Authoritarianism guarantees nuclear war—short circuits deterrence
Holdorf, 10 [Polly Holdorf, graduate of the University of Denver’s Josef Korbel School of
International Studies, MA in International Security and a BA in International Studies, “Limited
Nuclear War in the 21st Century”, http://csis.org/files/publication/110916_Holdorf.pdf, Evan]
There are four specific objectives that nuclear-armed regional adversaries might seek to
achieve through the use of nuclear weapons.14 They might seek to deter the U nited
S tates from intervening in a conflict or projecting military power into the region by threatening escalation
. If the United States is not deterred by threats of escalation, the adversary might consider using its nuclear weapons to
limit or defeat U.S. military operations
. The adversary might seek to intimidate U.S. allies or friends within the region, or to split regional political coalitions apart. Certainly the adversary would attempt to limit U.S. objectives in the confrontation and try to dissuade the United States from seeking to impose regime change.
For authoritarian
or despotic
leaders, nuclear weapons may be seen as a means of survival
.
These
types of leaders may be preoccupied with
the survival not just of their regimes, but of their own personal survival
.
Regional adversaries
facing a confrontation with the United
States would know beyond any doubt that they faced an opponent with vastly superior military forces and resources
.
Adversarial leaders may not be prepared to face the disastrous consequences of a military defeat
, particularly one that would result in
their removal from power
. Such leaders may feel that their only hope for survival would be to attempt to stave off
, or at least delay, a defeat by employing a nuclear weapon
against U.S. forces. It is also possible that an adversary, knowing that it cannot and will not prevail, may wish to “go out with a bang”; or they may wish to be remembered as the leader who stood up to the U nited
S tates by utilizing nuclear weapons
.
A number of factors
exist that could serve as catalysts
for future nuclear use.
Latent conflicts within a regional setting could ignite and nuclear threats may be signaled
by one or both sides in order to influence the opposing states’ actions.
A nuclear state on the verge of losing a conventional war might employ its nuclear weapons in order to avert defeat
. Small nuclear states which harbor feelings of isolation (such as North
Korea) could perceive the actions of others as threatening and therefore be intimidated into employing nuclear weapons as a means to protect their interests.
Traditional
means of deterrence may not work the same way between small states
as they did with the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War.
Strategic discourse
between two small nuclear-armed states may be lacking, thus elevating the prospect for the collapse of deterrence at the regional level
.
Small nuclear states may have flawed or incomplete intelligence regarding their relative positions in a conflict
. A misperception
regarding an adversary’s intentions could compel a country to conduct a preemptive strike
on the opponent’s nuclear arsenal or conventional military forces. There is also the possibility that a small nuclear-armed state may have a deficient command and control structure, increasing the risk of an accidental or unauthorized nuclear launch
.15 The use of nuclear weapons in a regional setting could support
a range of objectives including coercion, war termination, regime preservation or even revenge
.16
Some states
could view
the use of nuclear weapons as
a means-of-lastresort, while others may view them as the only viable means to alter the status quo or to remedy a deteriorating regional security situation
.17 In some circumstances a state may view the use of nuclear weapons as the best
, or the “least bad,”18 option available
to them. The fear of regime change may be a compelling reason for a nuclear-armed regional adversary to consider employing nuclear weapons
during a conflict.
For leaders who are concerned about their ability to remain in power
in the event of a war with a superiorly armed adversary, nuclear weapons could be viewed as a valuable tool to have in their arsenal
. “
If
an attack by a U.S.-led coalition would pose a significant threat to your regime and your nation cannot afford conventional forces capable of deterring or defeating such an attack, you may regard nuclear weapons as the answer
.”19 One can be certain that the overthrow of the Taliban in 2001 and Saddam
Hussein in 2003 are still very fresh, particularly in the minds of the Iranian and North Korean regimes. These regimes are also aware that they have been identified as security threats to the United States.

Status quo solves and eco authoritarianism isn’t key
Micah, 10 [Micah White, The Guardian, “An alternative to the new wave of ecofascism”, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/cif-green/2010/sep/16/authoritarianismecofascism-alternative, 9-16-2010, Evan]
Environmentalism is currently marketed as a luxury brand for guilty consumers. The prevailing assumption is that a fundamental lifestyle change is unnecessary: being green means paying extra for organic produce and driving a hybrid. The incumbent political regime remains in power and the same corporations provide new "green" goods; the underlying consumerist ideology is unquestioned. This brand of environmentalism only emboldens ecofascists who rightly claim that shopping green can never stop the ecological crisis. And yet, ecofascists are wrong to suggest that the suspension of democracy is the only alternative
.
