Critical accounting and communicative action:
on the limits of consensual deliberation
Judy Brown
School of Accounting and Commercial Law
Victoria University of Wellington
PO Box 600, Wellington, New Zealand
judy.brown@vuw.ac.nz
Jesse Dillard
School of Business Administration
Portland State University
Portland, OR 97201
jdillard@pdx.edu
Acknowledgement: We wish to thank the Royal Society of New Zealand Marsden Fund for
supporting this research as part of a funded programme on “Dialogic Accounting: the Challenge
of Taking Multiple Perspectives Seriously”, Contract No. VUW1011.
1
Abstract
Richard Laughlin’s work provides a framework for scholarly engagement that includes process
(middle range thinking), a societal model of administration, and a means for reflexive and
collective decision-making. The framework draws on Habermas’ theory of communicative
action, which is underpinned by a deliberative, consensus-oriented conceptualization of
democracy. Based on recent developments in political theory and related applied fields, we
argue that deliberative democracy is only one of several democratic bases useful in
understanding and/or improving accounting and accountability systems to better meet the needs
of diverse contemporary societies. In particular, we contend that, in relying on Habermasianstyle deliberative democracy, Laughlin’s conceptualizations do not fully account for the
dimensions of disagreement and difference in democratic interactions. Drawing on the work of
agonistic political theorists and studies from the applied fields of communicative planning and
critical policy analysis, we argue that deliberative democracy approaches based on ideal speech
criteria and universalistic consensus need to be balanced with theorizations that recognize the
reality and value of more open-ended and unfinalizable struggles among actors with different
histories, cultures, and/or ideological orientations. While cognizant of the significant challenges
involved in bridging the deliberative-agonistic democracy divide, some of these (re)theorizations
offer promise for enriching critical accounting by, as we argue, reinforcing the critical/political
in critical accounting. To this end, we consider possibilities of forging links between Laughlin’s
work and our own proposals for dialogic/polylogic accountings based on agonistic democracy in
an effort to foster more enabling accounting praxis.
Keywords: agonistic democracy, pluralism, Habermas, communicative action, deliberative
democracy, Mouffe
2
Critical accounting and communicative action: on the limits of consensual deliberation
1. Introduction
Investigating the socio-political context and implications of accounting and accountability
systems (AAS) has been the central focus of critical accounting, an orientation emerging from its
radical political economy roots. The introduction and application of Jürgen Habermas’ critical
theory by Professor Richard Laughlin (1987) represents a seminal contribution to the critical
accounting project1 that provides a linguistically based framework for implementing and
evaluating democratic processes for decision-making as social systems undertake social
integration aided by AAS. The introduction, application and extension of Habermas’
communicative action (CA) has enriched theory and theorizing and empirical research (e.g.
Broadbent, 1992, 2002; Broadbent and Laughlin, 1997, 1998; Broadbent, et al., 1991; Laughlin,
1987; Laughlin et al., 1994). While there is much to commend in this work, the approach has
been characterized as modernist and somewhat utopian, tending to gloss over the political
conflicts and antagonisms present in pluralistic social systems as they strive toward social
integration through democratic deliberations and decision-making.
We propose to expand the scope of these democratic deliberations. Laughlin advocates
deliberative democracy where rational consensus is reached through dialogue and debate within
the parameters of Habermas’ CA. We consider agonistic democracy as an alternative that
attempts to find ways of relating and deciding that foster democracy within a political context of
power relationships that presumes “ineradicable dimensions of undecidability and antagonism”
(Mouffe, 1997, p. 27).2
Agonistic democracy is an approach to understanding democracy based around Laclau and
Mouffe’s (2001) post-structural materialist ontology. This holds, with deliberative democrats,
that the social world – and crucially our social and political identities – are discursively
constructed through the operation of language as people deconstruct and rearticulate the world.3
1
In addition, some of us (e.g. Dillard, 1991; Dillard and Reynolds, 2008) have gained significant and meaningful
insights from Professor Laughlin’s work as well as from his collegial support and guidance.
2
We draw on agonistic political theory and related theoretical and empirical studies from communicative planning
and critical policy analysis. These fields cover a wide range of theory and practice that is variously described as,
inter alia, collaborative, deliberative, interpretive or argumentative policy analysis and planning and which
discusses the general theoretical points raised by Brown (2009) in applied settings. Habermasian ideals of
communicative rationality have been highly influential in this literature (Purcell, 2009). As in Laughlin’s work,
deliberative theory has been viewed as a means to foster democratic interaction and social justice in organizational
and wider societal governance processes, prompting much experimentation with multi-stakeholder initiatives in
areas such as urban planning, development studies and environmental governance. Theorists and practitioners
remain divided over deliberative theorizations of democracy and their effectiveness in practice. This literature is
vast and an exhaustive review is beyond the scope of a single paper (see Gaffikin and Morrissey, 2011; Healey and
Hillier, 2010 and Wagenaar, 2011 for useful overviews).
3
This does not, as positivists claim, amount to a rejection of realism (Torfing, 2005, p. 18). The key point is that
“discourses construct matter as meaningful social forms and orient human action” rather than any suggestion that the
material world would somehow cease to exist if we stopped talking and writing about it (Brown, 2009, p. 322,
emphasis in original). See also Laclau and Mouffe (2001, p. 108, emphasis in original) stressing that “the fact that
every object is constituted as an object of discourse has nothing to do with whether there is a world external to
thought, or with the realism/idealism opposition”.
3
A contribution of post-structuralist thought is that it highlights the unfinalizability of the social
world by foregrounding “the realm of the political, its radical contingency and its inherent
antagonistic character” making it easier “to contest existing hegemonies and institute new
counter-hegemonic projects that carry opportunities to alter or transform power relations” (Bond,
2011, p. 171). Researchers and practitioners are provided with a useful set of analytic tools with
which to “question and critique the obvious, the normalized and the apparently unquestionable of
everyday practices” and “to facilitate a critical… power-sensitive… understanding of the messy
world of politics” (ibid., p. 180-81). This approach recognizes that there is always potential for
antagonism in politics (in Tully’s 2008 terms, the ability to think and act otherwise), something
that may be obscured in a communicative rationality oriented towards consensus. The social is
recognized as contingently and historically constituted through discursive interaction (Glynos
and Howarth, 2007; Howarth, 2010; Laclau and Mouffe, 2001; Torfing, 1999) and always open
to counter-hegemonic projects based on new social logics. Concepts of antagonism and
hegemony are key in providing the “means to interrogate and possibly transform the power
relations inherent in social relations” encouraging us to critically reflect on the Reason of our
time (Bond, 2011, p. 163). The differentiating dynamic is to translate antagonistic relationships
where enemies attempt the annihilation of the other into agonistic conflicts where advocates
fiercely defend their position but recognize and defend their opponent’s right to have and defend
their position.
Agonistic democracy allows us to explicitly consider pluralism and diversity as we endeavor
to develop a more enabling and political accounting. In undertaking a critique of mainstream
accounting, Laughlin’s work also aims to foster a more enabling and democratically responsible
form of accounting through the application of critical theory that sees deliberative democracy as
a core tenet in emancipatory governance mechanisms. However, there are limitations in
understanding existing practice and future imaginings associated with Habermasian inspired
critical theory. Habermas’ conception of deliberative politics has been criticized by scholars
drawing on agonistic conceptions of democracy in various disciplinary contexts (Bond, 2011;
Gunder, 2003; Hillier, 2002, 2003; Jezieriska, 2011; Laclau and Mouffe, 2001; Mouffe, 1997,
1999, 2000a,b; 2005; Murtagh and Ellis, 2011; Norval, 2007, 2009; Purcell, 2009; Schaap, 2006,
2009; Tully, 2008)4 and also by those who favour more difference-sensitive variants of
deliberative democracy (Benhabib, 1996, 2002; Dryzek, 2000, 2006; Young, 2000). This critique
provides a basis for our extension of Laughlin’s work.
We focus specifically on aspects of the agonistic-deliberative democracy debate that concern
theorizations of disagreement, difference and conflict as they relate to the ideal of
communicative rationality. We engage these issues by considering proposals for
dialogic/polylogic accounting underpinned by agonistic pluralism (Brown, 2009; Dillard and
Brown, forthcoming; Dillard and Roslender, 2011; Söderbaum and Brown, 2010). We envision
this comparison contributing to the further democratization of accounting in two ways: by
articulating commonalities and differences between consensually oriented deliberative
understandings of democracy and agonistic perspectives, and by bringing insights from
deliberative and agonistic democracy together and applying them to critical accounting
theorizing. We focus on debates between proponents of agonistic and deliberative approaches.
