Business Case and Intervention Summary
Intervention Summary
Title:
Agri-Tech Catalyst: Supporting Agricultural Innovation for International
Development
What support will the UK provide?
DFID will provide £10 million over five years to support a Catalyst fund which will support the
development and deployment of new agriculture technology in developing countries. The Agri-Tech
Catalyst will offer funding to innovative small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) and researchers
looking to work either individually or in collaboration to develop solutions to the global agriculture and
the food system. The Catalyst will accept innovative ideas from any sector or discipline that can
demonstrate the potential to provide significant positive development impact.
DFID funding to the Catalyst will leverage private sector innovation and financing to improve food
security for farmers in Africa by tackling two of the biggest challenges facing the food and agriculture
sector in developing countries; agricultural innovation and post-harvest loss. The Catalyst will generate
and test novel methods of translating world-leading UK agricultural research into development results
in developing countries. Private sector funding will match government funds. DFID funding will be
used to generate high quality evidence on the effectiveness of catalytic finance in supporting novel
methods to increase the pace and scale of translation of innovations for agricultural innovation and
reduced post-harvest losses.
This will form part of a larger UK effort to address translational gaps in the development of new
technology set out in the UK Agriculture Technology Strategy to be launched by Government on 22
July 2013. DEFRA and BIS are contributing substantially to develop a Catalyst for the UK agriculture
sector. DFID will align with this effort by running a development Catalyst in which funds will be
restricted to technology directly relevant to developing countries and held separately for this purpose.
Why is UK support required?
Big picture on food security
Ensuring that the global population can be fed sustainably and equitably is an unprecedented
challenge that will require the global food system to change more radically in the coming decades than
ever before, including during the Green Revolution. Meeting the challenges posed by land and water
scarcity, climate change, and declining crop yields will need another giant leap in agricultural
innovation to bring about sustainable intensification, producing more food with fewer inputs, and
wasting less which in turn will require more effective agricultural research investments1.
Delivering this giant leap will require new approaches to developing technologies and to getting them
into the hands of farmers, including innovative funding mechanisms. The scale of the challenges to
agricultural innovation necessitates more rapid adoption of research outputs than has been the case to
date. In many developing countries, private sector investment and slow technological innovation are
1
UK Government Office for Science, Global Food and Farming Futures Foresight project, 2011
1
limited by two major market inefficiencies gaps, often referred to as “valley[s] of death,” that impede the
translation of technological opportunities, often leading to the demise of technologies and companies
that are unable to overcome these gaps. Addressing these financing gaps can be a useful
complement to conventional “push mechanisms,” where donors provide funding to increase the supply
of research and development (R&D).
Agricultural research for hunger and poverty reduction is a prime example of a Global Public Good
(GPG) which, in common with most public investments, suffers from under-funding2. Developing
countries as a group invested just 0.54% of their agricultural GDP in agricultural R&D in 2008
compared to 3.07% in developed countries and although funding has increased over the past decade,
spending still lags far behind OECD spending3 In 2005, 2% of total global investment in agricultural
research was attributable to private sector investment in low and middle income countries4. The
investment required to meet global food needs cannot be wholly sustained by the public sector.
Private sector support is also required both to close the investment gap, and to help develop new
commercial models for agricultural innovation.
There is evidence of strong complimentarity (rather than crowding out) between public and private R&D
in agriculture, with an extensive review of the evidence in this area for Defra suggesting that a 1%
increase in public R&D leads to a 1.6% increase in registration of domestic patents (a key measure of
private research activity)5. The study suggests that the returns to public agricultural R&D spending in
the UK are of the order 17-60%6 per year over a lifetime of around 30 years. The evidence of
complimentarity cited above suggests that support for translational research would link up the UK’s
existing basic research infrastructure with the commercial needs of international and UK private sector
companies to develop new innovations that address the challenges of agricultural innovation and
reducing post-harvest loss.
New agricultural technology for Africa
The agricultural technology sector refers to primary production and the scientific and technical
development activities that underpin the agricultural sector. It covers a diverse range of activities
including the agriculture industry itself (primary production i.e farming for both food and non-food uses)
but also topics such as soil science, crop and livestock genetics and agri-chemicals. Examples of past
successes in agricultural innovation include the development of livestock vaccines through DFID the
DFID funded GALVmed7 programme and the African Agricultural Technology Fund8 which delivers
crop technology into the hands of farmers.
The overall impact of the uptake and application of agriculture research outside Africa is impressive.9 10
In Africa the situation has historically been substantially different. Analysis of the impact of investments
in international research demonstrates the significantly lower figure for SSA in comparison to other
geographical regions.11 In 2000 only 17% of the maize harvested in Africa was planted with modern,
high yielding varieties. The equivalent figure for south and south-east Asia and the Pacific was 90%12.
2
World Development Report 2008
ASTI Global Assessment of Agricultural R&D Spending. ASTI-CGIAR 2012.
4 Beintema and Elliot, 2009. Setting meaningful investment targets In agricultural research and
development
5 This is an internal rate of return. Source:
http://archive.defra.gov.uk/evidence/economics/foodfarm/reports/documents/ProdRep.pdf
6 http://archive.defra.gov.uk/evidence/economics/foodfarm/reports/documents/ProdRep.pdf
7 www.galvned.org
8 www.aatf-africa.org
9 Renkow and Byerlee 2010. The impacts of CGIAR research: A review of recent evidence
10 Evanson 2003
11 Raitzer and Kelley 2008. Benefit-cost meta-analysis of investment in the International Agricultural
Research Centers of the CGIAR
12 Golden et al 2005.
3
2
Reviews of the impact of crop genetic improvement in Africa show considerably less impact than in
South Asia. 88% of the yield growth in crop agriculture in South Asia between 1965 and 1998 was
attributable to crop genetic improvement; however the comparable figure for Africa is 28%13.
A recent analysis14 by the Australian Government assessed the net present value of Consultative
Group in International Agricultural Research rice research in three countries in South East Asia over 20
years as $97bn with a benefit:cost ratio of 21.7. However, the transformation of the agriculture sector
which characterised rapid growth in Asia has not taken place in many countries in Africa, and although
the picture is far from universal, the slow pace of technological innovation by small-holders in many
regions is a critical constraint to productivity gains and to economic growth and poverty reduction.
Bringing about sustainable intensification and overcoming the barriers to adoption requires an
understanding of the social, economic and institutional constraints which hinder innovation.
