Final Version – October 11, 2011
Coordinating Child Protection Responses in Emergencies
Lessons learned for Child Protection Sub-Clusters
Since the advent of the Humanitarian Reforms in 2005, the IASC Cluster Approach has been implemented in 43
countries (31 countries with Humanitarian Coordinators, 12 with Resident Coordinators). In over 20 of these,
Child Protection Sub-Clusters have been formally established as Areas of Responsibility within the Protection
Cluster. Even though each Child Protection response is unique, each brings with it new learning for the
coordination of emergency Child Protection responses more widely. The purpose of this brief is to present a
compilation of the main lessons learned for Child Protection Coordination identified over the years.
Methodology
The lessons captured below were identified through a desk review of evaluations, reviews and exit interviews
with Child Protection Coordinators. Resources consulted are listed at the end of the document. With regards
to the individual lessons listed below, the sources most relevant are listed in parentheses after the point
raised. The categories used to summarise the lessons learned below are derived from the overall objectives of
the Cluster Approach as outlined in the IASC Guidance Note for the Cluster Approach. These include:
 Leadership
 Partnership and Cohesiveness
 Ownership and Connectedness
 Advocacy and Resource Mobilisation
 Accountability
 Cluster support and guidance
Leadership: Lessons learned
The Cluster approach is designed to improve humanitarian response by clearly designating lead organizations
to establish coordination mechanisms, ensure the complementarity of responses, ensure adequate resources
to support the work of the Cluster including human resources, ensure links with other sectors, ensure
attention to cross-cutting issues and act as providers of last resort.
Coordination Capacity
 Humanitarian Child Protection responses with dedicated full-time CP Sub-Cluster Coordinators were
found to be more successful in achieving the overall objectives of the Sub-Cluster than those without
full-time dedicated Coordinators. (Learning from Haiti, Afghanistan, Myanmar, Uganda, Pakistan, Kenya,
Yemen, Mozambique, Cluster 2 Evaluation and 2008 Inter-agency Review of CP Coordination)
 Many Clusters have dedicated Coordinators at national, but not a sub-national level, where in most
cases the main operational coordination tasks arise. Where sub-national level Coordinators are in place,
they are often tasked with two roles, as Programme Officer as well as Coordinator, which is not only
challenging but has been shown to be less effective. (Learning from Cluster 2 Evaluation and Haiti exit
interviews)
 Many Clusters are not managed effectively enough and Cluster Coordinators often do not have enough
time for all the tasks assigned, insufficient coordination skills and/or experience of coordination.
(Learning from Cluster 2 Evaluation)
 Elements of a good Cluster Coordinator role are not necessarily just technical expertise but also
diplomacy, strong facilitation skills and coordination experience. In addition, being an effective listener,
showing members that they are treated equally and in a transparent manner, and being a team-player
able to delegate tasks are elements that have been highlighted. (Learning from Haiti and Pakistan exit
interviews)
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 In contexts where strong, traditional, agency-centric leadership styles were adopted by Coordinators,
Cluster lead agencies were unsuccessful in building strong inter-agency coordination mechanisms.
(Learning from Kenya)
 One aspect which has been shown to determine whether a Cluster is participatory or not is the
Coordinator’s style of chairing. Participation is a two-way street and members need to feel comfortable
in assuming an active role for it to work well. (Learning from Mozambique)
Information Management Capacity
 Ensuring adequate capacity for information management is an additional area of responsibility for
Cluster lead agencies that is often overlooked or inadequately addressed. (Learning from Cluster 2
Evaluation, Haiti, Philippines)
 In many contexts, the Cluster approach is said to improve information sharing but information
management remains weak with information either getting lost or not being shared in a timely manner.
(Learning from Cluster 2 Evaluation Haiti)
Structure of the Sub-Cluster
 Although various models exist for the structure of CP Sub-Clusters, what has been identified across the
board is that the more clearly identifiable the CP structure is, in terms of objectives, set-up and terms of
reference, and the clearer the links to other Clusters are, the more likely the Child Protection response
will be complementary to the overall Protection response. (Learning from 2008 Inter-agency Review of
CP Coordination)
 To avoid working in silos, duplicating work and to strengthen local capacity, it is important to build upon
existing coordination structures in-country when establishing a CP Sub-Cluster. In doing so, however, it
is important to ensure that these structures are able to embody an emergency approach reflecting a
sense of urgency and emergency priorities which might be slightly different to development ones.