Humanity can avert climate catastrophe without accepting ecological tyranny
. However, this will take an immediate, drastic reduction of our consumption. This requires the trust that the majority of people would voluntarily reduce their standard of living once the forces that induce consumerism are overcome
.
The future of environmentalism is in liberating humanity from the compulsion to consume
. Rampant, earth-destroying consumption is the norm in the west
largely because our imaginations are pillaged by any corporation with an advertising budget
. From birth, we are assaulted by thousands of commercial messages each day whose single mantra is
"buy".
Silencing this refrain is the revolutionary alternative to ecological fascism
. It is a revolution which is already budding and is marked by three synergetic campaigns: the criminalisation of advertising, the revocation of corporate power and the downshifting of the global economy
.
In
São Paulo
, the seventh largest city in the world, outdoor advertising has been banned
. Meanwhile, artists
in New
York City and Toronto are launching blitzkrieg attacks on billboards, replacing commercials with art
.
Their efforts have put one visual polluter out of business.
Grassroots organisers
in the US are pushing for an amendment to the constitution that will end corporate personhood while others are fighting to revive the possibility of death penalties for corporations
.
The second international conference on degrowth economics met recently
in Barcelona. In Ithaca, New York a local, time-based currency is thriving. Buy
Nothing Day campaign is celebrated in dozens of nations and now
Adbusters is upping the ante with a call for seven days of carnivalesque rebellion against consumerism
this November. And, most important of all, across the world everyday people are silently, unceremoniously and intentionally spending less and living more
.
Authoritarian environmentalists fail to imagine a world without
advertising, so they dream of putting democracy "on hold"
. In Linkola's dystopian vision, the resources of the state are mobilised to clamp down on individual liberty. But there is no need to suspend democracy if it is returned to the people
.
Democratic, anti-fascist environmentalism means marshalling the strength of humanity to suppress corporations. Only by silencing the consumerist forces will both climate catastrophe and ecological tyranny be averted
. Yes, western consumption will be substantially reduced
. But it will be done voluntarily and joyously
.

No link—there’s no forced choice between authoritarian and democratic practices—they can be combined
Blühdorn, 12 [Dr Ingolfur Blühdorn, Reader in Politics/Political Sociology at the University of
Bath, his work combines aspects of sociological theory, political theory, environmental sociology and environmental policy analysis, “Democracy and Sustainability: Opening the discursive arena – Struggling for an innovative debate”, http://www.fessustainability.org/en/nachhaltigkeit-und-demokratie/democracy-and-sustainability, 13th
December 2012, Evan]
Common questions which, in addition to the ones cited at the beginning of this essay, figure prominently in the current debate include: How does the eco-political performance of democratic systems compare to that of authoritarian systems? Will our democratic systems collapse under the pressure of the environmental crisis? May the achievement of sustainability necessitate a change of political regime? Like those cited earlier, these questions make a range of implicit assumptions which are themselves not subjected to any critical enquiry
.
They pre-structure the debate in ways that
, from the outset, preclude certain lines of investigation
. For example, such questions
, in a simplifying and generalising manner, juxtapose democratic and authoritarian systems
. However, given that both democratic and autocratic systems come in a large variety of shapes and that
, furthermore, contemporary democracies are
, as outlined above, rapidly acquiring expertocratic-authoritarian features, while authoritarian systems like China are experimenting with strategies of decentralisation and local empowerment, such a simplistic binary distinction is manifestly
unhelpful – if not outright ideological
.
It ignores factual political developments and instead focuses public attention on a hypothetical alternative
. In fact, if there is any truth in the diagnosis of a post-political condition, democratic and autocratic modes of government might find themselves located on the same side of the new cleavage between
the political formulation and implementation of competing visions of societal
organisation and development and the purely managerial execution of systemic imperatives which are non-negotiable, self-legitimizing and allow for no alternative
. In any case, the alleged choice between democratic and authoritarian policy approaches does not occur
in practical day-to-day politics. And given that in eco-political matters democratic and autocratic forms of government both have a frighteningly poor performance record, ecologists may feel they are being offered the choice between a rock and a hard place.