Losses due to poor post-harvest practices
The nutrition impacts of global food harvests are radically reduced by poor post-harvest practices that
affect the quantity, quality and safety of the food that is available for consumption. Post-harvest loss
also impacts the value and economic returns to farming as well as reducing food security and food
supply and driving up food prices. The significance of these different forms of loss is illustrated below:
1. FOOD LOST - The UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) calculates that 30 per cent of
global food harvests are lost, equivalent to 1.3 billion tons of food15. While these are estimates,
their magnitude is undeniable, and the value of annual postharvest losses of cereal grains, roots
and tuber crops, fruits and vegetables, meat, milk and fish for Africa alone have been valued at
more than US$ 48 billion (FAO/AfDB 2009).
2. UNSAFE FOOD – Contamination of food in the value chain risks undermining the gains made
through increased production and increased accessibility of nutritious food by leaving the poorest
and most vulnerable exposed to a range of food borne diseases. These can have serious short and
long terms health impact affecting particularly those with the least ability to buy safe food. Safe
food is defined as food free of hazardous biological (such as virus, bacteria, toxins, parasites,
prions), chemical (such as contaminants, pesticides and drugs residues) and physical (foreign
bodies) agents.
In developed economies, such as the UK, more-efficient farming practices and better transport, storage
and processing facilities ensure that a larger proportion of food produced reaches markets. Significant
losses are associated with consumer culture, market incentives and customer behaviour. This
situation reflects the success of the UK agriculture and food sector in reducing post-harvest losses
through technical innovation.
In sub-Saharan Africa post-harvest loss occurs primarily in production and transport, where inefficient
harvesting, poor local transport and inappropriate handling and storage under unsuitable conditions16
are responsible for the vast majority of food loss (Figure below).
13
Renkow and Byerlee 2010. The impacts of CGIAR research: A review of recent evidence
ACIAR 2011. International Rice Research Institute’s contribution to rice varietal yield improvement
in South-East Asia.
15 FAO 2011, Global Food Losses and Food Waste.
16 FAO 2011, Global Food Losses and Food Waste.
14
3
Given that many smallholder farmers in developing countries live on the margins of food insecurity, a
reduction in food losses could have an immediate and significant impact on their livelihoods. The
development of better products more suited to African demand for new post-harvest technology and
the application of effective and innovative new ways of getting the right technology to farmers and other
uses at a price they can afford is a priority?
Translational issue
Recent Government and independent reports171819 recognised the UK’s highly competitive position in
world-class fundamental research, including agricultural sciences, but they also stressed that the
economic performance of the agriculture and related sectors is currently being compromised through a
lack of investment from the public and private sectors in translational research. Consequently the
strong basic research is not being taken forward as effectively as it should be, with much of the
commercialisation of technologies taking place overseas.
Translational research is an iterative style of research, with interaction between academic research and
private sector and end-users aimed at developing new products for existing or new markets and which
aims to generate proof-of-concept and proof-of-value evidence to support further investment, often by
the private sector. However where markets are weak or poorly developed, technology untested or
novel or where evidence of the success of earlier investment is not available, then the perception of
risk by the private sector can stifle investment. This is the case in many Sub-Saharan African markets,
particularly in DFID’s priority countries.
By pushing forward the frontier of agricultural technology, a DFID investment in Agricultural Technology
likely to benefit agricultural development in developing countries which tend to focus their R&D activity
on applying developments from OECD countries to their own agricultural context.20 However, this
translational research is not progressing fast enough to address the current challenges facing African
agriculture. Focussing funding on specific topics, such as drought resistant crops or low tillage farming
methods, is likely to be particularly beneficial for agricultural development in the tropics, as indicated by
the FAO21.
17
Global Food and Farming Futures, UK Foresight Report, 2011,
TSB 2013. Feeding the future.
19
Elsevier 2011. International Comparative Performance of the UK Research Base
20 Thirtle and Holding, 2003. Productivity of UK agriculture : causes and constraints
21 FAO How to Feed the World in 2050
18
4
What we will do to tackle the problem
DFID will support an “Agricultural Technologies Catalyst - International Development Window” to
develop, test and scale up novel approaches to innovation for sustainable intensification and reducing
post-harvest losses in Africa, bringing together UK and African businesses and academic institutions
working in the Agri-Tech sector. The “Agricultural Technologies Catalyst - International Development
Window” will be managed through the UK Technology Strategy Board (TSB) to leverage their
expertise, and that of the private sector, in stimulating innovation and bringing technologies into use. It
will build upon a much larger investment by BIS and DEFRA, who will establish the Catalyst. DFID
funds will be held spate and channelled through the Catalyst to support the development of new
technology to address development challenges. The Catalyst mechanism has been used by the TSB
in the biomedical and UK agriculture sectors, and has generated significant private sector investment.
DFID is proposing to test the model for international development results in agricultural innovation and
reducing post-harvest loss.
The Catalyst programme will identify constraints to the uptake of agricultural and post-harvest
technology in Africa making use of the TSB’s extensive UK and international networks. It will make
three classes of grant available on a competitive basis to tackle the identified constraints.
1. Early stage award: evaluating the technical feasibility of an idea and establishing proof of
concept in a model system.
2. Feasibility award: enabling the exploration and evaluation of the commercial potential of an
early-stage scientific idea.
3. Late-stage award: taking a well-developed concept and demonstrates its effectiveness and
utility in a relevant environment.
In each case the proposal can be either business or academic led but in all cases grants will be not
more than 60% of the proposal value. Criteria for the assessment of proposals received are being
developed, and would include a requirement for partnership with African academic institutions and
businesses and a clear benefit for poor farmers in Africa..
What are the expected results?
The impact of the “Agricultural Technologies Catalyst - International Development Window” will be
enhanced food security, nutrition and welfare of the poor. This will result from greater involvement of
the private sector, both UK and African, in innovation for sustainable intensification and reducing postharvest losses, generating faster translation of research outputs, and innovation at scale. This is likely
to lead to the following long term impact:




Sustained reduction of poverty and hunger of small-holder farmers;
Sustainable intensification in agriculture
Improvements in human health and diversity in diets and nutrition. For children, this will
also mean that potential for learning is increased;
Positive impact on rural income and food security and facilitating trade in agricultural
products.
This impact will be achieved through two outcomes.

Increased pace and scale of uptake of sustainable intensification and post-harvest
5
innovation by farmers in Africa.

Increased investment by the private sector in sustainable intensification and post-harvest
innovation.
An additional outcome will be the generation and dissemination of high quality evidence and research
into the impact and effectiveness of an “Agricultural Technologies Catalyst - International Development
Window” in addressing market failure and unblocking the innovation pipeline. The programme will be
supported by a robust evaluation framework to demonstrate quality evidence.
