of development partner projects and programs in
the Horn of Africa
Projects highlighted in red denote regional programs designed to foster collective cross-border action55
Thematic Area
Partner
Details
Countries
AfDB
Water point and livestock-related
infrastructure and capacity building.
Ethiopia, Djibouti, Kenya.
South
Sudan,
Sudan,
Somalia and possibly Eritrea
to be added.
WBG
Regional pastoralism support
Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia
IsDB
Regional pastoralism support (health
and education)
Djibouti, Somalia, Uganda
EU
Sudan
AfDB
Support to livestock productivity and
animal disease control
Extractives information center
IsDB
Contract negotiation
Somalia
UNDP
Local content policies
Kenya
WBG
Support to local content policies and
key analytics
Kenya, Uganda
AfDB
Regional road missing links
Ports development
Kenya – S Sudan, Kenya –
Ethiopia, Ethiopia – Djibouti
Djibouti
Regional road missing links
Ethiopia, Kenya
OFID
Ports development
Djibouti
WBG
Kenya – S Sudan Road Phase 1
Ports development
South Sudan
Djibouti
Pastoralism
Kenya
Extractives
Connective
infrastructure
Transport
EU
Uganda56, Sudan
IsDB
ICT
WBG
National broadband expansion and egovernment
Kenya
Energy
OFID
Generation
Kenya, Ethiopia, Uganda,
55
56
Specific national projects targeting youth, gender and private sector development are not included.
In support of the Global Drylands Initiative the IsDB recently approved $20m for the Government of Uganda towards
integrated development of the Karamoja Region.
51
Thematic Area
Partner
generation &
transmission
WBG
Kenya – Ethiopia Interconnector
Djibouti
Kenya – Ethiopia
AfDB
Kenya-Ethiopia Interconnector
Kenya – Ethiopia
Generation and transmission
Ethiopia
IsDB
Dam construction
Sudan
OFID
Dam construction
Somalia
Nile Basin Initiative
Nile riparian states
Sewage treatment and waste disposal
Djibouti
Drought resilience and land use
Multiple countries
TerrAfrica Sustainable Land
Management Program
Sudan, Ethiopia,
Uganda
FAO, UNDP, UNEP, EU
Ethiopia, Sudan, Uganda,
and pipeline Kenya-South
Sudan
EU
Environment
& water
resource
management
Multiple donors
EU
UNDP
WBG, FAO, UNDP,
UNEP, AfDB, EU
REDD Africa Program
to Reduce
Deforestation and
Forest Degradation
UNDP
Forced
displacement
UNHCR
Details
Countries
Kenya,
Support to refugees
Budget of$1.2bn
Multiple countries
Livelihood support to communities and
displaced populations
Sudan
UNFPA
UNICEF
EU
Health57
IGAD
Regional HIV/AIDS program
Peace and
Security
EU
EU
EU
Anti-piracy capacity building
Anti-terrorism capacity building
Security mission and AMISOM
Safety nets
EU
Support to enhance resilience
IGAD
UNDP
EU
57
Multiple countries
General capacity building and drought
response
General capacity building
This does not reflect the totality of partner assistance to national health systems and peoples in displaced situations outside
of national systems.
52
Thematic Area
Partner
WBG
AfDB
Details
Project-linked capacity building
General capacity building
53
Countries
Annex III.
Alignment with IGAD strategy and programs
Pillar I: Vulnerability and Resilience
 Displaced populations – the initiative will help to fill gaps in the IGAD Drought Disaster
Resilience and Sustainability Initiative (IDDRSI) which does not have operations targeted
specifically at displaced people.
 Support to regional health – fully in line with the aims and objectives of the IGAD Regional
HIV/AIDS Partnership Program (IRAPP) Support Project which targets mobile cross border
populations
Pillar II: Economic Opportunities and Integration
 Kenya – South Sudan transport connectivity is one of IGAD’s 6 regional priority road corridors.
An IGAD infrastructure master plan is currently being developed with the support of AfDB for
the region.
 Strengthening exiting regional ICT connectivity is in line with the HoA IGAD Backbone Project
which plans to fill missing links, including linking Eritrea and Somalia (Berbera and Bosaso) to
Djibouti, and address policy and regulatory environments.
 IGAD has started addressing borderland issues under IDDRSI and the initiative will enhance the
IGAD approach.
 Extractives - new discoveries and exploitation will enhance economic growth. Assessment and
mapping of extractives will enhance IGAD regional planning in economic integration and
environmental protection. Efforts to support groundwater evaluation and extraction will
complement IGAD’s efforts under IDDRSI which has a groundwater component.
Private sector development – IGAD has a Civil Society Forum which is used to enhance the involvement
of the civil society in IGAD overall activities. The HoA initiative will enhance IGAD’s efforts to promote
private sector development, where the IGAD business forum has an important role to play.
Security – the IGAD region is beset with a number of conflicts, security threats and fragility. Currently,
there are 4 on-going conflicts. IGAD has been actively engaged in addressing some of the above threats
through mediation, establishment of the Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN)
and the IGAD Security Sector Programme (ISSP). The initiative will reinforce IGAD’s efforts in these
areas and enhance its capacity.
54
Annex IV.
Overview of WBG country programs in Horn of Africa countries
1. UGANDA Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) 2011 -2015
The World Bank Group’s Country Assistance Strategy (CAS), aligned with Uganda’s National
Development Programme (NDP) covering FY11-15, supports structural transformation of the economy. It
provides a framework for World Bank Group support for five years (FY11-15). IDA resources under the
FY011-15 CAS are estimated at about SDR1.3 billion (US$1.97 billion equivalent). Development policy
operations are expected to account for about one-third of annual IDA financing. The CAS focuses on four
strategic objectives and eleven outcomes:

Promote Inclusive and Sustainable Economic Growth. There are four outcomes: (i) improved
conditions for private sector growth; (ii) improved interconnectivity for regional integration; (iii)
increased productivity and commercialization of agriculture; and (iv) increased efficiency and
sustainability of natural resource management.

Enhance Public Infrastructure. There are four outcomes: (i) increased access to electricity; (ii)
improved access to and quality of roads; (iii) increased access to and quality of water and
sanitation services; and (iv) improved management and delivery of urban services.

Strengthen Human Capital Development. There are two outcomes: (i) improved access to and
quality of primary and post-primary education; and (ii) strengthened health care delivery.

Cross-cutting: Improve Good Governance and Value for Money. There is one outcome:
strengthened accountability and efficiency of public financial and human resource management.
The CAS includes interventions to address the skills development and demand side interventions geared
towards continued creation of private wage jobs, entrepreneurial training, supporting household
enterprises in the non-farm sector to increase their incomes, and public works and community programs
that help youth identify opportunities and find support.
The WBG is heavily involved in building domestic capacity to engage in the oil sector. Policy notes on
fiscal federalism, establishment of a petroleum training center, oil production in environmentally sensitive
areas, and development programs for local communities in oil-affected areas are being produced under
the current CAS period.
2. KENYA Country Partnership Strategy (CPS) 2014 -2018
Kenya’s “Vision 2030” rests on three pillars: economic, social, and political and is operationalized by the
second Medium-Term Plan (MTP2, 2013-17), and provides a good anchor for this Country Partnership
Strategy (CPS). The Bank’s annual commitments will be governed by the IDA17 settlement,
provisionally assumed at around US$600 million each year. This will build on the IDA portfolio in Kenya
of US$4.3 billion at mid-FY14, covering 23 national projects (US$3.5 billion) and 7 regional projects in
which Kenya is a partner (US$0.8 billion). It is important to continue to “move to scale” especially in
IDA investments, but also in IFC commitments, by focusing on larger projects and the judicious use of
additional finance. The WBG could be providing over US$1 billion per year to Kenya over the life of this
CPS. IFC is targeting portfolio expansion perhaps even beyond the US$785 million of commitments at
mid-FY14 if market conditions permit. MIGA’s current total exposure to Kenya is US$255 million, and
55
international investors’ interest in infrastructure, power, and agri-business sectors provides potential for
this to expand further. The CPS focuses on:

Competitiveness and sustainability. WBG policy advice will help the authorities create a wellfunctioning and properly regulated energy market; IDA financing will be used for some publicly
merited investments; and IFC and MIGA instruments help leverage more private resources. More
broadly, the Bank Group will redouble its support public-private partnerships, especially in the
water and transport sectors where there is medium-term potential. On transport, the focus of new
IDA lending will be on significant rural feeder roads within and between counties to connect
communities to emerging economic opportunities. The Bank will support the Government’s
oversight of the rapidly emerging oil and gas sector. Both IFC and Bank resources will be
deployed to help create private sector and try to make cities livable and sustainable, with a special
focus on secondary cities where poverty is proving most stubborn.

Protection of the vulnerable and help them develop their potential. The social pillar focuses
on investing in people, including in education, health, and housing, with a focus on women,
youth, and vulnerable communities. Health is a pressing priority; in this sector the combined
resources of IDA and IFC, alongside global funds and other partners, will be scaled up. Another
key to help target support for the poor is to focus on agriculture, a high priority since it has such a
direct link with helping families in rural areas where a majority of Kenyans live. Potential IFC
investments in infrastructure, agro processing, and financial institutions further support the goal.
The burgeoning youth population brings opportunities and challenges for WBG support in
education, jobs, and skills. Protecting the poor who are disproportionally impacted by climate
variability will also be an area of support. And across the board the gender focus of WBG
operations and analytical work will be upgraded, including support for female education,
entrepreneurship, and rural women’s groups.

Building consistency and equity. The Bank’s large-scale capacity building and AAA program
will inform a series of IDA operations to help counties and national agencies to make devolution
work. The consistency of Kenya’s development will be buttressed by deepening regional
integration with its neighbors; and WBG investments will be made in multi-country projects,
including in energy and transport
The Bank will support the Government’s oversight of the rapidly emerging oil and gas sector. Both IFC
and Bank resources will be deployed to help create private sector jobs and try to make cities livable and
sustainable, with a special focus on secondary cities where poverty is proving most stubborn.
The consistency of Kenya’s development will be buttressed by deepening regional integration with its
neighbors. The WBG will provide a mixture of analytical activities and investment for near and longerterm initiatives. Some—such as advisory services to the capital markets authority to help facilitate
regional financial deepening, or partnering for results with TradeMark East Africa on a Mombasa Port
Charter to enhance operations—can be delivered primarily with Kenya counterparts. Others such as
continuing transformative road and energy investments linking Kenya with Tanzania, Ethiopia, and other
locations require multi-country agreements.
3. DJIBOUTI County Partnership Strategy (CPS) 2014 – 2017
The CPS is anchored in the Government of Djibouti’s Vision 2035, a long-term development plan that
focuses on economic integration, governance, and human development. The overarching objective of the
CPS is to support the government’s vision, working to reduce extreme poverty and build the foundations
56
for shared growth by harnessing the country’s human and economic potential. The CPS rests on two
pillars—reducing vulnerability and strengthening the business environment—while focusing on
institutional strengthening and gender as cross-cutting themes. This is the first joint World Bank Group
strategy prepared for Djibouti, demonstrating the deepening engagement with national authorities, civil
society, the private sector, and development partners. The strategy has been defined cooperatively by the
International Development Association (IDA), the International Finance Corporation (IFC), and the
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA). The CPS aims to leverage the Bank Group’s modest
financial resources for Djibouti by supplementing a focused country program with regional and global
resources. The CPS assumes an indicative IDA envelope of US$25 million under IDA17.

The first pillar of the CPS will seek to support the government’s efforts to alleviate poverty and
boost shared prosperity through improvements in social protection and disaster risk mitigation,
as well as indirectly through enhancements to education, health, and basic infrastructure
services. In particular, the CPS program will aim to address the following challenges: (i) the
inadequate targeting of beneficiaries of safety net programs and difficulties in ensuring that
benefits reach the poorest and most vulnerable; (ii) the lack of institutional capacity in the
Ministry of National Education and Vocational Training, which holds back the delivery of
efficient and effective education services; (iii) the weak quality of maternal and child health care
and communicable disease control programs; (iv) the lack of access to basic infrastructure,
including water and agro-pastoral resources in rural communities and water and roads in poor
urban areas of Djibouti-Ville; and (v) the country’s poor resilience to climate change and natural
disasters.