4
Brown (2009) provides a general overview of the main differences between agonistic and deliberative political
theories and their implications for accounting.
4
Our inclination is that both can be useful (Beaumont and Loopmans, 2008; Bond, 2011;
Gürsözlü, 2009; Jezierska, 2011; Kapoor, 2008, pp. 97ff; Schaap, 2006). In doing so, we attempt
to bring together their collective insights to develop more robust understandings of existing
institutional arrangements and imaginings of new accountings.
The discussion is organized as follows. In Section two, we briefly outline Laughlin’s critical
perspective. Section three undertakes an agonistic critique of the deliberative and consensual
theorizing of AAS and research methods that underpins Laughlin’s writings. In Section four, we
consider the possibilities of a deliberative-agonistic theorization leading to more pluralistic
accountings. In the concluding section, we pause with our (in)conclusions, looking forward to
future conversations and debates on the important, but vexing, issue of democratizing
accounting.
2. Laughlin’s critical perspective
The objective of Laughlin’s critique of AAS is to move accounting and accounting research
beyond the traditional functionalist’s instrumentally rational view. He understands accounting
and its context as something more than the narrow, technocratic realm of mainstream scholarship
and practice. In applying and extending the critical theory of Habermas, Laughlin fosters more
enabling AAS sensitive to the systemic injustice, asymmetrical power relationships and the
colonization of the public sphere (lifeworld). At the risk of over-simplification, we identify three
Habermasian ideas(l)s that represent core elements of Laughlin’s work. The first is a
philosophically grounded methodology for undertaking research that guides Laughlin’s
formulation of middle range thinking (MRT) as a three-stage research process: critical theorem
generation, processes for enlightenment, and strategy selection.5 The second is a societal
administrative model of the relationship between the lifeworld and systems.6 The third core
element is the theory of CA and associated ideal speech situation that provides a universal
process where consensus is reached as to the appropriate action(s) to be taken.7 The processes
provide the mechanism whereby skeletal theory is developed, or appropriated, and then
discursively fleshed out within a specific empirical setting. The evaluation and subsequent
change possibilities are the result of consensual deliberations of CA undertaken within the
parameters of the ideal speech situation.
These three core elements are integrated, and operationalized, in much of Laughlin and his
collaborators’ work. MRT specifies the processes whereby critical research is to be an
engagement between the researcher and the researched. The presumed relationships to be
researched, and possibly changed, are generally articulated in terms of lifeworld, systems,
steering media, and steering mechanisms as laid out in Habermas’ societal model.
Understanding is gained through discussion and debate guided by the tenets of the ideal speech
situation, which requires that truth claims be legitimated in terms of comprehensibility, truth,
rightness, and truthfulness. The criteria for deciding is agreed to be the strength of the better
5
See Habermas (1968, 1984, 1987), Laughlin (1987), Broadbent and Laughlin (1997).
See Habermas (1973, 1984, 1987), Broadbent, et al. (1991).
7
See Habermas (1984, 1987), Laughlin (cf 1987, 2007).
5
6
argument. These ideas have been extensively and insightfully applied by Laughlin and his
colleagues, primarily in noncommercial settings (i.e., religious, educational, health care settings).
Laughlin’s critiques of mainstream accounting, informed by Habermasian notions of
deliberative democracy based on communicative rationality, rest on a formulation of democracy
oriented towards reaching consensus through rational dialogue carried out within the context of
an “ideal speech” situation. In exposing the limitations of instrumental reason that shape social
relations in accordance with the narrow economic rationality of finance capital, biases and
privileges in institutions like accounting are revealed and can possibly be made more
democratically accountable.8 These biases and privileges are reflections of power differentials
among interested parties.9 CA poses the possibility of suspending or overcoming these power
asymmetries and arriving at a rational consensus.
Admittedly, Habermas’ ideas, especially those associated with CA and the ideal speech
situation are somewhat idealistic, although Habermas himself regards them as “utopian potentials
within existing social reality” (Cooke, 2004, p. 422, emphasis in original). While we are
sympathetic with these ideas, having used them in previous research, we wish to take a more
pluralistic and pragmatic view by theorizing accounting within a context wherein there are limits
to consensual deliberation such as where deep-seated value conflicts exist or where coercion is
the impetus for change. How do we address such situations, and how do we “dialogue” and/or
decide?10
In proposing agonistic democracy as an alternative perspective, we do not see it as being
inconsistent with the spirit of Laughlin’s MRT wherein theory is never complete and needs to be
fleshed out in particular local settings. In some respects, agonistic democracy might be seen as
complementary in addressing intermediate contested spaces where power asymmetries cannot be
suspended and agreement cannot be attained based on the strength of the better argument. In
other words, it addresses politics as experienced “on the ground”. We also generally accept the
concepts underlying the model of social systems, lifeworld, and steering media. Ideally, the
lifeworld (civil society) provides the values and administrative parameters of the systems as
opposed to the situation wherein the lifeworld is colonized by the instrumental rationality of the
system. While we explore the limits of consensual deliberation relative to a broader and
pluralistic agonistic perspective, our ultimate aim is to explore possible extensions and
divergences leading to more robust, critical and enabling accountings. Our intent is to be more
pragmatic than doctrinaire.
While aggregative models of democracy ignore power asymmetries and operate “as if social inequality did not
exist” (Purcell, 2009, p. 151, emphasis in original), deliberative democrats are deeply concerned about the power of
sectional interests in neoliberal societies to structure and restrict social dialogue.
9
The power differentials can be the result of coercion, ignorance, complicity, deception, false consciousness, and/or
structural or cultural hierarchies.
10
Habermas himself, in response to his critics, has sought to address some of these issues in his more recent work
though he still holds to his “proceduralist conception of deliberative politics” (i.e. CA) as “the cornerstone of the
theory of democracy” (Habermas, 1998b, p. 246).
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8
We take a less idealistic perspective than Laughlin (1987, and Power and Laughlin, 1996). 11
Though we both see mainstream accounting technology, as currently articulated and practiced, to
be captive to the economic system within which it operates and, relatedly, to particular framings
imbued with neoclassical economics and neoliberal hegemony. To critique the system, and
related AAS, we need to stand outside the hegemonic framings of the currently dominate
system.12 We propose an agonistic ethos that can be used to consider, design, implement and
evaluate engagement and the anticipated and actual outcomes. We specifically recognize
inherent elements of undecidability, difference and (irresolvable?) antagonisms13 within social
systems that make it important to take divergent socio-political orientations and related power
relations seriously. We consider what types of institutional practices might help to mobilize these
aspects towards democratic designs that recognize legitimate differences and avoid the type of
colonization of the lifeworld that Laughlin rightly condemns.
Within Laughlin’s critical perspective, the purpose of AAS is seen as aiding and abetting
consensual (deliberative) democratic processes and decision-making.14 While sympathetic with
Laughlin’s critical perspective, our focus is to problematize and extend aspects of his work as it
is grounded in Habermas’ conceptualization of deliberative democracy. In the next section, we
contrast this perspective with one following from agonistic political philosophy, where the
purpose of AAS is to recognize various socio-political identities within a social system and to
foster agonistic democratic processes and decision-making. We argue that agonistic democracy
can add scope and depth to our deliberations regarding enabling and emancipatory AAS. We
consider how these two different perspectives might be engaged in a dialectical process whereby
new insights may be gained into accounting and its social and organizational context. We draw
on work from across a range of disciplines that explore the deliberative-agonistic democracy
divide in the interest of promoting critical social praxis (Beaumont and Loopmans, 2008; Bond,
2011; Jezierska, 2011; Kapoor, 2008; Norval, 2007; Schaap, 2006, 2009). In the spirit of MRT,
our discussion is an exploratory endeavor, and our proposals are offered as an impetus to further
debate and empirical investigation.
3. Theorizing democracy and accounting – deliberative and agonistic approaches
We present an agonistic critique of CA that outlines the responses offered by agonistic
democrats to the democratic deficits of both Habermas’ CA as well as mainstream accountancy.
We also draw attention to amendments that deliberative democrats themselves have put forward
in response to acknowledged weaknesses in CA and then point to some limits in agonistic
11
As discussed in Dillard (1991), we are concerned with developing a critical theory for accounting, not a critical
theory of accounting.
12
These neoliberal framings are increasingly impacting on supposed “alternative perspectives” such as social and
environmental accounting.