Innovation in sustainable intensification and reducing post-harvest loss will be delivered for smallholder farmers in Africa. The “Agricultural Technologies Catalyst - International Development Window”
will be demand driven and therefore it is not possible to specify the technologies/innovations that will
be delivered or the number of households reached. It is expected that between 8 and 12
technologies/innovations will be funded.
6
Business Case
Strategic Case
A. Context and need for a DFID intervention
The need for agricultural innovation and translational research
1.
The global food system, which is currently failing to provide adequate food for almost 1 billion of
poor people, is expected to experience an unprecedented confluence of pressures over the next
40 years. Greater investment in agricultural innovation is needed to help overcome these
obstacles and meet the world’s growing food needs.22
2.
On the demand side, global population size is predicted to increase from nearly 7 billion today to
9 billion by 2050. It is estimated that the investment in agriculture in developing countries to
meet food needs in 2050 will be US$ 83 billion per year23. On the supply side, competition for
land, water and energy will intensify, while climate change impacts will increase.
3.
The investment required to meet the food needs of the global population in 2050 is estimated to
be $83 billion per year24. This amount cannot be wholly sustained by the public sector; private
sector support is also required. In many developing countries, markets for agricultural inputs,
services and outputs are either underdeveloped or non-existent, limiting private sector
investment and slowing technological innovation. Failure to maintain on-farm productivity
growth at historical levels is in itself an indicator of significant underinvestment in the sector.
Publicly funded research and extension services cannot adequately compensate for the
investment gap. Yet private sector investment in developing countries is low - of the $39.6
billion of investment in agricultural research in 2005, only 2% was private sector investment in
low and middle income countries25. To address this challenge, public funding mechanisms can
help overcome market failures and “pull” the private sector into innovating for agriculture in
developing countries.
4.
Investments in research will translate into transformative impact and better welfare outcomes
only where there is widespread uptake of research products. Over the past 30 years global
investment in research has driven a rapid increase in yields and significant returns to
investment. The overall impact of the uptake and application of agriculture research outside
Africa is impressive.26 27
5.
In Africa the situation has historically been substantially different. Analysis of the impact of
investments in international research demonstrates a significantly lower figure for SSA in
comparison to other geographical regions.28 In 2000 only 17% of the maize harvested in Africa
was planted with modern, high yielding varieties. The equivalent figure for south and south-east
Asia and the Pacific was 90%29. Reviews of the impact of crop genetic improvement in Africa
show considerably less impact than in South Asia. 88% of the yield growth in crop agriculture in
South Asia between 1965 and 1998 was attributable to crop genetic improvement; however the
comparable figure for Africa is 28%.
22
UK Foresight 2011
FAO, 2009
24 FAO, 2010
25 Beintema and Elliot, ASTI private sector investment in research presentation to FAO, 2009
26 Renkow and Byerlee 2010. The impacts of CGIAR research: A review of recent evidence
27 Evanson 2003
28 Raitzer and Kelley 2008
29 Golden et al 2005.
23
7
6.
The transformation of the agriculture sector which characterised rapid growth in Asia has not
taken place in many countries in Africa, and although the picture is far from universal, the slow
pace of technological innovation by small-holders and Agri-Tech is many regions is a critical
constraint to economic growth and poverty reduction. Overcoming the barriers to adoption
requires an understanding of the social, economic and institutional constraints which hinder
innovation, the development of better products more suited to African demand for new postharvest technology and the application of effective and innovative new ways of getting the right
technology to farmers and other uses at a price they can afford.
7.
New technology must get over a threshold of profitability in order to be adopted. Just because
technology has the potential under ideal conditions to deliver substantially higher yields does
not mean it should or will be adopted. The low level of innovation and adoption in Africa is often
rooted in the uncertainty of the performance of technology.30
8.
The nutrition impacts of global food harvests are radically reduced by poor postharvest practices
that affect the quantity, quality and safety of the food that is available for consumption. The
significance of these different forms of loss is illustrated below:
9.

FOOD LOST - The UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) estimates that 30 per cent
of global food harvests are lost, equivalent to 1.3 billion tons of food31. While such estimates
are based on a large number of assumptions, their magnitude is undeniable, and the value
of annual postharvest losses of cereal grains, roots and tuber crops, fruits and vegetables,
meat, milk and fish for Africa alone have been valued at more than US$ 48 billion
(FAO/AfDB 2009).

UNSAFE FOOD - Producing more food without meeting minimal quality and safety
requirements would undermine the response to the global food and nutrition security
challenge and the resilience required in vulnerable rural households. Safe food is defined
as food free of hazardous biological (such as virus, bacteria, toxins, parasites, prions),
chemical (such as contaminants, pesticides and drugs residues) and physical (foreign
bodies) agents.
The Institute of Mechanical Engineers32 highlights that in developed economies, such as the UK,
more-efficient farming practices and better transport, storage and processing facilities ensure
that a larger proportion of food produced reaches markets. A significant proportion of losses are
associated with consumer culture and expectations and customer behaviour (Figure 1). This
situation reflects the success of the UK Agri-Tech sector in reducing post-harvest losses through
technical innovation.
10. By contrast in sub-Saharan Africa post-harvest loss occurs primarily at the household/producer
end of the supply chain, where inefficient harvesting, poor local transport and infrastructure
result in inappropriate handling and storage under unsuitable conditions (Figure 1).
30
Jack, J-PAL 2011
FAO 2011, Global Food Losses and Food Waste.
32 Institute of Mechanical Engineers, 2013 - Global Food: Waste Not, Want Not.
31
8
Figure 1: Cereal production lost or wasted, at different supply chain stages (Source FAO 2011)
11. For perishable crops such as fruit and vegetables figures are significantly higher, as shown in
the Figure 2 below.
Figure 2: Fruit and vegetable production wasted at different stages of supply chain (FAO 2011)
12. Given that many smallholder farmers in developing countries live on the margins of food
insecurity, a reduction in food losses can have an immediate and significant impact on their
livelihoods.
13. Data from the African Postharvest Losses Information System33, below, highlights the scale of
post-harvest grain losses in different agro-ecological zones across Africa.
33
www.aphlis.net
9
14. Recent Government and independent reports343536 recognised the UK’s highly competitive
position in world-class fundamental research, including agricultural sciences, but they also
stressed that the economic performance of the agriculture and related sectors is currently being
compromised through a lack of investment from the public and private sectors in translational
research. Consequently strong basic research is not being taken forward as effectively as it
should be, with much of the commercialisation of technologies taking place overseas.
15. By pushing forward the frontier of agricultural technology, a DFID investment in Agri-Tech is
likely to benefit agricultural development in developing countries which tend to focus their R&D
activity on applying developments from OECD countries to their own agricultural context37.