The second pillar of the CPS focus on strengthening Djibouti’s job creation, in energy, and
telecommunications programs. In particular, the CPS program will seek to reduce the barriers
to business growth and investment by: (i) working to reduce the costs of electric power by
improving the government’s capacity to assess the commercial viability of geothermal energy and
addressing the tenuous financial viability of the energy utility, Electricité de Djibouti; (ii) helping
to improve access to telecommunications by addressing the limited coverage and high cost of
internet services; and (iii) improving the quality of the business environment.
4. SUDAN Interim Strategy Note 2014 -2015
Given Sudan's non-accrual status and ineligibility for IDA, the Bank will continue to work in partnership
with bilateral and multi-lateral donors. Knowledge intensive services, including capacity building and
training, have and will continue to constitute a significant part of the proposed program through a select
number of trust-funded interventions with a value of over $120m. The Bank will continue to work closely
with the IMF on the macro-economic issues and especially on the technical preparedness for debt relief
and on the macro-economic framework to support sustainable fiscal adjustment and to provide incentives
for growth. The Bank will focus on supporting activities that accelerate growth and expand sources of
growth, ensure equitable distribution of resources and access to services, and respond urgently to
opportunities to consolidate peace in areas emerging from conflict:

Pillar 1: Manage the Economic Transition: Support policy and institutional reforms at the
national level to improve economic management to achieve fiscal adjustment, proper debt
management and readiness for debt relief; to promote new sources of growth and to accelerate
growth that empowers citizens; and institutional reforms that ensure equitable distribution of
fiscal resources across regions.
57

Pillar 2: Address Socio-economic Roots of Conflict: Support to national and local programs for
service delivery focusing on key human development outcomes; to establish mechanisms that
minimize the impact of the fiscal shock transmitted to households through cutbacks in services or
through inflation; and to building systems for service delivery and accountability, especially in
areas emerging from conflict, including Darfur.
5. SOUTH SUDAN Interim Strategy Note 2013 – 2014
The proposed interim strategy is aligned with GRSS’s ambitions as reflected in the South Sudan
Development Plan. The central challenge for South Sudan will be to lay the foundations for effective and
accountable institutions that will use the country’s own resources to respond to its citizens’ needs. The
Bank’s role in the ISN period will be to assist South Sudan in meeting this challenge by selecting
interventions which will, over time, have a foundational or transformational impact that are guided by the
priorities of GRSS, aligned with the activities and focus of development partners, and responsive to
emerging needs. Building institutional accountability and capacity will be central to all programming.
Gender sensitivity will figure prominently in all activities, both for equity and efficiency considerations.
During the ISN period, the Bank expects that South Sudan will receive an IDA finance allocation of
approximately US$130 million during FY14. The program will have two clusters of activities:

Cluster 1 will focus on improving economic management and governance for effective local
service delivery, and includes (i) knowledge activities and technical assistance that address
macroeconomic policies, public financial management and oil revenue management, and develop
statistical capacity for generating data for decision making and accountability; (ii) a lending
operation to build responsive, inclusive government structures for local service delivery and for
addressing local grievances. A comprehensive approach to expanding productive employment
opportunities is more effective than isolated interventions; therefore, a robust analytical program
will underpin employment interventions in Cluster 2.

The second cluster will pilot a public works and skills operation on livelihoods, targeting
gender, youth and vulnerable groups, including ex-combatants; it will also help build the
foundations of the economy by improving connectivity through a core network of roads, ICT
and trade, including regional links. IFC is expected to focus on support to private-public
partnerships in pharmaceutical development, introduce new mobile enabled services, and build
capacity in small and medium enterprises.
6. ETHIOPIA Country Partnership Strategy 2013 – 2016
The CPS builds on the progress achieved by Ethiopia during the past five years and aims to help the
Government of Ethiopia address this structural transformation and assist in the implementation of
Ethiopia’s Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP). The CPS sets out a proposed IDA program which
will span the last two years of IDA 16 (FY13-14) and the first two years of IDA17 (FY15-16). The
lending program for the first two years IDA 16 of the will be US$1.5bn in FY13 and US$1.2bn in FY14.
The CPS framework includes two pillars with governance as foundation and two cross cutting themes:

Pillar One, “Fostering competitiveness and employment”, aims to support Ethiopia in achieving
the following strategic objectives: (i) a stable macroeconomic environment; (ii) increased
competitiveness and productivity; (iii) increased and improved delivery of infrastructure; and (iv)
enhanced regional integration.
58