13
As Brown (2009, p. 321) observes, some agonistic democrats leave open the issue of whether a final resolution of
conflict is possible. We are inclined to Laclau and Mouffe’s (2001, p. xviii) position that any consensus “always has
an ‘outside’ that impedes its full realization” and thus that antagonism remains “an ever-present possibility in
politics” (Mouffe, 2000a, p. 13). As we explain in later sections, a key task of democratic politics is to transform
relations of antagonism to agonism. Refusing the idea of a “final consensus” is also important as a means of
resisting hegemonic closure by dominant elites and preserving democracy itself.
14
We acknowledge that such a position is a significant improvement over the instrumental rationality and
aggregative democracy of mainstream accounting.
7
conceptions of democracy, before explicitly considering proposals from social and political
theorists for ways of bridging the deliberative-agonistic divide.
As critical accountants, both we and Laughlin oppose the instrumental rationality of
mainstream accounting in favor of new, enabling forms of accounting. To this end, we are both
drawing on the writings of leading social and political theorists who are unsatisfied with
contemporary forms of liberal democracy, especially those based on thin neoliberal notions of
aggregative democracy (Brown, 2009, pp. 314-15). We are both interested in developing theory
and fostering practices that assist in enabling the transformation of accounting and the wider
socio-political context towards a more socially just society. However, we are somewhat dubious
of the consensually-oriented approach of CA and consider what accounting might learn from the
alternatives presented by agonistic democrats.
A key contention of agonistic democrats is that deliberative dialogue, oriented to consensus
within a power neutral context, is unlikely to be attainable in contemporary social settings and,
as a result, the process will most likely serve the interests of dominant elites, enabling neoliberals
to reinforce their hegemony (Purcell, 2009). Agonistic political theory is based on poststructuralist understandings of the ongoing production of democratic subjects. Both language
and the identities of political actors operate through processes of differentiation, not consensus,
and thus are constituted by what they are not. Accountings “take pluralism seriously” by
attending to this contingency, difference and conflict. We see as more realistic and useful an
ethos that fosters agonistic relations between individuals and groups with competing ideological
perspectives through notions of dialogic/polylogic processes that enable actors to explore their
socio-political differences (Brown, 2009; Dillard and Brown, forthcoming; Dillard and
Roslender, 2011; Söderbaum and Brown, 2010). Next, we consider the main areas of contention
between deliberative and agonistic democrats relevant to our discussion of Laughlin’s work.
3.1. Habermas’ deliberative democracy and an agonistic critique
CA presumes that dialogue amongst all relevant stakeholders oriented towards a “justified or
grounded consensus” (based on defined procedural norms) is the most appropriate means of
ascertaining truth and making decisions in a democratic society (cf Laughlin, 1987, pp. 489-90).
Participatory spaces are conceptualised as fully inclusive, and power asymmetries are contained
by satisfying Habermas’ procedures for rational discourse. If the aim of communication is
mutual understanding and the successful democratic practice results in intersubjective consensus,
then transparent, legitimate and fully rational decisions are possible in a world of strategic actors.
According to Habermas’ CA, agreements must rest on reasons given by actors under suitable
(ideal speech) conditions. This view of deliberative democracy is presented as an idealized
model to be aspired to and worked towards.15 Where aspects other than “the force of the better
argument” enter the deliberative space, the result is “distorted communication” (Habermas, 1984,
pp. 332-33). Systematically distorted communication (or unconscious deception) may arise when
a lifeworld is “colonized” by instrumental rationality as Laughlin demonstrates in his work on
accounting.
For example, in the communicative planning literature “ideal speech conditions” are employed as evaluative
criteria in empirical studies, to assess how democratic decision-making has been in specific case settings (see Innes
and Booher, 2010 for an overview).
8
15
In Habermas’ deliberative democracy, reasons can be objectively evaluated to
determine their validity. Reasoning provides common criteria for determining the better
argument and, thus, which one should prevail. The aim of the dialogue is to achieve
mutual understanding of the situation as a basis for collective action. Habermas (1998a)
identifies four categories of universal validity claims: comprehensibility, truth,
truthfulness and rightness.16
In ideal deliberative processes, participants are to translate their particular perspectives and
rationalities based on universal reasoning that results in a consensus based on the common good.
As Laughlin (1987, p. 490) recognizes, deliberative democrats acknowledge that there may be
constraints which “prevent the steady progression through the stages... (e.g. cognitive ability,
psychological or sociological resistance etc.)” and thus the progression “always runs the risk of
being subverted”. Nonetheless, the ideal nature of the processes is not seen to “detract from its
value”; rather the aim “is to provide as many guarantees as possible that the actual functioning of
the process” (in this case the analysis of AAS) “approximates to the ideal” (ibid.).
Habermas also acknowledges that “political questions of what values and ideals of the good
should be politically realized do not admit of rational resolution in the unrestricted sense of
questions of justice because they are inseparable from the cultural traditions and historical
experiences that shape the identities of groups, and hence can only be answered within the
context of an already constituted political community” (Habermas, 1998b, p. xiv, emphasis in
original). Thus “any claim to normative rightness is always situated, governed by the implicit
local ‘rules’ of a given time, place or community” (Bond, 2011, p. 165). The task of democracy
for deliberative democrats thus becomes to find “a procedure involving the co-operative search
for a single truth in a particular deliberative community” (ibid., emphasis added), a position that
agonistic democrats find highly problematic.
Epistemologically, CA is based on a proceduralist perspective through which Habermas
purports to identify a rational and universal process that “sets in motion a cooperative
competition for the better argument, where the orientation to the goal of a communicatively
reached agreement unites the participants from the outset” (Habermas, 1998b, p. 44, emphasis in
original). For agonistic democrats this approach masks important differences between
individuals and groups by, inter alia, assuming “it is possible to find a shared normative
background – an assumption that denies the hegemonizing processes at play in social and
political spaces that normalize certain ways of thinking, knowing, arguing and indeed, being”
Habermas formulates his “ideal speech” conditions differently in different works. In many versions the
“comprehensibility” claim is omitted. In a more recent text where Habermas (1998b, p. 44) seeks to address the
issue of “Inclusion of the Other” he lists the “four most important features” as follows: “(i) that nobody who could
make a relevant contribution may be excluded; (ii) that all participants are granted an equal opportunity to make
contributions; (iii) that the participants must mean what they say; and (iv) that communication must be freed from
external and internal coercion so that the ‘yes’ or ‘no’ stances that participants adopt on criticizable validity claims
are motivated solely by the rational force of the better reasons”. So long as all those who engage in argumentation
make “at least these pragmatic presuppositions, then in virtue of (i) the public character of practical discourses and
the inclusion of all concerned and (ii) the equal communicative rights of all participants, only reasons that give equal
weight to the interests and evaluative orientations of everybody can influence the outcome of practical discourses;
and because of the absence of (iii) deception and (iv) coercion, nothing but reasons can tip the balance in favor of
the acceptance of a controversial norm”.
9
16
(Bond, 2011, p. 165; see also Allmendinger and Tewdwr-Jones, 2002; Gaffikin and Morrissey,
2011; Purcell, 2009). From an agonistic perspective, Habermas’ normative principles are not
treated as uncontestable universals. People are recognized as socio-political beings embedded in
discursive structures that often entail divergent readings of even broadly agreed concepts such as
accountability, efficiency, wealth, democracy, liberty and equality. While some level of
agreement is necessary in democratic relations (e.g. a shared commitment to ethico-political
principles such as equality and liberty), the specific meaning of these is open to legitimate
debate.
3.1.1. Rationality hierarchy
Habermas’ CA tends to privilege narrow Enlightenment notions of rationality (i.e.
rational argumentation based on “disinterested” reason) over other forms of
communication, in much the same way that monetary measures of performance are
privileged in traditional accounting. However, in a pluralistic democracy participants
may communicate in various ways, including the use of rhetoric, imagination, testimony,
storytelling, passion, narrative, art, poetry, silence, bodily language, and the like (Norval,
2007, pp. 64-74). In Habermas’ formulation, these modes of putting one’s case are
effectively constructed as “lower” forms of communication with “all but universalizable
arguments” deemed irrelevant (Jezierska, 2011, p. 173). When viewed as such, the
“marginal” groups (typically ascribed as “women” and “ethnic minorities”) who may
adopt particularistic standpoints and utilize alternative forms of political communication
are arguably differentiated from a higher “us” who do not require such options (Norval,
2007, pp. 67-8). For agonistic democrats, these notions of rationality privilege
subjectless arguments “over other affective, emotional or embodied forms of talk” (Bond,
2011, p. 167). This not only prevents “the whole person” from being present in
deliberations and negotiations but also limits the potential for transformative social
learning that may result in “shifts in values and institutions” (Sandercock, 2000, pp. 267).17 In particular, it denies “the important role of rhetoric in seeking to persuade others
who hold reasonable positions that differ from one’s own” (Norval, 2007, p. 72).