However, this translational research is not progressing fast enough to address the current
challenges facing African agriculture. Translational research is an iterative style of research,
with interaction between academic research and private sector and end-users. Practitioners
and users help shape the research agenda by supplying difficult problems to be addressed.
Focussing funding on specific topics, such as drought resistant crops or low tillage farming
methods, is likely to be particularly beneficial for agricultural development in the tropics, as
indicated by the FAO38.
The Strategic Fit - Why DFID’s intervention is justified
16. This programme will contribute to the UK and DFID’s commitments to MDGs, particularly around
poverty reduction and rural economic growth in poor countries. With an emphasis on the private
sector role in agricultural innovation, it will help boost growth in low income countries, through
reduced post-harvest losses. The programme also directly supports DFID’s objective to
continue to invest in cost effective and innovative approaches aimed at supporting small-scale
agribusiness in developing countries and increasing income of poor people. It responds to
DFID’s ambitions to scale up its impact on nutrition, including through agriculture. DFID’s inputs
will help to ensure that the pull mechanism is pro-poor, and that it is able to promote clear
impact pathways and results from UK investments.
17. This programme is aligned to DFID’s agriculture research priorities paper, particularly in terms of
current priorities in 2013 in working with the private sector, in accelerating agricultural
innovation. It is highly innovative, and therefore has an element of risk but with the prospect of
high returns both in terms of tangible results for poor people, as well as in terms of
34
Global Food and Farming Futures, UK Foresight Report, 2011,
TSB 2013. Feeding the future.
36
Elsevier 2011. International Comparative Performance of the UK Research Base
37 Thirtle and Holding (2003)
38 FAO How to Feed the World in 2050
35
10
strengthening the evidence base on what works in agricultural innovation.
18. The UK Agricultural technologies (Agri-Tech) sector, including academic institutions and
businesses, have an internationally recognised comparative advantage with respect postharvest and value chain knowledge and technology. The Agri-Tech sector refers to primary
production and the scientific and technical development activities that underpin the agricultural
sector. It covers a diverse range of activities including the agriculture industry itself (primary
production i.e farming for both food and non-food uses) but also topics such as soil science,
crop and livestock genetics; agri-chemicals; and general purpose technologies such as remote
sensors, satellites and robotics.
19. DFID intervention through this “Agricultural Technologies Catalyst - International Development
Window” will make use of the skills, knowledge and innovation of the UK Agri-Tech sector to
support international development objectives in Africa through a demand driven approach to
technology transfer in the post-harvest sector.
11
The need for DFID intervention
20. There are two major market inefficiencies, often referred to as “valley[s] of death,” that impede
the translation of technological opportunities, often leading to the demise of technologies (and
sometimes even firms) that are unable to overcome these gaps. The first gap is at the early
stage of innovation where funds are required to go from the proof of concept to product (see
Figure 3). Generally research funds (from public sources or from internal sources in the case of
private firms) are sufficient to demonstrate the technical feasibility of a concept; but support for
translating the proof of concept to a working prototype is relatively limited. Public research and
public funding agencies cannot justify the development of a prototype since it is seen as a
commercial activity and for private funders. Private firms hold back due to an excess of
technical risk and the lack of a business case at this stage. Private funders (such as venture
capitalists) generally are interested only when a prototype has been developed and
demonstrated.
21. The second “valley of death” refers to a later stage where significant funds are needed to
establishing facilities for commercial-scale manufacturing of a product. At this stage, there still
remains some market risk since there is no guarantee that the product will be attractive to
consumers.
Figure 3: Innovation “valleys of death” 39
22. The market for new information (e.g. research and knowledge) is characterised by pervasive
39
Menon, J., Sagar, A. (2012) Prize-Driven Innovation for Development. X PRIZE Foundation, US
and IIT Delhi, India.
12
market failures. New information is non-rivalrous, meaning that one person’s use of it doesn’t
prevent another person from using it, and it is difficult, though not impossible, to stop people
accessing new knowledge once it has been created. These public good properties mean
private firms are likely to undersupply new knowledge, as they can’t capture all of the benefits.
This is exacerbated by the special problem that information is hard to evaluate: you don’t know
how much it is worth until you have it.
23. In the case of sustainable intensification and on-farm post-harvest innovation, the intended
users of new technology are poor. This is important for two reasons. First, the poor have
limited purchasing power, leaving firms with little incentive to develop technologies for them.
Therefore, there is a distributional argument in favour of incentivising the development of
technologies that address the needs of the poor. Moreover, the fact that the poor are a user
group that firms are less familiar with means it is difficult to assess the potential demand for new
technologies (uncertain/unknown demands and returns), exacerbating the risk involved in
developing new products for them. Incentivising and introducing new players into this thin
market will reveal more information about poor consumers, reducing risks and potentially
encouraging others.
Market Failures
24. Market failures take a number of different forms.
25. Innovation market failures: It is well established that private firms are likely to underinvest in
R&D from a societal perspective because they are unable to capture the full returns on their
investment. This knowledge can be applied by other firms and to other sectors, and may
contribute to socially desirable objectives such as reduced environmental impact or
improvements in working conditions. Furthermore, innovations in the UK could have benefits
internationally, such as increased global food security and poverty reduction.
26. Research payoffs are highly uncertain – individuals and firms don’t know the commercial
potential of their research when they make the initial investment. The market inefficiency refers
to the difficulty in securing funding for translating basic research carried out by universities and
research institutes into applied research that has commercial applications. There is currently a
gap where government funding for basic research ceases, and private finance for applied
research kicks in. Given the uncertainty of research payoffs, the long lead times of bringing new
technologies to market, and the lack of financing for the Agri-Tech sector, it is difficult for firms to
overcome the market inefficiency in the absence of government support.
27. Underinvestment in public sector R&D is likely to adversely affect private sector R&D, which
would otherwise have built on the knowledge and technologies generated by public research.
There is evidence of strong complimentarity (rather than crowding out) between public and
private R&D in agriculture, with an extensive review of the evidence in this area for Defra
suggesting that a 1% increase in public R&D leads to a 1.6% increase in registration of
domestic patents (a key measure of private research activity)40.
28. How will the proposal tackle innovation market failures: Research for Defra suggests that the
returns to public agricultural R&D spending in the UK are of the order 17-60%41 per year
over a lifetime of around 30 years. The evidence of complimentarity cited above suggests
that support for translational research would link up the UK’s existing basic research
infrastructure with the commercial needs of international and UK private sector companies to
40
This is an internal rate of return. Source:
http://archive.defra.gov.uk/evidence/economics/foodfarm/reports/documents/ProdRep.pdf
41 http://archive.defra.gov.uk/evidence/economics/foodfarm/reports/documents/ProdRep.pdf
13
develop new innovations that address the challenges of sustainable intensification and reducing
post-harvest loss.