(Learning from Afghanistan)
 Structures that involve a national level Sub-Cluster and field-level Sub-Clusters covering designated
areas were identified as more effective than one single national level Sub-Cluster alone. (Learning from
Myanmar, Kenya, Uganda, Cluster 2 Evaluation)
 Although field-based coordination structures can be successful in coordinating field operations, without
a clear communication architecture involving information sharing with the national level coordination
structures, Child Protection actors overall are less able to track trends, identify common concerns
across operational areas and develop more upstream advocacy and programming strategies. (Learning
from Uganda, Kenya, Afghanistan, Yemen)
 Centralized decision-making for all decisions, even operational ones that are better taken closer to
where they impact, can slow the pace of response. (Learning from Cluster 2 Evaluation, DRC)
Co-Chairing and Co-Leading Arrangements
 CP Sub-Cluster Co-lead arrangements with NGOs were identified as having positive effects on
partnership. NGO Co-leads improved the quality of Cluster activities in a number of contexts. (Learning
from Cluster 2 Evaluation, Myanmar)
 UN and NGO Co-chair arrangements play a positive role in creating more equal partnership within the
Cluster and facilitating increased ownership between NGO members. In addition, Co-chairs are
perceived to limit the potential conflicts of interest, reduce problems related to a lack of consistency
with high turnover in Cluster leads, and increase the possibility of Cluster leads spending time in the
field. (Learning from Myanmar, Cluster 2 Evaluation)
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 The link between the Cluster approach and UN peacekeeping missions is often weak, unclear and
creates challenges for Clusters on the ground. In some contexts, the Protection Cluster has faced
leadership problems as a consequence, because the responsibilities of integrated Cluster leads towards
UN peacekeeping missions and Cluster members are not clearly defined. According to evaluations in
Haiti and the DRC, non-UN agencies tend to view unfavourably the idea of integrated Cluster leads.
(Learning from Cluster 2 Evaluation, Haiti and echoed in DRC)
Gap filling and Coverage of Response
 The Cluster approach can help to better identify gaps and areas of duplication but there is little
evidence for Sub-Clusters filling gaps and increasing coverage. (Learning from Myanmar)
 Attempts by Clusters to fill gaps identified and improve the geographical coverage of the response are
often hampered by access problems; lack of funds; difficulties to prioritize needs; weak provider of last
resort; lack of inclusion of relevant stakeholders. (Learning from Cluster 2 Evaluation)
 In contexts where the basic core Cluster activities are not successfully completed, including completing
a Who, What, Where (3W) overview, and developing a joint strategy, the Sub-Cluster’s ability to
effectively identify and respond to geographic and programmatic gaps is hindered. (Learning from
Kenya)
Partnership and Cohesiveness: Lessons learned
The Cluster approach is intended to strengthen humanitarian response by supporting the work of
humanitarian actors as equal partners (as defined in the Principles of Partnership), strengthening the
coherence of their policies, carrying out joint activities and ensuring compliance with minimum standards.
Clusters were created to enhance partnership and coherence both within and among Clusters.
CP Sub-Cluster Membership
 Although strong partnership alone does not ensure a successful Sub-Cluster response, poor partnership
clearly undermines joint decision making and limits the group’s ability to effectively identify and
respond to programmatic and geographic gaps. (Learning from Kenya, Haiti)
 Active steps need to be taken from the beginning to support the involvement of a diverse range of Child
Protection actors in the CP Sub-Cluster. These steps, which may be related to transport, location of
meetings, information reaching actors, etc., may be viewed as seemingly ‘small’, but have shown to
make a critical difference in the participation of various CP actors. (Learning from Haiti, Myanmar,
Kenya, Afghanistan)
 A challenge for Sub-Clusters remains the better inclusion of national/local actors. In some contexts the
Cluster approach is viewed by national/local actors as isolationist in the first months after
establishment and in other contexts it remains so throughout the lifeline of the Cluster. In these
contexts, the Sub-Cluster does not play a role in mobilisation of NGOs and other actors to respond.
(Learning from Cluster 2 Evaluation, Myanmar, Afghanistan, Mozambique)
 Clearly defining roles and responsibilities of the CP Sub-Cluster members has shown to be an effective
way of avoiding tension build up between Sub-Cluster members and the creation of false expectations.
