Presidential Leadership on Global Climate Change:
Opportunities and Constraints
Jeffry Burnam
Visiting Assistant Professor of Government
Department of Government
Georgetown University
Burnamj@georgetown.edu
Presidential leadership on the environment matters (Vig 103),
including on the international environment (Daynes and Sussman). But
when do presidents lead on international environmental issues, what roles
do they play when they do and how effective are they in achieving their
objectives?
Executive branch agencies with differing missions and
constituencies are likely to disagree on the terms or even on the need for a
new international treaty. As Richard Neustadt says: “Executive officials
need decisions, and political protection and a referee for fights” (p. 6).
So, first, a president may choose to referee executive branch disputes over
international environmental issues as they arise. Second, a president may
work to persuade key legislators whose support he may need that it would
be in their interest to support his proposed treaty (Neustadt, p 41).1 Third,
a president may choose to bypass an unfriendly Congress and use executive
2
orders or other administrative means to secure his objectives (Howell). To
support his interventions in any of these three roles, a president may build
support by going public (Kernell) or by going local (Cohen 2009), a
technique that has become increasingly attractive given the limits that
media fragmentation imposes on appeals to the general public.
So presidents must be strategic. To be successful they must
“facilitate change by recognizing opportunities in their environments and
fashioning strategies and tactics needed to exploit them” (Edwards 188).
Edwards suggests this is the “essential” leadership skill (p. 6). Equally
important are the constraints on the president’s ability to lead. They often
derive from the same factors that provide opportunities for leadership.
In the case of international environmental treaties, the constraints
and opportunities a president confronts include: the state of the science,
economic impact, public perceptions of the need for action, congressional
and interest group support or opposition, and the presence of absence of socalled “action forcing” events. His success in recognizing these constraints
and exploiting these opportunities will largely determine the effectiveness
of his interventions.
In this paper, I draw upon insights derived from these presidential
leadership theories and from original interviews with high-level officials
3
who worked closely with presidents from Reagan to Obama on ozone layer
and climate change protection, given the constraints and opportunities
these presidents confronted. But these have evolved, so a new kind of
presidential leadership is both possible and needed. That is strategic
advocacy in which the President through his words and deeds stresses the
moral urgency of addressing global climate change and employs the
techniques most likely to yield success in a given instance.
The Montreal Protocol on Ozone Layer Protection
Background
The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer
(1987) is “perhaps the most successful international agreement to date”
(Kofi Annan) and one in which the United States and U.S. Presidents have
played a critical role.
The ozone layer is in process of recovering. The ecology and the
global environment have been protected. New industries have been
created, and consumers have generally benefitted from more efficient
means of refrigeration (UNEP 2012). In the United States alone, the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) projects that 22 million cataract
4
cases and 6.3 million skin cancer deaths will be avoided at an estimated
savings in health care costs of $4.2 trillion over the period 1990-2165.
(US EPA 2010).
Ozone in the stratosphere forms a thin layer that protects humans,
animals, fish and crops from the damaging effects of ultraviolet (UV)
radiation from the sun. In 1974, scientists Mario Molina and Sherwood
Rowland demonstrated theoretically that certain industrial chemicals such
as chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) had the potential to migrate into the
stratosphere and be broken down by UV rays, creating significant amounts
of free chlorine radicals. These chlorine radicals would generate a
complex chemical reaction that would gradually deplete the stratospheric
ozone layer (Anderson and Sarma, 9-10).
Stratospheric ozone protection entered the policy arena long before
the White House became involved, which is also typical of many
presidential legislative initiatives (Rudalevige, 81). In 1978, the EPA
banned the use of aerosols in deodorant and other spray cans, a popular
move that industry also supported because substitutes for aerosol sprays
were readily available.2 But the European Commission (EC) did not
follow suit, adopting instead a loose cap only on CFC production. Public
5
interest subsided and attempts to further regulate CFCs came to a
temporary halt with the demise of the Carter Administration.
An Action Forcing Event: The Ozone Hole
In 1986, surprising news of a large winter depletion in the Antarctic
ozone layer (the Antarctic Ozone Hole) led industry officials on both sides
of the Atlantic to begin thinking about the prospects for international
controls. At the time, U.S. industry favored a global ban on CFC usage in
aerosols, whereas European industry was prepared to discuss only a
production cap. Japanese industry also had a keen interest in the issue,
since CFCs were used as a solvent to clean electronics; so did the USSR,
both as a significant producer and a significant consumer of CFCs. As
time went on, Japan and Russia came to favor strong controls, but the
European Community held out almost until the bitter end, largely due to
the intransigence of the British chemical industry (Rowlands, 101-123).
The unexpected discovery of the Antarctic Ozone Hole confounded
scientists and policy makers alike because it raised the possibility that
relatively small increases in CFCs could lead to much larger (non-linear)
reductions in the ozone layer once a certain threshold was reached.
6
In September 1986, the U.S. industry-led Alliance for Responsible
CFC Policy switched its opposition to controls and advocated a
“reasonable global limit” on increases in CFCs. Then, in October 1986,
U.S. industry leader DuPont called for an actual global reduction in CFC
production. These switches can be attributed to a number of factors, most
notably to DuPont’s capacity to develop marketable potential substitutes
for CFCs as well as to its fear that the United States Government might
decide to act unilaterally, placing it at a competitive disadvantage (Casin
and Dray, 308).
David Doniger
David Doniger joined the Natural Resources Defense Council in
1978, taking a lead for NRDC and for the environmental community on the
Montreal Protocol starting in 1986 and continuing to the present day.
Doniger remembers how bitterly industry in the 70s had “decried” the
science of ozone depletion and how strongly industry had opposed the
Carter Administration’s proposal to regulate CFCs in 1980. He recalls that
at an informally designed United Nations Environment Program (UNEP)
workshop hosted by the United States in Leesburg, Virginia, DuPont
presented an economic analysis that found the alternatives to CFCs to be
too costly. But when Doniger asked them if their analysis would change if
7
CFCs were further restricted, by law, “their answer was somewhere
between ‘we hadn’t thought of that’ to ‘yes’!”
EPA Administrator Lee Thomas
In the fall of 1986, as the Department of State was seeking an
interagency determination of the U.S. negotiating position, EPA
Administrator Lee Thomas intervened at a critical moment. Thomas had
attended the Leesburg Workshop and had testified at a Senate Environment
Committee hearing in June 1986. He knew the issue in detail. In an
October 1986 meeting with EPA professionals, Thomas surprised them by
recommending a phase out of CFCs and not just a production freeze. Here
is how Thomas puts it:
It came through in the discussion that from a regulatory point of
view we needed a more clear-cut goal to work with. From a
scientific point of view a phase out was the correct goal because
these were offending chemicals. All this discussion they were
having about a freeze seemed to blur the fact that this was the
ultimate goal…. I felt that a phase out was something we could
defend better than what they were coming up with (Casin and Dray,
310-311).
Scientific Uncertainty: The Negotiator’s View
Ambassador Richard E. Benedick was the lead U.S. negotiator on
the Montreal Protocol from 1985 to 1987. In Ozone Diplomacy, he notes
8
that the science of ozone depletion was far from certain at the time that the
Montreal Protocol was negotiated:
Perhaps the most extraordinary aspect of the treaty was its
imposition of substantial short-term economic costs to protect
human health and the environment against unproven future
dangers—dangers that rested on scientific theories rather than on
firm data (Benedick, 2).
However, according to Benedick, scientific uncertainty actually
helped the State Department to propose the middle ground of a phased
reduction in ozone layer depleting substances. The phased reduction
allowed industry time to make available acceptable substitutes for CFCs,
thus maintaining industry support. At the same time, environmentalists
were pleased that the ultimate goal of the U.S proposal was the virtual
elimination of global emissions of ozone layer depleting chemicals. Major
U.S. producers of CFCs (DuPont in particular) supported a 50% reduction
for the interesting reason that a lesser reduction of, say, only 20% or a
mere freeze would not provide them with a sufficient incentive to produce
the chemical alternatives to CFCs they knew they could develop for the
market if given time and an incentive to do so (Benedick, 51-58).
The Assistant Secretary of State: John Negroponte
9
Ambassador Benedick was not only the lead U.S. negotiator of the
Montreal Protocol; he was at the same time the Deputy Assistant Secretary
of State for Environment (E-DAS) in the Bureau of Oceans, Environment
and Science (OES), a position that I once held so I am aware of its
responsibilities. The E-DAS needs support as required from the Principal
Deputy Assistant Secretary and from the Assistant Secretary for Oceans,
Environment and Science, who at the time was Ambassador John
Negroponte. Negroponte recalls that while Benedick “drove” the
negotiations, it was up to him and to EPA Administrator Lee Thomas “to
shepherd the Montreal Protocol through the crucial higher levels of the
international and the domestic political processes.” He and Thomas
“pushed this thing through against considerable odds” with support from
Deputy Secretary of State John Whitehead and Secretary George Shultz.
Two tasks were important. One was to persuade key countries of the
merits of the science, especially Europe, Russia and Japan. So Thomas
and Negroponte worked with their counterparts in foreign governments
and deployed U.S. scientific and technical experts to meet with their
scientific and technical counterparts. Nor did Secretary Shultz hesitate to
inform foreign leaders of his support for our negotiators. The other task
was internal. According to Negroponte, the President’s Science Advisor
10
William Graham “didn’t believe in the science” and Interior Secretary
Donald Hodel took issue with State’s position. Negroponte and Thomas
“worked to overcome those” views when the matter was elevated to the
Domestic Policy Council (Negroponte).
A Friendly Congress
In the spring of 1987, the Office of Management and Budget had set
up an interagency working group to reexamine the State Department’s
negotiating position. The OMB review was soon elevated to the cabinetlevel Domestic Policy Council (DPC). The DPC’s options paper included
Secretary of the Interior Donald Hodel’s “personal protection option” that
proposed (among other things) that the public be urged to wear sunscreen,
sunglasses and broad brimmed hats. A calculated leak of Hodel’s views by
his own staff generated an uproar (Doniger). The Washington Post’s
Herblock penned a famous cartoon that showed fish wearing sunglasses!
(The actual damage to fish from UV radiation results from its potential
negative effect on plankton, the source of all ocean life.)
Secretary of State George Shultz
Secretary of State George Shultz did not believe that the Domestic
Policy Council was an appropriate forum to determine the
11
Administration’s position in an international treaty negotiation. But that
did not matter so much because Shultz had “raised and carefully talked
over the ozone layer issue on several occasions” in private meetings with
the President that Nancy Reagan had arranged for him on pending matters.
Shultz told the President that “although there was still some controversy
over the science, it was quite likely that CFCs were damaging the ozone
layer and if that was true, the result would be catastrophic and
irreversible.” So “it made sense to take out an insurance policy.”
According to Shultz, President Reagan was a “good man for grasping the
essence of an issue” and he did so in this instance. So Shultz knew that if
the issue were elevated to the President, Reagan would support an
international treaty (Shultz).
President Ronald Reagan: The Referee
On June 18 1987 President Reagan chaired a Domestic Policy
Council Meeting at which a majority of departments and agencies lined up
against the State Department’s negotiating position. Neither Benedick nor
Secretary of State George Shultz was present at the meeting with the
President. Shultz was on travel at the time, together with Negroponte.
