Young People and Political Participation: The
Policy Implications of the FP7 MYPLACE Project
for the UK
April 2015
FP7 MYPLACE (Memory, Youth, Political Legacy And Civic Engagement) http://www.fp7myplace
EC Grant agreement no: FP7-266831
Contents
1 Introduction: Brief Outline of the MYPLACE Project
3
2 The Aims and Approach of the MYPLACE Project
5
3 The UK Policy Context for Young People’s Political Participation
11
4 The UK MYPLACE Findings
19
4.1 How historical memory fashions a ‘depressing present’
for many young people
19
4.2 Modest Interest in Politics but hostility to Politicians
and Political Institutions
21
4.3 Young people’s patterns of political and civic
participation
25
4.4 Social Attitudes and Receptivity to Populism
and Extremism
28
5 Working from Evidence to Policy
32
APPENDIX:
MYPLACE Comparative Evidence on Young People’s Voting
Behaviour, Political Trust and Participation in Formal Politics
37
References
40
2
1 Introduction: Brief Outline of the MYPLACE Project
MYPLACE– which stands for Memory, Youth, Political Legacy and Engagement – is
a major 7.9 Million Euro EC funded project, that run from June 2011 to May 2015,
using a mixed method approach across 14 countries to map the relationship
between political heritage, current levels and forms of civic and political engagement
of young people in Europe, and their potential receptivity to radical and populist
political agendas.
Conceptually, it focuses on interconnections between young people’s
orientations to the past, present and future to show that while youth civic and
political engagement is structurally rooted in historical and cultural contexts,
young people themselves are active agents of social and political change.
Empirically, MYPLACE combines survey, interviews and ethnographic case
studies to show the interactions between local, national and transnational
patterns of youth engagement and participation, providing a new and unique
pan-European data set that not only measures levels of participation but also
captures the meanings young people attach to it.
Analytically, through its holistic focus on the broader historical and cultural
contextualization of young people's civic, social and political participation,
MYPLACE replaces simplistic assumptions of a presumed ‘disengagement’
from politics with an empirically rich mapping of their understandings and
orientations towards local, national and European political spaces.
In policy terms, MYPLACE works from this new evidence to identify both the
obstacles and facilitators for young people's reclamation of the European
political arena as 'my place'. It has significant relevance for national and
European policy agendas, particularly those promoted by the EU Youth
Strategy 2010-18.
3
The 14 countries were Croatia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Greece,
Georgia, Hungary, Latvia, Portugal, Russia, Slovakia, Spain, and the United
Kingdom.
The project produced a wide range of quantitative, qualitative and ethnographic
outputs, all of which can be accessed here: http://www.fp7myplace.eu/deliverables.php. It also produced three Policy Briefs which can be
accessed here: http://www.fp7-myplace.eu/policybriefs.php
This evidence-based policy publication builds on our extensive empirical evidence
and previous policy analysis to elaborate the policy implications of the MYPLACE
research for the UK, focusing particularly on England where our research was
conducted. It was written by Professor Mick Carpenter, of the University of Warwick,
who was with Dr Marti Taru of Tallinn University, Estonia, Policy Lead for the whole
project. He also led on policy for the UK project, including chairing the UK Youth
Policy Advisory Group (YPAG) which played an active role in advising the project
on UK research strategy and the policy implications of the emerging research
findings. It comprised a range of professionals involved in local youth work, as well
as representatives of national youth organisations and academic experts.
4
2 The Aims and Approach of the MYPLACE Project
There has been much discussion and concern expressed in the media about the
alleged disengagement of young people from formal politics – for example as
reflected in declining trust in politicians and political institutions and in turn falling
rates of voting over time. While turnout at general and local elections has been
falling across the board, it is particularly pronounced among young people. As Table
1 below shows, fewer young people are voting in UK general elections, only 51.8%
in 2010 compared to 76.4% in 1964, and the gap between them and other age
groups is widening. In addition anxiety has been expressed in some quarters at the
propensity of some young people to be attracted to populist parties and movements,
in the context of both the rise in both far right and radical left across Europe and
fears that young Muslims might be attracted to extremist radical Islamic politics (e.g.
see Krekó, 2013, Mondon and Bowman,2014). While the decline in trust and decline
in membership of political parties is not a universally British phenomenon, the
relative and absolute decline in young people’s voting is more marked than in other
OECD countries. The percentage point difference in voting rates between 55+ year
olds and 16-35 year olds is 38%, much higher than other countries. By comparison
in Italy young people have a 5% higher voting rate. The average is 12% and the
country with the nearest wide gap is Japan at 25% (OECD, 2011).
Table 1: Estimated percentage turnout by selected age groups at selected
General Elections 1964-2010
18-24
55-64
65+
1964*
76.4
78.4
76.7
1979
62.5
81.4
77.7
1992
67.3
78.1
79.2
1997
54.1
79.9
77.7
2010
51.8
69.8
74.7
*Age 21-24 for 1964 as voting age was 21 not 18
Source: Dar and Mellows-Facer, 2014: 4
5
This overall pattern needs some qualifications and further analysis. For example, the
Ethnic Minority British Election Study (EMBES) showed that age had a weaker effect
for minorities than white British, who were not less engaged politically than whites
(O’Toole, 2014). Gender effects are also important and interact with age, with
research by the House of Commons Library commissioned by Harriet Harman MP
showed that 9.1 women of voting age did not vote, compared to 8 million men with
indications that they were turned off by the predominant political culture (Harman,
2015). While education (and thus class) were linked to turnout, less educated older
people were more likely to vote than educated younger people (Dar and MellowsFacer, 2014).
This disconnect from formal politics has been associated with significant signs of
social and political unease among groups of young people since the economic crisis
of 2008, including the 2010 student protests against increases in university fees, the
riots of 2011, and the anti-capitalist Occupy movement in London and other UK cities
in 2011. The political impact among young people of these recent events were
reflected in the research in various ways. While previous research projects have
charted young people’s political attitudes either on a national or comparative basis
(for example, Fahmy, 2006; Henn, 2012; Sloam, 2013) MYPLACE is the first project
to analyse this systematically and holistically across Europe, utilising a range of
triangulated research methods, to set this within the context of young people’s wider