Pillar Two, “Enhancing resilience and reducing vulnerabilities”, aims to support Ethiopia in
improving the delivery of social services and developing a comprehensive approach to social
protection and risk management. Good governance and state building form the foundation of the
CPS. In line with the GTP, gender and climate change have been included as cross-cutting issues
in the CPS to strengthen their mainstreaming across the portfolio. The programs of IFC and
MIGA are well aligned with the CPS framework, contributing mainly to the strategic objectives
under Pillar 1.
7. SOMALIA Interim Strategy Note 2014 to 2016
A transformational moment: In August 2012 the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) was brought to
power with a four-year term under a provisional constitution approved by a new parliament - ending
Somalia's long period of revolving transitional government at the federal level. Since its establishment,
the FGS has emphasized improved governance and economic management as key pillars of its
development plan and is also laying the foundations for the implementation of a federal system of
governance. The new government is responsible for meeting important political, security and economic
milestones during its term, including the passage of a permanent constitution and the preparation for
national elections in 2016. Regional countries and international actors have re-doubled efforts to support
and sustain this window of opportunity, endorsing a New Deal for Somalia at the September 2013
Brussels Conference and pledging US$2.4 billion against the Somali Compact ("the Compact"), which
includes a "Special Arrangement for Somaliland". The Bank has now put in place an operation to provide
recurrent cost financing to finance critical expenditure in the first phase of the transition.
1. The binding constraints to poverty reduction are stability and the rudimentary elements of statebuilding: While Somalia's trajectory is now positive, transitions are rarely linear and the situation
is likely to remain fragile unless progress is made on the following three issues:
 Achieving consensus on a federal system that provides for inclusive representation and
political accommodation among the regions on power and wealth-sharing;
 Establishing core institutions that can deliver basic services to citizens, including security,
and can manage the economy transparently and effectively;
 Redressing the elite capture and economic exclusion that has resulted in widespread
vulnerability among the Somali population
To tackle these issues, the Compact commits international and domestic actors to priority peace- and
state-building goals, whose implementation will demand strong domestic political will and sustained
international engagement. Important steps on the political front have already been taken: key legislation
has been passed to enable the constitutional review process and political dialogue has been initiated with
the regions. The August 2013 agreement on the formation of an interim administration in the southern
region of Jubbaland is an important milestone. Progress has also been commendable on economic
governance issues. This is important given the need for Somalia, an IDA-only country, to address its
stock of debt and arrears, and the intention of the authorities to engage Somalia's creditors through the
Heavily Indebted Poor Country Initiative (HIPC). Nevertheless, deep rooted issues of economic
governance and mistrust between regions remain and building inclusive governance will require
concerted efforts by Somalia's leadership.
59
A renewed World Bank Group engagement: The ISN aims to lay the foundations for poverty reduction
and shared prosperity by delivering selected activities in two priority areas: (a) strengthening core
economic institutions; and (b) expanding economic opportunity. The ISN aligns the Bank's work fully
within the framework of the new Somali Compact that is committed to priority peace and state-building
goals necessary to address the binding constraints to poverty reduction in Somalia. In preparing this ISN,
the Bank has renewed its engagement with a dejure government in Mogadishu while also strengthening
its dialogue and engagement with regional authorities. Maintaining this balance will be critical to the
successful delivery of the ISN, given a spectrum of contexts across Somalia's regions, and the sensitivity
of economic resource allocation. The proposed program will rely on trust fund resources and will build on
the activities initiated under the FYO8-09 ISN (mainly in Somaliland and Puntland). In addition to the
US$19.5 million committed under the State- and Peace-Building Fund (SPF), additional resources will be
mobilized from international partners through a Bank-administered Multi- Partner Fund7 (MPF) to
implement the ISN (up to $150m contributions expected in FY14). The MPF will be a discrete fund that
will share the governance structure of the Somalia Development and Reconstruction Facility (SDRF), a
coordinated financing architecture proposed as the centerpiece of Compact implementation.
60
Annex V.
Horn of Africa Regional Fragility Assessment
INTRODUCTION
1. Recognizing the potential to accelerate poverty reduction and bolster shared prosperity in
the Horn of Africa (HoA), the World Bank Group (WBG) is developing a regional initiative
to support critical regional initiatives for the area’s development and also to address the
instability and vulnerability that could undermine the region’s potential. Many of the region’s
zones of extreme fragility are near border areas, thus making a regional approach a critical tool to
improve stability and reduce the risk of conflict. Here, the Horn of Africa is defined as Djibouti,
Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan, and Uganda.
Links to wider WBG goals and strategy
2. The WBG’s regional HoA initiative will contribute to delivery of its Africa Regional
Strategy (2011–2016) which sets out two pillars: (1) competitiveness and employment; and
(2) vulnerability and resilience, with governance and public sector capacity serving as a
foundation. It recognizes conflict and political violence as drivers of vulnerability and proposes
mitigation measures, including strengthening accountability, participation, and political
consensus building. The Africa Regional Strategy prioritizes programmatic operations and
partnerships.
Objective of the Regional Fragility Assessment
3. The HoA Regional Fragility Assessment (RFA) serves as a framing paper for the regional
initiative and offers a summary analysis of the primary regional drivers of conflict and
fragility in the Horn, focusing on those factors that have a regional impact or can be addressed
through a regional approach. On this foundation, the RFA considers how the WBG’s regional
initiative can build on the region’s resilience factors to promote security through development,
both through direct interventions and by mitigating the risks of instability associated with
regional development.
4. The entry points suggested in the RFA seek to complement ongoing regional support by
other institutions and country-specific initiatives of the WBG. They build on suggestions set
out in the Working Concept Note for the regional initiative of January 10, 2014, in which two
pillars of support are proposed: one on addressing vulnerability and building resilience, and
another on strengthening economic opportunity and integration. Both pillars will be supported by
cross-cutting themes on security and the private sector. The recommendations of this RFA
therefore focus on how to integrate security into the development initiatives proposed within each
pillar, as well as on complementary, standalone initiatives to build security.
DRIVERS OF CONFLICT AND FRAGILITY
5. Despite increasingly effective regional collaboration—for instance, in developing trade and
transport—the HoA has experienced significant levels of conflict and tension. Whether
interstate, intrastate, or inter-communal, many of the region’s conflicts are connected. This is
particularly true of instability in border areas where drivers of conflict and fragility transcend
political borders and weaker governance provides refuge for criminal and violent activity. Crossborder spillover of conflicts means that the fates of the region’s more stable countries are
inextricably linked to their troubled neighbors. Governments cannot ignore conflicts in or among
61
their neighbors, nor can they expect containment strategies to be sustainable. This is well
understood by the region’s states, and many are taking active roles either within regional
institutions such as the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the East
African Community (EAC), or bilaterally, to support stabilization and stronger regional
integration and collaboration.
6. Endowed with very different environmental capital and thus livelihood approaches, built on
contested histories, and often lacking consistent delivery of state functions to generate
greater state legitimacy, untangling the drivers of disenfranchisement, poverty, and
vulnerability in the Horn is a complex task. Such drivers are often exacerbated by ineffective
governance and intragroup power struggles. Furthermore, linkages are found between different
levels of conflict, with interstate relations frequently played out through intrastate or communal
conflicts and regional governments engaging in proxy wars in each other’s territories.
7. Covering an area over half the size of Europe and hugely diverse, generalizations on trends
and drivers of fragility in the Horn are difficult, with each case having its own unique set of
characteristics and context. This section looks only at the broad trends and drivers of conflict
and fragility in the Horn, focusing on their regional characteristics. The implications of these
drivers for the WBG’s regional initiative are highlighted.
Geopolitical Environment
8. The geopolitical environment in the HoA has for a long time been one of the most complex
in the world. The many conflicts all have spillover effects that complicate political relations and
stability between neighbors. Regional development programs in this part of the world will
therefore undoubtedly be more politically sensitive than elsewhere.
9. In Somalia, the differentiated development between southern Somalia, Somaliland,
Puntland, and more recently, Jubbaland, has created localized power centers, some that are
perceived to be even more powerful than Mogadishu itself. While recognizing the positive
local effects on stability and development of these areas, they also increase tensions around the
nation-building agenda and create specific challenges for the unity ambitions of Mogadishu,
backed by the international community.
10. Over the course of time the ongoing conflict in Somalia has come to take on an increasingly
regional character through the military intervention of the African Union Mission in
Somalia (AMISOM). AMISOM is playing a crucial role in stabilizing Somalia, but can also be
perceived by some observers as provoking Al-Shabaab toward its increasingly international
character. The huge numbers of refugees that have long gathered in the camps of mainly Ethiopia
and Kenya are now becoming an intricate part of regional political dynamics. They are now at the
center of the debate of the increasing number of terrorism attacks in Kenya, which in turn fuels
anti-Somali sentiments among the general population and further adds complexity to KenyaSomalia bilateral relations. Kenya has openly stated that one of the objectives of its intervention
in Somalia is to create a safe zone for refugees to return.
11. Al-Shabaab is playing an increasingly destabilizing role regionally, and has demonstrated
its ability to execute terrorist acts in both Uganda and Kenya. The group is now actively
promoting radicalization of other Islamist groups in the region, most notably in the coastal
regions of Kenya.
62
12. The continued exclusion of Eritrea from IGAD and some other sub-regional mechanisms
presents an obstacle to comprehensively addressing peace and security as well as
development and humanitarian issues in the HoA. Eritrea continues its attempts to reactivate
IGAD membership.
13. In South Sudan and Sudan, the unresolved disputes over oil transit and several border
regions, such as Abyei, Kafia Kingi, and the Heglig oilfield, have become overshadowed by
the recent internal conflict in South Sudan, but could surface again once the country returns to
relative stability. The internal conflict in South Sudan—where IGAD is acting as a mediator—
also has regional implications, with a strong Ugandan military presence and large numbers of
refugees. However, it is still too early to foresee the full extent of the spillover effects. The UN
recently voiced its concern that the conflict will lead to another humanitarian food crisis.
14. The most striking development in the region’s recent political economy has been the
emergence, or reemergence, of Ethiopia as its dominant and centrally placed power. The
current Ethiopian regime’s ability to contain the major sources of conflict within the country that
have historically restricted its regional role, coupled with a remarkable level of economic growth,
has given Ethiopia a central role in any initiative to reduce regional instability. The attractions of
such an initiative are greatly increased by the fact that the current government in Ethiopia has
embraced this role, including mediating conflicts in the region. This is most strikingly
demonstrated by its attempts to remain even-handed in dealing both with sources of tension
between the two Sudans and with the current conflict within South Sudan. Most basically,
Ethiopia has come to see conflicts that affect any of its neighbors as presenting a threat to its own
central strategy of pursuing economic growth, not least because it is a landlocked state whose
access to the sea depends on transit across potentially highly unstable coastal borderlands. As the
headquarters state of the African Union (AU), which for more than fifty years has been at the core
of African diplomacy, Ethiopia is also acutely aware of its need to remain within a continent-wide
consensus.58
Historical Influences
15. Unlike other parts of Africa, the Horn includes countries where conquest was internal
rather than external. The region’s mix of histories has resulted in states that were created in
significantly different ways, which in turn shapes their governance systems, patterns of security
and justice, levels of inclusion, and how each state now relates to others.
16. Ethiopia and Somalia are examples of countries that do not fit the typical African pattern in
that their historical identity may drive their engagement with their neighbors. For instance,
Ethiopia’s historical identity as the Abyssinian Empire encouraged an expansionist approach to
incorporate and retain its lowland peripheries. Somalia’s history of nationalism, meanwhile,
fuelled enormous instability after the fall of the Barre regime and continues to challenge efforts to
build a functional and stable state.
17. Colonialism in other parts of the region has left its own legacy. Many ethnic groups are
divided across state boundaries, which restrict social and cultural ties, cuts through political
communities, and limit the regional management of ecosystems, which is essential to many
livelihood approaches. The division between sociocultural identities has also played out at the
national level by colonial powers. This division of ethnic groups has often been coupled with a
58
This paragraph on Ethiopia is from Christopher Clapham at the Centre of African Studies, University of Cambridge, which
he wrote as peer review comments to an earlier version of this document. It is published here with his kind permission.
63
sense of marginalization where extractive colonial states privileged some areas over others. For
example, in Kenya, the colonial administration identified central Kenya and the Rift Valley as
profitable, while the western and northeastern regions were seen as troublesome and unprofitable
and were thus marginalized. This has left long-lasting grievances that have often been
manipulated for political or economic purposes.
18. Afro/Arab identities continue to shape interactions in the region based on a mix of
geopolitical interests. There is a long history of social, cultural, and economic interaction
between the Arab world and the Horn. Some of this is founded on historical trading relationships
and Oman’s colonial footprint, others through more recent developments such as insecurity in the
Red Sea. Djibouti, for example, is a member of both the AU and the League of Arab States and
seeks to balance its population’s sense of identity with its regional trading and security relations.
19. The WBG should therefore recognize that in regional initiatives, some parties may adopt a
competitive approach. This reflects distrust in interstate relations and negotiations, which has
strong historical roots. However, some countries, such as Kenya, Ethiopia, and others, have
promoted regional strategies and actively participated in mediation efforts and the design of
regional projects that are central to the development of their economies. Regional initiatives have
not always succeeded because of the history of mistrust and because of the tensions created by the
weight of geopolitical dynamics described in the previous sections.
The Domination of a Security and Stability Agenda
20. Governance systems in much of the Horn are often primarily geared toward security and
