Iranian Election / Analysis
With just two months to go to June's crucial presidential election, Iran's amorphous political landscape is becoming
clearer.
Although the list of candidates will not become finalized until next month, manoeuvrings indicate that the country's
current political line-up can be split into three broad groups:
- The conservatives or the so-called Principle-ist supporters of Supreme Leader Seyyed Ali Khamene'i;
- the government camp around President Mahmud Ahmadinezhad; and
- the reformists.
Despite earlier reports suggesting that prominent figures may stand - such as former reformist President Mohammad
Khatami and the veteran Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, who now might attract reformist voters - it is unlikely they will
contest the polls. But reformist voters may not turn out in large numbers. Reformist leaders are divided over taking
part in the poll. Moreover, after the experience of the 2009 presidential election - when reformists accused the
authorities of election fraud in Ahmadinezhad's defeat of opposition Green candidate Mirhoseyn Musavi - many
voters remain disillusioned. They have lost trust in the election process.
Observations of the Iranian media indicate that the next president will most likely be from among the Principle-ists,
but they have not yet agreed on a single, credible candidate. If they do not reach consensus, or if the right-wing
establishment and Khamene'i decide it would be politically expedient for others to stand, there could be a surprise in
store.
Conservatives
The term Principle-ist ("Usul-garayan") has been in vogue in Iran's political and media narrative since the 2005
presidential election, which saw Ahmadinezhad defeat Hashemi-Rafsanjani in the second round of the poll. It is used
to describe a number of groups or individuals who fall under the conservative umbrella and who are united by
absolute loyalty to the supreme leader. Moreover, most of them can be characterized by their dislike of
Ahmadinezhad and his protege Esfandiar Rahim-Masha'i and their nationalist "Iranian School".
Although the Principle-ists are expected to dominate the 2013 election, they have not yet agreed on who will be their
standard bearer. They fear that their core vote may be split if they fail to agree on a single candidate.
The fluid nature of Iranian politics means that it is difficult to differentiate categorically between each Principle-ist
trend or group. Temporary alliances are formed and any particular individual may be influential or have the support of
one or more conservative grouping. Nevertheless, a number of factions can be discerned so far.
"The 2+1 Coalition"
This coalition, or the Coalition of Progress ("E'telaf-e Pishraft") as it has begun to call itself on its Facebook page,
consists of Khamene'i's adviser on international affairs, former Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati; Tehran Mayor
Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf; and the supreme leader's top adviser Gholamali Haddad-Adel (whose daughter is married
to Khamene'i's son).
The coalition has announced that one of its members will definitely stand and the other two will, if the candidate wins,
be part of his government. They have conducted various workshops which focus on potential individuals who could
be part of the possible cabinet. Velayati has said: "The people will get to know about the possible cabinet before the
elections." [1, 2]
"The Majority Principle-ists Coalition"
This group ("E'telaf-e Aksariyat-e Usul-garayan"), aka "the Quintet" or "3+2", announced its formation earlier this
month. [3, 4]
The group seeks to nominate "one, maximum two" Principle-ist candidates to stand in the election. It is associated
with the traditional conservative Militant Clergy Association. Its secretary is Mohammad Musapur, a former deputy
interior minister.
It appears that this group is mostly made up of the Front of the Followers of the Imam's Line and the Leadership
("Jebh-e Peyrovan-e khat-e Emam va Rahbari"), an umbrella group of conservative forces whose secretary-general
is the veteran politician Habibollah Asgaroladi.
The five members of the Majority Coalition who are seeking the presidency are:
- Mostafa Purmohammadi, director of the State Inspectorate Organization. A conservative and fierce critic of
Ahmadinezhad, he allegedly played a central role in the massacre of political prisoners and other dissidents in Evin
prison in Tehran in 1988.
- Mohammad Reza Banohar, first deputy speaker of the Majlis (parliament).
- Mohammad Hasan Abutorabifard (a deputy speaker of the Majlis).
- Former Foreign Minister Manuchehr Mottaki. Ahmadinezhad dismissed Mottaki in December 2010, while the
minister was on an official visit to Senegal.
- Yahya Al-e Eshaq, the head of the Tehran Chamber of Commerce, Industries, and Mines and the former commerce
minister in Hashemi-Rafsanjani's second government in the 1990s.
"The Steadfastness Front"
The far right, hardline faction known as the "Steadfastness Front" (Jebh-e Paydari) consists mostly of former
supporters of Ahmadinezhad who turned against him and now operate under the spiritual leadership of Ayatollah
Mesbah Yazdi. They published their first statement in August 2011.
They aim to maintain the ideological purity of the regime and to eliminate "deviant tendencies", a reference to the
"Iranian School" narrative of President Mahmud Ahmadinezhad and his chief of staff Esfandiar Rahim-Masha'i. This
school of thought has been attacked by hardline and traditional conservatives as they see its attention to secular
nationalist symbols as a dangerous revisionist trend.