Their ideology of a “fixed choice” between democratic and authoritarian action makes action to confront the problem impossible
Blühdorn, 12 [Dr Ingolfur Blühdorn, Reader in Politics/Political Sociology at the University of
Bath, his work combines aspects of sociological theory, political theory, environmental sociology and environmental policy analysis, “Democracy and Sustainability: Opening the discursive arena – Struggling for an innovative debate”, http://www.fessustainability.org/en/nachhaltigkeit-und-demokratie/democracy-and-sustainability, 13th
December 2012, Evan]
Closely related is that the leadquestions which frame the contemporary debate on democracy and sustainability
implicitly suggest that we know what sustainability actually means and what targets need to be achieved
, and only need to decide about the most appropriate political means for getting there.
Yet
, as the concept does not provide any specification of exactly what is to be sustained
, at which level, for what reason, and for how long, the meaning of sustainability has so far remained as intangible as the beauty of nature, the intrinsic value of nature or any other entity that environmentalists have placed at the centre of their concern and political efforts. Beyond this, the focus of attention on the means, i.e. the How?, entirely eclipses the question of Whether?.
Indeed, the current debates about democracy and sustainability notoriously claim that categorical ecological imperatives will render a transition towards sustainability inescapable and that in one way
(democratic) or another
(authoritarian), sustainability will have to be achieved
.
Time and again, reference is being made to supposedly objective
bio-physical limits or tipping-points which
purportedly make the transition towards sustainability inevitable, because transcending these limits would trigger ecological collapse and put the survival of the human species under threat
. Undoubtedly, natural resources are finite, bio-physical limits do exist, and the sustainability crisis does render responsive action inescapable. Yet, the one-dimensional fixation on the alleged choice between democratic versus authoritarian pathways towards sustainability obstructs the view of what for the foreseeable future is the most likely scenario: sustained unsustainability
.
That turns solvency—rejecting this conception is key to engendering solutions
Blühdorn, 12 [Dr Ingolfur Blühdorn, Reader in Politics/Political Sociology at the University of
Bath, his work combines aspects of sociological theory, political theory, environmental sociology and environmental policy analysis, “Democracy and Sustainability: Opening the discursive arena – Struggling for an innovative debate”, http://www.fessustainability.org/en/nachhaltigkeit-und-demokratie/democracy-and-sustainability, 13th
December 2012, Evan]
For the new debate on democracy and sustainability all this represents a most challenging task. The questions which have framed this debate
so far contribute little to tackling this agenda
. With their implicit assumptions and normative commitments
they obstruct rather than facilitate a realistic analysis and constructive discussion
.
They cultivate notions of democracy and autocracy which are largely unrelated to socio-political reality
.
They contribute to the construction
and maintenance of societal self-descriptions which reassure us of our profound democratic and ecological commitment
.
They mobilise for the defence of democracy and against the threat of ecoauthoritarianism without ever realising to what extent
the prevalent understandings of democracy have emancipated
themselves from the egalitarian-progressive agenda, and to what extent
the spectre of eco-dictatorship is really just a tool in the campaign for sustained unsustainability
. Therefore, the
first objective for a new debate on democracy and sustainability must be to break away from these established patterns of discourse
. The assumptions and normative commitments which have framed and constrained the debate so far need to be subject to

radical scrutiny
.
This will open up the discursive arena and create space for genuinely innovative and constructive thinking
. Given that this debate concerns the very foundations of the established societal consensus, we must not expect it to deliver quick answers and easy solutions. Indeed the demand for quick fixes will most reliably choke the debate before it gets going.
The hope that
a few institutional reforms might turn contemporary democracies into ecocracies is
just as unfounded
as the belief in an expertocratic-authoritarian pathway to sustainability. But this only re-emphasises the need to open the discursive agenda and struggle for a genuinely innovative debate.

Authoritarians hate the environment—statistical evidence proves
Reese, 12 [Gerhard Reese, Friedrich Schiller University, “When Authoritarians Protect the
Earth—Authoritarian Submission and Proenvironmental Beliefs: A Pilot Study in Germany”,
Ecopsychology, September 2012, 4(3): 232-236, doi:10.1089/eco.2012.0035
In the environmental realm, previous research
by Schultz and Stone (1994) suggested that authoritarianism and proenvironmental beliefs are negatively correlated: the more authoritarian one is, the less concern one demonstrates about the environment
. These authors argued that the main reason for this finding is grounded in authoritarians’ belief that community, politicians, and business leaders are immersed in the dominant paradigm that economic growth has a higher value than environmental protection
.
