Margo en Magnus Malan: 7 February 1993
THE FINAL MALAN DOSSIER JUN 2013
INTRODUCTION
The personal views and opinions regarding General Magnus Andre de Merindol Malan (1930-2011)
by the persons named herein are enclosed below. All of these comrades and persons had either
served with Malan in the former SA Defence Force over the period 1950 to 1991 or were critics of
him at some time or other.
1
His former comrades speak with the necessary convictions born from personal interactions with the
gentleman concerned. Some of the critiques are from persons who are reasonably objective in that
they are students of history and matters political and have gained public recognition through the
books that they have written.
These views and opinions about Malan, the man, general and politician can be weighed up against
any other opinionated criticisms that came his way especially after his death on 18 July 2011. It is
noteworthy that the attack on his character and judgement only came after his death, when he was
unable to defend himself. [Legally only the defamed person himself can take legal steps to have any
such assassination of personal integrity repealed]. Detail of this uncalled for defamation can be
found via Google.
This compilation has been done in alphabetical order of surnames; the current contributors are as
follows:
Crowther, Danie: Freelance commentator; pages 4-5.
De Klerk, FW: Former President of South Africa; page 6.
Du Rand, Frans: Political Secretary to Minister of Defence; pages 7-11.
Earp, Denis: Former Chief of the SA Air Force; page 11.
Giliomee, Hermann: Professor of Political Science and Historian; pages 12-15.
Gleeson, Ian: Former Chief of Staff SA Defence Force; pages 15-16.
Holtzhausen, Raymond: Former Chief of Staff Personnel SADF, Past Chairman of the SA Infantry
Association and Council of Military Veterans Organizations; pages 17-21.
Marais, Dirk: Former Deputy Chief of the Army and Convenor of SADF Contact Bureau; pages 2124.
Opperman, Gert: Former Military Secretary of Minister of Defence and CEO of the
“Erfenisstigting”; pages 25-27.
Pretorius, Sarel: Former Director of Physical Training and Sport SADF; pages 27-28.
Spaarwater, Maritz: Former Intelligence Officer and Writer; pages 28-32.
Van der Merwe, J (Koos): Member of Parliament and Chief Whip of the Inkatha Freedom Party;
pages 33-34.
Van der Westhuizen, Pieter: Former Secretary of the State Security Council and Chief of Staff
Intelligence, SADF; pages 35-36.
Viljoen, Constand: Former Chief of the Army and Chief of SADF, former leader of the Freedom
Front; pages 36-41.
Warwick, Rodney: Freelance Writer and Commentator; pages 42-46.
To this list could be added numerous and varied additional views all to be found via Google.
2
Any person wishing to add his or her views based on personal interaction with the gentleman in
question are invited to submit them to “The Compiler for Consideration”
(dave_junior@mweb.co.za) for possible future inclusion.
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CHEERFUL PHILOSOPHER
[Aka] Danie Crowther
In Defence of General Magnus Malan.
“On 23 July an obituary to the late Minister of Defence, was published Times Live, the online
version of the South African newspapers The Times and the Sunday Times. You can read it “here”.
Note: For the purpose of inclusion in the dossier this router to the relevant web page has been
omitted.
The obituary of Gen. Magnus Malan by Chris Barron “Vile, enemy of the people” on 23 July 2011
deserves comment.
Malan’s “Total National Strategy” was a direct response to the ANC’s change in their revolutionary
strategy blurring the distinction between “hard” and “soft” targets, embarking on a violent
intimidation campaign to make the country ungovernable, creating murderous “self defence units”
in townships, while still calling for the implementation of a Marxist one-party state in South Africa.
The model Malan implemented is accepted best practice counter-revolutionary strategy by military
strategists world wide.
Attacks by the SADF on MK training camps in African countries, have always been in direct
response to ANC terror operations in South Africa, like exploding car bombs in busy streets, killing
woman and children by placing limpet mines in Wimpy Bars and bombing popular night clubs.
Despite the furore over the alleged continuation of SADF support to Renamo after 1984, the facts
show that it was mostly humanitarian in nature, or for the protection of the leadership while
negotiations was continuing in that country. Yet the myth is being kept alive…..
Malan always insisted that the military should not lead the “hearts” and “minds” campaign. It failed
because of internal politics and the failure of the civilian government departments to make a mind
shift from racist policies and practice at the time.
When the townships “went up in flames” and the police asked for assistance, would any Minister of
Defence sit back and do nothing while people are being necklaced, public facilities and schools
being burnt down in the midst of a murderous campaign of intimidation? Sending in the Defence
Force to stabilize is doing his job, not racism.
Malan authorised the creation of the CCB to increase the intelligence collection capabilities of the
SADF outside the country. The fifth region (South Africa) of the CCB was never authorised by
Malan. Maj Gen Joep Joubert (unfortunately deceased) activated it and accepted responsibility. It
acted without authorization and was a rogue unit out of control. This has been testified countless
times and the records are public. Why continue to give Malan the blame?
The authorization of Project Coast to develop a defensive chemical warfare capability was prudent
in the light of chemical weapons in Angola.
3
The allegations of chemical agents being used on SWAPO captives and “dropped into the Atlantic
from army (sic) helicopters” has been the subject of a court case against Wouter Basson and he has
been found not guilty.
While their certainly was some corrupt generals in my opinion, not a single case has been brought
to court and most of it remains rumours. Malan lived a modest life, retiring on a government
pension.
Malan and his co-accused were found not guilty by a competent and legitimate court in the
KwaMakutha trail. Why is this important fact omitted by Barron?
The training of the IFP members was extensively covered in the trial. Calling them hit squads is a
provocative twisting of tested facts.
The “mass destruction of wild life” smuggling of elephant tusks, rhino horn and diamond is again
malicious rumours, yet unproven. It is possible that individuals may have been involved in such
actions and Unita certainly was involved it. The SADF’s record for wild life protection in the
erstwhile operational areas is impeccable.
Malan’s initiatives at desegregation of the SADF before he became Minister and his countless calls
for reform and a political solution to the conflicts, is deliberately ignored. His public record speaks
of a diligent soldier and a reformer rather than the murderous monster he is being portrayed as.
While Malan has surely became symbol of a reprehensible political system Barron’s obituary is a
subjective, malicious and undeserved attack on an individual unable to defend himself.
It is simply bad journalism.”
Note: The preceding is an authenticated copy of a Blog posted by Danie Crowther at 6:27 PM on
July 28, 2011
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POLITICSWEB- FW DE KLERK’S TRIBUTE ON DEATH OF MAGNUS MALAN
FW de Klerk on 18 July 2011
STATEMENT BY FW DE KLERK ON THE DEATH OF GEN MAGNUS MALAN
“I have learned with sorrow of the death of Gen Magnus Malan.
Gen Malan played a leading role, as Chief of the South African Defence Force and as Minister of
Defence, in developing the SADF into the most formidable military force in Africa.
Under his leadership the SADF played an indispensible role in defending South Africa and our
region until the collapse of Soviet Communism facilitated the commencement of the negotiations
that led to the establishment of our non-racial constitutional democracy.
From an early stage Gen Malan and the SADF accepted that there could never be a military solution
to the constitutional challenges facing South Africa and worked diligently for the establishment of
conditions that would make a peaceful and negotiated settlement possible.
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I should like to extend my sincere condolences to Gen Malan’s wife, family, and friends and to all
his former SADF comrades.”
Statement issued by the FW de Klerk Foundation, July 18 2011
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MAGNUS MALAN – THE POLITICIAN
Frans du Randt (Former Lt-Col)
“Introduction
On 24 July 2011, an article appeared in the Sunday Times by Chris Barron under the heading ‘Vile,
venal enemy of the people’. In the article, Barron portrayed Malan as a scowling bully who
misused his authority and did not have the loyalty of his sub-ordinates.
Although Barron is entitled to his own views, the article represents a disgruntled writer who
endeavoured to slander a person who was the most successful Minister of Defence in a very volatile
period of our history. It is not my intention to react to the article, but rather to concentrate on first
hand experience of an officer close to Malan for a period of nearly 12 years.
Background
My tenure with Gen Malan started in 1980 as assistant Private Secretary, Private Secretary and
since 1987, Communications Manager (a Director’s post). This lasted till 1992 when he retired. It
is being recognised by the Department of Labour, who presented the Ministerial Private Secretary’s
Course which I attended, that a private secretary is also responsible for the Minister’s political
activities. That was my responsibility. My duties entailed liaison with Defence Study Groups of all
political parties in Parliament, communication with his constituency and the overall arrangements
of his political activities. I was entrusted with these tasks and over a period of 12 years I got to
know Malan – the person, soldier and politician – extremely well.
It is obvious that during such an extended period of working very close to Gen Malan, we had
various discussions on any kind of topic and a couple of arguments as well. Due to his immense
intellect, I can vaguely remember one argument that I won.
Entering politics
Although he discussed his entering into politics in detail in his book My life with the Defence Force,
it is interesting to note that he chose to enter the political arena the difficult way. He contested a
brand new constituency, Modderfontein, won the election and entered Parliament with a huge
majority. From there on he started organising his constituency as if it was a head office. The
constituency thereafter dominated the Transvaal Congress of the National Party in winning trophies
for the best organised constituency, most enlisted members, most funds paid over to Head Office
etc.
His rise ‘through the political ranks’ made him very acceptable to many politicians in his Caucus
and a number of them commented to me in this regard. He was adamant that the Ministry of
Defence should function on the highest level of efficiency and be approachable to both members of
Parliament and the public at large. He did not tolerate mistakes. Should any occur, he handled
them internally. During the early 80’s a remarkable incident stunned him. The Speaker of
Parliament, Mr Loots, had his own constituency and approached the Ministry with a relative small
problem through his secretary. The Military Secretary at that time was a highly efficient women
officer and cordially invited the Speaker to her office for a cup of tea. The Speaker accepted and as
Gen Malan walked pass her office in the HF Verwoerd Building opposite Parliament where the
Ministry of Defence was located, he noticed his Military Secretary having tea with the Speaker of
Parliament in her office!
5
Even Ministers had to make appointments with the Speaker for an audience, and here he noted his
major chatting with the Speaker in her humble office. He continued walking! He also protected the
Defence Force in a jealous manner. A Deputy Minister once made a sneering remark towards the
Defence Force in the presence of Malan. After establishing the facts, Malan had a word with him.
That person regretted that unfounded remark forever.
The politician
As Minister of Defence, Gen Malan was acutely aware of his responsibilities. He knew that the
Defence Force was the protector of the Constitution and as such the Defence Force was to be seen
as the protector of South Africans as a whole. While he was Chief of the Defence Force in the mid1970, the Defence Force was miles ahead of the politicians regarding the integration of all races.
People of colour became officers and the other ranks became very efficient and loyal soldiers.
Critics of the then SADF do not recognise this fact.
During the early 1980’s, poverty amongst people of colour was a reality. This came more to the
fore as the reform programmes of the then President PW Botha got momentum (3-tier government,
etc). Malan was the driving force behind a project, called Molteno, where the Defence Force
employed people and they were taught a skill by the Department of Labour. Should such a person
find permanent employment, the Defence Force would release such a person immediately. Again,
critics were silent.
Malan always referred to the Defence Force and Armscor/Denel as the Defence Family. He was
very proud of the successes of both these institutions. Malan insisted on frequent visits of opinion
formers from among the politicians, business sector and the media to these institutions. Malan was
very persistent that these opinion formers should be allowed to express their views and he was a
keen listener to such views. He did not hesitate to implement a recommendation should it make
sense to him.
Gen Malan did not politicise his Ministry or the Department of Defence. All political aspects were
handled by the Chief of Communications, the late dr DAS Herbst and me. Dr Herbst was a man
with a brilliant mind and the interaction between our Section and the Minister was very
invigorating. I became more and more impressed during such sessions by the immense intellect of
Gen Malan as he dissected intricate problems and presented solutions based on solid reasoning and
farsightedness. During the early 1990’s, he instructed the Chief of the Defence Force (late Gen Kat
Liebenberg) to prepare for the ‘Defence Force of the future’. This happened in my presence. Dr
Herbst was ill and I was tasked to be the conduit between the Minister and the CSADF. Gen Malan
said that he will give the political guidelines and he expected from the SADF to plan well in
advance as negotiations will be the order of the day in the nearby future. It was interesting to note
how fluently the Codesa negotiations were conducted regarding the Defence Force, coupled with
highly sensitive matters like integration of forces etc. During that time Gen Malan made an
interesting decision by appointing a very efficient Adm Bert Bekker from Chief of Staff Finance to
the post Chief of Defence Force Staff (effectively the 2nd in command of the Defence Force).
Malan’s view, when asked on this appointment, was that the Defence Force’s future battles would
be finances and not necessarily an enemy.
The person
The best description of Gen Magnus Malan came from a colleague of his, Adriaan Jordaan, who
was the Member of Parliament of False Bay and later on the Chairman of the National Party’s
Defence Study Group. We became very good friends.
He said to me sometime in the past that Malan and his wife, Margot, typify ‘Afrikaner Adel’. I
agreed. All through his long career as a soldier and politician he was most ably supported by his
wife and family.
6
General Magnus Malan was, and will remain an enigma. His type will not re-emerge. I base it on
the following:

He was totally devoted to his country, his fellow man and his family. He adored his father and
mother. He was extremely proud of his brother Avril, the successfull Springbok rugby captain and
coach. His sisters – one was a Springbok athlete. All were achievers. His children gave him joy. He
openly admitted to me that the successes of his children were attributable to Margot. According to
him he was an absent farther. We worked 24 hours and 7 days per week. People dont’t realise it.
It was common practise to start our day at 06h00 and end it at 8 o’clock in the evening.

Gen Malan was a team man and believed in teambuilding exercises. As a visionary he believed in
taking the team with him regarding major decisions. This established a solid core of loyal people in
the top offices of the SADF and Armscor. He was the first cabinet minister in committing his
Department to the initiatives of the then Pres de Klerk in public. This happened at a parade at Air
Force Base Hoedspruit.

He was extremely unhappy with the handling of Gen Chris Thirion and others during the so-called
‘night of the generals’. Unfortunately he was at that stage the Minister of Water Affairs and he was
not allowed to interfere.

Malan was acutely aware of the roll that the media have to perform. He believed that an informed
media would be a responsible media. Members of the media were frequently invited to
teambuilding exercises and visits to the operational area in SWA/Namibia. Many bridges were built
during such visits.

He accepted that a man in his position would be subjected to rumours of various kinds. He treated
unfounded rumours with contempt. Interesting to note that at a stage a sort of investigative
journalist wrote an article on Malan claiming that he was influenced by pres Kennedy while he
attended the Joint Staff Officers course in the USA. I showed him the article and he just smiled.
He told me that the course as a whole visited the White House and they were all
introduced
to the American president. Kennedy’s words to him was something like
‘nice meeting you’.

Malan was extremely devoted to his country and always endeavoured to bring the positive side
under the attention of opinion formers locally and abroad.

The Joint Staff Officers Course he attended at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas in the USA was a
prestigeous event in that top officers on the rank level of major were invited from the Defence
Forces of the free world to attend the course. If my memory serves me correct, about 120 officers
attended the course. A number of USA officers included. Since then, Malan continued to
correspond with his class mates on a yearly basis. He informed them about South Africa and local
developments. Political overviews, challenges and threats etc. As the cream of the crop attended
that course, many of them rose dramatically in becoming Chiefs of Defence Forces, Ministers,
Presidents and so forth. A couple had also been assassinated, involved in coup de eta’s etc. After
completion the results were simple fail or pass - for obvious reasons. An ex class mate of Malan
was a very good friend of his and visited South Africa frequently as an academic after retiring as a
colonel. A typical Texan and a wonderful person. We became good friends and he confessed to me
7
that he used all his contacts to lay eyes on Malan’s course report. Malan was under the 10 best
students (no foreigner had been there before) and on the course report the course leader
commented ‘the sky is the limit for this man’.

He knew loyalty. Loyalty to his superiors and loyalty to his juniors. This was one of the pillars of
Malan’s being. He detested disloyal people. He was extremely loyal to his colleagues and the two
presidents under which he served. The same applied to the SADF and Armscor. At the height of the
storm around the CCB debacle, a respected opposition Member of Parliament invited me to his
office. He told me that he is convinced that my boss and the Chief of the Defence Force were
innocent, but he wanted to see blood – figuratively speaking. I had to report this to Malan and he
did not even respond. I knew that Malan will never allow dirty washing to be hung in public. As
already stated he handled his problems in-house and very efficiently. Although he was retired, his
public and moral support to dr Wouter Basson during his trial was noted by many people.

The Kwa Makutha trial in Durban in which Gen Malan and the top echelon of the then SADF were
accused of murder was certainly the darkest spot thinkable on the career of a man who only knew
how to serve his country. I assisted him and was intensely involved in handling the media on his
behalf. We spent hours together. He was a man with a very strong composure, but to be accused
of a despicable deed of killing innocent women and children, touched every raw nerve of his
system.

They were aquitted but I think the damage was done in that his health suffered thereafter. That
might also be a reason for his public support to dr Basson as Malan knew what dr Basson had to
endure. He was there himself.
Conclusion
History will be unkind to Gen Malan as it is a tendency that the victors write it. Churchill
apparently said: ‘History will be kind to me as I intent writing it myself!’ The mistake that
people like Barron make is that there are still such a vast number of people alive who can render
a contribution to the memory of a person who truly was a statesman.”
Frans du Randt
August 2012
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COMMENTS ON GENERAL MALAN BY LIEUTENANT GENERAL (RETIRED) DENIS
EARP (FORMER CHIEF OF SA AIR FORCE)
“First, I suggest that the obituary on General Malan by Chris Barron (in Sunday Times of 24 July
2011) is an example of the worst kind of gutter journalism I have ever read. His comments are
ignorant, incorrect and totally biased. It would require a book-length effort to address in detail all of
Chris Barron’s libellous statements. So I will dismiss his writing as rubbish.
I worked with, and under, General Malan for more that ten years and therefore claim to know him
well. During this time my primary mission was operations, and it was mainly in this context that we
had close contact. He always treated me with respect and courtesy. He always listened to me with
8
patience and often followed my advice. Consequently our relationship was cordial, respectful and
completely professional.
General Malan had a keen sense of humour and he particularly enjoyed playing practical jokes on
his cabinet colleagues during “spanbou” sessions in the bush. How he could be seen as
“humourless” totally escapes me!
After I retired from the South African Air Force in 1988, my contact with General Malan was
obviously less, but I have always viewed him as a friend and have good memories of our
association during the years of “bush war”.”
Lt Gen (Retd) Denis Earp 2012
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POLITICSWEB-MAGNUS MALAN AND MAO-FEATURES
By Hermann Giliomee on 01 August 2011
Hermann Giliomee on the late former minister of defence and SADF head.
“The recent death of General Magnus Malan, the former head of the SADF and later Minister of
Defence, brought to mind two interviews I conducted with him.
The first was in the grim winter of 1986 just after the declaration of a general state of emergency
and with no end in sight of the unrest, which had broken out in September 1984. I was writing at the
time for the somewhat left leaning quarterly, Die Suid-Afrikaan, and miraculously secured an
interview with the minister.
In certain circles of the University of Cape Town, where I was a lecturer of political studies, he was
regarded as even more of a political demon than President PW Botha. It was speculated that he was
behind the militarization of South Africa and was planning to turn the regime into a military
dictatorship, through the imposition of martial law followed by a military coup.
My first question in the interview of 1986 was whether the winning of “hearts and minds” was as
important, for the combating of racial unrest, as it was in a war where insurgents had to be fought.
Malan’s answer was surprising: “The state must satisfy the expectations of the masses, who have
huge needs. The radicals want to exploit this situation. I have on my desk Mao Zedong’s red bookgo read it. This is how the enemies of South Africa are driving the assault”.
In that period it was generally accepted that the top rung of the ANC was a coalition of nationalists
and communists, all strongly inspired by the writings of Karl Marx. Cosatu was also seen as an
organisation relying upon Marx rather than Mao. But Malan did not think that it was, in the first
instance, a class struggle that was being fought in South Africa in the 1970s and 1980s. Rather it
was a case of revolutionary elite using poor people, living in dreadful circumstances, to take to the
streets on their behalf against a state authority. In South East Asia it is still Mao rather than Marx on
whom revolutionaries rely upon for guidance in trying to mobilize the poorest of the poor.
Magnus Malan was a member of the first white military generation that received an academic
training in military studies. He went to university during the 1950s when revolutionary war
increasingly displacing the conventional kind. In the thirty years after receiving his BSc Mil in 1953
at the University of Pretoria, one revolutionary war followed another: Malay, Algeria, Vietnam, the
Portugese colonies in Africa, Namibia and Zimbabwe.
9
In his interview Malan underlined one point in particular: “You never lose this sort of fight
militarily. You lose it diplomatically, politically, economically and on similar terrain. The military
or security aspect is only a small component.” At the same Malan believed that the black masses
were more concerned with the betterment of their living conditions than in full democratic rights.
He clearly did not believe that a liberal democracy was appropriate in South Arica.
It is a bit silly, as was done in many articles on his death, to present Magnus Malan as a sinister
figure responsible for the ‘militarisation’ of society through the framework of the total onslaught,
strategy and the State Security Council. In the first place South Africa was never militarised and, in
any case, military conscription for white males was introduced in 1967, well before Malan became
head of the army or the defence force.
Secondly, in the 1970s South Africa was under increasing diplomatic, economic and political
pressure. Coordination and coherence in decision making was urgently needed, particularly as the
Vorster government managed the country a bit like an outmoded family shop. South Arica became
militarily involved in Angola in 1975 without clear goals being identified or followed. It could
easily have ended in catastrophe. If a properly functioning state security council had been in place,
such situation would probably have been avoided.
General Malan became the head of the army in 1973 and in 1976, at the age of only 46, head of the
defence force. Four years later in 1980, he became minister of defence I PW Botha’s cabinet. After
PW Botha he can be credited with building up of the armed forces into the most formidable in
Africa.
On the State Security Council PW Botha and the politicians still had much more say than the
generals. General Jannie Geldenhuys, head the army in the second half of the 1990s estimated that
he spoke for a total of twenty minutes during his time on the council.
General Malan and his successors always insisted that the defence force was, as in the British
tradition, required to loyally serve the civilian authorities. There was never in talk within the officer
corps of a possible coup d’état. To emphasize the distinction between the military and the civilian
roles Malan, on being appointed Minister of Defence in 1980, refused to be nominated to
Parliament but insisted on fighting a parliamentary seat.
Malan was one of the architects of National Security Management System which reported the State
Security Council. Below the NSMS there Joint Management Centres for twelve national regions,
sub-JMCs for metropolitan centres and mini-JMCs for each town, where officials and businessmen
met under the chairmanship of a military or police officer. The JMCs provided information on local
security issues and acted as an early warning system by spotting areas of friction and identifying
bureaucratic obstacles to improvement in living conditions in the townships.
Malan wished to launch a large scale housing programme in the most turbulent townships to win
“the hearts and minds’ of the oppressed people and thwart the efforts of radical to establish control
over them. He and the military officers quickly ran into the turf battles, particularly the Department
of Constitutional Development and Planning under whom housing construction in the townships
fell. “South Africa” is one of the most difficult countries in the world to govern’, Malan told
Harvard’s Samuel Huntington in 1986. It is a sentiment many ministers today would echo.
Malan never contemplated seizing power. He told me in the 1986 interview.
“A military regime is never a solution, just a deferral of the problem. South Africans were the very
last people who would have accepted a military coup”. This principle of a non-political military,
10
from which Malan did not deviate, was one of the most important reasons for the peaceful
transitions to democracy in 1994.
Malan went along when the cabinet in December 1989 decided to lift the ban on the ANC and some
other extra-parliamentary organization, but he remained deeply sceptical of the wisdom of
negotiating with a section of the ANC committed to the ANC’s National Democratic Revolution,
that had been drafted by members of the South African Communist Party in the early 1960s.
Malan was a proponent of the cross-border operations aimed at attacking the “terrorists”- as they
were called- before they infiltrated the country. I asked him what he thought of the view, expressed
by the National Intelligence Service that the security forces should have limited their operations to
within South Africa’s borders. His answer was: “Such people do not understand war. If we had
allowed the ANC insurgents to cross the border in great numbers we would have ended up in a full
scale and bitter war, which would have had ten times more fatalities which would have made a
settlement impossible.”
As a proportion of the total population South Africa’s political deaths were- along with Northern
Ireland and Israel- the lowest of all major ethnic conflicts of the second half of the Twentieth
Century. The reasons are complex but the cross border operations were probably one contributing
factor.
A huge blot on the name of the defence force was the existence of a Civil Cooperation Bureau
whose internal section was guilty of murders on ANC cadres and other gruesome deeds. General
Malan’s claim that he was unaware of what was going on in the unit is generally not accepted. It
could be said, on reflection, that it would be much better if a person with a civilian background had
been the political head of the defence force in the 1980s. There is good reason why this is the
situation in Western countries.
In my 2008 interview with him I asked him why the hearts and minds strategy did not work so well
in the 1980s. He said: “The big problem was the poverty of so many black people. We had to build
houses for them on a huge scale.” But he ran into bureaucratic turf battles and inertia. He
dismissively referred to “ministers who were gods on their own territory”. Chris Heunis would
warn him “Keep your paws out of my department area.”
In the interview he was also highly critical of the way in which a political settlement was reached.
“We won militarily but lost politically.” FW de Klerk had the personality of a negotiator but was
not actually a negotiator. He was unbelievably bad in his choices of negotiators. From this point
Nelson Mandela had the upper hand over FW de Klerk and De Klerk simply retreated.
Until the end Malan did not believe South Africa was fit for a majoritarian form of democracy, in
which a single party drawing almost all its votes from blacks dominated the political process,
he remained convinced that a system in which majorities enjoyed s significant share of the power
was the only way in which the country would be governed well and would prosper.”
Note: Copied by the Compiler from web page with no change to grammar.
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COMMENTS ON GENERAL MAGNUS MALAN BY LT GEN (RETD) IAN GLEESON
11
General (Genl) Malan joined the SA Defence Force (SADF) in1950, and I did so four years later.
Because we served at different units around the country, our earlier career-paths did not cross much,
until the 1970s.
According to his CV, Genl Malan served in the usual posts during the initial years of his career; as
an officer instructor, company commander, junior staff officer, ADC, instructor at the Military
College and second –in-command (2IC) of the Military Academy. He also completed the normal
promotion courses and the Staff Duties course at the Military College in 1960/61. A year later he
attended the US Command and Staff Course at Fort Leavenworth in the USA.
In 1966 Magnus Malan was promoted to colonel and appointed as Officer Commanding (OC) SWA
Command in Windhoek where he served for two years and was promoted to the rank of brigadier.
Thereafter he served as the OC of the Military Academy until1972 and from 1972 to 1973 as OC of
Western Province Command. These three senior posts provided him with invaluable experience in
military command and management.
He had the right family and political background (his father had been Speaker of Parliament) to
earmark him as a candidate for high office. However, any assertion that he had a meteoric rise
through the ranks is refuted by his extensive service record and his many and varied appointments,
over a period of 23 years, before he was promoted to major –general.
He was appointed as Army Chief of Staff (2IC of the Army) and promoted to major-general in
1973. It was at that stage that our career-paths crossed again when I was appointed as the OC of the
Military Base at Walvis Bay.
Genl Malan became Chief of the Army (C Army) in 1973 and served until 1976 when he was
appointed the Chief of the SA Defence Force (CSADF). He then took up the position of Minister of
Defence from 1980 to 1991. When he was CSADF, I worked at Army Headquarters as Chief of
Staff Operations under genl Viljoen, and when genl Malan became minister, I served at Defence
Headquarters, again under genl Viljoen and later under genl Geldenhuys.
Although I never worked on his personal staff or under his direct command, I knew genl Malan at a
senior level, for more than 15 years.
During that time I found him to be a strong leader and a hard and sometimes difficult task-master,
but always approachable and courteous towards myself. He had a good sense of humour, but was
not given to be the popular type of leader. However, I never had the feeling that he was disliked by
many of his senior officers, nor that there was resentment regarding his top level appointments. He
and Genl Viljoen worked together for many years and had a good relationship. I never discerned
any animosity between the two of them. Therefore, it is totally ridiculous for anybody to blatantly
state that Genl Viljoen despised Genl Malan. The exact opposite was true.
Genl Malan was always committed to the need for a total strategy to combat the security threat to
the country as well as the role of the military as part of that strategy. However, that concept
originated well before his tenure as C Army and CSADF.
The SADF’s strategic approach during the late sixties was based mainly on the writings of the
French general and strategist, André Beaufre, and the British and French experiences in counterinsurgency (COIN) warfare.
Beaufre’s ideas were introduced to the SADF by Lt General Alan Fraser, while he was the general
officer commanding (GOC), Joint Combat Forces, through seminars that he arranged to be led by
academics in Pretoria. He also arranged the first inter- departmental conference on the subject.
During that time (1969) a one man commission under Judge Potgieter recommended the
establishment of a State Security Council.
12
Genl Malan was one of the participants in the earlier seminars and later, like many of the generals
before and after him, he always emphasised the point that counter insurgency was very much a
political war. The main precept of the SADF’s total strategy was that the solution to the conflict was
80% political and 20% military. This was also regularly stated by him and others in the military,
both in public and to the politicians. Genl Malan’s error was probably that he used the term total
strategy and total onslaught too frequently in public, which made some journalists and academics
see him as propagating a form of total military dominance.
On the subject, Genl Viljoen (who was CSADF when genl Malan was minster) is quoted by the
American author Patti Waldmeir (in her book Anatomy of a Miracle), as saying “I can remember at
least four occasions when we had formal briefings for the cabinet, in which we warned them that
militarily we can carry on for a long time, but politically year after year, the strategic options keep
narrowing.” Fortunately in the end, while the military and police were able to provide the buffer
against armed insurgency, the politicians found the solution through negotiations.
During these times Genl Malan served as a dedicated soldier and then also as a politician. He and
the other Chiefs of the SADF always accepted the principle that the military was subject to the civil
authority and the government of the day. Later, in his capacity as a cabinet minister he was part of
the decision making process and the negotiations that brought about a peaceful transition to a new
South Africa.
It is therefore very difficult to understand how he is the one person who is so often derided and
ridiculed over the implementation of a total national strategy that finally enabled the country to end
a long and costly conflict.”
Lt Gen (retd) IR Gleeson 2012
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
OPINION OF GENERAL MA DE M MALAN BY LIEUTENANT GENERAL RF
HOLTZHAUSEN (RETIRED)
“The fact that the ‘Press’ has the freedom to malign with impunity any person after his death
offends my sense of justice. The case of General Magnus Andre de Merindol Malan in August 2011
is a typical example. (Refer to the Article by Chris Barron in the Sunday Times of 24 July 2011
titled “Vile, venal enemy of the People”)
Having known the deceased person for 61 years makes the deliberate vilification even more
unacceptable.
Public figures are always open to close scrutiny but character assassination based on biased
reporting and unproven innuendos with the abused party unable to comment or contradict such
biased allegations therefore requires reaction from those who knew the deceased gentleman for
what he was.
The following remarks by the writer are based on his direct interactions with one ‘Magnus Malan’
as an officer and a gentleman.
In order to establish the basis of my knowledge of Magnus Malan it is necessary to describe the
circumstances of our association which follows:
13
He joined the Union Defence Force in 1950 whereas I joined in 1951. We were both Permanent
Force Officer Cadets at the Military College in Voortrekkerhoogte studying for our BSc (Military)
degrees at the University of Pretoria.
I discontinued my degree course in 1952 and completed my military course and passed out as an
Infantry Subaltern in 1953. Magnus Malan graduated in 1953. He became a Subaltern in the Marine
Corps.
During this first period I viewed him as a senior cadet with some “gestalt”. He had a mischievous
streak and played practical pranks, eg after a thunderstorm he would race his 1936 Mercedes coupe
at night on the hallowed parade ground of the Military College to the utter frustration of the College
RSM. The guilty party was never caught red-handed. When it came to social outings he was the
first to oblige with his father’s three ton truck to move us juniors to some venue along the Hennops
River.
Never during my sojourn at the Military College was I ever treated discourteously by him or found
myself ‘manipulated’ as senior cadets were inclined to do to juniors. He appeared to be a natural
leader of men.
Our ways parted until 1957 when we were fellow students as Lieutenants on our promotion courses
to Captain. He was one of the attendees that kept our spirits high; his practical pranks had no end. If
it was not smearing teargas jelly inside the lining of our caps, it was nailing down the lecturer’s
notes on the lectern in the classroom. At this time he was posted to Army Headquarters and was
also our lecturer on Military Geography.
After the course our ways parted again and he went on to serve as the Aide-de-camp to the
Governor-General, 2I/C of the Military Academy and passed the Army Staff Duties Course in
1960-61. During this last course he obtained valuable experience as the Operations Officer serving
under Brigadier Piet Jacobs (later to become Chief of the Army) in the Western Cape during the
first major internal unrest period. From there he went to Defence Headquarters and served in the
Directorate of Operations and Planning under Brigadier Jan Burger (who was famous for his
meticulous planning and execution). They were instrumental in doing the first major military
appreciation for the overall handling of the security situation in South Africa and SWA.
He then went as South Africa’s only student (ever) to do the United State’s Army Command and
Staff Course at Fort Leavenworth in 1962. After the course he was posted to the 35th Mechanized
Division for practical experience. He returned to South Africa in the second half of 1963 and was
posted to the Army College. In 1964 he was posted to Defence Headquarters as Assistant Military
Secretary. He attended all the General Staff Council’s meetings and kept the minutes.
During 1965 he was notary officer of General Grobbelaar (then Chief of the SADF) during the
latter’s inspection tour of all the relevant units of the Defence Force in order to establish their
combat readiness.
On the request of General Fraser, the Chief of the Army, Malan was posted to SWA as
Commanding Officer with a view on the deteriorating security situation there. His experience in
SWA was invaluable with an eye on the future security developments in SWA and the RSA.
These experiences and development of Malan as a top commander made him very suitable for
higher command positions later on. These facts are conveniently absent in those criticisms of his
command leadership when he was Chief of the Army, Chief of the SADF and even as Minister of
Defence.
14
I continued serving in the Operations Division at Army HQ. To my surprise I was promoted and
transferred to the Military Academy as Malan’s 2IC in 1968. This occurred on his request. Here I
served directly under him for four years and could observe him at close quarters. My conclusions
after four years were the following:
He was a practical commonsense commander who had an abundance of “social power”. Dr Meyer
Feldberg, the Director of the Graduate School of Business at UCT who had evaluated Malan’s
powerbase during a training session at the GSB in 1971 confirmed my view later in 1972. “Social
power” implies that a person possessing it has the personality and capability to inspire others to do
his bidding and enjoy it.
He was also a strong willed person who always set out to achieve the objectives of the organization
and was capable of providing the required resources to make it possible. He managed to neutralize
any opposition that existed to the changes that we were sent to achieve at the Military Academy
such as remilitarizing the culture there.
He allowed one freedom of action within the parameters of the structure that existed. He
encouraged original and innovative thought and endeavours.
He was also a practical man’s man who did not tolerate fools lightly.
He had mastered the art of sound leadership and developing high morale.
He also did not shrink from getting his hands dirty with physical activities. He was no slouch when
playing squash. During his younger days he played lock forward for the Pretoria Defence 1st Team.
During 1973 he requested my assistance to become the Project Leader of an Organizational
Development team to commence a culture change in the Army in order to improve mutual cooperation and perfect decentralized management with an increase in morale. During this period
(1974-1976) when he was Chief of the Army we experienced the fruits of his influence as a sound
leader; he inspired us to achieve the required results. This was the start of the SA Army becoming
the leading ground force in Africa, post WW2.
I accompanied him on his two weekly visits to the Border Area of SWA during the period of
Operation Savannah in 1975. I never found him to unjustly criticize his subordinates. Obviously
you had to know your job and use your God given intelligence to interpret his directives, whether
verbally or in writing. Initiative was a prime requirement in his environment.
He always treated me with respect and courteously. I was never afraid of him but showed the
necessary respect for him as person and commander. Those who may have been scared of him
either lacked self-confidence or were not on top of their jobs.