(Learning from Haiti)
 When Clusters maintain close relationships to integrated missions, peacekeeping forces or actors
involved in a conflict, the humanitarian principles of independence, impartiality and neutrality can be
threatened. This can contribute to an erosion of humanitarian space and make humanitarian actors
who see themselves as independent reluctant to engage in Clusters. (Learning from Cluster 2
Evaluation)
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CP Sub-Cluster Needs Assessments
 When carrying out an inter-agency assessment, the engagement of all Sub-Cluster members should be
encouraged especially in terms of design, inputting from the local cultural perspective and
acknowledging the results for collective use and benefit. A working group for the assessment should be
encouraged. (Learning from Pakistan exit interview)
 When a CP Sub-Cluster rapid assessment is carried out in partnership with the Protection Cluster, it
should be ensured that the technical areas of both are sufficiently covered and that the technical
expertise of both are reflected in all aspects of the design, implementation of the assessment,
preparation of the report and its dissemination. In the Pakistan flood response, disagreements between
assessment methodologies and questions to include in the tool caused unnecessary delay. (Learning
from Pakistan exit interview)
Sub-Cluster Strategy Development
 Although information sharing is a central role of the Sub-Cluster, the Sub-Cluster should not shy away
from using the opportunity of going beyond problem identification into being more of a strategic
decision-making body. Experience shows that Sub-Clusters that do not move from information sharing
to developing strategic response plans face the risk of losing momentum and the interest of Sub-Cluster
members. (Learning from Afghanistan, Myanmar, Kenya)
 It is challenging for a Sub-Cluster to get the balance right between focusing on programming and
enhancing the capacity of Sub-Cluster members to effectively carry out the programming. In some
contexts, evaluations found that Sub-Clusters focused too much on capacity building and too little on
actual programming. (Learning from Kenya)
 In many contexts, CP Sub-Clusters have missed the opportunity for integrated protection programming
with the Protection Cluster members including the other Areas of Responsibility. For example in
Uganda, one of the weaknesses of the response raised was the lack of common activities and
interaction between the CP Sub-Cluster, the GBV Sub-Cluster, and the overall Protection Cluster.
(Learning from Myanmar, Uganda and 2008 Inter-agency Review of CP Coordination)
 The CP Sub-Cluster in Uganda provides a good practice example of the development of an inter-agency
child protection response strategy built upon a referral system involving NGOs and Government
representatives in different parts of the country. The standards and guidelines adopted by the SubCluster are endorsed by the Government of Uganda, who is currently considering how to roll out the
approach in non-affected areas of the country. Similarly, in Afghanistan, a Government-led provincial
and national Child Protection Action Network was established involving key actors. (Learning from
Uganda, Afghanistan)
Intra- and inter-Cluster Coordination
 The relationship between, and the individual personalities of, the Protection Cluster Coordinator and
the CP Sub-Cluster Coordinator are key factors in determining the quality of the response but also the
risks, opportunities and added-value for Child Protection within the Protection Cluster. (Learning from
Pakistan, DRC and Uganda)
 Protection issues are often seen as being more political than child protection issues. This leads in many
contexts to the Protection Cluster having less involvement with Government than the CP Sub-Cluster. In
some contexts, the CP Sub-Cluster will have a government counterpart whereas the Protection Cluster
may not. (Learning from Philippines, Pakistan, DRC and Uganda)
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Ownership and Connectedness: Lessons learned
Clusters are meant to increase ownership and the connectedness of humanitarian responses by building on
local capacities, ensuring appropriate links, coordination and information exchange with national and local
authorities, state institutions and civil society organizations. Strong ownership and connectedness facilitate
the transition from relief to development and ensure that achievements can be sustained. Connectedness also
refers to the link with other actors in the country, for example development actors and peacekeeping forces.