This faction is characterized by its hardline political and religious posturing. It wants to completely eliminate the
reformists, Hashemi-Rafsanjani and even moderate conservative figures such as former Majlis Speaker and 1997
defeated presidential candidate Ali Akbar Nateq-Nuri. [5]
The Steadfastness Front has criticized the veteran conservative Asgaroladi of the Followers of Imam's Line faction for
showing lenience towards defeated 2009 reformist candidates Mirhoseyn Musavi and Mehdi Karrubi. Both are now
under house arrest.
Although the Front has not yet named its candidate, there are at least three possible runners:
- Sa'id Jalili, the secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council. He is also well-known outside the country,
because as Iran's chief nuclear negotiator, he has been sparring with Western and UN diplomats. [6]
- Former Health Minister Kamran Baqeri-Lankarani, who fell out with Ahmadinezhad. He is now the spokesman of the
Steadfastness Front. [7]
- Parviz Fatah, energy minister during Ahmadinezhad's first term in office (2005-2009). [8]
But the Front's absolute loyalty to Khamene'i means that in the end, it will fall into line, and its supporters will vote for
anyone who they perceive has the approval of the leader.
Independent Principle-ists
There are a number Principle-ists seeking office who do not belong to any particular coalition. Two figures stand out
among this group:
- Mohsen Reza'i. He is a former commander of the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) and current secretary of
the Expediency Council. This body was set up in September 1988 in accordance with a decree by Ayatollah
Khomeyni to rule on disputes between the Majlis and the Guardian Council. It also acts as an advisory body for the
supreme leader. This election is Reza'i's third attempt to become president. According to official figures, he came
third in the 2009 poll, behind Ahmadinezhad and Musavi.
- Ali Fallahian. Hardline former Iranian intelligence minister, Fallahian is the subject of an international arrest warrant
issued by a German court for his alleged role in the 1992 assassination of Kurdish dissidents at the Mykonos
restaurant in Berlin. He is also on the Interpol wanted list in connection with the 1994 bombing of the AMIA Jewish
community centre in Buenos Aires, Argentina, killing 85 people. He was also implicated in the 1998 killing of
dissidents in Iran, known as the "chain murders". [9]
Ahmadinezhad supporters
Since Khamene'i's seal of approval to Ahmadinezhad just after the 2009 disputed poll, the two have fallen out.
Although there had been media murmurings about disagreements between the two over the role of Rahim-Masha'i
not long after that election, Iranians generally trace back the serious falling out to April 2011. Ahmadinezhad had
dismissed Heydar Moslehi as minister of intelligence, a move which was not supported by Khamene'i who
subsequently reinstated him. Ahmadinezhad was so affronted that he refused to undertake his presidential duties for
11 days, a period the Iranian media refer to as the "11-day huff".
Since then, Ahmadinezhad's and Rahim-Masha'i's differences with the religious hard liners and Khamene'i loyalists
have sharpened. They, in turn, have accused the pair of trying to implement the so-called "Putin-Medvedev" plan,
which would see Rahim-Masha'i becoming president, paving the way for his mentor to return to office (Iranian
electoral law limits the presidency to two consecutive terms). [5]
Ahmadinezhad's recent moves have been controversial, and some of them are aimed at promoting his aide's profile.
The president has been praising Rahim-Masha'i during gatherings, describing him as the "Man of Spring". This
slogan has hit the establishment's nerve. Upon his return from his Egypt visit in February, Ahmadinezhad and
Masha'i were greeted by dozens of supporters holding "Long Live Spring" posters. [10]
The next move by Ahmadinezhad is expected to take place on 18 April at the 100,000-seat capacity Azadi Stadium
near Tehran. Princilpe-ists are worried that Rahim-Masha'i's candidacy will be announced at that venue. According to
one conservative news website, "It is believed in some political and media circles that Esfandiar Rahim-Masha'i will
now certainly run in the election." [11]
But the president has other options. The conservatives' hatred of Rahim-Masha'i means that he would have difficulty
passing the extensive and controversial vetting process before being allowed to stand. The Guardian Council, which
supervises the elections, actively vets the candidates so that, in the words of one leading jurist, "it prevents corruption
and deviation". Critics see this as a political disqualification stage, aimed at allowing only loyalists into the race. There
is an appeals procedure, but it is seen as ineffective.
If, as is likely, Rahim-Masha'i is eliminated at the vetting stage, the president has other candidates up his election
sleeve. Foremost among these is Minister of Roads and Urban Development Ali Nikzad. The former governor-general
of Ardabil Province is a long-time colleague of Ahmadinezhad from the days when the latter served as Ardabil
governor.
Another possible candidate from this faction is Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi. [9]
Meanwhile, it appears that the president is seeking the backing of reformist voters with his stance against the vetting
process in general and his call for "free" presidential elections in particular.
In a major speech in January, Khamene'i castigated those who call for "free elections", saying such talk helps "the
enemy's plots".
The term "free elections" has since become somewhat of a taboo for the conservative right-wing. Their supporters
have lined up to condemn anyone calling for free and fair elections by referring to Khamene'i's speech and accusing
detractors of helping "the enemy".
In an unlikely meeting of minds, the president as well as senior reformist figures, such as Khatami, have called for
free elections.