social attitudes and participation in social, civic and political activities. The research
has particularly sought to give prominence to the voices of young people
themselves, not least because – as we shall see – there is evidence that young
people’s widespread political disillusion, which for some leads to active
disengagement, has been externally generated rather than produced solely through
the unmediated choices of young people themselves. In other words, young people’s
expressed concerns that politicians and political systems ignore or at best
marginalise young people’s concerns must be listened to, and considered to have
some basis in fact. The 2011 OECD figures also indicate that the extreme gap in the
UK is due to more than general processes in modern developed democracies, but
has distinctly British features associated with its society and political institutions. This
raises important issues of where the chief responsibility lies to correct this situation:
our evidence suggests that much more needs to be done by politicians and policy
6
makers to restore faith in politics, rather than simply making exhortations to young
people.
Thus MYPLACE research contextualised the appeal of far right, radical left and
populist movements holistically within the total profile of youth consciousness and
action, rather than simply focusing on the most publicly visible aspects. It went
beyond restrictive conventional definitions of ‘the political’ limited to electoral or ’party
politics’ that excludes too many youth actions that have political implications and
effects, by mapping a wide array of socio-political activities engaged in by young
people and their associated preferences, expectations and values. It sought to
analyse international, cross national features and influences, and contextualises
contemporary youth actions against national and European ‘historical memory’.
It is a large scale project which is unusual in combining survey, interview and
ethnographic case study research methods to capture both levels of civic, political
and social participation and the subjective meanings young people attach to it, in
order to inform policy. Through a specific focus on 'youth' and the historical and
cultural contextualization of young people's social participation, MYPLACE
challenges over-generalized concepts of ‘disengagement’ from politics by
documenting the wide range of young people’s understandings and responses to
civic and political spaces. It examines these processes across 14 countries which
represent a wide variety of historical, social, political and administrative conditions
that shape the lifeworlds of young people in different countries and their social and
political actions. Five of the countries joined European Union relatively recently or
still are in the accession process: Latvia, Estonia, Hungary, Slovakia, and Croatia.
Georgia and Russia, which have rather different cultural-historical backgrounds,
represent countries from the outside of European Union, The more ‘central’ countries
of Europe and Scandinavia are represented by Denmark, Finland, and Germany
(former Western and Eastern parts of the country being treated separately). The
three main countries of Southern Europe, Spain, Portugal and Greece also feature,
and the Anglo-Saxon world is represented by England. The project is therefore well
situated to uncover how common European and contrasting national political and
cultural traditions and economic circumstances shape the ways in which young
people respond in similar and different ways.
7
The centrepiece of the research was a decision to eschew spurious attempts at
seeking to national representativeness of youth responses in favour of more in-depth
analysis of two contrasting areas, which would enable the research to uncover how
national and transnational influences were represented through specific localities.
This in turn would show how local, national and international influences interact in
shaping young people’s political values and actions, embedded in particular locales.
These local results could then be referenced against national research evidence,
and also against the comparative evidence from 28 sites across Europe which show
common as well as contrasting features. The most important of these, as we shall
see, are a widespread disillusion with formal politics and a feeling that politicians are
not interested in the concerns of young people, leading to a degree of disconnect by
a significant minority of young people.
In the UK much of the research took place in two contrasting sites:
Hillfields, an inner area of the large urban centre of Coventry in the West
Midlands, is characterised by high diversity as an area that has long been the
main arrival points for migrants since the 1960s, more recently refugee and
asylum seekers, and East Europeans. It has a growing student population,
often in dedicated housing. The area suffered from the decline of the car
industry but until the 2008 recession, was situated in a relatively dynamic
urban centre that had partly recovered from deindustrialisation.
Nuneaton, a medium sized town 9 miles to the north in Warwickshire. It has
traditionally hosted a white working class population, though this is recently
changing with higher numbers of inward migrants. The town’s economic base
of mining and engineering has been significantly undermined by
deindustrialisation and globalisation since the 1980s. The town also has a
military barracks on the outskirts, and was an area where the far-right English
Defence League (EDL) sought to make recruits.
The social indicators for both areas show high levels of persistent poverty and
deprivation, where the effects of recession and austerity would be most likely to be
quite marked. The research involved:
8
A large scale structured survey conducted at the end of 2012 and early 2014. This
involved in total 1092 respondents.
Follow up qualitative and more open ended interviews with a sample of willing
respondents, 62 in total, in order to gain deeper insight into the responses to the
questionnaire.
Collaborative research with museum partners into young people’s ‘politics of
memory’ This examined how young people interpret the past, how this shapes their
social and political responses to contemporary events. It also focused on the
processes involved in intergerational transmission of history, both informally through
families and publicly through institutions like museums. In the UK this involved the
Herbert Art Gallery and Museum Coventry (http://www.theherbert.org/). Research
focused particularly but not exclusively in each country on ‘difficult’ or traumatic
events in the past. In the UK the period chosen was the 1980s associated with
economic recession and deindustrialisation on the hand, and politically on the other
hand with the Thatcher government, both leading to transformations in both the
national and local economic and political landscapes and consequently the
‘lifeworlds’ of young people themselves.
A range of ethnographic case studies, around 3 in each country, in order to
capture young people’s active involvement in social movements and political
organisations, with particular emphasis on their own interpretations. Across the
whole project 44 such case studies were conducted, providing a unique database
with invaluable insights for both general understanding and policy. In the UK
ethnographies were conducted into:

UK Feminista was founded in 2010 as a campaigning feminist organisation
which places emphasis on providing training and resources for activists and
groups

Occupy movement emerged in cities around the world, including London in
the UK in 2010, to protest in the wake of the 2008 crisis against ’corporate
greed’, austerity and the growing inequality associated with unbridled
capitalism. The UK case study focused on a local Occupy camp in a Midlands
city
9

English Defence League (EDL) is a street action movement set up in 2009
to campaign against perceived excessive Muslim influence and promotion of
an English identity
None of these were exclusively youth organisations or campaigns. However young
people were particularly prominent in the first two, though less so in the EDL. They
were each ‘new’ movements and embraced social media and non-mainstream
political approaches. While Occupy was short-lived in the UK it helped to generate
new political parties in both Spain (Podemos) and Greece (Syriza).
10
3 The UK Policy Context for Young People’s Political Participation
In Section 4 below we present the UK MYPLACE findings, before moving in Section
5 to consider the policy implications that emerge from them. First, however, we
briefly set the public policy scene against which the UK young people in our research
responded to the questions we set them. This is with two considerations in mind.
First, to counter the tendency to stereotype and over-generalise youth who are
socially and hence also politically diverse; second, to show that young people’s
responses cannot be understand in ‘essentialist’ terms as simply the result of their
considered or (more often assumed to be) unwise chosen responses. Rather it is
generated by political, economic and social events, processes and institutions and
the structured way that these interact with young people’s own perceptions and
agency.
Much has been written about the situation of young people from both media and
generally more considered sociological research. One way in which the tendency to
overgeneralise is particularly pronounced is in the way that media, marketing
organisations and political commentators define young people as members of
distinct generations which largely shape, almost determine their experiences and
responses. To give just a typical flavour of this:
‘Generation X’
Known as slackers, they were initially dismissed as cynical and unfocused 20
somethings lacking drive or ambition. The first wave left school in the early
1980s in an era of mass unemployment with the Cold War threatening nuclear
annihilation. But the end of the Thatcher government and the fall of the Berlin
Wall brought positive social change.
‘Generation Y’
Also known as the Millenials, this generation has never known economic good
times with little hope of buying a home, many rely on mum and dad. Jobs are
low-paid and last for an average of 15 months compared to more than 10
years for Baby Boomers.
‘Generation Z’
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The oldest Gen Z child was six at the time of the 9/11 terror attack. But it was
their defining moment, US research says they are growing up amid ‘chaos,
uncertainty, volatility and complexity’. But they are also hailed as ‘the first true
digital natives’ or ‘screenagers’. They have few fights at school and less risky
sex. In fact they have learned all the lessons their elders took a lifetime to
understand
-
’Are you X, Y, Z, Baby Boomer or Silent Generation – What Does it Meah
to You?’ Daily Mirror
This is ‘pop-sociology’ which, although ‘a bit of fun’ at one level, and draws attention
to some nuggets of ‘evidence’ for example of the more computer aware nature of
young people, uses it to create a gross distortion of Mannheim’s original emphasis
on generations (Mannheim, 1927), deploying a crude deterministic model of
character and change which contributes to unhelpful and often negative stereotypes
of young people. It commits the ‘ecological fallacy’ of assuming that relatively similar
background experiences and widespread characteristics mean that these are more
or less universal and all those affected respond largely in the same way.
Thus properly grounded policy must be based on a more sophisticated
understanding of the changing situation of young people, be aware that this affects
young people in socially differentiated ways, and that their responses to it are not
predetermined. In other words, awareness that youth is socially divided, and their
responses are shaped by the interplay between (external) structural forces and their
own (self-generated) individual or collective agency. In some ways the Generation X,
Y or Z approach may seem better than the notion that young people ‘nowadays’ are
problematic, but it equally seems to end up similarly portraying them stereotypically
as the ‘other’.
We do not have space to outline here in full the complex and changing social,
economic and political contexts of young people in the UK, which have been
portrayed well elsewhere (for example, Mizen, 2004; Furlong and Cartmel, 2007;
Jones, 2002, 2009). However, drawing on such work, we do wish to make a few
points about how they might be approached sociologically in ways that will help
policy makers to make sense of the policy implications of the MYPLACE research.
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The natural sociological point is the concept of ‘youth transitions’, of youth as a
socially and politically constructed space beyond childhood in which young people
seek to develop individual and collective life strategies both in the moment and in
ways that seek to move to future adult status and positions. Within this are certain (in
the immediate sense) givens such as the structure of labour market and educational
opportunities, shaped by political institutions and public policies, which again impact
differentially on different groups young people. Within these givens or structures,
young people themselves seek to develop individual and collective agency, which
can involve both acting within these frameworks, and/or also seeking to change
them.
The interplay between young people’s own lifestyle and ‘subcultural’ choices was
highlighted by Shildrick and MacDonald (2006) who argued that the emphasis on
distinct youth subcultures and ‘neo-tribes’ within a postmodern perspective tended to
underplay the continuing significance of inequalities among youth. In particular they
argued that social class and ethnicity and to a lesser extent gender had been
marginalised, and argued that youth cultures have been shaped significantly by
economic differences and the extent of social and political exclusion. In arguing this,
she drew on Pilkington’s (2006) study of Russian youth which relates youth cultural
responses to the wider ‘cleavages’ associated with Russian post-Soviet modernity.
These attempts to combine structural and cultural analysis could in some senses be
seen as developing approaches which enable us to see young people’s collective
participation in social movements and political organisations as having ‘cultural’
dimensions which are shaped by the changing social position of different groups of
young people. It is therefore not the question of one or other type of analysis.
Having said that it is clear that labour market trajectories and the way that these are
affect by wider pressures, and the circumstances in which different groups of young
people are able to acquire skills and educational qualifications provide a central
‘structural spine’ that impacts on youth agency and culture. The way that this shapes
general and differential transitions has been subject to considerable research and
analysis. In 2006 Furlong, Cartmel and Biggart (2006) summarized the trend towards
more protracted and complex transitions to adulthood, between school and
employment, as a shift from ‘linearity’ and predictability. However at the time they
13
argued that this was over-stated, again because postmodern analysis had suggested
a degree of agency or what they call ‘choice biographies’. In fact such ‘non-linearity’
was much more a feature of the least advantaged groups of young people.
The emerging evidence of more difficult youth transitions associated within what was
then characterised as ‘late modernity’ and ‘risk society’ fed into a wider ‘Third Way’
political project which gained currency under the 1997-2010 Labour government.
However, this suggested that in a global, increasingly neoliberal economy and
political context the responsibility lay primarily with young people to acquire the skills
and qualifications in a society characterized by ‘knowledge’ and networking to enable
them to make successful transitions to adulthood. The responsibility of the state
shifted from welfare or protection to investment in training and expansion of higher
education as key elements of what Giddens called a ‘social investment state’ (SIS).
This was in turn associated with a shift from national Keynesian ‘demand site’
economies and protective welfare states, to ‘post-Fordist’ economies in which the
state sought through ‘supply side’ measures to transform citizens into individuals
with skills and motivations to compete and be productive. It was recognized that
particular groups were at risk of ‘social exclusion’ and that this particularly applied to
those without skills or qualifications in the new ‘knowledge economy’, so-called
NEETS (Not in Education, Employment or Training) who might need to be cajoled by
compulsory training schemes such as the now defunct New Deal for Young People
(NDYP) initiated in 1999.
Thus even in the years prior to the economic crisis in 2008-9 youth transitions,
particularly for the most disadvantaged, were becoming more difficult. However this
also was associated with significant restructuring and a shift away from a welfare
protection model for young people, rather than attempts to make them easier. These
trends have been documented in more details by Mizen (2004), who documents in
full the role the state in this era and how its forms of intervention have helped to
reshape the choices available to young people. The onset of crisis since then has led
to the intensification of this situation. While it has become more difficult to those
