Remediation of Land Affected
by Radioactive Residues
Proceedings of an International Conference on the Remediation of Land
Affected by Radioactive Residues Organized by the International Atomic
Energy Agency, Hosted by the Government of Kazakhstan and held in Astana,
18-22 May 2009
International Atomic Energy Agency
REMEDIATION OF LAND AFFECTED BY
RADIOACTIVE RESIDUES
The following States are Members of the International Atomic Energy Agency:
AFGHANISTAN
ALBANIA
ALGERIA
ANGOLA
ARGENTINA
ARMENIA
AUSTRALIA
AUSTRIA
AZERBAIJAN
BAHRAIN
BANGLADESH
BELARUS
BELGIUM
BELIZE
BENIN
BOLIVIA
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
BOTSWANA
BRAZIL
BULGARIA
BURKINA FASO
BURUNDI
CAMBODIA
CAMEROON
CANADA
CENTRAL AFRICAN 
REPUBLIC
CHAD
CHILE
CHINA
COLOMBIA
CONGO
COSTA RICA
CÔTE D’IVOIRE
CROATIA
CUBA
CYPRUS
CZECH REPUBLIC
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC 
OF THE CONGO
DENMARK
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
ECUADOR
EGYPT
EL SALVADOR
ERITREA
ESTONIA
ETHIOPIA
FINLAND
FRANCE
GABON
GEORGIA
GERMANY
GHANA
GREECE
GUATEMALA
HAITI
HOLY SEE
HONDURAS
HUNGARY
ICELAND
INDIA
INDONESIA
IRAN, ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF
IRAQ
IRELAND
ISRAEL
ITALY
JAMAICA
JAPAN
JORDAN
KAZAKHSTAN
KENYA
KOREA, REPUBLIC OF
KUWAIT
KYRGYZSTAN
LATVIA
LEBANON
LESOTHO
LIBERIA
LIBYAN ARAB JAMAHIRIYA
LIECHTENSTEIN
LITHUANIA
LUXEMBOURG
MADAGASCAR
MALAWI
MALAYSIA
MALI
MALTA
MARSHALL ISLANDS
MAURITANIA
MAURITIUS
MEXICO
MONACO
MONGOLIA
MONTENEGRO
MOROCCO
MOZAMBIQUE
MYANMAR
NAMIBIA
NEPAL
NETHERLANDS
NEW ZEALAND
NICARAGUA
NIGER
NIGERIA
NORWAY
OMAN
PAKISTAN
PALAU
PANAMA
PARAGUAY
PERU
PHILIPPINES
POLAND
PORTUGAL
QATAR
REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA
ROMANIA
RUSSIAN FEDERATION
SAUDI ARABIA
SENEGAL
SERBIA
SEYCHELLES
SIERRA LEONE
SINGAPORE
SLOVAKIA
SLOVENIA
SOUTH AFRICA
SPAIN
SRI LANKA
SUDAN
SWEDEN
SWITZERLAND
SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC
TAJIKISTAN
THAILAND
THE FORMER YUGOSLAV 
REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA
TUNISIA
TURKEY
UGANDA
UKRAINE
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
UNITED KINGDOM OF 
GREAT BRITAIN AND 
NORTHERN IRELAND
UNITED REPUBLIC 
OF TANZANIA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
URUGUAY
UZBEKISTAN
VENEZUELA
VIETNAM
YEMEN
ZAMBIA
ZIMBABWE
The IAEA’s Statute was approved on 23 October 1956 by the Conference on the Statute of the IAEA held at United Nations Headquarters, New York; it
entered into force on 29 July 1957. The Headquarters of the IAEA are situated in Vienna. Its principal objective is “to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of
atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world”
PROCEEDINGS SERIES
REMEDIATION OF LAND AFFECTED BY
RADIOACTIVE RESIDUES
PROCEEDINGS OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON
THE REMEDIATION OF LAND AFFECTED BY RADIOACTIVE
RESIDUES ORGANIZED BY THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC
ENERGY AGENCY, HOSTED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF
KAZAKHSTAN AND HELD IN ASTANA, 18-22 MAY 2009
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY
VIENNA, 2012
FOREWORD
In past decades, when supplies of uranium were urgently needed for nuclear weapons
production and for nuclear energy generation, the emphasis of the industry was on production,
often at the expense of the environment from which the uranium ore was taken. The uranium
mining activities of this era have left a legacy of tailings piles and polluted land and water
courses in many countries of the world. The need to restore the affected areas is now
recognized and remediation programmes are under way in many countries.
Uranium was mined in some countries which had no other nuclear or radiation related
practices and, as a result, there is little or no expertise to manage the remediation.
Furthermore, these countries tend to have only modest resources and so, finding funds to
remediate the uranium legacy sites is often difficult. These problems have been recognized by
the international community and efforts to assist countries in resolving them have been made
in recent years.
With this background, the International Atomic Energy Agency decided to organize an
international conference on the Remediation of Land Affected by Radioactive Material
Residues with the purpose of reviewing global progress in remediating areas affected by
radioactive materials – with special emphasis on areas affected by former uranium mining and
milling activities. The conference was held in Astana, Kazakhstan from 11 to 22 May 2009.
This was the second conference organized by the International Atomic Energy Agency
on this subject. The first was held in 1999 in Arlington in the United States of America and
was titled ‘Restoration of Environments with Radioactive Residues: The Arlington conference
was focused mainly on the cleanup of nuclear weapons test sites and areas affected by nuclear
accidents. In contrast, the Astana conference was concentrated on legacy sites from uranium
mining and milling activities.
The Astana conference was organized in eight sessions: From Arlington to Astana –
Lessons Learned, International Cooperation and Support in Environmental Remediation,
Complying with Safety Criteria, Innovative Technologies in Environmental Remediation,
Life Cycle Planning and Stakeholder Issues, Case Studies (2 sessions), and Expediting and
Enhancing Experience Exchange. This publication, which constitutes the record of the
conference, includes the opening address, the invited papers, the summaries of the individual
sessions and the conference president’s summary.
The IAEA gratefully acknowledges the support and generous hospitality of the
Government of Kazakhstan in hosting this conference. The IAEA officers responsible for this
publication were R. Edge of the Division of Radiation, Transport and Waste Safety and H.
Monken Fernandes of the Division of Nuclear Fuel Cycle and Waste Technology.
EDITORIAL NOTE
The Proceedings have been edited by the editorial staff of the IAEA to the extent considered necessary for the
reader’s assistance. The views expressed remain, however, the responsibility of the named authors or participants. In
addition, the views are not necessarily those of the governments of the nominating Member States or of the nominating
organizations.
Although great care has been taken to maintain the accuracy of information contained in this publication, neither the
IAEA nor its Member States assume any responsibility for consequences which may arise from its use. The use of particular
designations of countries or territories does not imply any judgement by the publisher, the IAEA, as to the legal status of such
countries or territories, of their authorities and institutions or of the delimitation of their boundaries.
The mention of names of specific companies or products (whether or not indicated as registered) does not imply any
intention to infringe proprietary rights, nor should it be construed as an endorsement or recommendation on the part of the
IAEA.
The authors are responsible for having obtained the necessary permission for the IAEA to reproduce, translate or use
material from sources already protected by copyrights.
CONTENTS
CONFERENCE SUMMARY .................................................................................................... 1
OPENING SESSION
Opening Address ........................................................................................................................ 7
H. Forsstroem
FROM ARLINGTON TO ASTANA – LESSONS LEARNED (Topical Session 1)
Summary of the 1999 International Conference on the Restoration of Environments
with Radioactive Residues .............................................................................................. 13
D.W. Reisenweaver
Remediation of Contaminated Areas of Kazakhstan ............................................................... 17
A.M. Magauov
International Policies and Strategies for the Remediation of Land Affected by
Radioactive Residues ...................................................................................................... 21
A.J. González
Assisting the Return to Normal Life in Chernobyl–Affected Regions: the International
Chernobyl Research and Information Network (ICRIN) ............................................... 31
O. Leshchenko, L. Vinton, Z. Carr, D.H. Christie, V. Berkovskyy, E. Sherstyuk,
A. Karankevich, E. Stanislavov
SUMMARY OF SESSION 1
H. Forsstroem
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND SUPPORT IN ENVIRONMENTAL
REMEDIATION (Topical Session 2)
Remediation of Radioactively Contaminated Sites – Review of Projects Supported by
the International Science and Technology Center (ISTC) .............................................. 41
V. Rudneva, W. Gudowski
SUMMARY OF SESSION 2
S. Vorobiev
COMPLYING WITH SAFETY CRITERIA (Topical Session 3)
The Existing Regulatory Framework in Russia on Environmental Remediation .................... 51
N.K. Shandala, M.F. Kiselev, M.I. Balonov, M.K. Sneve
US Policies for Cleanup at Radioactively contaminated sites ................................................. 57
S. Walker
Principles of Uranium Stewardship: Guidance from the World Nuclear Association ............. 61
S. Saint-Pierre
Adapting International Experience to Regulatory Supervision of Legacy Sites in the
Central Asian Republics ................................................................................................. 67
M. Sneve, M. Kiselev, N. Shandala, T. Zhunussova, A. Kim, U. Mirsaidov,
B. Tolongutov
SUMMARY OF SESSION 3
A.J. González
INNOVATIVE TECHNOLOGIES IN ENVIRONMENTAL REMEDIATION
(Topical Session 4)
Innovative Mathematical Modelling in Environmental Remediation ...................................... 79
G.T. Yeh, J.P. Gwo, M.D. Siegel, M. H. Li, Y.L. Fang, F. Zhang, W.S. Luo,
S.B. Yabusaki
Advances in the Application of Electrical Techniques for Site Remediation .......................... 85
D.F. Osborne
Site Remediation in Practice .................................................................................................... 91
A. Várhegyi, G. Földing, Z. Berta , M. Csövári
Monitored Natural Attentuation of Metals and Radionuclides in Soil and Groundwater ........ 97
M. Denham, K. Vangelas
SUMMARY OF SESSION 4
V. Adams
LIFE CYCLE PLANNING AND STAKEHOLDER ISSUES IN
ENVIRONMENTAL RESTORATION (Topical Session 5)
Balancing the Uranium Production Cycle: Central Asia as a Case Study ............................. 107
A.T. Jakubick, D.R. Metzler, P.Waggitt, R. Edge
IAEA Preliminary Assessment of the Former French Nuclear Test Sites in Algeria ............ 119
D.W. Reisenweaver
Social and Ethical Issues in Remediation .............................................................................. 127
D.H. Oughton
A Guide for the Remediation of Radioactively Contaminated Sites: EURSSEM ................. 131
L.P.M. Van Velzen, L. Teunckens, M. Vasko, E. Hajkova, V. Daniska,
K. Kristofova
Improving Radioactive Waste and Source Management at the Vinča Institute ..................... 139
M. Recio, J. Kelly, M. Kinker
SUMMARY OF SESSION 5
M. Paul
CASE STUDIES (ENVIRONMENTAL REMEDIATION IN CENTRAL ASIAN
COUNTRIES) (Topical Session 6)
Environmental Effects of Possible Landslides in the Areas of Radioactive Waste
Storage in Kyrgyzstan ................................................................................................... 147
I.A. Torgoev, Y.G. Aleshin, G.E. Ashirov
The Radiological and Environmental Situation Near to the Decommissioned Uranium
Mines in Uzbekistan ..................................................................................................... 153
E.A. Danilova, A.A. Kist, R.I. Radyuk, G.A. Radyuk, U.S. Salikhbaev, P. Stegnar,
A. Vasidov, A.A. Zhuravlev
Multiple Stressors – Environmental Impact at Sites Contaminated with Radionuclides
and Metals ..................................................................................................................... 159
B. Salbu
Industrial Environmental Monitoring — a Land Restoration Costs Tracking Tool .............. 165
M. Iskakov, M. Nurgaziyev, B. Eleyushov, P. Kayukov
SUMMARY OF SESSION 6
A. Kim
CASE STUDIES II (Topical Session 7)
Challenges in Estimating Public Radiation Dose Resulting from Land Application of
Waters of Elevated Natural Radioactivity .................................................................... 173
P. Lu, R. Akber, A. Bollhöfer
Experience
of
the
Constraints
Affecting
the
Implementation
of
Decommissioning/Remediation Programmes at Uranium Mining Sites ...................... 179
M.R. Franklin
Lessons Learned from the Remediation at Villa Aldama Uranium Extraction Plant ............ 185
R. Fabian Ortega
Occupational Exposure During Remediation Work at a Uranium Tailings Pile ................... 191
M.L. Dinis, A. Fiúza
Baseline Radiological Survey of the Uranium–Bearing Region of Poli (Northern
Cameroon) .................................................................................................................... 195
S. Saïdou, F. Bochud, S. Baechler, K.N. Moïse, P. Froidevaux
Romanian Experience in the Remediation of NORM Contaminated Sites – A Case
Study ............................................................................................................................. 203
O. Velicu, A. Toma
Radioecological Assessment and Remediation Planning of Uranium Milling Facilities at
the Pridneprovsky Chemical Plant in Ukraine .............................................................. 211
T.V. Lavrova, O.V. Voitsekhovych, M.G. Buzinny
Experience Gained in Transferring WISMUT Radiation Protection Know–How to
International Projects in Uranium Mining Remediation............................................... 217
P. Schmidt, C. Kunze, J. Regner
Justification of Remediation Strategies in the Long Term After the Chernobyl Accident .... 223
S. Fesenko, P. Jacob, A. Chupov, A. Ulanovsky, I. Bogdevich, N. Sanzharova,
A. Panov, N. Isamov, V. Kashparov, Y. Zhuchenka
Experiences in the Remediation of Contaminated Land ........................................................ 229
I. Adsley, R. Murley, L. Fellingham, K. Stevens
Assessment of Current Doses from Uranium Tailings........................................................... 235
R. Avila, O. Voitsekhovych, I. Zinger, P. Keyser
SUMMARY OF SESSION 7
B. Salbu
EXPEDITING AND ENHANCING EXPERIENCE EXCHANGE
(Topical Session 8)
The ENVIRONET – Network on Environmental Management and Remediation ................ 247
H. Monken-Fernandes
SUMMARY OF SESSION 8
D. Louvat
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS OF THE CONFERENCE .......................................... 253
Report of the Conference President
CHAIRPERSONS OF SESSIONS ........................................................................................ 257
PRESIDENT OF THE CONFERENCE ................................................................................ 257
SECRETARIAT OF THE CONFERENCE ........................................................................... 257
PROGRAMME COMMITTEE ............................................................................................. 257
ORGANIZING COMMITTEE IN KAZAKHSTAN ............................................................ 258
AUTHOR INDEX .................................................................................................................. 259
LIST OF PARTICIPANTS .................................................................................................... 261
CONFERENCE SUMMARY
This conference was concerned with the progress being made globally in the
remediation of land areas affected by radioactive residues. This was the second conference
organized by the International Atomic Energy Agency on this subject. The first was held in
1999 in Arlington in the United States of America and was titled Restoration of Environments
with Radioactive Residues. The Arlington conference was focused mainly on the cleanup of
nuclear weapons test sites and areas affected by nuclear accidents. In contrast, the Astana
conference was concentrated on legacy sites from uranium mining and milling activities.
Uranium mining legacy sites exist in many countries and result mainly from mining
activities in the period 1950–1990 when uranium was being sought globally for nuclear
weapons and for nuclear energy generation. Some of the countries affected are among the
poorest of nations. The problems that these countries have in remediating their legacy sites
stem mainly from the lack of available economic and human resources. The uranium mining
site remediation issue has emerged strongly in recent years since the end of the Cold War. In
response, the international organizations have begun to provide support to the countries
concerned in addressing the problems, especially to the countries of Central Asia. It was
mainly for this reason that the conference was held in Astana the capital city of Kazakhstan.
The conference was designed to cover all relevant aspects related to environmental
remediation including: Regulatory and Safety Regimes, Innovative and Mature Technologies,
Life-Cycle Planning, Technical Experience Exchange, and Stakeholder Issues and
International Cooperation and Support. A series of case study presentations was organized to
provide the participants with an overview of environmental remediation activities in different
parts of the world. A special session addressed environmental remediation in Central Asian
Countries (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan) where many legacy sites were
created without proper consideration of the associated environmental impacts.
Unlike most other areas of radiation protection, there is not a global consensus on
radiological principles and criteria for the remediation of areas affected by radioactive
contamination. This was shown at the Arlington conference where a wide variation in the
radiological criteria being used as the basis for decisions on the cleanup of contaminated areas
was demonstrated. Most of the concern at Arlington was with artificial radionuclides. In the
context of the present conference, it is relevant to consider if the criteria should be the same
when the contamination is caused by naturally occurring radioactive material. Guidance on
radiological criteria for remediation has been given by the international organizations but it is
by no means universally accepted, especially by the persons living in the affected areas.
Despite the fact that, in many situations, such as the areas affected by the Chernobyl release,
the exposures to radiation are low, and below the levels of acceptability recommended by
national and international organizations, the population living in these areas remain
unconvinced.
In some of the countries in which uranium has been mined, the regulatory infrastructure
is weak and is not yet capable of ensuring that tailings remediation operations are conducted
safely. Efforts are being made to correct this situation by the transfer of experience and
expertise from industrialized countries. The progress of this work, which involves national
and international organizations, was reported at the conference.
It is clear that many of the environmental problems that have resulted from the mining
and milling of uranium could have been avoided with proper planning during the uranium
extraction phase. Nowadays, life cycle planning is being emphasised as a strategy for
avoiding the generation of future legacy sites. Life cycle planning means considering the
potential environmental and other impacts at all stages in the life of a facility, e.g. design,
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CONFERENCE SUMMARY
construction, operation, closure and decommissioning, and planning to avoid them. A session
focussing on this strategy was an important element of the conference.
A major aim of the conference organizers was to promote the transfer of remediation
technology from countries which already have considerable experience in addressing the
problem to countries which are relative newcomers to the subject. It was also intended to
provide countries having similar problems with an opportunity to exchange information.
Special sessions of case studies were included for this purpose. The aims of these information
transfer sessions are similar to those of an IAEA networking initiative called ENVIRONET
whose objectives are to provide coordinated support, to organize training and demonstration
events, and to foster information exchange by establishing a forum for discussion in different
areas. The final structure of ENVIRONET is still being developed but the programme was
formally announced at the General Conference of the IAEA in October 2009.
Remediation activities often affect local populations by requiring them to change their
habits and lifestyles or even to be relocated. For these reasons, the concerned public must be
part of the decision making process and formal arrangements must be established to enable
this to happen. In recognition of the importance of this topic, often termed ‘stakeholder
involvement’, it was specifically addressed in one of the conference sessions.
The problems associated with the uranium mining legacy sites in the countries in
Central Asia are well known and many international organizations are interested in providing
assistance to the concerned countries. However, to date, the coordination between them has
been less than optimal and this conference led to an agreement among the participating
international organizations that a mechanism to facilitate coordination is desirable. The
concerned organizations include the European Commission (EC), the International Science
and Technology cleanup (ISTC), the European Bank for Research and Development (EBRD),
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the World Bank, the World Health Organization (WHO) and
the IAEA. In this context, it was suggested that the mechanism used by the IAEA for
coordinating international and bi-lateral cooperation in northern Russia (the Contact Expert
Group (CEG)) could be used as a model for coordinating international cooperation in Central
Asia.
In summary, environmental contamination of land with radionuclides is a problem in
many countries. The policies and regulatory strategies for managing the remediation of
affected areas are not yet harmonized globally although there is considerable experience in the
world on remediation technology. Some of the concerned countries have insufficient
resources and expertise to properly manage the remediation required to render the affected
areas fit for human use and occupancy. Efforts in the future should therefore be focused on
unifying regulatory policies and strategies, promoting the transfer of knowledge and, where
necessary, supporting countries in their efforts to remediate their lands.
In the third session, the progress of the relevant international organizations in
developing recommendations and guidance to ensure the safety of remediation were
summarized and, in addition, the international operators’ organization, the World Nuclear
Association, presented its safety code of practice for industry. The development of regulatory
frameworks in Russia and in the United States of America (USA) were described as well as a
Norwegian-led initiative to improve regulatory supervision in the countries of Central Asia.
The discussion in this session led to a recognition of the need for coordination among
regulatory authorities and it was suggested that an international forum for the regulatory
supervision of legacy sites should be created.
Different technologies for the remediation of sites were discussed in Session 4. It was
shown that local conditions have to be well understood in order to design appropriate cover
systems for uranium tailings piles. Bioremediation techniques are still at the stage of
development but it was demonstrated that this is a particularly attractive solution for
2
CONFERENCE SUMMARY
situations where the groundwater reservoir is deep and difficult to access. Natural Monitored
Attenuation is an approach in which the attenuation of the migration of the contaminant by
natural processes is utilised. In many cases, if a sufficiently good understanding of the
location and movement of the contaminant plume can be obtained, no further remedial
measures may be needed. This approach seems to be gaining support in the USA from the
cost perspective; it is an alternative to treating large volumes of water for long periods of
time. Electrical vitrification of contaminated soil to produce a solid matrix has been applied at
various sites around the world. Its main advantage is that it creates a waste form that isolates
the radionuclide or metal contaminants and prevents leaching by water. Because of this, it
avoids the long term monitoring that other waste storage options require. Mathematical
modelling is an essential tool for the design and performance assessment of remediation
solutions. Most models use of the Kd approach but since this approach not really represent the
processes taking place in the environment, it must be used with caution. Instead, it was
recommended that reactive transport models should be used whenever the necessary data can
be obtained.
Along the same lines, the planning approach used by the US Department of Energy
(DOE) to manage environmental remediation projects was presented. It was pointed out that
the regulator must be involved in the overall management programme as well as the
stakeholders.
In relation to the session (Session 6) devoted to the Central Asian countries
(Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan) it was evident that the countries share
common problems, such as, similar histories and geographical locations for the tailings sites,
a lack of funds to deal with remediation, a lack of local expertise and equipment and, as a
result, inadequately characterized sites. Furthermore, the radiological conditions of people
living near to the sites may not be known. Each country has particular conditions that have
caused the situation to worsen. In some areas, precipitation has caused an increase in erosion,
landslides have caused significant changes in previously stable storage sites and residues have
been used as building material in homes and public buildings such as schools. If solutions are
not implemented in a timely manner, the possibility exists that contamination from one
country could cross national borders and cause contaminated areas in surrounding countries.
So far, only preliminary studies have been conducted at the Central Asian legacy sites.
It was concluded that near term actions for all of these sites should involve: measurement and
assessment studies in order to gain an understanding of the radiological situation at each site;
the identification of alternative water supplies if ground water has been contaminated; the
maintenance of institutional controls at the sites; routine monitoring to ensure controls are
performing their intended functions; and finally, the enhancement of public awareness of the
local situation.
It was stressed that decisions on intervention at these sites must be the result of a
comprehensive risk assessment, and decision making based solely on the perceived risk must
be resisted. It was noted in one study that risk assessment studies should take account of all
the risks present, not just those due to radionuclides. It is often the case that other pollutants
are present together with radionuclides; they are typically heavy metals and chemicals.
More case studies were discussed in Session 7. In some countries environmental
remediation works cannot be easily implemented by local technical people and international
assistance is essential. However, working in different juridical, social and political
environments has proved to be difficult. As a result, local capacity building is of utmost
importance and this is an essential role to be played by the relevant international
organizations.
Stakeholder involvement in the context of environmental remediation emerged as one of
the most important themes discussed during the conference. Many presentations highlighted
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CONFERENCE SUMMARY
the importance of effective stakeholder involvement in reaching solutions which satisfy all
parties.
4
OPENING SESSION
OPENING ADDRESS
H. Forsstroem
International Atomic Energy Agency
Vienna
Your Excellency, Mr Minister, Mr Mayor, on behalf of all of us I would like to thank
you very much for the warm welcome that we have received coming to Astana this week and
for the excellent preparations for this international conference.
Ladies and Gentlemen, dear Colleagues, we have come to Astana to discuss the
challenges involved in the remediation of lands affected by radioactive residues, which is an
international problem. In the past, many industries, such as the uranium mining industry, were
often developed without deep consideration of environmental issues in the overall planning
and implementation of their operations.
Many of these industries operated in an environment that did not have appropriate or
effective environmental laws and regulations. As a result, many contaminated sites have been
created. Other nuclear activities, e.g. defence programmes and the Cold War legacy, as well
as nuclear and radiological accidents, such as Chernobyl and Goiania, also created important
legacy sites.
Such sites can lead to undesired health effects for members of the public and harm to
the environment. The objective of environmental remediation is to mitigate the radiation
exposure from existing areas of contaminated land to reduce exposures now and in the future.
The main goal is, if possible, to release the land for unrestricted use, which means total
removal from regulatory control.
However, there are situations in which the removal from regulatory control cannot be
practically achieved. In these cases, once the cause of unacceptable risks to man and
environment is removed, restrictions on access and use of the area must be established and
long term stewardship schemes put in place. It is important to remember that remediation can
be done not only by removing the contamination itself but also through other actions that
prevent the contamination from influencing human and non-human biota.
From the perspective of radiation safety, two main principles govern the decision
making for any remediation programme. Firstly, justification, the implementation of the
remediation programme shall produce more good than harm; and secondly optimization,
working to ensure that the residual doses will be as low as reasonably achievable, social and
economic factors taken into account. Therefore, when selecting an optimized remediation
option, a wide variety of factors need to be considered.
The need to address radiological liabilities has been increasingly recognized since the
end of the Cold War. However, in many Member States, remediation programmes have made
little progress beyond the assessment and/or planning stages. One reason for this is that the
costs of remediating contaminated sites can be very high and. in many cases. these costs
cannot easily be met, even by the State. Just to give you an example of the costs involved on
environmental remediation projects, in the United States of America (USA) more than US $5
billion are spent per year on activities related to environmental remediation.
In many cases, remediation might require that resources have to be diverted from other
priority actions in order to improve the environmental conditions of a particular site or region.
It is thus critical to develop remediation projects together with all interested parties and, in
particular, with the local communities.
Today, with increasing activity in uranium production, the challenge for the
international community is to avoid that new legacy sites are created. This can be achieved
through the development of sustainable good practices and stewardship principles throughout
7
OPENING ADDRESS
the global uranium production industry. There is a need for active promotion of the concept of
lifecycle planning at the early stages. This is valid for all projects – be they remediation of
legacy sites, establishment of new developments, such as uranium mines, or re-development
of legacy sites for renewed production of radioactive minerals. In this context, the
development of a widespread safety culture and the building of relevant safety infrastructures
and competences are key factors.
The present situation in the Central Asian countries is an illustrative example. One of
the reasons that this conference is taking place in Kazakhstan is to highlight the need to find a
viable and effective architecture to address the remediation of the existing legacy sites, which
have resulted from the inappropriate development of several uranium mining and milling
operations. The mining enterprises that extracted uranium and rare earth elements for over 50
years in Central Asia have left behind very large amounts of industrial waste, including
radioactive residues.
Recent initiatives by the International Atomic Energy Agency concerning the former
uranium mining and production activities in Central Asia include cooperation and
communication with other international organizations. We expect that improved coordination
among affected countries and international organizations will result in a regional initiative to
tackle the health and environmental consequences of these legacies.
Meanwhile, the IAEA provides comprehensive assistance at both national and regional
levels with the aim of upgrading institutional capabilities. So far, the main focus of this
assistance has been on upgrading regulatory control, and expanding environmental monitoring
and laboratory analysis capabilities in full compliance with the International Safety Standards.
In the future, the emphasis will shift to helping States to fully implement environmental
remediation programmes.
Another very important case of environmental remediation is concerned with the
Chernobyl accident that took place in 1986. It resulted in a very large release of radionuclides
to the environment. The Chernobyl Forum, which was an initiative grouping together the
three affected countries and eight United Nations organizations, completed its tasks in 2005
and issued consensus reports on the health, environmental, social and economic consequences
of the Chernobyl accident. The Forum also provided directions for future actions and, in
particular, for the remediation of contaminated territories, the decommissioning of the
Chernobyl NPP and the management of radioactive waste resulting from these operations. As
a follow up, the IAEA is carrying out a regional programme of technical cooperation on the
remediation of agricultural land and it is supporting the Ukraine in decommissioning planning
and radioactive waste management.
As we all know, there have been other activities that resulted in the contamination of
extensive areas. The former nuclear weapons testing programmes radioactively contaminated
large territories in many places. Here, in Kazakhstan, there are still 16 000 km2 where public
use is restricted. The IAEA has provided an independent assessment of the radiological
situation at some of these former test sites and is prepared to continue to support its Member
States in assessing present and future radiological threats and in planning the remediation of
these sites.
The IAEA has thus been working worldwide to assist Member States with their efforts
to come to grips with the important task of remediating radioactively contaminated sites.
Numerous activities are ongoing, primarily national and regional Technical Cooperation
projects. However, the IAEA is not alone in working to alleviate this situation. Other agencies
and organizations have also been working on these same issues. In recent times, there has
been a major effort directed at Central Asia to bring all the players together to work with the
affected nations to better coordinate and complement the many aspects of the existing
programmes. This will culminate in a series of meetings later this year with the objective of
producing a Framework Document that will bring all the issues together in one place so that a
8
FORSSTROEM
common approach can be taken to obtain the necessary funding for the remediation of these
sites.
Let us remember, however, that environmental remediation programmes are not only
constrained by the lack of financial resources. Technical and non-technical factors including
appropriate programme management, socio-economic issues and changing regulatory regimes
have also contributed to the slow pace at which cleanup projects are being implemented. A
lesson which has been learned is that strong involvement at government level is essential.
From the regulatory perspective, legal instruments applicable to cleanup requirements
for groundwater and soil are evolving. It is necessary to keep track of these changes as new
regulations or improved international standards may affect the selection of cleanup strategies
and techniques. Legal requirements will determine the standards and levels of compliance to
be achieved. Such standards need to take into account updated scientific evidence. The
policies and regulatory frameworks are essential to provide assurance to members of the
public that they are being adequately protected. This will be discussed in Session 3 of the
conference.
Technologies must continuously evolve to bring solutions to existing problems in a
cost-effective way and to achieve compliance with regulatory standards. Some of the most
well established technologies can be ineffective in meeting modern regulatory standards. A
close follow-up of the performance of innovative technologies is thus essential. But it should
also be noted that remediation implementers are sometimes reluctant to promote innovative
technologies on a commercial scale, partly owing to the risk that innovative technologies may
fail to perform as predicted. Session 4 will provide some good illustrations of this.
Every remediation project is composed of separate tasks which are prioritised to assist
in planning and to optimise the use of resources. These tasks will vary significantly in size
and scope. It may be, from time to time, efficient to catch the less costly ‘low hanging fruits‘
first in order to bring immediate relief to the most important problems, without affecting the
long term objectives. It is important to ensure in the planning that ‘the best will not become
the enemy of the good’.
For these and other reasons, the involvement of different stakeholders in the decision
making process has become more and more relevant. Stakeholders may include local
communities, non-governmental organizations with national, regional or international
outreach, regulatory authorities and other relevant authorities. Failing to obtain complete
stakeholder involvement in environmental remediation programmes will usually result in
unnecessary delays and higher costs in project implementation. Session 5 will touch upon
these aspects.
The scope of environmental remediation has increased dramatically lately. A series of
study cases will be presented during Sessions 6 and 7 and in the Poster Session to give you an
overview of various environmental remediation programmes in different countries,
representing different regions of the world. It is not only uranium mining, weapons testing
and nuclear scientific applications that have given us contaminated sites. Some radiological
problems may have arisen as a consequence of non-nuclear activities, for example, as a result
of the so called NORM industries.
What is the role of the IAEA in all this? The key role of the IAEA is to assist Member
States with the planning, development, implementation, maintenance and continuous
improvement of programmes and activities. The IAEA provides support in the form of
guidance documentation, technical advice and training. The guidance may be found in the
IAEA documents including Safety Standards and Safety Reports, Technical Reports and
Technical Documents. The technical advice and training is mainly provided through
Technical Cooperation Programmes or bi-lateral assistance agreements. By taking full
advantage of these opportunities, a Member State should be able to avoid creating new legacy
9
OPENING ADDRESS
sites as well as achieving a significant decrease in the costs associated with extensive and long
lasting environmental remediation programmes.
The IAEA recognizes, however, that new mechanisms and means of experience
exchange and information transfer must be put in place. For this reason the IAEA is
establishing networks in different areas such as decommissioning, waste disposal and,
specifically, related to the scope of this conference, environmental remediation (the
ENVIRONET – will be presented during Session 8).
This conference creates a good opportunity to discuss the relevant issues relating to the
environmental remediation of radioactively contaminated sites. It follows on from the
environmental remediation conference that took place 10 years ago in Arlington, USA and
will allow you to discuss the achievements, the successes, the failures and the lessons learned,
as well as the new challenges that have emerged since that time.
The conference will also provide a forum for discussions on financing mechanisms and
support for the international or multi-lateral organization of environmental remediation
programmes; regulatory and safety issues; mature and innovative technologies; life-cycle
planning and non-technical issues in environmental remediation;
As a result, it is expected that the conference will encourage and assist the establishment
of different partnerships; reveal synergies that can help in the full implementation of
environmental remediation projects, and provide a forum for improved coordination among
the international organizations that support environmental remediation programmes,
especially in this region.
Finally, the conference will allow the IAEA to collect ideas for its programme and for
the assistance it gives to its Member States.
I wish you all a fruitful and rewarding conference with good and intensive discussions
both here and in the coffee breaks.
10
FROM ARLINGTON TO ASTANA – LESSONS LEARNED
(TOPICAL SESSION 1)
Chairperson
H. FORSSTROEM
IAEA
SUMMARY OF THE 1999 INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE
RESTORATION OF ENVIRONMENTS WITH RADIOACTIVE RESIDUES
D.W. REISENWEAVER
Alion Science & Technology,
Los Alamos, United States of America
Abstract
In November 2008, an international conference on the ‘Restoration of Environments with Radioactive
Residues’ was held in Arlington, Virginia in the United States of America. This paper reviews the contents and
outcomes of the Arlington conference and examines its relevance for the issues of today.
1.
INTRODUCTION
In November 1999, the International Atomic Energy Agency organized an international
conference on the Restoration of Environments with Radioactive Residues in Arlington,
Virginia in the United States of America (USA). The conference was co-sponsored by the US
Department of Energy, the US Environmental Protection IAEA and the US Nuclear
Regulatory Commission. This was the first IAEA conference to address the subject of
environmental remediation.
The format of the conference comprised five technical sessions, a panel discussion, a
poster session and opening and closing sessions. Thirty-seven papers were presented orally in
the technical sessions. The discussions that followed each paper together with the panel
discussion were recorded and an edited version of them was included in the conference
proceedings. Summaries of each of the five sessions were also included in the proceedings
which were published by the IAEA [1]. In addition, over 120 contributed papers were
published as a separate volume of the proceedings.
2.
SESSION ONE – GLOBAL OVERVIEW
The first session provided a global overview of the environments contaminated with
radionuclides requiring restoration and identified the major areas where environmental
contamination has occurred. Presentations addressed the radioactive residues in the USA, the
Russian Federation, the European Union and China. Other presentations addressed areas
contaminated with naturally occurring radioactive material, residues from accidents that have
occurred in the former Soviet Union and the general approach that the IAEA was taking to
establish policies on environmental restoration.
The session clearly illustrated that radioactive residues exist at many sites around the
world and result from events including accidents, nuclear weapons testing, decommissioning
and inappropriate past practices. There are also many areas that are affected by elevated levels
of naturally occurring radioactive materials. Three major issues were identified during the
discussions:
– The need for harmonized criteria for guiding restoration efforts;
– The need for consistency in the treatment of natural versus man-made radioactive
residues;
– The need for good communications with the public on decisions related to restoration.
13
TOPICAL SESSION 1
SESSION TWO – RESTORATION PRINCIPLES AND CRITERIA
3.
The papers in this session described current remediation approaches and cleanup criteria
being used by different countries, i.e. USA, Germany, France and the Russian Federation. The
three concerned governmental agencies in the USA have slightly different approaches and
criteria and these were discussed. The recommendations of the International Commission on
Radiological Protection (ICRP) relevant to cleanup were also presented.
There was considerable discussion of the issues contained in this session. It was
apparent that a unified view on the subject of radiological criteria and policies for aiding
cleanup decisions did not exist. It was recognized that the concept of ‘intervention’ is
generally not recognized in national regulations. Proposals were discussed on how to build a
framework that can deal with the remediation of residual contamination situations associated
with both man-made and naturally occurring origins. The following major conclusions were
identified during the discussions:
– The involvement of interested parties as part of the overall remediation process is of
primary importance;
– Establishing derived (and measurable) criteria is necessary for the management of
contamination situations as well as the protection of the environment;
– There is a serious potential for overestimating risks because of overly conservative
and unrealistic modelling and this can prove to be very costly.
SESSION THREE – CASE STUDIES
4.
In the third session, various case studies involving remediation efforts were presented.
The session was divided into five sub-sessions, each dealing with a particular type of
remediation problem. Each type of problem has unique issues and requires different
approaches to the remediation. The sub-sessions were concerned with:
–
–
–
–
–
Nuclear weapons test sites;
Legacy of discharges;
Legacy of accidents;
Mining and milling activities; and
Residues from the termination of practices.
It was identified that choosing between alternative restoration options should be based
on weighing the potential reduction achieved in worker and public doses against the
associated cost of the strategy. Site characterization approaches must include both a historical
review and a contaminant assessment. It was stressed that a good understanding of the site is
important when planning the characterization activities. The importance of interested party
involvement as part of the restoration activities was underlined and it was recognized that this
involvement is critical for project success. Since most sites are affected by both chemical and
radiological contamination, the harmonization of cleanup levels and goals for these different
contaminants is an important issue. It was also recognized that consideration has to be given
to the possible uses of the site and, if necessary, the maintenance of institutional controls to
limit use or access. Policies in this area still needed development at the time of the
conference.
14
REISENWEAVER
5.
SESSION FOUR – CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CASE STUDIES
A critical review of the case studies presented during Session Three had been conducted
by a small group of experts. The radiological protection approach, the criteria used for
remediation, the application of various non-radiological factors and the involvement of
interested parties were all considered during this analysis.
It was determined that there were no uniform criteria in use for guiding restoration
activities. The criteria being used ranged from 0.1 to 10 mSv/a. The cost/benefit justification
for the lower levels was questionable and it was clear that the decisions on remediation were
influenced by social, political and psychological factors, rather than by health or safety
aspects. The importance of early planning and the involvement of interested parties in the
decision making process was emphasized. The lack of public acceptance of even low levels of
voluntary risk was a significant factor influencing the decision making process. It was
recognized that the lack of disposal facilities for the high volumes of material that can be
generated during the restoration process can be problematic.
6.
SESSION FIVE – ROLE OF PUBLIC PARTICIPATION
This session was concerned with public involvement during the restoration process,
from the initial planning and decision making through to the final disposition of the site. This
issue was discussed during the other sessions, but this session focused on two programmes
that were developed to foster public participation in the process. The first was the Superfund
programme in the United States and the second was the European Commission ETHROS
programme involving territories that were contaminated due to the Chernobyl accident.
It was determined that the public must be brought into the decision making process at an
early stage to ensure the success of the project. The level of information needed will vary
depending on the level of interest of the individuals, and this may range from information
summaries to documentation of the detailed studies and data. It is important that involved
members of the public get the feeling that their input is important. It should be recognized that
individuals may have different concerns from those of the overall community and these
concerns must be taken into account.
7.
PANEL SESSION
The panel session was designed to bring together a wide range of interested parties to
discuss their concerns about the restoration process. The panelists included a radiation
protection expert, an individual from the local government of an area affected by nuclear tests
(the Marshall Islands), a representative from a local environmental group, a representative
from a public interest group and an environmental expert.
Not surprisingly, the concerns and the approach that should be taken to restore a site can
vary depending on the perspective of the individual or group providing comment. The
radiation protection expert thought there were three main issues concerning site restoration:
standards and limits, risk limitation with respect to natural verses manmade radiation, and the
role of the radiation protection community. The Marshall Island governmental representative
was concerned with the people and his community; how the island would be restored, and
how the people and community would be compensated. The environmental group
representative was concerned with the local population being involved with the federal and
local governments in a timely manner and in ensuring that all information is presented to
allow an informed decision to be made. The environmental expert agreed that stakeholder
involvement is important, but that it is not a substitute for governmental or official action. It
was considered that for stakeholders, the process is often more important than the criteria. The
15
TOPICAL SESSION 1
public interest group representative considered that the intelligence of the general public is
sometimes underestimated and that scientists sometimes tend to patronize the public. It was
emphasized that respect must be shown to all interested parties.
8.
SUMMARY
The closing session summarized the overall conference. The basic concepts of
restoration were agreed and the need for consistent criteria was identified. The problem within
the United States of the divergent opinion of governmental agencies on radiological criteria
was identified and a plea was made for convergence. There was also a recognition that the
concept of intervention was not fully endorsed by everyone and that this issue needs to be
addressed to help avoid confusion in the future. At the beginning of the conference it was
thought that there was a need for education of the public but by the end of the week it was
determined that this was not the problem, and that what is needed is early public involvement
in the remediation planning phase.
The following is a list of questions that was developed from the discussions on the
major issues:
– Have consistent criteria been established that provide guidelines for the remediation of
contaminated sites?
– Can a single criterion be applied to the remediation of all forms of contaminated site,
be they nuclear test sites, areas resulting from accidents, the termination of practices,
mining and milling activities or legacy discharges?
– Should areas contaminated with man-made versus natural radioactive material have
different criteria?
– Is the public being properly involved during the decision making process?
– How do we ensure that overly conservative and unrealistic modelling is not being used
which could lead to the overestimation of risks?
– Have we harmonized the cleanup levels and goals for sites that are contaminated with
chemical and radioactive material?
– How do we justify removing material from one site and moving it to another site
verses stabilizing the material in place?
I consider it to be appropriate to challenge this (Astana) conference to reflect on these
questions and I ask “Have these questions, that were identified 10 years ago, been addressed
in the intervening time?”
REFERENCES
[1]
16
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Restoration of Environments with
Radioactive Residues, Proceedings of an International Conference held in Arlington, USA,
November 1999, IAEA, Vienna (2001).
REMEDIATION OF CONTAMINATED AREAS OF KAZAKHSTAN
A.M. MAGAUOV1
Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources,
Astana, Kazakhstan
Abstract
This paper provides a summary of the situation in Kazakhstan in relation to environmental contamination
with radioactive materials. It identifies the sources of the contamination and describes the progress made towards
the remediation of affected areas.
1.
INTRODUCTION
The main sources of radioactive contamination in Kazakhstan are:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
Uranium mining enterprises;
Mining enterprises of the non-uranium industry (rare metals, phosphoric and coal
deposits);
Oil fields;
Former nuclear test sites; and
Commercial and research reactors (BN–350 power reactor in Aktau (under
decommissioning) and four research reactors).
Radioactive waste management in Kazakhstan in the period 1999–2009 has been
managed under both national and local budgets. The major programmes are:
(1)
(2)
(3)
Improving and maintaining uranium mining enterprises and remediating the
consequences of past mining activities;
Radiation safety;
Scientific, technical and technological support.
2.
REMEDIATION OF URANIUM MINING AND MILLING SITES
From the 1950s until 1991, Kazakhstan provided 40% of the uranium production in the
Soviet Union. Conventional uranium mining and milling continued until 1995/6 when it was
discontinued. Numerous legacy sites were left behind in Northern, Central/South and Western
Kazakhstan.
After the development of a specific legislative framework for the purpose in the late
1990s, a governmental programme for the remediation of the legacy sites was started in 2001.
The responsibility for remediation in Kazakhstan is with the State Enterprise
‘Uranlikvidrudnik’.
By 2007 a substantial part of the most urgent remediation work had been completed.
The remediation work is currently (2008–2010) being concentrated on the storage sites at
Aktau (Western Kazakhstan) and Stepnogorsk (Northern Kazakhstan). The remediation
1
Presented by K. Kadyrzhanov, National Nuclear Centre, Kurchatov, Kazakhstan.
17
TOPICAL SESSION 1
activities are conducted under close radiological supervision with constant operational
monitoring in order to ensure the protection of workers, the public and the environment.
The programme for the maintenance of active uranium mining sites and for the
remediation of the residues at the sites has been implemented in several steps:
Step 1 (2001–2005) – 8 sites;
Step 2 (2006–2010) – 6 sites;
Step 3 is concerned with the remediation of buildings and facilities above ground and
the monitoring of the ground surface in the vicinity of flooded shafts.
The responsibility for uranium mining in Kazakhstan is with the National Atomic
Company Kazatomprom which is also responsible for the management of the mining waste at
the active mine sites.
3.
BN–350 REACTOR DECOMMISSIONING
When the BN–350 fast breeder reactor reached the end of its operating life in 1999,
Kazakhstan assumed its international obligations related to the prevention of nuclear weapons
proliferation. The Government of Kazakhstan resolved to decommission the reactor.
According to the Government Resolution (Decree No.456, April 22, 1999), spent fuel must be
transported to the ‘Baikal–1’ research reactor site complex of the National Nuclear Centre,
located on the territory of the former Semipalatinsk Nuclear Test Site near to Kurchatov town,
for long term storage.
All of the spent fuel has been unloaded from the reactor and packed in sealed
containers. Preparations are being made to transport the nuclear fuel but for the time being it
is temporarily stored in the cooling ponds of the BN–350 reactor. Work has started on
arrangements for packaging the fuel in special transport casks. It is envisaged that 60 metal
concrete casks containing the spent nuclear fuel will be transported by rail and road to Baikal–
1 for long term storage.
4.
RADIATION SOURCE MANAGEMENT
Spent radiation sources represent a substantial proportion of the total of accumulated
radioactive waste in Kazakhstan and a significant amount of work has been carried out to
render these sources safe. The work follows two main directions:
(a)
(b)
Solving the radiological problems associated with the accumulation of spent sealed
sources;
Developing technologies for the recycling and use of spent radiation sources in industry
in Kazakhstan and the establishment of manufacturing facilities.
Since 1995, the Baikal–1 complex has been used for the long term storage of all spent
sealed sources in Kazakhstan and a special storage facility has been created there for that
purpose.
18
MAGAUOV
5.
REMEDIATION OF NUCLEAR TEST SITES
All types of nuclear weapons tests were carried out on the territory of Kazakhstan in the
period 1949 to 1989: they included air explosions, above ground explosions, underground
explosions, high altitude explosions and tests in space.
From 1996 to 2001, after the removal of the nuclear weapons infrastructure at the
Semipalatinsk Test Site, 181 tunnels at the Degelen site and 13 unused boreholes and the
facilities for 12 silo missile launchers at the Balapan site were destroyed. All of the operations
were carried out under strict radiological supervision and with the approval of experts from
the Ministry of Ecology and the Ministry of Emergency Situations. It is expected that up to
95% of the Semipalatinsk Test Site area can eventually be returned to normal economic use.
6.
RADIATION SAFETY SUPPORT
The radiological investigation of the territories of Kazakhstan is being carried out as
part of a national programme. The basic tasks of the programme are:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
7.
Assessment of the radiological situation in Kazakhstan, including an assessment of the
radiation doses to the population;
The zoning of radioactively contaminated territories and of areas for monitoring;
evaluation of the effectiveness of remediation and assessment of protection of the
population from non-standard exposures, e.g. hot particles;
Prevention of the dispersion of radioactive materials in the environment adjacent to the
Irtysh Chemical and Metallurgical Plant;
Support for the radiation and nuclear safety of the former Semipalatinsk Test Site, for
example, its use for agricultural activities, the seismic condition of underground
explosion locations and radioecology aspects.
REGULATORY AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK
The fundamental legislation governing the remediation of uranium mining and
processing sites comprises the legal acts on Atomic Energy Use, Radiation Safety of the
Population and Licensing. Relevant governmental decrees are: Decree on the Atomic Energy
Committee of the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources of the Republic of Kazakhstan,
Decree on the Licensing of Activities related to the Use of Atomic Energy, and Decree on the
Final Disposal of Radioactive Waste in the Republic of Kazakhstan.
The strategies and plans for remedial work have been established in compliance with
the following regulations: Norms of Radiation Safety (NRB–99), Hygiene Standards to
Ensure Radiation Protection (SP PORB–2003), Hygiene Standards for the Decommissioning,
Remediation and Conversion of Production Units for the Mining and Processing of
Radioactive Ores (SP LKP–98), and Hygiene Standards for the Handling of Radioactive
Waste (SPORO–97).
8.
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND PERSPECTIVES
The problem of radioactively contaminated areas is global and the Republic of
Kazakhstan has experience which can help others with similar problems. International
programmes can be of help in starting remediation programmes, for example, the programmes
of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the
Institute for Scientific and Technological Cooperation, and the European Commission. In the
case of Kazakhstan, the combining of national and international programmes has helped to
19
TOPICAL SESSION 1
strengthen the scientific and technical potential of the country in this field.
9.
CONCLUSIONS
A regulatory and legal framework exists in Kazakhstan which facilitates the control and
regulation of radioactive waste management. The potential to create facilities for the long
term storage and processing of radioactive waste exists at many locations in Kazakhstan.
The remediation of the former uranium mining enterprises is almost complete. A
monitoring system around the ground areas near to flooded mine shafts will have to be
developed.
In the context of supporting the non-proliferation regime, substantial work is being
carried out which helps in the evaluation of the radiation situation in the territories of
Kazakhstan.
Countries can benefit from international cooperation in this field and this conference is
a good example of such cooperation.
20
INTERNATIONAL POLICIES AND STRATEGIES FOR THE REMEDIATION
OF LAND AFFECTED BY RADIOACTIVE RESIDUES
A.J. GONZÁLEZ
Argentine Nuclear Regulatory Authority,
Buenos Aires, Argentina
Abstract
The paper addresses the international policies and strategies for the remediation of land affected by
radioactive residues. The main aim of the paper is to describe the evolution and status of the international
paradigms in this area while, at the same time, identifying some of the associated misunderstandings, mainly due
to the terminology employed. The international radiation protection approaches for remediation are described.
They derive from the recommendations of the International Commission on Radiological Protection. Prolonged
exposure situations, which are typical in the case of contaminated land, are analyzed in some detail. Finally, the
international safety standards on remediation, which are being established under the aegis of the International
Atomic Energy Agency, are explored. The paper suggests that the time is ripe for a simple and clear
international agreement on the levels of land contamination with radioactive material that may be considered
unambiguously safe.
1.
INTRODUCTION
The so-termed remediation of territories experiencing ‘contamination’ with radioactive
residues has been one of the more elusive issues to tackle and regulate for the radiation
protection community. Radiation protection experts have generally been unable to respond to
a simple and straightforward question from anxious members of general public: “Is it safe for
me and my family to live here?”. Experts have tried to explain that, while the territory was in
fact contaminated, remediation had to be optimized, and depending on many factors
(generally incomprehensible for the common public) they might, or might not, be able to
remain there. Moreover, sometimes, experts have implicitly advised members of the public
that it was ultimately their decision whether to leave or to remain in contaminated land or
whether it should be remediated. The meanings of the terms contamination and ‘remediation’,
in the context of radioactive material on land surfaces, are sometimes not clear to nonspecialists and can create ambiguity in understanding.
The paper’s main aim is to describe the evolution and status of the international
paradigms and standards for the remediation of land affected by radioactive residues and also
to discuss the misunderstandings caused by the terminology used. It also suggests further
international actions to help countries to solve their problems in this area. The ideas in this
paper are elaborated in greater depth elsewhere [1].
While many States have been challenged by the issue of remediating contaminated land,
Kazakhstan has been particularly challenged because its territory suffered extensive
contamination from the nuclear testing activities of the former Soviet Union. In May 1993,
representatives of the Kazakhstan Government informed the International Atomic Energy
Agency of their concern [2]. Subsequently, at the request of the Government of Kazakhstan,
the IAEA undertook to carry out a study of the radiological situation at Semipalatinsk [3].
From 1949 to 1989, the former Soviet Union had conducted 456 nuclear explosions at the
Semipalatinsk test site. Until 1963, the explosions were mainly carried out on the surface and
in the atmosphere. After 1963, testing was conducted underground. The last nuclear explosion
at the site was in 1989. Two Semipalatinsk areas, the so-called Ground Zero and Lake
Balapan areas were found to be heavily contaminated. Since the IAEA assessment, little aid
has been provided by the international community to help Kazakhstan remediate this vast area
21
TOPICAL SESSION 1
of territory. The IAEA had clearly qualified its assessment as ‘preliminary in nature’ and
expressly indicated that “it does not constitute a comprehensive radiological survey of the
site, which covers a very large surface area, but rather identifies the topics on which further
study is needed in order to develop a full understanding of the radiological situation at the
site” [3].
2.
MISUNDERSTANDINGS
The term (radioactive) ‘contamination’ is widely misunderstood and its
misinterpretation has had significant effects in radiation protection strategies. Surprisingly,
the term derives from a historical religious background as a descriptor of impurity.
Contamination originates from the Latin ‘contaminat-’, ‘contaminare’, or ‘make impure’. The
obvious conclusion from this definition is that something that is ‘contaminated’ is
automatically unacceptable, regardless of the quantification of such ‘contamination’. The
original intention of radiation specialists was to denote the presence of radioactive materials,
as expressed by the quantity (radio) ‘activity’, a denotation describing an amount or
concentration of radionuclides in a given energy state at a given time. The intention was not
of a connotation of impurity or dirtiness, nor even of the magnitude of the hazard involved.
However, in the public mind, ‘contamination’ became a quasi-synonym of dangerously
undesirable ‘radioactivity’. In sum, while the term is commonly used by experts to quantify
the presence and distribution of radioactive material in a given environment, it has become
widely misinterpreted as a measure of radiation-related dangerousness. Moreover,
‘contamination’ strictly refers to radioactive substances on surfaces, or within solids, liquids
or gases (including those in the human body), where their presence is unintended or
undesirable, or to the process giving rise to their presence in such places. Unfortunately the
term is used more informally (even by experts) to refer to the amount of (radio)activity on a
surface, and it is misinterpreted and misunderstood as a dangerous level of (radio)activity.
The term (radioactive) ‘remediation’ became closely associated with the
misinterpretations of ‘contamination’, as the former is a consequence of the latter. The term
may be used in a variety of contexts and, as a result, it can be badly misunderstood. In
common parlance, it means providing a remedy, namely a pharmaceutical product, cure or
treatment, for a medical condition. Not surprisingly, members of the public became extremely
anxious when informed that the place where they are living would be subject to remediation
because of a radiation-related contamination! Environmental radiation protection specialists,
however, use remediation to mean the removal or reduction of radioactive substances from
environmental media such as soil, groundwater, sediment, or surface water. The ultimate
purpose of ‘remediation’ is protecting human health and the environment against potential
detrimental effects from radiation exposure, rather than eliminating contamination
completely.
The untranslatable and more informal English term ‘cleanup’ has been used as a
synonym of remediation and this usage has added to the misunderstanding. The term implies
making a place ‘clean’, and is taken to mean making it absolutely free from dirt or harmful
substances. The confusion arises because a decision to reduce a given level of radioactive
contamination may be taken simply because the radioactivity is measurable and not because it
is ‘dirty’ or ‘harmful’. Moreover, the term ‘clean’ can also be tacitly equated to ‘morally
pure’, which again has religious implications. This interpretation combined with the
misinterpretations of the term ‘contamination’ described previously may have played an
important role in the misunderstanding. Members of the public may be further confused
because regulations for the remediation of contamination are not established in terms of
quantities expressing radioactivity levels in the ‘contamination’ but rather in terms of
radiation doses to be expected from the contamination. Increasing the confusion is the fact
22
GONZÁLEZ
that these doses can be expressed as integrated doses (e.g. doses to be incurred over life-time)
or as dose-rates (e.g. annual doses).
It seems, therefore, that there is a strong connection between the misunderstandings of
contamination and remediation and the quantities used to measure them. In simple terms,
remediation should be expected if there is contamination and there will be contamination if,
and only if, the levels of ‘radioactivity’ per unit area are above values considered to be unsafe.
Despite the confusion described in this section of the paper, it is considered that the
usage of the terms contamination and remediation etc. is so entrenched in radiation protection
practice that changes at this stage into more precise language may produce more harm than
good.
3.
SCENARIOS
Radioactive residues can originate from several causes, as follows:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
Occasionally, they may have been generated by the accumulation of radionuclides from
normal discharges of radioactive effluents into the environment from planned and
properly authorized human activities (the so-called ‘practices’ in international jargon);
They may also be radioactive remnants from the termination of a practice and the
decommissioning of the installations used by it;
Most commonly, radioactive residues are the result of unregulated human activities that
have been carried out in the past, where the termination of the activity and the handling
of the remaining residues would most probably not have been adequately considered
when the activity was initiated; (A simple example of this is the ancient practice of
mining and milling operations of ores containing natural radioactive substances.)
Radioactive residues may also remain from past events that may have been
unforeseeable at the time of occurrence, such as accidents releasing long-lived
radioactive materials to the environment;
Finally, the largest part of the radioactive residues in the human habitat is a legacy from
past military operations that were both foreseeable and avoidable.
It should be noted that the complexity of the situations that may arise from territorial
contamination was not recognized early enough by the international community. The many
assessments of the aftermath of the Chernobyl accident have shown the difficulties in dealing
with this type of situation. However, it was not until the year 2002 that the IAEA issued a
report in which governments and international organization documented the severity of the
problem [4].
4.
THE ICRP RECOMMENDATIONS
At the root of the international approach for the remediation of contaminated land is the
discipline of radiation protection. Radiation protection is not a science but a paradigm, namely
a model for keeping people safe from the potential detriment that radiation exposure may
cause. The International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) provides
international recommendations on radiation protection. The ICRP recommendations that are
still used in current standards appeared as Publication 60 [5] in 1990. Recently, in 2007, new
recommendations were issued as ICRP Publication 103 [6]. Virtually all international
standards and national regulations addressing radiological protection are based on the ICRP
recommendations contained in ICRP Publication 60. The relevant international standards are
the International Basic Safety Standards for Protection against Ionizing Radiation and for the
23
TOPICAL SESSION 1
Safety of Radiation Sources, or BSS [7]. Currently, a process is cleanup to revise the BSS
taking into account the new recommendations contained in ICRP Publication 103.
In the context of remediation, there is an important presentational difference between
the ICRP Publications 60 and 103. The former is founded on a process-based approach using
the concepts termed ‘practices’ and ‘interventions’ (a practice being defined as a human
endeavour that can increase the overall exposure to radiation and an intervention being
defined as human actions that decrease the overall exposure to radiation). Thus, remediation,
in the language of ICRP Publication 60, is an archetypical intervention. Conversely, ICRP
Publication 103 uses a situation-based approach to characterize the possible circumstances
where radiation exposure may occur. It considers that the term ‘planned exposure situations’
better characterizes its previous intentions for defining practices and, similarly, that
‘emergency exposure situations’ and ‘existing exposure situations’ better characterize
interventions. The new characterization is defined as follows:
(a)
(b)
(c)
Planned exposure situations are situations involving the deliberate introduction and
operation of sources;
Emergency exposure situations are situations that may occur during the operation of a
planned situation, or from a malicious act, or from any other unexpected situation and
require urgent action in order to avoid or reduce undesirable consequences;
Existing exposure situations are exposure situations that already exist when a decision
on control has to be taken, including prolonged exposure situations after emergencies.
Thus, in ICRP 103 language, contaminated territories requiring remediation could be
considered a case of existing exposure situations, which, however, could have originated from
planned situations or from emergency situations or could be an existing situation proper.
Three fundamental principles provide the basis of the ICRP paradigm. They are termed
justification, optimization, and individual dose limitation, and are particularly relevant to
situations of remediation and, importantly, they are based on solid ethical principles. Within
the context of remediation, these fundamental principles can be formulated as justification of
remediation, optimization of remedial actions and restriction of residual individual doses:
Justification of remediation: Any remediation should be justified, namely: the alteration
that remediation generates in the radiation exposure situation of the contaminated territory
should do more good than harm. This means that by reducing the existing exposure through
remediation, the individual or societal benefit must offset the detriment that the remediation
may cause.
Optimization of remedial actions: Remediation measures in a contaminated territory
should be optimized, namely: the level of protection to be achieved by the remediation should
be the best under the prevailing circumstances, maximizing the margin of benefit over harm.
Optimization should result in that the likelihood of incurring exposures, the number of people
exposed, and the magnitude of their individual doses, are all kept as low as reasonably
achievable, taking into account economic and societal factors.
Individual dose restrictions: In order to avoid severely inequitable outcomes of the
optimization procedure, there should be restrictions on the doses or risks to individuals
remaining in the contaminated territory. Restrictions are applied to the doses to a nominal
individual (or reference person). Protection options resulting in doses greater in magnitude
than such restrictions should be rejected at the planning stage. Importantly, these restrictions
on doses are applied prospectively, as with optimization as a whole. If, following the
implementation of an optimized protection strategy, it is subsequently shown that the value of
the constraint or reference level is exceeded, the reasons should be investigated, but this fact
alone should not necessarily prompt regulatory action. The ICRP has traditionally
recommended an individual-related annual dose limit of 1mSv for planned exposures from
24
GONZÁLEZ
regulated practices and has further recommended the use of source-related dose constraints
and reference levels, which, in the context of remediation, can be described as follows: (i) a
dose constraint is a prospective and source-related restriction on the individual dose from a
specific contamination source, which provides a basic level of protection for the most highly
exposed individuals from such a source, and serves as an upper bound on the dose in
optimization of protection for that source; (ii) in contrast, if protection cannot be planned in
advance for a situation, reference levels should be used in deciding on intervention with
protective measures. Reference levels should represent the level of dose or risk above which it
is judged to be inappropriate to plan to allow exposures to occur and below which
optimization of protection should be implemented. The chosen value for a reference level will
depend upon the prevailing circumstances of the exposure under consideration. The ICRP
now recommends that reference levels, set in terms of individual dose, should be used in
conjunction with the implementation of the optimization process for exposures in existing
exposure situations. The objective is to implement optimized protection strategies, or a
progressive range of such strategies, which will reduce individual doses to below the
reference level. However, exposures below the reference level should not be ignored; these
exposure circumstances should also be assessed to ascertain whether protection is optimized,
or whether further protective measures are needed. An endpoint for the optimization process
must not be fixed in advance and the optimized level of protection will depend on the
situation. It is the responsibility of regulatory authorities to decide on the legal status of the
reference level, which is implemented to control a given situation. Retrospectively, when
protective actions have been implemented, reference levels may also be used as benchmarks
for assessing the effectiveness of the protection strategies. The use of reference levels in
existing situation is illustrated by Fig. 1, which shows the evolution of the distribution of
individual doses with time as a result of the optimization process.
FIG. 1. The use of a reference levels in existing exposure situations and the evolution of the
distribution of individual doses with time as a result of the optimization process.
25
TOPICAL SESSION 1
According to the new ICRP recommendations, reference levels for existing exposure
situations such as those candidates for remediation should be set typically in the 1 to 20 mSv
band of projected dose. The individuals concerned should receive general information on the
exposure situation and the means to reduce their doses. In situations where individual lifestyles are key drivers of the exposures, individual monitoring or assessment as well as
education and training may be important requirements. Living in contaminated areas after a
nuclear accident or a radiological event is a typical situation of that sort.
The current recommended values for protection criteria are compared in the following
table with those provided by the previous recommendations in ICRP Publication 60 [5] and
the derivative ICRP Publication 82 [7]. The comparison shows that the current
recommendations are essentially the same as the previous recommendations encompassing
the previous values but are wider in their scope of application.
Intervention
Previous reference levels [7]
Unlikely to be justifiable
<≈10mSv/year
May be justifiable
>≈10mSv/year
Almost always justifiable
Towards 100 mSv/year
Current reference level [6]
Between 1 and 20 mSv/year
according to the situation
Remediation usually includes considerations of environmental protection. The
traditional position of the ICRP on environmental protection has evolved over time. Usually,
the traditional environmental concern of radiation protection has been limited to the transfer
of radionuclides through the human habitat primarily in relation to planned exposure
situations (because this transference directly affects the protection of human beings). In ICRP
Publication 60, the ICRP considered that the standards of environmental control needed to
protect the general public would ensure that other species are not put at risk. Under this
approach, if remediation is not needed for humans it should not be needed for other species.
While the ICRP continues to believe that this is likely to be the case, it also recognizes that
interest in the protection of the environment has greatly increased in recent years in relation to
all aspects of human activity. This has been accompanied by the development and application
of various means of assessing and managing the many forms of human impact upon the
environment. The growing need for advice and guidance on such matters in relation to
radiological protection have, however, not arisen from any new or specific concerns about the
effects of radiation on the environment. There seemed to be a lack of consistency at
international level with respect to addressing such issues in relation to radioactivity. ICRP is
also aware of the needs of some national authorities to demonstrate, directly and explicitly,
that not only humans but the overall environment is being protected and, therefore, it decided
to develop a clearer framework to assess the relationships between exposure and dose, and
between dose and effect, and the consequences of such effects, for non-human species, on a
common scientific basis. This issue was first discussed in ICRP Publication 91 [8], and it was
concluded that it was necessary to draw upon the lessons learned from the development of the
systematic framework for the protection of human beings.
Another issue affecting international remediation policies is the necessary global
agreement on situations that do not justify being remediated. The ICRP has long recognized
that there may be exposure situations for which it will be obvious that remediation to reduce
exposures is either not feasible or not warranted [9]. While many exposures from
contaminated territories are controllable, a number of situations can be either uncontrollable
or essentially unamenable to control (for example exposure undisturbed levels of natural
radioactivity). Exposure situations that are uncontrollable or unamenable to control are
generally subject to ‘exclusion’ from the scope of radiological protection measures. Other
26
GONZÁLEZ
situations may be controllable but considered trivial by the authorities and not requiring
control. Exposure situations for which control is not needed are subject to ‘exemption’.
According to ICRP, the decision as to what components of existing exposure are either not
amenable to control or do not need to be controlled, requires a judgment by the regulatory
authority that will depend on the controllability of the source or exposure and also on the
prevailing economic, societal and cultural circumstances.
Moreover, it should be emphasised that non-technical factors have an enormous
influence on remediation policies. For this reason, the ICRP has always cautioned that its
recommendations are based on objective assessments of the health risks associated with
exposure levels and on radiological protection attributes of various exposure situations.
However, members of the public (and sometimes their political representatives) may have
personal and distinct views on radiation risks, for instance between those attributable to
artificial sources of exposure in relation to those due to natural sources. Social and political
attributes, generally unrelated to radiological protection, usually influence the final decision
on remediation. Therefore, while the ICRP reports should be seen as a provider of decisionaiding recommendations, mainly based on scientific considerations on radiological protection,
the outcome of the ICRP advice is expected to serve just as an input to a final (usually wider)
decision-making process, which may include other societal concerns and considerations and
the participation of relevant stakeholders rather than of radiological protection specialists
alone.
The ICRP is issuing new recommendations on the application of the ICRP’s
recommendations to the protection of individuals living in long term contaminated territories
after a nuclear accident or a radiation emergency. The new recommendations recognize that
nuclear accidents and radiation emergencies are managed according guidance covering short,
medium and long term actions. The most recent guidance related to the management of the
short and medium actions is provided by recently approved ICRP recommendations on the
Application of the Commission’s Recommendations for the Protection of People in
Emergency Exposure Situations. The post-accident rehabilitation situation covered by these
recommendations corresponds to the long term actions that may be necessary to be
implemented in the case of a nuclear accident or radiological event resulting in long lasting
contamination of large inhabited territories. The transition from an emergency exposure
situation to an existing exposure is characterised by a change in management, from strategies
mainly driven by urgency, with potentially high levels of exposures and predominantly
central decisions, to more decentralised strategies aimed at improving living conditions and
reducing exposures to as low as reasonably achievable given the circumstances. These
strategies must take into account the long term dimension of the situation with the direct
involvement of the exposed individuals in their own protection. The ICRP recommends in its
new report that this transition should be undertaken in a co-ordinated and fully transparent
manner and agreed and understood by all the affected parties. The decision to allow people to
live in contaminated territories marks the transition between emergency and the existing
exposure situations and will be taken by the authorities. This will be the beginning of the
post-accident rehabilitation phase and is where the new recommendations have their focus.
5.
INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS
The International Basic Safety Standards (BSS) [10] of 1996 are standards that govern
general international requirements on radiation protection. The BSS, however, are basically
mute about remediation of contaminated territories. They only include generic requirements
for intervention in what, at the time, was termed ‘chronic’ exposure situations. The BSS
presumed that States should determine the allocation of responsibilities among regulatory
authorities, national and local intervening organizations and even registrants or licensees, for
27
TOPICAL SESSION 1
the management of interventions in chronic exposure situations. Under this proviso, the BSS
require that generic or site specific remedial action plans for chronic exposure situations shall
be prepared by intervening organizations, as appropriate. The plans shall specify remedial
actions and action levels that are justified and optimized, taking into account: (a) the
individual and collective radiation exposures; (b) the radiological and non-radiological risks;
and (c) the financial and social costs, the benefits and the financial liability for the remedial
actions. They also require that action levels for intervention through remedial action shall be
specified in terms of appropriate quantities, such as the annual average ambient dose
equivalent rate or a suitable average activity concentration of radionuclides that exist at the
time remedial action is being considered. However the BSS failed to prescribe numerical
action levels for remediation.
The many assessments of the Chernobyl accident [11–17] clearly demonstrated that the
BSS had to be complemented with specific guidance. In the year 2000, the IAEA issued
guidance on the restoration of environments affected by residues from radiological accidents,
with approaches to decision making [18]. Areas needing remediation from technologically
enhanced natural radiation were also discussed in various fora (see, e.g. [19–22]. After the
accident in Goiănia, Brazil, the IAEA started to publish a review of major radiological
abnormal situations around the world, many of them requiring remediation [e.g. 3, 23,]. Last
but not least, the IAEA started to tackle the controversial issue of decommissioning of nuclear
installations and the remediation of sites [24, 25].
However, it was not until November 2003 [26] that the IAEA finally established safety
requirements for the remediation of areas contaminated by past activities and accidents. The
new requirements did not introduce any fundamental change in the remediation philosophy.
The objectives of remediation were now formulated as: (i) to reduce the doses to individuals
or groups of individuals being exposed; (ii) to avert doses to individuals or groups of
individuals that are likely to arise in the future; and, (iii) to prevent or reduce environmental
impacts from the radionuclides present in the contaminated area. Reductions in the doses to
individuals and environmental impacts were to be achieved by means of interventions aimed
at: (i) removing the existing sources of contamination; (ii) modifying the pathways of
exposure; and/or, (iii) reducing the numbers of individuals or other receptors exposed to
radiation from the source. In some cases the restricted use of human habitats may be the
outcome of the optimization process for remediation [27]. The requirements established a
generic reference level for aiding decisions on remediation as an existing annual effective
dose of 10 mSv from all environmental sources, including the natural background radiation.
The IAEA also analyzed the non-technical factors influencing decision making
processes in environmental remediation [28]. It concluded that a range of non-technical
factors will influence the choice of technologies to be employed in remediation and the
strategy for their implementation, including: economy, employment and infrastructure; costs,
funding, and financing; regulatory and institutional aspects; stakeholder perception and
participation; project implementation related risks; co-contamination issues; future land use;
and, stewardship issues.
6.
OUTLOOK
It is clear that substantive international recommendations, policies, strategies and,
ultimately, standards are available for the remediation of land affected by radioactive
residues. What is missing, however, is a simple, clear, unambiguous and unmistakable
international agreement on what is safe and what is unsafe in relation to land contamination
with radioactive materials. Fundamentally, an international safety regime is also missing –
one that governs the standardization of protection in the remediation of contaminated
territories and also the appraisal of compliance. Conveniently, an agreement on remediation
28
GONZÁLEZ
could be expressed in terms of a derived practical quantity rather than in terms of the
fundamental dosimetric radiation protection quantities. For instance, it could be expressed as
activity per unit area rather than as a dose. Expediently, the agreement could ignore
distinctions among radionuclides, even if it became over-conservative for some of them, and
just include three basic numbers, for alpha-, beta- and gamma-emitters, with some caveats for
hot particles.
The time is ripe for such an agreement. People dwelling in the so-called ‘contaminated’
lands continue to ask an elementary question: “Is it safe for me and my family to live on this
land?” And we, the radiation protection community ought to provide a clear and unambiguous
answer.
REFERENCES
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
GONZALEZ, A.J., International Approaches to Remediation of Territorial Radioactive
Contamination, Radioactivity in the Environment 14 (2009) 1-40.
Strengthening Radiation and Nuclear Safety Infrastructures in Countries of the Former USSR,
Proceedings of a Forum (IAEA/UNDP), IAEA Proceedings Series, Vienna (1993).
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Radiological Conditions at the
Semipalatinsk Test Site, Kazakhstan: Preliminary Assessment and Recommendations for
Further Study, Radiological Assessment Report Series, IAEA, Vienna (1999). http://wwwpub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1063_web.pdf
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Radiation Legacy of the 20th Century:
Environmental Restoration, IAEA–TECDOC–1280, IAEA, Vienna (2002).
INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION, 1990
Recommendations of the International Commission on Radiological Protection, Publication 60,
Annals ICRP 21 1–3, Elsevier, Amsterdam (1991).
INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION, The 2007
Recommendations of the International Commission on Radiological Protection, Publication
103, Annals ICRP 37 2–4, Elsevier, Amsterdam (2007).
INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION, Protection of the
public in situations of prolonged radiation exposure, Publication 82, Annals ICRP 29 1/2,
Elsevier, Amsterdam (1999).
INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION, A framework for
assessing the impact of ionising radiation on non-human species, Publication 91, Annals ICRP
33 3, Elsevier, Amsterdam (2003).
INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION, Scope of
Radiological Protection Control Measures, ICRP Publication 104, Annals ICRP 37 5, Elsevier,
Amsterdam (2008).
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, International Basic Safety Standards for
Protection Against Ionizing Radiation and for the Safety of Radiation Sources, Safety Series
No. 115, IAEA, Vienna (1996).
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY IAEA, Proceedings of the All-Union
Conference on the Medical Aspects of the Chernobyl Accident, IAEA–TECDOC–516, IAEA,
Vienna (1988).
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, The International Chernobyl Project:
Assessment of Radiological Consequences and Evaluation of Protective Measures, IAEA,
Vienna (1991).
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Declaration of Participants of the First
International Conference of the European Commission, Belarus, Russian Federation and
Ukraine on the Radiological Consequences of the Chernobyl Accident, INFCIRC/511, IAEA,
Vienna (1996). http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/1996/inf511.shtml
One Decade after Chernobyl: Summing up the Consequences of the Accident. Proceedings of
an International Conference in Vienna, Austria, 8-12 April 1996; IAEA Proceedings Series,
Vienna (1996).
29
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[15] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Dosimetric and biomedical studies
conducted in Cuba of children from areas of the former USSR affected by the radiological
consequences of the Chernobyl Accident, IAEA–TECDOC–958, IAEA, Vienna (1997).
[16] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, International Conference Chernobyl:
Looking Back to Go Forward, Vienna, 6–7 September 2005, Organized by IAEA on behalf of
the Chernobyl Forum (2006).
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[17] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Environmental Consequences of the
Chernobyl Accident and their Remediation: Twenty Years of Experience, Report of the UN
Chernobyl Forum Expert Group ‘Environment’, Radiological Assessment Series Reports,
IAEA, Vienna (2006).
[18] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Restoration of Environments Affected by
Residues from Radiological Accidents: Approaches to Decision Making, IAEA–TECDOC–1131,
IAEA, Vienna (2000).
[19] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Technologically Enhanced Natural
Radiation (TENR II), Proceedings of an International Symposium held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil,
12–17 September 1999, IAEA–TECDOC–1271, IAEA, Vienna (2002).
[20] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Testing of Environmental Transfer
Models Using Data from the Remediation of a Radium Extraction Site, (IAEA BIOMASS–7),
IAEA, Vienna (2004).
[21] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, The Long Term Stabilization of Uranium
Mill Tailings, IAEA–TECDOC–1403, IAEA, Vienna (2004).
[22] Environmental Contamination from Uranium Production Facilities and their Remediation,
Proceedings of an International Workshop, Lisbon, February 2004, IAEA Proceedings Series,
IAEA, Vienna (2005).
[23] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Dosimetric and medical aspects of the
radiological accident in Goiania in 1987, IAEA-TECDOC-1009, IAEA, Vienna (1998).
[24] Safe Decommissioning for Nuclear Activities, Proceedings of an International Conference in
Berlin, Germany, 14–18 October 2002, IAEA Proceedings Series, IAEA, Vienna (2003).
[25] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Planning, Managing and Organizing the
Decommissioning of Nuclear Facilities: Lessons Learned, IAEA–TECDOC–1394, IAEA,
Vienna (2004).
[26] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Remediation of Areas Contaminated by
Past Activities and Accidents Safety Requirements, Safety Standards Series No. WS–R–3,
IAEA, Vienna (2003).
[27] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Remediation Process for Areas Affected
by Past Activities and Accidents, Safety Standards Series No. WS–G-3.1, IAEA, Vienna
(2007).
[28] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Non-Technical Factors Impacting on the
Decision Making Processes in Environmental Remediation, IAEA–TECDOC–1279, IAEA,
Vienna (2002).
30
ASSISTING THE RETURN TO NORMAL LIFE IN CHERNOBYL–AFFECTED
REGIONS: THE INTERNATIONAL CHERNOBYL RESEARCH AND
INFORMATION NETWORK (ICRIN)
O. LESHCHENKO*, L. VINTON*, Z. CARR**, D.H. CHRISTIE**,
V. BERKOVSKYY***, E. SHERSTYUK****, A. KARANKEVICH****,
E. STANISLAVOV****
*
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
**
World Health Organization (WHO)
***
International Atomic Energy Agency
****
United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF)
Abstract
This article describes the International Chernobyl Research and Information Network (ICRIN) project, a
programme designed to meet the priority information needs of communities in areas of Belarus, the Russian
Federation and Ukraine which were affected by the 1986 nuclear accident. Its aim is to empower Chernobylaffected communities through targeted delivery of the most recent scientific information on the accident’s
impacts, translated into practical advice, including recommendations on healthy lifestyles. Supported by a United
Nations (UN) General Assembly resolution, the project is part of a broader effort by all UN agencies to help
local communities return to normal life, under the UN Action Plan on Chernobyl to 2016.
1.
INTRODUCTION
On 26 April 1986 and over the following days, one of the Chernobyl reactors released
around 14×1018 Bq of radioactivity into the environment, mainly in the form of iodine (131I),
caesium (137Cs) and strontium (90Sr). Around 340 000 people were evacuated and millions
have lived since then in territories classified as ‘contaminated’.
Although in 1986 more than 200 000 km2 of Europe was contaminated with
radionuclides (at a level greater than 37 kBq/ m2 of 137Cs), nowadays the radiation exposure
has been reduced by a factor of several hundred through natural processes and
countermeasures. Now, most of the contaminated land is safe for life and economic activities,
but around 5 million people in Belarus, