Working Paper
HIGH, HOT and HEAVY:
THE CH-47 CHINOOK IN COMBAT ASSAULT OPERATIONS IN AFGHANISTAN
Peter W. Connors, PhD
8165906821
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HIGH, HOT and HEAVY:
THE CH-47 CHINOOK IN COMBAT ASSAULT OPERATIONS IN AFGHANISTAN
Table of Contents
Chapter 1: Introduction………
Chapter 2: A Brief History of US Army Air Assault Doctrine……..
Chapter 3: Operation ANACONDA Would Not Have Occurred Without the Chinook…….
Chapter 4: High/Hot/Heavy Combat Air Assaults in Afghanistan 2002-2006……..
Chapter 5: High/Hot/Heavy Combat Air Assaults in Afghanistan 2007-2011……..
Chapter 6: Conclusion……..
Bibliography……….
Suggested List of Photographs……….
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HIGH, HOT and HEAVY:
THE CH-47 CHINOOK IN COMBAT ASSAULT OPERATIONS IN AFGHANISTAN
Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
The Expanding Role of US Army CH-47 Chinook Helicopters
“There sits the workhorse of the United States Army,” said Major General William T.
Crosby, pointing to a CH-47F Chinook helicopter on the ramp at the Boeing Rotorcraft Systems
facility in Ridley Park, Pennsylvania. “Everyone wants more,” Crosby – US Army Program
Executive Officer, Aviation – noted during ceremonies celebrating the 50th anniversary of the
Chinook’s first flight.1 Leanne Caret, Boeing Vice President of H-47 Programs, later remarked
“Chinooks plays a non-stop critical role in delivering people, equipment, and supplies to difficult
areas.”2 Because of their ability to function effectively in high density altitude environments and
to carry up to 50 fully-equipped Soldiers, CH-47s were increasingly utilized for combat air
assaults in both Operations ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) and IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF). For
their size, Chinooks are fast and agile, have power to spare even when operating at maximum
gross weight, and can “drop off a huge amount of fighting power in one swoop.”3
In Afghanistan, for example, inadequate roadways, mountainous terrain, and the threat of
IED attacks and ambushes, dictate that a significant percentage of personnel and equipment be
3
transported by air. In such an environment, Chinooks have become a critical asset in both
logistical and tactical operations. Because of the CH-47’s exceptional performance
characteristics in high altitude/high temperature conditions, its mission profile has expanded to
include air assaults, troop insertions, medical evacuations, and search/rescue operations. As a
result, the number of tactical missions undertaken by Chinook crews has increased steadily, since
other helicopters are often unable to operate effectively in the high/hot conditions typically
encountered in Afghanistan. “We have documented missions above 16,200 feet [and] any
mission above 10,000 feet in Afghanistan is going to be operated almost exclusively by a
Chinook because of the stability and the additional payload,” explained Mark Ballew, a 20-year
veteran CH-47 pilot with combat experience in Afghanistan and Iraq and Boeing’s current
Director of Business Development for Chinook Programs.4 Chinook pilots flew some of the first
OEF combat assault missions during Operation ANACONDA, as six CH-47s ferried 101st
Airborne Division and 10th Mountain Division Soldiers to blocking positions in the Shahi Kowt
Valley.5
Since the 1980s, the UH-60 “Blackhawk” has been the US Army’s designated combat
assault mission helicopter. Chinooks were relegated to transporting supplies and equipment. In
Afghanistan’s high altitude operating environment however, the CH-47, with its superior useful
load, greater service ceiling, and higher shaft horsepower engines, became the most reliable
means of reaching locations in mountainous terrain. For these same reasons, plus the fact that
Chinooks carry more troops and fly farther faster, Army commanders in Afghanistan soon
realized that CH-47s could also serve effectively as combat assault aircraft. Since a single CH47 can carry 40-50 fully-equipped combat Soldiers, one Chinook can successfully perform air
assault missions typically requiring four or five Blackhawks.6
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This Long War Occasional Paper is a comprehensive review of the US Army’s use of
CH-47 Chinook helicopters in OEF combat assault operations. The study will cover the period
2002-2011, focus on conventional forces only, and tell the story of how the CH-47 is tactically
employed beyond the scope of its original role as a rear area transport aircraft. The rationale for
this expanded role, the associated planning, and the preparations/training undertaken by US
Army heavy helicopter units will be described in detail. Successes, failures and other pertinent
observations will also be addressed and analyzed. To the extent possible, this paper will rely in
first hand data obtained through interviews with heavy combat aviation brigade, battalion, and
company commanders, staff planners at the US Army Infantry School, representatives from the
CH-47 Program Office at the US Army Aviation and Missile Command (AMCOM), personnel
from the Army Aviation Center at Fort Rucker, and Boeing Rotorcraft Systems management
team members; and from CH-47 unit After Action Reports available at AMCOM. As has been
clearly demonstrated in Afghanistan, superior performance specifications make the CH-47
Chinook the aircraft of choice for combat assault operations in high altitude/high temperature
environments.
CH-47 Chinook – History, Development, Specifications, and Performance Characteristics
Early Experimentation with Rotary Wing Concepts
Mankind’s fascination with rotary wing flight dates back more than two centuries to the
Chinese invention of light-weight flying devices that mimicked falling maple tree seeds.7 Not
until 1483 did Leonardo da Vinci, inspired by Archimedes’ water-screw, design the first
semblance of a helicopter-type flying device, referred to alternatively as a helical air screw, an
aerial screw, or an air gyroscope.8 In the margin of da Vinci’s design drawing were instructions
5
noting that the helical component of the craft be covered with linen “made air tight with starch
[and] rotated with speed that said screw bores through the air and climbs high.”9 Due in all
likelihood to the lack of an adequate contemporary power source, Da Vinci never built his flying
machine.10
During the 18th and 19th centuries, scientists and inventors experimented with various
methods for increasing the aerodynamic efficiency of rotor systems and with the development of
light-weight, more powerful, engines. In the United Kingdom, for example, Sir George Cayley
built flying models driven by rubber band-like devices and by clock-spring winding mechanisms.
Horace Phillips successfully flew small-scale steam powered machines that vented the steam
from the craft’s rotor blade tips. In 1861, Henry Bright patented a uniquely configured model
that featured two contra-rotating, co-axial, rotors mounted on a single vertical drive shaft.11
In France, former secretary of the French Aeronautical Society, Emmanuel Dieuaide, built
several steam-driven, twin rotor prototype systems; and Viscomte Gustave de Ponton
d’Amecourt, who first coined the term ‘helicoptere,’ experimented with steam power engines
and counter-rotating rotor blades. Meanwhile, German scientist Wilheim von Achenbach
developed the tail rotor concept to counteract main rotor torque and Russian electrical engineer
Alexander Lodygin conceived of the gyrocopter concept that utilized a rotating main rotor for lift
and a standard airplane propeller for thrust. In 1878, Italian civil engineer Enrico Forlanini built
a small steam-powered helicopter with dual counter-rotating rotors (similar to those of a CH-47)
that flew to an altitude of 40 feet. Finally, Thomas Edison built model helicopters to test
primitive internal combustion engines and electric motors as potential power sources in the
United States.12
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Twentieth Century Rotary Wing Developments
During the early 20th century, continuous improvements in the power-to-weight ratios of
gasoline fueled, internal combustion, reciprocating, engines made the prospects of genuine rotary
wing flight more practical and more promising. In 1921, the US Army awarded a classified
contract to Dr. George de Bothezad to design and build an experimental helicopter. The ‘Flying
Octopus,’ with four rotors and a single 180 horsepower engine, was first flown in December
1922 by Army Colonel Thurman Bane.13 Companies with familiar names in helicopter aviation
– Sikorsky, Piasecki, Hiller, Kaman, and Bell – subsequently emerged and began developing a
wide variety of rotary wing aircraft for testing and evaluation. Progress in helicopter design
progressed in Europe as well. One notable example is the first effective twin tandem rotor
machine built in 1933 by Nicolas Florine. Although both rotors on Florine’s helicopter turned
counter-clockwise, they were tilted in opposite directions to help counteract torque effects.14
Success of the Florine tandem rotor concept eventually led to the Piasecki Helicopter Company’s
design, development and production of the tandem H-21 ‘Flying Banana’ helicopter and
ultimately to the Boeing Rotorcraft Systems’ CH-47 Chinook.
Piasecki and Tandem Rotor Systems
In 1940, Frank Nicholas Piasecki, an aeronautical engineering graduate of the
Guggenheim School of Aeronautics at New York University, formed the PV Engineering Forum
with his partner Howard Venzie. The Forum concentrated initially on single rotor/tail rotor
helicopters, but in 1945, the company built the first US overlapping twin tandem rotor helicopter,
called the PV-3 ‘Dogship’ and designated the XHRP-1. PV Engineering became the Piasecki
Helicopter Company in 1946 and went on to build larger, more powerful, tandem rotor
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helicopters such as the H-21 and the HUP. Collectively by 1959, the US Air Force and US
Army had purchased 535 H-21 A, B, and C models – the H-21Cs having been designated
‘Shawnee’ by the Army. Piasecki also built 339 HUP helicopters for the US Navy, US Army
(H-25 ‘Mule’), and the French and Canadian navies. Success of the tandem rotor concept
transformed the helicopter from a small aerial observation vehicle to an aircraft with a wide
variety of military, commercial, and humanitarian applications. Piasecki Helicopter Company
was renamed Vertol Aircraft Corporation in 1956, after Frank Piasecki resigned following a
lengthy reorganization dispute.15
Emergence of Boeing-Vertol
Throughout the remainder of the 1950s, Vertol Aircraft continued developing tandem rotor
helicopters. Following acquisition in 1960, Vertol became a division of the Boeing Company.
Subsequently, the Boeing-Vertol Model 107, with two powerful gas-turbine (turboshaft) engines,
was purchased by the US Navy/Marine Corps and designated the CH-46 Sea Knight. By 1990,
601 Sea Knights had been produced and delivered to the Marines. In roughly the same
timeframe, the US Air Force, on behalf of the US Army, issued a contract to Boeing-Vertol for
the development of a prototype medium lift transport helicopter, described interchangeably as
Model 114 and/or the YHC-1B. Before test and evaluation was completed, Boeing-Vertol began
receiving orders for production versions of the Model 114, designated initially the HC-1B, and
by 1962, the CH-47A ‘Chinook.’ The maximum gross weight of the new Chinook was an
impressive 33,000 pounds, and later versions of the CH-47A were configured with dual
Lycoming T55-L-7 turbine engines rated at 2,650 shaft horsepower (shp) each. The first CH47A was delivered to Fort Rucker, Alabama in 1962, and by the following year, the Chinook was
declared the Army’s official medium transport helicopter. A total of 354 CH-47A helicopters
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had been built by Boeing-Vertol as of May 1967, when the upgraded CH-47B model entered
service.16
Chinook B and C Models
Boeing only produced 108 B model Chinooks before shifting production to the CH-47C at
the end of 1967. The CH-47B provided better performance, increased payload, and improved
stability over and above the original A models. The more powerful 2,850 shp T55-L-7C
turboshaft engines, for example, raised the aircraft’s maximum gross weight to 40,000 pounds
and increased cruise speed from 110 to 140 knots. Deliveries of the CH-47C began in 1968 and
once again this model offered improved performance characteristics beyond those of previous
models. Chinook C models were designed to meet a newly established Army requirement for
transporting a 15,000 lb. payload, over a distance of 30 miles, in temperature conditions up to
95° F, and at an altitude of 4,000 feet. Upgraded Textron Lycoming T55-L-11C engines, rated at
3,750 shp, increased the C model’s maximum gross weight to 46,000 lbs. and extended the
cruise speed to 150 knots. Eventually, Boeing-Vertol manufactured 270 CH-47Cs between 1968
and 1980. 17
Chinooks in the Vietnam War
All three versions of the Chinook – A, B, and C models – performed admirably during the
Vietnam conflict. CH-47s participated in night combat assaults, conducted countless resupply
missions, sling-loaded artillery pieces, and became indispensable in the establishment and
maintenance of dozens of fire support bases. Chinooks crews sprayed Agent Orange and
dropped napalm and tear gas on enemy facilities and troop concentrations. During the course of
the war, Chinooks also recovered more 10,000 downed fixed wing and rotary wing aircraft. In
9
1966, four Chinooks were converted to ACH-47As gunships that were configured with armor
protection and a formidable assortment of weapons systems, including M-75 40mm grenade
launchers, M-24 A1 20mm cannons, XM-159 2.75 in. forward firing rocket pods, M-18E1
7.62mm Miniguns, and M2 50 cal. or M-60D 7.62mm machine guns. In support of combat
operations during 1967, ACH-47s delivered devastating fire power on enemy targets. However
by 1968, three of the four gunships had been lost in accidents or to enemy action. With only one
ACH-47 remaining, the large armed helicopter gunship program was discontinued in favor of the
less expensive AH-1 Cobra attack helicopter initiative.18
Modernized D Model Chinooks
Following the Vietnam War, production of Chinooks decreased significantly. In 1976,
Boeing-Vertol began modifying and upgrading CH-47 A, B, and C models under an Army
contract designed to increase the aircraft’s reliability and maintainability, while reducing overall
operating and support costs. Modernized Chinooks, with 3,750 shp Textron Lycoming T55-L712 engines and a maximum gross weight of 50,000 lbs., were designated CH-47Ds and began
entering the Army inventory in 1982. During Gulf War I, D model Chinooks participated in the
largest aerial combat assault in history as US and Allied forces outflanked and cutoff Iraqi
soldiers retreating from Kuwait. CH-47Ds were also utilized extensively in Operations JOINT
ENDEAVOR, PROVIDE COMFORT, ENDURING FREEDOM, and IRAQI FREEDOM. A
total of 447 CH-47D helicopters were produced by Boeing-Vertol between 1982 and 1995.19
Special Operations Chinook Configurations
Beginning in the 1980s, Boeing converted 12 A and C model Chinooks to MH-47Ds. The
MH series aircraft were designed for special operations missions conducted by the Army’s 160th
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Special Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR) headquartered at Fort Campbell, KY. Typical
special operations missions often involve extended range, high-speed, night flights conducted in
adverse meteorological conditions at both extremely high and/or low (nap-of-the-earth) altitudes.
Boeing went on to produce 26 upgraded MH-47E and 62 MH-47G models. All of the G models
were built from reconfigured CH-47D, MH-47D, and MH-47E aircraft and incorporated highly
sophisticated satellite navigation/communications equipment, countermeasure systems, longrange fuel tanks, inflight refueling capability, terrain-following radar, Near Real Time
Intelligence Data (NRTID), and more efficient/more powerful T55-GA-714A engines. Further
discussions of MH series Chinooks and special operations will be limit since the focus of this
Long War Occasional Paper is restricted to conventional US Army operations only.20
Introduction of the CH-47F Series
The most recent addition to the Chinook lineup is the CH-47F series. The US Army
Modernization Program specifies a total of 464 F model Chinooks – 220 newly built and 244
remanufactured from retired CH-47Ds. First delivery of the F model occurred in late 2006, and
the aircraft was officially certified combat ready by July 2007. As of yearend 2011, Boeing had
produced and delivered to the Army approximately 160 CH-47 F helicopters. These newest
Chinook models are configured with a variety of significant upgrades, such as all glass cockpits
incorporating Common Avionics Architecture Systems (CAAS) and Digital Advanced Flight
Control Systems (DAFCS), along with two Honeywell T55-L-714A (4,733 shp – nearly double
the rating of the original CH-47A) engines, vibration-dampening fuselages, and modernized
cargo-handling equipment. The many impressive performance characteristics of the Chinook F
model include a 170 knot cruise speed, a 200 nautical mile mission radius, a service ceiling of
20,000 feet, a useful load of 24,000 lbs., and a maximum gross weight of 50,000 lbs. As the
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Army’s only heavy-lift transport helicopter, the advanced multi-mission CH-47F is scheduled to
remain in inventory well into the 2030s. Several Boeing Rotorcraft Systems executives have
speculated that the CH-47 Chinook may remain in the Army fleet for a century or more.21
Major General William Crosby quoted in Ann Roosevelt, “New Boeing Production Line Expects More, Less
Expensive, and high Quality CH-47Fs,” Defense Daily, Vol. 251, 21 September 2011, 3-4.
2
Leanne Caret quoted in Ann Roosevelt, “New Boeing Production Line Expects More, Less Expensive and high
Quality CH-47Fs,” Defense Daily, Vol. 251, 21 September 2011, 3-4.
3
James Warden, “Chinooks Take On More Air Assaults,” Stars and Stripes, 29 February 2008, 1-2.
4
Mark Ballew quoted in Eric Tegler, “High Ground: Boeing’s CH-47F Delivers Where Others Can’t,” Defense
Media Network Newsletter, 22 July 2011, 1-2.
5
Aircraft and crews were from (1) A Company, 7th Battalion, 101st Airborne Division, Fort Campbell, Kentucky,
and (2) B Company, 159th Aviation Regiment (Hunter Army Airfield), 18th Aviation Brigade, 18th Airborne Corps,
Fort Bragg, North Carolina. The principal ground units were (1) 3d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, and (2) 1st
Battalion, 87th Regiment, 10th Mountain Division. See Donald Wright et al., A Different Kind of War (Fort
Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2010), Ch. 6.
6
James Dunnigan, “Chinook Replaces Blackhawk in Combat,” StrategyWorld.com, 25 March 2008, 1,
http://www.strategypage.com/dls/articles/200832521247.asp (accessed 12 December 2011).
7
J. Gordon Leishman, Principles of Helicopter Aerodynamics (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006),
5-6; David Lentink et al., “Leading-Edge Vortices Elevate Lift of Autorotating Plant Seeds,” Science, 12 June 2009,
1438-1440; Nick Van Valkenburgh, Chinook – The Legacy of Tandem Rotor Helicopter (Huntsville, AL: US Army
Aviation and Missile Life Cycle Management Command (AMCOM), Cargo Helicopters Project Management
Office, 2011), 5.
8
Ivor Hart, The World of Leonardo da Vinci: Man of Science, Engineer, and Dreamer of Flight (London:
Macdonald Publishing Company, 1961), 356; “The Inventions of Leonardo da Vinci,” Linda Hall Library of
Science, Engineering, and Technology Exhibition, 27 October to 3 December 1994; Nick Van Valkenburgh,
Chinook – The Legacy of Tandem Rotor Helicopter (Huntsville, AL: US Army Aviation and Missile Life Cycle
Management Command (AMCOM), Cargo Helicopters Project Management Office, 2011), 5.
9
Leonardo da Vinci quoted in J. Gordon Leishman, “A History of Helicopter Flight,” extracts from the author’s
book, Principles of Helicopter Aerodynamics (First Edition, 2000), 3,
http://terpconnect.umd.edu/~leishman/Aero/history.html (accessed 17 January 2012).
10
Da Vinci may have intended to power his aerial screw machine by using four men to operate cranks that rotated
the central shaft and helical wing surfaces. See “Leonardo da Vinci Inventions: Helicopter (Aerial Screw),” provided
by InventHelp, 2008, 1, http://www.da-vinci-inventions.com/about.aspx (accessed 17 January 2012).
11
Douglas Jackson, Early Helicopter History, The Aircraft Museum, 1997, 1-3,
http://www.aerospaceweb.org?design?helicopter/history.shtml (accessed 17 January 2012).
12
Judy Rumerman, Early Helicopter Technology, US Centennial of Flight Commission, 2003, 1-5; Nick Van
Valkenburgh, Chinook – The Legacy of Tandem Rotor Helicopter (Huntsville, AL: US Army Aviation and Missile
Life Cycle Management Command (AMCOM), Cargo Helicopters Project Management Office, 2011), 5; J. Gordon
Leishman, “A History of Helicopter Flight,” extracts from the author’s book, Principles of Helicopter Aerodynamics
(First Edition, 2000), 3, http://terpconnect.umd.edu/~leishman/Aero/history.html (accessed 17 January 2012).
13
C.V. Glines, “The Flying Octopus,” Air Force Magazine, October 1990, 8-11.
14
Nick Van Valkenburgh, Chinook – The Legacy of Tandem Rotor Helicopter (Huntsville, AL: US Army Aviation
and Missile Life Cycle Management Command (AMCOM), Cargo Helicopters Project Management Office, 2011),
8.
15
“Pioneers in Vertical Flight: Frank N. Piasecki,” Piesecki Aircraft Corporation Fact Sheet, 2009, 1-5; David
Anderton and Jay Miller, Boeing Helicopters CH-47 Chinook (Arlington, TX: Aerofax, Inc., 1989), 1-2; Nick Van
1
12
Valkenburgh, Chinook – The Legacy of Tandem Rotor Helicopter (Huntsville, AL: US Army Aviation and Missile
Life Cycle Management Command (AMCOM), Cargo Helicopters Project Management Office, 2011), 12-13.
16
K. I. Grina, “Helicopter Development at Boeing-Vertol Company,” The Aeronautical Journal, March 1975, 401416; Helicopter History Site, “Boeing-Vertol 107M, H-46 Sea Knight: Helicopter Database,” Helis.com, 1997, 1-2;
Nick Van Valkenburgh, Chinook – The Legacy of Tandem Rotor Helicopter (Huntsville, AL: US Army Aviation
and Missile Life Cycle Management Command (AMCOM), Cargo Helicopters Project Management Office, 2011),
30-41; David Anderton and Jay Miller, Boeing Helicopters CH-47 Chinook (Arlington, TX: Aerofax, Inc., 1989), 47.
17
Tom Marinucci, “CH-47D Chinook,” Boeing Defense, Space & Security Backgrounder, June 2010, 1-2; Nick
Van Valkenburgh, Chinook – The Legacy of Tandem Rotor Helicopter (Huntsville, AL: US Army Aviation and
Missile Life Cycle Management Command (AMCOM), Cargo Helicopters Project Management Office, 2011), 4547, 70-71; David Anderton and Jay Miller, Boeing Helicopters CH-47 Chinook (Arlington, TX: Aerofax, Inc.,
1989), 7, 21-22.
18
Leo Burnett, “The Chinook Story,” US Army Aviation Digest, August 1972, 9-14; James Williams, A History of
Army Aviation: From Its Beginnings to the War on Terror (Lincoln, NE: US Army Aviation Museum Foundation,
Inc. and iUniverse, 2005), 118; Nick Van Valkenburgh, Chinook – The Legacy of Tandem Rotor Helicopter
(Huntsville, AL: US Army Aviation and Missile Life Cycle Management Command (AMCOM), Cargo Helicopters
Project Management Office, 2011), 42-44, 49-50; David Anderton and Jay Miller, Boeing Helicopters CH-47
Chinook (Arlington, TX: Aerofax, Inc., 1989), 7-11.
19
Boeing Defense, Space & Security, CH-47D/F Technical Specifications Fact Sheet, 2012, 1; Nick Van
Valkenburgh, Chinook – The Legacy of Tandem Rotor Helicopter (Huntsville, AL: US Army Aviation and Missile
Life Cycle Management Command (AMCOM), Cargo Helicopters Project Management Office, 2011), 51-53; David
Anderton and Jay Miller, Boeing Helicopters CH-47 Chinook (Arlington, TX: Aerofax, Inc., 1989), 8-9.
20
“Boeing MH-47D Model Helicopters,” Boeing Defense, Space & Security Factsheet, January 2012, 1-2; “MH47E/G Special Operations Chinook,” Boeing Defense, Space & Security Factsheet, January 2012, 1-2; Jack
Satterfield, “US Army Special Operations Command MH-47G Special operations Chinook,” Boeing Defense, Space
& Security Backgrounder, March 2005, 1-2; Nick Van Valkenburgh, Chinook – The Legacy of Tandem Rotor
Helicopter (Huntsville, AL: US Army Aviation and Missile Life Cycle Management Command (AMCOM), Cargo
Helicopters Project Management Office, 2011), 59-60.
21
Department of the Army, 2010 Army Modernization Strategy, Report to Congress, 23 April 2010, 58-60; James
Williams, A History of Army Aviation: From Its Beginnings to the War on Terror (Lincoln, NE: US Army Aviation
Museum Foundation, Inc. and iUniverse, 2005), 351-353, 386; Tom Marinucci, “CH-47F Chinook,” Boeing
Defense, Space & Security Backgrounder, January 2012, 1-2; Nick Van Valkenburgh, Chinook – The Legacy of
Tandem Rotor Helicopter (Huntsville, AL: US Army Aviation and Missile Life Cycle Management Command
(AMCOM), Cargo Helicopters Project Management Office, 2011), 56-58.
13
HIGH, HOT and HEAVY:
THE CH-47 CHINOOK IN COMBAT ASSAULT OPERATIONS IN AFGHANISTAN
Chapter 2
A BRIEF HISTORY OF US ARMY AIR ASSAULT DOCTRINE
Cavalry and I Don’t Mean Horses
Current US Army doctrine defines an air assault operation as a vertical envelopment in
which “assault forces, using the mobility of rotary-wing assets and the total integration of
available firepower, maneuver to engage enemy forces or to seize key terrain.1 During the mid1950s, the concept of combat assaults using helicopters increasingly intrigued senior level Army
leadership. The US Marine Corps, using six-passenger H-19 Chickasaws, had experimented
with the unique capabilities of helicopters in tactical situations and with vertical envelopment
techniques during the Korean War.2 In 1954, the Army’s interest in heliborne operations
mounted with the publication of “Cavalry – And I Don’t Mean Horses,” a journal article by
Major General James Gavin. Having personally witnessed the limitations of airborne and glider
operations during World War II, Gavin believed that cavalry-type operations could be effectively
implemented using helicopters to transport Soldiers into battle. To demonstrate the concept, he
theoretically inserted helicopters into war-gaming studies at the Army Command and General
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Staff College to show how the speed and maneuverability of the aircraft could significantly
improve tactical results.3
Joint Exercise Sagebrush
As the Army’s G-3, Major General Gavin continued to pursue his vision of tactical
helicopter operations, noting that “to win decisively and quickly in future limited wars, the Army
needed substantial forces of sky cavalry.”4 During Joint Exercise Sagebrush in 1955 at Fort
Polk, Louisiana, much of Gavin’s sky cavalry concept was validated. Soldiers from the 82d
Airborne Division formed a provisional sky cavalry troop consisting of a reconnaissance
element, a blocking force, an artillery/anti-tank group, and an aviation platoon. On several
occasions, sky cavalry Soldiers using helicopters successfully infiltrated behind opposing force
lines to gather valuable intelligence information unavailable by other means. The mobility and
flexibility of Army helicopters was clearly evident during Sagebrush, as the aircraft routinely
operated from improvised landing zones throughout the designated battle area.5
Air Assault Doctrine Initiatives
At the same time Exercise Sagebrush was evaluating helicopters as a means of
transporting sky cavalry on the battlefield, Brigadier General Carl Hutton, commander of the US
Army Aviation Center (USAAVNC) at Fort Rucker, proposed the development of an Armed
Helicopter Mobile Task Force to fight along-side the sky cavalry. “In one case we would have
an air transported Army, and in the other case we would have an air fighting Army…the time has
come for the Army to consider its aviation needs with a fresh eye,” Hutton explained in Army
Aviation Digest.6 In 1957, Hutton’s replacement as USAAVNC commander, Major General
Bogardus Cairns, and his staff rewrote a 1936 horse cavalry field manual (FM 2-5) to create a
15
training handbook entitled New Tactical Doctrine that reflected the sky cavalry advancements
developing at Fort Rucker. Cairns also established a provisional Aerial Combat Reconnaissance
Platoon that, after several re-designations, eventually deployed to Vietnam as the 1st Squadron,
9th Cavalry. Finally in 1958, the US Army Command and General Staff College at Fort
Leavenworth published FM 57-35, Army Transport Aviation Combat Operations, in which the
phrase ‘air landed operations’ described the expanded sky cavalry concept.7 A subsequent
version of FM 57-35 revised the nomenclature again to ‘airmobile operations’ – those in which
“combat forces and their equipment move about the battlefield in aerial vehicles under the
control of a ground force commander to engage in ground combat.”8
Army Aviation Assessments and the First Deployments to Vietnam
In 1960, advancements in Army aviation continued with the establishment of an Army
Aircraft Requirements Review Board led by Lieutenant General Gordon Rogers, Deputy
Commanding General of the Continental Army Command. The Rogers Board Report – Army
Aircraft Development Plan – presented a series of recommendations regarding observation,
surveillance, and transport aircraft. Included in the Board’s proposals were the purchase of UH1 Iroquois/Huey and CH-47 Chinook helicopters, and the continued feasibility testing and
evaluation of the airmobile operations concept. This later recommendation was addressed in an
addendum, entitled “Requirements for Air Fighting Units,” to the Rogers Board Report which
was written by Lieutenant General Hamilton Howze, Commanding General of the Strategic
Army Corps and the XVIII Airborne Corps at Fort Bragg.” Howze argued that air cavalry units,
equipped with their own aircraft, could successfully fight both dispersed traditional enemy forces
in conventional/European-type conflicts and less-formidable opponents in small brush fire
actions, such as the one intensifying at the time in the Republic of Vietnam.9
16
Meanwhile, Major General William Westmoreland, commanding general 101st Airborne
Division, centralized control of the division’s disjointed aviation assets under the newly formed
101st Combat Aviation Battalion (Provisional), the first such unit authorized by the Army.10
Then in the fall of 1961, General Maxwell Taylor, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
concluded that the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) suffered from a serious lack of
mobility in the growing Vietnam conflict. As a result of Maxwell’s assessment, the 8th and 57th
Transportation Companies (Light Helicopter) deployed expeditiously to Vietnam. On 11
December, the USNS Card arrived at the port of Saigon with 400 Soldiers and 32 Piasecki H-21
Shawnee helicopters from the two transportation companies. Less than two weeks later, 30
Shawnees participated in the first airmobile combat operation in Vietnam – Joint Operation
CHOPPER, in which 1,000 Vietnamese paratroopers were airlifted into position for a surprise
attack on a Viet Cong stronghold near the village of Duc Hoa. The 93d Transportation Company
(Light Helicopter) from Fort Devens, Massachusetts also deployed to Vietnam, arriving aboard
the USS Princeton at Da Nang on 25 January 1962. Airmobile operations and combat air assault
tactics soon became routine in the Vietnam War, with H-21 Shawnees initially, then H-34s and
UH-1s pioneering the effort.11
The Howze Board
Back in Washington, not completely satisfied with the Rogers Board results, Secretary of
Defense Robert McNamara called upon the Army to “completely re-examine its requirements for
aviation,” to evaluate “revolutionary new concepts of tactical mobility,” and to recommend
actions required to “give the Army the maximum attainable mobility in the combat area.”12 In
separate memoranda, McNamara directed Secretary of the Army, Elvis Stahr, to take a “bold
new look,” and implement “fresh…unorthodox concepts” to “acquire quantum increases” in land
17
warfare mobility.13 McNamara suggested six specific areas of inquiry including the substitution
of aviation assets for conventional military surface vehicles and the types of organizations and
operational concepts required to exploit increases in mobility. Finally, the Secretary of Defense
strongly encouraged the use of field tests to evaluate new mobility concepts, and even went so
far as to suggest potential members for the soon-to-be established US Army Tactical Mobility
Requirements Board.14
Lieutenant General Howze was appointed president of the Tactical Mobility Board –
henceforth known as the Howze Board – which included 199 officers, 41 enlisted men, and 53
civilians. Also included were a governing board, a review committee, a steering committee, an
advisory panel, a field test group, seven working committees, and eight working groups. One
hundred twenty-five helicopters and 25 fixed-wing aircraft were allocated to the Board which
established its headquarters in a grade school building at Fort Bragg. Eventually, more than
3,200 military personnel and 90 civilians took part in three major airmobile field exercises (in
Georgia, West Virginia, and North Carolina), sixteen small unit tests, and 30 additional tests and
evaluations of new concepts and equipment.15
Within 90 days, the Howze Board completed its assignment and submitted a 3,500 page
final report to the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Howze summarized the findings in one
overarching statement noting “the board has only a single, general conclusion – the adoption by
the Army of the airmobile concept…is necessary and desirable [and] in some respects the
transition is inevitable.”16 The Howze Board Report went on to describe five different
approaches to increasing Army airmobility. The alternative deemed most responsive to
Secretary McNamara’s guidelines called for establishing five air assault divisions to replace five
of the Army’s 16 existing divisions. According to Howze, 459 organic aircraft would be capable
18
of transporting an air assault division’s combat troops and equipment to a battle zone in three
lifts. Also recommended as additions to the existing Army force structure were three, enhanced
mobility, air cavalry combat brigades (316 aircraft each) capable of moving all combat elements
in just one lift, and five air transport brigades, each with 142 aircraft, to perform logistics
distribution operations.17
Evaluating the Air Assault Concept
Although the new Secretary of the Army, Cyrus Vance, and the Chief of Staff, General
Earl Wheeler, supported the Howze Board airmobility recommendations, the suggested changes
to the Army’s force structure were considered excessively disruptive. Accordingly, Secretary
McNamara authorized the creation of only one provisional air assault division and a supporting
air transport brigade for additional testing and evaluation. The air cavalry combat brigade
concept was not immediately pursued.18 Subsequently, the 11th Air Assault Division (formerly
the 11th Airborne Division), plus the 10th Air Transport Brigade were activated at Fort Benning,
GA in February 1963. For the next eighteen months, with Lieutenant General Charles Rich as
overall project director, the new division conducted a series of exercises to assess and refine
airmobile/air assault tactics, techniques, and procedures.19
Following Exercise AIR ASSAULT II in October 1964, in which the 82d Airborne
Division served as the opposing force, the 82d commander, Major General Robert York, praise
air assault operations as having “dynamic potential,” adding “seldom do we see a new military
concept which can contribute so decisively throughout the entire spectrum of warfare.”20 After
completion of the additional extensive testing phase, McNamara approved the recommendation
to establish an air assault division and add it to the Army force structure. In July 1965, new
19
Army Chief of Staff General Harold Johnson activated the US Army’s first air assault division –
designated the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), comprised of Soldiers from the 11th Air
Assault Division (Test) and the 2d Infantry Division. The new unit was given 90 days to prepare
for deployment to Vietnam.21
The 1st Cavalry Division Deploys to An Khe
In a nationally televised address on 28 July 1965, President Lyndon Johnson first laid out
the United States’ goals and objectives in Vietnam, then went on to announce “I have today
ordered to Vietnam the Airmobile Division and certain other forces which will raise our fighting
strength from 75,000 to 125,000 men almost immediately…additional forces will be needed
later, and they will be sent as requested.”22 The deployment of the 1st Cavalry Division to
Vietnam was designated Operation PAT and occurred in three increments – an advanced liaison
detachment, and advanced party, and the main body. During August 1965, the 13,500 Soldiers
and equipment (including 470 aircraft) of the main body sailed for Vietnam on troop ships, cargo
ships, and aircraft carriers from the port cities of Charleston, Savannah, Jacksonville, and
Mobile. The USNS Boxer alone carried 239 aircraft, including fifty-seven CH-47 Chinooks.
The 1CD arrived piecemeal in Vietnam during September and by the end of the month was fully
operational in its new base camp at An Khe – the world’s largest helipad – in the Central
Highlands province of Bihn Dihn.23
1st Cavalry Combat Air Assaults
On 10 October 1965, the 1st and 2d Battalions, 7th Cavalry, 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry, and
the 1st Battalion, 12th Cavalry conducted the first brigade-size airmobile/air assault against units
of the North Vietnam Army (NVA) 325th Infantry Division and the Viet Cong 2d Main Force
20
Regiment in the Soui Ca River Valley during Operation SHINY BAYONET. The 1st Cavalry
Soldiers met only light resistance as the enemy forces chose not the fight and retreated westward
toward Cambodia. During a second air assault mission on 1 November, however, 8th, 9th, and
12th Cavalry Soldiers encountered intense resistance from the NVA 33d Regiment in a series of
engagements southwest of Plei Me. Although seven 1CD helicopters sustained hostile fire
damage, the enemy regiment suffered considerable casualties, with ninety-nine killed and an
estimated 183 wounded. On the night of 3 November, troopers form the 1st Squadron, 9th
Cavalry came under attack from the NVA 66th Regiment near the Chu Pong Mountains. In what
became the 1st Cavalry’s first night heliborne airmobile mission, ‘A’ Company, 2d Battalion, 8th
Cavalry, air assaulted into an unprepared landing zone (LZ) to reinforce the 9th Cavalry Soldiers.
Airmobile operations were proving to be significantly innovative.24
Operation SHINY BAYONET was only the prelude to the more dramatic Operation
SILVER BAYONET involving the 1st and 2d Battalions, 7th Cavalry, LZ X-Ray, and the Ia
Drang Valley. On 14 November 1965, the 1st Battalion 7th Cavalry conducted an air assault on
the 66th NVA regimental base camp in the Ia Drang. The first three lifts were uncontested,
however, on the fourth and fifth insertions, helicopters from the 229th Assault Helicopter
Battalion received intense enemy fire – four of the eight aircraft in the fifth lift were shot down.
Although heavy fighting continued for the remainder of the day and night, the arrival of 5th
Cavalry reinforcements on 15 November turned the tide in the American’s favor. On the
following day, the majority of NVA forces broke contact and withdrew toward Cambodia. The
8th Battalion, 66th NVA Regiment remained behind, however, and inflicted heavy casualties in an
ambushed of the 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry, as the Soldiers were preparing for extraction from the
battle zone. Although SILVER BAYONET and the air assault into the Ia Drang Valley was
21
considered a tactical success – two NVA regiments destroyed and 3,500 enemy combatants
killed – the campaign also exacted a heavy toll on the 1st Cavalry Division with 300 Cavalrymen
killed and hundreds more wounded.25
The 1CD also fought on a secondary front in heavily populated Binh Dinh Province. Once
again the division conducted a series of air assaults, this time to mass its troops and to repeatedly
strike enemy forces at great distances. US and ARVN Soldiers remained in continuous contact
with enemy units for nearly two months, knocking out three NVA regular regiments. The 1st
Cavalry’s success in the Central Highlands validated the airmobile concept, demonstrated the
flexibility of air assault tactics, and led senior military leaders to believe that expanded
employment of airmobile TTP could be beneficial in achieving US strategic objectives in
Vietnam.26
In the fall of 1965, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) commander, General
William Westmoreland reported that double the number of US battalions would be required to
win the war in Vietnam. By the end of the following year, battalion levels had increased more
than two-fold from thirty-four to seventy-four. US troop strength escalated accordingly to nearly
400,000. Following a series of briefings with Westmoreland in Saigon and 1st Cavalry Soldiers
at An Khe, Secretary of Defense McNamara told reporters “it will be a long war.”27
US Divisions Employing Air Assault Tactics
In addition to 1CD, the 173d Airborne Brigade and elements of the 101st Airborne and 1st
Infantry Divisions were also conducting combat operations in Vietnam during 1965. Each of
these units was utilizing their own versions of air assault tactics. In March 1966, the Army
formed the 1st Aviation Brigade, with 11,000 soldiers, 850 aircraft, two combat aviation groups,
22
eight combat aviation battalions, and forty-three companies stretching from Soc Trang in the
south to Hue in the north. Over the next four years, the 1AB more than double in size to four
groups, sixteen battalions, eighty-three companies, 4,000 aircraft, and 25,000 men. In a further
testament to the success of air assault concepts, the Army converted the 101st Airborne Division
to an airmobile configuration, re-designating it the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile). At the
height of the Vietnam War build-up, twenty-five US Army brigades were deployed to the
country.28
The tempo of US Army air assault operations remained high for the duration of the war.
During the Communists’ Tet Offensive – January through March, 1968 – NVA and Viet Cong
forces attacked major cities throughout Vietnam. Dozens of US airmobile combat assaults on
enemy strongholds and concentrations drove the Communists from the urban areas and delivered
a crushing blow to their offensive aspirations. Airmobility provided US forces with the tactical
flexibility to quickly deploy and re-deploy to areas under attack.29 During Operation PEGASUS
in April 1968, two 1st Cavalry brigades air assaulted into northwestern Quang Tri Province to
assist besieged US Marines at the Khe Sanh Combat Base. After a week of fighting, North
Vietnamese forces withdrew west toward Laos and north toward the Demilitarized Zone.30 Later
in April, the 1st Cavalry, 101st Airborne, and the 1st Army of the Republic of Vietnam divisions
conducted a combined airmobile and ground attack – Operation DELAWARE/LAM SON 216 –
into the A Shau Valley, a major NVA supply base along the Ho Chi Minh trail. Although tons of
enemy equipment and supplies were captured/destroyed, dozens of American helicopters either
crashed or were damaged by intense NVA anti-aircraft fire before the operation ended on 17
May 1968.31
23
US airmobile operations had become commonplace by the time the Cambodian Campaign
began in 1970. Army aviation was crucial to the success of the US and ARVN incursion into
NVA sanctuaries in eastern Cambodia. From April through July, thirteen separate ground and
air assault operations were conducted involving units from the 1st Cavalry Division, 11th
Armored Cavalry Regiment, and the 4th, 9th, and 25th Infantry Divisions. By mid-May, thirtythree US maneuver battalions were fighting in Cambodia. By the completion of the campaign,
allied force had captured or destroyed 22,500 weapons, 431 vehicles, and more than 9,800 tons
of rice, ammunition, communications equipment, and medical supplies.32
Success in Cambodia led US officials to develop a similar plan for interdicting NVA
supply routes further north in Laos. By 1971, US ground troops were prohibited by law from
entering Laotian territory. As such, Operation LAM SON 719 involved an all-ARVN
armor/infantry task force that proceeded west into Laos along Route 9 from the former US
Marine base at Khe Sanh. ARVN Airborne, Ranger, and 1st Infantry Division forces were then
airlifted by US Army helicopters across the border to flanking positions north and south of the
main advance. When the main column bogged down, additional ARVN 1st Division soldiers air
assaulted aboard Army helicopters into LZ Hope near Tchepone village, the operation’s primary
objective. The LZ Hope air assault was the largest of the Vietnam War, involving 276 US
helicopters.33
On 9 March 1971, ARVN forces began their withdrawal east along Route 9. A continuous
series of NVA ambushes soon turned the ARVN withdrawal into a chaotic retreat. Enemy antiaircraft fire devastated American helicopters that attempted to assist the besieged ARVN
soldiers. By 6 April, when LAM SON 719 officially ended, military commanders were
dismayed by the excessive helicopter losses sustained during the operation – 108 totally
24
destroyed and 618 damaged. Although officials subsequently concluded that airmobile/air
assault operations could in fact be conducted successfully in mid-intensity type conflicts, the
significant LAM SON helicopter losses soon led to unique aviation innovations, such as nap-ofthe-earth flight techniques, an increase in night operations with pilots and crews using night
vision devices, and improvements in aircraft survivability.34
Following the 1973 armistice agreement signed by the United States, North and South
Vietnam, and the Viet Cong, MACV disbanded, US troops returned home, and American
military involvement in South Vietnam officially ended. In testimony before the US Senate
Armed Services Committee, Director of Army Aviation, Brigadier General William Maddox,
explained that “the helicopter made a difference the French lacked earlier,” during the First
Indochina War (1946-1954).35 Former MACV commander, General William Westmoreland,
later proclaimed helicopter air assault warfare “the most innovative tactical development to
emerge from the Vietnam War.”36 Noting the unwelcomed effectiveness of US airmobile
operations, one Viet Cong commander recalled “the days of power and comfort were fine, but
ever since those accursed helicopter soldiers have been encountered our troubles had
multiplied.”37 By adding the dimensions of flexibility and mobility to warfare, tactical helicopter
operations came of age during the Vietnam War. Helicopters touched the lives of every US
Soldier who fought in Vietnam, taking them into battle and returning them to safety. 2,700 US
Army helicopter pilots and crewmen were killed in Vietnam, flying missions in support of their
infantry comrades.38
25
Air Assault Developments 1970s – 1980s
Although air assault operations had proven successful during the Vietnam Conflict, the
higher intensity threats observed in the 1973 Middle East Yom Kippur War led US military
officials to question the survivability of helicopters in more hazardous combat environments –
those that included armor, radar-controlled anti-aircrafts systems, and shoulder-fired, heatseeking missiles. Meanwhile, the Army surprisingly converted the 1st Cavalry Division from
airmobile to a TRICAP division, and then to an armored division, thereby leaving the 101st
Airborne as the sole remaining US airmobile division.39 And in 1979, the Army began replacing
the venerable UH-1 Huey with faster, larger, UH-60 Black Hawk utility tactical transport
helicopters. The UH-60 soon became the Army’s primary air assault aircraft, as a single Black
Hawk could carry a completely-equipped eleven-Soldier infantry squad over greater distance on
the battlefield, even in adverse weather conditions.40
Further reorganization and expansion in the 1980s under the Army of Excellence (AOE)
initiative led to the establishment of sixteen combat aviation brigades, six corps aviation
brigades, three regimental aviation brigades, and a more robust aviation brigade for the 101st that
included four attack helicopter battalions, two combat support aviation battalions, a general
support aviation battalion, and a reconnaissance squadron. Army leaders calculated that a total
of 5,900 combat and transport helicopters would be needed to support the AOE configuration
requirements. In 1988, the Army briefly considered establishing a corps-level air cavalry
division reminiscent of the 1960s’ sky cavalry concept. Finally, under the Aviation Restructure
Initiative (ARI) of the mid-1990s, the Army adopted a more streamlined force structure and
reduced its total helicopter requirement to 4,400.41
26
Additional US Combat Operations and the Employment of Air Assault Tactics
Also during the 1980s-90s, US military forces participated in three conflicts that that
required combat air assaults. In the first, four-hundred Marines conducted an air assaulted in
Grenada during Operation URGENT FURY in October 1983. The following day, US Army
Rangers, flying aboard CH-46 Marine Corps Sea Knight helicopters, conducted a second air
assault to rescued endangered American medical students who had been studying on the island.
Unfortunately on the third day, three Army UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters crashed during an air
assault on a Grenadian military barracks. URGENT FURY clearly demonstrated, however, the
growing value of US military aircraft and air assaults tactics in support of political-military
operations. A lesson learned originally in Vietnam, then relearned in Grenada, was the
requirement for helicopter gunship escort and coverage during air assault operations.42
Six years later, nearly 26,000 US military personnel took part in Operation JUST CAUSE,
conducted to protect American citizens living in Panama, to promote democracy and human
rights in the country, and to uphold the Torrijos-Carter Treaties that transferred control of the
Panama Canal to Panamanians. US Army Soldiers and Paratroopers conducted five air assaults
during the operation, one of which was carried out at night by the 1st Battalion, 508th Parachute
Infantry Regiment.43
Finally, during Gulf War I – the liberation of Kuwait from occupying Iraqi forces – nearly
700,000 US troops and more than and 1,900 Army aircraft participated in Operations DESERT
SHIELD and DESERT STORM. CH-47 Chinook helicopters, often the most effective means of
transporting personnel and equipment over extended distances, conducted numerous Special
Operations insertion and extraction missions inside Iraq. On 24 February 1991, in the largest
27
and longest combat air assault ever conducted, 300 Black Hawks and Chinooks from the 18th
Aviation Brigade flew the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) 110 miles into Iraq
to secure Forward Operating Base (FOB) COBRA in the Euphrates River Valley. Using their
helicopter assets, 101st AB Soldiers then leapfrogged from FOB COBRA sixty miles further to
Highway 8, thereby blocking the escape route for Iraqi forces retreating from Kuwait. In the
main attack, VII Corps Soldiers from the 1st Infantry, 1st Armored, and 3d Armored Divisions
and the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment attacked and destroyed Iraq’s Republican Guard Armored
Divisions. The 11th Aviation Brigade conducted numerous air assaults of infantry units into
trouble spots during this phase of the operation. After four days of fighting, Kuwait had been
successfully liberated and an official ceasefire was declared. The series of successful air assaults
conducted during Gulf War I extended reach and flexibility of the ground force and validated the
US Army’s increasing reliance on helicopters and airmobile operations.44
Combat Air Assaults – Twenty-First Century Considerations
Air assault tactics were particularly suited to the counterinsurgency operations conducted
by US and allied forces in Afghanistan and Iraq. During Operations ENDURING FREEDOM
(OEF) and IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF), enemy combatants lacked air superiority and sophisticated
air defense systems, transportation networks were typically poor, and useable roadways were
often mined with improvised explosive devices (IED). The role of aviation as a critical
facilitator of ground force movement increased dramatically grew in the counterinsurgency
operational environment. As a result, the Army continued to revise, restructure, and fine tune
aviation assets, capabilities, and force structure during the early twenty-first century. Additional
plans and programs were developed and updated descriptive terminology, such as, modular, selfcontained, multi-functional, and unit of action, was introduced. Army aviation units were
28
expected to be flexible, lethal, tailorable, sustainable, and easily deployable. Finally, under the
terms and conditions of the 2004 Aviation Transformation Plan, the Army settled on a force
structure consisting of twenty-one standardized combat aviation brigades (CAB), thirteen active
component and eight reserve.45
Currently, combat aviation brigades are task-organized based upon mission requirements
and typically support Army divisions and/or multiple brigade combat teams (BCT). CABs can
be configured as either “heavy,” or “full-spectrum,” with varying combinations of attack, assault,
and general support aviation battalions, medevac and command aviation companies, and
reconnaissance squadrons. As of 2012, CAB helicopter assets included only UH-60 Black
Hawks, CH-47 Chinooks, AH-64 Apaches, and OH-58 Kiowa Warriors. CABs and BCTs can
be easily integrated into Air Assault Task Forces (AATF) when conducting combat assault
missions. CABs are capable of performing a comprehensive range of independent missions,
including aerial attack, reconnaissance, security, movement to contact, air assault, casualty
evacuation, crew recovery, and command and control.46
The Army issued the first Air Assault Operations Field Manual (FM 90-4) in 1987. An
upgraded version – ATTP 3-18.12 – was released by TRADOC and the US Army Maneuver
Center of Excellence in March 2011. An air assault is currently defined as a vertical
envelopment, under the control of a ground or air maneuver commander and using the mobility
of rotary-wing aircraft, to seize terrain, destroy an enemy force, or interdict enemy withdrawal
routes. The new manual describes the coordinated effort necessary for brigade combat teams
and combat aviation brigades to properly plan, prepare for, and vigorously conduct combat air
assault missions. Commanders are advised to attempt to surprise the enemy, and whenever
possible strive for unopposed landings. Also addressed are the establishment and effective use
29
of integrated, task-oriented, mission-specific, AATFs to execute offensive, defensive, stability,
and civil support air assault operations. Inherent speed and agility make it possible for an AATF
to extend the battlefield and rapidly concentrate decisive combat power above and beyond the
capabilities of most other US forces.47
Apropos to this Long War Occasional Paper, Chinooks conducted the first US military
infiltration missions of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. On 19 October 2001, two separate
teams of Special Forces Soldiers from Task Force DAGGER were successfully inserted into
Afghanistan’s Panjshir and Darya Suf Valleys aboard specially equipped MH-47 Chinook
helicopters.48
1
Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual ATTP 3-18.12 (FM 90-4), Air Assault Operations
(Washington, DC, 1 March 2011), 1-1; Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 3-18, Joint Forcible Entry
Operations (Washington, DC, 16 June 2008), GL-4.
2
Lieutenant Colonel Ronald Brown, “Whirlybirds: US Marine Helicopters in Korea,” in US Marines in the Korean
War, ed. Charles Smith (Washington, DC: History Division United States Marine Corps, 2007), 710; Kevin
Dougherty, “The Evolution of Air Assault,” Joint Forces Quarterly, Summer 1999, 52.
3
James Gavin, “Cavalry – And I Don’t Mean Horses,” Harper’s Magazine, April 1954, 54-60; James Williams, A
History of Army Aviation: From Its Beginnings to the War on Terror (Lincoln, NE: US Army Aviation Museum
Foundation, Inc. and iUniverse, 2005), 69.
4
Major General Gavin quoted in Russell Weigley, The American Way of War: A History of United States Military
Strategy and Policy (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1973), 423; the term “Sky Cavalry” attributed to
Major General Gavin in Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 1-100, Aviation Operations
(Washington, DC, 21 February 1997), G-3.
5
Colonel Stewart McKenney, “SKYCAV Operations during Exercise Sagebrush,” Military Review, June 1956, 1118.
6
Brigadier General Carl Hutton, “The Commandant’s Column: An Air Fighting Army,” Army Aviation Digest, July
1955, 2-3; See also Richard Weinert, History of Army Aviation 1950-1962: Phase II 1955-1962 (Fort Monroe, VA:
US Army Training and Doctrine Command Historical Office, 1976), 90.
7
James Williams, A History of Army Aviation: From Its Beginnings to the War on Terror (Lincoln, NE: US Army
Aviation Museum Foundation, Inc. and iUniverse, 2005), 76; Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual
(FM) 57-35, Army Transport Aviation Combat Operations (Washington, DC, June 1958), 4.
8
Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 57-35, Airmobile Operations (Washington, DC, 2
November 1960), 3.
9
Lieutenant General John Tolson, Vietnam Studies: Airmobility 1961-1971 (Washington, DC: US Government
Printing Office, 1973), 8-9; James Williams, A History of Army Aviation: From Its Beginnings to the War on Terror
(Lincoln, NE: US Army Aviation Museum Foundation, Inc. and iUniverse, 2005), 90-91, 98-99; Lieutenant General
Hamilton Howze, “The Howze Board I,” Army, February 1974, 14; Lieutenant General Hamilton Howze, A
Cavalryman’s Story: Memoirs of a Twentieth-Century Army General (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution
Press, 1996), 235-236.
10
Lieutenant General John Tolson, Vietnam Studies: Airmobility 1961-1971 (Washington, DC: US Government
Printing Office, 1973), 10.
30
145th Combat Aviation Battalion, “Battalion History: 11 December 1961 to 2 April 1972,” 1-3,
http://www.145thcab.com/History/BattalionHistory.htm (accessed 31 January 2012); Lieutenant General John
Tolson, Vietnam Studies: Airmobility 1961-1971 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1973), 3; Nick
Van Valkenburgh, Chinook – The Legacy of Tandem Rotor Helicopter (Huntsville, AL: US Army Aviation and
Missile Life Cycle Management Command (AMCOM), Cargo Helicopters Project Management Office, 2011), 18.
12
Robert McNamara, Memorandum to the Secretary of The Army, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 19 April
1962, 1.
13
Robert McNamara, Memorandum to the Secretary of The Army, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 19 April
1962, 1; Robert McNamara, Memorandum to Mr. Stahr, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 19 April 1962, 1-2.
14
Robert McNamara, Memorandum to the Secretary of The Army, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 19 April
1962, 2; Robert McNamara, Memorandum to Mr. Stahr, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 19 April 1962, 1.
15
J. Stockfisch, The1962 Howze Board and Army Combat Developments (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1994), 15-16;
Lieutenant General John Tolson, Vietnam Studies: Airmobility 1961-1971 (Washington, DC: US Government
Printing Office, 1973), 20-21.
16
Lieutenant General Hamilton Howze quoted in Lieutenant General John Tolson, Vietnam Studies: Airmobility
1961-1971 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1973), 24.
17
John Carland, How We Got There: Air Assault and the Emergence of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) 19501965 (Arlington, VA: The Institute for Land Warfare, 2003), 10-11; J. Stockfisch, The1962 Howze Board and Army
Combat Developments (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1994), 18-24.
18
General Hamilton Howze, “Winding Up a Great Show: Howze Board III,” Army, April 1974, 18-23.
19
At the time of the Howze Board, the terms airmobile and air assault were often used interchangeably. Following
the air assault concept evaluation at Fort Benning, airmobility began to refer generally to the use of Army airlift
assets to simply move troops and equipment. Air assault operations, however, were seen as deliberate combat
operations using aviation assets to engage and destroy enemy forces or to seize and hold key terrain.
20
Major General Robert York quoted in Lieutenant General John Tolson, Vietnam Studies: Airmobility 1961-1971
(Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1973), 55.
21
J. Stockfisch, The1962 Howze Board and Army Combat Developments (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1994), 25-28;
John Carland, How We Got There: Air Assault and the Emergence of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) 19501965 (Arlington, VA: The Institute for Land Warfare, 2003), 11-14.
22
President Lyndon Johnson, “The President’s News Conference,” 28 July 1965, 1-2.
23
“The Scout’s Prologue: Organizational Legacy of the 1st Cavalry Division and its Subordinate Commands,”
Cavalry Outpost Publications, 1996, Chapters 7 and 8, http://www.first-team.us/tableaux/ (accessed 3 February
2012).
24
“The Scout’s Prologue: Organizational Legacy of the 1st Cavalry Division and its Subordinate Commands,”
Cavalry Outpost Publications, 1996, Chapter 8, 4-5, http://www.first-team.us/tableaux/chapt_08/ (accessed 3
February 2012).
25
James Williams, A History of Army Aviation: From Its Beginnings to the War on Terror (Lincoln, NE: US Army
Aviation Museum Foundation, Inc. and iUniverse, 2005), 126-128; “The Scout’s Prologue: Organizational Legacy
of the 1st Cavalry Division and its Subordinate Commands,” Cavalry Outpost Publications, 1996, Chapter 8, 5-6,
http://www.first-team.us/tableaux/chapt_08/ (accessed 3 February 2012).
26
James Williams, A History of Army Aviation: From Its Beginnings to the War on Terror (Lincoln, NE: US Army
Aviation Museum Foundation, Inc. and iUniverse, 2005), 130.
27
Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara quoted in Lieutenant General Harold Moore and Joseph Galloway, We
Were Soldiers Once and Young (New York: Random House, 1992), 368.
28
John McGrath, The Brigade: A History: Its Organization and Employment in the US Army (Fort Leavenworth,
KS: US Army Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004), 65; Kevin Dougherty, “The Evolution of Air Assault,” Joint
Forces Quarterly, Summer 1999, 56; Walter Boyne, How The Helicopter Changed Modern Warfare (Gretna, LA:
Pelican Publishing Company, Inc., 2011), 132-136; James Williams, A History of Army Aviation: From Its
Beginnings to the War on Terror (Lincoln, NE: US Army Aviation Museum Foundation, Inc. and iUniverse, 2005),
136, 159.
29
James Willbanks, The Tet Offensive: A Concise History (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), 79-86.
30
Jack Shulimson et al., US Marines in Vietnam: 1968 The Defining Year (Washington, DC: History and Museums
Division, Headquarters, US Marine Corps, 1997), 255-290.
31
227th Assault Helicopter Battalion, “After Action Report: A Shau Valley, 227th AHB,” May 1968, 1-5, Appendix
I, http://vhfcn.org/ashau.html#bn (accessed 6 February 2010).
11
31
32
Shelby Stanton, The Rise and Fall of an American Army: US Ground Forces in Vietnam 1965-1973 (New York:
Random House Publishing Group, 1985), 333-339; John Shaw, The Cambodian Campaign: The 1970 Offensive and
America’s Vietnam War ( Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 2005), 158-162; Major Donald Phillips,
Across the Border: Success and Failures of Operation Rockcrusher (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command
and General Staff College, 4 June 1999), 68-87.
33
Nguyen Duy Hinh, Indochina Monographs: LAM SON 719 (Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military
History, 1979), 58-88; Lewis Sorley, A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of America’s Last
Years in Vietnam (New York: Harvest Books, 1999), 253.
34
Earl Tilford, Setup: What the Air Force Did in Vietnam and Why (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University
Press, 1991), 201; James Williams, A History of Army Aviation: From Its Beginnings to the War on Terror (Lincoln,
NE: US Army Aviation Museum Foundation, Inc. and iUniverse, 2005), 166.
35
Brigadier General William Maddox quoted in James Williams, A History of Army Aviation: From Its Beginnings
to the War on Terror (Lincoln, NE: US Army Aviation Museum Foundation, Inc. and iUniverse, 2005), 171.
36
General William Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1976), 348.
37
Unidentified Viet Cong commander quoted in Captain William Griffin, “Army Aviation in Support of
Counterguerrilla Operations,” US Army Aviation Digest, September 1962, 9.
38
Herbert LaPore, “The Role of the Helicopter in the Vietnam War,” US Army Aviation Digest, July/August 1994,
33-39.
39
Captain Daniel Henk, “The Threat to Air Assault Operations,” US Army Aviation Digest, February 1976, 6-7, 1618; 1st Cavalry Division, “America’s First Team: TRICAP Conversion,” 2010, 1
http://pao.hood.army.mil/1stcavdiv/about/history/tricapconversion.htm (accessed 8 February 2012).
40
US Army FACTFILES, “Black Hawk,” 1, http://www.army.mil/factfiles/equipment/aircraft/blackhawk.html
(accessed 9 February 2012).
41
John Romjue, The Army of Excellence: The Development of the 1980s Army (Fort Monroe, VA: United States
Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1993), 48, 78, 93-94; Kevin Stubbs, “Beyond the AOE,” Military Review,
August 1988, 35-41; Congressional Budget Office, A CBO Study: An Analysis of US Army Helicopter Programs,
Report to Congress, December 1995, 11, 20, 64-65.
42
Ronald Cole, Operation URGENT FURY: The Planning and Execution of Joint Operations in Grenada 12
October – 2 November 1983 (Washington, DC: Joint History Office, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, 1997), 41-58; James Williams, A History of Army Aviation: From Its Beginnings to the War on Terror
(Lincoln, NE: US Army Aviation Museum Foundation, Inc. and iUniverse, 2005), 223.
43
Cody Phillips, Operation JUST CAUSE: The Incursion into Panama (Washington, DC: US Army Center of
Military History, 2004), 26-28, 34-35.
44
James Williams, A History of Army Aviation: From Its Beginnings to the War on Terror (Lincoln, NE: US Army
Aviation Museum Foundation, Inc. and iUniverse, 2005), 236-258; VII Corps, “VII Corps in Desert Storm,”
http://www.vii-corps.org/DesertStorm/DesertStorm.htm (accessed 9 February 2010).
45
John McGrath, The Brigade: A History: Its Organization and Employment in the US Army (Fort Leavenworth,
KS: US Army Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004), 86-90, 131-138; Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2010
Army Modernization Strategy, 23 April 2010, 58.
46
Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations (Washington, DC: 2008), C-10;
Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual ATTP 3-18.12 (FM 90-4), Air Assault Operations
(Washington, DC: 2011), 1-3, 1-4.
47
Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual ATTP 3-18.12 (FM 90-4), Air Assault Operations
(Washington, DC: 2011), vi, 1-1, 1-2, 1-5.
48
Brigadier General John Mulholland, interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Combat Studies
Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 7 May 2007, 6.
32
HIGH, HOT and HEAVY:
THE CH-47 CHINOOK IN COMBAT ASSAULT OPERATIONS IN AFGHANISTAN
Chapter 3
OPERATION ANACONDA WOULD NOT HAVE OCCURRED WITHOUT THE CH-47
“US Army-style air assaults were key…the helicopter landings by hundreds of US troops
at strategic locations in the Shahi Kowt Mountains were pulled off almost flawlessly on D Day,”
Colonel Frank Wiercinski explained.1 Wiercinski was commander of the 101st Airborne
Division’s Task Force Rakkasan, the air assault force for Operation ANACONDA which took
place during March 2002 south of Gardez in Paktia Province. “We used Chinooks because of
the altitude…the lowest HLZ was 8,500 feet…we needed to get to the HLZs fast with a lot of
troops,” he later recounted, adding “the CH-47 was the helicopter of choice…we had just put in
new 714 engines, incredibly powerful…we had up to 35 troops with full combat loading [per
aircraft].”2
TF Rakkasan went on to conduct fourteen combat air assaults in support of ANACONDA.
Lieutenant Colonel James Marye, commander of Task Force Talon, the US Army composite
aviation unit in Afghanistan that actually flew the air assault missions, was equally
complimentary of the Chinook, noting “no other airframe was capable of providing lift for that
large a force at that altitude to achieve mass on each HLZ. “The Chinook was the assault
platform of choice for that type of operation where massing large numbers of troops on a specific
33
target is required to achieve overwhelming firepower…Operation ANACONDA would not have
succeeded or even occurred without the CH-47,” Marye subsequently wrote.3
Prelude to Operation ANACONDA
Following the terrorist attack of September 2001, the United States launched a military
campaign – Operation ENDURING FREEDOM – against the Taliban regime and its militant alQaeda allies in Afghanistan. An ingenious combination of US Special Forces, friendly
indigenous Afghan militias, and devastatingly effective American airpower quickly
overwhelmed Taliban resistance. By December, Taliban rule in Afghanistan was officially over,
Hamid Karzai had been appointed leader of the new interim government, twenty-five million
Afghan citizens had been liberated, and US and coalition military forces remaining in
Afghanistan began the transition to stability and humanitarian aid operations.
In January 2002, plans were being formulated to redeploy US troops back to the United
States. Major General Franklin Hagenbeck, commanding general of the 10th Mountain Division,
who also led the Combined Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC, Forward) which was
responsible for nearly all ground forces in the theater, described the mindset at the time, noting
“it was the general consensus from everyone that the war, the fight, in Afghanistan was done.”4
Meanwhile, Special Operations Forces intelligence reports indicated the presence of up to 800
Taliban and al-Qaeda combatants remaining in the Shahi Kowt Valley, near Shir Khan Kheyl
village.5 Since a key aspect of the potential assault on the Shahi Kowt involved establishing
blocking positions to prevent the enemy from escaping, CENTCOM directed that a combination
of Afghan militiamen, US Special Forces, and US conventional forces be organized to conduct
the operation.6
34
The conventional force chosen for Operation ANACONDA was the 3d Brigade, 101st
Airborne Division (Air Assault) which had arrived in mid-January to replace elements of US
Marine Corps Task Force 58 at Kandahar. In compliance with the DoD light American footprint
directive and consistent with the prevailing notion that the war in Afghanistan was basically
over, the Rakkasans deployed with only 2,200 Soldiers, just 30% of its standard equipment load
plan, and no organic artillery – hardly the makings for a full-spectrum brigade combat team
(BCT).7 Colonel Wiercinski, his downsized brigade staff, and the 2d Battalion, 187th Infantry
took control of operations at Kandahar, while 1st Battalion, 187th Infantry deployed initially to
Shahbaz Air Base in Jacobabad, Pakistan to provide airfield security. 1st Battalion, 87th
Infantry, 10th Mountain Division, which was providing security at Karshi-Khanabad (K2)
airfield in Uzbekistan, would eventually be attached to TF Rakkasan, thereby providing
Wiercinski with three highly trained light infantry battalions for Operation ANACONDA.
Task Force Talon served as the composite aviation component for the Rakkasan package.
Aviation assets from the 3d and 7th Battalions, 101st Aviation regiment were assigned to TF
Talon which was led by 7-101st commander, Lieutenant Colonel James Marye. The task force
consisted of a grand total of twenty-four helicopters – eight CH-47 Chinooks from A Company,
7-101st (Major John Davidson), eight AH-64 Apache gunships from A Company, 3-101st
(Captain Bill Ryan), and a detachment of eight UH-60 Black Hawks for command and control
and medical evacuation. At the time of deployment in early January, Talon’s mission primarily
involved transporting Soldiers in support of CFLCC stability operations. Bravo Company, 159th
Aviation Regiment, XVIII Airborne Corps (Major Terry Jamison) joined the task force in
February, adding seven more CH-47 Chinooks to the aircraft mix.8
35
CFLCC (Forward) was redesignated Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) Mountain in midFebruary 2002. Major General Hagenbeck moved his headquarters from K2 to Bagram and took
over responsibility for the planning and execution of Operation ANACONDA. His planning
staff began a thorough analysis of the 60-square mile Shahi Kowt Valley that was bordered by a
steep mountain ridge on the east and the smaller Tergul Ghar hill mass to the west. The valley
was oriented northeast to southwest with entrances at both the north and south ends. Intelligence
reports indicated that Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters were concentrated in the south-central
portion of the valley near the villages of Shir Khan Kheyl, Babol Kheyl, and Marzak. CJTF
Mountain planners anticipated that the enemy would be armed with AK-47s, RPG-7s, 82-mm
mortars, and DShK 12.7-mm machine guns. Concerns were raised regarding the availability of
suitable HLZs along the eastern ridge as well as the possibility that enemy combatants might
have established defensive positions in the eastern high ground. The final analysis concluded,
however, that the enemy would fight briefly, allow their leaders to escape, and then withdraw
eastward toward Pakistan. Planners discounted the possibility of the Taliban and al-Qaeda
vigorously defending the valley and fighting to the death.9
Hagenbeck’s final operations plan for ANACONDA called for TF Anvil, two Afghan
militia groups each accompanied by US Special Forces advisors, to establish outer-ring blocking
positions east and south of the Shahi Kowt. A third Afghan militia – the operation’s main effort,
designated TF Hammer, and also advised by US Special Forces Soldiers – was to split into two
assault elements, enter the valley from the north and south, and hold in place along a line three
kilometers west of Tergul Ghar. Following a series of preplanned US air strikes, TF Hammer
would then proceed eastward to clear Shir Khan Kheyl, Babol Kheyl, and Marzak.10
36
While the Afghan militias were moving into position, TF Rakkasan would air assault into
seven blocking positions below the eastern ridge to prevent Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters from
escaping along exfiltration routes into Pakistan. Sealing the escape routes on the eastern side
meant a two-battalion operation with each of the seven passes closed off by an individual
infantry company. “This mission had 101st written all over it…an air assault…the 101st’s raison
d’etre,” Lieutenant Colonel Jim Larsen, TF Rakkasan executive officer, recalled thinking during
a February 2002 receipt of mission briefing at Bagram.11
Finally, Major General Hagenbeck’s commander’s intent for Operation ANACONDA was
unmistakable – he would consider the operation successful when all the al-Qaeda combatants in
the Gardez-Khost region were either killed or captured. On 26 February 2002, the CJTF
Mountain commander issued the following mission statement to Coalition forces:
On order, CJTF Mountain attacks to destroy (capture or kill) AQ (al-Qaeda) vicinity
OBJ Remington (Shir Khan Kheyl), and to identify or disrupt AQ insurgency support
mechanisms and exfiltration routes into Pakistan. BPT (be prepared to) conduct
follow-on operations to clear selected objectives and interdict AQ movements in AO
Lincoln.12
The planning for ANACONDA was painstakingly meticulous at CJTF Mountain command level.
For the aviators who would eventually fly the mission, the goal was simply to get the infantry on
the ground, on time, where they wanted to be. “For us, the objective was always get them in on
target, plus or minus 50 meters, plus or minus 30 seconds,” explained Chief Warrant Officer 3
Jeffrey Simon, a TF Talon Chinook pilot.13
During the last two weeks of February, TF Rakkasan Soldiers, pilots, and aircrew
members conducted a series of drills and rehearsals designed to replicate the ANACONDA
mission requirements. Troops carrying nearly 100 pounds of combat equipment practiced
loading and unloading the TF Talon Chinook helicopters. On the last day of the month, the six
37
CH-47s scheduled for the first lift into Shahi Kowt conducted a fully loaded fly away exercise in
the mountainous region north of Bagram to reevaluate and reaffirm the Chinook’s high altitude
flight and performance characteristics. ANACONDA would be the highest altitude combat
assault ever undertaken by US Soldiers. Additionally, Rakkasan combat engineers made
preparations for establishing a forward arming and refueling point (FARP) at an abandoned
airstrip north of the valley. The FARP TEXACO was intended primarily to give AH-64 Apache
pilots a close-in facility to quickly rearm, refuel, and return to the fight. Fuel at the FARP would
be provided by two Chinooks, specially equipped with 3,600-gallon internal fuel tanks, and
referred to fondly as “fat cows.”14
Due to inclement weather conditions in eastern Afghanistan, D-Day for Operation
ANACONDA was postponed until 2 March. The delay gave Colonel Wiercinski all the more
time to worry about problematic issues, such as the distinct possibility of enemy heavy weapons
covering the flight approaches to the Shahi Kowt, the prospects of a Chinook being shot-down,
assaulting into the low ground (not the high ground) below the eastern ridge, losing the element
of surprise with a day vs. a night assault, going into battle with no supporting artillery, and recent
intelligence reports that enemy fighters were not holed up in the villages, but instead were
manning defensive positions in the ridgelines.15 Wiercinski no doubt recalled the briefing he
attended at the Special Forces’ advanced operating base the day he arrived in Bagram.
Lieutenant Colonel Pete Blaber, commander of Advance Force Operations, had stated the
obvious, “Remember, every enemy on the planet expects the US military to attack using
helicopters, this enemy will be no different.”16
The final plan for ANACONDA remained essentially unchanged. Beginning on D-1, TFs
Hammer and Anvil would begin movements to reach the western and southern portions of the
38
Shahi Kowt, respectively, by daybreak on D-Day. At dawn on D-Day, the first air assault wave
of Rakkasans would land along the eastern ridgeline. The northeastern escape route out of the
valley would be purposely left open to entice enemy fighters to withdraw in that direction. At
dusk on D-Day, a second Rakkasan air assault would land in the northern portion of the valley to
close the northeastern exfiltration route. On D-1, Colonel Wiercinski spoke with the Chinook
crews that would ferry the Rakkasan Soldiers into combat and to the Apache pilots who would
provide the protective firepower for the air assault. He told the airmen that in an earlier briefing
he had told the infantrymen that they would be “flying into battle with the best crews and the
best helicopters in the world.” “Not every helicopter and not every crew could do this,” he said.
“You’ve got the equipment, you’ve got the people…this is going to be a great mission.” In
concluding his remarks, the Rakkasan commander reflected on the broader meaning of the
ANACONDA mission. “When they wrote the book on air assault, this is what they were talking
about,” Wiercinski said. “No other unit in the world could do this…you will make history.”17
Combat Air Assault into the Shahi Kowt Valley
After midnight on D-Day, Rakkasan troops began boarding the six CH-47 Chinooks that
would take them into the Shahi Kowt. For security purposes, the loading operation – forty to
forty-five Soldiers per helicopter – was conducted under blackout conditions. As only five AH64 Apaches were available for the mission, TF Talon commander Lieutenant Colonel Jim Marye
revised the air movement plan such that two lead Apaches (Team 1) would clear the valley and
cover the three Chinooks (Section 1) inserting 2d Battalion, 187th Infantry into the northern
HLZs, while the remaining three Apaches (Team 2) would escort the three Chinooks (Section 2)
landing in the southern HLZs with the 1st Battalion, 87th Infantry. At 0430, 2 March 2002,
Apache Team 1 departed Bagram for the valley. The three Chinooks in Section 1 lifted off at
39
0500, followed shortly thereafter by Section 2. Although inclement weather played havoc with
the enroute flight, the pilots successfully navigated the intense fog and cloud cover and all the
aircraft had arrived without incident in the objective area by approximately 0615.18 In describing
the intensity of the mission, Chinook pilot Chief Warrant Officer 2 Kenneth Gunter reported that
“ten minutes out the entire helicopter was just silent…everybody was just doing their jobs and
getting ready for those last few minutes inbound.”19
Apache Team 1’s sweep of the designated landing areas along the eastern ridge was
uneventful with no enemy activity detected. Once cleared to proceed, the Chinooks then entered
the valley from the south, with each aircraft proceeding to a different HLZ close to the blocking
position assigned to the ground maneuver element onboard. The three Chinooks inserting 2-187
Infantry landed safely at HLZs 1, 3, and 4, while the three CH-47s with 1-87 Soldiers landed at
HLZs 5, 12, and 13. “I was most worried about the terrain in the landing area…we had imagery
[but] those pictures didn’t do us a lot of good,” recalled Chief Warrant Officer 2 John Quinlan.
“We knew we were going to be in jagged areas…so basically getting that helicopter in there
safely and getting those guys off, that’s what everyone was focused on,” Quinlan added.20
At the same time, Colonel Wiercinski and a tactical command post staff were inserted by
UH-60 Black Hawks on a high ridge – Rak TAC ridge – south of the valley. In addition,
Lieutenant Colonel Marye as the Air Mission Commander remained airborne over the Shahi
Kowt in a command and control UH-60 for the duration of the air assault. As the Section 1
Chinook pilots began their return trip to Bagram, they were ordered to TF Hammer’s location
west of the valley to pick up wounded US Special Forces Soldiers and Afghan militiamen.21
40
Soon after landing, 2-187 began taking enemy fire at HLZ 3. A short time later, Soldiers
remaining on HLZ 1 also came under small arms and RPG fire. However, with assistance from
the Apaches, the 2-187 troops completed their movement and established three blocking
positions by 1500 D-Day.22 “I don’t think they anticipated the type of resistance they
encountered when they got on the ground…a lot of us anticipated it going smoother than it did,”
Chief Warrant Officer 3 Scott Breslin thought as he climbed out of the Shahi Kowt and headed
back to Bagram.23
To the south along the eastern ridge, 1-87 also received enemy fire from Takur Ghar after
landing. The Soldiers began to consolidate in a bowl-like depression between two of their
assigned blocking positions – BPs Heather and Ginger – as enemy small arms, machinegun,
RPG, and 82-mm mortar fire intensified. CW3 Simon recalled thinking that enemy fighters “are
actually attacking our guys as opposed to trying to flee…it wasn’t what we expected.”24
Although fixed wing and Apache close air support knock out numerous enemy fighting
positions, by noon on D-Day 1-87 had more than 20 wounded Soldiers, was running short of
ammunition, and was pinned-down in the bowl.
After sunset, an AC-130 gunship arrived to provide suppressive fire while two US Air
Force HH-60 Pave Hawk helicopters evacuated the wounded. At midnight, two Chinooks
landed and extracted the 1-87 Soldiers from the bowl area.25 Chief Warrant Officer 2 John
Ketchum, one of the Chinook pilots on the extraction mission, recalled being nervous going in –
“we weren’t sure how the infantry guys were going to signal us…we came around and I saw
them waving a stick in the air and that was really a sigh of relief.” “My aircraft had five
wounded that had taken shrapnel to different parts of their bodies,” Ketchum continued, “fellow
Soldiers carryied them onto the aircraft and they were bleeding.”26
41
By the end of D-Day, TF Hammer’s advance east of the Shahi Kowt had bogged down,
two of the five TF Talon Apaches were un-flyable due to battle damage, a second lift by
Chinooks with reinforcements from Bagram had been cancelled because of the intense action in
the valley,27 twenty-six Americans had been wounded, most of 1-87 had been extracted, and the
enemy was fighting back, not attempting to escape. CJTF Mountain needed a new plan.
On 3 March (D+1), TF Rakkasan ordered all of the 1-87 and 2-187 units remaining along
the eastern ridge to link up, move north, and consolidate at HLZ 15. At approximately 1100, six
Chinooks departed Bagram headed for HLZ 15 with 1-187, the brigade reserve, onboard. Due to
enemy mortar fire at the HLZ, the ground commander recommended that this air assault mission
be aborted. However, one section of Chinooks landed anyway, while the other section returned
to Bagram. At 1800, additional 2-187 Soldiers arrived by Chinook at HLZ 15, and at 2000 the
Chinooks that had earlier aborted brought in the remaining 1-187 troops. By the end of the day,
all of the Rakkasan troops had assemble at HLZ 15 in the north end of the valley.28
After arriving at the HLZ, 1-187 was ordered to move south to BP AMY. Upon reaching
AMY early the next morning, the battalion was further ordered to clear the entire eastern ridge
all the way south to blocking point GINGER. That afternoon (4 March), however, 1-187 was
instructed to hold at BP DIANE. TF Rakkassan then assigned the mission of securing blocking
point GINGER to the reconstituted 1-87th, designated at this point TF Summit. With a welltrained and capable, yet makeshift, complement of three full companies, Summit air assaulted
into HLZ 3 west of BP DIANE aboard CH-47 Chinooks on 5 March. A brief change of mission
involving the seizure of Takur Ghar was quickly reversed and 1-87 proceeded south toward PB
Ginger as originally planned. By 12 March, TF Rakkasan had withdrawn all of its battalions
42
from the Shahi Kowt. The entire extraction operation was conducted by Chinook pilots and
crews.29
By 10 March, Afghan militia forces had reorganized west of the valley. Under the code
name Operation GLOCK, a newly arrived Northern Alliance Tajik unit assaulted and cleared
Tergul Ghar, then attacked the villages to the east in the Shahi Kowt. The original TF Hammer
Pashtun force also attacked villages in the southern portion of the valley before linking up with
the Tajiks. CJTF Mountain leaders then established Task Force Commando, comprised of the 3d
Battalion, Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry; 4th Battalion, 31st Infantry, and elements
of 2d Brigade, 10th Mountain Division to conduct additional ANACONDA missions. During
Operation HARPOON on 13 March, the Canadian Light Infantry, along with A/4-31, air
assaulted onto the north end of Tergul Ghar to conduct a more thorough sweep of the four mile
long hill mass. Chinooks from the 159th Aviation Regiment conducted the air assault. After
completing the mission and reaching the south end of Tergul, the Canadians and A Company
were extracted by CH-47s from the 159th.30
The final ANACONDA operation was designated POLAR HARPOON. The mission was
assigned to 4-31 Infantry and entailed clearing Takur Ghar and the upper Shahi Kowt Valley.