Across two studies, Schultz and Stone found a substantial, negative relation between authoritarianism and proenvironmental beliefs
(rs= -.51 and - .54). In a similar vein,
Peterson and colleagues (1993, Study 2) showed that authoritarians were more hostile toward the environmental movement than less authoritarian individuals
. In fact, authoritarians were more positive toward polluters compared with people supporting the environmental movement
.
Subsequent researchers also suggested that higher levels of
rightwing authoritarianism predicted weaker proenvironmental beliefs
(e.g., Sabbagh, 2005).
Taken together, such findings suggest that an authoritarian
personality or belief system
1 is
rather undesirable when it comes to the protection of our environment
. Yet, as will be argued in the following, the relation between right-wing authoritarianism and proenvironmental beliefs requires a more fine-grained analysis. Precisely, it is suggested that above all, the subconstruct
‘‘authoritarian submission’’ should relate to stronger proenvironmental beliefs.

No chance of an eco-authoritarian shift—democracy will adapt and coopt the alternative
Blühdorn, 12 [Dr Ingolfur Blühdorn, Reader in Politics/Political Sociology at the University of
Bath, his work combines aspects of sociological theory, political theory, environmental sociology and environmental policy analysis, “Democracy and Sustainability: Opening the discursive arena – Struggling for an innovative debate”, http://www.fessustainability.org/en/nachhaltigkeit-und-demokratie/democracy-and-sustainability, 13th
December 2012, Evan]
The highly sensitive, and politically inconvenient, question that a more differentiated and constructive debate on the relationship between democracy and sustainability will need to ask is exactly what role democracy
plays in this scenario of sustained unsustainability
. This necessitates a shift away from the currently prevalent
, but rather unhelpful, normative statements about what democracy and eco-politics ought to
look like and achieve
Instead, descriptive-analytical accounts are required of what democracy and eco-politics in contemporary consumer societies factually do look like. As regards the condition of democracy, such descriptive-analytical accounts will acknowledge, firstly, that
. today prevalent understandings of democracy have evolved well beyond the ideals in which the emancipatory social movements had still firmly believed
. From the perspective of contemporary society these ideals of authentic democracy have become too cumbersome, inflexible, demanding and restrictive. Secondly, such descriptiveanalytical accounts will recognize that democracy is not nearly as frail and vulnerable as the warnings about the threat posed to it by the sustainability crisis suggest
. In fact democracy is, and has always been, highly adaptable to changing societal conditions, and it also has strong and reliable allies – who are well aware that democracy is the best possible political shell for consumer capitalism
. And thirdly, an academically
rather than mainly politically committed perspective on the relationship between democracy and sustainability will
also be more perceptive of the fact that the defence of democracy can actually become reactionary
: it does so when it fails to take account of the degree to which contemporary notions of democracy have actually emancipated themselves from the progressive, egalitarian project and have instead turned democracy into an essential tool for defending and legitimating personal lifestyles and societal structures which are predicated on ever rising levels of social inequality and on the continued degradation of the natural environment.

Authoritarianism can’t solve the environment—their China example is wrong
Niemeyer, 13 [Simon Niemeyer, PhD at the Australian National University, Australian
Research Council (ARC) Future Fellow whose research covers the broad fields of deliberative democracy and environmental governance, particularly in respect to climate change,
“Democracy and Climate Change: What Can Deliberative Democracy Contribute?” Australian
Journal of Politics and History: Volume 59, Number 3, 2013, pp.429-448, Evan]
While democracy is uncertain and, in many cases, frustrating for those seeking decisive action, it is arguable that authoritarianism provides a poor foundation for motivating and coordinating collective action in order to meet ecological imperatives
. As Dryzek argues, in theoretical terms, authoritarian approaches to governance fail to adequately coordinate inputs within the socio-environmental system to respond to environmental challenges
.17
This also appears to be the case in practice.
The Chinese response to climate change is not driven by public demand, and the level of support is irrelevant in any case
. Indeed, consideration of climate change per se does not appear to be most relevant.
