Resources,
Energy and
Tourism
China
Review
June 2012
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Resources, Energy and Tourism • China Review • June 2012
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Resources, Energy and Tourism • China Review • June 2012
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Acknowledgements
This publication was jointly undertaken by the Bureau of Resources and Energy Economics (BREE) and
Tourism Research Australia (TRA), the Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism (RET).
Authors
Bureau of Resources and Energy Economics (BREE): Quentin Grafton and Jin Liu.
Tourism Research Australia (TRA): Robyn Agnew, Geoff Bailey and Grant Keys (RET)
By Invitation: Zheng (Annie) Wei and Rui Hao
Other contributors
A number of colleagues at BREE and RET have contributed to the preparation and development of the
statistical tables in this report and include: Jin Liu, George Stanwix, Yuan Yuan Liu, Seema Mul ye and
Matt Unicomb.
Design and production
Typeyard Design and Advertising Pty Ltd
Cover image
Paul Gunning
Resources, Energy and Tourism • China Review • June 2012
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Foreword
The past three decades has witnessed the re-emergence of China as one of the world’s largest economies.
This change has been dramatic such that by 2010, measured on purchasing power parity, China became the
world’s second-largest economy after the United States. China’s GDP in 2011 was 46 times higher than it
was in 1980 and accounted for about 14 per cent of global GDP. By comparison, the United States’ GDP in
2011 represented about 19 per cent of world GDP, while Australia’s share was 1.2 per cent.
Along with China’s own economic transformation there has been a structural shift in its trading relationship
with Australia. China has become Australia’s most important trading partner and is both our largest export
destination and the largest source of our imports in value terms.
The change in the Australian-China trading relationship is most visible in terms of resources, energy and
tourism. The real value of Australian exports of mineral resources to China increased from A$0.2 billion (in
$2010-11) in 1989–90 to A$49.9 billion in 2010–11. In volume terms, China accounted for around 69 per
cent of Australian total exports of iron ore in 2010–11, compared to around six per cent in 1989–90. Over the
period 1989–90 to 2010–11, China’s share of Australian total exports of metallurgical coal increased from
one per cent to around 11 per cent, while its share of Australian thermal coal increased from 0.1 per cent to
around 12 per cent.
From a low base in the mid-1990s, the Chinese tourism market has grown to be Australia’s most important
market by value worth A$3.5 billion in export value, and the third largest inbound market by visitor arrivals,
with 542 000 arrivals in 2011. By 2020–21, it is projected that Chinese arrivals in Australia could grow to over
one million visitors with a total inbound economic value of A$6.9 billion.
Given the importance of China to Australia, especially in terms of my portfolio responsibilities,
I am very pleased that the Bureau of Resources and Energy Economics (BREE) and Tourism Research
Australia (TRA) have collaborated to produce Resources, Energy and Tourism China Review.
In this, the inaugural issue, there is a valuable overview of China’s economic re-emergence and
its economic relations with Australia. There are also three review articles. These include: a
‘By Invitation’ article on China’s demographic transition provided by two Chinese scholars; a review of the
Chinese gas market; and a review of China’s demand for tourism and prospects for the future. In addition,
this issue includes a unique collection of statistical tables, figures, charts and comparisons to illustrate the
‘China story’ and China’s economic relations with Australia and also the rest of the world.
Hon. Martin Ferguson
Minister for Resources and Energy
Miniter for Tourism
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Contents
Acknowledgements
Foreword
Acronyms and abbreviations
Overview
China’s economic growth and transition (Quentin Grafton and Jin Liu)
Reviews
By Invitation: China’s demographic transition and economic growth
(Zheng (Annie) Wei and Rui Hao)
China’s demand for natural gas: drivers and prospects (Jin Liu)
China’s demand for tourism: Opportunities and implications for Australia
(Robyn Agnew, Geoff Bailey and Grant Keys)
Statistical Tables and Figures
Part 1: Chinese trends: economic and social indicators
Part 2: Chinese trends: resources and energy activities
Part 3: Australian exports to and imports from China
Resources, Energy and Tourism • China Review • June 2012
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3
5
6
6
24
25
30
34
45
46
61
78
5
Acronyms and abbreviations
ABARES
Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics and Science
ABS
Australian Bureau of Statistics
ADS scheme
Approved Destination Status scheme
bcm
billion cubic metres
BREE
Bureau of Resources and Energy Economics
cm
cubic metres
FDI
foreign direct investment
FYP
Five Year Plan
GDP
gross domestic product
GFC
global financial crisis
GFCF
gross fixed capital formation
GNP
gross national product
GTEM
global trade and environment model
IEA
International Energy Agency
IMF
International Monetary Fund
koe
kilogram of oil equivalent
kWh
kilowatt hour
LNG
liquefied natural gas
Mt
million tonnes
NTAF
National Tourism Accreditation Framework (also known as T-QUAL Accreditation)
ODI
outward direct investment
PPP
purchasing-power parity
RET
Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism
TFC
Tourism Forecasting Committee
TIEV
total inbound economic value
T-QUAL
tourism quality assured
TRA
Tourism Research Australia
UNCTAD
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
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Overview:
China’s economic growth and transition
Quentin Grafton and Jin Liu*
Introduction
China’s rapid economic growth in the late 20th and early 21st centuries is one of the world’s most
remarkable stories of economic development. Today, China is the world’s second largest economy, its
largest exporter and manufacturer. Over the past three decades, growth in gross domestic product (GDP)
averaged over 9 per cent a year, and over 500 million people were lifted out of poverty (World Bank 2012).
As a result, in 2011 China produced 14 per cent of global GDP (measured by purchase power parity), a
sevenfold increase from 2 per cent of global GDP in 1980.
Over the decade 2001–10, China’s economy was a key engine of growth for the world economy—for
example, during the global financial crisis in 2009 China provided almost all of the positive contribution to
the world’s real GDP growth (see Figure 1).
Figure 1: China’s contributions to world real GDP growth, 2001–10
Source: IMF database 2012; BREE.
Note: ‘Advanced economies’ comprises 34 countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong SAR, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands,
New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Singapore, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan Province of China, United
Kingdom, and United States. ‘Emerging and developing economies’ comprises 149 countries, excluding China.
*: The views expressed in this review are those of the authors alone and are not necessarily those of the
Bureau of Resources and Energy Economics (BREE) or the Department of Resources, Energy and
Tourism (RET).
While China’s growth has been spectacular, its economic development is not fundamentally different to
that which has occurred elsewhere in a resurgent Asia, or in Japan, in earlier decades. That is to say, its
‘super growth’ in per capita incomes has been characterised by: (1) very high rates of investment in
physical capital coupled with substantial foreign direct investment that draws upon on a large pool of
‘surplus’ labour; (2) large improvements in the quality of human capital; and (3) export -led development
through rapid increases in exports as a proportion of GDP. Nevertheless, China is special due to its
population, in excess of 1.3 billion in 2010, and because of the size of its economy. In particular, China’s
economic integration into world trade over the past two decades has had a profound global impact.
Resources, Energy and Tourism • China Review • June 2012
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Economic divergence and convergence
Until the 19th century China was one of the most economically advanced countries, and Chinese GDP
accounted for a third of global GDP in the early 1800s. At that time, its GDP per capita was similar to that
of Japan and about half that of Western Europe (see Figure 2).
From the first half of the nineteenth century China experienced economic divergence as Western Europe
grew while China’s GDP per capita relative to European nations fell (see Figure 2). As a result, in 1950
China’s GDP per capita was only 9 per cent of Western Europe’s and 38 per cent of Japan’s, while its
share of global GDP was less than 5 per cent.
China’s economic divergence was a result of both foreign interventions and domestic failures. According
to Lin (2012), China’s economic retrogression was a result of longstanding competitive deficiencies and
very limited technological developments over this period. In part, this was because China had a
bureaucratic system that was less favourable to commercial interests and that reduced incenti ves for
innovation.
China’s re-emergence in recent decades has reduced its income gap with the West. When Chinese
Economic Reform began in 1980, China’s GDP per capita was just 8 per cent of Europe’s, while its share
of global GDP was around 5 per cent. By 2010, its GDP per capita was more than 30 per cent of Europe’s
and its share of global GDP had more than doubled.
Figure 2: Economic divergence and convergence, 1700–2010
Source: Liu & McDonald 2010.
Note: Europe refers to Western Europe. GDP measured by 1990 PPP-adjusted international dollars.
Economic transformation and industrialisation
Industrialisation is normally measured by an increased share of industry and manufacturing as a
proportion of total economic activity (Weiss 2002). This transformation is, typically, characterised by a shift
from agriculture to high-value economic activities, such as manufacturing and services. This process of
industrialisation occurred first in Britain in the 18th and 19th centuries, in the United States and Western
Europe in the 19th century, in Japan and Korea in the 20th century, and in China in the late 20th and 21st
centuries.
China’s path of industrialisation since 1950 has been uneven and has been shaped by various economic
and social events. During the period 1950 to the late 1970s, China’s economy was dominated by
Resources, Energy and Tourism • China Review • June 2012
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agriculture and was heavily influenced by the so-called ‘Great Leap Forward’ and ‘Cultural Revolution’.
Since the late 1970s, China has experienced ‘Chinese Economic Reform’, with a very rapi d economic
transformation and growth.
The Great Leap Forward in 1958–59 was an economic and social campaign that aimed to use China’s
population to transform the country from an agrarian economy into a modern society through rapid
industrialisation and collectivisation. After the Great Leap Forward, when GDP fell between 1960 and
1962, China went through economic restructuring over the period 1963 –65 designed to promote faster
growth in agriculture. The Cultural Revolution was a sociopolitical movement that took place in China from
1966 through 1976. China’s worst ever earthquake, at Tangshan, and a leadership change after Mao’s
death, that both occurred in 1976, had a short-term negative impact on China’s economy.
Chinese Economic Reform is the program of economic reforms called ‘socialism with Chinese
characteristics’ that began in December 1978, and was initiated by Deng Xiaoping. The economic reforms
were in two stages. The first stage, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, involved the de -collectivisation of
agriculture and the opening up of the country to foreign investment that allowed Chinese entrepreneurs to
establish their own businesses. The second stage of the reforms, in the late 1980s and 1990s, involved
the privatisation and contracting out of some state-owned industry, the relaxation of price controls, and the
lifting of protectionist policies and regulations. Despite these reforms, key economic sectors, such as
banking, remained within the state ownership and/or control.
Following the Chinese Communist Party’s Third Plenum, held in October 2003, Chinese legislators
unveiled several proposed amendments to the state’s constitution. One of the most significant was a
proposal to provide protection for private property rights. At the Plenum, Legislator s indicated there would
be a new emphasis on government economic policy, so as to reduce unemployment, to rebalance income
distribution between urban and rural regions, and to maintain economic growth while protecting the
environment and improving social equity.
The structural transformation in China in the past three decades has involved a shift that has diminished
the importance of agriculture in the economy. This can be measured by changes in the share of output in
GDP and employment of different sectors of the economy. Figure 3 shows that China’s industrialisation
drive dates from its first Five Year Plan (FYP), which began in 1953.
Figure 3: Structural transformation, output and employment shares, 1952–2010
(a) Output share
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(b) Employment share
Source: China statistical yearbook 2011; CEIC.
Note: In China, economic activities are categorised into three strata of industry. Primary industry refers to agriculture; forestry; animal
husbandry and fishery; and the services in support of these industries. Secondary industry refers to mining and quarrying;
manufacturing; production and supply of electricity, water and gas; and construction. Tertiary industry refers to all economic activities
not included in primary or secondary industries.
Changes in China’s economic structure are shown in the primary sector’s decreased GDP share, and the
industry and tertiary sectors’ increased share of both GDP and employment. Primary industry’s share of
GDP, which includes agriculture, fell from 30 per cent in 1980 to 10 per cent in 2010. In 1980, seven in 10
Chinese worked in primary industry, but by 2010 it had fallen to 3 in 10. By contrast, China’s secondary
industry continues to dominate the economy and accounted for about 45 per cent of its GDP, on average,
over the past three decades. The output share of the tertiary or service sector has grown rapidly and
almost doubled, from around 22 per cent to more than 43 per cent, between 1980 and 2010.
Structural transformation has contributed to a massive shift in population from rural to urban areas, and to
higher-value-added manufacturing and the service sector. Figure 4 shows the spectacular impact on real
GDP per capita.
Resources, Energy and Tourism • China Review • June 2012
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Figure 4: Real GDP per capita (PPP) by the end of each FYP, 1953–2010
Source: The Conference Board Total Economy Database.
Note: PPP refers to purchasing-power-parity.
Resources, Energy and Tourism • China Review • June 2012
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Box 1: China’s eleven Five Year Plans (FYP), 1953–2010
The First FYP (1953–57) set the goal of higher economic growth and emphasised the development of heavy
industries (mining, iron manufacturing and steel manufacturing) and technology (for example, machine construction),
and followed the Soviet model of economic development.
The goal in the Second FYP (1958–62) was to rapidly increase China’s industrial output by ‘mobilising’ the country’s
vast rural workforce. This campaign was known as the Great Leap Forward. China began repaying its Soviet -issued
loans with agricultural products. During this period the Great Chinese Famine occurred in which millions of people
either starved or were malnourished.
The Third FYP (1966–70) aimed to deliver ‘basics’, including food and clothing, to the Chinese population and
outlined agricultural and economic goals. This FYP coincided with the beginning of the Cultural Revolution (1966 –76).
The Fourth FYP (1971–75) set the target of 12.5 per cent annual growth in industrial and agricultural gross output, with
130 billion Yuan budgeted for infrastructure development. Implemented during the latter stages of the Cultural
Revolution, the Fourth FYP stressed the importance of both industry and agriculture. There was faster economic growth
in the period of the fourth FYP than there was in all previous five-year periods.
The Fifth FYP (1976–80) was created as part of the Ten Year National Economic Development Plan for 1976–85. It
included the institution of the one child policy, which was introduced by Deng Xiaoping in 1979 as a way to control
population growth. This policy limits Chinese couples to having only one child. The Fifth FYP began a gradual
movement away from a Soviet-style command economy and a gradual introduction of market reforms.
The Sixth FYP (1980–85) was created as part of the Ten Year National Economic Development Plan for 1976 –85, but
was amended in 1980 and 1982. The final version of the Sixth FYP was ratified in December 1982. The institution of
the household responsibility system for farming and the rise of quasi-private township and village enterprises
coincided with unprecedented economic growth and capital accumulation in China’s rural sector. During this period
the central government, for the first time, opened China’s economy to foreign direct investment. Beginning in 1980,
special economic zones were created in southern coastal areas where it became legal for foreign companies to in vest
in export-producing joint ventures using local Chinese labour.
The Seventh FYP (1986–90) continued to emphasise innovation and economic expansion. Gross national product
(GNP) and fixed asset investment both increased over the period, but the 1989 Tiananmen incident had a negative
economic impact as foreign loans to China declined or were suspended, and foreign investment fell.
The Eighth FYP (1991–95) marked the beginning of a phase of renewed economic reform under the leadership of
Deng Xiaoping. Deng undertook his famous ‘Southern Tour’ in 1992 when he signalled his support for expanding
market reforms.
The Ninth FYP (1996–2000) was the first plan enacted under a ‘socialist market economy’. This plan, which straddled
the 20th and 21st centuries, aimed to quadruple per capita GNP and double gross national product by 2000.
The Tenth FYP (2001–05) continued and extended previous FYP objectives, including increasing annual economic
growth and income, keeping the unemployment rate at 5 per cent, maintaining price stability, continuing the
development of foreign trade and increasing international competitiveness, closing the gap between rich and poor by
raising levels of urbanisation, increasing research funding to more than 1.5 per cent of GDP, and expa nding science
and technological progress.
The Eleventh FYP (2006–10) had the same goals as the previous two plans: continue strong economic growth, support
urbanisation, improve the quality of life, protect the environment, improve education and access to jobs, and build a
better system of medical care and pensions.
China’s industrialisation and urbanisation are, in part, a consequence of foreign investment. China’s
admission to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 2001, in particular, coincided with a large increase in
its exports, imports and inward foreign direct investment. For example, Figure 5 shows that foreign direct
investment in China increased 30-fold in nominal dollars from US$3 billion in 1990 to US$106 billion in
2010, with an average annual growth rate of around 24 per cent.
Over the period 1990–2010 the total value of Chinese exports in nominal dollars increased 25-fold, from
US$62 billion in 1990 to US$1,578 billion in 2010, while total imports increased 26 -fold, from US$53 billion
in 1990 to US$1,396 billion in 2010. On average, the growth rate for total exports and imports was 18 per
cent per annum over the same period. China’s export-led growth has translated into very large trade and
current account surpluses. As a result, its foreign exchange reserves in nominal dollars increased from
US$3 billion in 1981 to US$2,847 billion in 2010, with an average annual growth rate of 35 per cent.