29. Co-ordination failures and Network externalities: In order for the private sector to fully capitalise
on public research there is a need for industry to collaborate with the wider science and
technology community on the development, demonstration and commercialisation of new ideas.
Greater collaboration between all stakeholders will help the Agri-Tech industry to provide a ‘pull’
for innovative ideas and transform them into commercial products. However, such collaboration
is difficult to achieve given the large number of actors involved, the diversity of the sector and
the organisational costs are too high for any individual organisation.
30. How will the proposal tackle coordination failures and network externalities? Current TSB
funding on the Agri-Tech sector is UK-focussed and therefore does not address pre-competitive
global public good applied research for the benefit of a range of actors. The proposed
Agricultural Technologies Catalyst - International Development Window will accelerate
innovation and technology transfer sustainable intensification and post-harvest loss for Africa
using UK-Agri-Tech expertise.
31. Information failures: Farmers do not always have the right information and/or knowledge to
make informed decisions about which technologies to invest in. Further, technologies may work
differently on different farms and farmers may not always be aware of the impact of technologies
on their profitability.
32. How will the proposal tackle information failures? By providing reliable information on new
technologies the Catalyst will encourage and accelerate the adoption of new technologies by
farmers and create new commercial opportunities for UK and African businesses, creating new
jobs.
33. Whilst the market (including for-profit companies, social enterprises, and civil society
organisations) can be expected to respond to some of this challenge, experience indicates that
it will not respond to those areas and issues that are of most relevance to the poorest and most
vulnerable42.
34. This business case is part of a package of programmes to address the various weaknesses in
the market’s ability to provide appropriate sustainable intensification and post-harvest solutions
– both new technologies made to address poor people’s needs and new business models that
help poor people access currently available technologies. The innovation chain/process
(Figure 3) is a process that all new ideas and concepts follow – starting with idea generation;
building prototypes, testing the idea; developing it for first entry into the market; early adoption
by the market; to finally, full commercialisation of the product/service/idea. The range of
initiatives available to address the various individual barriers have been plotted onto the diagram
below.
35. As highlighted in Figure 3 above, there are two funding and support gaps (‘valleys of death’)
where an idea or technology can fail due to a lack of finance as well as a lack of knowhow or
skills to take the idea to the next stage. This business case aims to test a new funding
mechanism, leveraging private sector investment to address these gaps in R&D in technologies
and different business models that serve the bottom of the pyramid market. Most global R&D is
focused on high-end developed world products and services because the demand and people’s
willingness to pay is well understood. This is not the case with bottom of the pyramid
consumers in developing countries. As such, the vast majority of public and private spending on
42
Karnani, A. (2009) Romanticizing the Poor, Standford Social Innovation Review, Standford
University, CA.
14
technology development pays little attention to the needs of the poor.
36. In addition to technology development (and/or adaptation of existing technologies for use in
different situations and locations), testing and trialling of different business models that help
scale up and socialisation of technologies to reach poor consumers is also needed (including
how social uses shape and re-shape the nature of technology). Often what is restricting
deployment is related to social aspects of the market, for example social barriers (behavioural or
cultural issues) and financial barriers (consumers ability to purchase and pay for goods and
services provided by the technology). There are opportunities to further understand which new,
innovative business models might help reach more consumers in a sustainable, long-term
manner.
37. This intervention targets the development of an innovative mechanism to fund translational
research in sustainable intensification and the post-harvest sector, both to develop new
technologies and to deliver new and existing technologies and products at scale. The added
value of DFID’s inputs in achieving this outcomes is to bring a strong emphasis on ensuring that
the “Agricultural Technologies Catalyst - International Development Window” has robust impact
evaluation based on the use of experimental design, in order to generate high quality evidence
of how pull mechanisms in agriculture can contribute to agricultural innovation.
The difference intervening will make to reducing poverty?
38. The World Bank estimates that there are 2.1 billion of poor people that live on less than US$ 2 a
day and 880m poor people that live on less than US$ 1 a day. Most of these people depend on
agriculture for their livelihoods (World Bank, 2008).
39. A number of studies have demonstrated the very high payoffs from investments in agricultural
R&D (Alston et al, 2000, Evenson 2001, Thirtle et al 2003, Alston 2010). Despite this, there is
strong evidence of under-investment in the sector. Public levels of investment in agricultural
R&D are varied and uneven – 0.54% of GDP in developing countries compared to developed
nations’ 2.36% (Pardey 2010). In 2000 only 5% of global private sector agricultural R&D was
estimated to be carried out in developing countries (Pardey 2010).
40. This underinvestment in agricultural research and development, particularly by the private sector
in agriculture in Africa, is a market inefficiency/failure, based on an assessment risks of
operating in what are perceived to be low value markets. The costs of doing business in Africa
are high, the returns uncertain and the small market. There is little incentive for the private
sector to ramp up investment to undertake research or introduce new products. Demand from
small-holders for goods and services has remained unmet in part due to a supply side response.
Suppliers have failed to deliver technology, financial, advisory or transport services. Poor
farmers have also been unable to access output markets on reasonable terms in order to sell
their goods profitably, so have underinvested in new products. Their demand for new technology
is limited by weak purchasing power; a lack of access to products which meet their specific
demands and which they are confident will work well.
41. Such a complex set of demand and supply interactions will have no simple single solution.
Nevertheless it is clear that technology which could have demonstrable impact on household
welfare has not made it into the hands of farmers. Therefore understanding how these market
failures are operating in a particular context will inform more effective approaches to delivering
innovation for poor people.
42. This initiative will test the effectiveness of an “Agricultural Technologies Catalyst - International
Development Window” in addressing these market failures, by creating demand for products,
and stimulating private sector investment.
15
B. Impact and Outcome that we expect to achieve
43. The impact of the “Agricultural Technologies Catalyst - International Development Window” will
be enhanced food security, nutrition and welfare of the poor. This will result from greater
involvement of the private sector, both UK and African, in innovation for sustainable
intensification and reducing post-harvest losses, generating faster translation of research
outputs, and innovation at scale. This is likely to lead to the following long term impact:




Sustained reduction of poverty and hunger of small-holder farmers;
Sustainable intensification in agriculture
Improvements in human health and diversity in diets and nutrition. For children, this will
also mean that potential for learning is increased;
Positive impact on rural income and food security and facilitating trade in agricultural
products.
44. This impact will be achieved through two outcomes.

Increased pace and scale of uptake of sustainable intensification and post-harvest
innovation by farmers in Africa.

Increased investment by the private sector in sustainable intensification and post-harvest
innovation.