Government involvement with Sub-Clusters
 Developing constructive working relationships with the Government within the coordination
mechanism can be key in influencing Government policy, promoting good practice and ensuring
support for emergency and recovery protection programmes. (Learning from Myanmar)
 Even in difficult circumstances, the CP Sub-Cluster must find ways creatively and sensitively to engage
the government with the work of the Sub-Cluster. Failing to do this will have long term consequences in
terms of ownership and the overall systems building effort of Child Protection actors. (Learning from
Haiti)
 Government involvement in the Sub-Cluster meetings does not only have to pertain to Co-chairing. In
situations where the government is not able to Co-chair the meetings alternatives such as chairing
every second or third meeting, briefings before/after meetings, or attendance at strategic meetings
only have been helpful to pursue to ensure involvement given capacity constraints. (Learning from
Haiti, Myanmar)
 In contexts where Clusters did not reach out to important stakeholders including national NGOs, the
government and donors and were viewed as exclusive for non-members, this weakened local
ownership, created tensions with the government and undermined sustainable solutions to “build back
better.” In cases where the Clusters had successful links with the government and civil society actors,
more positive results were achieved. (Learning from Cluster 2 Evaluation, Haiti)
 One strength of the Cluster approach lies in bringing together a large number of humanitarian actors to
develop and implement coherent strategies. However, by strengthening international leadership, it can
risk taking away (a sense of) responsibility from the government and undermining existing local capacity
(e.g. local coordination mechanisms). (Learning from Cluster 2 Evaluation)
 The CP Sub-Cluster has in some contexts managed to increase the sense of national ownership over the
child protection response and has enhanced the Government’s sense of responsibility towards
vulnerable children in their communities through close working relationships. (Learning from Uganda)
Advocacy and Resource Mobilisation: Lessons learned
Each Cluster should identify core advocacy concerns, including resource requirements, contribute key
messages to broader advocacy initiatives of the HC and other actors, and advocate for donors to fund
humanitarian actors to carry out priority activities. Clusters are intended to complement and strengthen the
other reform pillars, namely the Humanitarian Coordinator system, and funding mechanisms like the Central
Emergency Response Fund (CERF), pooled funding mechanisms and the Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP).
Sub-Cluster Advocacy and Representation
 Experience has shown that the Protection Cluster Coordinators in some contexts have either been not
able or not willing to champion child protection concerns as part of the wider protection concerns. As a
way to address this, it is important to create the possibility of direct representation by the CP SubCluster Coordinator in intra-Cluster fora and externally, in order to achieve efficient communication and
advocacy on Child Protection priorities both as a discreet set of concerns and as part of the broader
protection picture. (Learning from Kenya, Pakistan, DRC, Uganda)
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 Although Coordinators are often aware of their responsibilities to represent the views of the CP SubCluster to the wider Protection Cluster and the Humanitarian Country Team, one aspect that is
overlooked is the feeding back to Sub-Cluster members what was discussed or agreed at the wider
Protection Cluster and/or HCT meetings. (Learning from Myanmar)
Resource mobilisation
 In many contexts, Cluster members have little understanding about the CAP and CERF funding
mechanisms. This led to tensions between Cluster members and UN Cluster lead agencies. (Learning
from Cluster 2 Evaluation Myanmar)
Accountability: Lessons learned
The Cluster approach is meant to strengthen the accountability of humanitarian response. Accountability
includes the formal accountability of Cluster lead agencies to the Humanitarian Coordinator; the informal
accountability of humanitarian organizations to their peers for meeting their responsibilities and adhering to
relevant national and international standards; and accountability to affected populations.
Accountability to HC, Peers and the Affected Population
 Accountability overall within the Cluster approach remains weak in many contexts because roles and
responsibilities between the different levels (national, provincial, district) are unclear, and because
there is little monitoring and evaluation of Cluster activities. (Learning from Cluster 2 Evaluation DRC)
 In many contexts, there are very low levels of accountability of Cluster leads to the Humanitarian
Coordinator, particularly because the link between the Cluster approach and the Humanitarian
Coordinator system remains loose. (Learning from Cluster 2 Evaluation Haiti)
 In many contexts, Clusters have not been shown to promote participatory approaches or accountability
toward affected populations. (Cluster 2 Evaluation, Haiti, Mozambique)
 Positive small steps toward peer accountability have been taken in a number of Sub-Clusters, but this is
not always the case. (Learning from Cluster 2 Evaluation Haiti)
 When Cluster members are financially dependent on Cluster lead organizations, the humanitarian
principles of independence, impartiality and neutrality can be threatened. (Learning from Cluster 2
Evaluation)
Monitoring and Evaluation
 In terms of monitoring quality, Clusters often do not play a major role in quality control. One difficulty
cited for this is that there are often no agreed benchmarks for individual Clusters or Sub-Clusters.
(Learning from Mozambique)
 The need exists for rigorous monitoring and evaluation frameworks to be established and used by CP
Sub-Clusters and their members; something that is echoed more widely by Cluster evaluations. In
addition, when M&E frameworks have been set up, they have tended to focus on cluster performance
and activities alone and are not really designed to measure impact of the (Sub-)Cluster activities on the
care and protection of children. This needs to be addressed. (Learning from Uganda, Kenya and 2008
Inter-agency Review of CP Coordination)
Provider of Last Resort
 Cluster lead agencies in most cases act as an "advisor of last resort", but not as a "provider of last
resort". Financial resources are usually cited for the main reason behind this. (Learning from Cluster 2
Evaluation Myanmar)
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Cluster support and Guidance: Lessons learned
Global level Clusters are intended to support humanitarian responses by providing guidance, developing
standards and policies, building response capacity and providing operational support.
IASC Guidance for Clusters
 Although it is encouraged in most contexts, there is limited guidance available on Co-chairing
coordination mechanisms, including different modalities of co-chairing and what the organisational
commitments are for agencies agreeing to co-chair. There is a clear need for formal guidance on good
models. (Learning from Myanmar)
 There is no clear set of criteria for the activation and transitioning of Clusters in the context of
reoccurring natural disasters. This undermines participation and promotes emergency thinking outside
of emergencies. (Learning from Cluster 2 Evaluation Haiti)
 There is no guidance available on the relationship between the Cluster approach and UN peacekeeping
missions. (Learning from Cluster 2 Evaluation Haiti and echoed in DRC)
 There is a lack of institutional support and guidance on the application and implementation of the
‘Provider of Last Resort’ responsibility for Cluster lead agencies. (Learning from Myanmar)
Global CPWG Support and Guidance
 The Global CPWG can play an important role in reducing the burden on CP Sub-Cluster Coordinators by
assisting with the development of inter-agency advocacy messages, sharing best practice, etc. (Learning
from Haiti)
 In many contexts it was noted that there is limited knowledge about the possibility of receiving
coordination support from the Global level. (Learning from Cluster 2 Evaluation oPt)
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References
Binder, A. and Grünewald, F. (2010), IASC Cluster 2 Evaluation, Country Study: Haiti. GPPI and URD.
Binder, A. de Geoffroy, V. and Sokpoh, B. (2010), IASC Cluster 2 Evaluation, Country Study: DRC. GPPI and URD.
Cosgrave, J., Goncalves, C., Martyris, D., Polastro, R. And Sikumba-Dils, M. (2007), Inter-agency Real Time
Evaluation of the Response to the February 2007 Floods and Cyclone in Mozambique.
Global CPWG (2010), Key findings of the global Child Protection Working Group (CPWG) learning and support
mission to Haiti.
Global CPWG (2008), Inter-Agency Review and Documentation: Uganda’s Child Protection Sub-Cluster, Briefing
Document.
Global Child Protection Working Group (2008), Child Protection Coordination within the Cluster Approach: An
Inter-agency Survey.
Global Child Protection Working Group (2009), A small-scale review of coordination of Child Protection: Key
Findings.
Global Protection Cluster (2010), Mission to Afghanistan: November 11-15, 2010.
Global Protection Cluster (2010), Mission to Yemen: October 1-9, 2010.
Hassan, T. (2008), Review of UNICEF’s Child Protection Leadership Performance under the Cluster Approach in
Kenya’s Post Election Violence.
Kauffmann, D. and Krüger, S. (2010), IASC Cluster 2 Evaluation, Country Study: Myanmar. GPPI and URD.
Krüger, S. and Streets, J. (2010), IASC Cluster 2 Evaluation, Country Study: oPt. GPPI and URD.
Polastro, R., Roa, B. and Steen, N. (2010), Inter-agency Real Time Evaluation of the Humanitarian Response to
Typhoons Ketsana and Parma in the Philippines. DARA.
Save the Children Sweden (2010), Exit interview: Haiti Emergency Response.
Save the Children Sweden (2010), Exit interview: Pakistan Emergency Response.
Stoddard, A., Harmer, A., Haver, K., Salomons, D., Wheeler, V. (2007), Cluster Approach Evaluation. ODI
Streets, J. and Grünewald, F. (2010), IASC Cluster 2 Evaluation, Country Study: Uganda. GPPI and URD.
Streets, J. et al. (2010), IASC Cluster 2 Evaluation: Synthesis Report. GPPI and URD.
UNICEF (2010), Exit interview: Haiti Emergency Response.
UNICEF, UNFPA, Save the Children (2008), Inter-agency Review of the Myanmar Protection of Children and
Women Cluster Response to Cyclone Nargis.
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