Resources, Energy and Tourism • China Review • June 2012
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Figure 5: China’s foreign direct investment, export and import (nominal dollars), 1990 -2010
Source: China statistical yearbook 2011.
Note: *Refers to foreign direct investment.
A ‘go global’ policy was unveiled in 1999 and consolidated at the Chinese Communist Party’s Sixteenth
Congress in 2002. The objectives of this policy were to encourage outward direct investment (ODI) to
support national exports, to push domestic firms to internationalise their activities and to link to overseas
markets (Hurst 2011). By 2010, total Chinese ODI flows in nominal dollars were US$68.81 billion and the
cumulative flows were US$317.21 billion, a dramatic increase from US$2.7 bil lion in ODI and US$29.9
billion in stock in 2002 (see Figure 6).
Figure 6: China’s outward FDI flows and stock (nominal dollars), 2002–10
Source: MOFCOM (Ministry of Commerce, China) 2012.
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Urbanisation
Since the early 1980s the Chinese government has gradually relaxed the ‘hukou’ system, a formerly very
strict policy of household registration. This has helped the rural–urban migration of workers, supported
rapid growth in the construction and manufacturing sectors and, in some cases, the settlement of rural
workers in urbanised areas. Partly due to the changes in these policies the proportion of China’s
population living in cities in 2010 was almost 50 per cent and included some 670 million people (see
Figure 7).
Figure 7: Urbanisation in China, 1978–2010
Source: China statistical yearbook 2011.
Based on United Nations (UN) projections, the rate of urbanisation in China is expected to be 68 per cent
by 2040, which is equivalent to the urbanisation rate projected for Japan in 2015. By 2050, the
urbanisation rate in China is expected to be 73 per cent, equivalent to the rate of urbanisation projected
for Europe in 2015.
The UN projects that China’s urban population will reach one billion by 2030. By 2025, China will have 163
cities with one million–plus inhabitants, compared with 63 cities of that size in Europe. This growth will put
major pressure on public funding for the provision of social services and increase the need to supply
adequate land, energy and water for cities. On the positive side, concentrated urbanisation has the
economic advantage of ‘clustering’ the most skilled workers who promote innovation and higher -valueadded economic activities.
Rapid urbanisation has fuelled construction and transportation in China’ s cities. Most of the Chinese
middle class live in cities and with increases in their living standards demand better housing and more and
higher-quality consumer durables including refrigerators, colour televisions, air conditioners, computers
and cars. Rising incomes have meant that, today, most urban households in China have a refrigerator and
a colour television, and a growing number have air conditioners. Car ownership has increase d from one
car per 100 urban households in 2000, to three cars per 100 households in 2005, to 13 cars per 100
households in 2010 (see Figure 8).
Resources, Energy and Tourism • China Review • June 2012
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Figure 8: Ownership of major durable consumer goods per 100 urban households
Source: China statistical yearbook 2011.
Urbanisation and higher incomes have both increased the resource intensity of commodities in China’s
economy. Figure 9 shows the relationship between per capita consumption of crude steel, aluminium,
copper and zinc and real per capita GDP for selected countries, including China. China’s steel
consumption increased sharply over recent decades from a low base in 1980. Steel intensity of use
(measured by kilogram consumption per person) in China overtook that of the United States in 2009 and is
rapidly approaching the per capita intensity of Japan. Rapid increases in per capita resources intensities
have also occurred for aluminium, copper and zinc.
Figure 9: Commodity consumption per capita and GDP per capita: crude steel, aluminium, copper and
zinc, selected countries
(a) Crude steel, 1980 to 2010
(b) Aluminium, 1988 to 2010
Resources, Energy and Tourism • China Review • June 2012
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Source: BREE; Steel statistical yearbook; IMF database 2012.
(c) Copper, 1980 to 2010
(d) Zinc, 1990 to 2010
Source: BREE and IMF database 2012.
Economic catch-up
The ‘catch-up effect’ is the view that per capita incomes in poorer economies tend to grow at a faster rate
than those in richer economies. It purports that countries starting out with lower output per capita
experience faster growth and the rate of catch-up, in part, is determined by a country’s ability to absorb
ideas and knowledge from the technological frontier (Rodrik 2011).
Resources, Energy and Tourism • China Review • June 2012
16
The convergence or catch-up potential of countries is, typically, measured by the income gap that
separates poor countries from rich nations. Starting from a low level of income and high incidence of
poverty in the early 1980s, China’s catch-up has proceeded at a remarkable pace. Based on measures of
purchasing-power parity by the IMF, China’s GDP per capita increased from US$251 ( lower than Nepal’s,
US$265) in 1980 to US$7,544 (more than two times higher than in India) in 2010, a 30 -fold increase over
the period. Over the past three decades the Chinese economy has maintained an average annual growth
rate of over 9 per cent, equivalent to doubling its size every eight years. As a result, China’s real GDP per
capita rose from below 3 per cent of that of the United States in 1980 to 18 per cent in 2010. While China
is now the world’s second largest economy, in 2011 it ranked 93 (US$8,382 PPP measure) on the IMF’s
GDP per capita rankings of 181 economies.
China’s economic catch-up has been very rapid and is comparable to the pace of economic growth of
South Korea from the mid to late 1960s, and Japan from the mid 1950s (see Figure 10). I n part, the fast
speed of China’s economic convergence to richer countries is because it started from a significantly lower
per capita level than did many other Asian economies (Liu & McDonald 2010). For instance, in 1955
Japan’s real GDP per capita was around 27 per cent that of the United States, higher than China’s relative
level of 18 per cent in 2010. Moreover, as the global frontiers of income and productivity continue to
extend over time, the latecomers (such as China) can move more rapidly than thei r predecessors
(Garnaut 2006).
Resources, Energy and Tourism • China Review • June 2012
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Figure 10: Economic convergence
(a) Percentage of US GDP per capita
(b) GDP per capita growth after take-off
Source: Liu & McDonald 2010.
Note: GDP per capita is in purchasing-power parity (PPP) terms. Growth take-off is assumed to have occurred in 1955 for Japan, 1967
for South Korea, 1973 for Malaysia and Thailand, and 1979 for China.
Key determinants of long-term GDP per capita include workforce participation along with the size and
quality of the labour force. Labour force utilisation in the workforce depends on several factors including
the number of working-age people in the population, the level of structural unemployment, and hours
worked per worker. Labour productivity depends on improvements in labour quality (such as skills and
education) and the pace of technical change associated with the capital–output ratio and the quality of
capital used by labour.
Figure 11 shows that the ratio of China’s labour productivity to that of the US was about 3 per cent in
1960, but increased to 14 per cent in 2010. By comparison, the ratio of India’s labour productivity to that of
the US increased from 5 per cent in 1960 to 9 per cent in 2010 while for Venezuela and South Africa the
ratio fell over the same period.
Resources, Energy and Tourism • China Review • June 2012
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Figure 11: Labour productivity relative to the US: selected economies, 1960 –2010
Source: The Conference Board Total Economy Database.
As a result of China’s catch-up with developed countries, its economy has moved from the seventh largest
in the world in 1990, with a GDP that accounted for 4 per cent of world output, to the world’s second
largest economy, contributing about 14 per cent of world GDP by 2010 (see Table 1).
Table 1: World economic rankings (purchasing-power parity US$billion)
PPP
(US$b)
% World
GDP
PPP
(US$b)
% World
GDP
United States
5801
24.7
1 United States
14 527
19.5
2
Japan
2328
9.9
2 China
10 120
13.6
3
Germany
1447
6.2
3 Japan
4 324
5.8
4
France
1031
4.4
4 India
4 058
5.5
5
Italy
973
4.1
5 Germany
2 944
4.0
6
United Kingdom
961
4.1
6 Russia
2 231
3.0
7
China
911
3.9
7 United Kingdom
2 181
2.9
8
Brazil
783
3.3
8 Brazil
2 179
2.9
9
India
745
3.2
9 France
2 135
2.9
10
Mexico
612
2.6
1 779
2.4
Ranking
1990
Country
1
Ranking Country
2010
10 Italy
Source: IMF database 2012.
Resources, Energy and Tourism • China Review • June 2012
19
Economic differences
China’s aggregate catch-up, however, masks diverging paths for different parts of China. Three regions
with discrete development paths have emerged in the past two or more decades: (1) the ‘leading’ coastal
areas, characterised by high income levels and a high growth rate; (2) the ‘catching-up’ central regions,
with average income levels, but rapid structural changes from agriculture to industry and services; and (3)
the ‘backward’ regions of the west, with a much lower growth rate.
China’s ‘dual-track’ approach to economic transition has helped it to achieve enviable stability and growth
by achieving ‘reform without losers’ (Lin 2012). China’s transition strategy has included a desire to: (1)
maintain state-owned industries and (2) achieve dynamic growth while simultaneously pursuing China’s
comparative advantage via a market-based approach to economic development. This so-called dual-track
system has been used extensively in its urbanisation polices, the conduct of foreign trade and with various
reforms in terms of labour regulation, housing, social security and private ownership. The most significant
achievement of China’s dual-track transition has been the rapid development of the ‘new track’, or the
non-state sector, which includes rural collective industries, urban corporations, private and individual
businesses, and foreign joint-venture companies.
Despite rapid growth in China’s economy, there remain large disparities between rural and urban areas.
For example, the annual disposable income of urban households was 2.5 times higher than that of rural
households in 1980, but more than three times higher in 2010. While rural incomes increased faster than
urban incomes from 1980 until the early 2000s, since 2003 rural incomes have lagg ed behind urban
incomes (see Figure 12).
Figure 12: Growth in annual disposable income of urban households and net income of rural households,
1980–2010
Source: China statistical yearbook 2011.
Note: 1: Net income refers to the total income of rural households from all sources minus all corresponding expenses. It is principally
used for reinvestment in production and as consumption expenditure for the year while also providing funds for saving and noncompulsory expenses.
Economic transition
During China’s economic transition, trade has provided the impetus for investment and also the transfer of
knowledge that has allowed China’s per capita income levels to converge towards the levels in the West.
In the early ‘catch-up’ years, China’s comparative advantage was in cheap labour in manufacturing. Over
time, however, there has been a gradual shift from the labour-intensive sectors to capital-intensive or highvalue-added industries.
China’s future prosperity will increasingly depend on growing its domestic demand. Its household
Resources, Energy and Tourism • China Review • June 2012
20
consumption share of GDP was around 50 per cent in 1980, but fell to 34 per cent in 2010. By contrast,
the share of gross fixed capital formation of GDP increased from around 29 per cent in 1980 to more than
46 per cent in 2010 (see Figure 13).
Resources, Energy and Tourism • China Review • June 2012
21
Figure 13: Household consumption and gross fixed capital formation: share of GDP, 1978 –2010
Source: China statistical yearbook 2011.
As China approaches the global technology frontier and its capital intensity converges to that of the West,
its speed of convergence will likely decline. In other words, as the easy catch -up gains diminish, future
growth will increasingly depend on total factor productivity growth (Eichengreen et al. 2011). China’s future
economic growth will become relatively less resource-intensive and become more reliant on services and
private domestic consumption. These trends suggest that China’s economic growth rates will moderate
and the growth rate in its resource intensity will decline. During this process of economic and structural
adjustment, China’s faces a number of risks that include higher and more volatile levels of inflation and a
change in asset prices and income relativities.
China and Australia
China’s economic growth and transition have had a major impact on Australia. In particular, China’s
spectacular economic growth in the recent past has fuelled the resource commodities boom of which
Australia has been a major beneficiary in the form of both higher export prices and volumes. Thus, over
the past 20 years the real value of Australian exports of mineral resources to China has increased from
A$0.2 billion in 1989–90 to A$49.9 billion in 2010–11, and the value of Australian total merchandised
exports to China has increased from A$1.2 billion to A$64.9 billion over the same period (see Figure 14).
Resources, Energy and Tourism • China Review • June 2012
22
Figure 14: Australian exports of mineral resources and merchandised goods to China (A$2010 –11), 1989–
90 to 2010–11
Sources: BREE; ABS cat. no. 5368.0 and 5302.0.
Note: a Not based on balance of payments number; b Chain value calculation. Merchandised goods have sub-categories rural and nonrural. Non-rural has the further sub-categories metal ores and minerals; coal, coke and briquettes; other mineral fuels metals (excl. nonmonetary gold); machinery, transport equipment; other manufactures and other non-rural.
Australian export of iron ore to China accounted for around 69 per cent of Australian total iron ore exports
in 2010–11 compared to around 6 per cent in 1989–90. Over the period of 1989–90 to 2010–11 the share
of Australian export of metallurgical coal to China increased from 1 per cent to around 11 per cent, while
the share of Australian exports of thermal coal to China increased from 0.1 per cent to around 12 per cent
(see Figure 15). (see Box 2 for a snapshot of Australian commodity exports).
Figure 15: Volume share of exports to China as proportion of the Australia’s total exports: metallurgical
coal, thermal coal and iron ore, 1989–90 to 2010–11
Sources: BREE; ABS cat. no. 5465.0.
Resources, Energy and Tourism • China Review • June 2012
23
Box 2: Snapshot of Australian commodity exports
Australia supplied around a quarter of the world’s iron ore production in 2010 and exported more than 90 per cent of
its production.

Based on 2011 statistical information provided by the IEA, in 2010 Australian export of metallurgical coal
accounted for 57 per cent of the global total, compared to 18 per cent from the United States, 10 per cent from
Canada, 5 per cent from Russia and 4 per cent from Mongolia.

Based on the IEA’s estimates, in 2010 Australian export of thermal coal accounted for 21 per cent of the global
total, compared to 23 per cent from Indonesia, 14 per cent from Russia and 10 per cent from South Africa.

Based on the 2011 BP statistical review, in 2010 Australian LNG export accounted for about 9 per cent of the
global total, compared to some 26 per cent from Qatar and 8 per cent from Nigeria.
Source: Liu & Grafton 2011.
Strong Chinese demand for resources and energy, due to its re-emergence, has resulted in large volumes
of Australian exports, more Australian jobs and investment, higher incomes for working Australians and
tax revenue.
Direct employment in Australian mining accounted for around 2 per cent of total employment in Australia in
2011, and the number of jobs in the sector has increased by more than 130,000 since 2001. In 2010–11
gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) in the Australian mining sector was worth A$48 billion, or about 4 per
cent of Australia’s GDP. The direct value of the mining sector has more than tripled in terms of its
importance to the economy from less than 3 per cent in 1980–81 to 9 per cent in 2010–11.
Since 2003, strong investment and employment in the mining and construction industries have contributed
to strong growth in employment in states with large mining sectors. At the state level, the average an nual
employment growth rate in mining was 12 per cent in Queensland and 11 per cent in both Western
Australia and New South Wales.
Higher mineral resource prices, combined with reduced prices in imports (especially imports from low -cost
producing countries in Asia), have translated into an improvement in Australia’s terms of trade (the ratio of
prices we receive for our exports to the prices we pay for imports). Higher terms of trade, partly
attributable to increased prices for resources and energy commodities, increase Australia’s national
income and household incomes. The upward trend in the terms of trade has been occurring since 2003,
despite a temporary fall associated with the onset of the GFC (see Figure 16), and peaked in 2011.
Figure 16: Terms of trade, June 1960–June 2011
Source: ABS cat. no. 5206.0.
The prospect for China’s commodity demand over the medium term depends on the pace and composition
of its economic growth and structural adjustment (IMF 2012). The Chinese government, however, has
committed to rebalancing demand away from investment and exports and towards consumption.
China’s re-emergence has had important effects on the non-mining parts of the economy as it is both
Australia’s largest export destination and the largest source of Australian imports. In particular, Chinese
growth has had a major impact on Australia’s tourism industry. As incomes in China rise, consumption
patterns will shift towards higher order goods and services (such as consumer durables, culture, tourism,
Resources, Energy and Tourism • China Review • June 2012
24
and advanced education). The growth in Chinese tourists visiting Australia has been dramatic such that
more Chinese than Americans or Japanese visit Australia (see Figure 17).
Figure 17: International arrivals in Australia, by country, 2000–01 to 2010–11
Source: TRA 2012.
Concluding remarks
China was the world’s largest economy until the early years of the eighteenth century.
The period from the mid 1800s to 1950, however, was a time of relative economic decline. Starting from a
very low base in terms of per capita income China’s has transformed itself over the past 30 years into one
of the world’s fast growing economies.
China’s re-emergence, especially in the past decade, has had a profound global impact. To support its
very rapid growth, China has undertaken massive capital investments, particularly in its infrastructure, and
has become the world’s largest exporter. As a result of this transformation, its demand for key resources,
such as for iron ore and coal, has supported very large increases in the real prices of bulk resource
commodities in which Australia is a major exporter. Higher commodity prices have also encouraged
spectacular growth in mining investments in Australia over the past decade.
China is expected to continue to grow rapidly in the years to come, but at a lower rate than the average
over the past decade. The nature of its future growth will also likely change with lower growth in terms of
its resource intensity. This structural transformation already underway in China poses both challenges and
opportunities for Australia in the decades ahead.