On 18 March, Chinooks inserted the battalion TAC and C Company on a precariously steep
ridgeline north of, and 1500 feet below, Takur Ghar’s peak. Additional CH-47s landed in the
valley with A Company. Charlie Company and the TAC climbed to the top of the mountain and
conducted a thorough search, while A Company swept the valley below. After completing the
mission, 4-31 was extracted the next day, again by Chinooks.31 Operation ANACONDA was
finally over. Although some would disagree, General Tommy Franks, commander in chief, US
Central Command, declared ANACONA “an unqualified and absolute success.”32
43
Assessment of the ANACONDA Combat Air Assaults
Task Force Talon conducted fourteen separate CH-47 Chinook combat air assaults in
support of TF Rakkasan during Operation ANACONDA. “I use[d] Chinooks to bring the troops
in rather than Black Hawks…because of the altitude…the constraints on the lift capability of
helicopters at that altitude,” Major General Hagenbeck explained in a post-operation interview.33
More than 1,400 Soldiers had been safely inserted and extracted in ANACONDA – the highest
altitude combat operation in American history.34 Although none of the air assault Chinooks
sustained battle damage from enemy fire, the outcome could have been devastatingly different.
On D-1, a five-man Special Operations reconnaissance team that had earlier infiltrated the
upper Shahi Kowt spotted an enemy DShK 12.7-mm machine gun position perfectly situated to
interdict the CH-47s as they entered the valley and began their landing approaches. With
assistance from US Air Force AC-130 gunships, this Special Operations team and others located
throughout the Shahi Kowt attacked and successfully destroyed five DShK antiaircraft positions
prior to the Rakkasan air assault the next morning.35 Although this Long War Occasional Paper
focuses on CH-47 Chinook combat air assaults by conventional forces, it is worthy of note that
during the Special Operations phase of ANACONDA, two MH-47E Chinooks from the 160th
Special Operations Aviation Regiment were shot down by enemy RPGs and small arms fire. 36
“When we found out that two MH-47 crews had gone down in the exact area where we were
putting in the 10th Mountain, it hit close to home,” CW2 Quinlan recalled. The notion that the
Taliban “could be that effective with their rocket-propelled grenades to take down an aircraft…I
think that hit the special operations community pretty hard,” Quinlan said in an after action
interview.37
44
Operation ANACONDA was the US military’s first conventional combat operation of the
OEF campaign. It was the first time Chinooks and Apaches had ever operated together as a team
in combat. Unfortunately, TF Talon may not have had a sufficient of number of Chinooks
available to transport the entire Rakkasan force and its equipment to the valley all at the same
time in one lift. “The whole mission economy of force due to the restricted footprint allowed in
Afghanistan by direction of the Secretary of Defense,” explained Colonel Scott Kubica, Talon
executive officer during ANACONDA.38 Ground commanders were forced to pick and choose
which units and what supplies to take in first or leave behind. These decisions were difficult to
make since intelligence estimates of the enemy situation in the Shahi Kowt were updated
continually as new data came in prior to D-Day. In hindsight, for example, more mortars should
perhaps have been included in the first lift.
After inserting the first lift troops in the valley, the original six Chinooks returned to
Bagram to pick up the remaining Soldiers and equipment. Inclement weather and enemy activity
in and around the HLZs, delayed/prevented the second lift of Rakkasans from reaching the valley
in a timely manner. More Chinooks, enough to move everyone and everything in one lift, may
have been more effective. “Our deployment to OEF was done by USAF Strategic Airlift vice
Sea Lift…that kept us from taking more Chinooks,” Colonel James Marye, TF Talon
Commander emphasized. “Our full up sixteen ship Chinook company would have been able to
accomplish the task” of transporting all of the Rakkasans and their equipment to the Shahi Kowt
in just one lift. Marye conceded, however, that FARP TEXACO may not have been able to
support more aircraft. “We had a pretty fair FARP capability, but it would have been a serious
stretch with additional Chinooks, since they had to also fuel and rearm Apaches and Black
Hawks, he later wrote. 39
45
Because of the CH-47’s exceptional allowable combat load and its ability to operate in
high altitude environments, the six Chinooks that did participate in the D-Day air assault mission
enabled TF Rakkasan to surprise the enemy, take the initiative, and choke off escape routes by
rapidly massing combat power on key terrain features in the Shahi Kowt. No other aircraft was
capable of supporting Operation ANACONDA to the same extent. Two months after
ANACONDA ended, Royal Marines went back into the valley. They discovered some caves,
defensive positions, and piles of American MREs and bottled water, but no al-Qaeda or Taliban
fighters – “it’s pretty quiet,” Sergeant Darren Hughes admitted, acknowledging that
ANACONDA may have been more successful than previously believed.40 “It was clear that
Operation ANACONDA had dealt the enemy a heavy blow…al Qaeda and Taliban forces have
been devastated,” Brigadier Roger Lane, commander of British forces in Afghanistan said in
May 2002. “I don’t think we fully appreciate how devastating ANACONDA was,” he told a
Times reporter as he climbed down from an RAF Chinook at Bagram.41
Colonel Franklin Wiercinski quoted in “Colonel Sets Positions From Ridge,” Lubbock Avalanche-Journal, 16
March 2002, 1-2, http://lubbockonline.com/stories/031602/wor_0316020122.shtml (accessed 16 February 2012).
2
Colonel Frank Wiercinski, interview by Austin Bay, Creators Syndicate, 29 June 2002, 1-5,
http://www.strategypage.com/on_point/20020627.aspx (accessed 14 February 2012).
3
Colonel James Marye, email correspondence with author, 17 February 2012, 1.
4
Lieutenant General Franklin Hagenbeck, interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, US Army Combat
Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 30 March 2007, 6.
5
Lester Grau and Dodge Billingsley, Operation Anaconda : America’s First Major Battle in Afghanistan
(Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2011), 107-111.
6
In hindsight, some military commanders believed that failure to establish blocking positions during the Battle of
Tora Bora (12-17 December 2001 in the Spin Ghar region of Nangarhar Province) allowed high-level Taliban and
al-Qaeda leaders to escape.
7
A fully equipped brigade combat team would typically have 5,000 Soldiers, see Sean Naylor, Not a Good Day to
Die: The Untold Story of Operation Anaconda (New York: The Berkley Publishing Group, 2005), 53.
8
Lester Grau and Dodge Billingsley, Operation Anaconda : America’s First Major Battle in Afghanistan
(Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2011), 96-98. The exact number of aircraft in TF Talon at the time is
unclear. TF Commander Colonel James Marye later recalled 8 Chinooks initially, 4 more Chinooks arrived some
time later, 8 Apaches, 8 Black Hawks, and 4 MEDEVAC helicopters. TF Talon Executive Officer, Colonel (as of
2012) Scott Kubica recalled 8 Chinooks initially, 8 more arriving from the 159 th Aviation Regiment, 8 Apaches, 4
Black Hawks, and 3 MEDEVAC helicopters. On 28 January 2002, a Chinook from A Company, 7th Battalion,
101st Airborne crashed in Khost province while executing a night, brown-out conditions, landing. This aircraft was
damaged beyond repair. See Colonel James Marye, email correspondence with author, 26 February 2012, 1-3;
Colonel Scott Kubica, email correspondence with author, 27 February 2012, 1.
1
46
9
Donald Wright et al., A Different Kind of War (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2010), 132135; Richard Stewart, The United States Army in Afghanistan, Operation Enduring Freedom, October 2001-March
2002, CMH Publication 70-83-1 (Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military History, 2006), 31.
10
Richard Stewart, The United States Army in Afghanistan, Operation Enduring Freedom, October 2001-March
2002, CMH Publication 70-83-1 (Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military History, 2006), 33.
11
Lieutenant Colonel Jim Larsen quoted in Sean Naylor, Not a Good Day to Die: The Untold Story of Operation
Anaconda (New York: The Berkley Publishing Group, 2005), 62.
12
CJTF Mountain, Operation Anaconda, Combat Operations Brief, 26 February 2002, slide 2.
13
Chief Warrant Officer 3 Jeffrey Simon quoted in Boeing Rotorcraft Systems, “Pilot Reports from Afghanistan,”
Press Release, updated 21 January 2012, 1.
14
Donald Wright et al., A Different Kind of War (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2010), 141;
Lester Grau and Dodge Billingsley, Operation Anaconda : America’s First Major Battle in Afghanistan (Lawrence,
KS: University Press of Kansas, 2011), 130.
15
Sean Naylor, Not a Good Day to Die: The Untold Story of Operation Anaconda (New York: The Berkley
Publishing Group, 2005), 68, 119, 122, 125, 126, 131, 139, 149.
16
Pete Blaber, The Men, The Mission, and Me: Lessons from a Former Delta Force Commander (New York: The
Berkley Publishing Group, 2008), 241.
17
Colonel Franklin Wiercinski quoted in Sean Naylor, Not a Good Day to Die: The Untold Story of Operation
Anaconda (New York: The Berkley Publishing Group, 2005), 179-180.
18
Kevin Kennedy, “Operation ANACONDA Virtual Staff Ride,” US Army Combat Studies Institute, Fort
Leavenworth, KS, July 2010, 37-43.
19
Chief Warrant Officer 2 Kenneth Gunter quoted in Boeing Rotorcraft Systems, “Pilot Reports from Afghanistan,”
Press Release, updated 21 January 2012, 2.
20
Chief Warrant Officer 2 John Quinlan quoted in Boeing Rotorcraft Systems, “Pilot Reports from Afghanistan,”
Press Release, updated 21 January 2012, 2.
21
Donald Wright et al., A Different Kind of War (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2010), 142146.
22
Major Franklin Baltazar, interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, US Army Combat Studies Institute,
Fort Leavenworth, KS, 10 May 2007, 8-12.
23
Chief Warrant Officer Scott Breslin quoted in Boeing Rotorcraft Systems, “Pilot Reports from Afghanistan,”
Press Release, updated 21 January 2012, 3.
24
Chief Warrant Officer 3 Jeffrey Simon quoted in Boeing Rotorcraft Systems, “Pilot Reports from Afghanistan,”
Press Release, updated 21 January 2012, 3.
25
Kevin Kennedy, “Operation ANACONDA Virtual Staff Ride,” US Army Combat Studies Institute, Fort
Leavenworth, KS, July 2010, 44-63; Donald Wright et al., A Different Kind of War (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat
Studies Institute Press, 2010), 149-154; Note - A/1-87 and the battalion scouts purposely remained in the valley
covering blocking point EVE.
26
Chief Warrant Officer 2 John Ketchum quoted in Boeing Rotorcraft Systems, “Pilot Reports from Afghanistan,”
Press Release, updated 21 January 2012, 4-5.
27
After the initial air assault early on D-Day, the six Chinooks (including those that extracted casualties from TF
Hammer) returned to Bagram to refuel and load the remaining 1-87 and 2-187 Soldiers for the second air assault lift
to the Shahi Kowt. The second lift was postponed, however, due to the extensive enemy activity in the valley. The
CH-47s with 2-187 Soldiers never left Bagram. The CH-47s with 1-87 troops flew to the AO at sunset on D-Day,
but could not land because of enemy fire. The flight then waited at FARP TEXACO for a short period before
attempting a second landing in the zone. Again the Chinooks were unable to land safely and subsequently returned
to Bagram, see Sean Naylor, Not a Good Day to Die: The Untold Story of Operation Anaconda (New York: The
Berkley Publishing Group, 2005), 269-270.
28
Donald Wright et al., A Different Kind of War (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2010), 154157; Kevin Kennedy, “Operation ANACONDA Virtual Staff Ride,” US Army Combat Studies Institute, Fort
Leavenworth, KS, July 2010, 64-69.
29
Richard Stewart, The United States Army in Afghanistan, Operation Enduring Freedom, October 2001-March
2002, CMH Publication 70-83-1 (Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military History, 2006), 43; Kevin
Kennedy, “Operation ANACONDA Virtual Staff Ride,” US Army Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth,
KS, July 2010, 93-100, 103.
47
30
Charles Briscoe et al., Weapon of Choice: US Army Special Operations Forces in Afghanistan (Fort Leavenworth,
KS: US Army Combat Studies institute Press, 2003), 322-324; Colonel Stephen Townsend, interview by
Contemporary Operations Study Team, US Army Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 11 May 2007, 3;
Lieutenant Colonel Patrick Stogran, interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, US Army Combat Studies
Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 5-15.
31
Colonel Stephen Townsend, interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, US Army Combat Studies
Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 11 May 2007, 6-11.
32
General Tommy Franks, American Soldier (New York: Harper-Collins Publishers Inc., 2004), 381.
33
Major General Franklin Hagenbeck quoted in Robert McElroy, “Afghanistan: Fire support for Operation
Anaconda,” Field Artillery, September/October 2002, 6.
34
3d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), “TF Rakkasan Operation ANACONDA: The Battle of Shah-iKot Valley, 2-13 March 2002,” Briefing, Slide 57.
35
Sean Naylor, Not a Good Day to Die: The Untold Story of Operation Anaconda (New York: The Berkley
Publishing Group, 2005), 173-176; Lester Grau and Dodge Billingsley, Operation Anaconda : America’s First
Major Battle in Afghanistan (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2011), 149.
36
Kevin Kennedy, “Operation ANACONDA Virtual Staff Ride,” US Army Combat Studies Institute, Fort
Leavenworth, KS, July 2010, 70-92.
37
Chief Warrant Officer 2 John Quinlan quoted in Boeing Rotorcraft Systems, “Pilot Reports from Afghanistan,”
Press Release, updated 21 January 2012, 5.
38
Colonel Scott Kubica, email correspondence with author, 27 February 2012, 1.
39
Colonel James Marye, email correspondence with author, 26 February 2012, 1-3.
40
Royal Marines Sergeant Darren Hughes quoted in Carlotta Gall, “Marines Say al-Qaeda Unable to Fight On,” The
Times, 6 May 2002, 15.
41
Brigadier Roger Lane quoted in Carlotta Gall, “Marines Say al-Qaeda Unable to Fight On,” The Times, 6 May
2002, 15.
48
HIGH, HOT and HEAVY:
THE CH-47 CHINOOK IN COMBAT ASSAULT OPERATIONS IN AFGHANISTAN
Chapter 4
HIGH/HOT/HEAVY COMBAT AIR ASSAULTS IN AFGHANISTAN 2002-2006
The CH-47 Chinook proved its mettle in high elevation combat air assault operations
during Operation ANACONDA. The ability of the aircraft to insert large numbers of troops and
equipment into mountainous Afghan terrain proved invaluable to Task Force Rakkasan’s success
in the Shahi Kowt Valley. Combined Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC), Rakkasan,
and Task Force Talon commanders realized and understood early-on that Chinooks would in all
likelihood be the aircraft of choice for OEF missions into high altitude HLZs.1
Operation MOUNTAIN LION I
“It’s important for Americans to know this war will not be quick and will not be easy…the
battles in Afghanistan are not over,” President George W. Bush told the crowd gathered for the
George C. Marshall ROTC Award Seminar on National Security at Virginia Military Institute in
April 2002. President Bush announced a new offensive campaign, code named Operation
MOUNTAIN LION, designed to “hunt down [remaining] al Qaeda and Taliban forces and keep
them on the run.”2 At the time of the President’s address, the 90-day operation to clear enemy
sanctuaries in Paktia, Paktika, and Oruzgan provinces was already underway. The CJTF
Mountain plan called for battalion or company sized units to conduct a series of air assault/full
49
spectrum operations in and around the key cities of Gardez, Khost, and Orgun-e, to kill/capture
Taliban and al Qaeda fighters, and to set the stage for the upcoming loya jirga that would elect a
transitional Afghan government.3
In the opening action of Operation MOUNTAIN LION, the 1st Battalion, 187th Infantry
air assaulted from Kandahar onboard CH-47 Chinooks to seize and clear a suspected enemy cave
and tunnel facility near the Zhawar Kili mountain range in Paktia province. The air assault was
unopposed, and the 1-187 IN Soldiers systematically cleared the complex then flew back to
Kandahar. During the spring of 2002, British and Canadian forces conducted a series of suboperations – PTARMIGAN, SNIPE, HARPOON, TORII, CONDOR, BUZZARD, and
CHEROKEE SKY – in support of the overall MOUNTAIN LION effort. Although three Royal
Air Force HC Mark II Chinooks from the 27th Squadron at RAF Odiham deployed to
Afghanistan, many of these allied operations were supported by CH-47 crews and aircraft from
the 7th Battalion, 101st Aviation Regiment and 1st Battalion, 159th Aviation Regiment, 18th
Aviation Brigade.
Chinooks, for example, flew soldiers from the 3d Battalion, Princess Patricia’s Light
Infantry Regiment on a sensitive site exploitation mission to the Tora Bora area during TORII in
May. More than 400 US, Canadian, and Afghan Soldiers were involved in TORII, which also
included a team of American forensic experts which collected DNA samples from
deceased/buried Taliban and al-Qaeda suspects. Also in May, four companies of Royal Marines
from the 45th Commando Regiment, TF Jacana, air assaulted into the mountains of Paktia
province during Operation CONDOR in search of Taliban fighters who had ambushed an
Australian Special Forces team. British Marines participating in Operation SNIPE conducted air
assaults into a region southeast of Khost, and in Operation BUZZARD at the end of the month,
50
TF Jacana returned by Chinook to Paktia to deny the Taliban freedom of movement between
Khost and the Pakistan border. Finally, in June 2002, military vehicles and US Black Hawk and
Chinook helicopters transported Canadian troops on a sweep of Zabol province designated
Operation CHEROKEE SKY to establish a coalition presence, gather intelligence, and foster
positive relations with local Afghan citizens. CHEROKEE SKY was the last of the Operation
MOUNTAIN LION missions.4
Air Assaults under Combined Joint Task Force-180
Lieutenant General Dan McNeill and Combined Joint Task Force-180 (CJTF-180) – XVIII
Airborne Corps – assumed responsibility for OEF Coalition operations in June 2002. Later that
summer, Combined Task Force (CTF) 82 – 82d Airborne Division – deployed to Afghanistan
and replaced the re-designated CTF Mountain, and the infantry units of the 10th Mountain and
101st Airborne Divisions returned home. Bravo Company, 159th Aviation Regiment and A
Company, 7th Battalion, 101st Airborne Division, the CH-47 Chinook units that had flown in
Operation ANACONDA and during the ensuing months, remained in Afghanistan to support
CTF 82 which established its headquarters at Bagram. Task Force Panther, CTF-82’s tactical
forces based at Kandahar, was comprised of two battalions from the 3d Brigade and one battalion
from the 1st Brigade, 82d Airborne Division.5
During the remainder of the summer 2002, TF Panther began establishing forward
operating bases (FOB) Salerno, Shkin, and Orgun-e in southeastern Afghanistan and soon began
an ongoing series of raids and cordon/search operations, nearly all of which were supported by
Chinooks. 82d Airborne Soldiers continuously air assaulted into small villages, such as Qiqay
south of Khost, in search of weapons and equipment left behind by enemy forces. On 10 August,
51
hundreds of paratroopers flew to the village of Malakay on the Pakistan border to search
buildings and confiscate weapons.6 In a June 2008 interview, Lieutenant General McNeill
described the TF Panther tactical campaign as a “rolling series of operations going on all the
time” to prevent the Taliban from reconstituting.7
CTF 82 and TF Panther next launched Operation MOUNTAIN SWEEP, the largest OEF
air assault mission since ANACONDA. Soldiers from the 1st and 3d Battalions, 505th Parachute
Infantry Regiment (505 PIR) launched onboard 7-101st Chinooks from Kandahar to HLZs
southwest of Gardez, near the villages of Dormat and Narizah, in search of Taliban fighters in
and around the Shahi Kowt Valley. Over the next six days, the Paratroopers air assaulted from
village to village in Paktia province’s Zormat district capturing Taliban sympathizers and
confiscating caches of enemy weapons, ammunition, and documents. More than 2,000 US and
Coalition forces participated in MOUNTAIN SWEEP, which once again made evident the
Chinook’s ability to quickly deliver overwhelming combat power into Taliban sanctuaries in
even the remotest regions of Afghanistan. During the five combat air assault missions, the CH47 helicopters were escorted by AH-64 Apache gunships. “The air assaults were complex, with
some requiring two lifts to get all the forces into the objective area,” CJTF-180 spokesman Major
Gary Tallman explained the day after MOUNTAIN SWEEP ended.8
During the fall of 2002, TF Panther Soldiers began moving out from Kandahar to the
newly established FOBs in Khost and Paktika provinces. The troops also continued their
progressive series of offensive sweeps supported in part by Chinooks for air assaults.9 During
Operation VILLAGE SEARCH in October, 3-505 PIR launched from FOB Salerno and searched
four high-desert villages along the Pakistan border for enemy fighter and weapons caches. In
November, CH-47s air assaulted Soldiers from 1-505 PIR into several villages surrounding
52
Bagram Air Base. Operation KOFI SOFI, which also included Chinook insertions and
extractions of troops in the nearby Kohe Safi Mountain range, was designed to eliminate
weapons and ammunition caches that were in close proximity to the base. Finally, in December,
CTF 82 conducted an air assault into the village of Shumace in Parwan province just twenty
miles northeast of Kabul. This mission was flown by pilots and crews from Charlie Company,
159th Aviation Regiment. The landing was unopposed, and once on the ground, the Soldiers
offered medical assistance and humanitarian aid to the local Afghan villagers.10
First Brigade, 82d Airborne – TF Devil – replaced TF Panther in January 2003. Soon after
arriving, TF Devil initiated Operation MONGOOSE, a Chinook air assault to search for Taliban
and to exploit cave facilities southeast of Kandahar in the Adi Ghar Mountains, near Spin
Boldak. Nearly 350 Coalition troops, including Soldiers from 2-504 PIR, cleared 75 caves in the
honeycombed complex before being extracted by CH-47s in early February.11 Less than two
weeks later 2-504 PIR air assaulted into the Baghran River Valley in search of Taliban leaders.
The intense village-by-village cordon and search conducted during Operation VIPER result in
the discovery of several weapons caches and the capture of eight suspected Taliban operatives.12
On 20 March, several CH-47s from C Company, 7th Battalion, 101st Airborne Division
participated in a night air assault into several HLZ in the Sami Ghar Mountains. Operation
VALIANT STRIKE was a two-battalion insertion into eastern Kandahar province involving
Soldiers from both the 2d and 3d Battalions, 504 PIR, along with Romanian and Afghan Army
forces. More than five-hundred 504 PIR and Special Operations Soldiers air assaulted into
Sangin, Helmand province, during Operation RESOLUTE STRIKE the following month.
During the remainder of spring 2003, Chinook pilots and crews took part in a number of
additional air assault missions in support of Operation UNIFIED VENTURE – US, Italian, and
53
Afghan troops inserted along the Pakistan border, Operation DELIBERATE STRIKE 37 miles
north of Kandahar, and Operation DRAGON FURY, in which US and Italian troops were
inserted back into the Shahi Kowt Valley.13
Task Force Warrior, comprised primarily of the 1st Brigade, 10th Mountain Division,
replaced TF Devil as CJTF-180’s principle tactical combat force in southern and southeastern
Afghanistan during the summer of 2003. TF Warrior included four light infantry battalions, a
typical assortment of supporting elements, and Coalition forces from Romania, France, and Italy.
CH-47 Chinook aviation support for Warrior air assault operations remained the responsibility of
C Company, 159th Aviation Regiment and newly arrived Detachment 1, B Company, 2d
Battalion, 104th Aviation Regiment, a Connecticut Army National Guard unit from Windsor
Locks.14 Although routine combat and stability operations were normally conducted within ten
to fifteen miles of the Forward Operating Bases at Salerno, Shkin, and Orgun-e, TF Warrior did
launch several large-scale, battalion-sized, combat insertions into remote regions significantly
distant from its FOBs.
On 30 August 2003 for example, to kick off Operation MOUNTAIN VIPER, Chinooks
inserted a company-sized unit from 2d Battalion, 22d Infantry into the mountainous region near
the village of Deh Chopan in Zabol province. The purpose of this air assault was to clear a
twenty square mile area east of the landing zone of Taliban fighters. The following day
additional 2-22 IN Soldiers air assaulted into HLZs north of the original site in pursuit of fleeing
Taliban elements. CH-47s flew the Quick Reaction Force from Kandahar to join the fighting on
1 September. Afghan National Army forces were then inserted by Chinook into the operation to
conduct patrols and establish checkpoints. Over the next few days, 2-22 IN conducted several
additional Chinook air assaults in the region while pursuing Taliban leaders and exploiting cave
54
complexes. By the end of the week, operations around Deh Chopan ended and CH-47s picked up
the 2-22 IN Soldiers and flew them back to Kandahar.15
During a night air assault on 6 November, Chinooks inserted A Company, B Company,
and 2d Platoon, C Company, 2-22 IN into the Hindu Kush Mountains near the village of
Namgalam, Nuristan Province. Operation MOUNTAIN RESOLVE was a hammer and anvil
mission with 2-22 IN sweeping north through the Waygal River Valley, thereby forcing al-Qaeda
and Taliban fighters into blocking positions established by Combined Joint Special Operations
Task Force (CJSOTF) elements. After six days, the 2-22 IN Soldiers were extracted by
Chinooks and returned to Bagram, only to be re-inserted into the same area of the Waygal for a
follow-up operation a week later.16 In December, Chinooks conducted dozens of air assaults in
support of four week long Operation MOUNTAIN AVALANCHE to “deny sanctuary and
disrupt the activities of terrorist forces simultaneously throughout the eastern, southeastern, and
southern regions of Afghanistan.”17 With four battalions and 2,000 Soldiers participating, “this
one is the largest [assaults] we have ever designed…the enemy isn’t going to know when we hit
and he isn’t going to know what we’re doing,” explained Lieutenant Colonel Bryan Hilferty,
spokesman for US military headquarters at Bagram Air Base.18
In Helmand province, Paratroopers from the 1st Battalion, 501st Infantry Regiment used
CH-47s for company-sized air assaults in Operation MOUNTAIN BLIZZARD during the winter
of 2004. Thousands of US, Coalition, and Afghan Army troops conducted patrols, raids, and
cordon-and-searches, discovered dozens of weapons and ammunition caches, and killed 22
enemy combatants in the operation which ended in March.19 “In Operation MOUNTAIN
BLIZZARD…Coalition forces have succeeded in finding and destroying scores of weapons
caches, placing numerous terrorists and other enemies of Afghanistan under control, and
55
establishing the conditions for security and stability,” Lieutenant Colonel Hilferty told Voice of
America News in mid-February.”20 In TF Warrior’s last major operation before redeploying
code-named MOUNTAIN STORM, 2-22 IN conduct five Chinook air assaults in conjunction
with several cordon and search missions in the vicinity of Kandahar.21 The overall operation was
conceived by Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan (CFC-A) the new senior military theater
strategic headquarters for OEF established at Kabul in October 2003. In addition to 2-22 IN’s
insertions at Kandahar, US Marines from the 22d Marine Expeditionary Unit and two battalions
of Afghan soldiers conducted a series of simultaneous assaults into the southern and southeastern
provinces “to crush anti-coalition forces along Afghanistan’s border with Pakistan.”22
New Tactical Headquarters – Combined Joint Task Force-76
CJTF-76 from the 25th Infantry Division replaced CJTF-180 as the Coalition’s operational
and tactical headquarters in May 2004. CH-47 Chinook air assault support for CJTF-76 was
provided at the time by B Company, 214th Aviation Regiment at Bagram and F Company, 131st
Aviation Regiment from the Alabama and Georgia Army National Guard at Kandahar.
Company F conducted missions throughout southern and southeastern Afghanistan in
conjunction with the 25th ID’s CTF Bronco, which included 2d Battalion, 5th Infantry (TF
Bobcat), 2d Battalion 35th Infantry (TF Cacti), the Romanian 281th Infantry Regiment, plus
additional supporting units. F Company had 14 CH-47s and was a component of TF
Diamondhead (2-25 AVN), which was subordinate to TF Wings – one of six CJTF-76 task forces
– that was responsible for all Army aviation coverage in Afghanistan.