In the contemporary context, there are significant risks that common interests will be
hegemonically defined in terms of market logics perpetuating existing inequalities. By deeming
“rationally justified consensus” as the desired outcome of dialogue, “alternative forms of talk
may become further subordinated” (Bond, 2011, p. 167). As Murtagh and Ellis (2011, p. 362)
emphasize, “the question ‘whose consensus?’ raises the possibility of co-option of the
marginalized by more powerful interests generating ethical concerns when the collaborative
method is universally applied across problems and areas”. Empirical studies from
communicative planning and other applied fields are particularly instructive here.18
Also see Power and Laughlin (1996, p. 445) pointing to “the affective dimensions of accounting information”.
See, for example, Cooke and Kothari (2001) on the “tyranny of participation” in a developing country context;
Flyvbjerg (1998) on the ways “rationality” can serve power elites; and Purcell (2009) on the influence of neoliberal
discourse in consensus-seeking governance processes. Specifically, deliberative democrats in communicative
planning (Healey, 1998) emphasize that they interpret Habermas’ validity claims as reasons acceptable to
stakeholders in the specific collaborative space rather than some external objective truth. This is similar to
Laughlin’s (1987, p. 490) approach where discussion takes place among “a small group of people… who… can
undertake a real discourse…[and are] willing to adopt the discursive processes necessary”. However, as Bond
(2011, p. 181) highlights, such an approach risks overlooking that “such spaces are neither isolated from nor
10
17
18
Agonistic democrats do not deny the importance of reason in making collective decisions.
However, they are not persuaded that “justification and reasoning in a process of (broadly)
consensual decision-making” should be viewed as “the very stuff of democracy” (Bond, 2011, p.
167). They readily concede that in applied fields (e.g., communicative planning) a certain level
of agreement is needed if the protagonists are to move “beyond deliberation or conflict” and
“that justification, reasoning and agreement (of some kind) provide decisions with their
democratic legitimacy” (ibid., p. 167). Asking speakers to “give (or test) reasons” for their
claims enables contending parties “to criticize unsubstantiated or unconvincing claims” (Kapoor,
2008, p. 100). However, Mouffe and others argue that it is a mistake to posit rational consensus
as the goal of democracy. A primary point of contention relates to the likely exclusions arising
from application of CA’s rationality criteria, in particular the risk that conflict and power
asymmetries will be downplayed. As noted, a key issue is establishing normative rightness in
pluralistic societies. Agonistic democrats argue that every consensus is incomplete and “exists
as a temporary result of a provisional hegemony, as a stabilization of power” and, as such,
always entails some forms of exclusion and we/they relations (Mouffe, 1999, p. 756). While
“conflictual consensus” is possible, this is more appropriately conceptualized as a political
achievement, involving negotiation and compromise, rather than in terms of some idealized
fully inclusive moral consensus (Brown, 2009, p. 321).
Agonistic democrats claim that power is unavoidably implicated in the exclusions associated
with collective decisions. But this “risk of politics” is largely ignored in Habermasian
deliberative democratic theory because it conceptualizes conflicts in terms of a single moral
community (actual or to be aspired to) rather than accepting that it may involve plural “political
communities whose interests and values remain irreconcilable” (Schaap, 2006, p. 267). For
agonistic democrats, a major concern is that emphasis on the (impossible) possibility of a fully
inclusive rational consensus will serve to effectively silence dissent, making it easier for
dominant groups to claim others are being unreasonable. Accepting that the idea of a “final
consensus” is both a theoretical and practical impossibility provides “a means of resisting efforts
at naturalization and closure and thus helps to keep democratic processes alive” (Brown, 2009, p.
321).
3.1.2. Taking pluralism seriously
For agonistic democrats, antagonism and (at least potential) contestation are inherent
to self identity and social and political relations, foreclosing the possibility of a fully
inclusive rational consensus (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001, p. xvii). Moreover, in a healthy
democratic society, competing discourses19 should be given space so that differences can
be conveyed. This not only provides actors with “opportunities to think innovatively and
creatively about possible solutions”, but also “to use conflict and divergent views as a
immune from broader power relations and the effects of hegemonic projects”. Agonistic democracy pays closer
attention to the moral and political significance of difference, contest and struggle (Schaap, 2007, p. 57) than
Habermas’ consensus-oriented theorization.
Discourses here are understood in post-structuralist terms as “structured systems of differences, contingently
articulated and variously fixed or unfixed into our social relations” (Bond, 2011, p. 168). In each discourse specific
signifiers (e.g. ‘democracy’, ‘sustainability’, ‘accountability’) operate as “nodal points which anchor meanings and
identities around them, temporarily fixing them within particular discursive formations” (ibid.).
19
11
resource to inform a more radical praxis” (Bond, 2011, p. 169). Democratic relations are
thus understood in terms that are more open “to the role of contestation, political struggle,
and the always present possibility of challenge to existing orders and identities” (ibid.).
As part of this process supposedly consensually agreed concepts such as “sustainable
development” and the AAS associated with them can be rearticulated in the very process
of their application. Rather than consensual decision-making, according to this view, “it
is the politics involved in the very possibility of altering the established order that is…
the very stuff of democracy” (ibid.). Whereas Laughlin (2007, p. 281) sees “the reaction
of the targeted organisation(s)” as “the key litmus test” for judging legitimacy and “wider
societal views” as something of an optional extra (ibid.), we view the relevant context far
more broadly as including multiple competing and affected publics and recognize the
benefit of considering political deliberation in terms of the competing discourses.
The challenge in taking pluralism seriously is thus to foster participatory processes and
contestations that facilitate agonistic relations, which requires us to think about accounting in
new ways (Brown, 2009). Much work remains and it is here, as we will discuss in Section 4,
where we consider the most obvious benefits might come from considering synergistic
possibilities with respect to agonistic and deliberative approaches. To set the scene for these
bridging endeavours, we focus in the rest of this section on what we see as the benefits and limits
of agonistic democracy in providing critique and normative analysis in the contemporary
neoliberal context.
3.2. Agonistic democracy’s contribution to the neoclassical critique
The problematic nature of democratic theory oriented towards consensus has been widely
debated in political theory and applied fields such as communicative planning and critical policy
analysis (Benhabib, 1996; Bond, 2011; Dryzek, 2000, 2006; Gürsözlü, 2009; Innes and Booher,
2004; Jezierska, 2011; Norval, 2007; Purcell, 2009). In light of these debates, a key question
facing accounting, if it is to take pluralism seriously, is: How can it justly account for the
appropriate phenomena so as to facilitate the meaningful involvement of interested parties given
the conflictual character of politics that follows from the diverse interests, values, forms of
rationality, and stocks of knowledge of the participants?
3.2.1. Power
Deliberative democracy, with its emphasis on a communicative rationality oriented to
consensus, does not satisfactorily address the role of power and conflict in politics and, as such,
risks reinforcing the status quo rather than transforming inequitable social relations (Beaumont
and Loopmans, 2008; Kapoor, 2008; Purcell, 2009). Purcell (2009, p. 140) argues this is
particularly the case in the contemporary context of neoliberalization with its “project to install
market logics and competitive discipline as hegemonic assumptions in… policy-making”.
Through its everyday operation, neoliberal hegemony gives rise to key legitimacy problems (e.g.
increases in inequality) that policymakers seek to manage. A key strategy is to look for
“decision-making practices that do not fundamentally challenge existing power relations but still
confer a high degree of political legitimacy” (ibid.). In applied consensually-oriented
communicative practices ostensibly designed to enhance democracy (e.g. collaborative
policymaking, governance partnerships), the risk is that the effects of sedimented market
neoliberal logics and the power asymmetries associated with them are ignored or at least
12
downplayed. Thus rather than reducing power asymmetries, these often well-intentioned “third
way” processes may actually perpetuate them.20
By contrast, agonistic democracy enables us to interrogate the prevailing conceptualization of
instrumental (neoclassical market) rationality and its connection to power through the
interrogations of associated and alternative discourses. At the empirical level agonistic
democracy provides analytic tools to critically explore “real lived existence”; in particular, to
understand “the contingency and historicity” of the social spaces in which events occur (Bond,
2011, p. 176). Agonistic democracy emphasizes a relational understanding of social and
political phenomena. Through application of its key concepts (e.g. hegemony, the
political/politics, antagonism/agonism, articulatory practices), we gain insights into how
meanings can be interrogated and identities constituted through complex discursive practices;
how particular meanings and identities are changed through logics of difference and equivalence;
the role of antagonism; and the effects of hegemony, hegemonic and counter-hegemonic projects
(ibid., p. 182; see also Glynos and Howarth, 2007; Griggs and Howarth, 2008; Howarth, 2010).