Deputy Secretary of State John Whitehead represented the Secretary and
12
followed up the meeting by sending a letter to Chief of Staff Howard
Baker to correct the distortions of the State Department options in the DPC
Staff Memo. The President decided to support “virtually all of the StateEPA position” (Benedick 65-67). Benedick was in Berlin, giving a speech
at the fortieth anniversary of the Marshall Plan. He vividly recalls that a
young man from the U.S. Embassy delivered a sealed envelope to him with
a copy of the signed presidential decision memo that had a security
classification so high that it had to be burned after reading! Benedick was
amazed:
Usually, it’s some compromise, but in the case of Montreal, it was
99% for our list of options, which absolutely dazzled Negroponte
and me. Neither of us had ever experienced such an
uncompromising resolution of (strong!) interagency disagreement
(Benedick 2011b).
Reagan made one exception and selected an option that would have
required the U.S. to propose at Montreal that 90% of all countries would
have to ratify the treaty before it went into force:
However, the President’s instructions were that if, after every other
article had been decided at Montreal, we were still unable to attain
this provision I (specifically I) was to fly back to Washington and
explain this at an interagency meeting and then return the same day
to Montreal and accept the consensus for the easier entry-into-force
provision that State had favored from the beginning. This in fact
occurred (Benedick 2011b).
13
President Reagan had intervened to referee an executive branch
dispute in support of the State Department’s position despite significant
opposition from his Cabinet and his conservative advisors; it was this
strategic choice that allowed the United States to maintain its leading role
in negotiating the Montreal Protocol and to forge a reputation as a world
leader on the ozone depletion issue. And the President made this key
decision only after having been briefed twice by the Secretary of State and
after hearing both sides being presented at the Domestic Policy Council, a
procedure similar that he had often employed with his “super cabinet”
when he had been Governor of California (Svahn).
The President’s decision was not publicized, perhaps not to offend
his “base.” There had been a rumor that Benedick was about to be fired
and some European officials were surprised to learn just prior to Montreal
that Benedick was still our lead negotiator (Benedick, 2001b).
Despite President Reagan’s “hidden hand” leadership3, the outcome
of the September 1987 negotiations in Montreal was far from certain
(Benedick 74-76). As EPA Administrator Lee Thomas puts it:
The negotiations were quite contentious right up to Montreal.
Actually they were quite difficult in Montreal with all night sessions
by a smaller group of principals where we negotiated key elements
of the agreement in the final hours (Thomas).
14
The European Community was allowed a “bubble” over its
emissions to make it easier for its member nations to comply. Russia was
granted some deadline adjustments to conform to its five-year economic
plan. And the U.S.-backed provision to require that 90% of the Protocol
signatories must ratify the treaty before it went into effect was diluted to
67% (Shabecoff, 1987a; 1987b; 1987c).
Ironically, in late September 1987, just after the Montreal Protocol
was signed, new data were released that showed that the Antarctic Ozone
Hole was larger than ever. And a March 1988 study by the Ozone Trends
Panel showed not only that man-made chlorine emissions were causing
stratospheric ozone layer depletion, but also that the probable rate of loss
of ozone was far greater than the models had previously predicted
(Shabecoff, 1987d; 1987e; 1988a; 1988b; and Benedick, 110-111).
Science and the Montreal Protocol
What was the influence of the science of ozone depletion on policy
makers? In Ozone Discourses, Karen T. Litfin contends that the discovery
of the Antarctic Ozone Hole changed the terms of the debate, both for
scientists and policy makers. In 1986 and 1987, as the treaty was being
15
negotiated, scientists could still avail themselves of a variety of alternative
interpretations of the Antarctic Ozone Hole or even view it as an anomaly
that could not be explained by existing knowledge. Even the actual
depletion of the ozone layer was not an established fact.4
The discovery of the Antarctic Ozone Hole was a dramatic event that
not only had a major impact on public and legislative opinion; it led to
what Liftkin calls a “discursive shift” in favor of action. For the
unanticipated emergence of a hole much larger and much sooner than any
scientific model had predicted alarmed scientists and undermined their
faith in their own models, which had suggested a more gradual depletion of
the ozone layer over time. Policy makers sensed a crisis in the scientific
community, which could not at first explain these findings.5 They realized
that more immediate preventive action might need to be taken than they
had thought necessary (Litfin, 96-107).
Economics and the Montreal Protocol
The economic impact of the Montreal Protocol was mitigated because
the treaty’s targets and timetables could be adjusted to meet new scientific
assessment and changing expectations of when industry could produce
adequate and affordable substitutes. And unlike climate change, the
16
impact was not economy wide. But ways did have to be found to mitigate
its substantial impacts on consumers and small businesses, including
allowing “critical use exemptions” for methyl bromide as a key agricultural
fumigant or through recycling of CFC-based refrigerants, such as Freon.6
Limited fears about the economic impact of the Montreal Protocol
may have accounted for the fact that both public and political elites
generally accepted the science on ozone depletion, even in the period when
the science was somewhat uncertain. Once elites are persuaded that there
are economically and politically acceptable solutions to problems such as
acid rain and ozone depletion, they are less inclined to question the
scientific information (Burnam, 2011). By contrast, powerful interest
groups have sown doubt in the public mind concerning the need for action
on climate change. As Steven Seidel notes:
One critical difference between the Montreal Protocol and climate
change has been the existence of a well-funded opposition that
jumps on any scientific uncertainties and stokes fears about the
economic impacts of climate change (Seidel).
Doniger thinks that the key lesson from the Montreal Protocol process is
the importance of the environmental community and industry working
together. But he notes that some lobbyists have learned quite different
lessons that they use to fight action on climate change:
17
Paint the issues black and white, don’t rely on a process of scientific
fact finding and consensus building to get things started and don’t
admit that there are options for addressing the problem (Doniger)!