Resources, Energy and Tourism • China Review • June 2012
25
References
Eichengreen, B, Park, D & Shin, K (2011). When fast growing economies slow down: international
evidence and implications for the People’s Republic of China, ADB Economics Working Paper Series No.
262, Asian Development Bank.
Garnaut, R (2006). The China resources boom, paper presented at the Australian Ag ricultural and
Resource Economics, Sydney, 8-10 February 2006.
Hurst, L (2011), Comparative analysis of the determinants of China’s state owned overseas direct
investment in OECD and non-OECD countries, China & World Economy, Vol. 19(4), pp.
74-91.
IMF (2012). World economic outlook: growth resuming, dangers remain, International Monetary Fund,
April 2012.
Lin, J (2012). Demystifying the Chinese economy, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Liu, J & Grafton, Q (2011). Resources and energy prices: trends, volatility and demand shocks, Resources
and Energy Quarterly Review, Bureau of Resources and Energy Economics, September 2011.
Liu, J & McDonald, T (2010). China: growth, urbanisation and mineral res ource demand, Economic
Roundup, issue 2, Department of the Treasury.
TRA (2012). Forecast 2012, Tourism Research Australia.
Rodrik, D (2011). The future of economic convergence, paper prepared for the 2011 Jackson Hole
Symposium of the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City.
Weiss, J (2002). Industrialization and globalization: theory and evidence from developing countries ,
Routledge, London.
World Bank (2012). Global monitoring report 2012: food prices, nutrition, and the millennium development
goals.
Resources, Energy and Tourism • China Review • June 2012
26
China Review
Reviews
Resources, Energy and Tourism • China Review • June 2012
27
By Invitation:
China’s demographic transition
and economic growth1
Zheng (Annie) Wei, Crawford School of Public Policy, Australian National University, Canberra
Rui Hao, Institute for Advanced Study (IAS), Shenzhen University, Shenzhen, China2
In the past four decades few countries in the world have experienced more pronounced economic growth
than has China. In 2011 the growth rate of China’s GDP per capita was over 9 per cent—even higher than
its average growth rate over the past 30 years. The ‘miracle’ of China’s growth has been attributed to
various factors, including institutional reforms, rapid accumulation of capital and substantial improvement
in total factor productivity (see overview in this issue). However, one fundamental facto r that has rarely
been investigated is China’s demographic structure. During the past few decades China has experienced
significant changes not only in its institutions and economy, but also in the age structure of its population.
By applying China’s provincial-level data over the period 1989–2004 to a growth regression that
incorporated age structure dynamics, we find that changes in demographic structure have had profound
implications for the development of China’s economy.
Theoretical framework
According to the demographic transition model (Notestein 1945), a population usually experiences four
stages of demographic transition from high fertility and mortality to low fertility and mortality, eventually
becoming an ageing society. When a population enters the third stage of demographic transition, fertility
starts to decline. This leads to a considerable decrease in the number of dependants, particularly youth
dependants. Given the relatively small number of elderly dependants, the demographic structure of the
population is dominated by the working-age population (aged between 15 and 65 years); thus the ratio of
total dependants—the sum of youth and elderly dependants—to working-age population declines. This
ratio, known as the total dependency ratio, is often used as a proxy for a country’s demographic structure.
The so-called ‘demographic window’ opens when the total dependency ratio in a country falls to
approximately 40 to 60 per cent (United Nations 2004). During the demographic window, the working -age
population provides an ‘ample’ labour supply to an economy. A substantial decline in fertility means more
capital is available for productive investment. In smaller families, parents tend to invest more in ‘child
quality’—that is, they invest more in their child’s education and health—and, thus, more human capital is
accumulated. In short, changes in the demographic structure during the demographic window can boost
economic growth by providing an ample labour force, contributing to savings and promotin g the
accumulation of human capital. The contribution these demographic changes make is often referred to as
the ‘demographic dividend’ or ‘demographic gift’ to economic growth (Bloom & Williamson 1998).
The concept of the demographic dividend has been assessed in various cross-country cases. For
example, Bloom, Canning and Malaney (2000) found that dramatic changes in demographic structure
contributed to at least a third of the extraordinary economic growth in East Asia during the years 1965 –90.
Despite having experienced similar demographic transition, Latin America as a whole was unable to
achieve a demographic dividend in the 1960s to 1990s because of its unstable socio -political environment,
hyperinflation and severe unemployment (Bloom & Canning 2004). In this study, we examine the
demographic dividend to China’s provincial-level economic growth over the period 1998–2004.
1
2
This report relies heavily on the authors’ paper ‘Demographic structure and economic growth: evidence from China’, published in
the Journal of Comparative Economics 38(4), pp.472–91, 2010.
The views expressed in this review are those of the authors alone and not the Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism
(RET). ‘By Invitation’ provides an opportunity for scholars and experts tp present their research findings on issues of relevance to
the Bureau of Resources and Energy Economics (BREE) and/or Tourism Research Australia (TRA)
Resources, Energy and Tourism • China Review • June 2012
28
China’s demographic changes and economic development
The Chinese population has experienced dramatic demographic transitions over the past five decades. As
shown in Figure 1, birth rates rose as high as 4.34 per cent while mortality declined substantially, except
for the three famine years in the 1960s. This was as a result of improvements in preventive health and in
environmental sanitation and hygiene. Consequently, China’s total population grew at a rate of 1.95 per
cent per annum on average over 1949–70. This relatively high population growth rate began to slow in the
early 1970s when the so-called ‘later marriage, longer birth intervals and fewer births’ family planning
program was adopted. It declined further once the one-child policy was formally announced and
implemented in the 1980s. By 2007 China’s fertility rate had fallen to 1.8 births per woman, from 7.5 births
per woman in the 1960s, and was below the replacement rate. Mortality also declined dramatically, from 2
per cent to a level close to that for developed countries, while the annual growth rate of the total
population fell to just 0.59 per cent (World Bank 2009).
Figure 1: The demographic transition of the Chinese population, 1949–2006
Source: Comprehensive statistical data and materials on 55 years of NewChina (National bureau of statistics of China, 2005), World
development indicators (World Bank, 2009).
Figure 2: China’s dependency ratios, 1960–2005
Resources, Energy and Tourism • China Review • June 2012
29
Source: World development indicators (World Bank, 2009).
The dramatic transition of China’s population has changed its demographic structure. As illustrated in
Figure 2, the total dependency ratio declined by 38 per cent, from 80 per cent to 41 per cent, over the 30
years from 1965 to 2005. This can be attributed largely to changes in the youth dependency ratio, which
fell from 72.5 per cent to 30.2 per cent between 1965 and 2005. By contrast, the elderly dependency ratio
remained relatively stable at an average rate of 7.8 per cent. Since 1990 the total dependency ratio has
fallen to 49.8 per cent, indicating that China has entered the so-called demographic window, with the
opportunity to achieve a demographic dividend to growth.
Figure 3: China’s dependency ratio and economic growth, 1960–2006
Source: World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2009).
The implications of demographic transition for economic growth
We investigated the economic implications of the demographic transition in 1989–2004 in a convergence
equation that incorporated the key demographic variable—namely the age structure represented by the
total dependency ratio.
As shown in the equation below, both the initial level (denoted as lnDi,t-1) and growth rates (gD) of the total
dependency ratio were included in order to capture the long-run and short-run effects of changes in
demographic structure. Other demographic variables, such as urban population share (lnurbani,t-1),
population size (lnpopi,t-1) and population density (lnpopdeni,t-1), were also included.
gy = α1 lnyi,t-1 + α2 lnDi,t-1 + α3 lnurbani,t-1 + α4 lnpopdeni,t-1 + α5 lnpopi,t-1 +
α6 gD + β Xi,t-1 + γ geogi + ηi + δt + εit
The following variables were used:
gy is provincial growth rates of GDP per capita
lnyi,t-1 is the initial level of log GDP per capita for capturing the income convergence effect
Xi,t-1 represents a set of control variables, including openness, marketisation, government expendit ure and
investment rates
Resources, Energy and Tourism • China Review • June 2012
30
geogi captures geographic proximity to sea-based international trade and pure geographic topography.
Dummies for periods (ηi) and regions (δt) were included to account for unobserved heterogeneities across
regions and over time. In addition to ordinary least squares, the instrumental variable (IV) and feasible
generalised least squared (FGLS) estimation were applied to account for endogeneity and heterogeneity.
Table 1 presents a snapshot of the results.
Even after controlling for other growth determinants and the endogeneity of demographic variables, we
found that changes in demographic structure had a significant impact on China’s economic growth.
Specifically, a 1 per cent decline in the total dependency ratio leads to a 0.11 per cent increase in the
growth rate of GDP per capita. In 1989–2004, China’s provincial-level total dependency ratio fell by 13 per
cent on average, which contributed 1.43 per cent to economic growth. Given that provincial GDP per
capita grew at an average rate of 8.6 per cent per annum, this indicates that changes in demographic
structure contributed about one-sixth of China’s provincial economic growth over the defined period. This
finding is similar to the 15 per cent demographic contribution to economic gr owth reported by Wang and
Mason (2008). The impact of changes in demographic structure on China’s economic growth appears to
be more important in the long run than in the short run.
The urban population share, representing the degree of urbanisation of an economy, was included to
account for the impact of economies of scale. In the past few decades, China’s urbanisation has increased
by more than 20 per cent as a proportion of the total population, from 25 per cent in 1978. A larger urban
population share is a natural consequence of the expanded labour supply that has come from the
demographic transition. Increasing urbanisation can help urban industries achieve economies of scale in
production, but it may also generate congestion. The ultimate effect of ur banisation depends on the tradeoff between economies of scale and congestion effects. We find that the impact of urbanisation on
economic growth becomes positive and statistically significant only if we control for cross -sectional
heteroskedasticity and time series autocorrelation.
In our analysis, population density and size were used to examine the effects of density and scale on
economic growth. In 1978–2004, provincial-level population density increased by 43 per cent on average,
and the population grew from 31.9 million to 43.1 million. Higher population density may promote
economic growth by stimulating technological change, reducing transportation costs, increasing production
efficiency and facilitating specialisation, but may hamper it via diminishing returns to limited resources
such as land. Likewise, a larger population can help facilitate specialisation and diversification between
firms, but may also cause congestion. In our results, both density and scale appear to have a negative
effect on economic growth.
As noted by Bloom and Williamson (1998), the benefits of the demographic dividend are not automatic,
but critically hinge on a compatible economic and policy environment. As shown in Figure 3, China’s
economy has grown particularly rapidly since the late 1980s, when additional market reforms were
formally launched. Marketisation reforms have largely removed impediments to private sector
development and optimised allocation of economic resources. As a result, the flexibility of labour and
capital markets has been greatly improved. These changes have helped ‘absorb’ the increased labour
supply released during the demographic window and translated accumulated savings into productive
investment in the economy.
Economic reforms have coincided with the opening of the demographic window, but we contend that
reforms may also have helped realise the demographic dividend. We tested this hypothesis by introducing
an interaction term between the total dependency ratio and the degree of marketisation. Our re sults,
displayed in Table 1, show that the interaction term is negatively associated with economic growth at the 1
per cent level of significance, while the total dependency ratio itself becomes significantly positive. This
implies that marketisation may have played an important role in facilitating the demographic dividend to
China’s economic growth.
In summary, our study shows that since the 1990s China has experienced a remarkable demographic
transition. This has had a profound impact on the Chinese economy and contributed one-sixth of its rapid
rate of economic growth. During this period, marketisation appears to have played a pivotal role in the
demographic dividend in the economy. In 2010 China’s total dependency ratio fell to 34.2 per cent, and
the fertility rate was even lower than the replacement rate. However, China’s ageing and its dependency
ratio will begin to rise in three to five years. A future and less beneficial demographic transition demands
further and deeper marketisation in both its labour market and the social security system. Such changes
will enable China, the world’s most populous country, to prepare to become an ageing society.
Resources, Energy and Tourism • China Review • June 2012
31
Table 1: Contribution of China’s demographic structure to its economic growth
Average growth rate of GDP per capita in five-year intervals
Contribution
Impact (+/-)
Total dependency ratio, initial level
–3.793**
Negative
Population density
–0.484**
Negative
–0.082
Negative
–3.394***
Negative
1.389***
Positive
2.111**
Positive
Population size
Initial GDP per capita
Trade openness
Market reform
Note: ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. For other estimations, please see Wei and
Hao 2010.
References
Bloom, DE & Canning, D (2004). Global demographic change: dimensions and economic significance,
NBER Working Paper No. 10817, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Bloom, DE, Canning, D, Hu, L, Liu, Y, Mahal, A & Yip, W (2006). Why has China’s economy taken off
faster than India’s?, paper presented at the Pan Asia 2006 conference, Stanford Centre for International
Development, 3 June 2006.
Bloom, DE, Canning, D & Malaney, PN (2000). Population dynamics and economic growth in Asia,
Population and Development Review 26, pp. 257–90.
Bloom, DE & Williamson, JG (1998), Demographic transitions and economic miracles in emerging Asia,
World Bank Economic Review 12(3), pp. 419–56.
National Bureau of Statistics of China (2005). Comprehensive statistical data and materials on 55 years of
New China, China Statistical Press, Beijing.
Notestein, F (1945). Population—the long view, in Theodore W Schultz (ed.), Food for the world,
University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
Perkins, DH & Rawski, TG (2008). Forecasting China’s economic growth to 2025, in L Brandt & T Rawski
(eds), China’s great economic transformation, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, New York.
United Nations Population Division (2004). World Population in 2300, Proceedings of the United Nations
expert meeting on world population in 2300, United Nations, New York.
Wang, F & Mason, A (2008). The demographic factor in China’s transition, in L Brandt & T Rawski (eds),
China’s great economic transformation, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, New York, pp. 136–66.
Wei, Z & Hao, R (2010). Demographic structure and economic growth: evidence from China, Journal of
Comparative Economics 38(4), pp. 472–91.
World Bank (2009). World development indicators, World Bank,Washington.
Resources, Energy and Tourism • China Review • June 2012
32
China’s demand for natural gas:
drivers and prospects
Jin Liu 3
Introduction
China is currently the largest consumer of total primary energy in the world, followed by the US (see
Figure 1(a)). China’s energy consumption per capita, however, is among the lowest of the top 10 global
economies and about a quarter that of the US (see Figure 1(b)). This suggests there is potential for
substantial growth in Chinese energy consumption over the coming decades.
Figure 1: Primary energy consumption by selected markets in 2010
(a) Top ten market: Total
(b) Consumption per capita
Source: BP 2011 and GGDC 2011.
China’s gas consumption has grown rapidly, in line with robust economic development and accelerated
industrialisation and urbanisation. A low-carbon society is a goal for China and the structural
transformation of the energy market towards cleaner energy, such as natural gas, is the basis of China’s
energy strategy.
Key drivers
The key drivers of China’s demand for natural gas are its rapid economic growth, industrialisation,
urbanisation and changes in economic structure. Over the past three decades, China’s path to
industrialisation has been characterised by structural transformation. The agricultural sector’s share of
gross domestic product (GDP) has decreased from 30 per cent in 1980 to less than 10 per cent in 2010.
Since China started to open up its economy in 1979 the average annual growth rate of its urban
population has been 3 per cent, meaning that from 1981 to 2011 the proportion of the population living in
cities more than doubled, increasing from 20 per cent to around 50 per cent (see Figure 2).
3
The views expressed in this review are those of the author alone and are not necessarily those of the Bureau of Resources and
Energy Economics (BREE) or the Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism (RET).
Resources, Energy and Tourism • China Review • June 2012
33
Figure 2: Urbanisation and GDP per capita in China, 1981–2011
Source: World Bank 2011 and IMF 2011.
Gas consumption has increased at an average annual rate of 16 per cent over the past decade. This
exceeds the growth in consumption of coal (9 per cent) and oil (7 per cent) over the same period. In
volume terms, total Chinese gas consumption increased fourfold, from 27.4 billion cubic metres (bcm) in
2001 to 109 bcm in 2010. Despite this robust growth, China’s per capita gas consumption in 2010 was 27
times less than that of the US and nine times less than that of Japan (see Figure 3).
Figure 3: Gas consumption per capita, China and other economies, 1965–2010
Source: BP 2011 and GGDC 2011.
Per capita gas consumption in China is relatively low partly because of an ongoing energy security policy
of ‘more coal; less oil and gas’. As a result, oil’s contribution to primary energy consumption declined by
10 percentage points between 2001 and 2010, from around 28 per cent to 18 per cent. In the same period,
coal’s contribution increased from 62 per cent to 70 per cent, while that of gas increased by one
Resources, Energy and Tourism • China Review • June 2012
34
percentage point, from 3 per cent to 4 per cent.