Agonistic democracy is a more expansive and realistic lens than Habermasian deliberative
democracy because it highlights that democratic practices always involve elements of power and
(and at least potential) resistance. It encourages us to interrogate and challenge dominant
discourses (e.g. shareholder wealth maximization in mainstream accounting), by juxtaposing it
with alternatives, as it critiques status quo hegemonies. It also pays close attention to power
relations in specific contexts (e.g. the conditions of possibility in particular communicative
arenas). Agonistic democracy facilitates inquiry into the way hegemonic knowledge and practice
such as mainstream accounting is privileged over critical accounting research and practice. This
is crucial in developing “new imaginings” (Gray, 2002) that can contribute support to various
social actors within the context of inequitable power relations. It encourages us to think
carefully about the political arenas in which decision-making takes place and their openness to
difference. Power becomes understood in Foucauldian terms as deeply intertwined in “the
constitution of identity (itself relationally and differentially conceived), linked to knowledge and
meaning, and how certain meanings (and identities) become accepted and legitimated over
others” (Bond, 2011, p. 173).
3.2.2. Contesting neoliberal hegemony
Agonistic democracy thus provides a broader understanding of democratic relations than
deliberative democracy, enabling the exploration of democratic processes “beyond formal liberal
institutions and deliberation in an idealized public sphere towards a means of questioning the
very operation and nature of those institutions and deliberations” (ibid., p. 172). Focusing on the
“already existing” allows “a radical critique that intervenes or engages with” existing
institutional processes and “opens the way for empirical investigation and potentially brings
theory and practice closer together” (ibid.). It also suggests new possibilities for contesting
existing hegemonies, developing counter-accountings and initiating diverse forms of democratic
20
More recent variants of deliberative democracy such as those offered by Benhabib (1996), Dryzek (2000, 2006)
and Young (2000) help considerably in addressing a politics of difference. These writers have much in common
with agonistic democrats, and (as we illustrate in Section 4) we consider they offer much in terms of bridging the
agonistic-deliberative divide. In this section, we are concerned to emphasize the limitations of the democratic
theory that Laughlin draws on, which is closely attached to Habermas’ position.
13
action (e.g. see Brown, 2010 on the possibilities of “accounting and the visual”).
“Counter-hegemonic mobilizations” based on the development and assertion of different (i.e.
non neoliberal) social logics are arguably better suited “to confronting neoliberalization” than
Habermasian style dialogue (Purcell, 2009, p. 140). The goal of critical accounting research and
practice is to challenge the status quo and transform power relations that produce various social
inequalities. This requires making power relations a central concern; namely “questions of who
loses, who wins and whose voices are heard” (Bond, 2011, p. 163). In a broadly conceived
democratic accounting practice, these questions are relevant for various activities (e.g. planning,
budgeting, decision-making, policymaking) that steer organizations and people’s lived existences
in and outside them. Surfacing and legitimating conflict and contestation is a key part of
fostering the dialectic that may help to transform social relations. Here a logic of
problematization encourages critical interrogation of the ways in which accounting practices
construct and normalize particular ways of framing issues (Glynos and Howarth, 2007, pp.
167ff). Using agonistic principles as a normative framework facilitates inquiry into the
(un)democratic operation of accounting in a variety of spheres leading us, as in communicative
planning, to ask such questions as:
• What discourses interact and how?
• What relations of power are revealed by the operation of those discourses?
• What hegemonic projects are mobilized within the undecidable space and how?
What signifiers are elevated to a universal position such that they become empty or
floating master signifiers and how are they reinscribed into discourses in this
particular space-time?
• What possibilities are foreclosed in the taking of a decision? What is the effect of
this foreclosure? Who is advantaged or disadvantaged? What has been overlooked or
considered less important? What alternative trajectories are available and why were
they superseded? (Bond, 2011, p. 178).
Such critique is helpful in exploring why things happen as they do. It encourages us to
unpack and situate the language, sense-making and practices of actors within a broader context,
to consider “how different articulations are made or performed, what influences them and how or
whether they anchor realms of meaning in particular geographical space-times” and “the
discursive configurations or forms of knowledge that shape particular claims, demands or
arguments made” (ibid.; see Griggs and Howarth, 2008 for an applied example). Recognizing
that power relations are infused throughout this process helps us understand how particular
“meanings and articulations carry weight or become sedimented” in specific contexts (Bond,
2011, p. 178).
3.2.3. Contingent and contestable contexts
Agonistic political theory highlights that decisions are made in contingent and contestable
contexts and encourages us to ask where, and how, accounting information fits into this picture.
What part does it play in the formation of dissensus/consensus? Do actors involved in counterhegemonic projects against dominant neoliberal hegemonies understand the contestability and
subjectivity of accounting information? To what extent do they use this knowledge to construct
counter-accounts? Or is accounting primarily used to manufacture consensus? To what extent
can the answers to such questions contribute to understanding the “conditions of possibility” that
help to illuminate why one path rather than another was taken.
14
Ethically and politically, agonistic democracy encourages us to think about how we can foster
agonistic encounters in the interests of achieving more socially just societies. Here it is crucial
to understand that this is not a traditional liberal conception which sees politics as a simple
competition between adversaries on “a neutral terrain in which different groups compete to
occupy the positions of power” without putting into question the dominant hegemony (Mouffe,
2005, p. 21). Nor is it something that points to the Habermasian possibility of a full
reconciliation of different political positions. Rather:
what is at stake in the agonistic struggle… is the very configuration of power relations
around which a given society is structured: it is a struggle between opposing
hegemonic projects which can never be reconciled rationally (ibid.).
An agonistic lens leads to a new and challenging set of questions for critical accounting. How
can accountants learn to surface and work with this type of conflict and dissensus? How can
accountants come to understand and respond to the need for polylogic accountings that enable
different social constituencies to express themselves in their own voice? How do we construct
agonistic spaces? How is accounting currently implicated in the deprivation of voice? How do
hegemonic relations currently structure accounting decision-making? How have particular
meanings become sedimented? What role have the profession’s conceptual frameworks played
here, and why do they carry such weight? What potential is there for those involved in counterhegemonic projects to co-create new frameworks? How can these actors most effectively
articulate their claims and demands? What new discursive configurations, forms of knowledges
and spaces do they require? Before constructing agonistic spaces, do those historically deprived
of voice need incubatory spaces in which they can explore and cultivate new ideas and language?
Agonistic democracy is hopeful in that it reminds us that it is always possible for people to
think and act otherwise (Tully, 2008). In Derridean terms, all decisions pass through a terrain of
undecidability (not to be confused with indeterminacy). Without some level of openness, they
could not even be called decisions, but we also need to take existing discourses and rules into
account. Torfing (1999, p. 64) provides the example of collective wage negotiations where the
rules of the game may be changed “in many different ways, but we have to take the pre-existing
rules into account” and understand how they are “compatible or incompatible with the new
rules”. Thus this is not an “anything goes” type of difference, but one that recognizes that the
possibilities for change depend on “the particularity of that space-time” (Bond, 2011, p. 176).
All discursive fields and decision spaces are structured to some extent, making some outcomes
more likely than others. The challenge for critical accounting thus becomes to try and shape
those possibilities towards more radically democratic ends. Here, an understanding of the
contingencies of our particular space-time contexts is key (e.g. inviting us to recover lost
possibilities in the historically contingent discourses of our past by resurfacing older debates
regarding corporate accountability). By advocating a normative stance based on agonistic
democracy, critical accountants can work with others to help facilitate the creation of
organizational and societal spaces where counter-hegemonic voices can be developed and heard
as well as political spaces that are potentially generative of more socially just ideas, knowledges,
logics and identities. Agonistic democracy views social relations in terms of a “constant struggle
and renegotiation of social identity” (Kapoor, 2008, p. 102). Progressive social change thus
becomes more a question of surfacing and critically reflecting on our always situated (but
changeable/non-essentialist) positions than seeking deliberative consensus using the resources of
15
some universal reason.