Congress and the Montreal Protocol
In response to the public outcry over the Herblock cartoon and
aware of the struggle within the Reagan Administration, the Senate on
June 5, 1987, debated a Baucus-Chafee Sense of the Senate Resolution
endorsing the State Department’s negotiating position, while adding
language to instruct the negotiators to consider the economic and
competitiveness impact of the proposed treaty. In a remarkable
demonstration of congressional support for the State Department’s
position, the Senate voted for the resolution 80-2.7 The House passed a
similar resolution some weeks later, but only after powerful Energy and
Commerce Chair John Dingell (D. Mich.), sensed industrial interest and
scientific support and thus came to favor international negotiations.
Previous Congressional hearings and support for negotiating an
international treaty had made it easier for the State Department and EPA to
prevail over those in the Reagan Administration who favored either a
limited response or no response to the ozone layer depletion problem
(Shimberg).
18
Lessons
President Reagan was persuaded to support the Montreal Protocol by
his Secretary of State. He never attempted to persuade Congress to support
the Montreal Protocol. But Senate Republicans and Democrats and Liberal
Republicans in the House had engaged through the hearing process in 1986
and 1987 in publicizing the threat to the ozone layer and to encourage the
Reagan Administration to take action. However, the Antarctic Ozone Hole
was its own persuader. Every school child in America knew about it
(Schmitt)—it was something the public could be easily comprehended in
the absence of any detailed knowledge of the science of ozone depletion.
Climate Protection
President Clinton and Vice President Gore
President Clinton started out his Administration in a manner pleasing
to environmentalists by assigning a lead role on the environment to Vice
President Gore, appointing two Gore aides to key environmental positions-Kathleen McGinty to coordinate environmental policy throughout the
government--and Carol Browner to be EPA Administrator. And on Earth
19
Day, the President announced “our nation’s commitment to reducing our
emissions of greenhouse gases to their 1990 levels by the year 2000,”
promising that the United States would “take the lead in addressing the
challenge of global warming. ” And overruling his own Treasury
Secretary, the President accepted the Vice President’s proposal for a tax on
the heat content of fossil fuels as part of his deficit reduction plan. The bill
with the fossil fuel tax included narrowly passed the House in May, but
was rejected in June by the Senate Finance Committee and was not
included in the final law.8
However, climate change was not a high priority for the White House
during the remainder of the Administration’s first two years, either
domestically or internationally. In October 1993, the President and the
Vice President jointly announced a Climate Change Action Plan.
Ironically, like the “no regrets” plan of the departing Bush Administration,
it relied only upon administrative measures that could be implemented
under existing legislative authority (Parker and Blodgett).
Two important international meetings on climate change occurred in
1995 and 1996. In March 1995, in Berlin, at the First Conference of the
Parties (COP 1) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC), which President Bush had signed at Rio, the U.S.
20
acceded to the demands of the developing countries to draft a treaty that
would contain emission limits for developed, but not for developing
countries (The Berlin Mandate). The Clinton Administration thought it
had to concede to this demand “in order to keep the international process
moving along” (Pomerance). That proved to be a fateful decision.
In July 1996, at Geneva, Under Secretary of State Timothy Wirth
announced the principles that would guide United States negotiators in
preparing for a climate change treaty. First, the United States would
commit to “realistic and achievable” reduction targets provided that other
developed nations also did so. Second, the U.S. would insist that
“maximum flexibility” be allowed for countries to meet those targets,
including the deployment of “market based” mechanisms. Third, the U.S.
would support funding to assist developing countries in meeting the
challenge of climate change.
The Kyoto Protocol: Successes and Failures
In 1997, the White House assumed control of international climate
change policy and established a White House Climate Change Task Force
headed by Todd Stern, who realized that outreach with key constituencies
was badly needed to communicate the Administration’s climate change
21
strategy (Royden 18). And a working group was established to draft
options for the President and Vice President. It was co-chaired by Gene
Sperling, Director of the National Economic Council (NEC), Kathleen
McGinty, Chair of the White House Council on Environmental Quality
(CEQ) and James Steinberg, Deputy Director of the National Security
Council (NSC) and also included David Sandalow (NSC and CEQ), Dan
Perrolli (NEC), Larry Summers (Treasury), and Under Secretary of State
for Global Affairs Stuart Eisenstadt, who became the US chief Kyoto
negotiator when Tim Wirth left in the summer of 2007 in order to head up
the United Nations Foundation. The working group met in Sperling’s
office in the West Wing. Sandalow recalls that it had a tough assignment:
“We realized that climate change was an issue in which economic,
environmental and diplomatic concerns intersected in somewhat
incompatible ways” and that there was “no way to come up with a U.S.
position that would make everyone happy.” He notes that the President
and Vice President were fully engaged throughout much of 1997: “We
recognized that this was a big decision that would require a big
commitment on the part of the United States.” The President’s distinctive
take on the issue was “to frame the issue in terms of opportunity.” Both
the President and the Vice President were “technology optimists who
22
believed that Americans could solve the climate change problem if only
they put their minds to it” (Sandalow). Kathleen McGinty, Chair of the
Council on Environmental Quality, recalls that the President and the Vice
President worked together on climate change:
The President and the Vice President functioned as a team, or
perhaps I should say a partnership, that recognized a high degree of
expertise on the climate change issue by the Vice President. But the
President was fully engaged, especially in how to frame the issue in
terms of economic opportunity and jobs, how to achieve a broader
base of support and how and when to expend political capital
(McGinty).