45. An additional outcome will be the generation and dissemination of high quality evidence and
research into the impact and effectiveness of an “Agricultural Technologies Catalyst International Development Window” in addressing market failure and unblocking the innovation
pipeline. The programme will be supported by a robust evaluation framework to demonstrate
quality evidence.
46. Innovation in sustainable intensification and reducing post-harvest loss will be delivered for
small-holder farmers in Africa. The “Agricultural Technologies Catalyst - International
Development Window” will be demand driven and therefore it is not possible to specify the
technologies/innovations that will be delivered or the number of households reached. However,
their potential scale and reach will form part of the evaluation criteria for proposals received.
16
Appraisal Case
A. What are the feasible options that address the need set out in the Strategic case?
47. Three options are considered, which have the potential to deliver institutional or financing
mechanisms which overcome market failures in getting the private sector to deliver access to
agricultural technologies in least developed countries.
1) “Do nothing” - continue with conventional push based mechanisms
2) Catalyst mechanism established through the UK Technology Strategy Board (TSB).
3) A DFID managed competitive fund
Option 1: “Do nothing” - Conventional push based mechanisms:
48. This conventional approach to promoting uptake relies on seeing aspects of new technologies
as a public good. Where the public sector funds research inputs, the expectation has been that
either civil society or the private sector in target countries would take on the role of
disseminator, either without a financial incentive, or through short term grants or subsidies.
49. Under this Option, DFID would continue with existing investments into research uptake through
the CGIAR43 Consortium Research Programmes, Sub-Regional Organisations and other
partners. Whilst we would maintain an offer on innovation and the private sector (through
existing support to the CGIAR, sub-regional organisations, AATF44 and GALVMED) we would
not increase our investments in this area as a proportion of the total portfolio. We would not
develop a dedicated programme to scale up innovative work to leverage private sector
engagement in delivery of access to agricultural technologies.
50. This is effectively the Do Nothing counterfactual: this would imply DFID doing nothing over
and above existing mechanisms currently being used within the programme.
Option 2: Agri-Tech Catalyst mechanism established through the UK Technology Strategy
Board (TSB).
51. Option 2, the Agri-tech Catalyst, will offer funding to innovative small and medium sized
enterprises (SMEs) and academics looking to work either individually or in collaboration to
develop solutions to the global challenges facing the agriculture and food system. The Catalyst
will accept innovative ideas from any sector or discipline that can demonstrate the potential to
provide significant positive development impact.
52. The TSB has a track record of managing “Catalyst funds” to stimulate the development and
adoption of new technologies in the UK Agri-Tech (Sustainable Agriculture and Food Innovation
Platform45) and biomedical (Biomedical Catalyst46) sectors and address the innovation market
inefficiencies. The existing programmes have generated significant private sector investment.
53. Under this option, DFID would engage with the UK Agri-Tech sector, through the TSB to identify
constraints to the uptake of sustainable intensification and post-harvest technology in Africa.
This would make use of the TSB’s extensive UK and international networks. Based on the
identified constraints, calls for proposals would be issued. Criteria for the assessment of
proposals received are being developed, and would include a requirement for partnership with
43
Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research.
African Agricultural Technology Fund
45 https://connect.innovateuk.org/web/sustainable-agriculture-and-food-innovation-platform/overview
46 https://www.innovateuk.org/-/biomedical-catalyst
44
17
African academic institutions and businesses.
54. The Catalyst will make three classes of grant available:
1. Early stage award: evaluating the technical feasibility of an idea and establishing proof of
concept in a model system,
2. Feasibility award: enabling the exploration and evaluation of the commercial potential of an
early-stage scientific idea.
3. Late-stage award: taking a well-developed concept and demonstrates its effectiveness and
utility in a relevant environment.
55. Throughout DFID engagement with the TSB the primacy of ensuring international development
outcomes will be stated to ensure that the mechanism is not viewed simply as an investment in
the UK Agri-Tech sector.
Option 3: A DFID managed competitive fund.
56. Under this option, DFID would set-up and manage a competitive grant programme, to identify
constraints to the uptake of sustainable intensification and post-harvest technology in Africa and
subsequently implement programmes to address these constraints.
B. Assessing the strength of the evidence base for each feasible option including delivery
routes
57. The table below sets out the rating of evidence for each option. The evidence base on option 1
is relatively strong. However, it indicates that whilst the returns of agricultural investment are
high, the pace and scale of adoption has been mixed. Yield gaps particularly in developing
countries are significant, particularly in Africa. The evidence base for Options 2 and 3 is weak,
as this is an emerging area of work. Developing the evidence base is one of the primary
justifications for this business case.
Option
1
Evidence rating
There is good evidence that indicates that “business as usual” approaches represented
by this option, ie public sector driven conventional approaches to research and
development have delivered mixed results in terms of widespread rapid technology
adoption.
2
There emerging evidence of the success of the existing SAFIP and biomedical catalysts
in stimulation innovation and technology transfer in the UK agriculture/food and
biomedical sectors.
This option would trial the approach in a new context of increasing innovation and
technology transfer in Africa. There is no evidence of its efficacy in this context.
3
This proposed approach would be new to DFID and therefore this is no evidence for this
delivery route.
C. For each feasible option, what is the assessment of local capacity? Is the intervention
likely to strengthen capacity in a durable manner?
58. Option 1 would not strengthen capacity above existing programmes. Options 2 and 3 have
similar potential to strengthen local capacity both in the UK and Africa. Through support to the
development of partnerships between UK and African institutions the capacity of the former to
understand and address African sustainable intensification and post-harvest issues will be
increased. The capacity of African institutions to innovate and implement demand driven
innovation will be increased.
18
D. What is the likely impact (positive and negative) on climate change and environment for
each feasible option?
59. As indicated in the table below, there are a range of climate and environment implications from
this intervention. Although identified risks are medium in each option, the existence of potential
mitigation and adaptation opportunities associated with specific pilots means that overall this
intervention should be classed as B ie Medium.
Categorise as A, high potential risk / opportunity; B, medium / manageable potential risk /
opportunity; C, low / no risk / opportunity; or D, core contribution to a multilateral organisation.
Option
1
2
3
Climate change and environment risks Climate
change
and
environment
and impacts, Category (A, B, C, D)
opportunities, Category (A, B, C, D)
C (low)
C (low)
C (low)
B (medium)
C (low)
B (medium)
60. The potential opportunities will vary considerably according to the specific technology. More
broadly, sustainable intensification and reduced post-harvest loss will reduce the pressure on
the environment as a result of poor agricultural practices and wasted harvests.