During their deployment F Company Soldiers conducted approximately 200 air assault
missions, the largest of which required was the attack of a suspected Taliban training facility that
56
involved twelve Chinooks, six Apaches, and four Black Hawks. Coalition and Afghan Soldiers
were picked up at both Kandahar and FOB Gereshk and flown north to a suspected Taliban
training facility along the Helmand River. The Chinooks then landed the troops in ten separate
HLZs on both sides and in the middle of the valley. The training site was cleared without
resistance and the Soldiers were extracted the following day. Chinook crews and aircraft stood
continuous Quick Reaction Force (QRF) duty at Kandahar. The same day and night crews
served in this capacity 24/7 for a week at a time. Numerous air assault, insertion, and extraction
missions were conducted by the Chinook crews in the QRF role. The Company also flew
general support missions for the 22d Marine Expeditionary Unit at FOB Ripley in Oruzgan
Province. Chinooks from F Company inserted TF Cacti Soldiers into the Arghandab Valley on a
cordon and search operation north of Kandahar in July.23
Later, in October 2004, A Company, 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry was ambushed and pinned
down at Baylough Daychopan in Zabol Province. Taliban controlled the mountains surrounding
the town and attacked A Company with heavy machine gun fire, rocket propelled grenades, and
mortars during five straight days of fighting. If the Soldiers tried to escape in their own vehicles,
they would have been destroyed. Chinook crews from F Company volunteered to conduct the
emergency rescue mission. In adverse weather conditions and under enemy fire, a flight of
Chinooks landed in hot HLZs and extracted the A Company Soldiers and their equipment in less
than 15 seconds. Following the successful extraction, the appreciative A Company commander,
Captain Peter Farrell, explained, “There were no go-arounds, no missed hook ups, and despite all
that was going on around them, they managed to get our people off the ground and back home
safely.”24 During the winter 2005, F Company Chinooks and TF Bobcat Soldiers conducted
additional air assaults into Sha Wali Kot District of Kandahar Province, Mirabad in Helmand,
57
and the Bahguchar Valley in Oruzgan Province.25 Pilots, crew members, and support teams from
F Company returned to Georgia and Alabama in March 2005.
Also in March 2005, the Southern European Task Force (SETAF) replaced the 25th
Infantry Division as the CJTF-76 headquarters element. Although several operations were
initiated, such as DETERMINED RESOLVE, LIGHTNING FREEDOM, VIGILANT
SENTINEL, COUNTERSTRIKE, and SECURE PROSPERITY, to disrupt any potential Taliban
resurgence and set conditions for the September Afghan parliamentary and provincial elections,
none required Chinook combat air assault support. SETAF controlled all US tactical ground
forces in Regional Commands South and East. The 173d Airborne Brigade Combat Team, CTF
Bayonet, at Kandahar was responsible for RC-South, while 1st Brigade, 82d Airborne Division,
CTF Devil, directed operations in RC-East from Bagram Air Base.
The principal focus at this time was the less kinetic pillars of counterinsurgency operations
rather than fighting Taliban. As described by CTF Bayonet commander Colonel Kevin Owen,
the emphasis was on providing “a secure environment for the Afghan people…to allow
governance to develop and economic initiatives to take hold.”26 Soldiers moved off of the FOBs
into the villages, took responsibility for specific AOs, and lived among the Afghans. For the
paratroopers of 2d Battalion, 504th Infantry in RC-East this experience was significantly
different from that of their first OEF deployment. Previously 2-504 Infantry was more mobile –
a small unit would air assault into an objective area, fight for several days, fly back to the FOB,
and do the same thing over again in a different location a week or so later.27 For 1st Battalion,
325th Infantry, responsible for Wardak, Lowgar, and portions of Ghazni and Paktika Provinces,
all movements were on foot or by HMMWV – the battalion never conducted a single air assault
mission.28
58
Taliban Resurgence
By the time the 10th Mountain Division assumed command of CJTF-76 in February 2006,
the Taliban had begun a surprisingly resilient resurgence. To thwart the Taliban buildup, the
Caolition undertook a second Operation MOUNTAIN LION designed to clear, hold, build and
engage in the Pech River Valley, Marawara district, Kunar Province. Nearly 2,500 US Soldiers,
Marines, and Afghans from the 3d Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain (TF Spartan), the 1st
Battalion, 3d Marine Regiment (TF Lava), and the ANA 203d Corps, participated in the
operation. CH-47 Chinook air assault support in Afghanistan at this time was provided by 3d
Battalion, 10th General Support Aviation Brigade and B Company, 7th Battalion, 158th Aviation
Regiment, an Army Reserve heavy lift company from Kansas.
Prior to the official launch of MOUNTAIN LION, Soldiers from 1st Battalion, 32d
Infantry, TF Chosin, infiltrated to blocking positions in the valley. Then at H-hour, 11 April,
Coalition forces conducted a pre-dawn air-ground assault into the Korengal and Shuryak Valleys
in search of Taliban sanctuaries. At the same time, Marines and B Company, 1st Battalion, 32d
Infantry air assaulted into an area 20 miles west of Kunar’s provincial capital of Asadabad near
Sawtalo Sar Mountain to seal off potential Korengal escape routes. By the end of June 2006,
having successfully cleared the valleys of Taliban fighters, Coalition forces began establishing a
permanent presence in the formerly disputed region. The CH-47 combat air assaults during
operation MOUNTAIN LION were conducted by pilots and crews from B Company, 3-10
AVN.29
To set the stage for the takeover of RC-South by NATO-International Security Assistance
Forces, CJTF-76 initiated Operation MOUNTAIN THRUST in May 2006 to drive Taliban
59
insurgents from sanctuaries in Kandahar, Helmand, Zabol, and Oruzgan Provinces. Ten
thousand Coalition and Afghan forces participated in the operation, in which movement was
conducted primarily by ground vehicles or on foot. As a precaution, however, several CH-47
Chinooks from 3-10 AVN were re-positioned from Bagram to augment those of B Company, 7158 AVN already at Kandahar. As MOUNTAIN THRUST unfolded, the Chinooks were utilized
increasingly for a wide variety of re-supply and air assault missions. In late May, for example,
2d Battalion, 4th Brigade Combat Team (TF Warrior) conducted a Chinook air assault into the
Chalekor Valley, Deh Chopan district, in northern Zabol Province in support of the arrival of a
Romanian battalion.30
Next in June, CH-47s inserted a Quick Reaction Force from A Company, British 3d
Parachute Battalion to help rescue a logistics convoy that had been ambushed near Sangin in the
Helmand River Valley. The next day, C Company, 2d Battalion, 87th Infantry, led by Captain
Jared Wilson, drove out to the ambush site and led the stricken convoy back to Musa Qal’eh.
Chinooks extracted the 3d Para QRF and returned them to FOB Robinson. On 17 June,
Chinooks inserted 170 Soldiers from Wilson’s company onto Hill 1999, which offered a
commanding view of the Baghran Valley. Two days later, C/2-87 successfully fought off an
attack by 60 Taliban fighters. The company was subsequently extracted by Chinooks on 5 July
and flown to Musa Qal’eh.31 Finally, in a follow-on operation designated MOUNTAIN FURY,
two TF Warrior companies conducted Chinook air assaults into eastern Ghazni Province to
establish blocking positions in Andar district.32 “We did all of our air assaults with Chinooks,”
Lieutenant Colonel Frank Sturek, TF Warrior commander said. “We put sniper teams on MGator utility vehicles, loaded them last, so they could be first off the ramp…after landing they
60
would race to the high ground…set up an overwatch…while the rest of the platoon established a
perimeter,” Sturek explained.33
From March to October 2006, Bravo Company, 7th Battalion, 158th Aviation Regiment
conducted 1,000 missions, logged more than 7,700 flight hours, and carried 25 million tons of
men and equipment in support of the 10th Mountain Division in RC-South. Shortly after
mobilizing, B Company was diverted to Pakistan to provide several months of humanitarian
assistance following the October 2005 earthquake. Once in Afghanistan, the 230 member
company became the heavy lift component of Task Force Knighthawk at Kandahar. Pilots and
crews began flying day and night missions immediately in support of US and Coalition forces –
British, Canadian, French, and Afghan – along the ring route, which included FOBs, COPs, and
other outposts, such as Cobra, Anaconda, Tarin Kowt, Deh Chopan, Robinson, Gereshk, Qalat,
and Spin Boldak.34
Two or three Bravo Company Chinooks stood QRF duty each day and night. During one
high priority QRF mission, US Special Forces and Afghan military personnel were inserted into
an area near the Kajaki Dam about 100 miles northwest of Kandahar City. The landings created
an enormous brownout, but the Chinooks were in and out in 30 seconds. With the Chinooks
capacity to haul large numbers of Soldiers, “you could surround a village in no time…it was
going to be a bad day for somebody,” Bravo Company commander, Lieutenant Colonel Walter
Bradley explained in a post-deployment interview. “We’d move quickly, often conduct our
briefings on a dirt patch, and give the ground commander whatever he wanted,” Bradley
continued.35 Three and often four Bravo Company Chinooks flew the air assault missions during
Operations MOUNTAIN LION, MOUNTAIN THRUST, and MOUNTAIN FURY, described
above. The company returned to Kansas in October 2006.
61
Lieutenant Colonel John O’Brien, Post Historian, Fort Campbell, KY, interview by the author, 14 March 2012, 1;
Colonel Wiercinski, TF Rakkasan commander, realized the critical importance of CH-47s during pre-deployment
mission analysis planning at Fort Campbell in the fall of 2001.
2
President George W. Bush, “President Outlines War Effort,” Remarks at the George C. Marshall ROTC Award
Seminar on National Security at Virginia Military Institute, Lexington, VA, 17 April 2002, 3.
3
CJTF Mountain, Headquarters, 10th Mountain Division, Afghanistan and Operation ANACONDA Brief, undated,
Slides 41 and 42; Donald Wright et al., A Different Kind of War (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute
Press, 2010), 184-185.
4
Boeing Rotorcraft Systems, “Waging the War Against Terrorism: A Fight in Afghanistan,” Press Release, 18
February 2012, 4-1, 4-5, 6-1, 6-2; Lieutenant Colonel Patrick Stogran, interview by Contemporary Operations Study
Team, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 18 May 2007; Donald Wright et al., A Different Kind of
War (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2010), 185-187.
5
Donald Wright et al., A Different Kind of War (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2010), 209211.
6
Boeing Rotorcraft Systems, “Waging the War Against Terrorism: A Fight in Afghanistan,” Press Release, 18
February 2012, 10-2; Donald Wright et al., A Different Kind of War (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies
Institute Press, 2010), 211.
7
General Dan McNeill, interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Combat Studies Institute, Fort
Leavenworth, KS, 16 June 2008, 10.
8
Jim Garamone, “Coalition Forces Complete Operation MOUNTAIN SWEEP,” American Forces Press Service, 26
August 2002, 1; Boeing Rotorcraft Systems, “Waging the War Against Terrorism: A Fight in Afghanistan,” Press
Release, 18 February 2012, 10-4 to 10-6.
9
Although Chinooks participated in these air assaults, the majority were conducted by Black Hawks - Brigadier
General Martin Schweitzer, email correspondence with author, 17 March 2012, 1; see also David Zucchino, “The
Changing Face of Battle,” Los Angeles Times, 13 October 2002, 1-7,
http://articles.latimes.com/2002/oct/13/world/fg-82nd13 (accessed 16 March 2012).
10
Donald Wright et al., A Different Kind of War (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2010), 215216; Boeing Rotorcraft Systems, “Waging the War Against Terrorism: A Fight in Afghanistan,” Press Release, 18
February 2012, 12-2, 13-1.
11
HK94 Team Administration, “Operation MONGOOSE: Cave Clearing Taliban Strongholds,” 26 February 2003,
1-2, http://www.hk94.com/weblog/archives/75 (accessed 17 March 2012); Boeing Rotorcraft Systems, “Waging the
War Against Terrorism: A Fight in Afghanistan,” Press Release, 18 February 2012, 14-1.
12
Heike Hasenauer, “The War on Terror,” Soldiers, September 2003, 27.
13
Specialist Marie Schult, “Operation VALIANT STRIKE,” ARMY, May 2003, 59-60; Jim Garamone, “Errant
Bomb Kills 11 Afghan Civilians,” American Forces Press Service, 9 April 2003, 1; StrategyPage, “Operation
UNIFIED VENTURE,” 6 May 2003, 1, http://www.strategypage.com/qnd/afghan/articles/20030506.aspx (accessed
17 March 2012; Jim Garamone, “US, Italian Forces Launch Strike in Afghanistan,” American Forces Press Service,
4 June 2003, 1; Boeing Rotorcraft Systems, “Waging the War Against Terrorism: A Fight in Afghanistan,” Press
Release, 18 February 2012, 14-6.
14
According to Colonel (Ret) John Whitford, PAO, Connecticut National Guard, B Company, 2d Battalion, 104th
Aviation Regiment did not participate in air assault operations during its 2003 deployment to Afghanistan –
interview by the author, 26 March 2012, 1.
15
Department of Defense, “DEFEND AMERICA: Afghanistan Update,” 19 August – 17 September, 2003, 1-6,
http://www.defendamerica.mil/afghanistan/update/sep2003/au091703.html (accessed 18 March 2010); Boeing
Rotorcraft Systems, “Waging the War Against Terrorism: A Fight in Afghanistan,” Press Release, 18 February
2012, 14-8; Donald Wright et al., A Different Kind of War (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press,
2010), 252-253.
16
Sergeant Greg Heath, “10th Division Shows Its Mettle in Operation MOUNTAIN RESOLVE,” The Mountaineer
Online, 26 November 2003, 1-2, http://www.drum.army.mil/mountaineer/Article.aspx?ID=3423 (accessed 19 March
2012); Boeing Rotorcraft Systems, “Waging the War Against Terrorism: A Fight in Afghanistan,” Press Release, 18
February 2012, 15-1.
17
CJTF-180 statement quoted in Liz Sly, US Launches New Afghan Ground Offensive,” Chicago Tribune, 9
December 2003, 4.
18
Lieutenant Colonel Bryan Hilferty quoted in “US Launches Largest Offensive to Date against Taliban, al-Qaeda,”
ArmyTimes.com, 8 December 2003, 1, http://www.armytimes.com/legacy/new/1-292925-2460750.php (accessed 19
1
62
March 2012); Boeing Rotorcraft Systems, “Waging the War Against Terrorism: A Fight in Afghanistan,” Press
Release, 18 February 2012, 15-2.
19
Colonel Harry C. Glenn III, interview by the author, 19 March 2012, 1; Combined Forces Command Afghanistan
(CFC-A), “Operation MOUNTAIN BLIZZARD has successfully ended here and Operation MOUNTAIN STORM
has Begun,” News Release, 13 March 2004, 1.
20
Lieutenant Colonel Bryan Hilferty quoted in Ayaz Gul, “US Troops Arrest Dozens of Suspected Insurgents in
Afghanistan,” VOANews.com, 16 February 2004, http://www.voanews.com/english/news/a-13-a-2004-02-16-11US-66340037.html (accessed 19 March 2012).
21
Colonel Joseph Dichairo, interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Combat Studies Institute, Fort
Leavenworth, KS, 27 August 2007, 11.
22
Terry Boyd, “Troops in Afghanistan Preparing Spring Offensive in Pursuit on Insurgents,” Stars and Stripes, 10
March 2004, http://www.stripes.com/news/troops-in-afghanistan-preparing-spring-offensive-in-pursuit-ofinsurgents-1.17447 (accessed 19 March 2012); Donald Wright et al., A Different Kind of War (Fort Leavenworth,
KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2010), 253.
23
Chief Warrant Officer 4 Jeffrey Hutchinson, Chief Warrant Officer 3 William Johnson, Chief Warrant Officer 4
Timothy Lidson, Chief Warrant Officer 4 Mark Morris, and Chief Warrant Officer 3 Duane Sandbothe, group
interview by the author, 14 March 2012, 1-3; Boeing Rotorcraft Systems, “Waging the War Against Terrorism: A
Fight in Afghanistan,” Press Release, 18 February 2012, 16-1.
24
Captain Peter Farrell quoted in Georgia Department of Defense, “Aviators Rescue Soldiers from Besieged
Afghan Town,” First Friday Briefing, 3 December 2004, 1-2,
http://www.dod.state.ga.us/firstfridayonline/dec04/pages/ch47.htm (accessed 20 March 2012).
25
Task Force 2-5 Bobcat’s Newsletter, March 2005, 1, 5, http://www.bobcat.ws/Task%20Force%2025%20NewsletterMar.pdf (accessed 20 March 2012).
26
Colonel Kevin Owens, interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Combat Studies Institute, Fort
Leavenworth, KS, 9 and 10 December 2008, 9.
27
Colonel George T. Donovan, Jr., interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Combat Studies Institute,
Fort Leavenworth, KS, 21 January 2009, 27.
28
Colonel David P. Anders, interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Combat Studies Institute, Fort
Leavenworth, KS, 14 January 2009, 6, 11-12.
29
“Coalition Launches Operation MOUNTAIN LION in Afghanistan,” Armed Forces Press Service, 12 April 2006,
1; Sergeant Joseph Lindsay, USMC, “Operation MOUNTAIN LION Roars into Korengal Valley,” Armed Forces
Press Service, 8 May 2006, 1; Colonel Michael A. Coss, “Operation Mountain Lion: CJTF-76 in Afghanistan,
Spring 2006,” Military Review (January-February 2008), 22-29; Chief Warrant Officer 4 Gary Ossinger, interview
by the author, 10 March 2012, 2.
30
Lieutenant Colonel Frank Sturek, interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Combat Studies Institute,
Fort Leavenworth, KS, 16 October 2008, 15-17.
31
Major Jared Wilson, interview by the author, 23 March 2012, 1.
32
Lieutenant Colonel Frank Sturek, interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Combat Studies Institute,
Fort Leavenworth, KS, 16 October 2008, 3-4.
33
Lieutenant Colonel Frank Sturek, interview by the author, 23 March 2012, 1.
34
Corporation for Public Broadcasting, “America at a Crossroads: Kansas to Kandahar,” Press Release, July 2006,
1-2; Lieutenant Colonel Walter Bradley, interview by the author, 9 March 2012, 1-5.
35
Lieutenant Colonel Walter Bradley, interview by the author, 9 March 2012, 2.
63
HIGH, HOT and HEAVY:
THE CH-47 CHINOOK IN COMBAT ASSAULT OPERATIONS IN AFGHANISTAN
Chapter 5
HIGH/HOT/HEAVY COMBAT AIR ASSAULTS IN AFGHANISTAN 2007-2011
Operation Enduring Freedom organizational and command level changes in 2006 and
2007 affected the number of combat operations and air assaults conducted by Coalition forces.
In October 2006, NATO/ISAF assumed responsibility for RC-East, after taking control of RCSouth the previous July as described in Chapter 4. By the end of 2006, ISAF was responsible for
all five contiguous commands in Afghanistan.1 As a consequence, CFC-A was deactivated in
February 2007, and CJTF-76 (10th Mountain Division) became the ISAF headquarters for RCEast. At the same time, 4th BCT, 82d Airborne (TF Fury) at FOB Salerno assumed
responsibility for the RC-East southern provinces, leaving 3d BCT, 10th Mountain (TF Spartan)
at Jalalabad to cover the northern provinces. CJTF-76 was then re-designated CJTF-82, with
arrival of the 82d Airborne Division headquarters element in March. Finally in June, the 173d
Airborne Brigade Combat Team (TF Bayonet) relieved TF Spartan. TF Bayonet units were split
up, with Soldiers eventually operating from eighteen satellite bases in Kunar and Nuristan
Provinces.2
ISAF launched a number of Coalition operations, such as HOOVER, HAMMER,
ACHILLES, SILVER, SILICON, HARAKATE YOLO, COMMANDO FURY, and
64
SNAKEBITE in 2007. The Battle of Musa Qala, the largest engagement of the year, involved
primarily US, Afghan and British troops. A Chinook detachment from B Company, 3d General
Support Aviation Battalion, 82d Combat Aviation Brigade with four Chinooks at Kandahar
provided critical support to the numerous FOBs and COPs throughout RC-South. During
Operation FURIOUS PURSUIT, Bravo Company, 3d GSAB inserted 400 Soldiers from 1st
Battalion, 508th PIR into an area in the Helmand River Valley known as the ‘heart of darkness’
in a four-Chinook air assault in April 2007. This operation, which cleared enemy fighters from
the village of Sangin and liberated two British forward operating bases that were under siege,
also included Afghan, Estonian, Dutch, Canadian, British and US Special Operations Forces.3
Sadly, two pilots and three crew members from B Company, along with two passengers, were
killed during a night air assault when their CH-47 was shot down in the Upper Sangin Valley,
Helmand Province, on 30 May 2007. The aircraft was second in a flight of three. Landing and
unloading troops at the HLZ was uneventful, however upon lift-off, the CH-47 was hit below the
cockpit and between the right main and rear auxiliary fuel tanks with rocket propelled grenades.
The aircraft nosed over immediately and crashed.4
Regional Command – East Air Assaults
In RC-East, a second B Company detachment flew dozens of air assault missions in
support of TF Fury and TF Bayonet Soldiers in the Waygal and Pitigal Valleys, Nuristan
Province, and the Korengal and Chowkay Valleys in Kunar Province.5 In July 2007 for example,
1st Squadron, 91st Cavalry Regiment Soldiers air assaulted onboard Chinooks into HLZ
Shetland, located at the 10,000 foot level in the mountains of Nuristan Province. The purpose of
the mission, called Operation SARAY HAS, was to search for Taliban who had been firing
missiles at FOB Naray from the mountain-top villages of Badermashal and Cherigal. Although
65
the Taliban shooters were not discovered, the mission was considered a success. “We came up
here to…deny the enemy use of the hilltop,” Headquarters and Headquarters Troop executive
officer, First Lieutenant Christopher Richelderfer said before the Soldiers were extracted from
the mountain.6
Next in August, 2d Battalion, 503d Infantry Regiment and Afghan National Army
elements conducted a night Chinook air assault onto a 7,000 foot mountain overlooking the
Chowkay Valley. The TF Bayonet mission, designated “Destined Strike,” used CH-47s to
ensure that the Soldiers could quickly seize the high ground above the valley. At daybreak, the
troops moved down the mountain and began sweeping villages in the valley. After five days, the
operation was completed and the Soldiers were extracted by Chinooks.7 Afghan and TF Bayonet
Soldiers air assaulted into three remote villages in the Pitigal Valley along the Pakistan border in
search of Taliban leaders in September. Twenty Taliban fighters were killed and 11 captured
during this operation, in which a bombmaking factory was also discovered. 8
A second CH-47 Chinook detachment deployed to Afghanistan in September 2007.
Detachment 1, B Company, 3d Battalion, 126th Aviation Regiment, comprised of pilots, crews,
and support personnel from the New York and Maryland Army National Guard, split their assets
sending two aircraft to Kandahar, two to FOB Salerno, and four to Bagram.9 The Guardsmen
arrived just in time to participate in TF Bayonet’s Operation ROCK AVALANCHE, a series of
multiple-company night sequenced air assaults into the Chapa Dara, Shuryak, Pech, Watapor,
and Korengal River Valleys, all of which were Taliban strongholds in Kunar Province.
Paratroopers from all four 2-503 IN companies were positioned, then, re-positioned, at different
times and into different locations throughout Kunar in an effort to drive Taliban fighters from
66
safe haven and into the open. A total of eight Chinooks flew dozens of day and night air assault
lifts over the course of the seven-day operation.10
Beginning in mid-October Soldiers from Bravo Company, 2-503 IN, conducted a
coordinated air assault of the Abas Ghar ridgeline that dominated the Korengal Valley. This was
the same area, known as the Valley of Death, where in 2005 a Chinook had been shot down
killing all 16 passengers onboard. Alpha Company air assaulted onto Phase Line Ridgeway,
7,500 feet above the Shuryak and Pech Valleys near the village of Aybot. The heavy-weapons
platoon from D Company also air assaulted onto a nearby ridgeline with its 40 mm MK19
grenade launcher, M2 machine guns, and 81 mm mortar tubes. “I’ve never air assaulted with a
MK19 before,” said grenadier Specialist David Hooker after setting up his firing position near
the HLZ.11 Operation ROCK AVALANCHE ended successfully on 25 October 2007 with
scores of Taliban insurgents killed during numerous firefights and other sustained contacts.
In December 2007, two additional Chinooks from B Company 3-126th were repositioned
to FOB Salerno to participate in operation DEADWOOD, designed to capture Taliban leaders
and disrupt enemy in the Khost Bowl. This was a complicated night air assault mission
involving US Special Forces, Afghan commandos, Chinooks, Black Hawks, and Apaches. The
assault teams struck three different locations on the same night. The air assault plan was unusual
in that, depending upon the objective, different aircraft would take the flight lead as the entire
packaged moved from one HLZ to the next. “We did this to support the ground commander’s
intent,” explained Captain Eric Fritz, OIC of the Chinook contingent at Salerno. In one
insertion, Chinooks landed within feet of a targeted house – 60 troops instantly surrounded the
building. “This is the advantage of using Chinooks for assaults,” Fritz said, “you can use
67
surprise and mass against the insurgents giving them little time to react.”12 Prior to conducting
the operation, the assault team practiced the mission during a flying rehearsal on Christmas Day.
Chinook pilots and crews from B Company, 3-126th, at FOB Salerno took part in an
additional large air assault mission, designated COMMANDO RECON, in April 2008. Four
CH-47s inserted 100 US Special Forces Soldiers and Afghan commandos into 10,000 foot-high
HLZs in the Afghanistan elephant trunk area, eastern Ghazni Province. One Chinook landed an
team on the highest mountain top in the objective area to provide overwatch for the operation.
“This was a pure CH-47D air assault with four Chinooks, 2 AH-64 Ds and a C-130 gunship for
cover,” Captain Fritz later wrote.13
Back in RC-South Chinook crews from both B Company, 3d GSAB, 82d CAB and
Detachment 1, B Company, 3d Battalion, 126th Aviation Regiment flew missions in support of
the aviation task force at Kandahar, TF Corsair, 2d Battalion, 82d CAB. These missions
typically involved routine re-supply, but also included 2-3 aircraft air assaults with ISAF forces –
either, US, British, Australian, Dutch, Canadian, or Afghan – in search of high value Taliban
targets or enemy weapons caches.14 After weeks of high-level planning, however, ISAF
launched Operation SNAKEPIT in December 2007 to retake the Taliban-occupied town of Musa
Qala in Helmand Province. Thousands of NATO and Afghan forces massed south of the town,
while 600 Soldiers from 1st Battalion, 508th Parachute Infantry Regiment conducted a lateafternoon air assault to seize Roshan Hill on the north side. Chinooks, Black Hawks, and
Apaches – nineteen helicopters in all – participated in SNAKEPIT air assault, which was one of
the largest in Afghanistan since Operation ANACONDA. Although some fierce fighting
occurred at Musa Qala, the Taliban slipped away and ISAF troops gained control of the town
within three days.15
68
Anatomy of the Chinook Air Assault during the Battle of Musa Qala16
On 2 December, two Chinooks from B Company, 3-82d AVN flew from Bagram to
Kandahar to temporarily join TF Corsair for the air assault on Musa Qala, referred to
alternatively as Operation SNAKEPIT and/or Operation MAR KARARDAD. At a preliminary
briefing the following day, critical aspects of the operation involving objectives, intentions,
responsibilities, scheduling, sequencing, forces available, and the enemy situation were presented
and discussed. The initial plan stipulated the insertion of three companies from 1st Battalion,
508th PIR into an area north of Musa Qala. Three separate helicopter lift serials, each
accompanied by AH-64 Apaches, were called for in the plan. Serial one consisted of four US
Chinooks; four British Chinooks made up serial two; and two Dutch Chinooks, along with four
US Black Hawks, comprised serial three. Additional Black Hawks were slated to provide
overhead command and control.