The push to reduce emissions intensity appears to be driven by economic, rather than
environmental imperatives
. Costs can be reduced where there is currently a good deal of “low hanging fruit” in industries with low energy efficiency and high greenhouse gas intensity.18
This form of ecological modernisation suits a developmentalist agenda, but more difficult choices will ultimately need to be made if greenhouse emissions are to be kept below dangerous levels
. Of course, the lack of responsiveness to the public sphere is the point of the authoritarians, who wish to side-step an unreliable public will. But my argument here is that political elites are actually less likely to support environmental causes on their own terms, not least because the “logic” of the state is skewed toward the functions of accumulation, even before we take into account the effect of lobbying by well-resourced interests
. It is no accident that the environmental movement first gained momentum
not within the machinery of government, but within civil society. It remains the legitimacy function and responsiveness to the public sphere that holds the key to action on climate change
.19 Moreover, authoritarianism does not appear
to work on its own terms
. If we scratch the surface, the observation that Asia is inclined toward authoritarianism is less than straightforward. China
, for example, is
manifestly authoritarian at the national level
.20
However, when we move to regional and local governance the picture is more nuanced. Local elections are increasingly occurring at village level, along with experimentation with deliberative methods
such as deliberative polls.21 Baogang He and Mark Warren argue that even at the national level there is an increasing recognition of the limits of authoritarianism
in governing complex social systems (to which I would add the ecological dimension).
The result is a transition toward “authoritarian deliberation”, which potentially marks a turning point toward greater democracy
.22 However, the main task here is not to rebut the advantages of authoritarianism, but to build an argument in favour of democracy. In theory, a democracy
is supposed to produce better environmental outcomes to the extent that it is inclusive (of all concerns, including those related to the environment)
.23 But on the other hand there is a critique in the literature cited above that, in practice, citizens as political agents fail to adequately synthesise complex information about climate change and translate this into demand for action. In addition democracies are supposed to be more responsive, with built-in accountability and sensitivity to legitimacy, ensuring that the system responds to environmental concern. But in practice democratic systems often fail to adequately realize and translate demand for action on climate change into working policy. I argue below that a remedy to the situation is a not a turn away from democracy, but toward a more deliberative approach
.
All of their offense assumes the ineffective democracy of the status quo—a shift to more participative and deliberative democracy solves—empirics prove
Niemeyer, 13 [Simon Niemeyer, PhD at the Australian National University, Australian
Research Council (ARC) Future Fellow whose research covers the broad fields of deliberative democracy and environmental governance, particularly in respect to climate change,

“Democracy and Climate Change: What Can Deliberative Democracy Contribute?” Australian
Journal of Politics and History: Volume 59, Number 3, 2013, pp. 429-448, Evan]
It is notable that the features of democracies that are supposed to be beneficial to the environment
( inclusiveness and responsiveness
) cited above correspond closely to the features of a deliberative system
attributed to Dryzek in the introduction (inclusivity and consequentiality).24 To these dimensions, deliberative democracy adds “deliberativeness” to a democratic system
.25 And it is this deliberative dimension that holds the key to realising the full potential of democratic systems to respond the environmental challenges
. There is a good deal of support for the argument that engaging citizens in deliberation produces improved environmental outcomes
. This is because deliberation can consider the interests of non-human agents to the extent that they can be represented via arguments used by interlocutors in favour of those interests
. To this extent, deliberation has the capacity to make salient the environmental dimensions of issues. It also has the potential to attune citizens to the complexities
.26 Ideally, deliberation produces reflection by citizens
of the kind that Shearman and Smith prize in advocating rule by eco-elites and avoids Giddens’ paradox, such that citizens come to reflect on the issue with a view to the long-term
. This effect is very different to the idea of nudge theory, which involves the use of social marketing and behavioural economics to “nudge” behaviour without inducing reflection.27
Deliberation
, on the other hand involves a far more conscious process, which
, arguably, results in far deeper and more enduring solutions
.28 Thus, on the face of it, deliberative democracy holds the potential to assuage democratic sceptics insofar as deliberation involves careful reflection by citizens regarding the course of action that they want implemented
. But is the citizenphilosopher, who openly reflects on the implications of climate change, a realistic prospect in light of the evidence? There are two related questions here. The first concerns whether it is possible for at least some proportion of the citizen population to engage in deliberation, and the boundary contours of this group. The second concerns whether it is possible to improve the “deliberative competence” of the population as a whole, and to what extent “scaling up” deliberation is possible. In terms of the first question, there is evidence to suggest that thoroughgoing deliberation including ordinary citizens is relatively rare.29 However, this is not to say that citizens are simply incapable of behaving deliberatively — engaging with alternative arguments with an open mind.30 It seems that the settings in which political discussion is conducted and the norms operating within the group play an important role in shaping the behaviour of interlocutors
, and in turn their ability to deal with complex issues
.31 By contrast, when researchers produce findings against the possibility of deliberation the results are often obtained in settings that are not actually designed to be deliberative, in some cases stretching the concept considerably
.32 The same also appears to apply to citizens’ willingness to participate in political deliberation, where the prevailing democratic experience plays an important role in motivating citizens
33 — a point to which I return to later in relation to the question of scaling up deliberation. The challenge, then, is finding settings in which the ideals of deliberative behaviour can be achieved.