stability. Political dispensations and governance systems that prioritize security may be less
democratic, less inclusive, and less accountable, with those in power arguing that this is by
necessity—in order to avoid greater instability. As a result, the region is characterized by huge
differences in social and political opportunities, with ongoing instability in some areas
encouraging more directive and restrictive governance. States that feature authoritarian and semiauthoritarian governments are often less inclined to partner with non-state actors to manage
conflict. Hybrid governance and peacebuilding arrangements that promote interaction between
state and non-state actors may therefore be more viable in the region’s more open states.
21. In the Horn, avenues for the transmission of instability from one country to another are
numerous, as are potential trigger points from which conflict may spark. Governments in the
region, many of which originated from a violent beginning and are experiencing internal and/or
neighboring conflicts, tend to prioritize security imperatives in their relations with neighbors and
peripheral regions. Economic interconnections—both dependencies and opportunities—are often
strengthened or weakened by the region’s security dynamics (Healy, 2011). For example, due to
longstanding conflict and contestation, Eritrea and Ethiopia do not cooperate on the potential
logistics corridor from landlocked Ethiopia to Eritrea’s coastal ports.
22. Security-oriented governance systems can encourage countries in the region to intervene
directly or indirectly in neighboring states. For example, Somalia now has five of its neighbors
with armed forces in its territory, some hatted under AMISOM, while Ugandan forces were
deployed rapidly in response to South Sudan’s current crisis. The Horn is a typical “regional
conflict complex” (Wallenstein and Sollenberg, 1998) in that there is extensive and direct
engagement of regional states in another’s affairs. Given the ongoing dominance of a security
agenda in parts of the region, regional initiatives and agreements should consider the stability
imperatives of regional actors. What may appear to be fruitful economic partnerships may
64
not be pursued, such as formalizing trade routes or developing cross-border livelihood
approaches, if they are perceived as undermining a country’s security.
Persistent Conflict and Widespread Displacement
23. The greatest single predictor of a civil war is a past civil war (Collier et al., 2009) and almost
all countries in the Horn have had a period of serious armed conflict in the last thirty years.
Some countries, such as Somalia and South Sudan, have been in a near continuous state of lowgrade war for decades. These wars leave a legacy of displaced populations, unresolved
grievances, militarization, damaged economies, polarized power, and distrust. Their form and
purported objective may change, but the conflicts persist. Even in conflicts aimed at overthrowing
governments, parties to the conflict have commonly committed human rights atrocities that target
civilians. For example, when faced with declining popular support, the Lord’s Resistance Army
(LRA) resorted to abductions and the massacre of suspected government allies to terrorize the
civilian population (ICG, 2004). Furthermore, over the last century, civil wars in Eritrea,
Ethiopia, Somalia, and Uganda have contributed to massive humanitarian crises that take decades
to heal.
24. The long-running conflicts in several countries of the Horn have also produced a large
diaspora population, which sends remittances back home. Private remittances from abroad,
channeled through the hawalla system, play a significant role in several parts of the region. In
Eritrea, the remittances arrive through official channels and add to the central bank foreign
exchange reserves. In other countries, unofficial remittances are often used to sustain extended
families and their businesses, but it has also in some cases been used to support armed factions,
fuel conflict, and finance jihad (Love, 2009).
25. Given the protracted nature of many of the region’s conflicts, the causes of the initial
conflict are often not those that promote its continuance. As such, it is important to
understand both the genesis of a conflict but also how it has evolved and how new conflict drivers
have developed, with ongoing division and violence sometimes used to advance political and
economic interests. Conflict is costly to many, but profitable to a few. For example, in Somalia,
the desire of some to sustain a war economy for monetary gain is widely recognized as a driver of
the country’s ongoing instability. Persistent conflict in many areas of the Horn has served to
entrench and deepen existing grievances, creating deep trauma and frequently enforced
stereotypes of identity. The conflict and crimes committed against civilians often leave lasting
psychological effects. The deep psychological scars and collective sense of trauma, if left
unaddressed, can contribute to conflict and fragility by deepening divisions in society. Trauma
affects trust by transforming the relationships in both the public sphere (between groups, between
society and the state, and within communities) as well as in the private sphere (within families,
between generations). It can also transform identities, hardening the distinctions groups draw
between “us” and “them” (Marc et al., 2013).
26. Children are particularly vulnerable to recruitment by armed groups, sexual exploitation
and abuse, and physical violence. These risks are exacerbated by the disruption to community
and family structures caused by displacement. Children are also more likely to have experienced
a recent traumatic event and be recruited to fight. For instance, in northern Uganda, between
20,000 and 66,000 children were abducted by the LRA between 1986 and 2006. During this
period, abducted children made up 80 to 90 percent of LRA soldiers (Dagne, 2011). Children
recruited into an armed conflict suffer threefold. Firstly, they lose their rights to a normal
childhood, including the right to education. Secondly, their risk of being killed or maimed is very
65
high. Thirdly, even after the war they may suffer from psychological trauma and limited access to
decent work and livelihood opportunities.
27. It will be important that the WBG’s regional initiative be informed by an understanding of
the political and economic power dynamics that underpin a conflict so as to avoid
reinforcing war economies or vested political interests. Regional support to peace processes
and associated development interventions should incorporate measures to address trauma, rebuild
social trust, and develop a sense of community and identity that is cohesive. Addressing abuse
and human rights violations is likely to be necessary following long and brutal conflicts, with the
impact on children deserving particular attention. Failing to recognize and address these issues
may see them emerge as conflict drivers in the future. This is particularly true given the erosion
of many traditional dispute resolution mechanisms and systems for grievance redress in the
region.
28. In the Horn of Africa, political uncertainty, violence, drought, and governance failures have
led to the displacement of millions of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs). In
their own territories, the eight countries of the HoA currently host over 6 million IDPs and over 2
million refugees. Around 700,000 refugees from the Horn currently reside outside of the region.
Still, these figures do not adequately portray the complexity and magnitude of the problem.
Ethiopia is now the largest refugee-hosting country in Africa. Almost a quarter of Somalia’s
population has been affected by forced displacement. In South Sudan, almost half of the country’s
population consists of IDPs, refugees in other countries, and returnees. Most of these refugees
and IDPs are in protracted displacement situations, which have moved beyond the initial
emergency phase but for which solutions do not exist in the foreseeable future. Too often,
international attention begins to fade after the initial emergency phase, and long-term support
becomes less predictable as displacement situations become protracted. Humanitarian assistance
and the generosity of host communities are overstretched, especially when policy frameworks and
institutional arrangements are for short-term humanitarian interventions. In these situations, the
challenge is often developmental—rather than humanitarian—in nature. The development
challenges of protracted displacement situations include the reestablishment of livelihoods and
the equitable delivery of services. The areas hosting the displaced are often affected by conflict
and displacement, and host communities and areas often lack the institutional capacity to deliver
or manage the delivery of the necessary protection and assistance to the displaced.
29. If neglected or poorly managed, protracted forced displacement in the Horn of Africa could
be a driver of conflict and fragility. Cross-border conflict spillovers—including a massive
influx of refugees—are among the security-related stress factors that lead to fragility. The
consequences of displacement are frequently regional, with large-scale displacement of people
due to internal conflicts often spilling over borders. This in turn can fuel further tensions between
refugees and host communities over land, natural resources, and livelihood opportunities, as well
as between countries, as described in the geopolitical section of this paper. The massive influx of
displaced persons also overwhelms the institutional capacity of host communities. For instance,
the post–1994 Rwandan genocide refugee influx is often cited as one of the factors that
contributed to the conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). In the HoA, several
protracted displacement situations are characterized by low-level tensions and conflicts between
host communities and refugees over firewood and access to energy resources.
30. The presence of refugees and IDPs does not necessarily have negative outcomes. Depending
on the context, the presence of displaced populations could have a positive impact. For
instance, in Kenya, the presence of a large number of refugees in the Dadaab area has increased
economic opportunities for the local communities. Displacement is not per se a driver of fragility;
66
it is the management of displaced populations that determines its impact. By taking a
development approach to displacement rather than strictly a humanitarian one, governments and
aid agencies could contribute to building institutions that help mitigate the stresses caused by
large-scale displacement and instead promote these groups’ potential to make positive impacts.
Neglected Peripheries and Border Zones
31. Many of the Horn’s border areas have been viewed as neither economically nor politically
important. Populated by low numbers of groups that often lack representation in central power
structures, and located in areas that offer limited economic potential, it is common to limit
investment of scarce public resources in border areas and peripheries. As a result, they are
frequently underdeveloped and the reach of the state and formal governance structures are
limited. This makes it difficult for border communities to cope with either the pressures
associated with increasing resource scarcity or taking up criminal or violent activity. Armed
groups are mobilizing disenfranchised populations to exploit existing fissures in society to further
violence based on religious or ethnic identity. Indeed, in some border areas of the Horn, armed
groups are increasingly using religion as a common identity that transcends borders.
32. In the arid lowland border zones of the Horn, droughts are frequent, often devastating, and
can cause communal clashes over scarce pasture and water. Periodic drought, such as that in
part of the eastern Horn in 2011, which affected 12 million people and had an estimated death toll
of 250,000 in Somalia alone (Food Security and Analysis Unit, 2013) caused massive
displacement—often to resource-scarce border areas. Resource scarcity, displaced communities,
poverty, and underdevelopment in the border areas exacerbate both communal conflict and civil
war. Traditional mechanisms for managing resource scarcity have become overwhelmed.
33. Armed resistance movements often target civilian populations for recruits, usually by force,
as do some governments when developing irregular counterinsurgency forces. There is a
resultant increase in arms flow and in those skilled in violence, which contributes to increased
militarization of the borders, with a concurrent increase in both communal conflicts and
trafficking. For instance, inter-communal cattle rustling operations have, in some cases, evolved
into militarized campaigns that transcend national boundaries. Cattle rustling, highway banditry,
and communal vengeance have not only increased in the region, but have caused increasing
numbers of casualties due to greater access to modern weapons. The areas on the border with
South Sudan, Kenya, and Uganda have particularly suffered from criminality and cattle rustling at
a massive scale over the last decade. Trafficking is also common, with lucrative smuggling
opportunities of minerals, products of poaching, guns, consumer goods, and people being
exploited by local security actors, middle men, and entrepreneurs.
34. With border areas offering a haven to extremist groups, violent criminals, and illicit
economic activities, countries of the Horn are increasingly committed to building stability
and strengthening governance in the borderlands and peripheral areas. In some countries,
this is also driven by changes in governance and an opening of the media. Under Kenya’s new
constitution, for example, devolution means that counties on its northern and eastern borders have
more voice and influence over decisions that affect their own populations.
35. The discovery of minerals, oil, gas, and water resources in remote and peripheral areas is a
potential driver of fragility but also an opportunity for better integration. Disputes within
border zones may be intensified by recent discoveries of oil, gas, and water reserves. Control over
the exploitation of and revenues from oil and gas deposits have triggered or fuelled insurgencies
in Sudan and Ethiopia, as well as raised tensions with neighbors. But such discoveries also put the
67
focus on earlier ignored regions, and in some cases could lead to efforts to better integrate them,
as in the case of the Turkana County in Kenya following the discovery of important oil reserves,
or in Uganda where oil has been discovered in the Lake Albert regions.
36. The region could capitalize upon thriving informal trade routes and the versatility and
interconnectedness of its business communities, but often does not due to concerns over
territorial and political control of peripheral and border areas. As such, opportunities to
deregulate trade, soften borders, and develop cross-border livelihoods—notably pastoralism has
been largely resisted. For example, some see the development of cross-border infrastructure and
opportunities, as promoted by the African Union’s Border Program, as at odds with their own
security agenda.
37. The WBG regional initiative should capitalize on the window of opportunity offered by a
renewed interest in the peripheries and support integrated approaches to developing the
border zones. These should seek to capitalize on trade opportunities including livestock and
labor movement, the development of soft borders with shared services, the control of illicit trade,
and should mitigate the risks of extractives development.
Grievance of Marginalized Groups
38. Conflict in the Horn is often fuelled by deep rooted social grievances related to poverty,
unemployment, and limited upward mobility. All generate a strong sense of exclusion,
particularly among youth. Ethnic and sectarian marginalization has proven to be particularly
explosive in the Horn, and is often overlaid upon each other. Challenged both from modern
systems of central and local governance and by the changes in social structures linked to
modernization, traditional systems of conflict resolution and decision making no longer serve to
address grievances and conflicts as they once did. With this decline in the importance of the
traditional decision-making institutions, marginalized groups are failing to find ways to
legitimately voice their concerns in the political arena.
39. A large part of the East African drylands is populated by pastoralists whose social and
economic life is structured around the maintenance and well-being of their livestock. During
the dry season or drought spells, pastoralists must move and look for other sources of pasture for
their livestock. In essence, mobility and adaptability are essential for pastoral livelihoods to
thrive. However, this movement often causes localized conflicts to emerge between pastoralists
and farmers competing for scarce resources such as land and water. As mentioned earlier,
although pastoralist conflicts are often low profile and subnational in nature, they can and have
sometimes escalated into the broader insurgencies that have afflicted the HoA. Furthermore,
these conflicts are increasingly fatal and have far-reaching consequences that destabilize
pastoralists’ livelihoods, uproot them from their traditional pasture grounds, and increase their
marginalization by depriving them of their mobility. This situation of heightened vulnerability