An additional planning session took place on the morning of 4 December, followed by a
final synchronization meeting involving dozens of US, British, and Dutch representatives in the
afternoon. That evening, the entire plan for SNAKEPIT, including a minute-by-minute
overview, was briefed to the CJTF-82 command and staff. Additional critical details, such as
ISR data, fire support, radio call signs/frequencies, and the final timeline, had been fleshed out
and were presented during the command briefing. The original plan for a night insertion was
revised such that all landings would now occur during daylight. This change was made to
accommodate British concerns regarding low illumination cycles and night vision systems
issues.17
69
On 5 December (D-2), TF Corsair conducted the Air Mission Briefing in which the
operational plan was first presented to the pilots and crews who would actually fly the air assault
mission. Photos of the HLZ, a large open wadi north of town, were presented and reviewed.
The enemy situation was described in more detail – Musa Qala was a center of insurgent activity,
numerous foreign fighters were in the area, and the Taliban were heavily armed and willing to
fight. Additional important information regarding weather conditions, flight sequencing, air
routes, abort/down aircraft/go around procedures, rules of engagement, and the ground force
(approximately 375 Soldiers from 1-508th) scheme of maneuver was also formally presented.
Later in the day, the same briefing was presented to all of the flight crews from all three nations,
more than 100 attendees, during the official Air Crew Mission Brief held in the TF Corsair
motor pool building. Following this briefing, the motor pool floor was used for a ‘rock drill,’ in
which the pilots and crews walked through the air assault, studied the timelines, reviewed their
roles and responsibilities, and considered several contingency scenarios.
During update briefings the evening of 5 December and next morning, SNAKEPIT
participants were kept up to date on progress of the British and Afghan ground operation south of
Musa Qala. They were also informed that the entire mission had been compromised by an
Afghan informant working at Kandahar Air Field and that the Taliban would be waiting with
heavy weapons to attack the air assault helicopters. It was anticipated that the Taliban would
remain undercover to avoid the Apaches and any preparatory fires, then pop up and begin firing
as the aircraft were on final approach. During a loading rehearsal later in the day, 1-508th
Soldiers practiced getting on and off the helicopters. It was determined during this routine
exercise that the original load plan, 40 troops per Chinook or 35 troops plus an M-Gator, was
impractical. With the approval of the 1-508th battalion commander, the load factor was
70
subsequently reduced to 30 Soldiers per Chinook. That evening, all of the air and ground forces
slated to conduct the air assault gathered in a large hangar for the final Combined Arms
Rehearsal which gave everyone involved the opportunity to review the plan for the last time.
On D-Day morning, 7 December 2007, a Predator drone feed spotted Taliban vehicles in
the proposed HLZ. Further observation indicated that the enemy fighters were planting IEDs
along the primitive roadway that ran through the wadi. Although it was obvious at this point that
the Taliban new exactly where the air assault aircraft would be landing, the mission was not
cancelled or changed. At mid-day, the Paratroopers assembled on the tarmac for a final briefing
before boarding the helicopters. The aircrews conduct one last briefing as well.
At 1520, the Apaches and C2 Black Hawks in serial one lift off. Next, five US Chinooks
carrying the main effort 1-508th ground force launched, followed thereafter by two US Black
Hawks and four British Chinooks, and lastly by four more US Black Hawks and two Dutch
Chinooks. When the aircraft were 20 minutes out from landing, preparatory fires, including a
salvo of guided multiple rocket launched missiles, hit suspected Taliban target in and around the
HLZ. Unfortunately, due to the convoluted USAF approval process, anticipated preparatory air
strikes never materialized. As a result, Taliban firing positions threatening the air assault egress
route were not attacked and destroyed as planned. With just a few minutes remaining before the
lead Chinooks were scheduled to land, the Air Assault Mission Commander, Colonel Kelly
Thomas flying overhead in the C2 Black Hawk, ordered the entire flight to divert to an
alternative HLZ over two miles away. All of the landings and departures at the alternate HLZ
were uneventful and uncontested. The paratroopers then conducted a night movement to their
originally assigned initial objectives.
71
By the next day, all three 1-508th companies were in contact with Taliban resistors.
Apaches provided overhead fire support, while Chinooks began a seemingly endless series of
day and night resupply missions. Nearly all the aircraft were fired upon, and three Apaches were
hit, but not seriously damaged. By 10 December, the US ground forces had reached their
primary objectives outside of Musa Qala and began preparations for the planned battle handoff to
Afghan troops. Over the next four weeks, the transition of responsibility to the Afghans was
postponed several times. Finally, during the second week of January 2008, the 1-508th Soldiers
were extracted by Chinooks and returned to Kandahar.
Changes in Regional Command - East
An additional series of troop rotations took place in 2008. In mid-January, the 101st
Combat Aviation Brigade – TF Destiny – replaced the 82d CAB at Bagram. The headquarters of
the 82d Airborne division was relieved in April by the 101st Airborne Division. The new
headquarters became CJTF 101 and assumed command of operations in RC-East. At the same
time, the 4th BCT, 101st ABN replaced the 4th BCT, 82d ABN; and in July, the 3d BCT, 1st
Infantry Division relieved the 173d Airborne Brigade, thereby retaining the two brigade force
structure arrangement in RC-East. CH-47 combat air assault support during this period was
provided by B Company, 6th Battalion, 101st Aviation Regiment and B Company, 7th Battalion,
101st Aviation Regiment, 159th Combat Aviation Brigade, which had recently begun flying the
upgraded ‘F’ model Chinook.
ISAF and CJTF 101 operations in RC-East during 2008 focused primarily on clear, hold,
and build activities. As a result, the number of RC-East platoon and company FOBs and COBs
had grown to 35 by 2008.18 Many of these facilities were in remote locations often inaccessible
72
by road, thus increasing the ground troops’ dependence on helicopters – principally Chinooks –
for resupply and general support. Combat air assaults during this timeframe were typically
company-sized or smaller and often included Afghan forces. After Taliban overran the Bari Alai
Afghan outpost in Kunar province on 1 May, for example, an ANA commando company, along
with US Special Forces advisers, conducted a Chinook air assault into the nearby Helgal Valley
in an effort to block the escaping insurgents.19
In July 2008, B Company, 1-506 IN and a company of Afghan soldiers air assaulted into
the Tangi Valley, Wardak Province, to block a Taliban force that had ambushed a 203d Afghan
Corps jingle truck convoy.20 Later, during Operation MANE – a major offensive in the Jalrez
and Nerkh Valleys in October – the 1-506 IN battalion TAC, the Scout and Mortar Platoons, and
an Afghan platoon air assaulted by Chinook onto an over-watch position near the Jalrez district
center. A platoon from C Company then conducted a night air assault to reinforce blocking
positions in the Nerkh near FOB Airborne. An estimated 180 Taliban were killed or wounded in
firefights and air strikes during the two-day operation.21 After replacing 1-506 IN in Wardak in
February 2009, 2d Battalion, 87th Infantry continued conducting air assault operation in and
around the worrisome Tangi Valley. During a two battalion operation in March, 2-87 IN began
sweeping the valley from the north end, while 3-71 Cav entered from the south. At the same
time Afghan commandos with Special Forces advisers air assaulted onboard Chinooks deep into
the valley in search of Taliban leaders. Enemy resistance was light and the two-day Tangi sweep
concluded after the two battalions met near the Lowgar-Wardak provincial border.22
“We did dozens of air assaults with Chinooks in my year over there 2008-2009…there
were a whole series of DEVIL, VIPER, SPADER, ROCK, and other operations, including about
a dozen more CJSOTF missions we resourced,” 3d BCT, 1st ID commander Colonel John
73
Spiszer explained.23 The brigade conducted at least four Chinook air assaults per month for the
first six months, then up to seven or eight a month during the latter half of the deployment.24
Once Soldiers from the 1st Battalion, 32d Infantry Regiment, 10th Mountain Division, arrived in
Kunar Province in February 2009, they also conducted several Chinook insertions in conjunction
with Operation LIONHEART along the rugged Pakistan border. LIONHEART was a
complementary operation, involving US, Afghan, Pakistani military, and Pakistani Frontier
Corps forces, designed to prevent Taliban insurgents from crossing the border into Afghanistan.
“What we have done is refocus our…intelligence, surveillance [and] reconnaissance assets to
identify who is transiting the border and launch attacks on those deemed a threat,” Spiszer told
the American Forces Press Service when the operation began in November 2008.25
During Operation VIPER SHAKE in the spring 2009, troops from 1st Battalion, 26th
Infantry Regiment, 1st ID (TF Spader) used Chinooks for air assaults into the mountains
surrounding the Korengal Valley. 1-26 IN was almost entirely dependent on helicopter support
since its platoons were scattered throughout the dangerous and volatile Kunar, Pech, Watapor,
Chapadara, and Korengal Valleys in Kunar Province.26 The 2d Battalion, 12th Infantry
Regiment, 4th Brigade Combat Team that replaced 1-26 IN in Kunar experienced numerous
firefights and skirmishes in these same valleys. “We used a lot of Chinooks up there…in the
Hindu Kush region…usually at least one Chinook on all of our air assaults,” 2-12 IN
commander, Colonel Brian Pearl, recalled.27
Meanwhile in Zabul Province, the Taliban had successfully closed down portions of
Highway 1, the main roadway connecting Kabul to Kandahar. Intelligence reports indicated that
the Taliban were launching their attacks on the highway from sanctuaries in the Lurah River
Valley. During the spring 2008, 2d Battalion, 506th Infantry initiated a series of Chinook air
74
assaults from FOB Qalat into HLZs near villages in the valley. The villages were systematically
searched for weapons and cleared of insurgents. “Company-size air assaults were most
effective…and with not enough aviation support to go around, Chinooks were most
efficient…you could get a larger number of guys in with fewer lifts,” Colonel John Allred, 2-506
IN battalion commander at the time later explained.28 Allred described how occasionally a
company would air assault into a village, stay for several days and then extract out. Thinking
that the Americans were gone for good, Taliban would move back into the village. The 2-506 IN
company would then air assault right back into the same village, catching the Taliban off guard
and putting them on the defensive in villages throughout the valley. With their support network
in the Lurah seriously disrupted, the Taliban were unable to continue attacking Highway 1.
Second Battalion went on to conduct a series of additional Chinook air assaults in Paktika
Province, after deploying there later in the year.29
In Paktia Province, 1st Squadron, 61st Cavalry faced a similar problem. The Haqqani
Network, an insurgent group allied with the Taliban, had closed down the Khost to Gardez road
and set up an illegal toll-collecting operation near the Seti-Kandow Pass. 1-61 Cav and Afghan
soldiers from 1st Brigade, 203d ANA Corps initiated a series of Chinook air assaults, designated
Operation RADWA U BARQ, to clear the pass area of Haqqani fighters. The squadron
conducted one assault per month beginning in April 2008; then during RADWA U BARQ IV in
July, two companies air assaulted directly into the Haqqani sanctuary high in the mountains
north of the pass. The surprised insurgents fled the area, leaving behind weapons, ammunition,
and explosives. Shortly thereafter, the Khost-Gardez road reopened.30
Finally, in June 2008, 2d Battalion, 2d Infantry Regiment, 1st ID deployed to RC-South to
support and augment Canadian (TF Kandahar) and British (TF Helmand) forces. 2-2 IN
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assumed responsibility for the Maiwand, Ghurak, and Shah Wali Kowt districts in western
Kandahar Province. The battalion went on to conduct a series of ground and air assaults
operation with Canadian, British, and Australian forces to interdict Taliban infiltration routes,
attack insurgent sanctuaries, and search for high value targets/IED cells in the more troublesome
Zhari, Panjway’i, and Arghendab districts.31
Combat Air Assaults in 2009 and 2010
As with previous years, significant command changes occurred in Afghanistan during 2009.
CJTF 82 replaced CJTF 101 in RC-East. The 4th BCT, 4th Infantry Division took over from the
3d BCT, 1st ID at Jalalabad Airfield and assumed responsibility for Nangarhar, Nuristan, Kunar,
and Laghman Provinces. Out of FOB Shank, 3d BCT, 10th Mountain Division began conducting
operations in Logar and Wardak Provinces, while 4th BCT, 25th ID at FOB Salerno took
command in Khost, Paktia, and Paktika. By mid-year CH-47 Chinook heavy lift support was
provided by the 159th CAB in RC-East and the 82d CAB in RC-South. General Stanley
McChrystal became commander of ISAF and USFOR-A in June, and earlier in the year,
President Obama had announced a significant OEF US troop increase, with “a clear and focused
goal…to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat Al Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan.”32
Soldiers from the 1st Squadron, 40th Cavalry Regiment, along with an Afghan platoon, air
assaulted onboard Chinooks into the Zormat district, Paktia Province, to establish COP Kalagu
during Operation KALAGU THUNDER in April.33 In Operation HIWAD PARAST, the 1st
Battalion, 501st Infantry Regiment conducted two air assaults into the Minzi Mountains, Paktika
Province, to assist Special Forces Soldiers in attacking and exploiting a large Taliban camp/IED
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factory.34 In June, 1-501 IN began Operation YUKON RECOVERY in which dozens of
Chinook air assaults were conducted in the futile search for a captured 1st Squadron Soldier.35
General McChrystal arrived in Afghanistan just in time to oversee Operation KHANJAR,
an unusually large brigade-sized offensive push into the Taliban infested Helmand River Valley
in southern Helmand Province that began in July. The KHANJAR plan called for 4,000 Marines
from the 2d Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) and 650 Afghan soldiers to simultaneously
night air assault into the towns of Nawa-l-Barakzayi, Sorkh-Duz, and Kanashin – all Taliban
strongholds in the valley. Since the Marines had insufficient helicopter assets to conduct the
mission on their own, both the 82d CAB (B Company, 3d Battalion) and the 159th CAB (B
Company, 2d Battalion, were called upon to provide Chinook and Black Hawk support for the
operation, which envisioned upwards of 50 aircraft.36 Chinooks – 15 in all – were provided by B
Company, 3d Battalion, 82d Aviation Regiment and B Company, 2d Battalion, 238th Aviation
Regiment (Army National Guardsmen from Illinois and South Carolina). “What makes
Operation KHANJAR different from those that have occurred before, said 2d MEB commander,
Brigadier General Lawrence Nicholson, is the massive size of the force introduced, the speed at
which it will be inserted, and the fact that where we go, we will stay, and where we stay, we will
hold, build, and work toward transition of all security responsibilities to Afghan forces.”37
On the night before the air assault, the Chinooks flew from Kandahar to FOB Bastion to
rehearse loading and pick-up zone (PZ) procedures with the Marines.38 During the actual assault
the following night, PZ execution was flawless. With 31-33 Marines per aircraft, three lifts of
four Chinooks each flew under night vision goggle conditions into pre-determined HLZs in the
Helmand Valley. Black Hawks and escort Apaches accompanied each lift. The first four
Chinooks then returned to Bastion, refueled at the Marine FARP, picked up the remaining 2d
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MEB Marines, and flew them to the objective area. Some aircraft took enemy fire while
approaching and departing the HLZs, however none were damaged.39
KHANJAR was a complex, complicated, air assault operation involving dozens of US
Army, US Marine Corps, US Air Force, and British fixed and rotary wing aircraft. The airspace
de-confliction process – vertical and horizontal separation – required intricate planning and
extensive coordination. “We had lots of liaison officers, established excellent communications,
worked through contingencies, minimized risks, rehearsed, and developed lengthy execution
checklists,” explained Colonel Paul Bricker, 82d CAB commander and air mission commander
for the northern Helmand air assault. Because of the significant number of aircraft involved, “we
tried to keep the execution simple,” Bricker added, “with timed releases, specific distances
between serials, Apaches over the HLZs before H-hour, and minimal time on the ground for the
Chinooks and Black Hawks.”40 “The new ‘F’ model Chinooks were the best helicopters in
Afghanistan, capable of bring in so much combat power in a short period of time…and our
combat-tested veteran Warrant Officer pilots were at the top of their game during KHANJAR,”
Colonel Bricker continued.41 Brigadier General Nicholson, the 2d MEB commander, was duly
appreciative of Army aviation’s contribution, later noting, “I was very, very pleased with Marine
aviation and frankly with Army aviation…[on] a couple of our principal lifts we used Paul
Bricker and the Combat Aviation Brigade…they did a tremendous job in support of the
Marines.”42 Chinook crews from the 82d CAB continued to support ISAF operations in the
Helmand Valley and throughout RC-South during the summer 2009.
In July and August, for example, Chinooks flew air assault missions into the Zhari and
Panjway’i districts, Kandahar Province, with Soldiers from 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry
Regiment, 4th Infantry Division, during a series of operations designated TORA AWAR I-V.43
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Subsequently, 1-12 IN air assaults back into the Zhari district in November to capture a
prominent IED maker.44 Back in Paktika in September 2009, 1-501 IN initiated Operation
GERONIMO DARAU to clear the districts of Sar Hawza, Mata Khan, and Yahya Khel, and to
reopen a key roadway between the provincial capital Sharana and the commercial city of Orgun.
Following a daylight air assault – flown by Chinook crews from the 159th CAB – into Sar
Hawza, the 1st Battalion Scout Platoon located and killed seven insurgents and a Taliban
commander.45 “One of the biggest impacts achieved during Operation GERONIMO DARAU
was defeating the insurgent command and control…this was critical because this district
connects two of our largest population centers…I believe GERONOMO DARAU was an
overwhelming success,” said 1-501 IN executive officer, Major Jeffrey Crapo.46
After Taliban overran Barg-e Matal, Nuristan Province, in July 2009, Soldiers from 1st
Battalion, 32d Infantry Regiment, 10th Mountain Division air assaulted into the area to recapture
the village during an operation designated MOUNTAIN FIRE. Following a Taliban
counterattack, troops from 2-12 IN at Camp Blessing conducted an additional air assault into
Barg-e Matal to provide reinforcement. By the end of July, the Taliban withdrew after having
lost 170 KIA.47 “This operation [MOUNTAIN FIRE] shows that Afghan and Coalition forces
can go anywhere, anytime, and successfully conduct any operation we choose to defeat the
enemies of Afghanistan,” Colonel Randy George, commander 4th BCT, 4th ID, told ISAF Public
Affairs representatives following the re-taking of Barg-e Matal.48
In February 2010, the 82d CAB participated in two additional combined, joint, ISAF air
assaults operations. During Operations MOSHTARAK and HELMAND SPIDER, some 15,000
US Army, US Marine Corps, British, Canadian, Danish, Estonian, and Afghan forces attacked
the villages of Marjah and Nad-e Ali in Helmand Province. The objective of the operations was
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to protect and secure the Afghan citizens living in the region, and not necessarily to kill Taliban.
US, British, and Afghan troops had been conducting shaping operations in preparation for the
mission for several weeks. “We’re going to take Marjah away from the Taliban,” Brigadier
General Lawrence Nicholson, commander, 2d Marine Expeditionary Brigade, said before the
operations began. Chinooks, Black Hawks, Apaches, and CH-53 Sea Stallions from Marine
Heavy Helicopter Squadrons 463 and 466 inserted the 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment, plus
additional ANA soldiers, into Marjah during a night air assault on 13 February. Prior to the
insertions, Predator drones and Apaches took out Taliban IED teams and anti-aircraft weapons
positions near several intended HLZs. Other Landing zones were secured by US and British
Special Forces and Afghan commandos. As the first Chinooks approached the objective area,
Marine AV-8B Harriers illuminated the landing zones with infra-red flares visible only by the
pilots and crews flying with night vision equipment. The approaches, landings, and departures
were executed without incident and all eleven objectives in and around Marjah were secured
within minutes.49
82d CAB Chinook pilots and crews also took part in the Coalition air assault on objectives
surrounding Nad-e Ali. This second air assault “was even more complex as it included over 20
rotary-wing aircraft from the US, Britain, and Canada,” explained 82d CAB commander Colonel
Paul Bricker after the assaults had been completed.50 There actually may have been as many as
40 helicopters involved in the Nad-e Ali assault, including three Canadian Chinooks, four
Canadian Griffon gunships, several British Chinooks, plus additional US Chinooks, Black
Hawks, and Apaches. Eleven hundred British and Afghan soldiers were inserted into objective
area HLZs by eleven separate lifts in little over and hour. The individual lifts were spaced just
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minutes apart and each country was assigned its own airspace and approach/departure routes,
with flights inbound to the HLZs flying at lower altitudes than returning flights.51
In Zabol Province, 1st Battalion, 508th Infantry Regiment, 4th BCT, 82d Airborne
Division conducted a series of air assaults and sweeps of Taliban safe havens in the Shamulzai
district along the Pakistan border.52 Chinooks from the 3d Combat Aviation Brigade provided
support for many of these missions.53 As with previous OEF air assaults, when significant
numbers of troops were need for deliberate or hasty missions, Chinooks often delivered enough
force to surround and capture an entire village. “This war would grind to a screeching halt
without Chinook heavy lift assets,” Sergeant First Class Jeremy Whittaker said.54 Although not
considered a true combat air assault, Chinooks from F Troop, 3d Squadron, 17th Cavalry
participated extensively in Operation MOUNTAIN DESCENT II, the evacuation of 4th Brigade
Combat Team Soldiers from multiple COPs scattered throughout the Korengal Valley. “We
[were] the main transportation element moving equipment and personnel out of the various
COPs swiftly and safely from the so-called valley-of-death,” said 3d CAB plans officer, Major
Michael Reyburn.55 Due to the rugged terrain, many locations in the valley were accessible only
by air. And since previous retrograde operations at COPs Bella and Keating had been contested
by the Taliban, MOUNTAIN DESCENT II was conducted entirely during hours of darkness,
with 500 Soldiers and five-hundred thousand pounds of equipment extracted in 76 flights over
the course on four nights. A lone Chinook lifted off with last contingent of Soldiers at 0300, 14
April 2010.56
In September 2010, Chinooks from 4th Battalion, 3d Aviation Regiment conducted an air
assault mission with the 173d Airborne Brigade Combat Team in Wardak Province during
Operation TALON PURGE. Nearly 350 Afghan commandos and Paratroopers from 1st
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Battalion, 503d Infantry Regiment were inserted at night by four Chinooks and two Black Hawk
helicopters from 3d CAB into five HLZs in Chak district. Two Army National Guard Chinooks
from the 168th Aviation Regiment (Oregon and Washington) flew five round trips each, with 30
passengers per aircraft, from COP Sayed Abad west of FOB Shank to the objective area. Two
additional CH-47s from 2d Battalion, 3d Aviation Regiment based at Bagram conducted three
round-trip flights in support of the complex mission. The air assault into the Chak Valley was
the largest undertaken by 173d Soldiers during their 2009-2010 OEF deployment.57 Once on the
ground, the Paratroopers quickly located and killed a Taliban commander and several
subordinates. “We came in, secured key locations, and fought it out with the insurgents…they
have to realize that we can and will go into any area in this country…,” Sergeant Bradley Mora,
a squad leader with A Company, 1-503 IN, said following the operation.58
Flight operations tempo for Chinook crews in 2010 at FOB Shank was intense. To begin
with, the FOB was a 6,600 feet and “we still had to climb out over the mountains,” said Chief
Warrant Officer 4 Jeffrey Hutchinson, D Company, 1st Battalion, 169th Aviation Regiment.
“Ninety percent of the HLZs we went into were also at 6,000 feet or higher.” “We ran dozens of
missions…do the infil at night, then do a resupply, and finally do the exfil,” Hutchinson
continued.59 With only two Chinooks at Shank, D Company pilots flew missions day and night
for 30 days straight during one stretch in 2010.60 Chief Warrant Officer 4 Gary Ossinger, who
arrived with B Company, 3-10 General Support Aviation Battalion later in the year, agreed with
the OPTEMPO assessment. Bravo Company’s Chinooks were split, with several at Jalalabad in
direct support of 1st BCT, 101st Airborne and others at Bagram in general support of the entire
RC-East AO. “We did at least 200 air assaults…seemed like every night,” Ossinger explained.
“F model Chinooks were the main air assault platform…and a typical mission involved two CH82
47s, escorted by two Apaches, inserting a relatively small force into a strategic location at
night.”61
In October 2010, 1st Squadron, 33d Cavalry conducted a joint air assault with Afghan
troops into a mountainous region of Khost Province. The objective of Operation WAR OLD
COFFEE (translated from Pashto) was to disrupt Taliban supply routes and destroy enemy
weapons caches. Chinooks making the insertions were required to execute pinnacle landings on
the mountain tops so that the off-loaded Soldiers could quickly capture the high ground. Two
substantial caches were discovered and destroyed by an attached explosive ordnance team.
Chinooks were well suited for this high altitude operation – “you can get the most guys and
equipment in in one shot,” said 1st Squadron commander, Lieutenant Colonel Stephen Lutsky.62
By December 2010, Chinooks from 6th Squadron, 6th Cavalry Aviation Regiment, 10th
Mountain Division had replaced those of 3d Squadron, 17th Cavalry Aviation Regiment at
Jalalabad and FOB Sharana. Chinook crews from 6-6 Cav and 3-10 GSAB subsequently
conducted an air assault with 2d BCT, 34 ID Soldiers and Afghan troops into the Galuch Valley,
near the town of Hind Dor, Laghman Province, in March 2011. Operation BULLWHIP, which
cleared the valley of Taliban, was the largest air assault by 101st Airborne Soldiers during their
OEF X-XI deployment. The air assault crews encountered very little enemy resistance when
landing in the valley.63 “We were going…out there with overwhelming combat power…the
large mass of folks we brought and the fact that we air assaulted in…the enemy probably made
the decision that it was best not to fight,” Lieutenant Colonel Steven Kremer, commander 133d
Infantry Regiment, 2d BCT, surmised following the successful insertion.64
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In RC-South, 2d BCT, 101st Airborne Division and Afghan forces from the 205th Corps
kicked off Operation DRAGON STRIKE, a large-scale ground and air assault into the Zhari,
Arghandab, Maiwand, and Panjwai districts surrounding Kandahar City, in September 2010.
The objective of the operation was to regain control of Highway One and to “disrupt enemy
sanctuaries and staging areas [used] for attacks into Kandahar City,” said Colonel Rafael Torres,
director of the ISAF Joint Operations Center.65 Chinook support – 21 aircraft total – for
DRAGON STRIKE came from B Company, 6th Battalion, 101st Combat Aviation Brigade, B
Company, 5th Battalion, 158th Aviation Regiment, and an Australian rotary wing detachment.