E. If any, what are the likely major impacts on social development?
Dependant on the specific technologies/innovations identified and/or scaled-up as a result of funding
there is potential for impact on social development. For example, women are frequently involved
post-harvest processes and the introduction of new innovations has the potential to increase or
reduce their workload, depending on the specific innovation. Programmes funded by the “Agricultural
Technologies Catalyst - International Development Window” will be required to identify how they will
ensure that the innovations developed have a positive impact on social development.
F. For fragile and conflict affected countries, what are the likely major impacts on conflict and
fragility, if any?
It is not anticipated that there will be any major impacts on conflict on fragility as a result of
programmes funded using the “Agricultural Technologies Catalyst - International Development
Window”.
G. What are the costs and benefits of each feasible option? Identify the preferred option.
Option 1: Do nothing - Conventional push based mechanisms:
61. Under this Do Nothing counterfactual: DFID’s agriculture research portfolio would remain
with a strong component of “push” financing mechanisms, but would have relatively few ways to
explore the scope for innovative mechanisms to speed up the pace and scale of agricultural
innovation at scale in developing countries and stimulate the involvement of the private sector.
62. Direct public funding is one of the best ways to stimulate basic research, and the evidence base
on the returns to these investments is strong. Over the past 30 years, investment in research
has driven a rapid increase in yields and impressive returns to investment. The overall impact
of the uptake and application of agriculture research outside Africa is impressive. However,
whilst some technologies have seen rapid and large scale adoption, in many cases, adoption
has been slow. Conventional push mechanisms have had mixed results in getting proven
technologies into use on the scale and at the speed required, particularly in Africa. Grants
alone have not always been sufficient to create an incentive for market actors to succeed, and
19
can in some cases undermine nascent enterprises from operating on a sustainable commercial
footing.
63. Without a new approach to getting research into use, and addressing some of the market
failures that underpin low rates of adoption, the private sector will continue to have a limited role
in innovations for smallholders. Sub-Saharan Africa in particular will continue to face
challenges in the pace and scale of agricultural innovation (World Bank 2005; Beintema and
Stads 2008). Average global rates of growth in yield of most of the major cereals would
continue to decline – since the 1980s, growth in wheat and rice yields fell from 2.5% - 3% to
around 1%. Maize yields showed growth of slightly less than 2% over the last decade
(Interagency Report to the Mexican G20 Presidency). Despite examples of successful efforts to
tackle market failures and get new technologies into use (eg GALVMED’s East Coast Fever
vaccine), these investments alone will not elicit innovation at the pace of or the scale required
by the intensifying and proliferating challenges confronting agriculture (Interagency Report to
the Mexican G20 Presidency). The sector will continue to suffer from underinvestment.
64. If we opt for this option, DFID would miss out on the opportunity to make use of the UK AgriTech sector’s expertise on testing new ways of getting innovation into use in Africa. We would
lose an opportunity to further catalyse the private sector in agricultural innovation, and to
explore the full range of instruments available to us in speeding up innovation processes.
Option 2: Catalyst mechanism established through the UK Technology Strategy Board (TSB).
65. Under this option, DFID have the opportunity to test out a new approach to stimulating demand
led innovation in sustainable intensification and reducing post-harvest loss in Africa. The
competitive process, managed by TSB, would enable DFID to broaden its range of research
partnerships and potentially identify innovative approaches to technology transfer for
sustainable intensification and reduced post-harvest losses.
66. This option would leverage the considerable expertise of the UK-TSB in linking the different
actors in the Agri-Tech sector, including UK science and businesses. It would provide
opportunities for the UK Agri-Tech sector to identify new markets for UK technology and skills
and enable the African Agri-Tech sector to source new technology and learn from the world
leading UK sector.
67. The proposed Catalyst mechanism forms part of a larger UK Agri-Tech investment strategy,
which, while principally focussed at the UK sector, also acknowledges the importance of global
food security and global markets to the UK. DFID engagement in the mechanism provides an
excellent opportunity to engage with the UK Agri-Tech sector and other government
departments (BIS, Defra) supporting the strategy.
68. The possible challenges of this option are the engagement with a new range of actors, with
whom DFID has little previous engagement on agricultural research. This will require careful
management to ensure that the international development objectives of the Catalyst
mechanism are achieved. This will require considerable costs in terms of time and relationship
building with the TSB.
Option 3: A DFID managed competitive fund.
69. Under this option, DFID have the opportunity to test out a new approach to stimulating demand
led innovation in sustainable intensification and reducing post-harvest loss in Africa. The
competitive process, would enable DFID to broaden its range of research partnerships and
potentially identify innovative approaches technology transfer for sustainable intensification and
reduced post-harvest losses.
20
70. However, this option would impose considerable administrative and operational costs on the
DFID research team and the opportunity to capitalise on the expertise of the UK-TSB would be
lost.
71. Option 2 is the preferred option. Option 1 is unlikely to deliver the impact and outcomes we
are looking for, and therefore does not present a viable option in the context of this Business
Case. Option 3 could generate some of the benefits in terms of evidence on innovation, but the
costs and lost leverage opportunities are considerable. Option 2 is consider the best
opportunity to develop evidence on the potential for the UK Agri-Tech sector to engage with
their African counterparts in tackling challenges in the sector. DFID’s funds and role in
championing a strong research and evidence component bring significant influence to the
direction of the initiative. The potential payoffs of adding new funding mechanisms to our toolkit
for encouraging agricultural innovation are considerable.
21
H. Theory of Change for Preferred Option
Input
Intervention
Manage
ment of
Catalyst
fund
Demand
assessme
nt and
calls for
proposals
Funding
Technic
al inputs
Manage
ment of
projects
Monitoring
3rd party
verificatio
n
Independe
nt
evaluation
Experimental
and quasi
experimental
Outputs
Impact
Pilots in R and D
deliver new
technologies for
sustainable
intensification and to
tackle post-harvest
losses.
1. Increased
pace and
scale of
uptake of
sustainable
intensification
and postharvest
technology
Pilots in Adoption of
proven
technologies:
deliver uptake of
new technologies at
scale and leverage
private sector
involvement
2. Increased
investment by
the private
sector in
sustainable
intensification
and postharvest
innovation.
High quality
evidence on the
role and
effectiveness of
the catalyst in
promoting
innovation and
update.
Pilots are managed and
delivered efficiently and
effectively.