Gas consumption in China is affected by the size of household incomes and structural changes in the
economy that have affected the distribution of gas among end-use sectors. Table 1 shows that end-use
consumption of natural gas has changed substantially over the past decade. For instance, the proporti on
of gas consumed as an industrial fuel declined from 41 per cent to 28 per cent while the proportion for use
in chemical production fell from 37 per cent to 22 per cent between 2000 and 2010. By contrast, the
proportion of gas consumption for civilian fuel use increased from 18 per cent to 34 per cent and for power
generation rose from 4 per cent to 16 per cent over the same period.
Table 1: Natural gas in China, share of consumption by end-use sector, 2000 and 2010,
End use
2000
2010
Industry fuel
41%
28%
Chemical
37%
22%
Civilian fuel
18%
34%
4%
16%
Power generation
Source: Pan 2011.
While the growth in gas consumption has been very rapid, the growth in gas production has been slower.
As a result, imports have become increasingly important in meeting Chinese gas demand, and in 2006
China began importing liquefied natural gas (LNG) from Australia. Between 2006 and 2010, imports of
natural gas (both pipeline and LNG) into China increased 16-fold. In 2010, the bulk of the imports were in
the form of LNG, with Australia providing about 40 per cent of China’s total gas imports.
Prospects for gas demand
Continued strong growth in Chinese natural gas consumption and imports is expected due to: (1) robust
economic growth and (2) a policy imperative in the existing Twelfth Five Year Plan to increase the share of
energy consumed from clean energy sources, including natural gas.
The growth in Chinese demand for natural gas will likely be faster than for other fossil fuels, including coal
and oil, because of relatively low carbon emissions from the combustion of gas and the stated objective of
the Chinese government to diversity its fuel sources. Another potentially positive factor to growth is the
anticipated increase in production of unconventional natural gas, especially shale gas. Rapid advances in
gas-fired power generation technologies, the relative price of gas and coal, the removal of gas price
subsidies, and investment in fuel infrastructure and distribution networks are also expected to affect futu re
Chinas natural gas consumption and imports.
The Chinese government is actively seeking ways to mitigate energy-related carbon emissions and
accelerate the transition to a low-carbon economy. Its policies include a range of measures that support
renewable energy generation and the introduction of a carbon tax in 2016. These measures are likely to
reduce China’s carbon intensity in coming years, while its energy and emissions intensity are already in
decline. The carbon intensity of China’s energy supply increased from 2.5 kg CO 2 per kilogram of oil
equivalent (koe) in 1980 to 3.3 kg CO 2 per koe in 2008. Over the same period, its energy intensity
declined from 1.2 tonnes of oil equivalent (toe) per US$1000 GDP (in 2005 price, purchasing power parity)
to 0.3 toe, and its emissions intensity declined from 2.9 kg CO2 per GDP to 0.9 kg CO 2 per GDP.
China’s Twelfth Fifth Year Plan, for 2011–15, proposed to increase China’s target gas consumption from
5.3 per cent of total primary energy consumption, the amount in the previous plan, to about 8 per cent by
2015 (IEA 2011a). In 2011, China announced the twin targets of reducing energy intensity by 16 per cent
and carbon intensity by 17 per cent during the Twelfth Five Year Plan period. As part of this strategy,
China will undertake various measures, including the optimisation of the industrial structure and energy
mix, further conservation of energy and improvements in energy efficiency, and the enhancement of the
capacity of carbon sinks to sequester greenhouse gas emissions.
To achieve its carbon mitigation goal, China will need to reduce coal’s contribution to electricity generation
which increased from 50 per cent in 1980 to 78 per cent in 2010. This suggests that other energy fuels,
including uranium and gas, will play an increasing role in power generation. In particular, gas use which
currently provides less than 2 per cent of total electricity generation in China compared to the average of
over 22 per cent in developed countries (IEA 2011b) should increase dramatically.
Resources, Energy and Tourism • China Review • June 2012
35
ABARES (Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics and Sciences) global trade and
environmental model, GTEM 4, can be used to provide projections of the fuel mix for China by 2025. The
results of GTEM indicate that the electricity generation generated by coal is expected to fall from 78 per
cent to 59 per cent, while the gas share is expected to rise from 1 per cent to 7 per cent over the period
2010 to 2025.
Based on the assumption of 8.3 per cent average annual growth in its GDP, the GTEM projection is that
China’s total gas consumption will increase to 653 bcm (at a 13 per cent average annual compounded
growth rate) while imports will increase to 112 bcm (at a 14 per cent average annual compounded growth
rate) over the period 2010–25 (see Table 2). This means that China’s gas consumption and imports are
expected to increase sixfold and sevenfold, respectively, over the 15 years between 2010 and 2025. If
these projections materialise, there will be opportunities for Australia to su bstantially increase its exports
of LNG to China.
Table 2: China’s natural gas consumption and imports, 2010–25
Consumption
Imports
2010
(bcm)
2015
(bcm)
2020
(bcm
2025
(bcm
Average annual
compounded
growth rate (%)
109.0
237.9
457.4
653.4
12.7
16.4
37.7
76.5
112.4
13.7
Source: GTEM and BREE.
Conclusions
China’s total gas consumption has grown rapidly over the past decade from a low per capita base.
Consumption of natural gas has the potential to grow rapidly in China over the medium term supported by
continued rapid growth in economic activity and by policy and structural changes that favour fuel sources
with lower emissions. Over the near term, China’s domestic gas production will not be able to keep up with
projected increases in demand. This is expected to result in rapid growth in Chinese gas imports f rom both
pipelines and LNG.
References
BP (2011). BP Statistical review of world energy, June 2011.
GGDC (2011). The Conference Board Total Economy Database (TED), Groningen Growth and
Development Centre & The Conference Board.
IEA (2011a). World energy outlook 2011, International Energy Agency, November 2011.
IEA (2011b). Are we entering a golden age of gas?, special report for the World energy outlook 2011,
International Energy Agency, June 2011.
IMF (2011), World Economic Outlook Database, International Monetary Fund.
Pan, J. (2011), China’s natural gas industry and its market prospect, Research Centre of Oil and Gas
Resources, Ministry of Land & Resources, PRC, the paper was presented at the inaugural Australia Gas
Conference, Sydney.
World Bank (2011). World Bank Database.
4
GTEM is a multiregion, multisector dynamic general equilibrium model of the world economy. GTEM’s projections of commodity
demand come from interactions among sectors within an economy as well as bilateral trade flows among various economies in the
world. It also captures impacts of climate change policies.
Resources, Energy and Tourism • China Review • June 2012
36
China’s demand for tourism:
Opportunities and implications for Australia
Robyn Agnew, Geoff Bailey and Grant Keys 5
Introduction
Tourism is an important industry for Australian social and economic development. While tourism directly
contributed around 2.5 per cent (or $35 billion) to Australia’s gross domestic product (GDP) in 2010 –11, it
had a much higher share of exports, where it accounted for 8 per cent of Australia’s total export earnings
and 4.5 per cent of jobs in Australia in 2010–11 (ABS 2011). The Australian tourism industry is starting to
see significant growth from Asian markets, particularly China, while at the same time growth has slowed in
the traditional markets of the United Kingdom, Europe and the United States.
As well as generating important export income for Australia, inbound tourism also enhances intercultural
understanding for both Australians and international visitors. In 2010–11 Australia welcomed 5.9 million
international visitors with a total inbound economic value (TIEV or tourism exports) of $23.7 billion.
The importance of China
In the past ten years, China has become Asia’s largest outbound market. The United Nations World
Tourism Organization (UNWTO) forecasts that by 2020, China will be the fourth l argest source of
outbound travel in the world, with 100 million outbound travellers. UNWTO data shows that between 2001
and 2008, the average growth rate of Chinese outbound departures was over 20 per cent. A combination
of effects, including the 2008 Beijing Olympics, the Global Financial Crisis and the 2009 H1N1 pandemic
saw this growth slow, and then recover again in 2010.
Given the uneven nature of economic growth across China, the major cities and surrounding areas of
Beijing, Shanghai and Guangdong are the primary source of outbound tourists, although the potential of
the second tier cities is being recognised. Part of Tourism Australia’s China 2020 Strategic Plan is to
expand current marketing and distribution in 13 6 cities to more than 30 cities by 2020.
Australia’s inbound Chinese tourism market has grown rapidly in recent years. From a low base in the
mid-1990s7, the Chinese market has grown to be Australia’s most important market by value ($3.5 billion
in exports), and the third largest inbound market by visitor arrivals, with
542 000 arrivals in 2011.
The Tourism Forecasting Committee (TFC) projects that by 2020–21, Chinese arrivals to Australia will
grow to over one million, with a TIEV of $6.9 billion (see Table 1 and Appendix 1). At this value , the
Chinese market is forecast to represent around one-fifth of total tourism exports in 2020–21, with solid
growth in real terms across all purpose categories (Table 1). Over the period 2010 –11 to 2020–21, China
is expected to account for 40 per cent of the total growth in tourism exports.
5
The views expressed in this review are those of the authors alone and are not necessarily those of Tourism Research Australia
(TRA) or the Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism (RET).
6
Tourism Australia’s existing Chinese markets are Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Hangzhou, Tianjin, Nanjing, Chongqing, Qingdao,
Xiamen, Ningbo, Shenzhen, Foshan and Dongguan.
7
There were just 42 600 Chinese visitor arrivals in Australia in 1995. In 2000, Chinese arrivals reached 100 000 for the first time.
Resources, Energy and Tourism • China Review • June 2012
37
Table 1: China’s importance to Australia’s inbound tourism sector
Forecast
average
annual
growth
(%)
Forecast
contribution to
total sector
growth
(%)
TIEV, 2010–
11
($m)
Share of inbound
expenditure,
2010–11
(%)
TIEV,
forecast,
2020–21
($m)
Share of
inbound
sector,
2020–21
(%)
Business
398
13.8
538
15.3
3.1
32
Holiday
670
7.8
1632
14.0
9.3
43
Visiting friends and
relatives
498
10.7
869
14.0
5.7
29
Other (education and
employment)
1836
22.7
3820
28.6
7.6
43
All travel
3402
14.1
6860
19.7
7.3
40
Purpose of visit
(2010–11 to 2020–21)
Note: the sum of the individual expenditure sub-items (by purpose) may not equal to ‘All travel’, due to rounding
Source: Tourism Forecasting Committee, 2012, Issue 1
Figure 1 illustrates the strong growth in Chinese outbound travel since 1998. For Australia to continue
growing its share of Chinese outbound tourism, Australian tourism product must be desirable and relevant
to a fast-growing Chinese middle class in an increasingly competitive global tourism marketplace.
Figure 1: Chinese outbound trips, all travel and overnight travel, 1999–2011
Source: Tourism Economics.
While the growth of the Chinese outbound tourism market has significant economic value for the
Australian tourism industry, Australia will face challenges in capturing these opportunities. As can be
seen in Figure 2, while overall Chinese expenditure is high, a significant proportion of this growth is
currently being derived from the education market.
Resources, Energy and Tourism • China Review • June 2012
38
Figure 2: Chinese expenditure by main purpose of trip 2000-2011
As the Chinese outbound market matures, more Chinese travellers will seek an independent leisure
holiday experience. If Australia can gain a share of this independent travel and also continue to grow
Approved Destination Status (ADS) travel, it can increase the proportion of holiday visitors from China.
As detailed in Figure 3, Australia accounts for only a small share (1.4 per cent) of the Chinese overnight
outbound tourism market8, with global competition to attract Chinese visitors intensifying. Of particular
concern is the emergence of new intra-Asia markets, such as Macao and intra-China, as investment in
tourism (aviation and accommodation) has been very strong in these regions (see Appendix 2).
In 2010, Chinese travellers’ top five outbound destinations were Hong Kong, Macao, Korea, Singapore
and Japan. In terms of destinations outside of North East Asia, Chinese travellers chose to visit
Singapore, Vietnam, Malaysia, Thailand and Russia. Australia ranked tenth among out -of-region
destinations.
8
An alternative measure of Australia’s share of China overnight outbound travel is to exclude ‘intra-regional’ travel—that is, from
North-East Asia. Chinese travel to North-East Asia represented 62 per cent of all outbound overnight travel in 2010 (see Appendix
2). Australia’s share excluding this region was 3.5 per cent in 2010.
Resources, Energy and Tourism • China Review • June 2012
39
Figure 3: Australia’s share of Chinese overnight outbound travel
Source: Tourism Economics.
Australia’s geographic location will remain a challenge in an increasingly competitive global environment.
European, North American and other Asian nations are all aggressively targeting Chinese tourists, with
many of these nations seeing tourism as a means of diversifying their maturing economic base.
Current government policy: Tourism 2020
The National Long-Term Tourism Strategy (Strategy), released in December 2009, was premised on
maximising the net economic benefits of tourism to Australia, with a focus on supply-side strategies.
Tourism 2020 (an update to the strategy) was released on 6 December 2011 to respond to ongoing
challenges and emerging opportunities for the Australian tourism industry. Tourism 2020 provides a
framework for growth and aims to give industry the tools to compete in the global economy, remain
competitive and take advantage of the opportunities offered by the Asian Century. Tourism 2020, which is
outlined in Box 1, takes a six-strand approach, where the first strand is a specific focus on growing demand
from Asia.
Resources, Energy and Tourism • China Review • June 2012
40
Box 1: Tourism 2020
1. Grow demand from Asia
While it is necessary to market investment across a balanced portfolio of markets, Australia has a unique opportunity
to drive demand from Asia. Industry and government need to deepen consumer understanding, strengthen
distribution, tailor marketing campaigns and product appropriately and develop relevant policy frameworks.
2. Build competitive digital capability
Strong digital capability is essential both in marketing Australia and in distributing product. Eighty per cent of
Australians have online access and 66 per cent of the world is expected be online by 2020. Developing strong and
efficient digital marketing and transactional capabilities is essential to remaining compet itive. Currently, only a third of
Australia’s tourism operators have online booking and payment facilities, which limits their ability to service customers
both domestically and overseas. Governments will continue to work with industry to ensure more touri sm enterprises
are able to take advantage of online opportunities.
3. Encourage investment and implement the regulatory reform agenda
Tourism investment in Australia is lagging. From 2000–01 to 2009–10, investment in tourism grew at only half the pace
of investment in the rest of the Australian economy. Tourism currently faces a disproportionate regulatory burden that
impacts negatively on investment. Governments will work with industry to reduce barriers to investment so that industry
can invest in the products and infrastructure consumers are seeking.
4. Ensure tourism transport supports growth
There must be adequate tourism transport capacity and infrastructure for the increasing number of visitors travelling to,
from and within Australia. Governments will work in partnership with industry to ensure transport capacity and
infrastructure continues to precede demand and facilitate, rather than hinder, tourism traffic.
5. Increase supply of labour, skills and Indigenous participation
The tourism industry has a labour shortage of 36 000 and an employee vacancy rate over four times the national
average, which is preventing parts of the industry from effectively servicing global customers. By 2015, an additional 56
000 people will be needed to fill vacancies (including 26 000 skilled positions).
Governments will work with industry to support industry recruitment, staff retention, labour mobility, education and
training to fill these gaps. They will also explore ways to increase the supply of skilled tourism labo ur and Indigenous
participation.
6. Build industry resilience, productivity and quality
Industry productivity is low when compared with the rest of the Australian economy and with tourism firms in
competitor countries. This is making it difficult for Australian tourism operators to give consumers value for money.
Building on Australia’s competitive advantages, governments will work with industry to increase industry productivity,
innovation and quality.
As part of Tourism 2020, the Australian, state and territory governments will work in partnership with
industry to achieve the 2020 Tourism Industry Potential. Its strategies seek to double annual overnight
expenditure from $70 billion in 2009 to $140 billion in 2020.
For the Chinese inbound market, the 2020 Tourism Industry Potential indicates that overnight expenditure
will need to grow from the current $3.6 billion to between $7.4 billion and $9.0 billion in 2020.
China has already delivered very strong growth in expenditure in recent years. As illustrated in Figure 4,
growth in Chinese inbound tourism is tracking ahead of the 2020 Tourism Industry Potential.
Resources, Energy and Tourism • China Review • June 2012
41
Figure 4: 2020 Tourism Industry Potential: Chinese inbound travel (total overnight expenditu re in nominal
terms)
Source: Tourism Australia; BDA Marketing Planning.
Chinese outbound travel to Australia and the Approved Destination
Status (ADS) scheme
For well over a decade the Approved Destination Status (ADS) scheme has underpinned China–Australian
tourism. ADS is a bilateral tourism arrangement between the Chinese Government and other governments
that allows Chinese tourists to undertake leisure travel in groups to destinations around the world.
Australia and New Zealand were the first western destinations to be granted this status in 1999. Without
the ADS scheme, Tourism Australia could not market Australia in China.
Initially, ADS travel was available only to Chinese citizens from Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou. In
2004, a further six areas were given access to the scheme by the Chinese Government, and in 2006 the
policy was applied to the whole nation.