leaves pastoral communities increasingly exposed to radicalization and recruitment by insurgent
groups, traffickers, and other criminal and rebel enterprises. Policies of forced sedentarization and
stricter border controls based on security threats also threaten the social and economic fabric of
pastoralist communities because of their dependence on mobility.
40. In the Horn, political economies often favor patronage as determinants for opportunities for
education and access to jobs, leading to a pronounced sense of exclusion among the region’s
burgeoning youth population. Empirical results suggest that there is a positive association
between the growth rate of youth unemployment and the brutality and incidence of violence
(Caruso and Gavrilova, 2012). In countries with rebel movements and religious extremism, these
68
men become a fertile recruiting ground of fresh soldiers for the cause. Several research reports
on the conflict in Somalia identify economic incentives as a primary reason for foot soldiers to
join the movement.
Trade and resource Management as Flash Points
41. Poverty and limited economic diversification characterize many parts of the Horn.
Manufacturing sectors and tax bases are small, and exports are limited to a few overlapping
primary commodities (such as coffee, livestock, seeds, and khat) (Healy, 2011). Meanwhile,
countries of the Horn depend heavily on imported manufactured goods. The result is a region in a
disadvantaged trading position, composed of countries that are largely in competition with each
other, and which therefore have little incentive for trade liberalization. A number of the region’s
states also have strong economic nationalism tendencies and will prioritize securing their own
position as the region’s economic powerhouse over regionalism as a development approach.
Negotiation and interpretation of trade agreements can become flash points for conflict, and the
institutional framework to resolve associated disputes is weak.
42. Local-level competition over scarce resources is increasingly becoming a reason for violence
in many countries of the Horn. As stated in the section on marginalization, mobile pastoralist
populations move across borders between Kenya, Ethiopia, and Somalia in competition over
grazing grounds for their cattle. In combination with the increased militarization of the
peripheries discussed earlier, and with easy access to weapons, these conflicts have a tendency to
blow out of proportion and across borders. Even in urban centers, land rights continue to be a
driver of fragility where unequal distribution of land is poorly managed through often corrupt
cadastral systems for registration and distribution of property set against rapidly increasing
demand.
43. Disagreements around the use of the region’s most significant natural resources such as oil
and gas are already, or are likely to become, flash points. Oil and gas represent a huge
opportunity to generate income for the region’s development. At the same time, tensions are
rising around sharing revenues from oil and gas. It is unclear how the local communities will
benefit vis-à-vis the central parts of the countries. Similarly, the competition is increasing over
transport routes and the use of land and water needed to exploit these resources. The
management, exportation, and revenue sharing of oil between South Sudan and Sudan is just one
example of how difficult this can be and how large the potential for interstate conflict is. In
Uganda, Kenya, and Somalia, there is also potential for important oil development, and the
prospects for commercial exploitation of gas in Ethiopia’s Somali region are also real. However,
effective development of these resources and management of conflict risks requires very strong
regional collaboration. In each case, political cooperation and robust arrangements for sharing the
benefits would be essential to avoid rising tensions and to promote regional integration, but is
hampered by the distrust and securitization of governments’ political agendas. In combination
with weak mechanisms for negotiating and resolving trade disputes, there is an inclination in the
region to engage in bilateral negotiations involving only two or maybe three countries, rather than
seeking greater regional potential and thus avoiding the establishment of competitive initiatives
(such as oil pipelines or railway routes).
44. Ethiopia’s ambitious plans for hydropower generation and export will influence future
regional dynamics, and an inclusive and negotiated agreement on the use of the Nile waters
has still to be reached. Historical relations do not often engender the trust required to enter into
long-term agreements, even where the mutual benefits are clear. The discussion over the use of
the Nile waters deserves special mention as an illustration of how natural resource management
69
can become a flash point for conflict, and to demonstrate how hard it can be to reach agreement
over the management of common resources in a region characterized by distrust. Ten countries
are directly dependent on the water of the Nile for energy and agriculture. Water flow in the Nile
river basin is asymmetrical and the access to physical flow of the Blue Nile by Egypt and Sudan
in the downstream has extremely heightened hydro-political tension.
45. A lack of consensus over the use of the Nile basin has a tendency to escalate into
transboundary conflict involving emerging dominant states. Ethiopia is developing water
resources through hydroelectric power along the Nile, while Egypt has denied other riparian
countries complete access to water resources along the Nile. That said, relations between
Ethiopia, Sudan and Egypt have improved recently.
CAPITALIZING ON RESILIENCE FACTORS
46. In the HoA, there are a number of factors of resilience—including institutions and
unexploited economic opportunities—that could help mitigate fragility.
Institutions
47. Regional institutions and bodies are serving as platforms for intergovernmental cooperation
on conflict and fragility issues. Despite the history of mistrust between the various governments
in the region and the common practice of meddling in each other’s conflicts, governments are
showing a renewed interest in promoting regional cooperation to address conflict and fragility.
There appears to be a pragmatic realization that many of the region‘s most pressing problems can
be effectively addressed only through cooperative relations with neighboring states and through
multilateral efforts. The AU, in collaboration with the Regional Economic Communities (RECs),
has established the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) to deal with prevention,
management, and resolution of conflicts in Africa. Its core organ is the African Union Peace and
Security Council (PSC). The other components include the Continental Early Warning System
(CEWS), the African Standby Force (ASF), the Panel of the Wise, and the Peace Fund. The AU
is currently operating a peacekeeping operation in Somalia, AMISOM, to support transitional
governmental structures, implement a national security plan, train the Somali security forces, and
assist in creating a secure environment for humanitarian aid delivery.
48. In addition to the AU, IGAD has a broad mandate in peace and security, operationalized
through the IGAD Security Sector Programme (ISSP). The Conflict Early Warning and
Response Mechanism (CEWARN) is a part of the ISSP and it collects information on possible or
imminent conflict in border areas, disseminates those reports to member states, and facilitates a
rapid response to the crisis. Established in 2002, CEWARN remains the principal platform for
regional cooperation on conflict prevention and mitigation through data-based early warning and
response, and feeds its data to AU’s CEWS system at the continental level. This network was
designed to promote collaboration between government and civil society and includes regional,
national, and local dimensions in data collection, analysis, and decision making. CEWARN
represents a significant milestone in regional and continental efforts to build peace and security,
but has encountered problems in transforming its vast data into actionable recommendations and
projects. Currently, the mechanism is in the process of revising its methodology based on lessons
learned since its inception.
49. The East African Community (EAC) is an intergovernmental organization comprised of
five countries in the African Great Lakes region in eastern Africa: Burundi, Kenya,
Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda. The organization was originally founded in 1967, collapsed in
70
1977, and was officially revived on July 7, 2000. In 2008, after negotiations with the Southern
Africa Development Community (SADC) and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern
Africa (COMESA), the EAC agreed to an expanded free trade area that included the member
states from all three organizations. The EAC is an integral part of the African Economic
Community (AEC).
50. The EAC is a potential precursor to the establishment of the East African Federation, a
proposed federation of its five members into a single state. In 2010, the EAC launched its own
common market for goods, labor, and capital within the region, with the goal of creating a
common currency and eventually a full political federation. In 2013 a protocol was signed
outlining their plans to launch a monetary union within 10 years.
51. In December 2012, Tanzania officially agreed to South Sudan’s bid to join the EAC,
clearing the way for the world’s newest state to become the regional bloc’s sixth member. A
team was formed to assess South Sudan's bid; however, in April 2014, the nation requested a
delay in the admissions process, presumably due to ongoing internal conflict. Similarly, both
Sudan and Somalia have applied to join the EAC.
52. The EAC aims to widen and deepen cooperation among the member states in political,
economic, and social spheres (among others) for their mutual benefit, but its track record so
far has been on the trade and economic side. Dispute, conflict management, and interventions
in the area of peace and security have largely been left to other regional institutions. Still, the
Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community recognizes peace and security as
prerequisites for the success of the EAC regional integration process, and a strategy for regional
peace and security in East Africa was adopted in 2012. Other organs of the EAC include the East
African Court of Justice and the East African Legislative Assembly.
53. While there are a number of challenges constraining the regional organizations, their
capacity to manage conflict and instability in East Africa is growing and contributes to a
window of opportunity for more effective collaboration between member states.
54. Sub-national governmental authorities, especially those in marginal and border areas, are
playing a growing role in conflict management. In past decades, local governmental structures
possessed little authority and few resources. In some countries of the region (notably Ethiopia and
Kenya), there is a process of decentralization and devolution, which seeks to empower local
government institutions, with local communities electing their own leaders and (potentially)
demanding more responsive local government. Local governments are devoting a considerable
amount of time to cross-border conflict management, often meeting with their counterparts in the
adjoining state on a frequent basis and attending multiple regional fora to encourage
intergovernmental and regional cooperation on security and access issues.
55. Customary institutions and civil society, including religious figures, women‘s groups, youth
groups, professionals, and business interests have also been managing conflicts and building
peace. Traditional civic authorities have always played a central role in managing local disputes,
applying customary or religious law, and engaging in relations with other social groups. These
traditional sources of conflict management have been joined by additional civic actors, including
women‘s groups, business people, faith-based groups, professionals, and youth organizations,
creating a new landscape of local conflict management that is both more promising and more
complex. Today, most borderland peace building involves coalitions between local government
and civil society actors.
71
56. In remote border areas, traditional community and religious leaders play a significant role
in mediating disputes within and between groups, and hearing criminal cases. The
involvement of traditional leaders and civil society organizations (CSOs) in local conflict
mitigation and prevention has strengthened local resilience. Customary institutions have also
played a role in the reconciliation and reintegration of ex-combatants. For instance, in northern
Uganda, traditional Acholi rituals such as “stepping on the egg” (nyouo tong gweno) and
“drinking the bitter herb” (mato oput) have played a key role in reconciling and reintegrating excombatants or abductees into their communities.
Unexploited Economic Opportunities
57. The very characteristics that have, or are perceived to have, driven conflict and fragility in
the Horn could also serve as factors of resilience, if strengthened in a conflict-sensitive
manner. For example, the cross-border ties of communities divided by political borders but with
common identities provide a foundation for informal trade and entrepreneurism. In many areas,
there is a vibrant informal commercial economy that creates shared interests and alliances across
communities and borders. If these ties were to be formalized, and trade deregulated in such a way
so as to develop market-based cooperation and economic security, the benefits could be
enormous.
58. Economic exchanges that build on tradition and culture could serve to strengthen
governance and address instability. Trans-border trade and the creation of trans-border markets
and livelihood development—particularly of pastoralism—offer opportunities for building
resilience along the Horn’s unstable border zones. This will require the development of border
controls in a context where local security and state actors may be ineffective or corrupt. Local
populations should be actively included, as their knowledge and networks can help stabilize
borders and address illicit trade—the capacity of local communities to build informal systems of
protection and rule of law that deter and mitigate trans-border crime and violence is proven. An
inclusive, integrated approach of supporting local governance, border management, and trade
facilitation is necessary.
59. Legitimate and conflict-free trade regimes over extractives and water resources can also
play a critical role in building resilience in the Horn. The costs associated with the violation of
certification schemes and from smuggling are high. This, coupled with the potential for the
exploitation of natural resources by criminal networks and armed groups, creates an opportunity
to develop robust regional norms and codes, and penalties for illegal trade.
BUILDING STABILITY THROUGH A REGIONAL APPROACH
60. This section aims to inform how the objective of building security through development can
be delivered in the proposed intervention areas of the WBG regional initiative. Based on the
analysis of conflict drivers and factors of resilience above, recommendations are made for how to
address security as a cross-cutting theme within these interventions.
Expand the Cross-Border Growth and Stability Program
61. A spatially organized cross-border program that focuses on creating economic
opportunities and improved governance of areas is critical to the region’s stability in border
areas. These zones could include the Mandera cluster in the border zones of Kenya, Somalia, and
72
Ethiopia; the Karamoja cluster in the border zones of Uganda, South Sudan, Ethiopia, and Kenya;
and clusters in portions of the Sudan-South Sudan and Ethiopia-South Sudan borders.
62. The program could include the development of shared cross-border services that facilitate
movement of populations and promote cross-border economic exchange. It should also
promote improvement of livelihood and economic activity and strengthen governance of these
areas through support to local governments.
Establish a Program to Address Vulnerability Among IDPs and Refugees
63. The program could support incentives for the return of protracted displaced populations,
or, where politically feasible, support the improvement of skills and economic opportunities
of displaced populations to reduce the strain on host communities.
Support the Development of Pastoralists in Building Regional Security
64. Support could be provided to develop the pastoralism economy, facilitate cross-border
movement, strengthen the security of pastoralist activities, support conflict resolution
mechanisms, and ensure and improve service delivery and interaction with local
governments. Work on pastoralist livelihoods is already underway through several projects with
pastoralism components in Uganda, Somalia, and Sudan, but a new regional pastoralism initiative
developed in partnership with the Agriculture Practice and the FCV Group, the Regional Pastoral
Livelihoods Resilience Project (Horn of Africa—RPLRP), will focus on supporting pastoralism
development in order to contribute specifically to conflict prevention and mitigation.
Furthermore, the initiative will have a component on knowledge building and exchange in