But Ahmadinezhad will have difficulty in attracting reformists to his cause. They maintain that he owes his 2009
presidential election victory to vote-rigging and the "engineering" of elections. Reformists believe it was Musavi who
won the 2009 election. [12]
Reformists
After the disputed 2009 presidential election, in which the incumbent Ahmadinezhad returned to office with a reported
63 per cent of the votes, many Iranians took to the streets. The reformists faced a major crackdown. Many of their
prominent leaders were arrested and their newspapers and other media outlets shut down. The restrictions placed
upon them led former reformist President Mohammad Khatami to say that Iran is going through "the autumn of
political activity".
This general political climate led to a debate among the reformists. Should they continue mainstream political activity,
such as taking part in parliamentary (Majlis), presidential or council elections? Or should they not take an active part
in the polls and engage in more grass-roots and civil political action? [13]
This difference, and the general failure of the reform movement, has meant that the reformist groups are yet to
introduce their candidate(s).
Still, their preferred candidate is Khatami, but it is looking increasingly unlikely that he will stand. He was recently
quoted as saying that "contrary to what we believed, the ruling establishment... will not allow us to take part in the
election with our maximum capacity."
Even so, some reformists have recently launched an online campaign in order to persuade Khatami to stand. The
"Sun of the Morning Hope" website has been doing the rounds with Iranians with the hope of "supporting Khatami's
candidacy". At the time of writing, it had attracted 19,473 signatures. [14]
This is while opposition social media users, who reflect views of many ordinary Iranians, have been dismissive about
the prospect of the former president running for presidency in the 2013 polls with the argument that Khatami was not
able to deal with the challenges facing the country during his presidential tenure. [15]
Their next hope was Hashemi-Rafsanjani. But this, too, looks unlikely. The latest figure to rule out a Rafsanjani (and
Khatami) candidacy is former Intelligence Minister Ali Yunesi. [16]
The more established reformist groups appear to have ruled out taking part in the poll. They maintain that there can
be no free and fair elections if their prominent leaders are not released. They also call for greater media freedom,
general liberalization and the lifting of the ban on two major reformist political parties, the Islamic Iran Participation
Front (the largest reformist group) and the Mojahedin of the Islamic Revolution.
The Participation Front has already announced that it will not take part in the elections. [17]
And the Mojahedin announced last week that there are "no signs of a free and democratic election taking place"
because none of the reformists' demands have been met. [18]
But other less radical reformists, such as the centrist Coordination Council of Reformist Front (CCRF), are making
efforts at a comeback. They want reformists to reach consensus on a single candidate, and take part in the poll even
if Khatami and Rafsanjani feel unable to stand. The following names are in the frame:
- Mohmmadreza Aref. He was First Vice President under Khatami. He is currently a member of the Expediency
Council.
- Hasan Rowhani (aka Ruhani). The former secretary of the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) became wellknown in the West during the Khatami presidency, as he was Iran's chief nuclear negotiator.
- Mostafa Kavakebian. He is a former MP and the leader of the centrist Mardomsalari Democracy Party. Kavakebian
is also editor-in-chief of the party's newspaper. That publication, also called "Mardomsalari", is known for not crossing
red lines and has been published without interruption since 2002.
*END*
Media Analysis by BBC Monitoring on 16 April
Sources:
[1] www.facebook.com/etelaf3
[2] www.radiofarda.com/content/f4_velayati_coalition_appoint_new_cabinet_election/24918425.html
[3] www.ghatreh.com/news/nn13532117/-?? ?
[4] www.mehrnews.com/detail/News/2026094
[5] "Iran paper analyses principle-ists strategy for presidential elections," pro-reform newspaper E'temad website,
Tehran, in Persian 06 Jan 13
[6] BBC Monitoring Analysis: "Iran's nuclear negotiator proposed as next president;" 13 Jun 12
[7] http://tinyurl.com/dxhjszg
[8] http://tasnimnews.com/Home/Single/41288
[9] BBC Monitoring Background Briefing: "Iran presidential poll: names in the frame;" 16 Nov 12
[10] BBC Monitoring Analysis: "Ahmadinezhad's 'spring' remarks spark Iran conservative anger;" 17 Feb 13
[11] BBC Monitoring report: "Ahmadinezhad supporters said to hold 'gathering';" 28 Mar 13
[12] BBC Monitoring Analysis: "Iran's Ahmadinezhad moves to attract reformist voters for June poll;" 28 Feb 13
[13] BBC Monitoring Analysis: "Iran's fractured reformists face uphill task ahead of conference;" 04 Jan 13
[14] http://salamkhatami.com/
[15] BBC Monitoring report: "Opposition social media shows little enthusiasm for Iran ex-president's return;" 18 Mar
13
[16] "Iran Rafsanjani to endorse ex-nuclear chief's presidency bid - official;" semi-official ISNA news agency website,
Tehran, in Persian 0805 gmt 14 Apr 13
[17] http://jahannews.com/vdcezv8wpjh8nni.b9bj.html
[18] http://news.gooya.com/politics/archives/2013/04/158132.php