There were significant disagreements that needed to be refereed
between the President’s advisors, with Kathleen McGinty and his
environmental advisors “pushing for tough and specific cuts in greenhouse
gas emissions” while economic advisors such as Deputy Treasury
Secretary Larry Summers and White House Economic Advisor Gene
Sperling were more concerned with the potentially high costs of
implementation (Warrick). In a speech to the National Geographic Society
on October 22, President Clinton publicly announced that the U.S.
negotiating instructions for Kyoto would include a “binding and realistic
target of returning emissions to 1990 levels between 2008 and 2012” with
further (unspecified) measures in the years thereafter (Clinton 1997).
23
The Kyoto Protocol required the United States to reduce its greenhouse
gas emissions by 7% below 1990 levels averaged over the period 20082012. However, in return, the United States was able to include some
important general provisions (such as emissions trading and carbon sinks)
to make it easier for it (and others) to comply. Developed nations took on
binding reduction commitments, but no developing nation took on any
such commitments, even though it was known at the time that developing
nations’ share of global greenhouse gas emissions would eventually
surpass both Europe’s and that of the United States, which they have since
done. Attempts by Assistant Secretary of State Eileen Claussen to
negotiate bilateral agreements with China, India and South Korea prior to
Kyoto were frustrated by the Asian financial crisis.9
The Administration did succeed in permitting and influencing the
negotiation of an international climate change treaty at Kyoto. First, at
Berlin and Geneva, the U.S. prepared the way for the structure of the
Kyoto Protocol by fatefully acceding to the international consensus that
developing countries need not take on emissions limitations. Second, at
Kyoto, the U.S. was able to include in the Protocol such key objectives as
an averaging of emissions limits over five years not to begin until 2008.
And against considerable odds, the U.S. won international support for its
24
emissions trading proposal.10 Third, Vice President Gore flew to Kyoto
during the last week of the conference, when the negotiations were on the
verge of collapse, and announced “flexibility” in the U.S. position.
According to Ron Klain, the Vice President’s Chief of Staff:
Gore himself decided to go to Kyoto. Clinton was comfortable with
our fate being in the hands of the negotiating team, a mix of State
Department folks and Stu Eisenstadt, who was then Undersecretary for
Global Affairs and our chief negotiator at Kyoto. But the team had very
limited negotiating instructions, and felt like they lacked the stature or
authority to “get to yes.” They asked Gore to come, with a broad
delegation of authority to reach an agreement. A lively debate at the
WH ensued about the pros/cons of such a trip, and Clinton left the final
decision in Gore's own hands. Gore elected to go (Klain).
The Vice President’s trip “injected energy” into the negotiations and
was essential to a successful international outcome (Sandalow). And,
showing flexibility, the U.S. agreed to reduce its emissions to 7% rather
than 0% below 1990 levels; however this made it even harder for the
Administration to contend back home that it had negotiated a treaty with
the “realistic and achievable” goals it had promised. 11
It was clear that the Senate would not accept the Protocol’s provisions
with respect to developing countries. While legislative opinion strongly
favored the Montreal Protocol, it strongly opposed the Kyoto Protocol.
Months before the Montreal Protocol was signed, the U.S. Senate had
passed a resolution 82-2 that endorsed the U.S negotiating position.
25
Months before the Kyoto Protocol was negotiated, the U.S. Senate passed
a resolution 95-0 declaring that it could not support a treaty that did not
involve commitments from developing nations in the same time frame as
developed nations or that would cause economic harm to the United States
(Cushman, 1997a).
Nor was it clear that the Kyoto Protocol would not have significant
adverse effects on the economy. Remarkably, the Administration’s
economic analysis was not released until six months after Kyoto; it
underestimated the cost of the Protocol by a considerable margin.12 The
Administration pretended that the treaty might not have significant shortterm costs in addition to its long-term benefits (Claussen).
The Administration did not have the advantage of an action-forcing
event such as the Antarctic Ozone Hole to arouse public concern
(Claussen). Instead it tried to negotiating details at future conferences such
as The Hague to mitigate its economic impact through forestry credits. 13
Although the science was there, despite lingering uncertainties, the public
did not feel the need for action.
Lessons
26
President Clinton played the role of referee on climate change,
deciding in favor of his Vice President to accept the BTU tax and allowing
Gore to decide to go to Kyoto. He also refereed executive branch disputes
over the Administration’s negotiating position for Kyoto. But he failed to
persuade either Congress or the public that the Kyoto Treaty could be
implemented at reasonable cost or that it was fair in excluding China and
other developing countries from emission reduction obligations. His
National Geographic Speech, a wonkiest event that he and Vice President
Gore held with leading scientists at Georgetown University14 and his 1998
State of the Union were his major efforts to go public on Kyoto. Kyoto
had the support of major environmental but not of major industrial
organizations. But his Administration had successfully negotiated a treaty
that included many of its key objectives and that it hoped would be
improved by further amendments.
President George W. Bush and Vice President Cheney
Lessons: The Vice President as Referee
Candidate Bush opposed the Kyoto Protocol during his 2000
presidential campaign, but he delivered a speech designed to blunt
Candidate Gore’s appeal committing his Administration to legislation
clarifying that CO2 could be regulated under the Clean Air Act.15
27
Once in office, Vice President Cheney and his staff strategized on
how to walk the newly elected president back from this campaign
commitment. On March 13 2001, the Vice President took a letter directly
to the President for his signature, bypassing even the internal White House
clearance process. The letter told key Republican senators that the
Administration did not support regulating CO2 emissions under the Clean
Air Act (Bush 2001a). The Vice President left the White House to
personally deliver the letter to the Senate just as EPA Administrator
Christine Whitman was arriving for a previously scheduled meeting to
discuss the issue with the President; the President told Whitman that he
had already made up his mind (Gellman, 81-90). Neither Secretary of
State Colin Powell nor National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice had
been consulted. She would have inserted language promising to work with
our allies to address the problem of climate change. The letter confirmed
the worst fears of European diplomats about American unilateralism (Rice,
41).