Since 1999, Australia has received over 730 000 ADS tourists in around 53 000 groups, which has
underpinned the strong growth in Chinese holiday travel to Australia (see Figure 5). Overall, both ADS
and non-ADS leisure arrivals have grown steadily (see Appendix 3). Non-ADS leisure arrivals are
generally either for short-term study or to visit friends and relatives.
Resources, Energy and Tourism • China Review • June 2012
42
Figure 5: The relationship between Chinese ADS and holiday travel
Source: Department of Immigration and Citizenship.
In 2008 the Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism commissioned research on whether ADS
visitors to Australia were satisfied with their experience. Overall, satisfaction with Australia was
significantly higher than satisfaction with the tour itself 79 per cent (and 77 per cent for those only on a
group tour) compared to 64 per cent.
When this was compared to a similar survey conducted in 2003, it was found that overall satisfaction with
the tour had increased 11 percentage points, from 53 per cent to 64 per cent, and that 97 per cent of ADS
visitors would recommend Australia as a holiday destination, compared with 73 per cent in 2003. From
2011 TRA has included visitor satisfaction questions for Chinese group travellers in its International Visitor
Survey.
Another 138 countries have gained approved destination status since Australia and New Zealand received
theirs in 1999. The challenge for the Australian tourism industry will be to remain competitive against key
tourism markets such as the United States of America and Canada.
Non-ADS leisure travel to Australia
The number of inbound Chinese visitors to Australia travelling outside of the ADS scheme has grown
considerably (see Appendix 3). While the number of ADS scheme visitors is expected to grow as new
parts of China take up this form of group travel, other more experienced travelle rs are likely to look for new
leisure travel experiences and opportunities. This may include the opportunity to travel in a more
independent manner.
Drivers of Chinese travel choices
Tourism Australia recently conducted extensive research on the target cus tomer in China and what drives
their travel decisions, which will help the Australian tourism industry increase its competitiveness and
market share. Key findings of the research were:



Chinese tourists prefer group tours when visiting destinations for the first time.
While more experienced travellers will use some element of a group tour, around one in five will opt for
individual travel.
When returning to a destination, Chinese tourists prefer to travel independently for some aspects of
the trip, with a Chinese-speaking tour guide.
Actions to support growth in the market
China 2020 Strategic Plan
Tourism Australia’s China 2020 Strategic Plan, developed in collaboration with industry and government,
identifies a clear direction for enhancing tourism business from China. The five key areas of the plan are:
Resources, Energy and Tourism • China Review • June 2012
43





Knowing the customer. During the first year of the plan’s implementation, Tourism Australia will
increase its direct marketing effort in China. Tourism Australia’s target audience in China is affluen t
couples who have an independent travel mindset and want to explore and experience local culture.
This group delivers high volume and spend and is geographically concentrated in Tourism Australia’s
current priority cities.
A dedicated geographic strategy. This will identify the focus for Tourism Australia’s resources in order
to maximise opportunities for growth in the Chinese market and achieve the 2020 goal.
Quality Australian tourism experiences. This area of the plan will address concerns with current travel
experiences and develop new products and services for Chinese visitors.
A healthy aviation environment. Tourism Australia will work with relevant partners to ensure there is
sufficient capacity to meet demand from existing and immediate growth mark ets.
Strong partnerships between government and industry. This will streamline consultation and
engagement on whole-of-government issues and approaches to market development.
Tourism 2020 – China strategic projects
Key to growing the independent tourism market in partnership with the Chinese Government will be the
development of innovative technologies and the supply of quality tour guides and commission shops.
The tourism industry needs to further understand the Asian consumer and provide the relevant an d high
quality products and services that this market demands. Part of this will be developing cultural awareness,
language skills and services to meet Asian expectations, as much of Australia’s tourism industry remains
focused on serving its traditional markets.
Capitalising on the fast-emerging independent travel segment in Asia will require a shift in current
business models and practices. Independent travellers will be affluent and expect high quality, Asia relevant service.
Tourism opportunities continue to arise as trade with Asia grows. There are, for example, major
opportunities to increase high-yield Asian education and business tourism following strong growth in these
areas in recent years. Over the period 1999–2000 to 2010–11, expenditure from Asian education visitor
trips rose by 178 per cent in real terms to $5.4 billion. Asian business visitor trip expenditure has also risen
strongly in recent years, up 21 per cent in the two years to 2010–11.
Conclusions
From a low base in the mid-1990s, the Chinese inbound market has grown to become Australia’s most
important market by value in 2011. The Tourism Forecasting Committee forecasts indicate that its
importance for Australian tourism is likely to grow over the next 10 years. This growth cannot be t aken for
granted, however, as the rest of the world is also looking to China for a share of its global travel.
China is not just one tourism market; therefore Australia needs to focus on several targets. New waves of
first-time ADS visitors to Australia are likely, as new areas of China increase their participation in the ADS
scheme, and Australia must continue to provide the products and services that this market is looking for.
There is scope for future work by TRA to understand the regions these tourists are coming from so that
the industry is best placed to service their needs.
Developing experiences that a more independent Chinese traveller is seeking could reap significant
rewards for Australia as well as help to meet meet the expectations that the dif ferent demographic groups
(based on age, region and income level) demand. While competition for the Chinese tourist globally is
increasing, Australia faces an additional, internal challenge—how to encourage regional dispersal of
Chinese visitors throughout Australia so that non-traditional destinations can benefit from this growth.
Resources, Energy and Tourism • China Review • June 2012
44
Appendix 1: International visitor arrivals, China
Business
VFRa Holiday
Other d
Total e
Chang
e
Total
nights
Exports bc
‘002
‘001
‘000
‘001
‘002
(%)
(m)
($m)
1999–00
31
15
35
16
105
n.a.
3.5
700
2000–01
39
18
57
23
143
36.6
3.9
889
2001–02
36
19
70
31
172
20.1
5.4
1119
2002–03
38
19
74
35
177
2.8
7.1
1210
2003–04
51
24
91
41
217
22.4
8.6
1446
2004–05
62
28
120
50
274
26.5
11.6
1835
2005–06
67
34
132
58
292
6.5
12.6
1687
2006–07
73
40
158
65
338
15.8
15.9
1948
2007–08
71
46
177
78
375
10.9
16.4
2236
2008–09
46
52
171
86
358
-4.6
17.8
2565
2009–10
53
67
165
104
394
10.0
22.6
2959
2010–11
66
82
226
120
500
26.9
26.0
3402
2011–12
78
94
280
136
595
18.9
28.9
4023
2012–13
89
106
322
145
669
12.6
31.4
4499
2013–14
97
117
359
155
736
9.9
33.9
4921
2014–15
104
128
389
166
795
8.1
36.3
5304
2015–16
110
137
408
179
843
6.0
38.6
5604
2016–17
115
145
425
191
886
5.1
40.9
5878
2017–18
119
151
439
204
925
4.4
43.0
6122
2018–19
123
158
452
219
963
4.1
45.1
6369
2019–20
126
163
465
233
1001
4.0
47.0
6619
2020–21
130
169
477
249
1039
3.8
48.9
6860
Compound
annual growth
rate (%)
2000/01–2005/06
11.8
13.2
18.1
20.2
15.3
26.3
13.7
2005/06–2010/11
-0.3
19.1
11.4
15.7
11.3
15.6
15.1
2010/11–2015/16
10.7
10.8
12.5
8.3
11.0
8.3
10.5
2015/16–2020/21
3.4
4.3
3.2
6.8
4.3
4.8
4.1
2000/01–2010/11
5.6
16.1
14.7
17.9
13.3
20.8
14.4
2010/11–2020/21
7.0
7.5
7.8
7.6
7.6
6.5
7.3
Note: Numbers shaded are forecasts.
a Visiting friends and relatives
b Tourism exports (or Total inbound economic value), TRA calculations
c in real terms, base = quarter 4, 2011
d
Other refers to education and employment visitors who stay in Australia for one year or less as well as arrivals for transit and other
purposes of visit. On average, education and employment visitors spend more and stay longer than the average tourist.
e Sum of purpose does not add to total as the total includes arrivals who did not state a purpose for their visit.
Source: Tourism Forecasting Committee
Resources, Energy and Tourism • China Review • June 2012
45
Appendix 2: Chinese outbound travel, 1995, 2000, 2005 and 2010
Compoun
d average
annual
growth,
2005–10
1995
2000
2005
2010
Share of
overnight
outbound
travel
(‘000)
(‘000)
(‘000)
(‘000)
(%)
(%)
4 339
7 541
16 016
27 584
82.8
11.5
31
41
124
330
1.0
21.6
Southeast Asia
793
2 338
3 043
6 148
18.5
15.1
Northeast Asia
3 455
5 003
12 469
20 505
61.6
10.5
2 060
2 707
8 030
11 678
35.1
7.8
Japan
221
352
653
1 413
4.2
16.7
Republic of Korea
178
443
710
2 058
6.2
23.7
Macao (SAR)
548
1 038
2 370
4 012
12.0
11.1
Taiwan
398
413
537
1 128
3.4
16.0
60
159
380
601
1.8
9.6
43
120
285
454
1.4
9.7
9
34
88
123
0.4
7.0
1 155
1 488
2 534
3 613
10.8
7.3
Asia
South Asia
Hong Kong (SAR)
Oceania
Australia
New Zealand
Europe
Western Europe
737
943
1 609
2 239
6.7
6.8
France
383
338
554
897
2.7
10.1
Germany
117
215
418
488
1.5
3.1
31
41
95
109
0.3
2.8
418
545
926
1 374
4.1
8.2
260
371
452
1 099
3.3
19.4
South America
21
30
46
77
0.2
10.8
North America
227
323
388
997
3.0
20.8
167
249
270
802
2.4
24.3
9
12
7
8
0.0
4.2
United Kingdom
Emerging Europe
Americas
United States
Central America
Caribbean
3
7
11
17
0.1
8.5
Middle East
58
49
112
285
0.9
20.7
Africa
67
94
257
723
2.2
23.0
Total overnight outbound
trips
5 879
9 543
19 371
33 305
100.0
11.4
Australia’s share of
Chinese outbound
excluding N-E Asia, per
cent
Total Chinese outbound
trips (day and overnight)
1.8
2.6
4.1
3.5
na
na
na
10 473
31 026
57 386
na
13.1
Source: Tourism Economics
Na: not available or relevant
Resources, Energy and Tourism • China Review • June 2012
46
Appendix 3: Visa Class 676 grants: Chinese nationals
Non-ADS
ADS
Total 676 (ADS and
non-ADS) grants
Share of ADS
grants
(No.)
(No.)
No.
(%)
1999–00
30 520
7 243
37 763
19.2
2000–01
34 286
25 539
59 825
42.7
2001–02
40 265
31 690
71 955
44.0
2002–03
43 861
29 254
73 115
40.0
2003–04
59 158
33 431
92 589
36.1
2004–05
62 283
46 908
109 191
43.0
2005–06
71 259
57 389
128 648
44.6
2006–07
69 790
84 404
154 194
54.7
2007–08
80 180
97 113
177 293
54.8
2008–09
90 120
85 975
176 095
48.8
2009–10
107 116
80 272
187 388
42.8
2010–11
135 561
110 609
246 170
44.9
Year
Source: Department of Immigration and Citizenship
References
ABS (2011). Australian national accounts: tourism satellite account, cat. No. 5249.0, Australian Bureau of
Statistics, December 2011.
TFC (2012). Forecast 2012, issue 1, Tourism Forecasting Committee, Tourism Research Australia.
TRA (2012). Tourism Research Australia, Tourism’s contribution to the Australian economy, 1997–98 to
2010–11, Tourism Research Australia, Canberra.
Resources, Energy and Tourism • China Review • June 2012
47
China Review
Statistical Tables
and Figures
Resources, Energy and Tourism • China Review • June 2012
48
Statistical Tables and Figures
Part 1: Chinese trends: economic and social indicators
Table 1: Gross domestic product, billion yuan (current price), billion US$ (2000 price), 1978 –2010
Gross
domestic
Primary1
Secondary 2
Tertiary3
Gross
domestic
product
industry
industry
Industry
Construction
industry
product
yuan
yuan
yuan
yuan
yuan
yuan
US$2000
1978
365
103
175
161
14
87
158
1979
406
127
191
177
14
88
170
1980
455
137
219
200
20
98
183
1981
489
156
226
205
21
108
192
1982
532
178
238
216
22
116
210
1983
596
198
265
238
27
134
233
1984
721
232
311
279
32
179
268
1985
902
256
387
345
42
259
304
1986
1,028
279
449
397
53
299
331
1987
1,206
323
525
459
67
357
370
1988
1,504
387
659
578
81
459
411
1989
1,699
427
728
648
79
545
428
1990
1,867
506
772
686
86
589
445
1991
2,178
534
910
809
102
734
486
1992
2,692
587
1,170
1,028
142
936
554
1993
3,533
696
1,645
1,419
227
1,192
632
1994
4,820
957
2,245
1,948
296
1,618
715
1995
6,079
1,214
2,868
2,495
373
1,998
793
1996
7,118
1,402
3,383
2,945
439
2,333
872
1997
7,897
1,444
3,754
3,292
462
2,699
953
1998
8,440
1,482
3,900
3,402
499
3,058
1,028
1999
8,968
1,477
4,103
3,586
517
3,387
1,106
2000
9,921
1,494
4,556
4,003
552
3,871
1,198
2001
10,966
1,578
4,951
4,358
593
4,436
1,298
2002
12,033
1,654
5,390
4,743
647
4,990
1,416
2003
13,582
1,738
6,244
5,495
749
5,600
1,558
2004
15,988
2,141
7,390
6,521
869
6,456
1,715
2005
18,494
2,242
8,760
7,723
1,037
7,492
1,909
2006
21,631
2,404
10,372
9,131
1,241
8,855
2,151
2007
26,581
2,863
12,583
11,053
1,530
11,135
2,457
2008
31,405
3,370
14,900
13,026
1,874
13,134
2,693
2009
34,090
3,523
15,764
13,524
2,240
14,804
2,940
2010
40,120
4,053
18,758
16,087
2,671
17,309
3,246
Year
Resources, Energy and Tourism • China Review • June 2012
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Source: China statistical yearbook 2011.
Note: In China, economic activities are categorised into three industry strata.
1. Primary industry refers to agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry and fishery, and services in support of these industries.
2. Secondary industry refers to mining and quarrying; manufacturing; the production and supply of electricity, water and gas; and
construction.
3. Tertiary industry refers to all economic activities not included in primary or secondary industries.
Table 2: Gross domestic product, composition (per cent), 1978–2010
Year
Primary
industry
Secondary 1
industry
Industry2
Construction
Tertiary
industry
1978
28
48
44
4
24
1979
31
47
44
4
22
1980
30
48
44
4
22
1981
32
46
42
4
22
1982
33
45
41
4
22
1983
33
44
40
5
22
1984
32
43
39
4
25
1985
28
43
38
5
29
1986
27
44
39
5
29
1987
27
44
38
6
30
1988
26
44
38
5
31
1989
25
43
38
5
32
1990
27
41
37
5
32
1991
25
42
37
5
34
1992
22
43
38
5
35
1993
20
47
40
6
34
1994
20
47
40
6
34
1995
20
47
41
6
33
1996
20
48
41
6
33
1997
18
48
42
6
34
1998
18
46
40
6
36
1999
16
46
40
6
38
2000
15
46
40
6
39
2001
14
45
40
5
40
2002
14
45
39
5
41
2003
13
46
40
6
41
2004
13
46
41
5
40
2005
12
47
42
6
41
2006
11
48
42
6
41
2007
11
47
42
6
42
2008
11
47
41
6
42
2009
10
46
40
7
43
2010
10
47
40
7
43
Source: China statistical yearbook 2011.
Note:
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1. Secondary Industry = Industry + Construction
2. Industry refers to mining and quarrying; manufacturing; the production and supply of electricity, water and gas.
Box 1: GDP and GDP per capita (purchasing power parity)
In 2010, measured on purchasing power parity (PPP), which adjusts for price differences, China’s economy became
the world’s second-largest after that of the United States. China’s GDP reached US$11,316 billion in 2011, 46 times
higher than it was in 1980. In 2011, China’s GDP accounted for
14.4 per cent of world GDP. By comparison, the United States’ GDP represented 19.1 per cent of world GDP, while
Australia’s share was only 1.2 per cent.
GDP (US$billion PPP): United States, China, India and Australia
Note: PPP refers to purchasing power parity (US$).
Source: World economic outlook database 2012.
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Box 2: Economic Catch Up
In 1980, the ratio of China’s GDP per capita (PPP measured in US dollars) to that of the United States was only 2.1
per cent. China’s income per capita relative to that of the United States has grown much faster, such that in 2011 the
ratio of its per capita income to that of the United States was 17.4 per cent, more than double that of India (7.7 per
cent).
China’s and India’s GDP per capita as a proportion of US GDP per capita
Source: World economic outlook database 2012.