One type of forum that is explicitly designed to be deliberative is the example of “mini-publics”, which are the most practical expression of deliberative democracy to date
.34
They have provided the test bed for
much of the empirical research involving authentic citizen deliberation
.35
Mini-publics typically involve
the random selection of citizens to participate in a forum
that is (ideally) held over multiple days, where discussion is facilitated to achieve the ideals of deliberation and information is provided, usually in the form of expert presentation
. Thus, mini-publics provide a window into the possibilities for achieving citizen deliberation, which
, in theory at least, improves the prospect of increasing the demand for action on environmental issues such as climate change by making salient those dimensions that are otherwise crowded out by more tangible and immediate concerns
. In the following section I draw on an example of a mini-public involving members of the Australian public in the
Australian Capital Region to demonstrate these possibilities, before moving to consider whether it is possible to scale up these affects to the polity as a whole.
Deliberative democracy is uniquely key and solves all their offense
Niemeyer, 13 [Simon Niemeyer, PhD at the Australian National University, Australian
Research Council (ARC) Future Fellow whose research covers the broad fields of deliberative democracy and environmental governance, particularly in respect to climate change,
“Democracy and Climate Change: What Can Deliberative Democracy Contribute?” Australian
Journal of Politics and History: Volume 59, Number 3, 2013, pp. 429-448, Evan]

What was the main impact of deliberation? Most importantly, relating to the concerns raised in relation to democracy and climate change at the beginning of this paper, deliberation served to clear the way for focus on more substantive issues and improved the ability of citizens to better deal with the kind of complexity associated with climate change
. This occurred because, for most participants, the deliberative setting not only provided the environment in which information can be acquired, it also provided the incentive structure to engage with that information
.55
The result is a shift from the “primitive” citizen, or
— more charitably — a “cognitive miser”, who is prone to drawing conclusions based on intuitive modes of thinking
(referred to as system I or “peripheral processing) toward deeper forms of cognition
(system II or “cognitive processing”).56 The level of cognition displayed by everyday citizens in deliberative contexts might not achieve the same standard sought by Shearman and Smith, but it is clearly possible to raise the bar in their assessment of complex issues such as climate change
.57 Deliberation does not fundamentally change the citizen; they still have roughly the same set of capabilities after as before.58 The value set of citizens is also roughly the same, although certain values, such a concern for the environment have become activated as part of the process.59
What the deliberative context did was to engender a set of capabilities that are possible, but not otherwise brought to bear on every day politics
. But deliberation did much more than improve appreciation for the climate change issue. It helped to change the conditions under which the issue could be governed and the expectations of citizens in a democratic system
. Among many participants, the climate change issue transformed from being a problem for a distrusted government to address, to an issue for the community to address, with government partnership with citizens
. In other words, deliberation enhanced the tendency to view
the issue of climate change through the lens of collective identity in solving a common-good problem
.60
It shifted emphasis away from
elected representatives and a failure of politics toward individual responsibility for the issue — not only seeking to understand it, but also to contribute to collective outcomes, both directly
in form of action on climate change, and indirectly
, via improved levels of political efficacy.61 Moreover, for participants in deliberation, these effects
on political efficacy and civic-mindedness appear to be enduring
.62 Thus, it is just possible that a polity that is more deliberative not only responds to climate change more constructively
, in ways that reflect the inner desires of its citizens; it may also be able to recreate the conditions required for proper democratic functioning
. And in doing so, it may help to avert the reflex
of some to favour more authoritarian
modes of governance
, or forms of liberal paternalism (such as nudge theory) in the face of climate change
.

The best social science evidence proves our arguments
***this evidence outlines the methodology and procedure of an experiment conducted to demonstrate the effect of deliberative democracy on climate change opinions, and showed a statistically significant increase in groups that participated in deliberation.
Niemeyer, 13 [Simon Niemeyer, PhD at the Australian National University, Australian
Research Council (ARC) Future Fellow whose research covers the broad fields of deliberative democracy and environmental governance, particularly in respect to climate change,
“Democracy and Climate Change: What Can Deliberative Democracy Contribute?” Australian
Journal of Politics and History: Volume 59, Number 3, 2013, pp. 429-448, Evan]
A series of citizens’ deliberative forums were conducted as part of the Australian Research
Council
-funded
Climate Change and the Public Sphere project
on the question of climate change and adaptation in the local regions of Canberra (Australian Capital Territory) and Goulburn (New South Wales). The research involved comparing the effect of exposing participants to a series of climate change scenarios ranging from no change in climate to changes anticipated under “business as usual” resulting in a high level of greenhouse emissions
. T hese responses where then compared to
the positions that emerged among
a subset of participants involved in a three day deliberative mini-public
. The approach used in the project is outlined in Figure 2. It shows the key components of the research design, split into three phases that spanned
2008 to 2010.
The first phase involved the development of three climate change scenarios
(baseline, covering the years 1970 to 2000; medium; and high emissions) and the impact on the region
inclusive of Australian
Capital Territory (ACT: Canberra) and the Goulburn- Mulwaree district (Goulburn).36
The medium and high emissions scenarios included two different emission trajectories based on a “medium” level of emissions
(equivalent to the International Panel on Climate Change, Special Report on Emissions Scenarios, SRES scenario A1B, which approximates a moderate level of greenhouse emission abatement) and a “high” level of emissions
(SRES A1FI, which approximately tracks “business as usual”) in the years 2050 and 2100
. The impacts on various climate parameters for the medium and high emissions scenarios were then produced for the 2050 and 2100 time slices.
The scenarios that were presented to participants covered a range of climatic variables relating to temperature, rainfall, growing range for key species and “climatic domain representation”
involving a visualisation of how the climate would “migrate”. The scenarios were in presentation form using multimedia technology. In most cases the information was presented in map form, otherwise as graphs or bullet points. The changes to scenario parameters in map, graphical and schematic form were animated between the time slices to highlight the changes that were occurring over time.37 In phase two, interviews were conducted with 103 individuals. During the interviews the three scenarios were presented to participants, who were encouraged to imagine that they were living under the conditions described by the scenarios
. At the conclusion of each scenario presentation, participants were interviewed about how they might feel under that scenario and respond to the impacts
.
They also performed
a series of surveys
, where the condition of instruction was to respond as if they were living under the conditions depicted by that scenario
.
The first survey concerned the broad policy response that they would prefer to see implemented
, in conjunction with a question regarding their willingness to pay (via taxation) to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
The second survey involved responding to a series of statements drawn from public debate about climate change from various media and interview sources
. In the third and final stage of the study, a sub-sample of the participants
from stage two were selected to participate in one of two treatments
.
The first involved participation in a three-day intensive deliberative forum, involving three days of evidence gathering and deliberation “proper” to develop policy recommendations (n=35)
.
A further twenty participants
did not participate in the deliberative event, but were individually interviewed three months after the phase two interviews in respect to their longer term response to exposure to the information provided in the scenarios
.
The conditions for deliberation were created by careful facilitation, which was designed to first build a “deliberative norm” within the group, where participants ideally came to identify with the need to collectively consider the merits of different arguments in relation to climate change

and adaptation
.38 Once participants were familiar with and accepted (in most cases, see below) the conditions under which discussion would proceed, the process moved to the information stage involving expert presentations and group discussion about the information provided, where small groups developed and coordinated follow up questions.39 This process was very nearly derailed due to a small number of individuals at different extremes of the climate change debate refusing to accept the norms of deliberation, in some cases behaving to disrupt the process — and in one case this was a deliberate strategy. It turned out that the deepest of climate sceptics in particular were very unwilling to reflect on their positions,40 although deep alarmists also behaved problematically from a deliberative perspective. But the process still maintained an overall deliberative flavour. Non-deliberative behaviour — using information selectively and behaving aggressively and without respect — was regulated among participants by the group itself, a strong majority of whom accepted and policed the norms of deliberation, as well as by the facilitator. In the end, two deep sceptics left the process: one because of the failure to shape the process, the second for more negative reasons pertaining to protracted argument with a deep alarmist — who did himself eventually agree to participate according to deliberative norms. On the final day, participants used their accumulated knowledge to develop recommendations that would address their primary concern in relation to climate change
.41 Not surprisingly, the climate change scenarios had a significant effect on participants
, although it tended not to last beyond the interview process.