Laughlin’s CA-inspired theorizations of accounting and democracy are relatively top-down in
approach, with a focus on how professional experts, managers and policymakers might work
together to implement appropriate steering mechanisms. From this perspective, democracy is
viewed primarily “as a model for organizing the collective and public exercise of power in the
major institutions of a society on the basis of the principle that decisions affecting the well-being
of a collectivity can be viewed as the outcome of a procedure of free and reasoned deliberation
among individuals considered as moral and political equals” (Benhabib, 2002, p. 105). While
deliberative democrats recognize a need to shift from the idea of “isolated, all-knowing”
experts,21 agonistic democrats seek to take this further to a “focus on talk amongst a wide range
of participants” (Bond, 2011, p. 171; see also Tully, 2008) and related collective action.
Interaction in everyday spaces (e.g. the home, workplace, classroom) and through social
movements as well as the world of policy and formal institutions, is important in terms of
understanding the status quo and future possibilities. Policymakers and managerial classes, no
matter how well-intentioned, do not necessarily have the incentives or ability to challenge
dominant hegemonies on their own. Agonistic democracy involves a broader conception of
politics and democracy “embracing direct action, protest, everyday group associations and the
formation of collectivities, as well as more formal institutional and ordinary practices of
democracy and decision-making” (Bond, 2011, p. 176; see also Bohman, 2007 on moving from
dêmos to multiple dêmois). For example, Dillard and Brown (forthcoming; see also Owen,
2008; Cooper, et al., 2005) highlight the importance of encouraging SEA academics to forge
links with social movements and critical scholars in other disciplines to protect against the risks
of co-option evident in many “stakeholder engagement” initiatives. This includes a need to pay
close attention to the potential for raising new voices and demands (Norval, 2009).
Moreover, agonistic democracy recognizes that political exchanges are rarely “settled once
and for all” (Tully, 1999, p. 175). There is always an element of non-consensus that leaves
agreements open to dissent and further contestation. Collective choices and decisions are, and
indeed need to be made, in the face of contingency and disagreement (e.g. through majoritarian
procedures). However, these should be seen for the political acts they are, and in ways that
respect, recognize and preserve opportunities for ongoing dissent. Undecidability does not
somehow disappear when decisions are made but rather underlines the possibilities for ongoing
“questioning, transformation and re-articulation of any existing socio-political order” (Jezierska,
2011, p. 112). Decisions thus become far more provisional, forcing “both ‘winners’ and ‘losers’
to continue to pay attention to each other” (Goi, 2005, p. 62).
At the same time, we acknowledge that more could be done in providing guidance as to how
an agonistic participative ethos might be fostered. Here, as we discuss in the following section,
we see considerable potential to draw on and adapt insights from deliberative democrats in other
fields, particularly those who admit more contestability and contingency into their procedural
21
Although in terms of his own posited relationship with practitioners, Laughlin (1987, p. 493) takes quite a topdown approach pointing to a possible need for “therapeutic discourse” between “doctor (taken to be the researchers)
and patient (the researched)” so they accept and are able to operationalize his model. We envisage more of a mutual
process whereby both researchers and researched work together to produce “critical theorems” (ibid., p. 489; see
also Bebbington et al., 2007).
16
guidance (Benhabib 1996, 2002; Dryzek, 2000, 2006; Gaffikin and Morrissey, 2011; Mäntysalo
et al., 2011; Umemoto and Igarashi, 2009; Young, 2000).
4. Moving the agenda along – toward agonistic deliberation
We do not consider that a simple merging of deliberative and agonistic approaches is possible
or even desirable.22 A more dialectic approach is required that recognizes the significant
ontological differences between the two bodies of thought, leading to different
conceptualizations of democratic interaction. However, we do accept that at least some versions
of deliberative democracy can accommodate or even facilitate agonistic political relations
(Brown, 2009, p. 321). We contend there are complementary insights to be gained from both
deliberative and agonistic approaches to accounting, and that there are considerable as yet
untapped opportunities to build valuable links with other disciplinary fields. Following
contemporary work in political theory and other applied fields (Bond, 2011; Jezierska, 2011;
Norval, 2007), the basic thrust of our proposal is to graft aspects of deliberative political theory
into an agonistic democracy perspective by considering what might be involved in linking
Laughlin’s work and our own. We emphasize that our proposals are tentative and exploratory
and space considerations dictate that we can no more than skim over many important issues.
Both deliberative and agonistic democracy take a constructivist perspective of the social.
Deliberative democracy (at least Habermasian style) takes as universal the construction of an
agreed upon criteria wherein the “right” can be mutually articulated and agreed upon and
strategy selection can be legitimated by reference to the agreed upon criteria. Agonistic
democracy takes as universal the indeterminacy of such an action space and the diversity and
disagreements (dissensus, conflicts and antagonisms)23 of the participants. Ontological
assumptions are just that, assumptions about the nature of being and knowing. The assumptions
are generally beyond verification, or falsification depending on one’s perspective. Thus, taking
one position over another ultimately comes down to a matter of ideological commitment.
Pragmatically, we agree with Kapoor (2008, p. 98; see also Gürsözlü, 2009) that the tensions
between these two theories are themselves “fruitful and educative”, and there is much to be
gained from a dialectical engagement between them. While cognizant of the significant
22
The extent to which deliberative and agonistic conceptions of democracy might be brought together towards some
“third position” is a key issue in contemporary political theory (see Jezierska, 2011, pp. 26-30 for an overview) and
has been debated in various disciplinary contexts including, inter alia, urban governance and planning (Beaumont
and Loopmans, 2008; Bond, 2011), development studies (Kapoor, 2008) and law (Schaap, 2009). Some contend any
rapprochement is impossible given the fundamentally different ontological and epistemological starting points of
agonistic and deliberative democrats with some in this group adopting highly polemic stances reminiscent of earlier
debates in accounting between Foucauldians and Marxists (Neimark, 1990) and critical theorists and social
accountants (Tinker et al., 1991; cf Tinker and Gray, 2003). Here the relationship appears to be akin to Mouffe’s
friend-enemy relation where the goal is to destroy the Other (Brown, 2009, p. 321). Others recognize potential for at
least some combining of agonistic-deliberative thought in the interests of providing effective critique and fostering
more enabling social and institutional practices (e.g. Beaumont and Loopmans, 2008; Bond, 2011; Jezierska, 2011;
Norval, 2007; Schaap, 2006; Tully, 2008). Some in this category (e.g. Kapoor, 2008; Gürsözlü, 2009) value both
approaches as providing different insights and prefer to construct a relation of “constructive agonism” between them
than looking to a third position. Yet others deny there are any real differences (e.g. Knops, 2007; Markell, 1997).
23
We follow Norval (2007, p. 39) here in recognizing that antagonism is just one form that the ontological condition
of disagreement may manifest itself.
17
challenges involved in forging links between these two bodies of democratic theory, we lean
towards doing so and contend that recent endeavors in other disciplines offer possibilities for
taking the field of critical accounting forward.
Also, both have their own blind spots24 that might be overcome by engaging with the other.
For example, CA would benefit from an agonistic perspective of the dynamics of the action
space permeated with dissension and contingency. The lifeworld can be understood and
constructed following the tenets of agonistic democracy as it recognizes the antagonisms, power
differentials and multiple logics of diverse participants. Articulating the problem, gathering data,
identifying and evaluating alternatives by applying an agonistic framework leads to a richer and
more complex picture of any decision space, for example, by bringing to the fore contested
discourses and pluralistic evaluation criteria (see also Dryzek, 2000, 2006). In doing so, the
differences and underlying power networks become more apparent, and the importance of
mobilizing counter hegemonic projects is highlighted. On the other hand, agonistic democracy
has paid less attention to the conundrum of how “to reach some form of decision in a sphere
crisscrossed by dissensus and contingency” (Bond, 2011, p. 176) and arguably underplays the
way procedures and institutional arrangements can strengthen democratic politics (Kapoor, 2008,
pp. 108-10). And it is here that we believe agonistic democracy can learn from deliberative
democrats. Thus, we see these conceptualizations of democracy in terms of both/and rather than
either/or logics.
With Laughlin, we recognize the need to establish procedural and other norms facilitating
conditions for social justice. Habermasian approaches seek to prescribe “an ideal set of
procedures or conditions that enable decisions to be reached that are legitimate and transparent”
and thereby hint “at perfectionism” (Bond, 2011, p. 172; cf Norval, 2007 for a post-structuralist
reading of the idea of perfectionism rooted in aversion to conformist thinking). Bond (2011, pp.