Since ground movement in many areas of Kandahar Province was often restricted by extensive
vegetation, numerous rat lines, and dozens of Taliban-placed IEDs, aviation support was
essential to freedom of movement and the ability jump over the IED belts. “The enemy knew we
would have to come from north to south, and they had prepared some pretty nasty defensive belts
[trenches, bunkers, IEDs, minefields] to keep us from doing that,” explained Lieutenant Colonel
Peter Benchoff, commander 2d battalion, 502 IN at the time. “So the air assaults were a way of
jumping behind those defensive belts…we coined the term ‘back clears’…you air assault to the
south of these defensive belts and then back clear up to them… you’re coming from an area that
is likely to be less of a threat,” Benchoff continued.66
During the initial month of DRAGON STRIKE, Chinooks conducted 24 air assaults,
placing a large number of troops – but broken down into small elements – into strategic locations
spread throughout the AO. The extensive number of insertions frustrated the Taliban’s
situational awareness, and prevented the insurgents from reinforcing. In the first week, eight
Chinooks were hit by enemy fire. Prior to the operation, portions of the objective area had been
declared ‘no-fly’ zones due to the heavy concentration of Taliban anti-aircraft fires. Since the
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plan called for the inserted forces to remain in-place for months rather than being quickly
extracted, resupply requirements were unceasing. Each night four Chinooks were assigned to fly
the seemingly endless resupply missions.67
Early in the operation, B Company and the Scouts from 2-502 IN air assaulted at night
onboard Chinooks into the town of Baluchan south of the battalion FOB at Howz-e Madad. The
Scouts were extracted and flown to a different location within a few days, while B Company
remained to hold the ground around Baluchan for several months.68 Second BCT was the main
effort during DRAGON STRIKE. “We had four Chinooks for six weeks…and used [them] for
multiple air assaults…normally run at battalion level…a two ship air assault with multiple
turns,” Colonel Arthur Kandarian, 2d BCT commander, said in describing the CH-47’s
contribution to the operation. “The Chinooks and Black Hawks…were from 101st CAB and their
support and bravery were the finest I have observed,” Kandarian continued. “We trained with
the CAB before we deployed and fought with them in Kandahar so we enjoyed a phenomenal
relationship.”69
Although DRAGON STRIKE continued into 2011, by late October 2010 Highway 1 was
Taliban-free. Kandahar Governor Tooryali Weesa drove without military escort from Kandahar
City to Howz-e Madad for a shura with village elders. “This has not been possible since 2004
and would have led to a catastrophe even three weeks ago, British Major General Nicholas
Carter, RC-South commander, said referring to Governor Weesa’s hour-long trip, then adding
that “Operation DRAGON STRIKE made this possible.”70 During the fall of 2010 and winter
2011, 2-502 IN conducted several additional Chinook air assaults into the Zhari and Maiwand
districts during a successive series of DRAGON STRIKE sub-operations code-named Nashville,
Clarksville, Franklin, and Nolensville. Numerous Chinook and Black Hawk air assaults were
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subsequently completed by the 2d BCT in the brigade-sized Operations DRAGON DESCENT
and DRAGON WRATH in January/February 2011. Finally, during Operation MOUNTAIN
JAGUAR in Maiwand district, 2-502 IN executed nine Chinook air assaults in 30 days to disrupt
the Taliban spring offensive. On the final mission, “we air assaulted all four maneuver
companies,” Lieutenant Colonel Benchoff recounted.71
Chinook Air Assaults Continue in 2011
In addition to providing support to 2d BCT, 101st CAB Chinook pilots and crews also
flew air assaults in October 2010 with 1st Battalion, 187th Infantry Regiment, 3d BCT, 101st
Airborne Division into the villages of Mushan, Zangabad, and Taluqan in the Horn of Panjway’i,
30 miles southwest of Kandahar City.72 Chinooks also conducted deliberate and hasty air
assault missions in support of Special Operations Forces in RC-South. During one 30 day
period, seven Chinooks were allocated every night for Special Operations missions. The new F
model Chinooks, with moving map displays, digital advanced flight control system hover modes,
common avionics architecture systems, and hovering symbology to see through dust, were nearly
comparable, performance-wise, to the MH-47G models flown by the 160th Special Operations
Aviation Regiment (SOAR). “In the end, we were providing multiple aircraft and aircrews for
multiple missions every night,” Captain Christopher Getter, B Company, 6-101 CAB,
commander, later wrote. 73
Captain Getter also estimated that the 21-aircraft Chinook team at Kandahar conducted at
least 250 air assaults during its deployment in RC-South. Colonel William Gayler, commander
of the 101st CAB, calculated that overall the brigade flew a combined total of 363 air assaults
while deployed in Afghanistan. In a 2012 interview, Gayler described how his pilots often flew
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what he called 3D maneuvering flight patterns, constantly changing heading, altitude, and air
speed, thereby causing Taliban gunners to continually adjust for height estimates, lead angles,
and range rates. “One of my tenets was never pattern set,” Colonel Gayler said, “Never do it the
same way every time.”74
In February 2011, the 159th CAB replaced the 101st CAB in RC-South. Bravo Company,
7th Battalion, 101st Aviation Regiment deployed with new ‘F’ model Chinooks, while two
attached companies – B Company, 1st Battalion, 171st Aviation Regiment (HIARNG) and B
Company, 1st Battalion, 52d Aviation Regiment from Alaska – were equipped with older ‘D’
models.75 The majority of the aircraft were at Kandahar, with a platoon each at FOBs Tarin
Kowt and Wolverine. Chinook pilots and crews flew air assault missions in support of all the
ground units in the region, including US conventional and Special Operations forces, Afghan
counterparts, and Romanian and Latvian troops.76 The general trend for CH-47 air assaults in
RC-South continued, often with two conventional and two Special Operations insertions per
night. “Typically two [conventional] companies would air assault into an objective area, stay for
a couple of days, and then extract out,” said 7th Battalion Commander, Lieutenant Colonel
Darren Gerblick. “Special Operations night assaults, on the other hand, were targeted raids…in
and out in a couple of hours.”77
Bravo Company, 1-52 was advised prior to deployment to expect a preponderance of
general support missions – battlefield circulation in support of multiple units in the AOR.
Instead, the company was divided upon arriving in Afghanistan, with half the aircraft remaining
at Kandahar and the other half split between Wolverine and Tarin Kowt. Due to the priorities in
the AOR, “we were immediately assigned direct support missions at all three locations,” Captain
Robert Bender, commander, B/1-52 explained after redeploying to Alaska.78 The most common
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air assaults were night cordon and search operations, involving two Chinooks and approximately
70 Soldiers/passengers, and requiring extraction within two to five days. Speed and surprise
were critical factors for success. Finally, normal air assault planning cycles were often cut short,
since B/1-52 routinely supported ground units located at different FOBs/COBs and mission
briefings were conducted via teleconference or secure email.79
Throughout the course of 159th CAB’s deployment, ground and air unit commanders most
often chose to insert as many troops as possible with a single lift – one turn with four aircraft, for
example, versus two turns with two aircraft. Generally, Chinooks, particularly ‘F’ models
because of their enhanced ability to land safely in dusty environments, were the platform of
choice for the 700 hundred air assault missions conducted by the 159th CAB during its tour in
Afghanistan.80
Bravo Company, 7th Battalion, 158th Aviation Regiment (KS USAR) returned to OEF
Afghanistan in April 2011. The company had 19 organic Chinooks, was augmented with six
additional CH-47s and crews from B Company, 2d Battalion, 135th General Support Aviation
Brigade, Nebraska and Colorado ARNG, and reported initially to the 10th CAB and later the 82d
CAB. Three separate company detachments were established in RC-East with the aircraft and
crews parceled out to Bagram Air field and FOBs Salerno and Shank. The headquarters
detachment at Salerno supported 3d BCT, 1st ID and then 4th BCT, 25th ID operations, while
the BAF contingent conducted ISAF-level general support missions. The crews at Shank
supported 1st BCT, 10th Mountain and Soldiers from the 16th Infantry Regiment, 1st Infantry
Division who were under the tactical control of the Combined Joint Special Operations Task
Force – Afghanistan for village stability operations.81 Both detachments at Salerno and Shank
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also flew numerous deliberate and hasty air assault missions in support of Special Operations
Task Force 310 in search of Taliban and Haqqani network leaders.
The Operational Tempo for B/7-158 AVN jumped dramatically compared to the
company’s previous deployment. “In 2005-6, we flew the ring route and conducted
approximately 30 air assaults in RC-South,” said Captain Christopher Ruff, B Company
commander. “This time in RC-East, we were an air assault platform…flew 12,300 hours and
completed 478 deliberate and hasty combat assaults.”82 At FOB Salerno, at least two Chinooks
were allocated for general support and deliberated air assaults for the BCT. During the last few
months of B Company’s deployment, Chinooks flew air assaults with 4th BCT, 25th ID Soldiers
nearly every night. In September 2011, during Operation NIKE 4, four Chinooks, each making
three round trips, inserted Soldiers into objectives on the north and south sides of the Mangal
Valley and onto the mountain-top OP Buttercup in the Lazha Mangal district, Paktia Province.
Two additional Salerno CH-47s were allotted to Special Operations Task Force 310 for nightly
hasty air assaults missions. The B Company crews often worked alongside Chinook pilots and
crew members from Task Force Brown, 160th SAOR. “We would do a ‘one over the world
briefing’ and just go,” Captain Ruff explained.83 On one such B Company Chinook raid into the
Khost-Gardez Pass region, TF 310 captured Haji Mali Khan, a high-ranking member of the
Haqqani network.84
On 6 August 2011, a Chinook from B Company, 7-158 AVN was shot down by a Taliban
RPG in the Tangi Valley, Wardak Province. All 38 persons on board – 17 US Navy SEALs, five
Naval Special Operations support staff, three US Air Force Special Tactics Airmen, seven
Afghan soldiers, plus the five Chinook crew members – were all killed.85 Late in the evening of
the previous day, 5 August, two Chinooks had air assaulted from FOB Shank with US Army
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Rangers and their Afghan partners into a different Tangi location in search of a suspected
Taliban leader. Overhead ISR aircraft observed Taliban fighters leaving the objective area as the
ranger-led assault force arrived. Shortly thereafter, 10 Taliban, possibly including their leader,
were spotted congregating approximately a mile away from the original target site. The special
operations task force commander subsequently decided to launch the Immediate Reaction Force
(IRF), built around a troop of Navy SEALs, to kill or capture the group of Taliban.86
A suitable HLZ was chosen, and the 33 member IRF was loaded onto a single Chinook –
callsign Extortion 17 – in order to quickly mass troops on the ground and to mitigate risk to a
second aircraft. Two Chinooks, however – one with passengers, one without – launched on the
mission at 0222, the morning of 6 August. The empty trail CH-47 broke off short of the HLZ
and began orbiting a pre-determined holding point while awaiting the return of the lead aircraft.
On final approached to the HLZ, however, one of the aft rotor blades on the lead Chinook – the
one carrying the IRF – was struck by a Taliban RPG. The aircraft began spinning
uncontrollably, the fore and aft rotor blade assemblies separated, and the fuselage crashed in a
ball of flames into a dry creek bed. Two hours later, the original Ranger-led assault force arrived
at the crash site. They were soon joined by a 20-member Pathfinder downed aircraft rescue and
recovery unit. By 1030, 6 August, the remains of all 38 passengers and crew members had been
successfully accounted for. The complete aircraft wreckage was removed by 9 August 2011.87
The next day, ISAF Commander and Commander of US Forces in Afghanistan, US Marine
Corps General John Allen reported that the Taliban who fired the deadly RPG shot had been
killed in a USAF F-16 airstrike.88
Back in RC-South, 2d Battalion, 34th Armor Regiment, 1st Heavy Brigade Combat Team,
1st Infantry Division, a combined arms battalion from Fort Riley, KS, conducted 33 air assaults
90
behind Taliban defensive positions in the Band-e/Timor region of Maiwand district, Kandahar
Province. “Tankers learned the skills of infantrymen…served in every maneuver company…and
conducted the majority of the air assaults,” said Lieutenant Colonel Christopher Kidd, 2-34 AR
commander.89 Colonel Patrick Frank, commander of the 10th Mountain Division’s 3d Brigade
Combat Team, wanted 2-34 AR off the beaten path and out in the Taliban controlled areas along
the Arghandab River and in the Sur Reg Desert west of Kandahar City. Since, the battlespace
had no road network, the “terrain and the enemy situation drove us to air assaults” as the primary
means of maneuvering, Colonel Kidd explained.90
Nearly all 2-34 AR air assaults were search operations executed at night by company-sized
elements and their Afghan counterparts, 200-250 Soldiers per assault. Typically, two or three
Chinooks would fly the missions, making multiple turns with approximately 30 Soldiers per
aircraft per lift. Rather than designating a single landing site, several HLZ were utilized in order
to surround a village or a particular tactical objective. After 48-72 hours on the ground, the
assault force was extracted, again from multiple PZs. AH-64 Apaches escorted the air assault
Chinooks during infiltration and exfiltration, while F-16s or A-10s flew overwatch coverage.91
Major Nicholas Ayers, and Armor officer and battalion S-3, did nearly all of the air assault
planning for 2-34 AR. After receiving mission orders from higher headquarters, Ayers prepared
ground tactical plans and a preliminary infiltration plans, with proposed air corridors and HLZs.
He initiated Air Mission, HLZ ISR, Apache escort, and fixed wing aircraft requests, and then
developed pre-assault fire support plans and electronic warfare objectives, if required.
Throughout the process, Ayers coordinated with planners and flight crews from the 159th CAB
regarding mission specifics, such as rehearsals, the number of passengers per aircraft, number of
turns, time requirements, resupply, and exfiltration plans. Occasionally, false insertions were
91
executed during the insertion and/or extraction phases of 2-34 AR air assaults to deceive and
confuse the Taliban.92
Army Aviation OPTEMPO remained high in Afghanistan well into 2012. All of the
aircraft were being flown at three-to-four times the rate for which they were originally designed
to fly. Chinooks were showing the most wear.93
1
The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) initially provided security for Kabul. NATO subsequently
assumed command of ISAF in 2003. ISAF expanded and took control of RC-North and RC-West in 2004 and 2005,
respectively.
2
173d Airborne Brigade, “2d Battalion (Airborne), 503d Infantry History,” 4,
http://www.173airborne.army.mil/173rd%20Template/website%20template/2nd%20BN/unitHistory4.html
(accessed 27 March 2012).
3
Captain Christopher Getter, “The Progression of the Deployment of the CH-47 Aircraft during the Global War on
Terrorism,” unpublished manuscript, 28 March 2012, 2-3; “Awards and Citations: Silver Star,” awarded to Sergeant
First Class William Tomlin, Military Times, 6 August 2009, 1-2, http://militarytimes.com/citations-medalsawards/recipient.php?recipientid=3835 (accessed 30 March 2012).
4
“Boeing CH-47D Chinook helicopter 86-01644,” 25 March 2012, 1-2, http://www.chinookhelicopter.com/history/aircraft/D_Models/86-01644/86-01644.html (accessed 26 March 2012).
5
Chief Warrant Officer 3 Jimmy Valencia, interview by the author, 26 March 2012, 1.
6
First Lieutenant Christopher Richelderfer quoted in Brandon Aird, “Sky Soldiers Air Assault into Clouds of
Nuristan,” Tien Bien Times, 1 September 2007, 15.
7
Chief Warrant Officer 3 Jimmy Valencia, interview by the author, 26 March 2012, 1; Brandon Aird, “Paratroopers
Take Fight to Taliban during Operation Destined Strike,” Armed Forces Press Service, 5 September 2007, 1-2.
8
Chris Brummitt, “US, Afghan Troops Kill Scores of Insurgents,” St. Petersburg Times, 2 September 2007, 1-2;
Sebastian Junger, “Into the Valley of Death,” Vanity Fair, January 2008, 84-93.
9
During their deployment, the Chinook crews at Bagram conducted several joint, multi-aircraft, operations with
Afghan National Air Force crews who were flying Mi-17 Russian-built, twin turbine, transport helicopters, see
Major William Hummer, interview by the author, 27 March 2012, 1.
10
Major William Hummer, interview by the author, 27 March 2012, 1; Jacob Caldwell, “Company Works to Flush
Out Taliban During Rock Avalanche,” American Forces Press Service, 31 October 2007, 1-2.
11
Specialist David Hooker quoted in Jacob Caldwell, “Company Works to Flush Out Taliban During Rock
Avalanche,” American Forces Press Service, 31 October 2007, 1.
12
Captain Eric Fritz, email correspondence (both quotations), 4 April 2012, 2.
13
Captain Eric Fritz, email correspondence, 4 April 2012, 2.
14
Major William Hummer, interview by the author, 27 March 2012, 1
15
Matthew Sanchez, “Kicking Out the Taliban,” WND.com, 10 December 2010, 1-2,
http://www.wnd.com/2007/12/44982/ (accessed 28 March 2012); “The Taking of Musa Qala,” Scotsman.com, 16
December 2007, 1-2, http://www.scotsman.com/news/the_taking_of_musa_qala_1_704162 (accessed 28 March
2012); Mark Townsend, “Fierce Battle Rages for Taliban Stronghold,” The Observer, 8 December 2007, 1-4, 33.
16
This Section of Chapter 5 is based on original source data from Major David Henselman, Detachment
Commander for the 305th Military History Detachment that deployed to Afghanistan in 2007 – Major David
Hanselman, “Operation MAR KARARDAD,” unpublished manuscript, January 2008, 1-16.
17
Some aviator night vision equipment required certain lunar elevation angles and percentages of lunar illumination.
Most US Chinook pilots by this time were utilizing AN/AVS-6(V)3 Aviator Night Vision Imaging Systems
(ANVIS) that enabled the pilots to conduct and complete night operations during the darkest of nights, see John
McGrath, email correspondence, 12 August 2010, 1; Harry Buchanan, ITT Night Vision, interview by the author, 18
May 2012, 1.
92
18
Headquarters, 3d Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division, Spartan Review, Draft After-Action Report,
May 2007, 5-13.
19
Lieutenant Colonel Brett Jenkinson, interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Combat Studies
Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 9 and 11 February 2011, 14.
20
Headquarters, 1st Battalion, 506th Infantry, “1-506 IN REGT: Red Currahee Operations in Afghanistan,” AfterAction Report, 9; Note – also in July 2008, the Battle of Wanat, involving Soldiers from 2-503 IN, occurred in
Nuristan Province.
21
Lieutenant Colonel Anthony DeMartino, interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Combat Studies
Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 5 April 2011, 19-20; Headquarters, 1st Battalion, 506th Infantry, “1-506 IN
REGT: Red Currahee Operations in Afghanistan,” After-Action Report, 18-20; Headquarters, 1st Battalion, 506th
Infantry, “Optimized Battle for Jalrez, Nerkh,” PowerPoint briefing, slides 1-3.
22
Fred Baker, “Clearing the Tangi: Task Force in Afghanistan Takes Troubled Valley,” American Forces Press
Service, 9 March 2009, 1-6.
23
Colonel John Spiszer, email correspondence, 1 April 2012, 1.
24
Lieutenant Colonel Jose Galvan, email correspondence, 2 April 2012, 1.
25
Colonel John Spiszer quoted in Jim Garamone, “Terror Groups along Afghan-Pakistan Border Feel Pressure,”
American Forces Press Service, 18 November 2008, 1.
26
Sergeant Matthew Moeller, “Operation VIPER SHAKE Clears Korengal Valley,” Regional Command-East Press
Release, 25 April 2009, 1.
27
Colonel Brian Pearl, email correspondence, 2 April 2012, 1.
28
Colonel John Allred, interview by the author, 5 April 2012, 1-2.
29
Colonel John Allred, interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Part 2, Combat Studies Institute, Fort
Leavenworth, Kansas, 10 December 2010, 19-23; Colonel John Allred, interview by the author, 5 April 2012, 1-2.
30
Lieutenant Colonel Thomas W. O’Steen, interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Combat Studies
Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 9 February 2011, 8-10; Headquarters, 1st Squadron, 61st Cavalry, “Operation
RADWA U BARQ,” Power Point Brief, undated, slide 2.
31
Colonel Daniel Hurlbut, interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Combat Studies Institute, Fort
Leavenworth, Kansas, 7 February 2011, 3-12; Rajiv Chandrasekaran, “Troops Face New Tests in Afghanistan:
Battalion's Experience Outlines Issues in South,” Washington Post, 15 March 2009, A1.
32
President Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President on a New Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan,” The White
House, Office of the Press Secretary, 27 march 2009, 2.
33
Lieutenant Colonel Robert Campbell, interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Combat Studies
Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 2 May 2011, 8; “Cav Air Assault,” 5th Mobile Public Affairs Detachment,
video account, April 2009, http://www.dvidshub.net/video/59707/cav-air-assault (accessed 7 April 2012).
34
Lieutenant Colonel Clint Baker, interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Combat Studies Institute,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 9 May 2011, 11; Valorous Unit Citation Narrative, 1st Battalion, 501st Infantry, undated.
35
Laura King, “World: New Taliban Video Shows US Soldier; Pfc Bergdahl of Idaho, Missing since June,” Los
Angeles Times, 26 December 2009, A32; “June 30 Marks Two-Year Point for U.S. Soldier in Captivity,” ISAF
Headquarters Public Affairs Office-Afghanistan, 30 June 2011, 1; Lieutenant Colonel Clint Baker, interview by
Contemporary Operations Study Team, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 9 May 2011, 10.
36
Department of Defense, Report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, Report to Congress,
October 2009, 17; Ben Sheppard, “US Marines Storm south in Major Afghan Offense,” Agnece France-Presse, 1
July 2009, 3, http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/us-marines-launch-major-operation-in-afghanistan-largest-sincevietnam (accessed 3 April 2010); “Marines Launch Operation KHANJAR in Southern Afghanistan,” Marine
Expeditionary Brigade-Afghanistan Public Affairs Office, 2 July 2009, 1.
37
Brigadier General Lawrence Nicholson quoted in Robert Haddick, “This Week at War, No. 24: Is Obama
Channeling Bush in Afghanistan,” Foreign Policy, 10 July 2009, 1,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/07/10/this_week_at_war_no_24?page=full (accessed 4 April 2012).
38
According to Colonel Paul Bricker, 82d CAB commander in 2009, the Army and the Marines both used the 101st
Airborne Division (Air Assault) “Gold Book” to plan the complex Khanjar mission. The Gold Book focuses on
TTP unique to brigade-size air assaults.
39
Major John Gunter, interview by the author, 16 March 2012, 1-2.
40
Colonel Paul Bricker, interview by the author, 10 March 2012, 1-5.
41
Colonel Paul Bricker, interview by the author, 10 March 2012, 4-5.
93
42
Brigadier General Lawrence Nicholson, interview by the United States Marine Corps History Division, 9 June and
17 August, 2010, 30.
43
Lieutenant Colonel Reik Andersen, interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Combat Studies Institute,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 11 February 2011, 5-6.
44
Lieutenant Colonel Reik Andersen, interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Combat Studies Institute,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 11 February 2011, 12.
45
Marcus Butler, “Operation GERONIMO DARAU: ANSF, Paratroopers Target Militants,” CJTF-82 Afghanistan,
Bagram Media Center, 10-18 September 2009, 1, http://www.troopscoop.typepad.com/updates/page/27/ (accessed 8
April 2012); Marcus Butler, “Operation GERONIMO DARAU: Paratroopers, Afghan Forces Target Militants,”
Alaska Post, 2 October 2009, Vol. 16, No. 39,
http://www.usarak.army.mil/alaskapost/Archives2009/091002/Oct02Story14.asp (accessed 8 April 2012);
Lieutenant Colonel Clint Baker, interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Combat Studies Institute, Fort
Leavenworth, Kansas, 9 May 2011, 14; Department of the Army, “Valorous Unit Award: 1st Battalion, 501st
Infantry Regiment,” Permanent Orders 174-09, 23 June 2010, 1-2,
http://www.history.army.mil/html/forcestruc/HRC/2010/174-09_20100623_HRCMD.pdf (accessed 8 April 2012).
Major Jeffrey Crapo quoted in Marcus Butler, “Operation GERONIMO DARAU: ANSF, Paratroopers Target
Militants,” CJTF-82 Afghanistan, Bagram Media Center, 10-18 September 2009, 1,
http://www.troopscoop.typepad.com/updates/page/27/ (accessed 8 April 2012).
46
47
Colonel Randy George, interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Combat Studies Institute, Fort
Leavenworth, Kansas, 27 January 2011, 6-12; Lieutenant Colonel Robert B. Brown, interview by Contemporary
Operations Study Team, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 16 February 2011, 19; Lieutenant
Colonel Brian Pearl, interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Combat Studies Institute, Fort
Leavenworth, Kansas, 13 May 2011, 9; Mathew Moeller, “Dawn Patrol during Operation MOUNTAIN FIRE,” 5th
Mobile Public Affairs Detachment, RC-East, 15 July 2009, 1, http://www.rc-east.com/regional-command-east-newsmainmenu-401/1848-dawn-patrol-during-operation-mountain-fire.html (accessed 9 April 2012); “ANSF, ISAF
Completing Operation MOUNTAIN FIRE,” ISAF Public Affairs Office, 16 July 2009, 1,
http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/pressreleases/2009/07/pr090716-500.html (Accessed 9 April 2012).
48
Colonel Randy George quoted in “ANSF, ISAF Completing Operation MOUNTAIN FIRE,” ISAF Public Affairs
Office, 16 July 2009, 1, http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/pressreleases/2009/07/pr090716-500.html (accessed 9 April
2012).
49
Sean Rayment, Patrick Sawer, and Benjamin Farmer, “Afghanistan: First Stage of Operation MOSHTARAK
Declared a Success,” The Telegraph, 13 February 2010, 1-3,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/7230940/Afghanistan-first-stage-of-operationMoshtarak-declared-a-success.html (accessed 9 April 2012); Lieutenant Colonel Carl Slaughenhaupt, interview by
Contemporary Operations Study Team, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 3 May 2011, 14;
Lieutenant Colonel Burton Shields, interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Combat Studies Institute,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 2 February 2011, 11.
50
Colonel Paul Bricker quoted in Aubree Clute, “Army Aviation Plays Key MOSHTARAK Role,” American
Forces Press Service, 17 February 2010, 1.
51
Josh Wingrove, “Canadians Play Key Role in NATO Offensive,” Globe and Mail, 12 February 2010, A23.
52
Lieutenant Colonel David Oclander, interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Combat Studies
Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 16 February 2011, 5, 15-16.
53
In 2010, Chinooks in the 3d CAB were flown by B Company , 2d Battalion, 3d Aviation Regiment; F Troop, 3d
Squadron, 17th Cavalry, and; B Company, 1st Battalion, 169th General Support Aviation Brigade, assigned to 4 th
Battalion, 3d Aviation Regiment.
54
Sergeant First Class Jeremy Whittaker quoted in Kaden Koba, “Heavy Lifting: National Guard Chinook Unit
Moves Thousands of Passengers and Tons of Cargo for TF Viper,” FALCON FLYER, April 2010, 10-11.
55
Major Michael Reyburn quoted in Monica Smith, “Flying in the Shadow of the Valley of Death,” FALCON
FLYER, May 2010, 16.