From 1976 I served under General Constand Viljoen until his retirement in 1986; first as his
Personnel Chief, then as GOC 1 SA Corps (SA Army’s conventional formation) and IG SA Army
when he was Chief of the Army; then as his Personnel Chief when he was Chief of the SADF. From
1986 to 1989 I served under General Jannie Geldenhuys as his Personnel Chief when he was Chief
of the SADF.
I can therefore compare the three gentlemen, Malan, Viljoen and Geldenhuys with each other; in a
nutshell
15
#
Malan was the strategic builder and people’s person;
#
Viljoen was the combat commander and straight as a die and never
beating around any bush;
#
Geldenhuys was the philosopher and obliged to be pre-occupied with
the resolution of the SWA/Namibian and Angolan conflict.
Malan was also the elder of the three with international exposure and political savvy. He had chosen
both the other two for the positions of Chief of the Army and Chief of the SADF. They had no
reason to be jealous of him or to despise him.
In the SADF of that time senior officers may have had mutual differences but the concept of
despising one another was non-existent. The cause was greater than puny mutual differences. The
exceptional sense of camaraderie that was cultivated by especially Malan and then continued by his
successors made sacrifices a pleasure. Anyone not serving at that level during those times of the
conflict would never be able to imagine what it felt like.
As Chief of Staff Personnel I was still in contact with Malan when he was Minister of Defence as
the personnel policies at that time were developed within the framework of the National Policies of
the Government of the Day. I had to implement and manage the Manpower Procurement Policy
which included the utilization of National Servicemen. I was also responsible to manage some of
the resources that were employed to lessen the impact of military service on those called up for such
service. This involved the Southern Cross Fund, the SADF Fund, the recognition for military
service (medals etc), the provisioning of bursaries and the SADF Complaints Office. All these
activities could have political repercussions with complaints to the Minister’s Office.
Even during those times that we had some hiccups and the Minister had to do some explaining in
Parliament he took it on the chin. He never took it out on me and we dealt with the snags as
professional soldiers and gentlemen. We were capable of resolving the issues before they could
affect our functioning seriously.
Pro-active dealing with potential problem areas was the way to obviate disasters.
After my retirement and his leaving politics we continued our association. Up to his death he was
still prepared to listen and provide advice to the best of his ability.
I did my duty as a “soldier’s friend” in the 1990s when he and several of our comrades were put to
trial and found not guilty of the offences charged against them. I would not have done so if I had
any misgivings about his integrity and honour bound sense of duty to serve his country and those
whom he commanded. He was prepared to be prosecuted instead of opting out as Mr Mandela had
offered him before the trial commenced. He stood by his “troops” which is something good military
leaders do.
During the period of the TRC I was involved as co-founder of the SADF Contact Bureau. We were
obliged to deal with all the former SADF personnel regarding any application for amnesty and also
deal with queries from the TRC regarding presentations by the former Chiefs of the SADF Malan,
Viljoen and Geldenhuys. I am therefore aware of what the SADF submitted to the TRC and what
the latter neglected to include in their reports. I had the privilege to compile an official list of
complaints regarding the actions of Mr Mbeki and lodge them with the Public Protector. These
complaints the latter conveniently sat on until the TRC’s reports were published and never acted
upon or responded to with any serious application of his mind to the legal complaints put before
him.
16
If anyone would study Malan’s autobiography and had any personal knowledge of the man, you
would accept his views as being that of a balanced person serving his country to the best of his
ability. Being human he had his faults such as maintaining a negative view of someone until that
someone had proven him wrong. He could not be faulted for having a sound memory.
He accepted the responsibility for the actions and any mistakes that were made by the troops under
his command during “combat” operations when acting according to lawful instructions.
Although there was no official and formal war declared the fact that the ANC/APLA/SACP factions
were internationally recognised as terrorist organizations and various states of emergency were
declared is sufficient motivation to accept that we were in a “state of war” with these banned
organizations. Al the more since they had resorted to a variety of killing and maiming
methodologies on innocent civilians. All this transpired within the framework of the various laws
passed by the de facto and de jure Parliament of South Africa. All this was done within the ambit of
International Law at that time.
In conclusion I salute General Magnus Andre de Merindol Malan as a leader, officer and gentleman
who served his country and its people to the best of his ability!
P.S. I have refrained from commenting directly on what Chris Barron had written on Malan because
how do you disprove a negative? When any writer slanders any person, he always seems to have a
negative purpose in mind. Most times such an individual fancies himself with an axe to grind and
thereby satisfies his own bent ego?”
Lt Gen (retd) RF Holtzhausen Jun 2013
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
THE GEN MALAN WHOM I KNEW FOR MORE THAN THREE DECADES
(By MAJ GEN D.R. MARAIS (Retired))
“INTRODUCTION
It is clear that Chris Barron, in his article in the Sunday Times of 24 July 2011, is a reporter full of
hatred and subjective sentiments towards the military, probably due to his history of anti-military
attitudes.
His generally false vindictive insinuations, regarding the character and military conduct of Gen
Malan, compel me to portray my own views in this respect, rather than going into the detail of
Barron’s allegations. Which in my opinion do not deserve paying much attention to?
I can only relate my personal observations and experiences while serving in the SADF, mostly
directly or indirectly under his leadership.
OBSERVATIONS
I never experienced ‘bluster and tough talk’ on any of many occasions that I had the privilege to be
in Gen Malan’s presence. He never tried to bluff or brag about himself or even all the achievements
of the SADF.
He was more of an introvert than outspoken. He rarely spoke about himself and then only in reply.
He managed to lead the SA Army and later the SADF to achieve high standards of preparedness
and efficiency. He did not generally lead by giving orders, but by involving subordinates in
planning and discussions and by acknowledgement of deserving achievements. He was not hesitant
17
in asking for opinions of subordinates and even for advice.
The allegation that ‘Malan was disliked by many of his senior officers’ leaves the impression that
‘like’ and ‘dislike’ was part of military culture, which was not the case. If there were ‘likers’ and
‘dislikers’ indeed in the military structure, they must have been a very few and out of place and
should not have been members of the SADF. I, myself never met any senior officer that fell into
this category, definitely no one of my colleagues with whom I worked together for more than three
decades.
If the allegation by Barron that “they referred to him sneeringly as a technocrat……. After a few
drinks they called him an idiot” has substance,
I have to comment as follows:
The ‘they’ leaves the impression that the above remark represents the general opinion – which
was not the case. The first I heard about it was when Barron wrote it.
I do not know any body in the SADF that called Gen Malan an idiot. But I do not deny the
possibility of the existence of a single idiot who could believe it and with whom Barron
associated.
I also cannot agree with Barron’s description that ‘Malan came across as a scowling, humourless,
autocratic bully’. I never had any reason to think the above description suits Gen Malan. It could
well have been the impression of a single individual, probably the same one who described him as
an idiot and probably was an idiot himself.
Gen Malan never ‘sneered that those who objected to fighting on religious grounds were “mommy’s
little boys”’. He went out of his way, often against the views of his subordinates, to accommodate
those with religious objections against fighting. He made it possible for them to serve in a noncombat capacity. This he did out of respect for those with strong religious convictions and when
their objections were supported by religious leaders of the community.
The statement that Gen Malan ‘regarded conscientious objectors as criminals, sent them to jail ….’
is also creating a false impression. It was not Gen Malan who regarded them as criminals; they
classified themselves as such in that they did not obey the law when they refused to report for
service and contravened the Military Discipline Code. The statement that Gen Malan sent them to
jail cannot be true as such cases were treated as prescribed in the Military Discipline Code by
Courts over which Gen Malan in his senior capacity exercised no influence.
PERSONAL EXPERIENCES WITH REGARD TO GEN MALAN
In 1975 I was a direct subordinate of Gen Malan when he was Chief of the Army and I was the
Officer Commanding, SWA Command.
He visited my headquarters for a one to one briefing. He came by SAA, landing at and
departing from the then J.G. Strydom Airport, 50 km East of Windhoek, staying overnight.
The morning of his departure, scheduled for about 11:00, he was invited to have breakfast
with Piet Gouws, an acquaintance and prominent citizen of Windhoek.
I accompanied him as I was supposed to drive him to the airport after that. I felt I was needed
in my office so I asked the host whether he would be so kind to drive the General to the
airport. I did this without consulting the General first as I should. The host agreed and I
excused myself while we were still at the table and left after greeting them. Gen Malan
18
showed no discomfort and apparently did not hold it against me, in spite of my unplanned
deviation from military custom.
Another incident worth mentioning occurred during a team building exercise in Vhembe, also in
1975. Up to that time the armed forces in SWA consisted purely of white personnel with a small
black auxiliary force in brown uniforms, armed with assegais for guarding purposes.
In that year SWA Command, which I took over from my predecessor, Gen Jannie
Geldenhuys, commenced the training of two companies of non-white soldiers in the same
uniform as the white soldiers, and also in the handling of fire-arms.
Gen Malan, as Chief of the Army, use this project as an example to encourage a faster transmission
from the previous system in the RSA to a fully integrated non-racial, non-discriminatory SADF.
The resulting transmission in the SADF thereafter can be attributed to Gen Malan’s influence and
leadership in the abolishment of apartheid in the early stages of the so-called armed ‘struggle’ for
democracy.
The following episode, also in 1975 will help to portray another facet of Gen Malan’s character as a
soldier.
Addressing an audience in Outjo, on invitation by the commander of the local commando, in the
school hall on a Thursday, I dared to expand on the future threat from SWAPO terrorist insurgents
from Angolo into SWA, based on factual indicators.
I was unaware of the fact that a SAPA reporter was also present. The news of a potential threat
against the population of SWA was reported through the SAPA network and most newspapers
published it the following day, also in the RSA.
Mr P.W. Botha, who was Minister of Defence, was apparently not informed or aware of the facts as
they were published in the press. He confronted the then Acting Chief of Defence Force, Gen
Armstong who pleaded that he was also not aware of the situation as reported in the press. At a
press conference the SADF also denied knowledge of the reported situation,
I was then instructed by telex to report for an interview with the Acting Chief of the Defence Force
in Pretoria on the following Monday.
On my arrival at Jan Smuts Airport on the Sunday, I was shocked to find that the Sunday papers
made a big issue of the discrepancy in communication in the SADF. The impression was created
that I spoke the truth and that the SADF tried to hide the facts from the media.
Arriving in Pretoria by car I felt embarrassed by posters of the Afrikaans Sunday paper along the
streets announcing “BRIGADIER IN BEK GERUK” in bold red print.
I reported to the Chief of the Army, Gen Malan on the Monday morning. We greeted and he
accompanied me to the office of the Acting Chief of the SADF.
The conversation was brief and formal and over in ten minutes. Gen Armstrong explained to me
that the news embarrassed the Minister of Defence and that the Minister expected that steps be
taken against me. He suggested that I be relieved from my post in SWA. Given the opportunity, I
replied that such a step would cause even greater embarrassment as I was telling the truth and that
the people in SWA believed me and would object to such a step and that the news of my relief from
my post would cause even more sensation in the media.
Gen Malan, who remained silent during the interview stayed after I left. I believe that he, as my
19
direct superior, came up for me in my absence. I remained in my post and was not bothered any
further.
Also worth recording is Gen Malan’s handling of a situation around 1984. A lady with leadership
qualities, known for her far-right political sentiments wanted to establish a separate
“Vroueparaatheidsfront” with the support from the SADF.
She came to me when I was Deputy Chief of the Army to seek our sanction and logistic support.
Improved women preparedness was with military policy but a separate independent organisation
with a military character was out of the question. I had to find a way to decline tactfully but also
not to estrange her and her followers. So I suggested she should talk to the Minister of Defence.
She gladly asked me to arrange for an interview.
I briefed Gen Malan beforehand as I was afraid he would reject the request on political grounds.
At the resulting interview Gen Malan acted as I advised him. He ruled that women with a desire to
serve militarily on a voluntary basis could join their local commando organisations where they
could be militarised on a decentralised basis. I implemented it and there was no affront.”
Maj Gen (retd) DR Marais 2012
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
TRIBUTE AT THE FUNERAL OF THE LATE GENERAL MAGNUS MALAN: 23 JULY
2011
By
Major General Gert Opperman, former colleague and friend of the family
“Dear Mrs Malan, although this will most certainly not be an easy task, I would like to thank you
for the privilege of delivering a short tribute on this occasion. Thank you very much for the trust
that you and your children have placed in me. Please be assured of our sincere sympathy and
prayers, as well as our appreciation for the manner in which you and the children have loyally stood
by General Malan over so many years and in very trying circumstances.
I first met General Malan in 1966 in Windhoek. At the first meeting he made a huge impression on
all of us as young officers. In my case this impression was intensely strengthened at several
different times thereafter, amongst others as his Adjutant at the Military Academy for two years,
and much later, during the eighties, for a period of five years as his Military Secretary in the
Ministry of Defence. There was also a lot of contact with him in the interceding years and
thereafter, also until a few weeks before his death. In the process he, for me, became more than just
an officer commanding, minister and a boss: He was someone who always commanded respect, and
for whom I would never be ashamed of.
He will certainly be remembered for his excellent qualities as a soldier and as a person, who must
be evaluated and appreciated in the context of his time.
As a soldier he excelled by constantly being the youngest person through the various levels of rank
on his way to becoming Chief of the SA Defence Force, a post that he fulfilled with excellence. He
was well-known as the general amongst the generals, a leader of his people with no equal, who
could encourage them, care for them and inspire them to be their best. He empowered them by
setting them huge challenges, by giving them the necessary training and by trusting them.
20
For him there was one thing that was worse than making a mistake or making a wrong decision;
that was to do nothing or not take a decision because you are afraid of making a mistake. Such
people, yes-men and turncoats did not get very far with him.
The indisputable role he fulfilled to introduce, first in the Army and later in the whole Defence
Force, and armaments industry, strategic thought processes, and a new and modern management
approach, is well-known. In the process the Defence Force was shaken out of its undermanned and
badly equipped state. It developed into a highly effective fighting force in which full time and parttime forces (for which he had a very soft spot) played equal roles.
It was a Defence Force with no equal on the African continent. One that was characterised by good
training, discipline, battle proven world class arms and -equipment, but even more importantly,
proud members with a high morale for whom success and the reaching their objectives were not
negotiable: a Defence Force that never came second on the battle field.
Under his command the national service system was expanded and refined. Persons with scarce
qualifications and skills were also utilized in other departments. The effect was felt all over the
country. Often, children who came to the Defence Force developed into efficient, trustworthy young
adults in record time because of the good training, discipline and exposure they were subjected to.
As a result, many of them would have a huge impact in the future of our country as well as
internationally.
Under his leadership the system was expanded to also encompass other population groups, either as
volunteers or as permanent force members. A few black units were established. In practice, the
Defence Force went from a purely people’s army to an army more representative of the whole
population. One in which merit and ability was more important than the colour of your skin and
where there was increasingly less tolerance for any form of discrimination.
At the height of his career, as Chief of the SA Defence Force he was appointed Minister of Defence
but in his heart of hearts he was always a soldier. Nevertheless he applied himself with total
commitment to his new career and to combating what he viewed as a total onslaught. He would also
quickly expand his constituency in typical military fashion to one of the best organised in the
country.
As a soldier and half forced politician he understood the essence of the political war the country
was waging. He believed, and said so in no uncertain terms, that the security forces could only buy
time to allow the communist onslaught in Southern Africa to run its course and for the politicians of
the country to be able to find a lasting, sustainable solution.
He played a leading role in the expansion of the national joint national management system in
which the Defence Force, often to the frustration of some of his political colleagues and members of
other departments, increasingly fulfilled a key role.
Ironically, the establishment of better inter-departmental co-ordination, a bigger sense of urgency,
the restoration of law and order and the improvement of housing and services for all the country’s
people were some of his key personal objectives. These are still relevant on all levels of our society
today.
He never yielded for what he believed had to be done in national interest. He also did not shrink
from what he considered to be essential political changes. He fully supported the principle of a
negotiated settlement but was disappointed in the manner in which the process was eventually
managed, amongst others concerning the assurances and promises over general amnesty which were
21
given repeatedly but never honoured. He also felt that the decision not to utilize some of the State’s
bases of power and to instead discredit, criticize and marginalize them, was not in the best interest
of the country or the process.
The criminal charges brought against him and some of his military colleagues, on which they were
found not guilty after protracted court proceedings, as well as what they were subjected to at the
Truth and Reconciliation Commission, left a huge impact on them and their loved ones. The Malan
family also did not escape its effects. Despite all this his family always supported him in a loyal and
loving manner, something that he appreciated immeasurably.
Over the past few days I have heard many one word descriptions of Magnus Malan the man:
steadfast, resolute, confident, dedicated, perseverance, team-mate, fearless, exacting, stubborn,
patriot, man of culture, close ally, formidable enemy, loyal, unimpeachable, integrity, exuberant,
adventurous, driven, creative, a prankster, mischievous and a true friend, are but a few examples.
He was a deeply religious person with an intense love of his country and his people. After
everything he was and despite his many obligations, he was a dedicated husband, father and
grandfather. That is why one understands the emotion and comments in the many letters of
commiseration that has been received. Hush, brothers, a man is passing, a giant has fallen, we salute
his memory, we will remember him!”
Maj Gen GN Opperman 2011
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
GENERAL MA DE M MALAN
By Sarel (Paal) Pretorius
“Much has been written about General Malan and many negative criticisms have been raised. I have
deemed it necessary to comment from a different point of view. What I intend saying springs from
the personal and work experience that I was fortunate to have shared with General Malan.
Who am I then to make a contribution to the debate? I was the first senior staff officer for sport and
physical training at the former Army Headquarters in Pretoria. For those who may not know, sport
in the current SANDF has changed a lot from what was experienced in the old SADF; whereas
physical training is today known as “human kinetics”. Sport remains sport whether you are doing or
managing it. Physical training was intended to prepare the soldier physically and mentally for the
purpose of his employment.
With my appointment at Army Headquarters Lt Gen Willem Louw was Chief of the Army; Maj
Gen Malan was one of his deputies responsible for operations with the other being Maj Gen
Hendrik Kotze responsible for administration, logistics and personnel. I resorted under Malan for
physical training and under Kotze for sport.
In this relationship I got to know General Malan as a man amongst men and as a people’s person.
He had no grey areas; white or black, right or gone. A soldier he was but also an academic and
thinker who believed that if one had a case and one’s facts were true, you could always win. This
was probably one of the reasons that he was not always popular with everyone. When he succeeded
General Louw as Chief of the Army I served under him for his whole term of office as Chief of the
Army. Later as Chief of the Defence Force and I in the post of Director of Sport and Physical
Training we worked together again. When he was appointed as Minister of Defence, we still had to
communicate on international level and when queries/questions were raised in Parliament.
22
In stead of engaging in rhetorical arguments I shall rather attempt to verify my statements with a
few personal experiences:
Malan the Person (Man)
On occasion I was instructed to report to his office. It was one of those “down” days after my wife
and children had a problem at No 1 Military Hospital. He questioned me on my depressed
appearance and I explained the problem. He reacted by assuring me that he would make an
appointment with the Surgeon General of the time so that he could examine my children. As time
elapsed I accepted the fact that he had forgotten about his promise.
On a particular Friday afternoon when I was home, instead of my office, with visiting family the
telephone rang and General Malan was on the other end of the line. He was at the Military
Academy for a passing-out parade of the final year students. Whilst preparing for the parade he
remembered his promise to me. He was phoning to say that he had not forgotten it. So I and my
family got to see the Surgeon General personally and the problem was resolved. As a colonel it was
my honour that he had remembered me.
Malan the Mentor
On a certain day I was in General Malan’s office. After routine matters were dealt with, he said to
me: “Petoors you must do the staff course”. I thought to myself there I was as a civilian newly in
the military world, why should I be doing a staff course? At that moment it appeared to me so
unreal and unlikely. “You have to learn the language of the soldier, and when you speak his
language he will listen to you” was his reason for this directive (comment). After a Groups
Commander’s course in 1976 I qualified to do a Staff Course. This was the first that comprised 44
weeks with a “Preparatory Course” of two weeks high intensity study. I qualified as one of 25 for
Command and Staff appointments at formation level in the Army. The original group consisted of
75 candidates. Thus I became one of few “professional officers” that were staff qualified; and what
great value it was for my further career in the Defence Force.
Malan the Operational Commander
It would be unjust to compare the various Chiefs of the Army or Chiefs of the Defence Force with
each other. Everyone had his own style and all with whom I had any association, had an influence
on my life. As different as each was, but with the same dedicated purpose, all were successful in
what they believed to be right. General Malan was the academic who begun to implement
“Management” in the SADF. After numerous management courses I began to appreciate the
difference between “management” and “execution”. Courses were then presented for chairmen of
sport and sport officers in the SADF. Sport was managed and not just “played”.
Thorough planning was done with the necessary feedback so that improvements could be made.
This led to a visiting American professor remarking that he would be obliged to adapt some of his
writings on the management of sport. This was because the practice of sport and the theory in his
book (s) did not track properly.
This transpired after he was impressed by the practical application of sport management by the
sport managers in the SADF. Some compliment, not so?
General Malan as the Commander viewed the work by his staff officers as very important to
achieve success in his career. He paid proper attention to the work done by his staff officers in
achieving his aim.
23
This lesson I learnt in my preparations for his meetings. In his capacity as Chief of the Army he was
also chairman of the Army Sport Council. For his meeting of the SA Defence Sport Council I had to
brief him regarding matters raised in the agenda. After my briefing he raised some questions on one
of the points I made. I replied that he as the “commander” must decide. He replied that I as the
responsible person was to anticipate all the questions and answers and give him the correct briefing.
I understood what he meant and went and did it. It led to him being the most prepared member of
the Council; and that what the Army wanted became sport policy.
It had been stated generally that General Malan was the “strongman” in the Cabinet. I believe this,
because of what I have stated above. The financial advisor to the Cabinet on an occasion confirmed
it with these words; “General Malan is the strongman in the Cabinet because he is the best prepared
for the discussions of portfolios and on an occasion knew more of a particular budget than its own
minister”. Must I say more about his thoroughness of decision making?
Malan the Friend
In his work he was professional and at times appeared surly and aloof. This is justified because he
was engaged in difficult matters and his feeling of “there is a time and place for everything”,
probably led some to believe that he was unapproachable as a person. My experience with the man
was that there was another side to him as a person. During an Officer Commanders conference in
the Mapungubwe area I was the secretary of the Army Sports Council and therefore present. The
last evening of the conference was concluded with a closing dinner. As was the custom the
permission of the senior officer (host) present had to be sought before leaving. I requested
permission late that evening but was told to wait. After the last commander had taken his leave in
the vicinity of midnight I was requested to join him next to the still burning campfire. There was
just the two of us with a bottle of good red wine. His words were: “Let us talk. There is not always
time to talk and to listen to one another”. A long and in depth discussion followed. So thorough
were our deliberations that some of the things we discussed later became defence force policy; such
as fitness tests for all. It surely would not have come about if we could not speak person to person.
On another occasion when I was on my return from official work in Cape Town I found that the
scheduled Air Force flight to Pretoria had been delayed. I would be late for a scheduled meeting in
Pretoria. General Malan was in Cape Town with the Chief SADF flight and was alone. I “hitched” a
lift on this aircraft; just the general, the flight crew and I. After take-off he said that I was to do my
own thing, as he first had to do some work himself.
After an hour or so he ordered a cup of tea and said we could now talk. We again had an engaging
discussion and formulation of defence force policy.
Conclusion
Like every other human being he had idiosyncrasies (faults?) but I have indicated briefly what he
meant to me:
Be ready, be thorough and be prepared. Do your work with diligence and believe in yourself and
above all in God!”
Brigadier (retired) SJ Pretorius
28 June 2013
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
MAGNUS MALAN
24
BY MARITZ SPAARWATER 11 AUGUST 2011
Maritz Spaarwater’s reply to Chris Barron’s obituary of the late SADF head
“Chris Barron’s hatchet job on Magnus Malan (review July 24) requires a response. I would like to
point out only a few of his disingenuous misrepresentations.
Dwight Eisenhower, arguably the most illustrious supreme military commander of the 20th Century,
‘without ever leading soldiers in combat…and never (knowing) what it was like to be under fire’,
successfully commanded the Free World’s assault on the Nazi scourge in Europe, sending his
troops, including thousands of 18 and 19 year-olds, into battle on the murderous beaches of
Normandy.
Both Malan and Eisenhower reached senior rank during periods when there were no wars to fight
and had already risen to high command when those arose. I’m sure both would have excelled at
lower levels as well. There is even the parallel between Malan and Eisenhower of both having
undergone staff training at the eminent Fort Leavenworth Staff College in Kansa, USA.
Barron eulogises and juxtaposes Gen Constand Viljoen, intellectually superior and wonderful
soldier and human being he is, to Malan, while omitting to mention that Viljoen had for the same
reason not ‘faced fire’ before he reached high command level.
His only combat experience was when, already commanding general in South West Africa, he
parachuted into the Swapo base at Cassinga in Angola in the airborne assault phase of Operation
Reindeer in 1978, which spoke eloquently of his bravery, but was otherwise ill-considered and
highly imprudent. Barron praises the one general for no other reason than to nail the other.
Barron seems in principle to be a pacifist as far as the war against the communist forces in Angola
is concerned, but would he also argue that the armed resistance to Hitler’s Nazi forces was wrong?
If South Africa hadn’t disabused the Soviet Union of their notion that the SADF would be a cheap
walk-over for its surrogate Cuban and other forces in Angola, what would have been the end result?
If the communist forces had prevailed militarily, why would they have negotiated at all?
Surely not to establish the liberal-democratic constitutions and systems of governance now evident
in Namibia and South Africa-with their attendant free-market economies, entrenched private
property and all the individual freedoms of Western-style liberalism? Stalinist systems of
subjugation of the individual and command economies eventually imploding into oblivion would
have been the result.
Under Malan’s command the SADF, through the generally effective State Security Management
System, and in the face of the infuriating indolence of some civilian state departments represented
in the forums of that system, identified real needs and as a start undertook the huge task of
upgrading Alexandra township by for instance tarring roads and installing street lighting.
When mobs destroyed what was being achieved there, Barron surely can’t be serious in suggesting
that the appropriate response would have been to go in with “spades and trowels” when that
township ”went up in flames?” How naïve can one be! Malan was not “supposedly” in favour of a
hearts and minds approach; he constantly preached this in and outside of the SADF and did his best
to put action to words, And, incongruously, Barron deplores Malan’s use of his “secret funds”
(again the innuendo), a facility of the security establishments of every serious country on earth to
25
hide strategic expenditure from enemy eyes, to not only make the SADF self-sufficient but to make
Armscor ‘South Africa’s largest exporter of manufactured goods’.
And how, pray may I ask, does Barron know to be able to factually report about Malan’s state of
mind in that ‘(It is) known that he regarded the resources of the SADF as his to dispose of as and
when he liked’?
The ANC at its Morogoro, Tanzania conference in 1969 declared all-out war with its ‘strategy and
tactics’ of the ‘four pillars of struggle’ heralding the ‘total onslaught’ in the defined areas of the
armed struggle, mass protest action to make the country ungovernable, underground organisation
and international isolation of South Africa.
Would the South African government and Malan not have been seriously derelict in their duty if
they hadn’t devised a sound ‘total national strategy’ to counter this ‘total onslaught’?
Unfortunately, South Africa, including Malan’s, efforts at explaining this to the populace was so
woefully inadequate, that the impression remains in the minds of many to this day that the ‘total
onslaught’ was a figment of Malan’s and others’ imagination.
Barron decries the pre-emptive raids on terrorist bases in neighbouring countries, but seems to have
forgotten the shocking images of people being burned, hacked and stoned to death in townships
under the direction and leadership of elements in those neighbouring countries, or the sickening
sight of aged black women being force-fed washing powder because they dared to defy violently
imposed consumer boycotts, or the shredded civilian bodies strewn across Church Street in Pretoria
after a bomb planted by elements infiltrating directly from those neighbouring countries?
International law acknowledges the right of states to pre-emptive strike when facing an imminent
armed assault from across its borders, in this case the assault already having commenced and war
formally declared by the ANC.
Atrocities that Barron refers to happen on all sides in all wars. The recognition of this fact does not
make such actions any less deplorable, but to single out only one side is disingenuous. Even worse,
it boils down to the journalistic dissemination of propaganda, surely not the intended purpose of a
newspaper such as yours?
Magnus Malan was a highly intelligent, thoughtful, reformist soldier, and a highly effective
commander. I did not know him well enough personally to judge whether he was a nice guy or not.
What seems clear to me is that is that his enormous achievements, together with P.W. Botha and
Piet Marais of Armscor, over a relatively short span of time in making the SADF a self-sufficient,
balanced and effective fighting force able to operate without any external support, are unlikely to
have been the result of him being a nice guy.
I would never have thought that Chris Barron, whose incisive interviews in your newspaper I never
try to miss, would be capable of producing such ill-considered, dishonest and vindictive article, for
whatever reason overflowing with his personal resentment and vitriol, and that in an apparent
obituary.
The most unspeakable of Barron’s innuendo is to my mind his scandalously gratuitous attempt to
associate Malan with the alleged paedophilia of John Wiley and Dave Allen. Is dubious journalistic
ethics the sole prerogative of News of the World reporters? I and many other life-long readers of the
Sunday Times will find you seriously amiss if you do not publish an apology or preferably a
retraction of Barron’s truly despicable article.”
26
Maritz Spaarwater, Col (retd) SADF
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
LETTER TO THE EDITOR OF THE SUNDAY TIMES
By JH van der Merwe MP, Chief Whip of the IFP on 27 July 2011
“Dear Sir,
The write-up by Chris Barron of General Magnus Malan as “Vile, venal enemy of the people”
(Sunday Times: 23 July 2011) cries out for reaction. I address this letter to you as an IFP member
and Afrikaner who cannot remain silent.
Barron’s article is based on misrepresentations, malicious gossiping, half truths and blatant lies. It
speaks of nothing less than a deep hatred for the IFP and of Afrikaners, such as Malan and most of
his officers of the SADF. He totally ignores the unspeakable atrocities committed by the ANC
which would have afforded the reader the whole picture about the violence in the eighties in
KwaZulu-Natal between the ANC and IFP. Without this information the uninformed reader is left
with no other option than to seethe IFP, Malan and the officers of the SADF as murderers, crooks
and “the enemy of the people”.
By being silent about the ANC’s atrocities, in what appears to be intentional, Barron by implication
paints the ANC as an party whose innocent members were slaughtered by the IFP and Malan’s
soldiers.
He makes no mention of the killing of 240 IFP leaders of which particulars were submitted to the
TRC. No mention of hundreds of more than 500 innocent black people killed by the most inhumane
execution method of the ANC by burning them alive; no mention of the killing of hundreds of
policemen; no mention of the killing of more than 8000 people by the ANC, injuring some 18000.
No mention is made of Goldstone’s report on violence in KwaZulu-Natal in 1992. The Folweni
massacre in October 1992, for example, involved gunmen dressed in army-type uniforms who
attacked the home of a known IFP supporter. The police testified to the Goldstone Commission that
Umkhonto combatants had been involved in these massacres. They gave examples of a number of
attacks perpetrated by ANC members dressed in security uniforms. The police also testified that the
ANC was ‘waging an aggressive war’ on the IFP ‘by military means’ in the region, while the IFP
was ‘disadvantaged in its resistance to the ANC’s onslaught [because it] lacked the quantity and
sophistication of the weaponry available to the ANC’.
No. No mention of any criticism of the ANC. A scandalous one sided picture which is nothing less
than an obedient cover up of ANC atrocities which makes a mockery of objective and responsible
journalism.
Barron claims that “hundreds of millions from the fund (controlled by Malan) went into training
and arming Inkatha hit squads to kill those aligned to the ANC and UDF”.
This is a lie. There is no evidence to support this lie. What is true is that some 200 IFP’s were
trained by the SADF to protect IFP VIPs. No proof at all that they were trained in order to murder
ANC and UDF supporters.
Malan, other generals and six IFP members who were trained by the SADF were charged with the
murder of persons killed at Kwa Makhuta. They were all found not guilty by the High Court. One of
the assessors in that trail was a Blackman who later became the Judge President of KwaZulu-Natal.
He concurred with the judgment. The two key witnesses whose statements led to the trial were at
27
the end of the trial denied indemnity of prosecution in terms of section 204 of the Act, which leaves
no doubt as to the falsehood of their testimonies.
Barron’s personal attacks and malicious insults of General Malan and officers of the SADF are
shocking. There is no proof that Malan authorised the assassinations of Webster and Lubowsky; no
proof that Swapo captives were dropped (into the sea from helicopters; no proof that “significant
amounts were pocketed by senior SADF officers” including Malan of which Barron says “Nobody
knows how much went into Malan’s pockets”. No proof that Malan presided over the mass
destruction of wildlife in Angola and Namibia.
Another scandalous lie is that General Constand Viljoen “despised Malan”. Viljoen spoke at the
Memorial for Malan on 27 July and made mice meat of Barron’s lie.
I served in the Citizen Force of the SADF as a volunteer for 15 years; I was promoted to the rank of
Major; I served in the operational area; I knew Malan as my Commander and later as a colleague in
Parliament. The vicious attacks on his integrity really pains me to such an extent that I, as an IFP
member and Afrikaner, simply cannot remain silent.
Barron’s lies, his cover up of ANC atrocities, his intentional painting of only one side of the picture,
his all out campaign against the IFP and Afrikaners (most SADF Officers were Afrikaners) and his
description of Malan as “vile, venal enemy of the people” is proof that it is becoming increasingly
more difficult to defend the media against the onslaughts of those who want to take away its selfregulation freedoms.”
JH van der Merwe, MP 2011
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
OPINION OF GENERAL MAGNUS DE M MALAN BY LT GEN PIETER WILLEM VAN
DER WESTHUIZEN, FORMER SECRETARY OF THE STATE SECURITY COUNCIL
“I had the privilege to serve under General Malan for more than twenty years as a staff officer and
commander. He always set a high work ethic but never unrealistic or unreasonable. He always
required of you to do your homework and proper staff work; to come forward with suggestions and
solutions. You would never dare to ask him for it; you had to do completed staff work. He would
sometimes after discussion make amendments if required and then make his decision. You never
left his presence without knowing what you were required to do.
He was always honest and respectful, also towards his subordinates irrespective of rank. Party
politics never played a role with him because he respected the faith, convictions and feelings of
others. Similarly he moulded the Afrikaans and English speakers into one unit to strive for a
common purpose. Because he came from a political home he understood how to handle politicians,
from the ranks of both the government and the opposition.
He understood politics and because of his managerial skills got everyone to strive for the common
goals.
As Chief of the Military Intelligence for seven years I had the advantage that he understood the
sensitive aspects like special tasks, some very sensitive with great risks involved not only for the
SADF but for the RSA as a country.
Take into account that SA during his tenure as Chief of the Army, Chief of the SADF and Minister
of Defence, was involved in a titanic struggle against communism. Most conflicts in our
neighbouring states enjoyed the support of Soviet Russia with more than 46 000 Cuban troops in
28
Angola supporting terrorism in South West Africa and South Africa. Also during my tenure as
Secretary of the State Security Council he as the senior minister was always the leader who
succeeded in getting our government departments to participate with the necessary
acknowledgement of their tasks without him being prescriptive.
As the RSA was subjected to an armaments boycott for many years we were obliged to produce our
own armaments. In this he played a key role to develop a spirit of co-operation between the military
and the civilian personnel of Armscor. This enabled us to become independent from foreign support
to develop our own armaments production capabilities; this progressed to the point where we
became exporters of weapons to friendly countries.
Because he was strategically well schooled in world politics he could stand his ground in the
company of and negotiations with other world figures. He commanded their respect be it friend or
foe.
I can personally vouch for this because I was often present in his discussions and negotiations with
foreign ministers, presidents and even a king.
He demanded a lot from his subordinates because he himself gave a lot. I learnt at an early stage
from him to accept responsibility:” If you are put in command you must assume command”.
His encouragement and example was key to the SA Defence Force being unbeaten and being
viewed internationally not only as the best in Africa but one of the most powerful in the world--also by our enemies.
Just because General Malan was such an outstanding militarist and also politically correct one can
expect also that he had many enemies and still have. Thus is so because we have to keep reckoning
with the fact that the communists never forget nor forgive. From this approach comes the
vilification of Malan as person and by implication the former SADF. The Intelligence Division of
the SADF was directly involved in analysing propaganda and we expected that the enemy, who
could never conquer the SADF, would now after the events distort reality in their favour and come
forward with false accusations. Especially would it be done via the English Press as the world and
our other enemies do not read Afrikaans. Typical as the communist propaganda works they will
never stop it especially because they had been shamed and feel insulted that they lost the military
(terrorist) campaign against the SA Defence Force.”
Lt Gen (retd) PW van der Westhuizen 2012
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
TRIBUTE BY GENERAL CL VILJOEN AT THE MEMORIAL SERVICE FOR
DECEASED GENERAL MAGNUS MALAN ON 27 JULY 2011
(Translation of a transcription as delivered by General Constand Viljoen)
“Dear Mrs Malan, children, grand children, family, dear friends and fellow former soldiers: I wish
to thank Mrs Malan and the family for affording us the opportunity to take leave of a comrade in
this fashion. There was unbelievable loyalty in the country, especially in the Defence Force;
whether Permanent Force, Citizen Force, Commandos, Armscor and civilian corps that worked in
the Defence Force. They did a great job in a critical time in South Africa.
We experience today also what was emphasized by the chaplain: our love for the Lord just as
General Malan would have wished it. And that we know that our love for the Lord and our mutual
love for one another are what counts.
29
As the Defence Force of our country we supported General Malan in the important task he
executed. Today it is my task to eulogise him. It is nigh an impossible mission. He has written a
book and I would have enjoyed reading from it; but that will take too long. I will rather use the
opportunity to give a better perspective of the value that Malan contributed to our lives during the
important period we lived in. When I talk of a perspective of these times I imply that no one can
judge, describe or otherwise understand Malan other than within the context of the extremely
critical period when he was privileged or entrusted with the onerous task on hand.
Now you must pardon me; today I am neither going to use beautiful adjectives nor play of words to
impress you. I am going to base my eulogy on the value of General Malan’s contribution in
practice.
During the period when General Malan joined the SADF as a young officer, the existing doctrine
provided for the hard, critical and classical military warfare that was developed during the first half
of the previous century. It was in a sense an easier type of warfare than later. The modus operandi
was as follows: a confrontation between countries arose, the government decided on military action,
and a military man (general or field Marshall) whom they appointed was then instructed to carry out
the military action (s).
If he won he handed back the matter to the politicians who then took it further politically. But this
methodology changed during the second half of the previous century.
It was at the end of the Second World War and the start of the fear for the development of nuclear
weapons and the talk of “Just not a great war again, and just not the use of nuclear weapons again”.
Notwithstanding this fear of total annihilation the clashes and conflicts did not diminish. The major
powers did not openly get involved in smaller area clashes, but exploited the fear of and thoughts of
nuclear weapons to promote their ideology to form power blocks, whilst stirring up local conflicts.
When General Malan joined the defence force, warfare entered an important period. It consisted of
underground, macro conflicts and area bound micro conflicts. Here I especially refer to Africa, first
to Cuba’s role in Africa and thereafter to the general understanding of ‘a cold war” that started at
this time.
Little did Magnus Malan the young officer at that time and whom we take leave of to-day, realize
that he would get so intensely involved in and that his whole life thereafter would be permeated
with the complexity of the smaller wars. Do remember that Malan joined the defence force shortly
after the Second World War. The general and overriding spirit in the SA Defence Force at that time
was the legacy of that War. It also included the armament and tactical doctrine.
At this stage the SA politicians’ were in conflict with the world. This we know. The local
politicians in the country were often uninformed in respect of the way this military conflict or the
overall conflict would develop and how they had to prepare for this. When General Malan took
over as Chief of the SA Defence Force the perception was that the country and its people could
continue without fear their normal life style because there was a defence force that would ensure
this. General Malan was an officer in that defence force! It was eventually believed that the defence
force was invincible and that politicians therefore could think and do as they pleased.
During the above named circumstances general Malan progressed rapidly to the highest rank and as
a leader of his time he developed the mission to safeguard South Africa. He was a realist and came
to the understanding that he had to gain time by handling regional conflicts in Southern Africa; the
neighbouring states, in SWA and later also in South Africa. General Malan made a study of this
situation and conveyed his findings to the Defence Force.
Not one of the other state departments really understood what the essence of the conflict was that
we experienced.
30
During the period of his progress from Commander SWA Command to Chief of the Army, to Chief
of the SADF and to Minister his primary mission was to ensure that the Defence Force never lost
the military struggle. That would have been fatal. Irrespective of the view that the military action
made up only 20 percent of the conflict it would have meant that this 20 percent would have
completely knocked us out.
General Malan’s subsequent responsibility or second task was definitely political influencing; we
were engaged in a political struggle that included counter-insurgency wars. The political handling
of conflict was important and therefore general Malan as an officer, as Chief of the Defence Force
and later as Minister of Defence had to act strong, had to influence politically and give advice in the
conviction that the political controllers in the country would accept it. He had to co-ordinate
structures so as to ensure that the full potential of South Africa and not only the military potential
could be employed to safeguard South Africa and win some time for us to find political solutions.
This was the primary task and General Malan did it.
It is impossible to describe General Malan’s total role with only a few examples. I would really
without any long windedness start to talk of Malan as a team leader; this was one of his strongest
traits. HE CONCENTRATED ON COMMUNICATION WITH HIS TEAMS. He would engage
and argue with them to obtain information from them until a solution was found. He would then
continue. He was very fond of teambuilding exercises. He really had fun in getting us together and
starting with teambuilding exercises. But basically he was already milking us for information,
discussing it first and thereafter ensuring that he could direct the Defence Force and advise
Government.
His second strongest trait was probably his role as political link. I have said that insurgency is all
about politics. As the defence force leader General Malan excelled in this role. He with our support
developed this Defence Force into the best in Africa; it could execute all its tasks comprehensively.
It was wonderful to observe him in this regard. And I am convinced that our Defence Force was
capable to continue as such for a very long time. The political liaison that Malan had to do was
critically important. Neither the country nor the politicians realized the demands of such a counterinsurgency conflict. Political liaison did among other things include the establishment of a security
management system.
The State Security Council and the co-ordination at all levels ensured that the Defence Force could
not only assist South Africa on the military level, but also ensured that we could win enough time to
eventually tackle the political discord properly.
Then there was Magnus Malan the driving force behind “Civic Action”. I was fortunate to visit the
former Rhodesia during a regional conflict there. The struggle was similar to what we experienced
later in South Africa. When I spoke to the officers they informed me that: “There was a tribal trust
land where we had peace. In fact, it was difficult for the terrorists or guerrillas to move into this
trust land”. I asked them why it was that the rest of the region, except for this one piece of land, was
overrun. They replied that it was because of the efficiency of the administrative system. It was then
that we and General Malan realized that everything possible had to be done and all involved
departments had to be engaged to make the outlook of all the people of the country as positive as
possible.
We were fully aware of the shortcomings of the administrative efficiency, the so-called service
delivery such as currently experienced in South Africa.
Effective administration is important to keep the masses satisfied. Thus General Malan also realized
that it was important to improve the attitude of people.
He personally was tremendously interested in the ways that attitudes could be changed and people
won over. He appointed people; he did civic action and utilized citizen force and the commandos
with specific skills and knowledge. Many of you that were in the Defence Force will remember how
31
he sent members of the Commandos to Katima Mulilo. I wish that you could have seen what
influence someone like Commandant Dirk du Toit, a simple farmer, had on the important opinion
makers in the Eastern Caprivi. Furthermore Malan promoted training. The assistance of
Onderstepoort services, the improvement of area initiatives regarding medical services, medical aid,
etc was another of General Malan’s strong points. He never shied away from talking about it and
initiating efforts to get all government departments to become involved country wide and to
motivate them to improve their services in that regard.
Then there was also General Malan, the Armscor partner. You will remember that I referred to the
obsolete armaments of the Defence Force when Malan joined the service as a young officer.
Initially under General Malan the main concern was counter-insurgency.
It was only later with the Cuban threat in Angola that we realized that we also had to prepare
ourselves for more than counter-insurgency; thus something such as conventional warfare.
To replicate the circumstances and norms that existed during World War 2 in Europe and North
Africa later in Angola that lay thousands of kilometres away, would have been a recipe for disaster.
Under General Malan’s leadership the top structure of the Army proposed that the tactical doctrine
of the Second World War be discarded and that we prepare ourselves for Africa (n) (warfare). We
were to develop more mobile combat techniques with greater firepower. Our armaments were to be
of the type that we could react rapidly to possible confrontations in SWA or elsewhere in SA.
We had to develop new weapons. A tank could not drive from Pretoria to SWA on its tracks. We
built the necessary mobility in our tank force and do you know, years later in 1987 these weapons
of the SA Defence Force were capable of achieving the greatest military successes when the Cubans
thought that they could infiltrate the South Eastern region of Angola with their brigades to eradicate
Savimbi whom we supported. This wonderful victory was due to various factors viz our new tactics
and the excellent co-operation with Armscor i.r.o. the design and development of weapons that
included better guns, tanks and beter infantry combat vehicles. We also had the ability to provide
logistical support.
Static battles like those of the Second World War were something of the past with the new mobile
warfare combat techniques that included greater fire power. This wonderful contribution by General
Malan was achieved by his good relations with his friend Commandant Piet Marais of Armscor.
But there also was Malan, the operational co-ordinator. He was often viewed and also denounced in
public as someone who tried to exert too strong influence. The general perception was that he tried
to militarize the country. This was not so. He was at that stage the best informed, as the Defence
Force had studied every insurgency war that had occurred. Therefore General Malan could pass the
most relevant information to the politicians and became the operational co-ordinator. He was often
accused by other departments that he was meddling in their affairs: but that was not the case. It was
an honest attempt by Malan to optimize these affairs in South Africa and in SWA.
Now I want to talk about General Malan the political realist. You know, he exerted meaningful
influence on the progress of the war in SWA; first as commander, later as Chief of the Army and
still later as Minister.
He eventually achieved stability and started at the right time with negotiations. I also refer to the
Turnhalle efforts that took place. When he first supported Resolution 435 and when implementation
occurred with the SWAPO guerrilla fighters suddenly tried to execute a quick insurgency to create
the impression that they could achieve a military victory in SWA, he taught them a good military
lesson that restored the peace and stability. Thereby he proved that the final answer was to achieve a
political solution.
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We honour General Malan with these successes that he achieved in SWA. A country to-day that is
one of those countries that is reasonably stable so that there is a future for its people and their
children.
Now I want to probably at my own peril quickly tell you more about Malan as a political realist.
You know that we supported Renamo and at that time were not great friends of Freelimo. They then
suddenly proposed that the Komati Accord be signed. The treaty was basically a ceasefire. I was not
very satisfied with it. I did not wish to get involved with it at that stage and tried to get out of
attending the discussions. General Malan quickly saw through my attempts and ordered me to
attend. I must to-day admit, I was there and met Samora Machel, greeted him and we got along
reasonably well. Thereafter my relationship with Mocambique was completely different and
Mocambique will hopefully just like SWA stabilize and become peaceful. General Malan was a
greater realist than I and he realized how important political adjustment and the use of the defence
force for political purposes during a Cold War were.
I must emphasize that General Malan’s leadership won time in SWA. It was really necessary. The
people of SWA were not ready to really negotiate their constitution. Time was required. I had a
long argument once with Mr Mudge because we were fighting in the North and they were sitting in
the Turnhalle and talking and then they wanted to take a month’s leave. When I told him that it
could not continue that way he told me a very true thing. He said that the people of SWA were not
ready and that what was decided in the Turnhalle had to be disseminated through SWA. Thus SWA
eventually achieved success and General Malan had played a very important role therein.
In closure I refer to our own situation and to the SA Defence Force over the period that General
Malan served in it. It is important to note that he served from the 1950s up to and including the
eighties; a very important period.
General Malan did also in regard to SA hold the viewpoint that we had to gain time until a final
solution was found. He for not one moment hesitated to convey our ideas to the Cabinet. I
remember an occasion were the Defence Command Council made a submission to the Cabinet: We
assured them that the defence force was very strong and that we had no problem to continue; but
that an insurgency war could only be won politically. He did nearly the impossible by allowing us
soldiers to say to the Cabinet that we would continue as long as possible but every year that it took
to find a political solution the end of that year would mean less strategic options for the resolution
of the conflict. General Malan was the Minister at that time and I think that it was also a risk he
took to allow a number of “arrogant” generals to convey it to the Cabinet. I refer to this incident in
order to emphasize how convinced General Malan was of the direction he had to follow in this
critical period.
Then we arrived in 1994 and I am sad to say that the loyalty of the Defence Force and the
contributions of General Malan were abruptly ended. I am also sorry to say that general Malan and
21 generals were sacrificed on the political altar. They were traded for one or other “benefit”. I hope
and with this conclude that the manner in which General Malan’s influence were taken away in the
end, notwithstanding his great contribution over so many years, does not make SA a more unstable
country than what Mocambique, Angola and SWA now are.
Ladies and Gentlemen, thank you for the opportunity to speak. General Malan was a great friend
and an effective general who led SA as he at the time thought he should. For that we commemorate
him. We, who had survived this struggle must remember what the minster said, let our mutual love
and our fellowship, let it grow and never disappear.”
(Authenticated by Lt Gen (retd) Raymond F Holtzhausen March 2013)
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POLITICSWEB- DON’T DEMONISE THE SADF-FEATURES
Rodney Warwick calls for a more nuanced understanding of the conflicts of the past.
“The recent death of former SADF Chief and Defence Minister Magnus Malan and the Independent
News and other press groups acknowledgement of such with the usual descriptions of any pre-1994
government entity or prominent person being prefixed with “apartheid this and that” follows years
of hostility to SADF history by the ANC and its sympathisers.
It contradicts any reconciliatory efforts which might reach significantly into the white community’s
collective psyche, exasperated as many are of the organisations seventeen years of negating the
tolerance and non-racial ideals of the 1994 “New South Africa”. Non-racialism and “nationbuilding” is still supposedly of interest to ANC leaders, but on strict ANC terms where an orthodox
version of South Africa history is intended to silence other interpretations, however well researched
these could be.
In creeping totalitarian style South Africans are being silently coerced into accepting the
government as owning the last word in history. Generally supported by the mass media, ANC
moves to guide public opinion away from any nuanced history of the SADF, is a process by which
white South African historical identity is repeatedly denigrated.
Without an awareness of this deliberate distortion, the generally historical illiterate public will
eventually struggle to grasp alternate viewpoints which demonstrate the complexity and paradoxes
of this country’s past. Because it is also thinly disguised anti-white racism, the lack of intellectual
rigor and integrity displayed by the SADF’s ANC detractors deserves interrogation.
Whether the ANC likes it or not some 600,000 or so, then young fellow countrymen went through
the national service system and most remain South African citizens today, many amongst the
population’s occupationally most skilled and valuable. Today they are a scattered amorphous
grouping, although some are formalised into veterans’ organisations. To the government along with
other entities and individuals broadly supportive of the ANC, these former conscripts are vilified for
having “defended Apartheid”. This simplistic accusation ignores the historical context of different
interest groups and fears.
The conscripts obeyed the law they were socialised to respect. Many did their duty under the often
exceptionally trying circumstances of both authoritarian military environments and war, which
soldiers throughout history have had to endure. But there is more than a touch of bitterness in ANC
attitudes towards the SADF; it often performed its work rather too efficiently for MK, SWAPO,
Fapla and the Cubans.
In promoting public antipathy towards former SADF military achievements and experiences, the
ANC finds easy allies in a new generation of both black and white journalists who repeatedly
demonstrate historical ignorance of ”border war” details.
They also manifest a blindness to even timidly questioning ANC interpretations of SADF historysuch would it seem constitute journalistic heresy; something apparently contrary to contemporary
press ideological parameters.
Criticism of current government incompetence and corruption abounds in independent and other
newspaper groups. But editors would be very reluctant to endorse that the supposedly righteous past
of the ANC/SACP/MK and its allies, like the Vorster and Botha regimes, might have been equally
34
incompatible with the contemporary South African Constitution. This regarding any genuine
aspirations towards liberal democracy and the respect for human rights. Yet Paul Trewhela and
others have so effectively exposed the abuses and totalitarianism of the ANC, SWAPO and its
leaders, not least in Angola.
But the real problem is that most conscripts emphatically opposed the ANC’s political objectives
pre-1994. But just read a copy or two of Sechaba or the African Communist editions from the
1970’s and 80’s to see what glorious visions the ANC/SACP had for a “New South Africa” back
then. Or read up on the excessively violent post-colonial histories of Algeria, Congo or Rhodesia to
get an insight into white fears of these periods.
This was/still is a deeply polarised country and as admirable were those who highlighted injustices,
there were scant plausible alternate roads across the political divides; and neither the ANC/SACP
nor Vorster/Botha offered any. It took the initiatives by De Klerk along with the collapse of Eastern
Europe regimes to break the logjam that was taking us all to hell.
But although the SADF was a tool of the NP government, its individual members did not make
national policy. It would also be nonsense to suggest all SADF members were unbending racists
and uncritical supporters of Verwoerd-style apartheid. The SADF drew its conscripts across
Afrikaans, English, Jewish and other white communities and from varying socio-economic
backgrounds and educational levels.
Neither were the SADF national servicemen morally obliged to have become supporters of Tambo,
Hani and Slovo and I doubt whether many ex-conscripts or their children today would have shifted
from this position. I argue that the media’s partly craven, perhaps more ignorant anti-SADF stance
is not only morally wrong, but also invalid when judged by any historical contextual vantage point
which seeks to critique emotions, built on tired old propaganda and clichés like “the Struggle” or
the “apartheid army”.
There are two historical examples worth reflecting upon concerning moral confusions in war,
military imperatives and social/ideological complexities. When these are juxtaposed to conflicts
involving the SADF in the 1970’s and 80’s, the sometimes awful paradoxes of war and society are
revealed. Between 1936 and 1939 Spain experienced a civil war where atrocities, military and
civilian casualties and victor’s revenge far exceeded anything in South Africa during the entire
twentieth century. Ideologically the issues were not clear cut at all.
Admirers of Stalin’s totalitarian state fought alongside principled liberal democrats on the
republican side. Members of the Spanish middle class and devout Catholics were appalled at for
example, the brutal murder of clergy, with priests and nuns tortured and raped by republican forces.
Further horrified at the prospect of Lenin’s nightmare post-1917 Soviet Union being transplanted
onto Spain, decent citizens supported merciless Spanish fascists, who in their turn murdered
thousands of fellow Spaniards whether combatants or not.
The Spanish military and nation was torn asunder and nationalist leader General Franco took the
view, grim as it was, that only complete defeat of the republicans on the scale inflicted by Union
forces on the South during the last years of the US civil War, could save Spain from a Stalinistic
future or permanent national disintegration. Are all nationalist or republican combatants now
condemned? Likewise with SADF history: it is ridiculous to argue that all conscripts were simply
“apartheid supporters”. The civil and border wars issues were far more complicated than such a
mindless description.
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In Poland during the 1940s to the late 1980s, the Polish communist party with a threatening USSR
behind it, ruled unhappily. Insurrections and strikes by Polish workers were crushed by the state in
1956 with heavy loss of life and again in 1970, while during the 1980s, the rise of Solidarity
exacerbated all the tensions familiar to South Africans of the same period, with the rule of law often
ignored by the state while the military/police were used to suppress internal political opposition.
The Polish communist government faced a unique problem: To what extent could it allow a 1980s
“Prague Spring” without risking a military invasion by the USSR and other Warsaw Pact members,
whose governments were equally nervous of sudden liberal reforms inviting internal breakdown and
a 1956 Hungarian catastrophe. Given Poland bloody twentieth century history regarding Russia and
Germany, most of the Polish military would probably have fiercely resisted any Soviet invasion
during the early 1980s, almost definitely setting Europe ablaze during this tense Cold War ‘freeze”
period.
The Polish security forces, regardless of individual political opinions, performed an odious
internal”stabilizing role” rather than risk the wider conflict. This did not appease the Pope and
Polish Catholic Church at the time, nor did it impress Solidarity. As in South Africa, amidst abuses
that cam mainly from the SA Police, the SADF had to be used to head off township anarchy which
threatened to irretrievably polarize the country racially and ideologically.
The ANC and the UDF had no control over stemming the chaos of the mid-1980s. They just
spurred it on supporting appallingly ill-conceived slogans like “making the country ungovernable”
and “no education before liberation”. And we continue to pay the cost today for these idiot
strategies through a myriad of social ills and state educational dysfunctionality.
Likewise, it is nonsense to so simplistically portray the wars in Angola and the SADF’s cross
border operations as just the “apartheid army” fighting the “apartheid war”. It is well known how
SWAPO for most of their existence arrogantly considered themselves the only representatives of
the Namibian people, while the ANC leaders admired Cuba as a political role model.
Who knows what extreme violence might have occurred across South Africa and Namibia if Cuban
troops had crossed the Angolan border as they threatened to in June 1988, before being mauled by
the conscripts of 61 Mechanised Battalion.
The Cold War certainly did impact upon the doctrines, ambitions and strategies of all forces in
Africa during the 1970s and 80s. While the NP government completely exaggerated that the USSR
was determined to gain control of the country’s mineral resources and the Cape sea route, the
Soviets did not supply the most sophisticated weaponry to Angolans and Cubans without some
calculated possible outcomes to their advantage.
Like their western opponents, communist countries were seeking extensions of influence. In
ordering the SADF to plan for the defeat of SWAPOI, which until 1989 envisaged a totalitarian
African socialist Namibia, the Vorster and Botha governments, as tarnished as the were politically,
followed a predictable course of self-defence within the Cold War context.
SWAPO’s history demonstrates that it would not brook fair elections, agreeing only reluctantly to
the US brokered peace as the Cold War fell away and with it the future Angolan and Cuban support.
While Namibia was under UNO jurisdiction SWAPO forces tried (and failed) in a reckless military
incursion from Angola in April 1989; evidence of SWAPO’s default position being disrespect of
democratic processes and endorsement of the SADF’s original strategy to hit SWAPO hard inside
Angola.
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One could hardly have expected professional military officers like Malan, Viljoen or Geldenhuys to
have advised the NP government otherwise and the SADF conscripts were part of this historical
context.
Like their communist polish counterparts, the SADF certainly represented a government guilty of
human rights abuses, but then Angola, Mocambique and Cuba were not exactly societies to admire
either, for effectively the same reasons. Of course the old NP government were also utterly
expedient in their use of the SADF, from the ‘secret’ invasion of Angola in 1975 to their
deliberately keeping the SADF restricted in numbers and equipment during the Angolan battles of
1987-88. But it does not mean that SADF conscripts, who fought bravely against powerful odds,
now deserve hostility through government and media incitement.
Although there are books like J Thompson’s An Unpopular War which have generally portrayed all
aspects of former national service as negative, there is a much larger and continually growing
library containing more balanced accounts of SADF experiences,
some written by former conscripts, with others penned by former permanent force members and
military historians.
There is an increasing interest by former SADF members in veterans’ organisation, where former
conscripts now make up the majority of members. Just a quick perusal of the MOTH website will
demonstrate the interest in commemorations of fallen comrades from the 1970s and 1980s conflicts
in Namibia and Angola.
Numerous other associations exist representing different units or corps, while a multitude of
websites represent organisations created specifically for the veterans of Operation Savannah
(Angola 1975-1976), 61 Mechanised Battalion, paratroopers, special forces members and many
others. Together with a massive amount of archival material and collective memory, the ANC has
no chance of successfully erasing SADF history.
The ANC honours its MK veterans today and that is their right. But if we are genuinely to move
towards commonalities of nationhood and engendering respect across former conflict lines, it
achieves just the opposite when journalists enthusiastically toe the ANC line regarding portraying
everything about the old SADF and its members as bad.”
By Dr Rodney Warwick, PhD: Posted 20 July 2011
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