171-72) identifies two interrelated aspects where Mouffe’s agonistic framework is underspecified that pose challenges for dialogic/polylogic accounting: “how to get to some kind of a
decision in a field crisscrossed by contestation and contingency and… how to determine whether
that decision is democratic”:
In certain situations, particularly in formal institutions, there will be a need for a specific
formalized decision based on some level of agreement, but it will always be a conflictual
consensus and open to further contestation. In this way, it is not a perfectionist model, the
achievement of which practice should strive. Rather, it provides a specific way of thinking
and of understanding politics that is (arguably) closer to real lived existence than an idealized
perfectionist model (ibid., p. 172).
Agonistic democrats’ broader and less idealized conception of democracy enables the
exploration of democratic processes beyond deliberation in a Habermasian public sphere and
allows consideration of both consensual and oppositional forms of democratic action.25 At the
same time, post-structuralists “are often criticized for being too negative, critiquing and
explaining what is wrong” rather than offering positive or realistic contributions that help “put
24
For example, see Kapoor (2008) and Molisa et al. (forthcoming) for discussion in a developing country context.
See also Dryzek (2000, pp. 81ff) on “insurgent democracy” and the “dualist nature” of civil society and social
movements).
18
25
things right” (ibid.). Agonistic pluralism is seen by some as normatively lacking so that analyses
become overly relativistic and too focused on deconstruction as opposed to reconstruction
(Glynos and Howarth, 2007, p. 7). A major fear is that, without explicit normative standards, the
enabling possibilities provided by emphasising contingency and unfinazibility open the way for
the (re)articulation of oppressive hegemonic projects (Critchley, 2004). We agree that it is
important not to assume that dialogic/polylogic accountings will automatically benefit currently
marginalized groups. As Davies (2008, p. 301) observes in responding to similar concerns about
pluralistic conceptions of law “no paradigm or model can wholly determine political outcomes,
since these are also shaped by the cumulative power of absolutely local practices, discourses and
relationships”. However, we contend that the charges of a “normative deficit” in agonistic
democracy are much exaggerated. As Bond (2011, p. 172) emphasizes, Mouffe’s work is
underpinned by a strong normative stance based on social justice and “contestable norms of
reciprocity, equality and liberty”.
A democratic ethos based on agonistic respect and critical responsiveness provides guidance
“for creating agonistic spaces, practices and institutions where antagonism can be transformed
into agonism” (ibid., p. 176; Connolly, 2005). These norms are derived from agonistic readings
of more general norms such as equality, liberty, reciprocity – “master signifiers” that are already
“sedimented into democratic thought” (Bond, 2011, p. 177). For agonistic praxis to become a
reality, these master signifiers would be recognized as open to contestation and change, but the
critical political task would be to secure a reading that coheres with the discursive structure of a
radical democratic politics. They can then do their work in helping to structure, shape and limit
the range of decisions possible in the agonistic space. Other interpretations, while always
possible, would take us outside the agonistic space. Thus this is not an attempt at some kind of
transcendental ethic along Habermasian lines, but a politically self-conscious effort to try and
shape social interaction in an undecidable terrain towards more socially just outcomes. These
norms, unlike ideal speech conditions, would not be put forward as “a fixed, universally
applicable set of rules” but rather seen as highly context dependent (ibid., pp. 176-77). Thus, for
example, the realities of power and dominant hegemonies in an existing context might create a
need for separate spaces where actors can articulate/nurture new practices and demands in the
form of counter-hegemonic projects before entering more inclusive spaces with divergent styles
of speech, argumentation and reasoning.
We consider possible ways of moving beyond the deliberative-agonistic democracy divide,
forging links between Laughlin’s work and our own proposals for dialogic/polylogic accountings
(Brown, 2009; Dillard and Brown, forthcoming; Dillard and Roslender, 2011), providing
guidance in applying agonistic democracy within an accounting context. Our approach is to
retain the basic framework of agonistic democracy, but draw on insights from deliberative theory
that assist in explicating conceptions of dialogic/polylogic accounting. The major synergy is
that they “provide a wealth of theorizing and empirical studies that emphasize the value of
understanding politics and democracy in terms of discussion, interaction, everyday talk and
contestation” (Bond, 2011, p. 174).
4.1. Reason, contestation and emotion
In addition to pluralizing the knowledge claims admissible and forms of participation
acceptable, we need to better understand their associated rationalities. For agonistic democrats,
Reason (qua reason) is constructed and obscured by power relationships manifested in
19
hegemonic processes that privilege certain facilitating rationalities. Agonistic democracy
recognizes that reasoning is a key part of how subjects relate with one another but goes further in
interrogating particularist forms of Reason in a specific time-space location. Accountings are
situated in a rationality that is “discursively constructed and shaped by dominant hegemonic
projects such as neoliberalism” (Bond, 2011, p. 174). Agonistic pluralism identifies and
interrogates the hegemonic projects indicating when Other voices and forms of knowledge are
not admitted to deliberative spaces, perpetuating existing inequities. Here agonistic democracy
draws on Foucauldian concepts of problematization and, as such, the key questions are quite
different from Habermas’ conception of reason. As Foucault (1984; p. 249, emphasis in
original) explains the focus is on asking: “What is this Reason that we use? What are its
historical effects? What are its limits, and what are its dangers? How can we exist as rational
beings, fortunately committed to practicing a rationality that is unfortunately crisscrossed by
intrinsic dangers?”. We are thus sensitized to both the necessity and indispensability of
rationality but “at the same time, to its intrinsic dangers” (ibid.).
An agonistic approach recognizes the important role of contestation, passion and emotions in
politics and the construction of socio-political identities. Drawing on Lacanian psychoanalytic
theory, people are often fearful of contestation and conflict because it is characterized as a sign
of “failure”, leading them to defensively deny, avoid, repress and foreclose difference. For
example, Davies (2000) discusses issues of exclusion of the Other through psychological
mechanisms of foreclosure and repression in the context of the difficulties indigenous peoples
face in achieving voice in constitutional law. Glynos and Howarth (2007) develop a concept of
“fantasmatic logics” that similarly seek to account for the dominance of particular ideas and
social practices and their grip on people. In contrast to Habermas’ transparent and coherent
selves, agonistic democrats are far more sensitive to the opacities of subjects, both in terms of
understanding themselves and others (Jezierska, 2011, pp. 166-71). Such insights help us to
understand how through the lack of contestation practices become sedimented and alternatives
resisted enabling exclusionary behavior; all of which typically benefit dominant elites.
Agonistic democracy seeks to cultivate a democratic ethos based on principles (e.g. agonistic
respect, critical responsiveness) that require “engagement with disagreement and conflict rather
than avoidance and fearfulness” (Bond, 2011, p. 179). From this perspective, the rationality
requirement of deliberative democracy with its emphasis on reason to the exclusion of emotion is
highly problematic, promoting an understanding of democracy that is limited to the notion of
“rational argumentation between all those with a stake in the decision in the public sphere”
(ibid., p. 171). There must also “be informal, organic, everyday spaces in which contestation,
anger and emotion can emerge and become legitimized forms of democratic action”, particularly
for actors in collectivities that have no established voice in existing institutional channels
(ibid.).26 Krause (2008, p. 200), in calling for a “new politics of (civil) passion” that recognizes
that “our minds are changed when our hearts are engaged” points to areas such as women’s
suffrage and charges that those who think that the public has somehow “reasoned its way to…
new views without help from the passions… is wilfully blind”. Here we can provide a strong
argument for counter-accountings as not only a form of protest action but also as means of
articulating new and/or unheard demands and voices; staking out a “speaking position…. not
See also Norval (2009, p. 297) stressing the need for engagement “with emerging identities, demands, and claims
that fall outside the parameters of dominant discursive orders”.