56
Lieutenant Colonel Thomas von Eschenbach, “Halfway There,” Lighthorse Times, 25 April 2010, 2,
http://www.stewart.army.mil/units/AB/unit317CAV/docs/TFLH-FRG_4.pdf (accessed 22 February 2012).
57
Chief Warrant Officer 4 Kyle Evarts, interview by the author, 13 March 2012, 1-2.
94
Sergeant Bradley Mora quoted in Bruce Cobbledick, “Soldiers, Afghan Forces Conduct Air Assault,” Task Force
Bayonet Public Affairs, Army News Service, 30 September 2010, 2,
http://www.army.mil/article/45944/Soldiers__Afghan_forces_conduct_air_assault/ (accessed 11 April 2012).
59
Chief Warrant Officer 4 Jeffrey Hutchinson, Chief Warrant Officer 3 William Johnson, Chief Warrant Officer 4
Timothy Lidson, Chief Warrant Officer 4 Mark Morris, and Chief Warrant Officer 3 Duane Sandbothe, group
interview by the author, 14 March 2012, 4-5.
60
Chief Warrant Officer 4 Jeffrey Hutchinson, Chief Warrant Officer 3 William Johnson, Chief Warrant Officer 4
Timothy Lidson, Chief Warrant Officer 4 Mark Morris, and Chief Warrant Officer 3 Duane Sandbothe, group
interview by the author, 14 March 2012, 5.
61
Chief Warrant Officer 4 Gary Ossinger, interview by the author, 10 March 2012, 1-2.
62
Lieutenant Colonel Stephen Lutsky, interview by the author, 11 April 2012, 1; Staff Sergeant Brent Powell,
“Afghan Air Assault Nets Weapons, Ammo, Intel,” WWW.ARMY.MIL, 12 October 2010, 1-2,
http://www.army.mil/article/46467/afghan-air-assault-nets-weapons-ammo-intel (accessed 11 April 2012).
63
Amanda Brown, “TF Phoenix Supports Largest Air Assault in RC-East,” Task Force Phoenix Public Affairs, RCEast.com, 3 April 2011, 1-2; Ryan Matson, “Red Bulls, ANA Sweep Galuch Valley, Establish Joint Security
Center,” Task Force Red Bulls Public Affairs, RC-East.com, 7 April 2011, 1-3.
64
Lieutenant Colonel Steven Kremer quoted in Ryan Matson, “Red Bulls, ANA Sweep Galuch Valley, Establish
Joint Security Center,” Task Force Red Bulls Public Affairs, RC-East.com, 7 April 2011, 2.
65
Colonel Rafael Torres quoted in “UPDATE Afghanistan, Coalition Forces Destroy IEDs in Kandahar,” ISAF
Joint Command-Afghanistan, IJC News Release #2010-09-CA-218, 21 September 2010, 1.
66
Lieutenant Colonel Peter Benchoff, interview by Afghan Study Team, US Army Combat Studies Institute, Fort
Leavenworth, KS, 10 June 2011, 28.
67
Captain Christopher Getter, “The Progression of the Deployment of the CH-47 Aircraft during the Global War on
Terrorism,” unpublished manuscript, 28 March 2012, 5-6; Lieutenant Colonel Peter Benchoff, interview by Afghan
Study Team, US Army Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 10 June 2011, 3, 30.
68
Lieutenant Colonel Peter Benchoff, interview by Afghan Study Team, US Army Combat Studies Institute, Fort
Leavenworth, KS, 10 June 2011, 42-47.
69
Colonel Arthur Kandarian, email correspondence, 11 April 2012, 1.
70
Major General Nicholas Carter quoted in “Provincial Governor Proves Kandahar Highway Safe,” ISAF Joint
Command-Afghanistan, IJC News Release #2010-10-CA-228, 22 October 2010, 1.
71
Lieutenant Colonel Peter Benchoff, interview by Afghan Study Team, US Army Combat Studies Institute, Fort
Leavenworth, KS, 16 June 2011, 9, 13, 34, 36-39.
72
Julius Cavendish, “Afghanistan’s Linchpin: Kandahar,” The Christian Science Monitor, 16 November 2010, 14;
Edward Garibay, “Soldiers and ANA Fight to Drive Out Last Taliban Stronghold,” 16th Mobile Public Affairs
Detachment, 3 December 2010, 1,
http://www.army.mil/article/48987/Soldiers_and_ANA_fight_to_drive_out_last_Taliban_stronghold/ (accessed 21
April 2012).
73
Captain Christopher Getter, “The Progression of the Deployment of the CH-47 Aircraft during the Global War on
Terrorism,” unpublished manuscript, 28 March 2012, 5.
74
Colonel William Gayler, interview by Afghan Study Team, US Army Combat Studies Institute, Fort
Leavenworth, KS, 18 April 2012, 19, 21, 25.
75
B/1-171AVN Chinooks were split-based in Bagram, Kandahar, and FOBs Salerno and Shank. B/2-135 AVN
(Colorado and Nebraska ARNG) replaced B/1-171 AVN in August 2011.
76
Colonel Kenneth Royar, interview by the author, 7 May 2012, 1.
77
Lieutenant Colonel Darren Gerblick, interview by the author, 26 April 2012, 1; Note: the Special Operations air
assault raids flown by 159th CAB pilots and crews resulted in the capture of approximately 180 Taliban leaders, see
Bill Larson, “The 159th Combat Aviation Brigade Uncased their Colors in a Ceremony at Fort Campbell
Yesterday,” Clarksville Online, 23 March 2012, 6, http://www.clarksvilleonline.com/2012/03/23/the-159th-combataviation-brigade-uncased-their-colors-in-a-ceremony-at-fort-campbell-yesterday/ (accessed 23 April 2012).
78
Captain Robert Bender, email correspondence, 22 May 2012, 1.
79
Captain Robert Bender, interview by the author, 17 May 2012, 1; Captain Robert Bender, email correspondence,
22 May 2012, 1.
80
Colonel Kenneth Royar, interview by the author, 7 May 2012, 2.
81
Colonel Donald Bolduc, “Forecasting the Future of Afghanistan,” Special Warfare, October-December 2011, 27.
82
Captain Christopher Ruff, interview by the author, 25 April 2012, 2-3.
58
95
83
Captain Christopher Ruff, interview by the author, 25 April 2012, 2.
“Afghan, Coalition Forces Capture Senior Haqqani Leader in Afghanistan,” ISAF Joint Command – Afghanistan,
ISAF Releases, 1 October 2011, 1-3; Captain Christopher Ruff, interview by the author, 25 April 2012, 3.
85
Two of the ill-fated Chinook crew members were from B Company, 2d Battalion, 135th GSAB.
86
Brigadier General Jeffrey Colt, Executive Summary: Crash of CH-47D Aircraft in Wardak Province, Afghanistan
on 6 August 2011, Memorandum for Commander, United States Central Command, 9 September 2011, 1-3; Captain
Christopher Ruff, interview by the author, 25 April 2012, 1-4.
87
Brigadier General Jeffrey Colt, Executive Summary: Crash of CH-47D Aircraft in Wardak Province, Afghanistan
on 6 August 2011, Memorandum for Commander, United States Central Command, 9 September 2011, 3-5; Captain
Christopher Ruff, interview by the author, 25 April 2012, 1-4.
88
General John Allen, “DoD News Briefing with General Allen via Teleconference from Afghanistan,” Office of
the Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), 10 August 2011, 1-2, 5.
89
Lieutenant Colonel Christopher Kidd quoted in Summer Woode, “Dreadnaughts Mark Return with Uncasing of
Colors,” 1st Heavy Brigade Combat Team Public Affairs, 14 February 2012, 1,
http://www.1id.army.mil/NewsViewer.aspx?id=6061 (accessed 1 May 2012).
90
Lieutenant Colonel Christopher Kidd, interview by the author, 8 May 2012, 1.
91
Lieutenant Colonel Christopher Kidd, interview by the author, 8 May 2012, 2.
92
Major Nicholas Ayers, interview by the author, 8 May 2012, 1.
93
Major General Anthony Crutchfield, interview by Vago Muradian, “US Army Aviation Part I,” This Week in
Defense News, 22 May 2011, http://www.rucker.army.mil/biographies/bio_cg.html (accessed 14 May 2012).
84
96
HIGH, HOT and HEAVY:
THE CH-47 CHINOOK IN COMBAT ASSAULT OPERATIONS IN AFGHANISTAN
Chapter 6
CONCLUSION
The CH-47 Chinook is a “prime example of the adaptability of Army Aviation,” explained
Major General William Crosby, Program Executive Officer, Aviation, US Army Aviation and
Missile Life Cycle Management Command (AMCOM), Redstone Arsenal, Huntsville AL.1
Designed originally to carry the MGR-1 Honest John Missile, its launcher, and support vehicles,
Chinooks soon became all-purpose, heavy-lift, cargo aircraft, and eventually assumed a
significant portion of the combat air assault role during Operation ENDURING FREEDOM.
The evolution of CH-47 tactics, techniques, procedures, roles, and missions is a “credit to the
innovation, vision, and imagination of modern day aviators…bread into them is a focus and
mindset to support the Soldiers on the ground, enabling the Soldiers to be inserted at the critical
time and place on the battlefield,” Major General Crosby, one of the few Army Aviators to have
flown all models of the Chinook, continued. “The CH-47 is a critical enabler today and will be
for the foreseeable future,” he added.2 Colonel Robert Marion, Program Manager for Cargo
Helicopters at AMCOM agreed, noting that he anticipates “the Army will keep the Chinook in its
inventory for another generation of aircrew members,” and that he expects “more of the same
97
from the venerable Chinook and the community that loves it so much, affectionately called the
Hookers.”3
September 21, 2011 marked the 50th anniversary of the CH-47 Chinook’s first flight in
Ridley Township, Pennsylvania. The US Army accepted delivery of the initial CH-47 A model
in August 1962, and by 1965, Chinook crews from the 1st Cavalry Division were flying combat
missions – typically troop movement, artillery emplacement, and battlefield resupply – in
Vietnam. The Army has steadily modernized and improved the Chinook fleet ever since. As of
April 2012, approximately 1,175 CH-47s have been built by Boeing Rotorcraft Systems, the
latest version being the highly sophisticated F model – either remanufactured from older D
models or newly built.4 “We have a great history and a great legacy…we also have a great
responsibility…to keep this aircraft flying for the next two generations of aviators.” “When you
talk about our system, it’s about relevance and the benefit that we bring…as an enabler for the
ground forces,” Colonel Marion told Kari Hawkins in a 2012 Redstone Rocket interview.5 Major
General Anthony Crutchfield, Commanding General, Army Aviation Center of Excellence
agreed, noting in his Army Aviation 2030 Vision statement that “our relationship with the ground
force is the best that it has ever been in our history.”6
To meet current and future full-spectrum requirements, the US Army has developed an
Aviation Transformation Plan to decisively upgrade aviation capabilities based on doctrine and
lessons learned from flying more than 4.2 million combat hours during OEF, OIF, and Operation
NEW DAWN. Active and reserve component aviation warfighting units have been reorganized
into Combat Aviation Brigades (CAB) to enhance modularity and tailorability, while providing
more lethal and sustainable support to ground force Brigade Combat Teams.7 Transformation
efforts were hastened by the Global War on Terrorism (Overseas Contingency Operations) which
98
effectively reduced the emphasis on large-scale conventional campaigns and focused more on
balanced, multi-functional, CABs. The Army also weaned some legacy aircraft from its fleet,
thereby reducing logistical and training requirements and concentrating aviation resources on the
four primary helicopters remaining – UH-60, AH-64, OH-58, and CH-47. Army Aviation is
continuously adding incremental upgrades and improvements to these aircraft, thereby
lengthening their respective service lives, enhancing full-spectrum mission capabilities, reducing
logistical footprints, and increasing speed, range, payload, reliability, and survivability. 8
Currently, there are more than 3,500 helicopters in the Army Aviation inventory, approximately
500 of which are CH-47 Chinooks. The overall Army Acquisition Objective is 533 F model
Chinooks by 2020.9
Army modernization upgrades planned specifically for the CH-47 include an improved
Cargo On/Off Load System (COOLS) that replaces the F model’s cargo bay floor with a roller
system, significantly improves loading and off-loading cargo through the ramp, reduces crew
member workloads, and facilitates in-flight reconfiguration to accommodate a variety of mission
requirements.10 The Cargo Platform Health Environment (CPHE) modification is an electronic
diagnostic and prognostication system that monitors all aircraft vibrations, thus assisting
maintenance personnel in predicting/identifying potential component failures. The Advanced
Chinook Rotor Blade (ACRB), which will increase the CH-47’s lift capacity by 2,000 lbs, is
expected to be operational by 2015. Also, the cockpit armor panels in D and F models are
scheduled to be replaced by a Multi-Impact Transparent Armor System (MITAS) which is 30%
lighter and affords comparable ballistic protection. Additional modifications include a cargo
ramp gunner seat for the crewman operating the ramp-mounted M240H machine gun and an
99
improved engine control unit that increases reliability, maintainability, and troubleshooting
capabilities.11
As a result of the early effectiveness of CH-47s in OEF, the Army expanded the role of
Chinooks beyond the division asset level and began assigning Chinook companies (12 CH-47s)
as organic units of General Support Aviation Battalions within each CAB. As the numbers of
FOBs/COBs rose in Afghanistan and as the BCT assigned areas of responsibility grew in size,
the Chinook’s superior range capability and high/hot operational proficiency became all the more
beneficial in support of both combat air assault and resupply missions.12 Operational demands
for Chinook support continued to mount as payload weights – vehicles, mission equipment
packages, Soldiers’ combat loads – increased over time. Technologies built into the CH-47F
models improved situational awareness and allowed pilots to land more safely at night and in
degraded visual environments (dust and brown-out landings), thereby lowering risks for
passengers and crews.13
In the February 2012 Army Aviation Vision 2030 statement, Major General Crutchfield
warned, however, that “incremental improvements or upgrades to the current DoD rotorcraft
fleet, which is nearing the limits for decades-old technology, will not fully meet future joint
service operational requirements…we will seek to execute change that is beyond the capabilities
of today’s aircraft.”14 Vision 2030 calls for a re-examination of Army Aviation’s roles, missions,
and organization in order to redesign, equip, and staff an aviation force that is effective, adaptive,
flexible, lethal, and efficient in the face of potentially uncertain, complex, and rapidly changing
future operational environments. When confronted with a broad spectrum of possible threats,
Army Aviation must be capable of providing ground commanders with sufficient multidimensional mobility to outmaneuver any enemy on any battlefield. Vertical lift, like that
100
provided by the CH-47, is unrestrained by troublesome terrain and will remain a critical combat
multiplier well into the 2030 timeframe. Current Army Aviation core competencies –
reconnaissance/security, attack, air assault/air movement, and aeromedical evacuation – will
likewise remain unchanged, as will the requirement to fly faster, further, day or night, in
unfavorable visual environments, and in adverse weather conditions. As for the air assault core
competency component, future vertical maneuver missions will require sufficient lift capacity to
transport complete ground teams to designated objectives and adequate speed/range to rapidly
close with enemy forces at extended distances.15
In May 2011, a specially equipped US Army MH-60K helicopter crash-landed at a
compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan during Operation NEPTUNE SPEAR. Abbottabad is
situated at the 4,000 ft. level in the foothills the Pir Panjal Mountain range. Air temperature
there on the night of the accident was above normal for that time of year. The Black Hawk
experienced an aerodynamic condition known as “settling with power,” the ship’s tail rotor
struck the 10-foot high compound wall, and the aircraft crashed into the courtyard. No one on
board was seriously injured, however the helicopter could not be flown and was subsequently
destroyed in-place by a demolition team following completion of the mission. The downed MH60K carried a crew of three plus 13 passengers, and was retrofitted with heat signature reduction
components, a radar-evading paint scheme, and a noise-reducing tail rotor assembly system. The
added stealth technology modifications made the aircraft heavier than a standard MH-60.16
Settling with power typically occurs on landing approaches involving slow forward
airspeeds, flight path angles greater than 30 degrees, and with vertical or near-vertical rates of
descent higher than 300 feet per minute. Despite applying full power, the excessive sink rate
cannot be reversed, rotor efficiency is lost, and the helicopter settles into its own downwash as
101
engine power is insufficient to stop the descent. The high, hot, and heavy flight conditions
encountered at Abbottabad were precisely those that had prompted Army commanders to favor
CH-47 Chinooks for air assault operations which involve elevated HLZs, high temperature days,
and excessive payload weights. Following the successful mission in Abbottabad, the crew and
passengers from the downed helicopter were extracted by Chinooks.
Since a significant proportion of Afghan terrain is above 6,000 ft. mean sea level,
thousands of OEF combat assault missions were conducted in high, hot, and heavy conditions, in
which Chinooks outperform all other Army Aviation assets. By utilizing CH-47s, ground force
commanders can bring along more of their critical assets, such as mortars, motorcycles, and
ATVs, thereby enhancing speed, mobility, and firepower after reaching the HLZ. The Chinook’s
large payload capacity also allows ground commanders to land their entire force in a single lift,
thus getting the force into action faster, while minimizing the risk of a small initial force being
attacked or a helicopter being shot down during multiple lifts and consecutive landings at the
same HLZ. These same benefits apply during the extraction phase of an operation as well.
Ground commanders can get their troops out more quickly and avoid leaving behind smaller
groups awaiting additional lifts/aircraft. Completing an air assault mission in a single lift also
simplifies route planning. The number of HLZs is reduced and the possibility of having to land
in the same zone twice is eliminated. “It’s much easier to plan a route for two CH-47s than for
six UH-60s,” Captain Robert Bender, commander, B/1-52 explained after returning to Alaska
from Kandahar.17
Based upon the CH-47’s unqualified success in the combat air assault role in Afghanistan,
ground unit commanders are likely to request continued Chinook support in future
operations/conflicts. Putting more forces on an objective in a shorter period of time in a high,
102
hot, and heavy environment is an obviously desirable capability. Anticipated improvements to
the Chinook, such as increased payload, range, speed, survivability, and digital interoperability,
will doubtlessly enable the aircraft to continue as the workhorse of Army Aviation well into the
21st century.
1
Major General William Crosby, email correspondence with the author, 30 April 2012, 1.
Major General William Crosby, email correspondence with the author, 30 April 2012, 1.
3
Colonel Robert Marion, email correspondence with the author, 29 April 2012, 1.
4
As of 2012, Chinooks were the rotary wing aircraft of choice in the OEF theatre, where Army Aviation OPTEMPO
was at its highest point ever. The new F model CH-47s incorporate machined airframes, common avionics
architecture system cockpits that meet digitized interoperability requirements, full authority digital automatic flight
control systems, and additional integrated improvements, see Major General William Crosby, “Department of
Defense Rotorcraft Modernization Programs,” Statement before the Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces
Committee on Armed Services, United States House of Representatives, Second Session, 112th Congress, 27 March
2012, 5-6.
5
Colonel Robert Marion quoted in Kari Hawkins, “Forget the Museum, First Chinook Still Flying,” Redstone
Rocket, 11 April 2012, 2.
6
Major General Anthony Crutchfield, Army Aviation 2030 Vision, 16 February 2012, 2.
7
Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2008 US Army Posture Statement, “Information Papers: Restructuring
Army Aviation,” 26 February 2008, 1-2; Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2011 US Army Posture Statement,
“Information Papers: Restructuring Army Aviation,” 2 March 2011, 1-2.
8
Major General Anthony Crutchfield, Army Aviation 2030 Vision, 16 February 2012, 6.
9
Congress of the United States, Congressional Budget Office, A CBO Paper: Modernizing the Army’s Rotary-Wing
Aviation Fleet, November 2007, 24; Colonel Robert Marion, “The Amazing Cargo Helicopter: Celebrating 50+
Years, 1961-2012,” Army Aviation Association of America, AAAA Cargo Update, 4 April 2012, 4.
10
Major General William Crosby, “Department of Defense Rotorcraft Modernization Programs,” Statement before
the Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces Committee on Armed Services, United States House of
Representatives, Second Session, 112th Congress, 27 March 2012, 6.
11
Colonel Robert Marion, “The Amazing Cargo Helicopter: Celebrating 50+ Years, 1961-2012,” Army Aviation
Association of America, AAAA Cargo Update, 4 April 2012, 6.
12
The nonlinear battlefield and lack of infrastructure/road networks in Afghanistan increased dependence on
aviation support in general.
13
Captain Jared Koelling, email correspondence with the author, 7 May 2012, 1.
14
Major General Anthony Crutchfield, Army Aviation 2030 Vision, 16 February 2012, 6, 9.
15
Major General Anthony Crutchfield, Army Aviation 2030 Vision, 16 February 2012, 2-8.
16
Peter Bergen, “The Last Days of Osama Bin Laden,” Time, 7 May 2012, 24-33.
17
Captain Robert Bender, email correspondence, 22 May 2012, 2.
2
103
HIGH, HOT and HEAVY:
THE CH-47 CHINOOK IN COMBAT ASSAULT OPERATIONS IN AFGHANISTAN
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HIGH, HOT and HEAVY:
THE CH-47 CHINOOK IN COMBAT ASSAULT OPERATIONS IN AFGHANISTAN
LIST OF SUGGESTED PHOTOGRAPHS
Cover
http://www.google.com/imgres?imgurl=http://kunar.artofwar.ru/photo/asadabad/fob.asadabad/th
umbnails/200_getting.dropped.off.jpg&imgrefurl=http://kunar.artofwar.ru/photo/asadabad/fob.as
adabad/index_2.htm&usg=__TreHB4xyhXGBQ3PYQ3c2WtLsUM=&h=112&w=150&sz=4&hl=en&start=1&sig2=2x1qcK03juOm
GHRlFSy2rw&zoom=1&tbnid=0hbu0_q2oHFnAM:&tbnh=72&tbnw=96&ei=rZizT9v5BKmKi
ALHnpW2BA&prev=/search%3Fq%3D200_getting_dropped_off.jpg%26um%3D1%26hl%3De
n%26tbm%3Disch&um=1&itbs=1
Others
http://theunawriterslair.typepad.com/photos/tf_brawler_afghanistan_fa/b11.html
http://theunawriterslair.typepad.com/photos/tf_brawler_afghanistan_fa/b6.html
http://theunawriterslair.typepad.com/photos/tf_brawler_afghanistan_fa/b7.html
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http://theunawriterslair.typepad.com/photos/tf_brawler_afghanistan_fa/b5.html
http://theunawriterslair.typepad.com/.a/6a00e553b244e188340153909d58c9970b-popup
http://theunawriterslair.typepad.com/.a/6a00e553b244e188340153909d6144970b-popup
http://theunawriterslair.typepad.com/.a/6a00e553b244e1883401543366cc56970c-popup
http://theunawriterslair.typepad.com/.a/6a00e553b244e1883401348971d4de970c-pi
http://theunawriterslair.typepad.com/.a/6a00e553b244e1883401348971e825970c-pi
http://theunawriterslair.typepad.com/.a/6a00e553b244e188340147e0156e9c970b-pi
http://theunawriterslair.typepad.com/.a/6a00e553b244e1883401348971ecd5970c-pi
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http://theunawriterslair.typepad.com/.a/6a00e553b244e188340133f64717b0970b-pi
http://theunawriterslair.typepad.com/.a/6a00e553b244e18834013488d62878970c-pi
http://theunawriterslair.typepad.com/.a/6a00e553b244e188340133f5b62f33970b-pi
http://theunawriterslair.typepad.com/.a/6a00e553b244e188340133f5b6379a970b-pi
http://www.google.com/imgres?imgurl=http://img401.imageshack.us/img401/5899/chinook20m
akes20house20kq1.jpg&imgrefurl=http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?1047
60-Chinook-pickup&h=533&w=800&sz=81&tbnid=YDFdt2XzZHs9DM:&tbnh=93&tbnw=140&prev=/search%
3Fq%3Dchinook%2Bphotos%26tbm%3Disch%26tbo%3Du&zoom=1&q=chinook+photos&doc
id=SoLbfr4CigekM&hl=en&sa=X&ei=qx60T8OeE6PY2gXK1NUe&sqi=2&ved=0CHYQ9QEwDA&dur=2657
http://www.pbase.com/aztomas/image/41514265
http://www.pbase.com/aztomas/image/41514282
http://www.pbase.com/aztomas/image/41514286
http://www.google.com/imgres?imgurl=http://www.museumsyndicate.com/images/6/56394.jpg
&imgrefurl=http://www.museumsyndicate.com/item.php?item%3D56394&h=1504&w=2064&s
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photos%2Bafghanistan%26tbm%3Disch%26tbo%3Du&zoom=1&q=chinook+photos+afghanist
an&docid=iZxo8tBi9r_GsM&hl=en&sa=X&ei=tSG0T7fbG4e62gXuhuA0&ved=0CFkQ9QEw
AA&dur=5547
http://xaxor.com/other/22566-ch-47-chinook-photos.html
http://www.visualintel.net/Army/Systems/CH-47Chinook/7601910_kGMRZc#!i=675978239&k=ti2m4&lb=1&s=A
http://www.visualintel.net/Army/Systems/CH-47Chinook/7601910_kGMRZc#!i=385654526&k=9wySt&lb=1&s=A
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http://www.visualintel.net/Army/Systems/CH-47Chinook/7601910_kGMRZc#!i=493083574&k=RsE6D&lb=1&s=A
http://www.visualintel.net/Army/Systems/CH-47Chinook/7601910_kGMRZc#!i=410405577&k=jviQF&lb=1&s=A
http://www.visualintel.net/Army/Systems/CH-47Chinook/7601910_kGMRZc#!i=408664412&k=wpQTy&lb=1&s=A
http://www.visualintel.net/Army/Systems/CH-47Chinook/7601910_kGMRZc#!i=491568495&k=Jg7HR&lb=1&s=A
http://www.visualintel.net/Army/Systems/CH-47Chinook/7601910_kGMRZc#!i=493083919&k=X38v3&lb=1&s=A
http://www.visualintel.net/Army/Systems/CH-47Chinook/7601910_kGMRZc#!i=491563889&k=HXGPU&lb=1&s=A
http://www.visualintel.net/Army/Systems/CH-47Chinook/7601910_kGMRZc#!i=491564118&k=ZvVxL&lb=1&s=A
http://www.visualintel.net/Army/Systems/CH-47Chinook/7601910_kGMRZc#!i=493081462&k=mdzu2&lb=1&s=A
http://www.visualintel.net/Army/Systems/CH-47Chinook/7601910_kGMRZc#!i=491564083&k=2T2VU&lb=1&s=A
http://www.visualintel.net/Army/Systems/CH-47Chinook/7601910_kGMRZc#!i=491560718&k=zFxD9&lb=1&s=A
http://www.visualintel.net/Army/Systems/CH-47Chinook/7601910_kGMRZc#!i=491563010&k=UQbAy&lb=1&s=A
http://www.visualintel.net/Army/Systems/CH-47Chinook/7601910_kGMRZc#!i=491560736&k=Vrbhw&lb=1&s=A
http://www.visualintel.net/Army/Systems/CH-47Chinook/7601910_kGMRZc#!i=410415554&k=bcMyD&lb=1&s=A
http://www.visualintel.net/Army/Systems/CH-47Chinook/7601910_kGMRZc#!i=406460681&k=nXTYm&lb=1&s=A
http://www.visualintel.net/Army/Systems/CH-47Chinook/7601910_kGMRZc#!i=663100214&k=ma2WV&lb=1&s=A
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