collaboration with the major donors and stakeholders involved in the intersecting realms of
pastoralism, conflict prevention, and stabilization.
Strengthen IGAD’s Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism
65. Over the last decade, CEWARN has focused on pastoralist and related conflicts and become
a continental benchmark for data-based early warning and response systems. It has
pioneered region-wide mechanisms and its presence stretches from local communities to policylevel structures in member states.
66. The CEWARN 2012–2019 strategy calls for expanding the monitoring and analysis of the
types, causes, and drivers of violent conflicts, as well as of CEWARN’s geographic focus.59
This expansion of CEWARN’s mandate in a politically sensitive space reflects a faith in and
ownership of the system and a drive for solutions arising from combined local, national, and
regional efforts. Today, CEWARN runs a slim organization not equipped for this expansion. To
be able to deliver on its strengthened mandate, CEWARN will need resources to be able to recruit
new staff at both central and field levels, and also to make training and investments in technical
equipment. CEWARN currently runs an annual budget of over US$1.5 million. Funding comes
from member states, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), GIZ, and the
Scandinavian countries through a facility known as the Joint Financial Arrangement (JFA).
59
CEWARN’s mandate is now “to receive and share information concerning potentially violent conflicts as well as their
outbreak and escalation in the IGAD region; undertake and share analyses of that information; develop case scenarios and
formulate options for response; share and communicate information, analysis and response options; carry out studies on
specific types and areas of conflict in the IGAD region.”
73
67. A partnership with the World Bank could provide external recognition and resources and
allow CEWARN to take on new challenges as it expands its mandate in the early warning
and conflict resolution space. Capacity transfer between the two institutions—in human
resource (people), skills, technological capabilities, and, where possible, data-sharing, as well as
joint country risk and vulnerability research and assessments—are areas highlighted for potential
institutional support to IGAD. Technical support for the expansion of the use of mobile
technology in reporting on conflict and incidents of violence as well as for the ongoing revision
of the reporting system and the handling of both historical and current data could also be crucial
for CEWARN’s future success.
Promote Responsible Management of Extractive Resources
68. With the support of IGAD, a regional program could be undertaken that (1) facilitates
dialogue on the transport and export of extractive industry products; (2) provides technical
assistance for designing sound regional projects; and (3) looks at mechanisms for mediating
conflicts in the extractive sector. This initiative would promote transparency and the flow of
information, incentives for the promotion of regional social and environmental standards, and
regional skills development. An analysis of conflict risks around extractives in the Horn and
interventions needed to mitigate these risks could be undertaken to ensure that programming is
cognizant of ongoing and potential conflicts around revenue sharing, responds to opportunities
and challenges arising from decentralization, and builds the preparedness of the region’s
institutions to respond to grievances.
Support Inclusive Dialogue Processes
69. To break repeated cycles of violence, it is imperative that peace and national dialogue
processes are both inclusive of all parties affected by the conflict, as well as sufficiently
comprehensive so as to offer a route to address trauma and rebuild social trust.
74
REFERENCES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
Anderson, D. M., and A. J. Brown. 2011. “The Politics of Oil in Eastern Africa.” Journal of Eastern
African Studies 5 (2): 369–410.
Bereketeab, R. 2013. The Horn of Africa: Intra-state and Inter-state Conflicts and Security. London: Pluto.
Bradbury, M. 2008. Becoming Somaliland. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Caruso, R., and E. Gavrilova. 2012. “Youth Unemployment, Terrorism and Political Violence: Evidence
from the Israeli/Palestinian Conflict.” Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy 18 (2).
Clapham, C. 2012. “Why Is the Horn So Different?” Paper, Rift Valley Institute, Nairobi.
Clapham, C. 2014. “Peer Review Comments on the World Bank’s Draft Horn of Africa Regional Fragility
Assessment.” WBG internal note, World Bank, Washington, DC.
Collier, P., and A. Hoeffler. 2004. “Greed and Grievance in Civil War.” Oxford Economic Papers 56 (4):
563–95.
Collier, P., A. Hoeffler, and D. Roehner. 2009. “Beyond Greed and Grievance: Feasibility and Civil
War.” Oxford Economic Papers 61: 1–27.
Dagne, Ted. 2011. Uganda: Current Conditions and the Crisis in North Uganda. Washington, DC:
Congressional Research Service.
Food Security and Analysis Unit. 2013. “Study Report: Mortality Among Populations of Southern and
Central Somalia Affected by Severe Food Insecurity and Famine During 2010–2012.” Report, Food and
Agriculture Organization, Rome. http://www.fsnau.org/in-focus/study-report-mortality-among-populationssouthern-and-central-somalia-affected-severe-food-.
Healy, S. 2011. Hostage to Conflict: Prospects for Building Regional Economic Cooperation in the Horn
of Africa. London: Chatham House.
International Crisis Group. 2004. “Northern Uganda: Understanding and Solving the Conflict.” Africa
Report No. 77. http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/horn-of-africa/uganda/077-northern-ugandaunderstanding-and-solving-the-conflict.aspx.
Leriche, M., and M. Arnold. 2013. South Sudan from Revolution to Independence. London: Hurst.
Love, R. 2009. Economic Drivers of Conflict and Cooperation in the Horn of Africa. London: Chatham
House.
Marc, A., et al. 2013. Societal Dynamics and Fragility: Engaging Societies in Responding to Fragile
Situations. Washington, DC: World Bank.
Mengisteab, K. 2011. “Critical Factors in the Horn of Africa’s Raging Conflicts.” Discussion paper no. 67,
Nordic Africa Institute, Uppsala.
Shankleman, J. 2011. Oil and State Building in South Sudan. Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace.
Soliman, A., A. Vines, and J. Mosley. 2012. “The EU Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa: A
Critical Assessment of Impact and Opportunities.” Study, Directorate-General for External Policies of the
Union, Brussels.
Stevens, P. 2009. Transit Troubles: Pipelines as a Source of Conflict. London: Chatham House.
Styan, D. 2013. Djibouti: Changing Influence in the Horn’s Strategic Hub. London: Chatham House.
PRIO (Peace Research Institute Oslo). 2014. “Revisiting the Politics of State Survival: Violence,
Legitimacy and Governance in the Greater Horn of Africa.” Seminar, St. Anthony’s College, Oxford, May
8.
USAID (United States Agency for International Development). 2012. “East Africa Regional Conflict and
Instability Assessment.“ Final report, USAID, Washington, DC.
Utas, M. 2012. “Urban Youth and Post-Conflict Africa: On Policy Priorities.” NAI Policy Notes 2012/4,
Nordic Africa Institute, Uppsala.
Vaughan, C., M. Schomerus, and L. de Vries, eds. 2013. The Borderlands of South Sudan: Authority and
Identity in Contemporary and Historical Perspectives. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Wallenstein, P., and M. Sollenberg. 1998. “Armed Conflict and Regional Conflict Complexes, 1989–
1997.” Journal of Peace Research 35 (5): 339–58.
Woodward, M. 2012. Crisis in the Horn of Africa: Politics, Piracy and the Threat of Terror. London:
Tauris.
75
Annex VI.
Forced Displacement in the Horn of Africa
1. Demographics, Causes and Consequences of Displacement
1.
War, conflict and insecurity, compounded by drought and poor economic conditions, have
triggered major displacements of people in the Horn of Africa. The region hosts an estimated 2
million refugees and over 6 million IDPs many of whom have experienced multiple or prolonged
displacements. Kenya and Ethiopia are respectively the fourth and sixth largest hosts of refugees in the
world60, hosting almost one million refugees between them. Somalis were the third largest refugee group
under UNHCR’s responsibility, with 1,157,210 people in January 2014. There are approximately over
1,200,000 Somali refugees in the Dollo Ado area of Ethiopia and over 500,000 registered in Kenya’s
Dadaab camp - the largest refugee settlement in the world and effectively Kenya’s third largest city.
These figures may even underestimate the true scale of displacement in the region, as they do not include
many ‘invisible’ IDPs.
2.
Much of the displacement in the region is protracted and the socio-economic impacts are
significant. These include the prolonged alienation of displaced people from their land, disruptions to
their livelihoods and access to services, and their lack of participation in the social, economic and political
life of host communities. The fiscal costs of servicing displaced populations are considerable for host
countries relative to their capacity and resources, putting significant strain on weak national and local
government and host communities. The needs of people in protracted displacement and those who may
eventually return to their places of origin when security permits are largely developmental in nature (i.e.
improving equitable access to land, housing and services, reestablishing livelihoods and strengthening
local governance) and significant untapped potential exists for the economic empowerment of displaced
people and returnees in both rural and urban areas. These are areas where humanitarian responses are
inadequate and where the Bank has a significant comparative advantage in terms of its technical expertise,
convening power, analytical capacity and operations.
2. Major Displacement Crises and Prospects for Durable Solutions
3.
Sudan: More than three million Sudanese are displaced, the majority in a state of
protracted displacement in urban and peri-urban areas, and numbers continuing to grow due to
ongoing conflict. There are several prolonged conflicts in Sudan fueled by economic, political and sociocultural marginalization of peripheral regions and leading to large-scale and protracted displacement.
There are at least 1.7 million IDPs in the Darfur region, 931,000 in South Kordofan State and 185,000 in
Blue Nile State. Armed conflict in these areas has become increasingly violent over the last 18 months; at
least 875,000 people were displaced in these areas between January 2012 and May 2013 (IDMC, 2013).
Additionally, there are an estimated 150,000 IDPs in the eastern states of Red Sea, Kassala and Gedaref
and a further 632,014 people who sought refuge in neighboring countries. The prospects for sustainable
return of displaced are limited, particularly in Darfur, due to ongoing insecurity (often leading to
secondary displacement), more limited access to services in return areas or because land has been
occupied by others. It is anticipated that many IDPs in Darfur would prefer to integrate locally in urban or
76
peri-urban areas. Some IDP families have chosen to separate, with men returning to cultivate land and
prevent its occupation and women, children and elderly remaining in camps (IDMC, 2013). Sudan is also
host to refugees from neighboring countries, including South Sudan (up to 350,000 in Khartoum plus
increasing numbers from the current conflict), Ethiopia, Eritrea and Chad.
4.
Somalia: More than two million Somalis are displaced and conditions not yet conducive to
large-scale returns. Almost a quarter of Somalia’s population has been affected by forced displacement,
the majority as a consequence of armed conflict or generalized violence, compounded by periods of acute
drought and famine. There are over 1,106,000 IDPs and 1,157,210 Somali refugees (the second largest
refugee group under UNHCR’s responsibility), the majority of whom have sought refuge in Kenya
(426,367), Ethiopia (244,995) and Yemen (233,723). Improving security in parts of Somalia has raised
expectations about the return of Somali refugees and IDPs. In November 2013, a Tripartite Agreement
between UNHCR, the Government of Kenya, and the Somali Government was signed to facilitate the
voluntary repatriation of Somali refugees from Kenya, however no deadline was established and
organized returns have yet to begin. Conditions are not yet conducive to large-scale returns to Somalia
particularly in areas where security is still fragile and livelihood options are limited. If returns occur
prematurely, it is likely that returning refugees will find themselves in IDP-like situations, with
competition over scarce resources and employment opportunities leading to new tensions. It is expected
that many IDPs in protracted displacement are likely to remain in urban centers such as Mogadishu,
Hargeisa and Bossaso. In January 2013, the government announced a six-stage plan to relocate hundreds
of thousands IDPs currently living in settlements in and around Mogadishu to areas outside the city,
although the relocation was put on hold due to deteriorating security.
5.
South Sudan: More than a million South Sudanese are displaced and numbers rising
rapidly due to current crisis. Forced displacement in South Sudan is a consequence of the north-south
conflict, tribal conflicts fueled by competition over natural resources, attacks by the Lord’s Resistance
Army (LRA), instability in neighboring countries, and most recently by the ongoing internal conflict. As
at August 7, 2014, there were over 1.3 million IDPs in South Sudan including 50,000 previously
displaced by LRA attacks who have not found durable solutions Around 600,000 people have crossed
into neighboring countries. Since October 2010, 366,000 South Sudanese have returned from Sudan but
there have been no documented returns, local integrations or resettlement of IDPs since 2012. Large
numbers of refugees and returnees are living in vulnerable urban settings, and insecurity and lack of
access to land, services, or livelihood opportunities have complicated the pursuit of durable solutions.
6.
Uganda: Almost all IDPs in Northern Uganda have returned to areas of origin, however
recovery and development efforts need further attention. The conflict in Northern Uganda caused the
displacement of over 1.8 million people, the majority of whom have now returned to their areas of origin.
About 30,000 IDPs are thought to remain in camps - most of which have been officially closed—unable
to return to their areas of origin due to age, illness or disability, or lack of land. Recovery and
development efforts in areas of return have not been sufficient, with inadequate basic services and limited
support to rebuild livelihoods. Uganda also hosts 121,577 South Sudanese and over 172,000 Congolese
refugees (fleeing conflict in North Kivu and Province Orientale) in the eastern Democratic Republic of
the Congo and provides asylum to refugees from Burundi, Eritrea, Rwanda and Somalia. Uganda ranks
seventh in the world in terms of refugees hosted per US$1 of GDP.
7.
Kenya: Second largest host of refugees in Africa and forth largest in the world in terms of
refugees hosted per 1 USD of GDP. At the end of 2012, there were over 412,000 IDPs in Kenya,
including IDPs displaced during the 2007/08 post-election violence. Kenya also hosts over half a million
refugees, including over 426,000 Somali refugees in Kenya’s Dadaab camp - the largest refugee
settlement in the world and effectively Kenya’s third largest city.
77
8.
Ethiopia: Home to the highest number of refugees than any other African country. Ethiopia
hosts over 244,000 Somalis, over 255,000 South Sudanese, over 98,000 Eritreans and over 33,000
Sudanese refugees, the majority in refugee camps situated near the borders of their respective countries of
origin. At the end of 2012, the Dolo Ado camp complex had grown to become the second largest in the
world with a population of 200,000 Somali refugees. Camp-based refugees are required to obtain permits
to leave the camps. In August 2010, the Ethiopian Government introduced a new policy allowing Eritrean
refugees to reside outside camps, provided they are self-sufficient or have other support in Ethiopia.
Approximately 1,000 refugees benefited from this policy, including 200 Eritrean students granted
scholarships by Ethiopian universities.
4. Bank’s Engagement on Forced Displacement in the Horn of Africa
9.
The Bank’s Global Program on Forced Displacement (GPFD) in collaboration with
UNHCR is carrying out a regional study on displacement in the HoA. The study will profile displaced
populations in the region, analyze displacement dynamics including prospects for durable solutions and
their consequences for vulnerability and security, and propose policy options and operational priorities for
assistance to displaced populations, returnees and their host communities. Additionally, it is envisaged
that forced displacement will be a key focus of the proposed Regional Initiative on the HoA. Specifically,
Pillar I on vulnerability and resilience would address the acute vulnerabilities of refugees, IDPs and
returnees as well as the impact of population displacement on host and return communities in terms of
access to land, services, livelihoods and local governance. This would complement ongoing assistance by
UNHCR and others in the region.
The issues to be covered by the assignment are the following:

History, Regional and Country Context: Forced displacement often has a regional impact in
the areas where it occurs. Population flows may also be rooted in centuries-old historical forces.
Analysis of present day displacement should start with an overview of the historical forces and
present day implications of the phenomenon. Regional drivers and implications of displacement
should be distinguished from country-specific drivers in order to crystallize the needs of a
regional World Bank approach.

Displacement Profile: Present a typology of the different displacement situations and the latest
demographic and other data on refugees and returnees. This study is focusing on forced
displacement due to conflict or political upheaval and natural disasters. Discuss the socioeconomic characteristics of displaced populations, whether there is protracted and new
displacement, whether secondary or tertiary displacement is occurring, with particular focus on
issues related to gender and children. What are the locations of those displaced across borders
(urban vs. rural; camp-based or dispersed within host communities)? Can these populations be
characterized by ethnic, geographic, or socio-economic variables?

Identify Actors, Factors and Interests: Provide a detailed discussion of the causes,
background, and drivers of displacement, as well as the interests, incentives, and distribution of
resources among key actors and institutions. Identify stakeholders, their interests and influence,
including elements of the displaced population, host populations, governments, the private sector,
political groups, aid agencies, etc. Distinguish regional drivers and implications of displacement
from those that are country-specific.
78

Analyze the Needs of the Displaced and Displacement Prospects, including Prospects for
Return. Identify the needs and coping strategies of the displaced and their hosts, and classify
these in terms of short-, medium- and long term expectations, and if appropriate, distinguish
between new and protracted displacement. Review possibilities for assessing the impact of
displacement on host governments (both local and national), including implications on planning
and service delivery, as well as fiscal and economic impact. Focus on the main development
challenges for displaced people, including: (i) access to land, housing and property; (ii)
livelihoods; (iii) service delivery; and (iv) voice, inclusion and accountable governance. The
study will focus on a regional approach to support solutions with the overriding goal of securing
return of refugees to their country of origin. In situations of protracted displacement this may
require support on both sides of the border including possible area development programs
benefitting both host populations and refugees to mitigate the impact of refugee presence and to
prepare the refugees for return and to improve development for the host populations. What
general developmental interventions are appropriate under these circumstances?