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Table 3: Reference exchange rate of renminbi (RMB 1 yuan), 1981–2010
Year
US$
¥100
HK$100
1981
171
1
30
1982
189
1
31
1983
198
1
27
1984
233
1
30
1985
294
1
38
1986
345
2
44
1987
372
3
48
1988
372
3
48
1989
377
3
48
1990
478
3
61
1991
532
4
68
1992
551
4
71
1993
576
5
74
1994
862
8
112
1995
835
9
108
1996
831
8
108
1997
829
7
107
1998
828
6
107
1999
828
7
107
2000
828
8
106
2001
828
7
106
2002
828
7
106
2003
828
7
106
2004
828
8
106
2005
819
7
105
2006
797
7
103
2007
760
6
97
2008
695
7
89
2009
683
7
88
2010
677
8
87
Source: China statistical yearbook 2011.
Note: 1. RMB is the official currency. The primary unit of RMB is the yuan.
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Table 4: Fixed-base price indices (index for 1990=100), 1990–2010
Year
Consumer price
Index
Urban household
Rural household
Retail price index
1990
100
100
100
100
1991
103
105
102
103
1992
110
114
107
108
1993
126
133
122
123
1994
157
166
150
149
1995
183
194
176
171
1996
199
211
190
182
1997
204
217
195
183
1998
203
216
193
179
1999
200
213
190
173
2000
201
215
190
171
2001
202
216
192
169
2002
200
214
191
167
2003
203
216
194
167
2004
211
223
203
172
2005
214
227
208
173
2006
218
230
211
175
2007
228
240
222
181
2008
242
254
237
192
2009
240
252
236
190
2010
248
260
244
196
Source: China statistical yearbook 2011.
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Table 5: Imports and exports, total value (current US$billion), 1978–2010
Year
Imports and
exports
Total exports
Total imports
Balance
1978
21
10
11
-1
1980
38
18
20
-2
1985
70
27
42
-15
1990
115
62
53
9
1991
136
72
64
8
1992
166
85
81
4
1993
196
92
104
-12
1994
237
121
116
5
1995
281
149
132
17
1996
290
151
139
12
1997
325
183
142
40
1998
324
184
140
43
1999
361
195
166
29
2000
474
249
225
24
2001
510
266
244
23
2002
621
326
295
30
2003
851
438
413
25
2004
1,155
593
561
32
2005
1,422
762
660
102
2006
1,760
969
791
178
2007
2,177
1,220
956
264
2008
2,563
1,431
1,133
298
2009
2,208
1,202
1,006
196
2010
2,974
1,578
1,396
182
Source: China statistical yearbook 2011.
Note: A negative balance indicates a trade deficit (i.e. imports surpassing exports).
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Table 6: Investment funds, sources (current yuan billion), 1981–2010
Year
State1 budget
Domestic
loans
Foreign
investment
Self-raised4,5
funds and
others
1981
27
12
4
53
96
1982
28
18
6
71
123
1983
34
18
7
85
143
1984
42
26
7
108
183
1985
41
51
9
153
254
1986
46
66
14
187
312
1987
50
87
18
224
379
1988
43
98
28
297
465
1989
37
76
29
299
441
1990
39
89
28
295
452
1991
38
131
32
358
559
1992
35
221
47
505
808
1993
48
307
95
856
1,307
1994
53
400
177
1,153
1,783
1995
62
420
230
1,341
2,052
1996
63
458
275
1,547
2,342
1997
70
478
268
1,710
2,526
1998
120
554
262
1,936
2,872
1999
185
573
201
2,017
2,975
2000
211
673
170
2,258
3,311
2001
255
724
173
2,647
3,799
2002
316
886
208
3,094
4,505
2003
269
1,204
260
4,128
5,862
2004
325
1,379
329
5,424
7,456
2005
415
1,632
398
7,014
9,459
2006
467
1,959
433
9,036
11,896
2007
586
2,304
513
11,677
15,080
2008
795
2,644
531
14,320
18,292
2009
1,269
3,930
462
19,362
25,023
2010
1,468
4,726
499
24,404
31,096
2
3
Total
Source: China statistical yearbook 2011.
Note:
1. Funds from the state budget consist of budgetary appropriation and loans.
2. ‘Domestic loans’ refers to loans of various forms from banks and non-bank financial institutions during the reference period for the
purpose of investment in fixed assets.
3. ‘Foreign investment’ refers to overseas funds received during the reference period for the construction and purchase of investment in
fixed assets (covering equipment, materials and technology).
4. ‘Self-raised funds’ refers to extra-budgetary funds for investment in fixed assets received during the reference period by investing
units from central government ministries, local governments, enterprises and institutions.
5. ‘Others’ refers to funds for investment in fixed assets received from sources other than those listed above, including capital raised by
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enterprises or financial institutions, funds raised from individuals and through donations, and funds transferred from other units.
Table 7: Investments, composition of funds (per cent), 1981–2010
Year
State
budget
Domestic loans
Foreign investment
Self-raised funds and others
1981
28
13
4
55
1982
23
14
5
58
1983
24
12
5
59
1984
23
14
4
59
1985
16
20
4
60
1986
15
21
4
60
1987
13
23
5
59
1988
9
21
6
64
1989
8
17
7
68
1990
9
20
6
65
1991
7
24
6
64
1992
4
27
6
63
1993
4
24
7
66
1994
3
22
10
65
1995
3
21
11
65
1996
3
20
12
66
1997
3
19
11
68
1998
4
19
9
67
1999
6
19
7
68
2000
6
20
5
68
2001
7
19
5
70
2002
7
20
5
69
2003
5
21
4
71
2004
4
19
4
73
2005
4
17
4
74
2006
4
16
4
76
2007
4
15
3
77
2008
4
14
3
78
2009
5
16
2
77
2010
5
15
2
78
Source: China statistical yearbook 2011.
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Table 8: Foreign capital investment utilised 1 (current US$billion), 1979–2010
Total
Foreign loans
Direct foreign
investments
Other foreign investments 2
18
13
4
1
1985
5
3
2
0
1986
8
5
2
0
1987
8
6
2
0
1988
10
6
3
1
1989
10
6
3
0
1990
10
7
3
0
1991
12
7
4
0
1992
19
8
11
0
1993
39
11
28
0
1994
43
9
34
0
1995
48
10
38
0
1996
55
13
42
0
1997
64
12
45
7
1998
59
11
45
2
1999
53
10
40
2
2000
59
10
41
9
2001
50
0
47
3
2002
55
0
53
2
2003
56
0
54
3
2004
64
0
61
3
2005
64
0
60
3
2006
67
0
63
4
2007
78
0
75
4
2008
95
0
92
3
2009
92
0
90
2
2010
109
0
106
3
Year
1979–1984
Source: China statistical yearbook 2011.
Notes:
1. Utilisation of foreign capital refers to remittance, equipment and technology financed from abroad by loans, foreign direct investment
and other measures undertaken by Chinese governments at all levels, by various departments, enterprises and other economic units.
2. ‘Other foreign investments’ refers to all forms of foreign capital other than foreign borrowings and foreign direct investment. It includes
the total value of shares in foreign currencies issued by enterprises at domestic or foreign stock exchanges; rent payable for equipment
through international leasing arrangements; and the cost of imported equipment, technology and materials provided by foreign
counterparts in compensation trade and in processing and assembly trade.
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Table 9: Employment, total and composition by industry, 1978–2010
Year
Total Employed Primary industry
Persons (‘0000)
(%)
Secondary
industry (%)
Tertiary industry
(%)
1978
40,152
71
17
12
1979
41,024
70
18
13
1980
42,361
69
18
13
1981
43,725
68
18
14
1982
45,295
68
18
14
1983
46,436
67
19
14
1984
48,197
64
20
16
1985
49,873
62
21
17
1986
51,282
61
22
17
1987
52,783
60
22
18
1988
54,334
59
22
18
1989
55,329
60
22
18
1990
64,749
60
21
19
1991
65,491
60
21
19
1992
66,152
59
22
20
1993
66,808
56
22
21
1994
67,455
54
23
23
1995
68,065
52
23
25
1996
68,950
51
24
26
1997
69,820
50
24
26
1998
70,637
50
24
27
1999
71,394
50
23
27
2000
72,085
50
23
28
2001
72,797
50
22
28
2002
73,280
50
21
29
2003
73,736
49
22
29
2004
74,264
47
23
31
2005
74,647
45
24
31
2006
74,978
43
25
32
2007
75,321
41
27
32
2008
75,564
40
27
33
2009
75,828
38
28
34
2010
76,105
37
29
35
Source: China statistical yearbook 2011.
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Table 10: Population, total and age composition (per cent), 1982–2010
Year
Total
population
(year-end)
(‘0000)
1982
101,654
34,146
34
62,517
62
4,991
5
1987
109,300
31,347
29
71,985
66
5,968
5
1990
114,333
31,659
28
76,306
67
6,368
6
1995
121,121
32,218
27
81,393
67
7,510
6
1996
122,389
32,311
26
82,245
67
7,833
6
1997
123,626
32,093
26
83,448
68
8,085
7
1998
124,761
32,064
26
84,338
68
8,359
7
1999
125,786
31,950
25
85,157
68
8,679
7
2000
126,743
29,012
23
88,910
70
8,821
7
2001
127,627
28,716
23
89,849
70
9,062
7
2002
128,453
28,774
22
90,302
70
9,377
7
2003
129,227
28,559
22
90,976
70
9,692
8
2004
129,988
27,947
22
92,184
71
9,857
8
2005
130,756
26,504
20
94,197
72
10,055
8
2006
131,448
25,961
20
95,068
72
10,419
8
2007
132,129
25,660
19
95,833
73
10,636
8
2008
132,802
25,166
19
96,680
73
10,956
8
2009
133,450
24,659
19
97,484
73
11,307
9
2010
134,091
22,259
17
99,938
75
11,894
9
Population
Population
aged 0–14 Proportion aged 15– Proportion
(‘0000)
(%) 64 (‘0000)
(%)
Population
aged 65 and
over (‘0000)
Proportion
(%)
Source: China statistical yearbook 2011.
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Table 11: Population, dependency ratio, 1982–2010
Year
Gross 1 dependency
ratio (%)
Children (0–14) 2
dependency ratio (%)
Old (65 and over) 3
dependency ratio (%)
1982
63
55
8
1987
52
44
8
1990
50
41
8
1995
49
40
9
1996
49
39
10
1997
48
38
10
1998
48
38
10
1999
48
38
10
2000
43
33
10
2001
42
32
10
2002
42
32
10
2003
42
31
11
2004
41
30
11
2005
39
28
11
2006
38
27
11
2007
38
27
11
2008
37
26
11
2009
37
25
12
2010
34
22
12
Source: China statistical yearbook 2011.
Notes:
1. ‘Gross dependency ratio’ refers to the ratio of the non–working age population (aged 0–14 and 65+) to the working-age population
(aged 15–64), expressed as a percentage.
2. ‘Children dependency ratio’ refers to the ratio of the child population to the working-age population, expressed as a percentage.
‘3. Old dependency ratio’ refers to the ratio of the elderly population to the working-age population, expressed as a percentage.
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Table 12: Per capita annual income, urban and rural households (current yuan), 1978–2010
Year
Annual disposable
income of urban
households (yuan) Index
Annual net
income1 of rural
households
(yuan)
Index
Engel’s 2
coefficient of
urban
households (%)
Engel’s
coefficient of
rural
households
(%)
1978
343
100
134
100
58
68
1980
478
127
191
139
57
62
1985
739
160
398
269
53
58
1990
1,510
198
686
311
54
59
1991
1,701
212
709
317
54
58
1992
2,027
233
784
336
53
58
1993
2,577
255
922
347
50
58
1994
3,496
277
1,221
364
50
59
1995
4,283
290
1,578
384
50
59
1996
4,839
302
1,926
418
49
56
1997
5,160
312
2,090
437
47
55
1998
5,425
330
2,162
456
45
53
1999
5,854
361
2,210
474
42
53
2000
6,280
384
2,253
483
39
49
2001
6,860
416
2,366
504
38
48
2002
7,703
472
2,476
528
38
46
2003
8,472
515
2,622
551
37
46
2004
9,422
554
2,936
588
38
47
2005
10,493
607
3,255
625
37
46
2006
11,760
671
3,587
671
36
43
2007
13,786
753
4,140
734
36
43
2008
15,781
816
4,761
793
38
44
2009
17,175
895
5,153
861
37
41
2010
19,109
965
5,919
954
36
41
Source: China statistical yearbook 2011.
Notes:
1. Net income refers to the total income of rural households from all sources minus all corresponding expenses. It is mainly used as
input for reinvestment in production and as consumption expenditure for the year, and also for savings and non-compulsory expenses of
various forms.
2. Engel’s coefficient refers to the percentage of household expenditures on food as a proportion of total living expenses.
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Box 3: China’s urbanisation
When economic reform began in China in 1978, about 18 per cent of the Chinese population was living in urban
areas. The rapid rate of economic growth in China over recent decades has encouraged the movement of labour from
rural areas to urban areas. The proportion of China’s population living in cities was almost 50 per cent, or 670 million
people, in 2010.
Percentage of the Chinese population living in urban areas
Source: China statistical yearbook 2011.
The UN’s projection is that the urbanisation rate in China will be 68 per cent by 2040, which is equivalent to the
projected urbanisation rate for Japan in 2015. By 2050, the urbanisation rate in China is expected to be 73 per cent:
equivalent to the projected urbanisation rate for Europe in 2015.
UN’s projections for urbanisation rate (per cent), 2015–50, selected countries and regions
China
India
Japan
US
Europe
2015
51
32
68
84
74
2020
55
34
69
85
75
2025
59
37
71
86
77
2030
62
40
73
87
78
2035
65
43
75
88
80
2040
68
47
77
89
82
2045
71
51
78
90
83
2050
73
54
80
90
84
Source: World urbanisation prospects, UN.
Resources, Energy and Tourism • China Review • June 2012
63
Part 2: Chinese trends: resources and energy activities
Table 13: Energy, total production and its composition, 1978–2010
Year
Total energy
production (million
tons of SCE) 1
Coal (%)
1978
628
70
24
3
3
1980
637
69
24
3
4
1985
855
73
21
2
4
1990
1,039
74
19
2
5
1991
1,048
74
19
2
5
1992
1,073
74
19
2
5
1993
1,111
74
19
2
5
1994
1,187
75
18
2
6
1995
1,290
75
17
2
6
1996
1,330
75
17
2
6
1997
1,335
74
17
2
7
1998
1,298
73
18
2
7
1999
1,319
74
17
3
6
2000
1,350
73
17
3
7
2001
1,439
73
16
3
8
2002
1,507
74
16
3
8
2003
1,719
76
14
3
7
2004
1,966
77
13
3
7
2005
2,162
78
12
3
7
2006
2,322
78
11
3
8
2007
2,473
78
11
4
8
2008
2,606
77
11
4
9
2009
2,746
77
10
4
9
2010
2,969
77
10
4
9
Crude oil Natural gas
(%)
(%)
Hydropower, nuclear
power, wind power (%)
Source: China statistical yearbook 2011.
Notes:
1. The coefficient for converting electric power into SCE (standard coal equivalent) is calculated on the basis of average coal
consumption in generating electric power.
Resources, Energy and Tourism • China Review • June 2012
64
Table 14: Energy, total consumption and its composition, 1978–2010
Year
Total energy
consumption (million
tons of SCE) 1
Coal (%)
Crude oil
(%)
1978
571
71
23
3
3
1980
603
72
21
3
4
1985
767
76
17
2
5
1990
987
76
17
2
5
1991
1,038
76
17
2
5
1992
1,092
76
18
2
5
1993
1,160
75
18
2
5
1994
1,227
75
17
2
6
1995
1,312
75
18
2
6
1996
1,352
74
19
2
6
1997
1,359
71
20
2
6
1998
1,362
71
21
2
7
1999
1,406
71
22
2
6
2000
1,455
69
22
2
6
2001
1,504
68
22
2
8
2002
1,594
68
22
2
7
2003
1,838
70
21
3
7
2004
2,135
70
21
3
7
2005
2,360
71
20
3
7
2006
2,587
71
19
3
7
2007
2,805
71
19
3
7
2008
2,914
70
18
4
8
2009
3,066
70
18
4
8
2010
3,249
68
19
4
9
Natural gas
Hydropower, nuclear
(%) power, wind power (%)
Source: China statistical yearbook 2011.
Notes:
1. The coefficient for converting electric power into SCE (standard coal equivalent) is calculated on the basis of average coal
consumption in generating electric power.