Assumption
s
Outcomes
Evaluation frameworks
able to measure the impact
& effectiveness, including
cost-effectiveness vis a vis
push mechanisms
Enhanced
food
security,
nutrition
and welfare
of poor
people in
developing
countries
Robust evidence is
increasingly used to
inform public sector
investment in sustainable
intensification and postharvest research and
development
I. What measures can be used to monitor Value for Money for the intervention?
60. Measure to monitor the Value for Money of the intervention will include:



Relevant comparison of unit costs with those used through different deliver mechanisms
Monitoring of TSB overheads on an annual basis
Inclusion of value for money metrics in funding arrangement with TSB, and in the Monitoring
and Evaluation framework
22
J. Summary Value for Money Statement for the preferred option
The use of the Technology Strategies Board gives DFID access to an organisation with experience of
managing similar funding mechanism and therefore potential economies of scale. Should the new
mechanism prove effective, there is considerable potential for leveraging expertise and funds from
the private sector and achieving innovation at scale.
Commercial Case
Delivery through a third party entity (multilateral organisation; civil society
organisation or support to government)
A. Why is the proposed funding mechanism/form of arrangement the right one for this
intervention, with this development partner?
In accordance with DFID procedures we will sign a MoU with TSB as they are a business-led
executive non-departmental public body (NDPB). This approach is consistent with all our current
joint initiatives with other NDPB such as BBSRC. TSB will manage and administer the funds on our
behalf in accordance with their rules and regulations. The MoU with TSB will govern the
implementation of the project, including the awarding of grants to the private sector.
B. What assurance has been obtained on capability and capacity to deliver?
The primary source of funding for TSB comes from the Department for Business, Innovation and
Skills (BIS). The budget available for the organisation's work this financial year 2013/14 is £440m.
TSB has a total staff of around 200 including technologists who act as focal points for their
technology area; relationship managers who work to build strategic relationships with business,
government and other external stakeholders; and teams looking after business planning, operations,
finance, and communications. Their capacity to deliver is demonstrated by emerging positive results
from the Biomedical and SAFIP programmes
C. Is there an opportunity to negotiate on anticipated costs?
Yes. We will work with TSB at the outset to ensure their cost recovery is appropriate and right sized
for this type of intervention to ensure VfM.
Financial Case
A. Who are the recipients of all proposed payments?
The main recipient of funds will be TSB. TSB will then pass the funds on to a number of third parties in
the form of a challenge fund grant.
B. What are the costs to be incurred directly by DFID?
The costs incurred directly by DFID will relate to the MoU with TSB. This will include amongst other
things personnel and overhead costs relating to management of the competitive challenge fund and the
challenge fund itself. We will work with TSB to minimise the personnel and overhead costs in order to
maximise front line delivery.
23
C. What are the costs to be incurred by third party organisations?
The costs incurred by third parties will include amongst other things personnel and overhead costs
relating to managing and implementing their funded programme. TSB will work with third parties to
minimise the personnel and overhead costs in order to maximise front line delivery.
D. Does the project involve financial aid to governments? If so, please define the arrangements
in detail.
N/A.
E. Is the required funding available through current resource allocation or via a bid from
contingency? Will it be funded through capital/programme/admin?
Provision has already been made in the Agriculture Teams programme budget for 2013/14 onwards to
fund this initiative.
F. What is the profile of estimated costs? How will you work to ensure accurate forecasting?
The total cost of the programme will be up to £10m over 5 years. As the delivery option has not been
discussed with TSB in detail, we are unable to provide detailed figures and a breakdown over the
lifetime of the programme. As part of our on-going discussions with TSB, they will be asked to submit
a budget broken down by DFID financial years. This budget will be used as the basis for our financial
forecasting. DFID’s Deputy Programme Manager will work with TSB colleagues on a regular basis to
ensure the accuracy and validity of the forecasts provided and make adjustments as necessary.
G. What is the assessment of financial risk and fraud?
The overall assessment of financial risk or fraud is considered to be low. As TSB are a NDPB funded
by BIS they are subject to the same robust auditing and accounting procedures as DFID.
H. How will expenditure be monitored, reported and accounted for?
TSB will provide DFID with a copy of its Annual Audited Accounts and Annual Report which will set out
the progress made against agreed work plan and objectives.
In accordance with DFID’s standard MoU, each request for funds will be supported by a breakdown of
costs being claimed. The Deputy Programme Manager will be responsible for ensuring due diligence
in the disbursement of funds, and for taking any appropriate action as deemed necessary.
Full details of expenditure and predicted future spend by financial year against the annual workplan will
be included in TSB’s annual report to DFID and agreed/monitored by RED.
I. Are there any accounting considerations arising from the project?
No.
24
Management Case
A. What are the Management Arrangements for implementing the intervention?
In order to a) provide technical oversight and b) maximise the effectiveness of our investment we will
establish a Steering Committee for the programme. The Steering Committee will likely comprise of
DFID, BIS and DEFRA officials and will meet on a quarterly basis. The Steering Committee will
provide strategic oversight to TSB and be involved in the selection and awarding of challenge fund
grants.
In addition to the quarterly Steering Committee meetings, DFID will undertake Annual Reviews and a
Project Completion Report in accordance with DFID Blue Book requirements. The MoU with TSB to
will outline other requirements, such as payments, audit requirements etc.
Within the Agricultural Research Team the A2 Livelihoods Adviser and B1 Deputy Programme
Manager will lead on the programme. Other members of the team including Livestock, Economics and
Governance expertise will be brought in as and when required. The Senior Research Fellows will also
be brought in to provide technical review and support on evaluation as appropriate.
B. What are the risks and how these will be managed?
Risk
Probability
Impact
1. TSB fails to deliver on the
programme
Low
High
2. A poor response to the
challenge fund call results in
sub-optimal quality research
being funded
Low
Medium
3. Challenge fund grants
awarded do not have an
impact on potential users.
Low
High
How risks will be
minimized/mitigated
We will work closely other member of
the Steering Committee and TSB to
ensure the programme is delivered on
track and within budget.
We will ensure that there is a robust
peer review mechanism in place in
selecting high quality research
proposals, and that on-going oversight
is strong. Clearly defined calls for
proposals, combined with expert
panels and rigorous peer review will
drive quality of the outputs.
TSB have significant expertise in this
area and detailed knowledge of the
market. The Steering Committee will
also help ensure that grants awarded
are well managed to maximise the
outputs.
C. What conditions apply (for financial aid only)?
N/A.
D. How will progress and results be monitored, measured and evaluated?
DFID Monitoring
Progress and results of this initiative will be monitored and measured through the DFID annual review
process. The Steering Committee will also play a role in this process, commenting on performance of
TSB and providing oversight and technical direction.
Evaluation
25
The Steering Committee will commission a mid-term review and an end evaluation in the final year of
the programme. These reviews will contribute to the evidence base on the effectiveness of the
“Agricultural Technologies Catalyst - International Development Window” in stimulating innovation.
Logframe
The log frame is currently a draft and will be finalised once proposals have been funded allowing
targets and milestones to be developed
Quest No of logframe for this intervention: 4057773
26