20
26
afforded…. by the prevailing social order” (Schaap, 2009, p. 5). Historically, the staging of
disagreements has played a crucial role in not only helping demonstrate the wrongs of a social
order but also bringing into existence new modes of political subjectivity (ibid., p. 12)
4.2. Procedural guides to practice
Deliberative democrats, particularly in applied settings, offer much practical guidance in
terms of how democratic interactions might be achieved across various governance settings, for
example encouraging new forms of social learning. Following similar efforts in other
disciplinary fields, we propose an approach that draws on this guidance but adapts it in light of
insights from agonistic democracy. An extended discussion of the possibilities here is beyond the
scope of this paper. Rather, we briefly outline two examples drawn from communicative
planning studies that illustrate how agonistic deliberation might be fostered. The first example
draws from Gaffikin and Morrissey’s (2011) work on the practical challenges of urban planning
and policymaking in contested cities, where:
incongruities among planning and policy agendas may derive from ontological,
epistemological, ideological, and methodological disputes. Deep divisions in cities generate
contest between protagonists about the reality of the context and content of the conflict; about
the form and validation of knowledge that offers causal understanding; about the rival values
and perspectives that inform the mission and behavior of the adversaries; and about the
methods of data collection and analysis designed to elucidate the actual situation.. [W]hat can
appear as rational and equitable to one side can appear as unreasonable and discriminatory to
the other (p. 10, emphasis in original).
Gaffikin and Morrissey’s (2011) discussion of the “knowledge co-production” model for
participatory planning helps to provide greater specification of why and how polylogic
accounting might be operationalized. This model “accepts the discordant realities of living with
complex difference” (p. 122), the messy processes and contradictions associated with
recognizing (as opposed to merely living with or accepting difference), and:
attempts to establish an equitable partnership between experts and activists in the coproduction of knowledge needed for plan development and delivery. Not only does it stress
processes such as enabling and empowering for all participants, it disputes that any particular
source is the repository of superior knowledge. Rather than deliberative processes of linear
argumentative debate and problem-solving, it leans towards a more recursive and agonistic
approach of competitive, outspoken, and sometimes combative exchanges, respectful of the
real rivalries, hard choices and exasperating trade-offs, and whose conclusion may yield both
discord and concord. In shifting from an approach to inquiry and engagement based on
Habermasian communicative action to one that encourages the savvy of improvisation and
reflexivity in a capricious world marked by fluidity rather than solidity, it disowns any
assumption about certainty and predetermination (p. 117, emphasis in original).
Rather than a more traditional problem-solving approach, the knowledge co-production model
emphasizes the tasks of surfacing “yet-to-be known possibilities” and “knowledge of a changing
unfinished world” constructed through agonistic discussions with others (ibid.).
The second example is drawn from Bond’s (2011, p. 179) discussion of a local government
21
context, indicating how a deliberative approach informed by agonism might help to structure a
decision space towards more progressive ends:
in local government the chaired committee format works in some contexts, but allowing for
agonistic spaces to develop might mean rethinking how meetings are run, agendas are set and
who takes part in the group. It might mean reorganizing meetings, holding them in different
places, in a workshop or small discussion group style, as walking tours of development sites,
thus drawing in groups who would not normally visit the town hall even when meetings are
open to the public. In consultation or participatory planning processes, it means being open to
and embracing dissensus and conflict as an opportunity to think in a different way.
We propose that a careful drawing together of insights from both deliberative and agonistic
democracy such as those outlined above provides a critically reflexive, context-sensitive and
potentially transformative approach to democratizing accounting. Dialogic/polylogic accountings
– by fostering an ethos of problematization and questioning – would help to facilitate the kind of
agonistic deliberation that arguably holds the most promise for dealing with the challenges of
devising critical AAS in and for pluralistic societies.27 Careful attention needs to be paid to the
potential role of such accountings in formal institutional settings whilst at the same time
recognizing the value of informal practices (cf Jezierska, 2011, p. 212 stressing the need for
agonistic democrats to pay more attention to issues of institutional design). As in
communicative planning and other applied fields, while much work remains to be done in
fleshing out these proposed new models, we consider that such approaches have considerable
potential in terms of offering an inevitably “imperfect pathway to a more productive discourse”
(Gaffikin and Morrissey, 2011, p. 10; see also Wingenbach, 2011 for a recent extended
discussion on the importance of, and possibilities for, institutionalizing agonistic democracy).
5. Non-Concluding Remarks
Our aim has been to expand the scope of Laughlin’s critical accounting wherein a rational
consensus is reached through dialogue and debate within the parameters of Habermas’ CA
through a dialectical encounter with agonistic democracy. As critical accountants, we share
much common ground with Laughlin in terms of our analysis of what is wrong with mainstream
accounting. Like Laughlin, we strongly object to the narrow technocratic way the accounting
profession currently approaches the normative purpose of accounting, especially the taken for
granted assumption that it should steer decision-making and accountability in line with the
dictates of neoclassical economics.28 We also abhor mainstream accounting’s lack of a critical
dimension, leading it to deny, ignore or downplay the injurious effects of power relations in
organizational and social settings especially in the current neoliberal context. We both seek new
27
Indeed the value of dialogic accounting has recently been recognized in the communicative planning literature.
Healey and Hillier (2010, p. 387) advocate “consideration of [the] concept of dialogic accounting…. Such
accounting is not concerned with discovery of an ‘infallible truth’, but rather with discussing actants’ values and
priorities in ‘democratic’ processes of decision making…. Who gets to discuss these values and priorities in what
type of ‘democratic’ setting, however, poses yet another ethical issue”.
28
In the private sector this manifests itself in the privileging of capital markets and the maximization of shareholder
wealth and in the public sector in the logic of (now not so) new public management.
22
critical accountings that are relevant to policy and practice and see democratic political theory is
key in helping: (a) to understand accounting in its wider socio-political context; (b) to evaluate
existing accounting policy and practice (e.g. in terms of how it approaches accountability issues,
governance and the management of resources); and (c) to offer ways of working towards more
enabling accountings.
We both reject aggregative conceptions of democracy based on neoliberal understandings that
reduce “the democratic process to the expression of those interests and preferences which are
registered in a vote aiming at selecting leaders who will carry out the chosen policies” (Laclau
and Mouffe, 2001, p. xvii). As deliberative and agonistic democrats, we see this as “an
impoverished conception of democratic politics” which treats interests, preferences and political
identities as pre-given rather than as constituted and reconstituted through intersubjective
dialogue and debate (ibid.; see also Brown, 2009, pp. 314-15). In marked contrast to this
neoclassical economics inspired view of democracy, we both conceive democracy more broadly
involving not just formal institutions associated with the public sphere (Parliament, the Courts,
Government departments etc.), but also wider realms of civil society (see also O’Leary, 1984).
Democratic interaction in a variety of everyday and official spaces is regarded as crucial in the
(re)formation of individual and collective preferences, and, thus, political subjects. We both
place a great deal of emphasis on the role of language, understanding, and meaning in our
theorizing, with accounting conceptualized as a communicative practice. For accounting to
contribute to a revitalized public sphere, we, like Laughlin, recognize a need to reject the idea of
accountants as technocratic, apolitical and all-knowing experts. We also both recognize that
political theory is useful in helping to evaluate experiments with participatory governance in the
public and private sectors, providing normative standards against which to judge the democratic
profile and practices.
However, there are also important differences in our approaches. We are less persuaded by
the consensually-oriented approaches to deliberative politics than Laughlin appears to favour and
believe that much greater acknowledgement is required of difference and conflict in theorizing
democracy and, relatedly, in any accounting that can help to facilitate transformative social
change. While Brown (2009) outlines some of these differences at a general level, we have
focused specifically on what they mean for the way we conceptualize democratic interaction and
how we might explore it empirically. In particular, we have focused on the nature and forms of
democratic exchange, arguing for a greater place for difference, passions and accountings that
allow for the expression of divergent socio-political identities. In short, we would like to see the
diversity Laughlin (2007, p. 287) applauds in research approaches applied to the social world
more generally.
We have examined recent work in political theory and its application for ways to bridge the
deliberative-agonistic divide to gain complementary insights from both bodies of thought. We
have drawn on some of this work (in particular Bond, 2011; Jezierska, 2011; Kapoor, 2008;
Norval, 2007 and Schaap, 2006, 2009) to sketch possible ways of forging links between
Laughlin’s work and our own. We acknowledge there are various ways these bodies of thought
might be brought into engagement with each other. We remain somewhat unsure ourselves, for
example, about whether it is better for the two approaches to coexist, in an agonistic spirit, as
“friendly enemies” or to look for some “third position”. We are convinced that the highly
polemic and antagonistic exchanges that have taken place in some other disciplines are not a
productive way to proceed. We also emphasize that what we offer here is more a pluralistic
23
exploration of the points of commonalities and difference in our and Laughlin’s positions, rather
than a blueprint for action. However, we hope that in exploring these issues we help to open up
the important, but vexed, issue of trying to democratize accounting.
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