Resources, Energy and Tourism • China Review • June 2012
65
Table 15: Energy production and consumption per capita 1, 1980–2010
Year
Production
Consumption
Total energy
(kgce)
Raw coal
(kg)
Crude Electricity Total energy
oil (kg)
(kWh)
(kgce)
Coal
(kg)
Oil Electricity
(kg)
(kWh)
1980
650
632
108
306
614
622
89
306
1981
636
625
102
311
598
610
94
311
1982
662
661
101
325
615
636
81
325
1983
696
698
104
343
645
671
82
344
1984
751
761
111
364
684
723
83
364
1985
814
830
119
391
730
776
87
392
1986
826
838
123
421
758
806
91
422
1987
842
856
124
459
799
856
95
460
1988
870
889
124
495
844
902
101
496
1989
909
942
123
523
867
925
104
524
1990
915
951
122
547
869
930
101
549
1991
911
945
123
589
902
960
108
591
1992
921
958
122
647
937
979
115
651
1993
942
976
123
711
984
1,026
125
715
1994
996
1,040
123
779
1,030
1,078
125
777
1995
1,071
1,129
125
836
1,089
1,143
133
832
1996
1,093
1,147
129
887
1,110
1,150
145
884
1997
1,085
1,128
131
923
1,105
1,120
157
917
1998
1,045
1,073
130
939
1,097
1,087
160
934
1999
1,053
1,089
128
989
1,122
1,112
168
982
2000
1,070
1,096
129
1,074
1,153
1,117
178
1,067
2001
1,131
1,157
129
1,164
1,183
1,136
180
1,158
2002
1,177
1,211
130
1,292
1,245
1,189
194
1,286
2003
1,334
1,424
132
1,483
1,427
1,402
211
1,477
2004
1,517
1,638
136
1,700
1,647
1,601
245
1,695
2005
1,658
1,802
139
1,918
1,810
1,778
250
1,913
2006
1,771
1,929
141
2,181
1,973
1,946
266
2,181
2007
1,876
2,042
141
2,482
2,128
2,070
278
2,482
2008
1,967
2,115
144
2,608
2,200
2,122
282
2,608
2009
2,063
2,233
142
2,782
2,303
2,222
288
2,782
2010
2,220
2,418
152
3,145
2,429
2,334
323
3,135
Source: China energy statistical yearbook 2011.
Notes:
1.
This table is calculated by annual average population.
Resources, Energy and Tourism • China Review • June 2012
66
Table 16: Residential energy consumption per capita, 1980–2010
Year
Total average
(kgce)
Coal Electricity
(kg)
(kWh)
LPG
(kg)
Natural gas
(cu.m)
Gas
(cu.m)
Urban
(kgce)
Rural
(kgce)
1980
112
118
11
0
0
1
332
60
1981
101
122
12
0
0
1
290
55
1982
102
124
12
0
0
1
281
56
1983
107
128
13
1
0
1
283
59
1984
113
135
15
1
0
2
288
63
1985
127
149
21
1
0
1
307
72
1986
127
148
23
1
1
1
306
71
1987
132
152
26
1
1
2
300
76
1988
141
159
31
1
1
2
307
84
1989
139
152
35
1
2
2
297
84
1990
139
147
42
1
2
3
298
83
1991
139
143
47
2
2
3
292
83
1992
134
127
55
2
2
4
267
85
1993
133
123
63
3
1
5
258
86
1994
129
109
73
3
2
6
238
86
1995
131
112
83
4
2
5
242
86
1996
121
83
88
6
2
6
238
71
1997
119
77
99
6
2
9
226
71
1998
119
73
104
7
2
10
218
71
1999
122
70
109
7
2
9
213
75
2000
124
67
115
7
3
10
210
76
2001
127
66
127
7
3
9
207
80
2002
134
66
138
8
4
10
210
87
2003
153
70
160
9
4
10
232
102
2004
176
75
184
10
5
11
256
119
2005
194
77
221
10
6
11
279
132
2006
212
77
256
11
8
13
298
145
2007
234
74
308
12
11
20
320
163
2008
241
69
332
11
13
20
319
173
2009
254
69
366
11
13
23
325
190
2010
258
68
383
11
17
26
315
204
Source: China energy statistical yearbook 2011.
Resources, Energy and Tourism • China Review • June 2012
67
Box 4: Residential electricity consumption per capita: China vs Australia
From a low base of 11 kilowatt-hours (kWh) in 1980—compared to 1971 kWh in Australia in the same year—
residential electricity consumption per capita in China has increased at an average annual growth rate of 13 per cent
over the period 1980–2010. By contrast, electricity consumption per capita in Australia increased at an average
annual growth rate of 1 per cent. In 2010, electricity consumption per capita in China reached 383 kWh, which was
seven times less than electricity consumption per capita in Australia.
Source: China energy statistical yearbook 2011; BREE, Energy in Australia 2012.
Resources, Energy and Tourism • China Review • June 2012
68
Table 17: Imports of major energy products, 1991–2010
Year
Coal Coke
(104 (104
tn)
tn)
Crude
Diese
Fuel
Natural
oil Gasolin
l oil Kerosen
oil LPG Other petro
gas Electricit
(104
e (104 (104
e (104 (104 (104
products
(108
y (108
4
tn)
tn)
tn)
tn)
tn)
tn)
(10 tn)
cu.m)
kWh)
1991
137
0
597
11
320
3
126
0
12
0
31
1992
123
0 1,136
33
501
16
169
2
11
0
50
1993
143
0 1,567
218
940
54
456
68
71
0
45
1994
121
0
235
105
624
27
398
97
139
0
18
1995
164
0 3,401
16
612
76
659
233
96
0
6
1996
322
0 2,262
8
465
66
943
355
107
0
1
1997
201
0 3,547
8
743
138 1,37
1
358
176
0
1
1998
159
0 2,732
1
311
129 1,62
7
477
191
0
0
1999
167
0 3,661
0
31
211 1,75
7
322
208
0
4
2000
212
0 7,027
0
26
255 1,48
0
482
161
0
15
2001
249
0 6,026
0
27
202 1,82
4
489
201
0
18
2002 1,081
0 6,941
0
48
215 1,66
0
626
384
0
23
2003 1,110
0 9,102
0
85
210 2,39
5
637
432
0
30
2004 1,861
1 12,27
2
0
275
282 3,05
9
641
384
0
34
2005 2,617
1 12,68
2
0
53
328 2,60
9
617
443
0
50
2006 3,811
0 14,51
7
6
71
561 2,79
9
536
443
10
54
2007 5,102
0 16,31
7
23
162
524 2,41
7
405
689
40
43
2008 4,034
0 17,88
9
199
624
648 2,18
6
259
666
46
38
2009 12,58
3
16 20,37
9
4
184
612 2,40
7
408
1,153
76
60
2010 16,47
8
0 23,93
1
133
180
487 2,29
9
327
0
129
0
Source: China energy statistical yearbook 2011.
Resources, Energy and Tourism • China Review • June 2012
69
Table 18: Exports of major energy products, 1991–2010
Year
Coal Coke1 Crude Gasolin
(104
(104 Oil (104
e (104
tn)
tn)
tn)
tn)
Diesel
oil (104 Kerosen
tn) e (104 tn)
Fuel
oil
(104
tn)
Other
LPG
petro Natural
(104 products gas (108 Electricity
tn) (104 tn)
cu.m) (108 kWh)
1991
2,000
108
2,260
250
121
32
70
1
149
0
3
1992
1,966
135
2,151
270
148
18
63
1
66
0
0
1993
1,981
261
1,943
185
129
7
32
1
108
0
1
1994
2,419
404
1,849
210
122
11
6
1
89
0
39
1995
2,862
886
1,823
186
131
37
28
7
131
0
60
1996
3,648
769
2,040
131
157
74
37
33
117
0
37
1997
3,073
1,058
1,983
178
232
72
52
39
156
0
72
1998
3,230
1,146
1,560
182
98
92
57
50
203
0
72
1999
3,744
997
717
414
60
125
25
8
221
0
91
2000
5,505
1,520
1,031
455
55
199
33
2
280
0
99
2001
9,012
1,385
755
572
26
182
44
2
325
0
102
2002
8,384
1,357
766
612
124
170
64
6
246
0
97
2003
9,403
1,472
813
754
224
202
76
2
262
0
103
2004
8,666
1,501
549
541
64
205
182
3
361
24
95
2005
7,172
1,276
807
560
148
269
230
3
473
30
112
2006
6,327
1,447
634
351
78
371
258
15
473
29
123
2007
5,317
1,530
389
464
66
448
380
34
416
26
146
2008
4,543
1,221
424
203
63
536
732
68
419
32
166
2009
2,240
54
507
492
451
594
862
85
305
32
174
2010
1,903
335
303
517
464
605
990
93
0
0
191
Source: China energy statistical yearbook 2011.
Note:
1. Includes semi-coke.
Resources, Energy and Tourism • China Review • June 2012
70
Table 19: Crude steel production, consumption, exports and imports, China vs rest of world (RoW), 1978 –
2010
Year
Production
Consumption
China
(Mt) RoW (Mt) China (Mt)
Exports
Imports
RoW
(Mt)
China
(Mt)
RoW
(Mt)
China
(Mt)
RoW
(Mt)
1978
32
685
40
677
0
139
9
131
1979
34
712
43
706
0
143
8
137
1980
37
678
42
675
0
140
5
137
1981
36
671
38
668
1
142
3
138
1982
37
608
40
606
1
134
4
132
1983
40
623
49
611
0
145
10
133
1984
43
667
57
653
0
159
13
145
1985
47
672
66
646
0
171
20
144
1986
52
662
69
642
0
162
17
142
1987
56
679
68
662
0
162
12
144
1988
59
721
67
710
1
170
9
160
1989
62
724
69
717
1
170
8
163
1990
66
704
68
698
3
168
4
163
1991
71
663
70
654
4
173
4
165
1992
81
639
85
619
4
192
8
172
1993
90
638
125
595
1
221
37
178
1994
93
632
116
605
3
236
26
208
1995
95
657
99
643
11
236
15
222
1996
101
649
111
625
7
238
16
215
1997
109
690
114
667
9
259
13
236
1998
115
663
122
642
5
264
13
243
1999
124
665
136
638
6
275
17
249
2000
129
720
138
704
11
295
21
278
2001
152
699
170
674
7
293
26
267
2002
182
722
205
693
7
312
29
284
2003
222
748
257
712
8
325
43
289
2004
283
788
296
772
20
346
33
329
2005
353
791
353
783
27
344
27
336
2006
419
828
387
852
52
367
19
390
2007
489
857
440
888
66
377
17
408
2008
500
829
460
857
56
380
16
408
2009
574
659
572
656
24
302
22
300
2010
627
791
602
806
42
345
17
361
Source: Steel statistical yearbook, various years.
Resources, Energy and Tourism • China Review • June 2012
71
Box 5: Commodity consumption per capita and GDP per capita: crude steel, aluminium, copper and
zinc, selected countries
The charts below show the relationship between per capita consumption of crude steel, aluminium, copper and zinc
and real GDP per capita for selected countries. China’s steel consumption has increased sharply over recent decades
from its low base in 1980. Steel intensity of use (measured by kilograms consumption per person) in China overtook
that in the United States in 2009 and is approaching that of Japan.
(a) Crude steel, 1980–2010
(b) Aluminium, 1988–2010
Source: BREE; Steel statistical yearbook ( years); World economic outlook database 2012.
(c) Copper, 1980–2010
(d) Zinc, 1990–2010
Source: BREE; World economic outlook database 2012.
Resources, Energy and Tourism • China Review • June 2012
72
Box 6: Ownership of major durable consumer goods per 100 urban households in China
Urbanisation and rising incomes are expected to increase the demand for consumer durables such as refrigerators,
colour televisions, air conditioners, computers and automobiles.
In Chinese urban households, the ownership of a range of consumer durables increased substantially bet ween 2000
and 2010. Virtually all urban households in China now own a refrigerator as well as a colour television, and a growing
number own air conditioners.
Car ownership has increased from one car per 100 urban households in 2000 to three cars per 100 ho useholds in
2005 and 13 cars per 100 households in 2010.
Source: China statistical yearbook 2011.
Resources, Energy and Tourism • China Review • June 2012
73
Table 20: Iron ore production, consumption, exports and imports, China vs rest of world (RoW), 1978 –
2010
Year
Production
Consumption
Exports
Imports
China
(Mt)
RoW
(Mt)
China
(Mt)
RoW
(Mt)
China
(Mt)
RoW
(Mt)
China
(Mt)
RoW
(Mt)
1978
55
773
62
757
0
350
6
334
1979
56
828
62
814
0
397
6
383
1980
53
804
59
789
0
384
6
368
1981
49
788
51
764
0
372
2
349
1982
50
707
54
693
0
328
3
314
1983
53
664
57
641
0
314
4
291
1984
57
756
63
732
0
372
6
348
1985
65
778
75
755
0
376
10
353
1986
67
778
81
748
0
370
14
340
1987
72
778
84
749
0
368
12
339
1988
73
812
83
785
0
401
10
373
1989
76
830
89
795
0
424
13
389
1990
84
806
99
782
0
395
14
371
1991
82
767
101
733
0
397
19
364
1992
92
717
117
699
0
364
25
347
1993
111
706
144
667
0
396
33
357
1994
113
724
150
686
0
422
37
383
1995
124
773
165
724
0
459
41
409
1996
119
769
163
722
0
444
44
397
1997
125
798
181
742
0
482
55
426
1998
116
790
168
735
0
463
52
408
1999
111
773
167
713
0
446
55
387
2000
105
854
175
779
0
507
70
432
2001
102
832
194
729
0
504
92
401
2002
109
881
220
753
0
544
112
416
2003
208
956
356
794
0
595
148
432
2004
204
1,040
412
843
0
646
208
449
2005
266
1,113
541
844
0
718
275
448
2006
328
1,221
654
903
0
764
326
446
2007
369
1,303
752
933
0
824
383
454
2008
301
1,380
745
944
0
890
444
453
2009
223
1,331
853
683
0
961
630
313
2010
315
1,513
934
872
0
1,071
619
429
Source: UNCTAD 2011.
Notes:
1. 1.0 Mt = one million tonnes.
Resources, Energy and Tourism • China Review • June 2012
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Resources, Energy and Tourism • China Review • June 2012
75
Table 21: Thermal coal production, consumption, exports and imports, China vs rest of world (RoW),
1978–2010
Year
Production
Consumption
Exports
Imports
China
(Mt)
RoW
(Mt)
China
(Mt)
RoW
(Mt)
China
(Mt)
RoW
(Mt)
China
(Mt)
RoW
(Mt)
1978
565
1,514
565
1,514
3
84
2
83
1979
581
1,602
579
1,607
4
96
2
101
1980
552
1,676
549
1,675
5
114
2
113
1981
561
1,676
558
1,675
5
122
2
121
1982
604
1,754
601
1,761
5
123
2
131
1983
648
1,742
646
1,748
4
125
2
131
1984
717
1,806
715
1,812
5
147
2
153
1985
735
1,874
732
1,874
5
173
2
174
1986
754
1,932
749
1,933
7
176
2
177
1987
783
1,984
775
1,992
10
170
2
178
1988
829
1,994
819
2,001
12
184
2
191
1989
895
1,993
885
2,005
12
185
2
196
1990
920
1,920
908
1,958
14
280
2
318
1991
926
1,892
910
1,939
16
271
1
318
1992
949
1,878
931
1,926
20
257
1
305
1993
985
1,804
971
1,850
16
232
1
278
1994
1,065
1,861
1,047
1,918
19
229
1
286
1995
1,145
1,885
1,125
1,929
22
267
2
311
1996
1,198
1,909
1,172
1,945
29
282
3
319
1997
1,154
1,956
1,125
2,000
31
303
2
347
1998
1,124
1,981
1,098
2,017
27
324
1
359
1999
1,064
1,974
1,034
2,025
32
318
1
369
2000
1,055
1,994
1,008
2,059
49
365
2
430
2001
1,090
2,118
1,014
2,219
79
378
2
478
2002
1,195
2,093
1,135
2,186
71
386
11
479
2003
1,422
2,141
1,350
2,241
81
426
8
526
2004
1,642
2,239
1,573
2,348
81
452
12
561
2005
1,786
2,336
1,738
2,415
66
498
19
576
2006
1,880
2,457
1,855
2,525
59
557
33
625
2007
1,974
2,485
1,968
2,546
51
588
45
650
2008
2,230
2,551
2,221
2,634
42
583
33
665
2009
2,347
2,507
2,417
2,496
22
632
91
621
2010
2,564
2,565
2,673
2,564
19
665
129
663
Source: IEA database 2011.
Notes:
1. 1.0 Mt = one million tonnes.