without skills, increasing ranks of educated young people have experienced pressure
with the collapse of middle class incomes and opportunities. In other words, the
‘precarity’ analysed by Standing (2011) is spreading up the social order with
14
potentially significant political consequences. This is not a uniquely British
phenomenon and has been more pronounced in other countries, notably Southern
Europe as the MYPLACE research summarized in Policy Brief 3 indicates
(http://www.fp7-myplace.eu/policybriefs.php). It has led some commentators to argue
for example, Paul Mason (2012), that the main drive towards the ‘leftist’
radicalisation of some young people has been ‘graduates without a future’.
Not all of the ‘crisis’ in youth transition, however, is solely produced by the economic
crisis, but also by the workings of political institutions and the political choices that
have been made by politicians in the face of perceived electoral pressures. While it
is possible to argue that the decline of the traditional working class with ‘post-Fordist’
globalisation undermined traditional labour politics, the ‘first-past-the-post’ political
system arguably leads to an emphasis on centrist politics a few key marginals in
which there is intense competition for the middle class vote. While the economic
‘boom’ was in full flood before 2008 a ‘social contract’ existed where the rapid growth
of economic inequality was tolerated as living standards rose, and a housing boom
enabled middle groups to accumulate wealth without need to save or curb consumer
spending. It is the collapse of this ‘social contract’ through the collapse of incomes
and salaries that has led arguably to ‘permanent recession’, or at best a weak
‘economic recovery’ under the neoliberal policies of the Coalition Government
2010-15 (Resolution Foundation, 2015). Alongside this the MPs ‘scandal’ over
expenses has helped to undermine the legitimacy of the political class. In addition,
where as in the case of the Liberal Democratic leader Nick Clegg, politicians make
promises on which they are deemed to renege – on university fees in this case –
this helps to undermine to undermine confidence in the political system, particularly
among young people.
In this context, even within the overarching political choice itself of austerity politics,
politicians have made decisions in response to perceived electoral pressures to
protect as far as possible the adult insiders with the employment and mortgages, and
to reward pensioners with inflation proofed pensions and protect benefits such as the
universal Winter Fuel Allowance. In contrast young people who through
unemployment have been hardest hit by the recession, have also lost out through –
among other things – cuts to youth services, the abolition of Connexions as a
15
national career service, the ending of the Educational Maintenance Allowance (EMA)
and the rise in university fees to £9,000 a year. According to the Resolution
Foundation: ‘recessions are always bad for young people; this one has been
disastrous’. They show that while the Coalition Government has increased jobs,
many are low paid and wages have fallen. While the over 60s experienced a decline
of 3.7%, 22 to 29 year olds saw a 12.5% fall in their wages between 2009 and 2014
(Stewart, 2015). One of the most striking social changes is the rise of zero hours
contracts, which by the end of 2014 had risen to 1.8 million, and are much more
common among both the young and over 65 year olds (Inman, 2015). True,
unemployment has fallen but young people have benefited least. Analysis by the
House of Commons Library shows that young people fare comparatively worse than
at any point since 1992. Their unemployment rate was 14.4% at the end of 2014,
compared to 5.7% for the UK as a whole. While the total number of unemployed fell,
youth unemployment rose in the last 3 months of 2014 (Boffey, 2015; Mirza-Davies,
2015)). Where they do claim benefits evidence from the Joseph Rowntree
Foundation shows that young people are particularly likely to be subject to the
increasing tendency for officials to impose benefit sanctions (Watts, 2014). Young
people are also negatively affected by the perverse effect of the grossly distorted UK
housing market and the withdrawal of the state from social housing. The English
Housing Survey 2013-14 showed that young households aged 25-34 were more
likely now to be renting privately (48%) than owning their own home (DCLG, 2015:
8). In addition many also are unable to afford the rents, and continue to live with
parents. As a result homelessness is also on the rise, particularly in London and
other large cities (Crisis, 2012, 2014). In this context, despite the earlier doubts
about concepts of ‘generation’, the concept of a ‘Generation Rent’ does seem quite
apt (Dorling, 2015).
We have argued elsewhere (e.g. Carpenter and Taru, 2013) that the combination of
these factors is leading to growing precarity and dependence of young people on
parents which has perverse class, gender and age effects, which in turn are leading
young people in northern European countries, particularly the UK, to converge
towards the ‘southern European model’. As a result whereas before 2008 youth
transitions resembled an increasingly longer tunnel, arguably it is now a ‘labyrinth’
from which many feel they are unlike to escape. This is reflected in our evidence
16
Section 4 below where young people reflect on what many of them regard as the
‘depressing present’ in which a future is bereft of hope, the policy implications of
which will be picked up in Section 5. This process is accelerating with austerity
politics as a response to economic crisis, which have served to intensify the existing
tendency of the political system and politicians to marginalise the concerns of young
people, creating a vicious circle of disadvantage, disillusion, and disengagement
which threatens the health of the political system. More is likely to follow, as the two
major parties, Labour and Conservative, went into the election promising a more
conditional approach to benefits for young people. Not all of policies however that
impact negatively on young people are deliberately intended to disadvantage them.
For example, the decision to individualise voter registration in 2014 in order to
prevent fraud has strangely been claimed to make it easier for groups like students
to register vote (https://www.gov.uk/government/news/biggest-change-to-voterregistration-in-a-generation). However it will in practice place more barriers than
previously existed to further deter young people from registering. Because this
possible effect could be anticipated, it arguably involves ‘indirect’ or ‘institutional’
discrimination against young people.
One of the central issues is the fact that the UK and its constituent nations has never
had a concerted youth policy. Some European countries have youth ministries which
act in an advocacy capacity. To be fair, the Coalition Government sought to at least
partially address this omission with the creation of a Positive for Youth Strategy (,
though much of this arguably brought together existing policies rather than created
many new ones. Despite this it was a welcome effort to create greater coordination,
although subsequently the Education Minister, Michael Gove stated that schools
rather than young people were the priority. In addition the shift under the Coalition
Government to a philosophy of ‘localism’ has also undermined efforts to protect the
situation of young people. Critical reviews of Postive for Youth, have been made by
Davies, (2011) and Buckland (2013), the latter suggesting that ‘the policy is an
attempt to “do something” about young people without providing the necessary
resources or addressing key structural issues’. An alternative more positive account
from the government on progress made is also available (HM Government, 2013)
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When local authorities are intense financial pressure, it is not surprising that they
give priority to protecting areas of expenditure that are statutory requirements,
primarily social care and child protection, and have instituted widespread cuts in
youth services. This has led to a situation where young people, particularly but not
exclusively the most disadvantaged and excluded, have suffered most in an area of
austerity, and have been protected least against its effects by public policy.
The aim of this admittedly brief policy analysis has been to identify the kinds of
pressures that young people have been under, and how the political system and
policy responses from the New Labour era onwards, has helped to undermine
young people’s faith in politics. Thus rather than fragmentation and individualisation
alone producing a disconnect, the workings of the UK political system have helped to
contribute to it. The next Section 4 present the results of the MYPLACE research,
before Section 5 returns to consider the policy implications, in particular how policy
makers and political actors might help to break the vicious cycle of disadvantage,
disillusion and disengagement, and help to foster a more positive environment for
young people’s political participation. We will argue that a good test of the health
political system is its’ ability to capture the enthusiasm and commitment of young
people, which has potential benefits for everyone.
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4 The UK MYPLACE Findings
In this section we outline some key policy related findings of the MYPLACE project,
which broadly show that while a substantial number of young people are interested
in politics, they are often disillusioned with politicians and political institutions, though
a substantial number are politically and civically engaged. Active alienation rather
than passive apathy is how their attitudes are best characterised. While there is little
support for extremist politics, there is evidence among some young people of social
attitudes which might potentially lend support for it in more fertile circumstances.
Thus the findings should not encourage complacency but urgent action, which we
elaborate the final ‘policy implications’ section of this Brief. We first show:

The continuing role of historical memory and transmission in shaping what
many young people view as a ‘depressing present’;

The substantial level of young people’s interest in politics combined with a
significant lack of trust in politicians and political institutions;

The extent and nature of young peoples’ involvement in political and civic
action;

Social attitudes among young people and their receptivity to populist or
‘extremist’ politics.
Only selected key findings can be reported here, giving a flavour of the results, and
the full research reports are available at: http://www.fp7-myplace.eu/policybriefs.php
4.1 How historical memory fashions a ‘depressing present’ for many young
people
This historical memory research was conducted in collaboration with the Herbert Art
Gallery and Museum (http://www.theherbert.org/),Coventry, who have a strong trackrecord of outreach work with groups of disadvantaged and diverse young people. It
involved observation of museum events, joint outreach sessions with young people,
expert interviews with Herbert staff members, plus focus groups and individual
interviews of young people. The research showed that:
19

In varying ways young people’s attitudes are often shaped by a ‘difficult
past’ which in these local contexts often centred on the perceived effects
of deindustrialisation in the 1970s and 1980s in eroding the postwar era of
working class affluence and social democracy;

In the eyes of many this had bequeathed the legacy of an economically,
culturally, and politically ‘depressing present’ for today’s often marginalised
young people living in urban centres, particularly so in the more
economically depressed Nuneaton;

Politically these changes were not usually seen as the result of
autonomous economic changes or globalisation per se, but as changes
driven forward by Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in the 1980s.
The focus of school curriculum on WWII as the most dramatic period in the recent
British history shaped young people attitudes to ‘key historical events’ and facilitated
their socialisation into both the national historical narrative and local mnemonic
communities, especially memories of the Coventry Blitz and rebuilding of the
‘Phoenix City’ after 1945. At the same time, the research found that family and
popular culture (films, TV, music, etc) were the main transmission mechanisms by
which young people interpreted the past and connected it to understandings of the
present, rather than what they had learned at schools and colleges. However older
family members often significantly shaped attitudes and political socialisation
through:

Nostalgia for a lost age of secure well paid jobs, affluence and state
welfare in an age of perceived urban decline and government austerity
measures;

Transmission of key cultural forms such as Punk, heavy metal, Two-tone
etc;

Attitudes such as socialism, anti-racism, mistrust of the police and
xenophobia;

The political interpretation of key local historical events such as factory
closures and the 1986 Miners’ Strike.
20
There were no statistically significant differences in the WP4 survey between the
views of young people in Coventry and Nuneaton regarding the importance of
significant historical events:

94% of young people in Coventry and 92% in Nuneaton stated that the
Second World War was either very important or important, and there were
similar views for the First World War (92% and 90% respectively).

A more recent event ‘The NY terrorist attacks on September 11th 2001’
was also significant with 83% of Young people in Nuneaton and 80% in
Coventry stating it was either very important or important.
The research therefore showed the importance of ‘memory work’ in shaping
contemporary social and cultural attitudes and political values, highlighting the ways
that meaningful outreach work by local institutions like The Herbert can help young
people reflect on, interpret and express their feelings about such issues, and start to
develop individual and collective life strategies linked to them.
4.2 Modest Interest in Politics but Hostility to Politicians and Political
Institutions
A substantial number of young people in the study were interested in politics
contradicting assumptions that are sometimes made of a lack of interest, though the
large scale survey indicated this varied in Coventry and Nuneaton:

52% of young people in Coventry and 39% in Nuneaton stated that they
were very or quite interested in politics, and in both locations, the higher
the level of political knowledge and education the greater the interest;

In both locations respondents leaned to the ‘left’ though participants did
not always clearly understand left-right distinctions;

42% of respondents in Coventry and 37% in Nuneaton felt closer to a
particular party and in both sites around 70% identified it as the Labour
Party.
21
An issue linked to our interest in memory and historical transmission was the extent
of ‘political closeness’ with the older generation, which we investigated using an
ascending 30 point scale:

In Nuneaton males (13.62) are closer than females (11.72) in a statistically
significant way, whereas in Coventry there was no statistical significant
difference:

In Nuneaton – but not Coventry - Muslims (8.94) are further away
compared to other religious groups, e.g. Catholics (13.31), and people with
no religion (14.67) in a statistically significant way.
The average interest (on 0-10 no to high interest scale) in particular contemporary
issues also varied substantially by location:
Coventry
Nuneaton
Immigration
6.3
5.4
Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender (LGBT) rights
3.8
4.7
The economy
6.9
5.8
National security
6.8
6.0
The environment
7.0
6.3
The European Union
5.8
4.2
General employment prospects
8.1
7.3
Housing
6.9
6.4
Local issues
6.1
5.6
Given high levels of youth unemployment it is perhaps not surprising that
employment configures figure highest and ‘bread and butter’ issues like housing and
the economy, but there is also substantial interest in other issues like the
environment and national security, as well as immigration.
Yet although there was a substantial number of young people in our study interested
in politics, there was considerable disenchantment with politicians, political parties
22
and institutions. The young people in our study were at best ambivalent about the
current democratic system, with significant discontent with the three main parties.
Thus while the survey attitudes to politicians and political influence varied in the two
locations, they were typically negative:

In Coventry only 33% and in Nuneaton 25% thought that ‘politicians are
interested in young people like me’;

57% in Coventry and 49% in Nuneaton thought that politicians were
corrupt;

In Coventry 77% and Nuneaton 72% felt the rich have too much influence
over politics;

Levels of trust in institutions (see table below) such as the courts, the
police, the Prime Minister, the media, the banks, international institutions
like the UN and the European Commission, NGOs, religious institutions
and Parliament,

With the single exception of trust in the army, levels of trust were
consistently higher in Coventry than Nuneaton;