Ea ch scenario resulted in increased preference for decisive action on climate change: with the high emissions scenario yielding a stronger result compared to the medium scenario
.42
This was also reflected in the willingness to pay
(WTP) monthly to reduce greenhouse emissions
. The data is shown in Table 1.
Deliberation also had an effect on preference s. Table 1 shows an appreciable increase in
WTP between baseline and post-deliberation, although it is not statistically significant
given the relatively small numbers. Nevertheless, the level of change in WTP is comparable to that which individuals nominated under the
Medium Emissions Scenario (where they were asked to imagine that they were actually living under those conditions). Moreover, follow-up discussions with participants suggested that these preferences were more enduring than those individuals who were only exposed to the scenarios
.43

Deliberative democracy is feasible—they overlook transformative moments and leadership which can overcome opposition
Niemeyer, 13 [Simon Niemeyer, PhD at the Australian National University, Australian
Research Council (ARC) Future Fellow whose research covers the broad fields of deliberative democracy and environmental governance, particularly in respect to climate change,
“Democracy and Climate Change: What Can Deliberative Democracy Contribute?” Australian
Journal of Politics and History: Volume 59, Number 3, 2013, pp. 429-448, Evan]
Certainly the challenge is
considerable, but not insurmountable
.
When considering the possibilities for deliberative democracy
and the role of mini-publics in a deliberative system, it is important to consider the role of transformative moments in politics
.
One important, and often neglected, dimension is that of leadership
.83 For example, Julia Jennstål analyses the deliberative relationship
that was permitted by the
fortuitous combination of personalities at the head of negotiations that led to the fall of Apartheid in South Africa
.84 Jonathan Kuyper recognises the leadership role of Julia Gillard in proposal the
Climate Change Citizens’ Assembly, in the lead-up to the 2010 election. However, it was also a perceived failure of leadership on climate change policy in the lead-up to the proposal
that contributed to
its demise
.85
A more consistent role for leadership in providing legitimacy for, and coherence in the application of, deliberative mini-publics might permit them to properly play a role in shaping the public discussion
.86
We don’t need to win full scale-up—just encouraging a culture of deliberative
democracy is key
Niemeyer, 13 [Simon Niemeyer, PhD at the Australian National University, Australian
Research Council (ARC) Future Fellow whose research covers the broad fields of deliberative democracy and environmental governance, particularly in respect to climate change,
“Democracy and Climate Change: What Can Deliberative Democracy Contribute?” Australian
Journal of Politics and History: Volume 59, Number 3, 2013, pp. 429-448, Evan]
It simply is not possible to simulate the workings of a deliberative mini-public in ways that involve everyone affected by a decision deliberating together. For Goodin the solution is to encourage greater internal reflection within a deliberative system by individuals
. 64 But this is not straightforward. Exposure to the climate change scenarios in the
ACR case study above certainly failed to induce deep reflection. It may be that deliberation properly takes place in groups for a reason — we are simply hard-wired to deliberate via discussion
.65
Deliberation by individuals is indeed possible (via internal discussion) even desirable
. But it is harder to achieve. And it may not be reasonable to expect citizens to devote the cognitive resources to deliberate deeply on every political issue that they encounter. Even the most diligent citizen cannot exhaustively consider every facet of every issue.66 As Claus Offe points out, there is an opportunity cost for the effort applied.67 Moreover, there is a strong question mark concerning how easy is to achieve deliberative modes of behaviour in anything but very specific settings.68 However, improving environmental outcomes may not require achieving ideal deliberation in all sites in the public sphere
, as much as developing the capacity to avoid the distortion of public opinion by entrenched interests.69
Achieving this
likely involves the steady building of deliberative capacity and development of deliberative cultures that are inured to the blandishments of elites making claims counter to the public interest
.70