A Cabinet Level Review Committee, chaired by Condoleezza Rice,
was established in the spring of 2001 to study global warming. It was coled by John Bridgeland (Assistant to the President for Domestic Policy)
and Gary Edson (Deputy Assistant to the President for International
28
Economic Affairs). Cesar Conda represented the Vice President.
Bridgeland recalls:
Edson and I led Cabinet-level discussions with the Cabinet Level
Secretaries themselves and came forward with significant policies to
advance the science and technologies on climate change. We briefed
the President regularly and he issued the policy in June 2001.
As good government types, we requested the latest science and facts
from the National Academy of Sciences. We summoned top experts—
scientists, climatologists, former EPA Administrators, Pew Center, nonprofits both advocates and skeptics, etc.
Kyoto was a non-starter. The key question was whether we’d follow
through on our commitment to include CO2 in the regulatory regime
(Bridgeland).
On June 11, the President went public and addressed the issue of
climate change on the White House lawn. While noting the finding of the
National Academy of Sciences that the “increase [in greenhouse gas levels]
is due in large part to human activity,” the President nevertheless
contended that “[w] e do not know how fast change will occur, or even
how some of our actions could impact it.” He called for a National
Climate Change Technology Initiative, but he did not propose any limits
on energy production from fossil fuels or any regulation of CO2 as a
pollutant under the Clean Air Act. The Vice President’s position had
prevailed.
29
In February 2002, in addressing a targeted audience at the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) President Bush
announced a Climate Change Action Plan that included a pledge to reduce
the carbon intensity of U.S. energy consumption by 18% by 2012. The
plan notably placed an emphasis on greenhouse gases that were not
generated by the burning of fossil fuels (Bush 2002).16 As CEQ Chair
James Connaughton recalls:
The President's Climate Change Action Plan included a component that
required us to focus on non-CO2 gases. We initially publicly identified
methane and black soot as key opportunities, and began to look more
closely at the viability of accelerated phase-out of gases subject to the
Montreal Protocol. The President was briefed and approved this
element of the Climate Change Action Plan, recognizing the power of
the approach with respect to large and quantifiable co-benefits
(Connaughton, 2012).
Lessons: A New Lead
As his second term approached, the President took Connaughton
aside and told him he wished to take a new lead on climate change. He
sent him around the world as his “Personal Representative” to lay the
foundation for Asia Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and
Climate Change, engaging China and India. In 2005, the President issued
a statement that “finally conceded the human influence on climate
30
change”; also in 2005 and in again in 2007, the Bush Administration
worked with Congress to enact new energy laws, including changes in
daylight savings time, an increase in vehicle fuel efficiency standards, an
aggressive biofuels mandate and a phase out of the incandescent light bulb!
In 2007, the President personally convened a meeting of the 18 major
economies (including major developing countries) to discuss national plans
for curbing greenhouse gas emissions. And the White House authorized
Under Secretary of State Paula Dobriansky to sign on to the Bali Plan of
Action, thus facilitating preparations for the 2010 UNFCCC Conference of
Parties in Copenhagen (Connaughton 2011).
The Bush Administration recognized that initiatives that can be
under the Montreal Protocol regime to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
With White House support, the State Department negotiated an accelerated
phase out of Hydroflourocarbons (HCFCs), which were the original
alternative to CFCs under the Montreal Protocol (Connaughton 2012).
Unfortunately, although HCFCs are now being phased out as a result of
these actions, many countries are now using HFCs as an alternative to
HCFCs. HFCs are not ozone depleters, but they are very powerful
greenhouse gases. So in the bipartisan fashion that it is typical of the
Montreal Protocol, the Obama Administration has followed through to
31
limit the production of HFCs under the Montreal Protocol. At the U.S.
China Summit in June 2013, President Xi and President Obama agreed to
support an amendment to the Montreal Protocol to phase down projected
increases in HFCs by 50% by 2050, a measure that if adopted by all
countries could avoid a temperature increase of 0.5 degrees centigrade
(Eilperin 2013; Y.Xu et.al.).
First Term: President Obama Goes to Copenhagen
In his first term, President Obama initially made climate change a
priority, but chose to place it behind health care reform, which in turn he
placed behind the need to stimulate the economy. In his 2009 State of the
Union, the President called for a cap and trade bill and spoke out
eloquently on climate change in an Earth Day Speech and to targeted
audiences on the promise of Green Jobs under the newly enacted American
Recovery Act (Going Local). But he did not send a bill to Congress;
instead he asked the House to send him a bill. Energy and Commerce
Chair Henry Waxman and Speaker Pelosi skillfully struck bargains with
major utility, coal and agricultural interests and the House passed a climate
change bill in June by a partisan majority of 217-212 (Neustadt).
However, the Administration lost control of the narrative, perhaps due to
32
low-key presidential involvement. Its opponents successfully labeled the
House bill a “Rube Goldberg contraption” filled with concessions to
special interests and a “Job Killer” (Pooley, 325-326, 359-403).
In the Senate, Senators John Kerry, Joe Lieberman and Lindsay
Graham launched a concerted effort to draft a climate change bill that
could be more broadly supported. But the Administration was not fully
engaged with them and actually undermined their efforts when it gave
away key items relating to offshore oil drilling and nuclear power that the
three senators had intended to use as bargaining chips (Lizza). However,
due to the economy and strong opposition from the Tea Party and
industry, their bill probably had no chance in any event. As Judith A.
Layzer notes:
(T) he Administration’s sporadic efforts to train the spotlight on energy
and climate change, combined with its determination to characterize
cap-and-trade as an economic boon, were not enough to overcome the
inertia that has long plagued Congress on this issue. The poor
economy, coupled with the efforts by Tea Party activists and other
opponents to cast a carbon cap as a job killer created enough confusion
among the public that, for fence sitting senators, simply doing nothing
appeared to be the most prudent course (Layzer).