Map Existing Displacement Policies and Programs: Describe and assess policies and programs
addressing displacement to highlight opportunities, gaps, and constraints for targeted
development action. Highlight government programs, if any, as well as operations by multilateral,
bilateral, and civil society actors. If there are programs in the existing World Bank portfolio that
address displacement directly or indirectly, these should be noted.

Provide Operational Recommendations: Discuss the scope for addressing development
challenges through analytical work and operations. Based on the analysis and program mapping,
provide recommendations for the Bank and other development actors for analytical, operational,
and policy activities to promote solutions to issues of displacement.
79
Annex VII.
Borderlands Development, West Africa, the Horn of Africa and the
Great Lakes Region
1. Rationale
1.
Traditionally border areas in many parts of Africa have been viewed as neither
economically nor politically important by central government. Yet many borders are contested and
are a common conflict trigger. Resource scarcity, combined with rapid population growth, the diversion
of resources to serve politico-military networks, poverty and underdevelopment in border regions is
exacerbating communal conflict, tensions between ethnic groups associated with neighboring countries,
civil wars and general insecurity. Populated by low numbers of groups that often lack representation in
central power structures and offering limited economic potential, limited investment of scarce public
resources has been the norm. As a result these areas are underdeveloped and the reach of the state is
limited, making it even more difficult for border communities to cope with either the pressures associated
with increasing resource scarcity or with pressures to engage in criminal or violent activity. Where
governments have ignored demands for basic services, closed avenues for political participation,
participated in illegal trade or failed to address grievances, marginalized groups may resort to violence.
2.
In the HoA neglected border zones are susceptible to influence by armed groups. Resource
scarcity combined with rapid population growth, poverty and underdevelopment is exacerbating both
communal conflict and civil wars in these areas with traditional conflict management mechanisms
overwhelmed by well financed armed groups and criminal networks. The increasing regional and
international threat emanating from border areas, along with a recognition of the potentially destabilizing
effect of natural resource finds, has resulted in countries’ increasing interest in strengthening security,
governance and development in the borders.
3.
In the HoA the twin issues of forced displacement and borderlands often overlap. Wars and
famines have generally triggered major displacements of people both within countries and across borders,
making the concentration of refugees and internally displaced people one of the highest in the world. The
region has generated over two million refugees and hosts around 1.6 million of them, many of whom have
experienced multiple or prolonged displacement, often lasting for decades. There are also over five
million internally displaced people in the region (See figure 1).
4.
In some parts of Central Africa the lack of state territorial control and effective
coordinating mechanisms have to date prevented a coordinated sub-regional approach. An example
is provided by the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) which has morphed into a regional menace, effecting
the Central African Republic (CAR), South Sudan and Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). To date
there are no specific regional policies or strategies to deal with the stabilization and recovery of LRA
affected areas. Supporting and strengthening of traditional ethnic social capital, transport corridors and
informal and formal trading links between affected countries (including Uganda), are all strategically
important, and could form elements of a borderlands development program. Not all countries are
members of a single Regional Economic Community (REC) which continues to impede progress on a
coordinated regional approach.
5.
Stabilization and rehabilitation demand a regional approach and has a strong borderlands
development dimension that needs to be twinned with effective security arrangements. The crossborder activities and loyalties of combatants in the Chad-CAR-Sudan zone and around the porous borders
80
of the DRC with Sudan, Uganda, Burundi and Rwanda have been a structured pattern of conflicts at both
the local and transnational levels. The close networks of ethnic groups that live astride current borders are
playing an important role; raiders, poachers, road-blockers and pastoralists are all active in the
Figure 1 - Patterns of displacement in the Horn of Africa
borderlands and partake in the governing of the area61. Widespread road banditry had led to the
displacement of population in Northern CAR to refugee camps in the south of Chad. Details of the extent
of forced displacement due to these incidences and from the current crisis in the CAR can be seen in
Figure 2. In the Great Lakes Region, the porous nature of the Congo’s borders with surrounding states
have led to a zone where political and armed actors on all sides use the incomes gained from smuggling
natural resources such as minerals, wood and ivory to finance their networks. In combination with the
ready availability of small arms, this has led to chronic conflict in the Kivus and Orientale province, with
thousands of deaths and refugee flows over the last decade as a result.
61
Lombard, L.N. Raiding sovereignty in Central African Borderlands, PhD dissertation, Duke University, 2012.
81
Figure 2: Forced displacement from CAR
6.
Countries in Africa are increasingly committed to building stability and strengthening
governance in the borderlands, and borderlands development is becoming a reality in many border
areas. In 2006 the ECOWAS convention on cross-border cooperation was approved by its member states,
and these efforts have had a snowball effect in that the West African Monetary Union (UEMOA), the
Inter-States Committee on Drought Control in the Sahel (CILSS) and the Lipatako-Gourma Development
Authority (ALG)62, have all launched cross border cooperation initiatives. Obstacles identified by a recent
EU study were conflicts due to the pressure on land and natural resources, poor infrastructure,
administrative procedures and national compartmentalization63. In the Great Lakes Region, the regional
Peace, Security and Coordination Framework (PSCF) of 2013, which followed a period of serious
conflict in the DRC and the defeat of the M23 rebel group has led to an agreement between the states to
increase security cooperation around the borders.
7.
The WBG cannot achieve its stated corporate goals of eliminating extreme poverty and
boosting shared prosperity without engaging more intensively and creatively in addressing very
difficult development problems, including those linked to insecurity and vulnerability. There has,
and continues to be, very few projects and programs which aim to bring about localized collective action
of neighboring countries to help solve problems and exploit opportunities for states to intensity efforts
towards the development of their borderlands. In addition, lasting and peaceful solutions to current and
crises can only be found if complex regional and international connections are recognized and addressed
within the framework of a comprehensive strategy.
62
63
A regional organization seeking to develop the contiguous areas of Malo, Burkina Faso and Niger.
Opportunities for cross-border cooperation in West Africa, Association of European Border Regions. 2012.
82
2. Opportunity
8.
Cross-border socioeconomic dynamics in Africa have a potential for integration and to
increase sustainable human development that is still underestimated. Examples include: joint
management and preservation of natural resources; rationalization of trade networks; control of illegal
trafficking; strengthening of the capacities of customs agents and border police; joint capitalization of
export goods; coordination of security force and emergency teams; support to discussion platforms
between cross-border communities to reduce tensions; local radio networks; and the handling of refugees
and displaced people.
9.
Trans-border trade and the creation of trans-border markets, and livelihood development
offer opportunities for building resilience along unstable border zones. Localized cross-border
collaboration and integration could also help in normalizing relations between neighboring states which
remains a key challenge in West Africa, the Great Lakes Region and the Horn. Regions could capitalize
more upon thriving informal trade routes and the versatility and inter-connectedness of its business
communities, but often do not due to concerns over territorial and political control of border areas. As
such, opportunities to deregulate trade, soften borders, and develop cross-border livelihoods have largely
been resisted. West African border markets have been extensively documented over the last decades – see
Figure 2.
Figure 2: Cross-border markets in West Africa. Source, Crosstrade64.
10.
Economic exchanges which build on tradition and culture could serve to strengthen
governance and address instability. An important consideration is that even where cross-border
tensions are very strong, there are nearly always regional markets which act as points of convergence,
where people from different backgrounds come together to trade based on common interests. In many
areas, there is a vibrant informal commercial economy that creates share interests and alliances across
64
Informal Trade and Cross Border Integration in West Africa, National Research Fund of Luxembourg, 2011.
83
communities and borders and if these ties can be strengthened and trade deregulated in such a way as to
develop market-based cooperation and economic security, the benefits could be enormous. Particular
ethnic groups with cross-border connections can play a particularly constructive role in this undertaking,
if this is accompanied with measures to decrease stereotyping.
11.
Yet the development of cross border infrastructure and opportunities, as promoted by the
African Union’s Border Program is seen by some as at odds with their own security agenda.
Security as defined in the context of borderlands development is not the provision of military hardware
for the militarization of the border, but the progressive dimension aimed at poverty reduction and the
provision of health and education services. For example, the porosity of Nigeria’s borders is an important
factor in the survival of Boko Haram, offering a lifeline to external support from transnational groups in
the form of weapons, training, radicalization and funding.
12.
Development of ‘borderlands’ would aim to promote zones of contact and exchange, rather
than lines of confrontation between separate sovereignties65. It promotes a new form of border
cooperation based on the process of sub-regional integration and strengthened decentralization.
Development of borderlands recognizes the existence of borders between countries but also to often
dynamic communities that are united by socio-economic and cultural realities.
13.
New WBG programs could provide support for a limited number of border zones which are
characterized by high levels of forced displacement and / or insecurity and high numbers of people
living in extreme poverty. It would be aligned to the African Union’s Border Programme (AUBP) which
has the general objective of the structural prevention of conflicts and the promotion of regional
integration.
3. What is the WBG already doing?
14.
A more considered and structured approach to borderlands development would enable
enhanced support, facilitate internal thematic coherence, and be an exciting area for new
partnerships. Several ongoing and planned WBG activities contribute to elements of borderlands
development whether operationally, for example, through support to pastoralism in the Sahel and Horn
regions, or our ongoing analyses on forced displacement in those same sub-regions and also in the Great
Lakes Region. Issues of forced displacement are often inextricably linked spatially to borderlands
development and require new solutions beyond traditional humanitarian interventions. A sample of
ongoing activities is detailed in Table 1. Internal coherence would extend to IFC and MIGA as
opportunities for private sector investments and borderlands are not mutually exclusive, and operations
could also leverage MIGA’s Conflict-Affected and Fragile Economies Facility.
15.
A more coherent WBG approach to borderlands development has the potential to leverage
significant partnerships opportunities. For example, the European Union is already active in this area
in West Africa and looking to do more in the context of the Horn, and also through new arrangements
with NGOs such as the Red Cross who often have a good ground presence in these more remote areas and
who are looking increasingly to support more development-orientated interventions. A promising
partnership opportunity in the Great Lakes Region is with the UN, through links with the Regional Peace,
Security and Cooperation Framework (PSCF). The WBG’s regional conflict facility, managed by the
Fragility, Conflict and Violence Group in close collaboration with the UN Secretary-General’s Special
Envoy for the Great Lakes Region is supporting these programmes to address the root causes of regional
65
Nigeria-Cameroon borderland: Prospects for economic cooperation and integration. American Journal of Social
Issues and Humanities, Vol 4, Issue 2, March 2014.
84
conflicts, and align with national programmes, as well as with the PSCF. The conflict facility could
support the integration of a borderlands-focus into planned and ongoing Great Lakes programming.
Table 1: Ongoing WBG activities in support of borderlands development
Status
Geography
Thematic
Area
Eastern Nile
Watershed
Management
Project
Project
ongoing
Egypt, Sudan
(Lake
Nubia/Nasir)
Sustainable
Watershed
Management
National
Poverty Map
AAA planned
Sudan
Social
Protection
Project –
Planned
Sudan
Employment
& Economic
Growth
Project –
Planned
Sudan all regions
that border
neighboring
countries
Employment
& Economic
Growth
Project –
Planned
South Sudan
Transport
Name
Gum Arabic
Phase II
Service
Delivery in
Areas
Emerging
from Conflict
Regional
Roads
Ruzizi
Agricultural
Development
Project
Improving
resilience and
social cohesion
in Border
communities
Facilitating
Trade in the
Great Lakes
Region
Regional Sahel
Pastoralism
Support
Project
Regional
Pastoral
Livelihoods
Resilience
Pre-concept
note
DRC, Rwanda,
Burundi
Agriculture
and trade
DRC- ZambiaUganda
Economic
development
and basic
services
Project –
concept note
DRC, Uganda
Rwanda, Burundi,
Tanzania, Zambia
Trade
Project –
April 2015
board date
Burkina Faso,
Chad, Mauritania,
Mali, Niger,
Senegal
Pastoralism
Project –
board
approval
March 2014
Kenya, Uganda,
Ethiopia
Pastoralism
Pre-concept
note
85
Key activities
Regional import focused on
sustainable watershed
management in communities on
the Eastern Nile Basin.
Inform the development of a
national social protection system
in Sudan. Provide better empirics
around the level of deprivation in
the border areas.
Addressing employment and
economic growth considerations
in Darfur (bordering Chad) and
in Kordofan (South Kordofan
borders South Sudan)
Strengthening cross border
agriculture trade, supporting the
emergence of regional valuechain in food products and
support the development of
agribusiness
Local economic recovery and
stabilization activities in conflictaffected border communities
including support for conflict
affected people and providing
access to basic services for
refugees and displaced persons.
Cross-border trade in goods and
services, policy reform, and
infrastructure in conflict-affected
borders of the Great Lakes
Animal health, improving natural
resource management, market
access and supporting pastoral
livelihoods
Natural resource management,
market and trade access,
livelihood support & risk
management
Program
Growth
Without
Borders
EAC spatial
analysis
Forced
displacement
of IDPs and
refugees in the
Sahel
Forced
displacement
in the Horn of
Africa
Economic
integration &
stability in the
Tamazuj
region
Value chain
support
project
Geospatial analysis of
endowments of and areas of
economic potential in
agribusiness, mining, tourism
and trade
Geospatial analysis of oil and gas
resources and future impacts on
spatially driven growth and
regional infrastructure
connectivity
AAA ongoing
Mozambique,
Malawi, Zambia,
Zimbabwe
Growth
Poles
AAA – July
start
Kenya, Uganda,
Rwanda, Burundi,
Tanzania
Growth poles
AAA –
completed
Burkina Faso,
Chad, Mali,
Mauritania and
Niger
Forced
displacement
Analysis of Sahel displacement
situation and development needs
AAA –
ongoing
Uganda, Kenya,
Somalia, South
Sudan, Sudan,
Ethiopia, Eritrea,
Djibouti
Forced
displacement
Regional study with UNHCR to
assess situation and inform
development operations
Concept
note
Project –
approved
May 2014
Sudan – South
Sudan
Trade &
community
governance
Chad
Value chains
Parallel and coordinated crossborder development for
integration and stability.
Infrastructure, access to finance
(mobile), technical and
vocational training and cross
border policy harmonization
Improvement of cross-border
trading business environment,
with focus on meat and dairy
sub-sectors
4. Which borders?
16.
Much of the literature on borderlands in Africa resides in the academic sphere with little
written on examples of practical implementation or on the typology of borders. There exists
substantial academic research on borderlands and cross-border affairs and a growing literature on African
issues. Research initiatives such as Border Regions in Transition66, the Association for Borderlands
Studies67 and specialist research centers such as International Boundaries Research Unit68 (Durham
University) and Centre for International Borders Research69 (Queen’s University Belfast) are all active in
this field. In the Great Lakes region, the NGO International Alert has undertaken a number of policy
studies into the functioning of the DRC’s borders for the WBG70.
66
67
68
69
70
http://www.brit2014.org/
http://absborderlands.org/ in addition the association organized a conference that features a large number of studies and
papers on borderlands. Information on the conference can be found on the following link:
http://absborderlands.org/studies/absworld/
https://www.dur.ac.uk/ibru/
http://www.qub.ac.uk/research-centres/CentreforInternationalBordersResearch/
See for example International Alert, ‘The Crossing’, 2011
86
17.
In the absence a border typology, an initial internal analysis has looked into two main
areas: (i) regional connectivity, and (ii) the level of vulnerability. These two main categories were then
broken down into a number of sub-categories as can be seen in Table 2 based on publicly available data
and indicators.
Table 2: Criteria used in ranking border areas
Level of Vulnerability
Vulnerability
 Population
density
 Adult
Literacy
 Refugee/IDPs
 Poverty Rate
 Demographic
Pressures
Insecurity
 Perceived
criminality in
society
 State legitimacy
 Security
apparatus
 Group grievance
Regional Connectivity
Structural
collaboration
 Neighboring
country
relations
 Membership
to RECs
 Transborder trade
Trans-border
trade
 Status of trade
 Market access
 Relative
importance of
trade to the
border area
Economic
potential
 Existing
infrastructure
 Natural
resources
 Potential for
economic
growth
Government
openness
 Client perception
For the scope of the HoA Initiative, the following border areas were identified: (i) Ethiopia-SomaliaKenya, (ii) Kenya-Somalia, (iii) Sudan-South Sudan-Ethiopia, (iv) Sudan-South Sudan, (v) KenyaUganda-South Sudan, (vi) Ethiopia-Eritrea-Sudan and; (vii) Eritrea-Djibouti. Scores were allocated to
each sub-categories in Table one to enable an initial ranking based on total scores. This ranking can be
seen in Table 3. The first three border areas in Table 3might constitute multiple options and higher
potential for trans-border activities envisaged in the Horn Initiative. It is important to note however that
the analysis is preliminary in nature and there is a need for validation and further analyses and research.
For the Great Lakes Region, the cross-border trade programme is still under development, including its
methodology for the selection of zones. However, based on discussions with the regional states, the
following DRC border posts were selected, which may strongly benefit from a Borderlands-approach as
well: (1) Goma-Gisenyi and Bukavu-Cyangugu (DRC-Rwanda); (2) Kavimvira-Gatumba(DRC-Burundi);
(3) Fizi-Kigoma (DRC-Tanzania); (4) Kasindi-Kasese, Ishasa-Mpondwe, Aru-Arua and Mahagi (DRCUganda); and one yet to be identified border crossing between the DRC and Zambia. These zones have all
known serious problems related to illegal smuggling and cross-border ethnic tensions, yet represent
serious potential for increased commerce and stabilization as well.
18.
Areas with low population density, weak governance, poor basic services infrastructure,
and high levels of heterogeneity among ethnic groups (sedentary or pastoralist) exhibit not only
higher levels of conflict; but also higher levels of illegal cross-border trade. In addition, these areas
exhibit higher levels of militarization due to persistent insecurity and human rights abuses by state and
non-state actors (foreign and domestic). For example, in Vakaga prefecture in Northeast CAR, which has
an extremely low population density (under 1/km2), there are many sedentary groups (Runga, Gula, Kara,
Sara, Kreich, and Yulu) residing in a vast and remote area with internal problems (viz. Kara – Gula; and
Gula-Runga) as well as conflicts with pastoralists from Chad and Sudan (Darfur). The Northeast region of
CAR is also an area (Savannah Natural Zone) where pastoralists roving from Chad and Sudan descend in
the dry seasons with their herds, staying for longer periods due to a combination of climate change and
conflict in Darfur and eastern Chad. In the same vein, the Ruzizi Plain in the eastern DR Congo acts as a
pass-through channel for pastoralists to the neighboring countries, which lead to violent clashes with local
agricultural communities and wider regional instability. Therefore, although the WBG has a corporate
focus on extreme poverty, it seems necessary to have to assess the wider regional economic impacts of
87
inaction in borderlands. Table 4 gives an overview of the types of operational interventions that might be
possible.
Table 3: Ranking of Border Areas
Border Area (high to low priority)
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
Ethiopia-Somalia-Kenya
Kenya-Somalia
Sudan-South Sudan-Ethiopia
Sudan-South Sudan
Kenya-Uganda-South Sudan
Ethiopia-Eritrea-Sudan
Eritrea-Djibouti
A similar ranking will be done for West/Central Africa and for the Great lakes Region, although the
methodology may need to be adapted. For the Great Lakes Region, the regional conflict facility is already
looking into studies into cross-border dynamics, but this work could easily be combined with a
Borderlands-approach. It is clear that on-going conflicts and insecurity in borderlands, which maybe
sparsely populated, are having serious negative economic impacts on whole sub-regions though to date
these impacts are not quantified.
5. Next steps
19.
A WBG’s approach to borderlands development is being explored as a subcomponent of
AFR’s regional integration strategy, partly in preparation for the high level visit in the fall. In
recent discussions with a small number of key academics, key messages included: 1) migration to
borderlands (particularly in West Africa) is pronounced and a growing trend; 2) the best practical
examples to date are in West Africa where some have received EU financing, but also some small-scale
initiatives in the Eastern DRC focused on dialogue between small traders and border authorities; 3)
upstream mapping of cross-borders actors and regional networks and their subsequent involvement is key;
4) the engagement of the WGB is this field is welcome.
New analytics are required to help the WBG in prioritizing possible new operations.
88
Table 4: Options for Operations
The following options are preliminary in nature and should not be taken as final suggestions deriving
from a comprehensive understanding of needs and potential of abovementioned border areas. The options,
however, represent applicable activities that can start the conversation and set a framework for
formulating the right kind of operations that would contribute to the objectives set out in Horn of Africa
Initiative.
Activity
Cross-border
connectivity projects
Cross-border basic
infrastructure
improvements
Enhancement of
Cross-border
Economic
Development
Enhancement of
Cross-border
Interactions
Cross-border civilian
disarmament project
Community
Reinsertion for IDPs
Objectives/Activities
- Improving trans-border connectivity by upgrading
border crossings.
- Developing integrated local transport connections
including road construction/ improvements to
increase logistical capacity and efficiency of the
border area.
- Increasing access to basic services in border areas
- Developing infrastructure aimed at reducing the
number of (illegally present) border actors, leading
to ‘one-stop’ borders;
- Developing infrastructure to protect (particularly
female) small traders based on their own
recommendations
- Strengthening economic development through
common interventions
- Facilitating cross-border relations.
- Supporting local economic associations
- Supporting regional governments in simplifying
border procedures and clarifying laws, regulations
and tax systems
- Supporting development of community-based
organizations which transcend ethnicity
- Improving overall governance in relation to the
provision of services for communities in border
areas.
- Supporting a dialogue between border authorities
and small traders to create understanding over-andback and decrease stereotyping
- Supporting the independent monitoring of the
functioning of border services
- Supporting governments in addressing impunity of
state agents on the border
- Increase educational, cultural and sporting
exchanges between border area communities.
- Reducing Small Arms and Light Weapons
(SALW)
- Supporting the return of IDPs
- Supporting IDPs to organize into trading
consortiums and providing them with training and
micro-credit
89
Impact
- Improved access to transport and
communication network
- Joint use of infrastructure to support
regional integration
- Support connectivity with border areas and
central/local authorities
- Increased trade volume
- Promote social cohesion between
communities living in border areas.
- Decreasing harassment and facilitating
small trade
- Improved access to basic services and
security
- Promoting entrepreneurship and
enhancement of Human Resources in the
border area.
- Partnerships between associations and
cooperatives across borders.
- Enhanced social and cultural integration in
border areas.
- Improved performance of border agents;
- Increased social cohesion and trust between
communities living in border areas.
- Increased border security.
- Increased social cohesion
Cross-border crime
and violence
prevention (CVP)
initiatives
Cross-border
environmental
management
Education across
borders
- Integrating CVP initiatives into development
process
- Increased security in cross-border areas
- Improved social and economic activity
- Improving cooperation between authorities and
international agencies in bordering countries to
reduce, damages caused by IDP and refugee
populations e.g. deforestation
- Improved national and cross-border
mechanisms to cope with potential risks
stemming from environment disasters.
- Improving overall quality and efficiency of
education for the populations living in border areas
by establishing cooperation among education and
skills training institutions in border areas.
- Increased cross-border mobility connecting
children and teachers in a multicultural
environment.
- Increased social cohesion between and
within cross-border populations.
90