Resources, Energy and Tourism • China Review • June 2012
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Table 22: Metallurgical coal production, consumption, exports and imports, China vs rest of world (RoW),
1978–2010
Year
Production
Consumption
Exports
Imports
China
(Mt)
RoW
(Mt)
China
(Mt)
RoW
(Mt)
China
(Mt)
RoW
(Mt)
China
(Mt)
RoW
(Mt)
1978
52.6
468.6
52.3
462.8
0.3
119.8
0.0
114.0
1979
54.4
503.5
53.7
497.8
0.7
139.5
0.0
133.8
1980
68.2
492.1
66.8
492.0
1.4
141.7
0.0
141.6
1981
60.6
487.6
59.1
483.3
1.5
147.1
0.0
142.8
1982
62.6
476.8
60.8
474.3
1.8
144.4
0.0
141.9
1983
66.2
454.5
63.9
448.7
2.3
142.2
0.0
136.3
1984
72.0
467.9
69.6
461.4
2.4
163.7
0.0
157.2
1985
68.4
470.9
66.1
469.1
2.5
168.6
0.2
166.8
1986
69.9
474.6
67.4
470.1
3.0
163.6
0.5
159.1
1987
72.8
476.6
69.4
469.9
3.6
170.7
0.2
164.0
1988
75.3
491.7
72.1
482.3
3.2
188.0
0.1
178.6
1989
81.3
489.0
78.7
477.2
2.9
189.0
0.3
177.2
1990
85.7
512.9
82.4
478.6
3.5
205.3
0.3
170.9
1991
87.2
471.9
83.7
442.9
3.8
197.7
0.4
168.7
1992
89.5
449.8
86.2
417.2
3.7
198.5
0.4
165.9
1993
96.6
420.8
92.3
404.2
4.3
180.2
0.0
163.7
1994
103.7
395.8
98.8
380.3
4.9
189.5
0.0
174.0
1995
147.8
397.5
141.1
389.9
6.7
187.2
0.0
179.6
1996
132.0
383.4
124.5
379.7
7.5
184.8
0.0
181.2
1997
135.4
389.7
131.2
381.4
4.6
191.2
0.4
183.0
1998
131.6
363.6
126.8
362.3
4.9
178.3
0.1
177.0
1999
123.0
357.2
118.0
353.0
5.2
172.6
0.3
168.4
2000
123.7
352.7
117.6
351.5
6.5
179.3
0.3
178.1
2001
128.8
345.7
117.6
334.8
11.4
182.3
0.3
171.5
2002
148.8
333.7
135.8
341.2
13.3
167.8
0.3
175.3
2003
165.8
342.3
155.2
345.0
13.1
171.0
2.6
173.8
2004
225.7
357.7
226.8
366.8
5.8
182.4
6.8
191.5
2005
280.6
363.5
282.6
350.6
5.3
200.1
7.2
187.3
2006
339.0
356.3
339.3
352.1
4.3
195.5
4.7
191.3
2007
379.1
383.5
382.8
372.5
2.5
212.4
6.2
201.5
2008
385.0
381.8
388.4
352.3
3.5
231.8
6.9
202.4
2009
416.5
365.3
450.2
322.9
0.6
210.9
34.4
168.5
2010
454.8
436.3
502.7
373.7
0.6
270.4
48.4
207.8
Source: IEA database 2011.
1. 1.0 Mt = one million tonnes.
Resources, Energy and Tourism • China Review • June 2012
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Box 7: China’s dependence on imports of iron ore, thermal coal and metallurgical coal
In 2010, China’s dependence on imports (measured by imports as a percentage of consumption) of iron ore was
around seven times higher than it was in 1978. Its dependence on imports of metallurgical coal was more than 30
times higher than it was in 1978. While China remains the world’s largest producer of thermal coal, its import
dependence increased from 0.4 per cent in 1978 to 4.6 per cent in 2010.
Source: IEA database 2011; UNCTAD 2011.
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Box 8: China’s thermal and metallurgical coal: production, consumption, export and import
Over the past three decades (1978 to 2010) China’s production of thermal coal increased 4.5 -fold, from 565 million
tonnes (Mt) in 1978 to 2,564 Mt in 2010. Its consumption increased 4.7-fold, from around 565 Mt in 1978 to 2,673 Mt
in 2010. Since 2009 consumption has surpassed production and China’s imports of thermal coal are now greater than
its exports.
Over the same period, China’s production of metallurgical coal increased 8.6-fold, from 52.6 Mt in 1978 to 454.8 Mt in
2010. Its consumption increased 9.6-fold, from 52.3 Mt in 1978 to 502.7 Mt in 2010. Since 2004 consumption has
surpassed production and China’s imports of thermal coal are now greater than its exports.
Despite the rapid increase in production of thermal and metallurgical coal, Chinese coal consumption has risen at an
even faster rate, on average, over the period. As a result, its exports of both thermal coal and metallurgical coal have
fallen dramatically since 2009 and 2004, while its imports have increased at a very fast rate.
(a) Thermal coal
(b) Metallurgical coal
Source: IEA database 2011.
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Box 9: Volume share of China’s coal imports from key suppliers Jan. 2008 to Feb. 2012
Over the past 50 months, the biggest foreign supplier of coal to China was Indonesia, which contributed around one third of China’s total coal imports, based on an annual average, over the period. Australia was the second most
important supplier, with a 22 per cent share of China’s total imports of coal.
Vietnam’s share of China’s coal imports has declined over the period, while Mongolia’s and South Africa’s shares
have risen.
Note: Data is based on a 12-month moving average.
Source: CEIC database 2012.
Box 10: Volume share of China’s imports of iron ore: key suppliers
Over the past decade Australia’s volume share of China’s iron ore imports was around 40 per cent, a proportion
roughly equivalent to Brazil’s and India’s combined share.
Source: Iron ore statistics, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 2011.
Resources, Energy and Tourism • China Review • June 2012
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Box 11:
China’s imports of LNG from key markets
Over the period 2006–10, China’s total imports of LNG increased around 13-fold, from 1.0 billion cubic metres (bcm)
to 12.8 bcm.
China’s imports of LNG (bcm)
Australia
Indonesia
Malaysia
Qatar
Others
Total
2006
1.0
0
0
0
1.0
1.0
2007
3.3
0
0
0
0.6
3.9
2008
3.6
0
0
0
0.8
4.4
2009
4.7
0.7
0.9
0.5
0.7
7.6
2010
5.2
2.5
1.7
1.6
1.9
12.8
Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2011.
In 2010 China imported 5.2 bcm of LNG from Australia, compared to 1.0 bcm in 2006. Australian exports of LNG
accounted for around 41 per cent of China’s total imports of LNG in 2010.
China’s imports of LNG from Australia and other economies
Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2011.
Resources, Energy and Tourism • China Review • June 2012
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Part 3: Australian exports to and imports from China
Table 23: Australian exports to China and rest of world (RoW) (2010–11 A$billion)
Year
Mineral Resources 1
Merchandised Goods 2
Goods and Services 3
China
RoW
China
RoW
All countries
1989–90
0.2
23.3
1.2
47.9
89.0
1990–91
0.3
27.2
1.3
51.1
99.0
1991–92
0.5
27.1
1.5
53.6
108.3
1992–93
0.8
28.6
2.3
58.4
116.4
1993–94
0.6
28.8
2.6
62.0
127.4
1994–95
0.7
29.1
3.0
64.1
133.0
1995–96
1.0
32.7
3.8
72.2
146.2
1996–97
1.2
32.4
3.6
75.3
162.1
1997–98
1.5
38.0
3.9
83.9
169.7
1998–99
1.6
36.7
3.9
82.0
173.0
1999–00
2.0
41.2
5.0
92.3
189.8
2000–01
2.8
52.3
6.8
112.7
205.4
2001–02
3.0
51.2
7.8
113.3
204.0
2002–03
3.6
48.6
8.8
106.7
204.3
2003–04
4.5
43.9
9.9
99.1
206.8
2004–05
6.8
56.2
13.0
113.8
214.0
2005–06
11.0
75.6
18.1
134.4
219.7
2006–07
13.2
86.8
22.8
145.3
228.4
2007–08
19.6
92.8
27.0
153.8
237.0
2008–09
33.2
126.4
39.3
191.5
241.1
2009–10
36.8
98.2
46.5
154.2
253.8
2010–11
49.9
na
64.9
180.9
254.4
Sources: BREE; ABS cat. nos 5368.0, 5302.0, 5465.0.
a Not based on balance of payments; b FOB value; c Chain value.
Notes:
1. Not based on balance of payments.
2. FOB value;
3. Chain value calculation
Resources, Energy and Tourism • China Review • June 2012
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Box 12:
Australian exports to China
Over the past 20 years the real value of Australian exports of mineral resources to China has increased from A$0.2
billion in 1989–90 to A$49.9 billion in 2010–11. The value of Australian total merchandised exports to China increased
from A$1.2 billion to A$64.9 billion over the same period.
Value of Australian exports of mineral resources and merchandised exports to China (2010–11 A$billion)
Note: Merchandised goods have subcategories of ‘rural’ and ‘non-rural’. There are also subcategories for non-rural: metal ores and
minerals; coal, coke and briquettes; other mineral fuels and metals (excluding non-monetary gold); machinery and transport equipment;
other manufactures and other non-rural.
Sources: BREE; ABS cat. nos 5368.0 and 5302.0.
In volume terms, China accounted for around 69 per cent of Australian total exports of iron ore in 2010 –11, compared
to around 6 per cent in 1989–90. Over the period 1989–90 to 2010–11, China’s share of Australian total exports of
metallurgical coal increased from 1 per cent to around 11 per cent, while its share of Australian total exports of
thermal coal increased from 0.1 per cent to around 12 per cent.
Volume share of Australian exports to China: metallurgical coal, thermal coal and iron ore
Sources: BREE; ABS cat. no. 5465.0.
Resources, Energy and Tourism • China Review • June 2012
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Box 13: Growth in China’s imports and exports of merchandised goods
From 1990–91 to 2010–11, the total value of China’s imports of merchandised goods from Australia increased 55 -fold,
at an average growth rate of around 22 per cent per annum. The value of merchandised goods the rest of the world
(RoW) imported from Australia increased around a fourfold over the period 1990–91 to 2010–11, at an average
growth rate of around 7 per cent per annum.
(a) Annual growth in China’s imports
from Australia
(b) Annual growth in RoW imports
from Australia
Source: ABS cat. 5302.0 and 5439.0.
From 1990–91 to 2010–11, the total value of China’s exports of merchandised goods to Australia increased 33-fold,
an average growth rate of 18 per cent per annum. The value of merchandised goods the rest of the world (RoW)
exported to Australia increased around a fourfold, an average growth rate of around 6 per cent per annum.
(c) Annual growth in China’s exports to Australia
(d) Annual growth in RoW exports to Australia
Note: RoW refers rest of the world.
Source: ABS cat. 5302.0 And 5439.0.
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Table 24: Metallurgical coal, thermal coal and iron ore, Australian exports to China and rest of world
(Row), 1989–2011
Year
Metallurgical coal 1
Iron ore2
Thermal coal
China (Mt)
RoW (Mt)
China (Mt)
RoW (Mt)
China (Mt)
RoW (Mt)
1989–90
0.5
42.6
0.0
43.9
5.5
93.0
1990–91
0.3
43.3
0.0
51.5
8.1
96.0
1991–92
0.3
47.4
0.0
58.2
14.6
91.9
1992–93
0.5
50.0
0.1
59.6
15.2
92.4
1993–94
0.5
47.7
0.0
59.1
16.7
97.7
1994–95
0.2
48.2
1.1
61.8
20.4
108.4
1995–96
0.1
49.7
1.4
59.7
23.3
102.9
1996–97
0.3
49.0
1.5
65.6
26.8
110.7
1997–98
0.3
56.7
1.5
77.0
29.9
112.3
1998–99
1.3
54.7
1.7
82.5
24.5
110.7
1999–00
1.4
61.4
0.9
78.1
30.4
119.0
2000–01
0.4
61.5
0.6
87.4
35.5
121.8
2001–02
0.0
65.4
2.9
89.1
39.1
117.0
2002–03
0.7
65.8
4.0
96.0
53.5
128.0
Part 2:
2003–04
3.1
64.5
2.5
104.2
66.1
128.7
2004–05
3.7
77.0
1.7
104.6
99.6
128.8
2005–06
2.2
75.3
4.0
106.8
123.5
115.9
2006–07
2.4
80.4
3.2
108.4
135.3
122.1
2007–08
1.4
82.3
1.5
113.6
167.6
126.7
2008–09
9.8
69.8
8.4
128.0
223.2
100.3
2009–10
15.5
82.2
13.9
121.1
265.6
124.3
2010–11
9.6
82.0
16.7
126.6
279.4
127.5
Sources: BREE; ABS cat. no. 5465.0.
Note:
1. High quality metallurgical coal.
2. Lump and run of mine.
3. 1.0 Mt = one million tonnes.
Resources, Energy and Tourism • China Review • June 2012
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Table 25: Aluminium, copper, lead and zinc, Australian exports to China and rest of world (RoW), 1990 –
2010
Year
Aluminium
Copper
China
(Kt) RoW (Kt)
Lead
China
(Kt) RoW (Kt)
Zinc
China
(Kt) RoW (Kt)
China
(Kt) RoW (Kt)
1990
3
934
7
226
0
72
0
594
1991
6
948
30
182
0
86
0
724
1992
25
905
41
230
0
106
0
775
1993
14
1,042
0
397
0
118
0
718
1994
2
946
52
383
0
88
13
698
1995
11
946
121
270
2
80
19
675
1996
12
1,056
191
597
19
65
70
676
1997
11
1,145
168
812
29
74
57
683
1998
5
1,305
317
917
26
205
16
760
1999
18
1,363
226
810
35
222
0
816
2000
19
1,383
285
730
70
215
5
885
2001
20
1,469
453
792
74
230
94
930
2002
46
1,480
371
784
42
222
63
953
2003
72
1,456
362
1,005
64
199
116
891
2004
75
1,458
216
966
83
181
131
864
2005
60
1,525
571
1,035
138
193
103
828
2006
37
1,581
540
1,019
127
153
104
782
2007
29
1,623
412
1,129
67
168
300
702
2008
16
1,663
602
1,204
60
162
352
644
2009
139
1,535
643
1,158
111
156
615
417
2010
40
1,652
564
1,313
166
135
532
633
a Aluminium, copper, Lead and Zinc export quantities are based on gross weight of ore and concentrates.
Sources: BREE; ABS cat. no. 5465.0.
Resources, Energy and Tourism • China Review • June 2012
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Table 26: Merchandised goods, Australian imports, top five economies and rest of world (RoW), current
custom value (A$billion), 1989–2011
Year
China
US
Japan
Singapore
Germany
RoW
1989–90
1.2
12.4
9.9
1.2
3.4
23.2
1990–91
1.5
11.5
8.8
1.3
3.1
22.7
1991–92
2.0
11.7
9.3
1.3
3.0
23.7
1992–93
2.6
13.0
11.1
1.5
3.4
28.0
1993–94
3.1
14.0
11.7
1.8
3.8
30.1
1994–95
3.6
16.0
12.8
2.2
4.9
35.0
1995–96
4.0
17.5
10.8
2.6
4.9
37.9
1996–97
4.2
17.6
10.2
2.6
4.6
39.7
1997–98
5.3
19.8
12.7
2.6
5.2
45.0
1998–99
6.1
20.9
13.6
2.9
6.1
48.0
1999–00
7.5
23.1
14.1
4.4
5.8
55.2
2000–01
9.9
22.4
15.4
3.9
6.2
60.6
2001–02
11.3
21.5
15.5
4.0
6.7
60.7
2002–03
13.8
22.5
16.3
4.4
8.0
68.2
2003–04
15.3
19.9
16.1
5.1
8.0
66.5
2004–05
19.8
21.3
17.2
7.2
8.6
75.3
2005–06
23.2
22.8
17.3
10.5
8.7
85.0
2006–07
27.1
24.9
17.4
10.1
9.3
92.0
2007–08
31.0
24.3
19.7
13.7
10.6
103.1
2008–09
37.0
25.3
17.8
13.4
11.1
114.7
2009–10
36.4
21.9
17.8
10.9
10.7
106.0
2010–11
41.1
23.2
16.7
11.4
10.2
111.4
Sources: BREE; ABS cat. no. 5439.0.
Resources, Energy and Tourism • China Review • June 2012
87
Box 14A: China’s share of export/import-value to/from Australia/rest of world of its total exports and
imports
The share of exports by value to Australia as a proportion of China’s total exports was around 2 per cent while its
share of exports by value to the rest of world was around 98 per cent in 2011.
The share of imports by value from Australia as a proportion of China’s total imports was around 5 per cent while its
share of imports by value from the rest of world was around 95 per cent in 2011.
(a) China’s export share to:
Australia vs rest of world
(b) China’s import share from:
Australia vs rest of world
Note: Exports and imports of total goods.
Source: CEIC 2012.
Box 14B: Australia’s share of export/import-value to/from China/rest of world of its total exports and
imports
The share of exports by value to China as a proportion of Australian total exports was around 26 per cent while its
share of exports by value to the rest of world was around 74 per cent in 2010–11.
The share of imports by value from China as a proportion of Australian total imports was around 19 per cent while its
share of imports by value from the rest of world was around 81 per cent in 2010 –11.
(c) Australia’s export share to:
China vs rest of world
(d) Australia’s import share from:
China vs rest of world
Note: Exports and imports of total merchandised goods.
Source: ABS cat. nos. 5368.0 and 5439.0.
Resources, Energy and Tourism • China Review • June 2012
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