Theda Skocpol blames the Obama Administration for following an
“inside” (bargaining) strategy uncoupled from a robust grass roots
strategy to mobilize public opinion for action on climate change (Skocpol
33
2013). But she does not highlight the President’s decision not to prioritize
speaking in support of the bill nor on industry’s aggressive campaign
against it (Pooley 2013). And public support for climate change action
was weak as the nation was still in the midst of the Great Recession.
The President did act administratively (Howell), ordering the EPA
and the DOT to issue dramatically enhanced fuel efficiency standards for
light trucks and automobiles and advancing the time line for those
standards, as authorized by the Bush era Energy Independence and
Security Act of 2007. And he bargained with the major automobile
makers for even more. The Administration then used these standards plus
the emission reduction goals of the House passed bill as the basis for its
position in international negotiations, at Copenhagen and Doha, when it
promised to reduce U.S. emissions of greenhouse gases 17% by 2020
from 2005 levels.
In December 2009, President Obama personally travelled to
Copenhagen and met with the leaders of China, India, Brazil and South
Africa. The Copenhagen Accord set a goal of limiting the increase in
average global temperature to 2 degrees Celsius and requested that both
developing and less developed nations submit national plans and take
steps to monitor and report their greenhouse gas emissions, provisions that
34
were spelled out in more detail in the Cancun Agreement of 2010
(Broder). And in South Africa in December 2011, the United States, in
concert with the European Union, China, India and other key international
players, signed on to the Durban Platform, launching the negotiation by
2016 of a new climate change treaty with “legal force” that will require
for the first time that the major developing nations pledge to reduce their
projected emissions (Eilperin 2011). The significance of the Durban
Platform is that it envisions a structure in which all key countries
(developed and less developed) will pledge to make “meaningful emission
reductions on an appropriate timetable at acceptable cost,” superseding the
dichotomous Berlin Mandate between them upon which the Kyoto
Protocol was based (Aldy and Stavins).
Second Term: New Opportunities for Presidential Leadership
A new strategic plan is needed for climate change. The experience
of previous Administrations and the contrasting economics and politics of
ozone layer and climate change protection suggest that a larger presidential
role will be needed on climate change than on ozone depletion--not just the
role of referee of executive branch disputes, the role that presidents have
played so far both on ozone depletion and climate change. After all, a
35
climate change treaty would likely affect almost every sector of the
economy and many more constituencies. At the same time, its benefits
would be widely shared. To effectively lead, the president would have to
assume the role of strategic advocate—speaking out urgently on the need
to act and choosing the techniques (bargaining, going public, going local
administrative remedies) most likely to yield success in a given instance.
The new strategic plan must be the President’s plan in fact as well as name
and he must give its implementation the priority and sustained attention
that studies of presidential communication suggest are needed to
successfully frame a debate (Cohen).
Fortunately, the constraints upon presidential leadership on climate
change are in the process of being lifted. Galen Weber has shown that
public concern about environmental issues rises as the employment rate
falls, and it has now dropped below 8% (Weber). The economics of
climate change are more favorable than ever due to the dramatic impact of
new supplies and low prices for natural gas in reducing the use of coal for
generating electricity.
As patterns of extreme weather events continue to accumulate, the
public will increasingly feel the need for action on climate change. For
example, a December 2012 survey found that 80% of Americans believe
36
that global warming is a serious problem, including an amazing 61% of the
public who call themselves “climate skeptics.” According to Stanford
University poll consultant Jon Krosnick, these skeptics “don’t believe what
the scientists say, they believe what the thermometers say…. Events are
helping these people see what scientists thought they had been seeing all
along” (Borenstein).17
So a discursive shift is underway in which the public perceives that
the effects of climate change are already upon them in the form of
powerful hurricanes, droughts, floods and melting ice (Carey 2011). It no
longer needs to trust scientific elites to conclude that global warming is a
clear and present danger.18
So President Obama now has an opportunity to become a strategic
advocate on climate change -- by making it a presidential priority, by
engaging national and international leaders and by pointing out that action
on climate change is urgently needed but can be achieved at reasonable
cost only if we act now (Ropgelj).
In a memorable speech proposing a ban on nuclear weapons testing,
President Kennedy declared: “In the final analysis …our most basic
common link is that we all inhabit this small planet. We all breathe the
same air and we are all mortal” (Clymer).
37
On June 22, 2013, at Georgetown University, President Obama
delivered a moral message to the young: “As a president, as a father and as
an American, I am here to say ‘It is time to act’…I refuse to condemn your
generation and future generations to a planet that’s beyond fixing.” At the
same time, he announced specific steps that his Administration would take,
including a directive to the EPA to regulate carbon emissions from both
new and from existing power plants under the Clean Air Act, an authority
that the Supreme Court had generally upheld in Massachusetts v. EPA
(2007). Unfortunately, his moral message was temporarily overshadowed
by that announcement, which was roundly denounced by Republican
congressional leaders as tantamount to an “energy tax” that would destroy
jobs and raise electrical rates (Landler and Broder).
At present, the President is predominantly pursuing an
administrative strategy on regulating carbon emissions; he does not have
significant legislative options open to him right now. Howell suggests that
“Congress can rarely mount an effective and timely response” to unilateral
action by the President (p. 178). But sometimes it can. On September 20,
EPA Administrator Gina McCarthy proposed strict new carbon standards
for new coal fired power plants, to be followed in a year by what are bound
to be more controversial standards for existing plants.