The army, the courts and NGOs were the most trusted institutions overall
Mean Level of trust in Organisation on a 0-10 scale where 0 means “do not trust at
all”, and 10 means “complete trust”)
Type of Organisation
Coventry
Nuneaton
The army *
6.4
7.5
The police *
6.6
6.1
The courts *
6.6
5.8
Greenpeace
6.3
6.0
Amnesty International *
6.0
5.2
The United Nations *
5.9
5.1
Banks *
5.5
5.2
The European Commission *
5.6
4.7
Religious institutions *
5.5
4.5
Parliament *
5.4
4.4
23
The head of government (PM) *
5.1
4.3
Political parties *
4.3
4.0
The media (national press and TV) * 4.0
3.3
* Comparison of Coventry and Nuneaton, t-test or Mann-Whitney U test (where
appropriate) significant at p<.05
These underlying reasons for this were elaborated in the WP5 in-depth interviews.
Many respondents stated that politicians were deceitful (‘liars’, ‘hypocrites’), and that
they tell people what they want to hear to get elected, and then ‘go back on their
promises’, which may have been influenced by compromises made by parties to
form a coalition government on issues such as student fees that particularly affect
young people. The in-depth qualitative interviews often suggested that politicians are
‘out of touch’ with ordinary people, privileged (‘rich’, ‘posh’), and out for themselves
(corrupt, interested in their own wealth and career). It was clear that the MP
expenses scandal prior to the research in 2012, had helped to reinforce such views.
This sense of disconnection between politicians, ordinary people in general, and
young people in particular, came across strongly in the in-depth interviews, e.g.:
Our government don’t listen to us, do you know what I mean? At the moment
all they care about is giving the rich tax breaks and taking, hitting all the poor
people.
The research also shows that the combined effects of social class and education
shape attitudes, in that these negative views and lack of trust were less prominent
among more educated higher class respondents than less educated ‘white working
class’ respondents’ in both Coventry and Nuneaton.
Lack of trust in politicians was slightly attenuated by the fact that some individual
politicians were praised. This included some local politicians, linked to their direct
responsiveness to approaches made to them. Individual politicians were respected if
they had an ability to ‘admit they were wrong’, had ‘passion’, or were ‘normal people’
able to speak to ordinary people.
24
4.3 Young people’s patterns of political and civic participation
Our research sought to situate young people’s formal engagement with politics, e.g.
voting and participation in elections, in a wider context to include a variety of forms of
activism not all of which would necessarily be defined as ‘political’. The results again
showed the influence of class and education in shaping the extent of political and
civic participation, which also varied in the two urban settings. It was not just
increased education up to degree level that generally led to higher participation, but
also the extent to which young people had been specifically educated in politics and
political systems. Of those voting, there was a ‘left leaning’ tendency:

In Coventry 52% voted Labour, 23% Liberal Democrat and 19%
Conservative in the general election;

In Nuneaton 61% voted Labour, 18% Conservative and15% Liberal
Democra
Of those choosing not to vote, between 30% (Coventry) and 50% (Nuneaton) of
eligible respondents said they “would have voted but were unable on the day.”
Given that polling stations in both sites were open from early to late, this may
indicate a lack of awareness of, or confidence in, the voting process itself, though
this was not explored in more detail. A number of young people indicated that
schools had not sufficiently educated them in politics, and that this contributed to the
breakdown in communication between young people and political leaders. As one of
the in-depth interviewees put it:
The language of politics… can be damaging, I think it stops some people
from getting involved, if they don't understand the terminology, I think it
can make it quite difficult, for some people, to interact with it.
Thus many young people indicated that they were ‘turned off’ by the language and
terminology of politics, and many were either not interested or did not feel they knew
enough about politics to have a view. Both the survey and interviews also reveal
considerable uncertainties and gaps in knowledge in respondents’ knowledge about
the parties, party ideology, party positioning in the Left-Right political spectrum, as
25
indicated in Figure 1 below. In Coventry 23.8% and in Nuneaton 42.4% of young
people responded ‘Don’t Know’, indicating that there is possibly considerable
uncertainty about such distinctions as well as widespread personal indecision on
where to locate oneself on the political spectrum. This might in part be linked to a
narrowing of differences between the major political parties in the post-Thatcher
period.
Figure 1: Young People’s Understanding of Left-Right Distinctions in Coventry
and Nuneaton
In politics people sometimes talk of “left” and “right”. On a scale of 0 to 10,
where 0 is left and 10 is right, would you say that you personally are left or
right-wing?
.
In addition to voting and participating in elections young people’s broader
engagement was measured by surveying their participation in ‘causes’ such as
product boycotts, involvement in ‘campaigns’ such volunteering in election
campaigns, and ‘civic engagement’ e.g. in sports clubs and trades unions. The
levels of participation in all types of activity were higher in Coventry than Nuneaton,
which may be linked to the presence of a significant number of students in the
survey.

As far as involvement in causes was concerned, signing a petition (47% in
Coventry, 46% in Nuneaton) was the most common, followed by
26
participating in boycotts or buying of products (24% and 13% respectively),
participating in a demonstration (20% and 11% respectively) and writing
an article (17% and 11% respectively).

In terms of campaigns, the highest rates of participation in Coventry were
reported for ‘voting in student union election’ (36%) and in Nuneaton
‘donating money for supporting a political group’ (18%). Significant
numbers in Coventry were also involved in the latter and other also
uploading political material to the internet, attending political meetings and
volunteering in an election campaign.

The highest civic engagement rates in both research sites were ‘sports
clubs’, and also trade unions, national or youth parliament, animal welfare,
neighbourhood association and ‘militarised’ youth organisation. Rates of
participation were higher in Coventry to a statistically significant degree.
There were some variations in participation by gender, parental social class, political
knowledge and ethnicity.
Levels of Civic engagement were very low across both locations. A 15 point index
was used to measure civic engagement across a range of activities:

The average for Coventry was 2.2 and Nuneaton 1.2.

Males (1.7) significantly more engaged than Females (1.08) in Nuneaton.

Non-Whites were significantly more engaged than Whites in both locations
(2.34 compared with 1.96 respectively in Coventry; and 1.7 compared with
1.08 in Nuneaton).
Some young people in the in-depth interviews spoke of their experience in
participating on school councils as good training for democracy. A wide range of
views was expressed on demonstrations and ‘riots’ with concern being expressed
that the two were being conflated in the public’s eyes, and that it was risky to attend
one because one came to the notice of the police. Quite often interest in politics was
highest when issues were directly relevant, such as youth unemployment and
increases in student loans. A number spoke of their concern at the effects of
27
increasing austerity and public expenditure cuts, and the impact of benefit ‘reform’ on
young people.
4.4 Social Attitudes and Receptivity to Populism and Extremism
Negative attitudes to migrants and minorities are often associated with a tendency to
support more populist parties and movements on the right. Our research therefore
sought to explore the complex relationship between social attitudes and political
attachment. As might be expected we found a range of viewpoints, and in particular
(consistent with many of the other UK MYPLACE findings). social attitudes varied
significantly between the two sites. We are still analysing these results but the
pattern is one of a greater support for multiculturalism in Coventry than in Nuneaton,
but somewhat stronger support for women’s rights and Lesbian Gay, Bisexual and
Transgender (LGBT) rights in Nuneaton than Coventry. While there is a danger of
overgeneralising, there are nevertheless indications that both sets of attitudes were
significantly shaped by the fact that the Coventry sample was more ethnically diverse
and the Nuneaton sample more ethnically ‘white British’. However this does not
account for the fact that attitudes vary considerably among individuals across
communities, an issue we will explore by drilling down further into the data.
Attitudes towards roles in society and homosexuality (% of respondents stating
agree or strongly agree)
Coventry
Nuneaton
12%
4%
Women make as good political leaders as men
72%
81%
Homosexuality is ‘unnatural’
33%
15%
Same sex couples should be able to adopt children
55%
80%
When jobs are scarce, men should have more right
to a job than women
Overall, there was strong support among many respondents in both cities for
principles of equality and democracy. However, a striking finding was that though
some young people, particularly in the ‘white working class’ setting of Nuneaton
expressed social views favourable to right wing populist politics it was rare for them
28
to express active support for them. This can be either regarded complacently as
reassuring or, as we argue in the policy implications section, seen as a wake-up call.
Overall levels of support for right wing populism and political extremism were low.
There were some differences in the sample along the lines of:

More males reported support for populism than females;

Greater support in Coventry for tolerance towards religious minorities;

Stronger support for LGBT rights in Nuneaton than Coventry, and in both
females and Catholics (but not Muslims) are more supportive;

Those of a higher social class are more politically involved and liberal, with
less support for populist views;

Young people from a non-white background are more positive towards
Roma, Gypsies and Travellers than white respondents;

While 40% of respondents overall support stricter border controls and
restrictions on immigration, the number supporting this was significantly
higher in Nuneaton than Coventry.
Attitudes towards minority groups (% of respondents stating agree or strongly agree)
Coventry
Nuneaton
20
14
46
52
during the Holocaust
25
13
Jewish people make an important contribution to society
50
38
Muslims make a positive contribution to society
55
41
It is right to be suspicious of Muslims
11
20
Roma, Gypsies and travellers make a positive
contribution to society
The police should be stricter with Roma / Gypsies / travellers
Jewish people talk too much about what happened to them
Overall the research shows that while generally the findings indicate a substantial
interest in politics, lack of trust of politicians, and low support for far right or radical
left movements, there are significant local variations shaped by the complex interplay
of forces associated with on the one hand a relatively isolated former industrial town
and an inner-city location in an urban centre. The findings therefore highlight the
29
importance of contextual factors in shaping young people’s responses, and also the
importance of developing intervention strategies that take full account of them
One distinctive feature of attitudes to democracy was their somewhat contradictory
nature, though it is not clear whether this is linked to underlying authoritarian
attitudes or lack of political knowledge. Either way, it gives some cause for concern.
Views of political systems (% of respondents stating very good and fairly good)
Coventry Nuneaton
Having a strong leader who is not constrained by parliament
52
61
Having a democratic, multi-party system
67
59
Having the army rule
20
35
Having an opposition that can freely express its views
79
74
Thus:

Young people in both Coventry (67%) and Nuneaton (59%) support a
‘democratic multi-party system’;

However they do this at the same time as expressing support for ‘a strong
leader not constrained by parliament, 52% in Coventry and 61% in Nuneaton;

While lower numbers support army rule this is significantly higher in Nuneaton
(35%) than Coventry (20%).
Given that the English Defence League (EDL) was seeking to gain recruits at the
time of our research, and that Nuneaton has an army barracks, the above findings
are not perhaps surprising, but there was however very little support for the EDL and
even some concern expressed that Nuneaton was becoming stigmatized as an ‘EDL
town’. The stronger ‘negative’ social attitudes and potential support for more
authoritarian politics, is also an indication of the stronger sense of disillusion with
politics in Nuneaton and a reflection of the frustration that young people express
concerning their employment and other prospects associated, as mentioned above,
with living in what they regard as a ‘depressing present’. These themes come across
strongly in both the memory research with the Herbert Art Gallery and Museum and
the qualitative in-depth interviews.
30
The differences between Coventry and Nuneaton reflect their contrasting urban
settings and the cultural dynamics associated with these, as well as the more
material differences in the different opportunities open to them. Thus young people in
Coventry were more likely in the qualitative in-depth interviews to appreciate its
multicultural identity, while young people in Nuneaton often expressed concerns
about austerity and a lack of job opportunities, and some expressed a desire to
move away. In both there was concern about street and domestic violence, and
perceptions of living in stigmatised areas, which despite the urban regeneration
schemes of the 1997-2010 Labour government, were perceived to be in a continuing
state of decline.
31
5 Working from Evidence to Policy
Engaging young’s interest in politics, providing them with meaningful ways of
participating, and responding to their legitimate expressed concerns, is centrally
important to the future health of our democracy and society at large. Our UK study of
young people in Coventry and Nuneaton gives some cause for optimism but also
identifies urgent issues that policy makers need to address. Although local
contextual factors were significant, what we found is not unique to the two areas we
studied as Henn and Ford’s (2013) nationwide research into the UK 2010 general
election showed, many of whose findings regarding young people’s orientation to
politics generally correspond with our own. Our research was also able to put this
into comparative context across contrasting localities in 14 European countries, thee
full results of which can be found at http://www.fp7-myplace.eu/deliverables.php
While the ‘fundamental’ nature of our research does not point to specific policy
solutions, there are substantial policy indications:

On the positive side, a substantial number of young people are interested
in politics and engaged in a wide range of political and civic activities, and
there is commitment to principles of equality diversity.

On the more troubling side, while very few young people express support
for populist and extremist politics, some of the potential attitudes for
mobilising it exist, in terms of a widespread lack of trust in politics,
politicians and political institutions for many young people, and a mixed
pattern of tolerance for minorities and social difference.

In summary young people feel increasingly marginalised in the two urban
centres, and not able to significantly influence political decisions in their
favour. Especially in Nuneaton young people felt set adrift by society,
condemned to live in a perpetual ‘depressing present’ with little hope for
the future.

Our research has shown that there are political, economic and cultural
discontents among young people that need to be addressed, including
o High levels of youth unemployment
o Access to higher education and rewarding graduate careers
32
o Poverty and increasing inequality.

We would argue therefore that the responsibility lies not so much with
problematizing ‘apathetic’ or ‘rebellious’ young people, rather policy
makers to take concerted action to restore the faith that seems to be
draining away.
Thus while young people have problems, they are not necessarily the problem.
Rather our evidence points to the need for politicians to look to themselves and
respond to these messages coming from young people. They point to a need for
politicians to both improve the upwards and downwards channels of communication
between young people and politicians (particularly the former) as well as achieve a
better outcome on social justice, poverty and equality issues in general, and
intergenerational justice issues in particular. The evidence points to the disillusion
that comes both from the style of politics and the fact that it has become
professionalised and technocratic. There has arguably been a decline
If young
people do not feel they are able to influence the political system this may not be just
a question of age justice. Many of the young people felt as we have seen that the
rich and powerful have too much influence over politics. This corresponds to what
some call ‘corporate capture’ of politics and regulatory institutions at national and
international levels, which is arguably far advanced in the UK (Monbiot, 2013).
Thus youth marginalisation is not solely a problem of intergenerational political
justice, but part of a more general ‘crisis’ in political representation in neoliberal
societies, which the Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR) characterise as the
problem of ‘political inequality’ (Birch, Gottfried, and Lodge, 2013). However
whatever the merits or demerits of their key proposal to make voting compulsory to
ensure marginalised and ‘hard to reach’ groups are represented, with a ‘none of the
above’ option on ballot papers, it does not seem to go to the root of this problem,
though compulsory registration through educational institutions as advocated by the
Political Studies Association report (Mycock and Tonge, 2014) would undoubtedly be
facilitative. It would however have to reverse the individualised arrangements that
have been put in place for the 2015 election. Certainly, widespread citizens concerns
that current democracy is not working underpin the rise of both right and left wing
populism in Europe which if not addressed involve clear risks for the future
legitimacy and flourishing of democracy. This is confirmed by the MYPLACE
33
ethnographic case studies of UK Feminista, the English Defence League and
Occupy Movement which shows how this was felt by young people across the
political spectrum.
The comparative results from other MYPLACE sites across Europe are displayed in
three figures in the Appendix to this Report. Chart 1 on page 37 below shows that
taken together, the two UK localities had the lowest levels of voting in general
elections by young people of any other country locations. Chart 2 on page 38 also
shows that similarly to other countries, young people in the UK have relatively low
levels of trust in political institutions. However, in some contrast to this, Chart 3
on page 39 below shows that though levels of participation in formal politics was
relatively low it was high by comparison with many other MYPLACE locations,
though not surprisingly we found that this was much higher in the more dynamic and
cosmopolitan urban centre of Coventry, than the more economically blighted town of
Nuneaton.
One of the most urgent issues course to address is the declining levels of voting
among young people which some argue is not helped when influential celebrities like
Russell Brand portray it as ‘cool’ (Brand, 2013). However it is possible to argue that
following Brand’s interview with Jeremy Paxman on Newsnight a more concerted
and urgent debate about young people’s participation has opened up (e.g. Owen,
2015). One way in which Brand’s stance does resonate with the MYPLACE
research, is our finding that much of young people’s declining voting turnout is not
due to apathy but alienation from politicians and political institutions.
In fact there is strong evidence that voting can make a difference, and that young
people are disadvantaging themselves but not participating, for example in the fact
that the UK Coalition government’s Spring 2014 Budget was perceived as
specifically targeted on better off older people who are more likely to vote (Toynbee,
2014). Clearly even in an age of austerity political choices are made by politicians in
response to perceived pressures from different sections of the population. Thus
more damaging cuts have been made to youth services relative to other spending
areas, which are likely to impact negatively on the social and political inclusion of
marginalised young people.
34
Therefore policy needs to address a vicious circle in which politicians feel they can
safely largely ignore young people, unless they became threats that need to be
‘kettled’, who in response become further alienated from politics as a means of
addressing their felt problems. We need to replace the vicious with a virtuous circle
in which politicians show they address young people’s concerns, view their political
mobilisation as positive, do not take overly repressive actions that alienate them, and
encourage all means possible to enable young people to register to vote and actively
exercise voting power.
We have put the promotion of voting last because it can only work effectively if the
other mechanisms to ‘keep the circle moving’ are in place. In March 2014 the
Electoral Commission advocated measures to enable young people to vote more
easily such as same-day registration and e-voting (Mason, 2014). While our
evidence suggestions that the current system of voting does confuse some young
people and creates barriers to their participation, it also clearly indicates that they
have much deeper concerns with the current democratic system and society. A
holistic approach rather than a ‘technological fix’ is therefore required. For this
reason we have raised doubts about the IPPR’s proposal for compulsory voting. This
is not to deny that measures such as reducing the voting age from 18 to 16 might
make an impact. It did so in the context of the 2014 Scotland Referendum, but this
was in a context where people were presented with real choices and engagement
was facilitated in non-traditional as well as traditional ways.
Other policy pointers from our evidence include the following:

While responsibility for listening and responding to young people’s
concerns lies with politicians and political institutions, young people also
need to be encouraged to politically mobilise to make their concerns felt;

There is a demand by young people for improved political education in
schools and colleges in order for them to reach views and take appropriate
action;
35

Where schools and colleges, and local councils through ‘democracy’
projects and other initiatives provided opportunities for democratic
participation, this was appreciated by young people and deemed effective.
We have not presented a shopping list of possible policies. Rather our research has
sought to sound both an alarm bell about the extent of disaffection of young people’s
disaffection but also the positive possibilities that are indicated for breaking the
vicious circle we have identified. Society cannot renew itself or flourish if the
enthusiasm and commitment of the young is not allowed to express itself or make its’
influence felt. In other words, the issues we have identified are not relatively minor
questions that require fairly easy adjustment, but rather a radical rethink of how we
create a meaningful democracy for all that is fit for purpose. We are pleased to see
that there is a growing concern and public debate about such issues, to which our
research will helpfully contribute both deeper understanding and a broad approach to
policy. This includes the lucid and thought-provoking by Gould (2015), which strikes
an excellent balance between generating a sense of alarm and also of possibility. It
also includes the more specifically policy focused report edited for the Political
Studies Association by Mycock and Tonge (2014). This advocates a range of
proposals which are consistent with the points we have made above on how to
improve create better ‘education for democracy’ and responsiveness by the political
system itself. This includes lowering the voting age to 16 years and (as we have
already seen) compulsory registration of voting. However we are not certain that
these measures in themselves, though steps in the right direction, would address the
wider points about the procedural health of democracy and substantive lack of
responsiveness to pressing social problems of precarity and a ‘depressing present’
through adherence to a general austerity politics. Linking the more immediate
procedural political changes that can be made to the broader issues of our
economic, political and social future is the theme of the edited collection Resist
which seeks to develop ideas for tackling the central issue of a ‘precarious’ future
(Filar, 2015).
In conclusion: we would be very interested in taking these issues further with those
generating this crucially important debate, particularly on how our evidence might
contribute through dialogue and discussion to a broader and more hopeful social and
political agenda that places young people at the centre.
36
APPENDIX: MYPLACE Comparative Evidence on Young People’s Voting
Behaviour, Political Trust and Participation in Formal Politics
Chart 1: Voting in National Elections by Location
37
Chart 2: Trust in Political Institutions by Location
38
Chart 3: Participation in Formal Politics by Location
39
References
Boffey, D. (2015) ‘Youth Unemployment Rate is Worst for 20 Years, Compared with
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