38
Industry reaction to EPA’s proposed standards has been bitter and
McCarthy has been accused of relying upon the new technologies that are
not ready for prime time and may be subject to court challenge in that
regard (Wald and Shear). Senator Mitch McConnell and other Senators
from coal states have vowed to stop these rules. So she will need to
engage with industry and state leaders in order forestall congressional
attempts to delay or overturn these proposed rules. And the President will
need to continue to deliver the message that climate change action is a
moral obligation, perhaps in a major address to the nation such as the State
of the Union. But speeches are only a part of strategic advocacy. The
President’s actions and the pattern of his choices on issues affecting
climate change--such as the Keystone Pipeline--will be as important as his
words in indicating his priorities and in sending a message to the nation
and to the foreign leaders whose support he will need in forging a new
international climate treaty (Neustadt 84; Lizza 2013).
Conclusion
Presidents have played an important yet underappreciated leadership
role on international environmental treaties. But that role has been largely
limited to refereeing disputes within the executive branch or in pursuing
39
unilateral administrative means. Persuasion has played a more limited role
than might have been expected. This is partly because critical events such
as the Antarctic Ozone Hole and the recent accumulation of extreme
weather events have had a tendency to speak for themselves. Nor has
Congress been prepared to pass the kind of climate change legislation that
a president might have desired. However, the public realizes the need for
action and the economics of climate change action are more favorable than
ever due to low natural gas prices. So the President should be able to
succeed for the time being in employing administrative means to achieve
his regulatory objectives. And he can also go local to show communities
the merits of renewable energy projects. Most important, China is moving
in our direction, having recently announced an aggressive enforcement
plan to curb air pollution from coal plans and high polluting vehicles
(Wong). So the opportunities are there for President Obama to become a
strategic advocate for climate change action as he seeks to make the United
States a leader and to work with foreign leaders to negotiate a new climate
change treaty.
40
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49
Notes
1
In a previous paper (Burnam 2010), I reinterpreted Neustadt’s theory as a theory
of strategic choice in which a president leads by making choices, not speeches or
bargains. Bargaining and Going Public are important techniques of presidential
leadership but the advisability of their employment is governed by presidential
strategic choices. I applied this interpretation to George H.W. Bush’s successful
leadership on the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, in which he proclaimed
himself to be an “Environmental President” and made passage of that legislation
his chief initial domestic priority. My interpretation is consistent with that of
George Edwards in The Strategic President, except in my understanding of what
Neustadt means by persuasion (Burnam 2012).
2
The EPA had proposed the ban on CFCs for aerosol spray cans under the
authority of the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA). Additionally, the Rogers
Amendment to the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977 obligated EPA to regulate
any substance that in the judgment of the Administrator “may reasonably be
anticipated to affect the stratosphere, especially ozone in the stratosphere, if such
effect may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health and welfare.”
3
The term used by Fred Greenstein to characterize Eisenhower’s leadership.
4
Note that David Brodeur’s influential June 1986 article in The New Yorker was
titled, “Annals of Chemistry in the Fact of Doubt” (Brodeur).
50
5
In 1988, the scientists concluded that the anomalous extent of the Antarctic
Ozone Hole was related to a chemical reaction that was accelerated by ice crystals.
6
The Protocol remained controversial in right wing circles into the 1990s.
In 1995, Congressman Tom Delay (R. -Texas), introduced legislation to repeal the
title of the Clean Air Act that authorizes regulation of ozone depleting substances.
7
Congressional Record, Senate, June 5, 1987: 14818-83
8
Al Gore in Earth in the Balance (1992) had called for a carbon tax to address
global warming. But after the stunning defeat of his proposed tax on the BTU
content of fossil fuels, the Vice President supported the Cap and Trade mechanism
that the Administration successfully promoted at Kyoto.
9
The Asian financial crisis may have limited the willingness of key Asian nations
to engage with the U.S. on climate change (Jordan).
10
Eisenstadt boldly threatened to withhold U.S. support for the Protocol when the
chair failed to include emissions trading in the text. Being the tough negotiator
that he was, he meant it (Sandalow). The flexibility that Gore won at Kyoto
allowed the Administration to claim that the 7% reduction in the Protocol was
equivalent to the freeze that the President had announced (McGinty).
11 Failure to reach an international agreement at Kyoto would have damaged Vice
President Gore’s standing with environmental organizations and thus his
presidential electoral prospects.
12 Once out of office, Clinton economic aides conceded that their cost estimates of
the Protocol had relied on overly optimistic assumptions (Weisman).
51
13
The author was a Senate Staff Observer at The Hague. In November 2000. On
the last day of the conference, U.K. Deputy Prime Minister John Prescott and U.S.
Special Envoy Frank Loy shook hands with German Environment Minister Jürgen
Trittien and French Environment Minister Dominique Voynet on a U.S. proposal to
partially credit our vast forest and agricultural carbon sinks. But Jennifer Morgan
of the World Wildlife Fund (Trittien’s friend) persuaded them to withdraw their
support, which they did after discussing it with their European colleagues.
Prescott blamed Voynet, who chaired the EU delegation, telling the British press
that she was “too tired” to understand the agreement. She in turn called Prescott’s
remarks “disgusting and deeply macho! ” (Author’s Notes).
14
White House Conference on Climate Change, October 6, 1997
15
As the Supreme Court eventually held in Massachusetts v. EPA (2007).
16
Carbon intensity is the ratio of carbon dioxide emissions to GDP. China and
India liked the Bush approach and voluntarily pledged at Copenhagen to reduce
their carbon intensity by 2020 by 40% and 23%, respectively.
17
2012 was the hottest year ever in the U.S. (Gillis).
18
Legendary climate change scientist James Hanson recently noted that “the five
year mean global temperature has been flat for a decade”. This poses complex
questions as to why the earth might be warming up more slowly than some
scientific models have predicted (“Climate Science: A Sensitive Matter”).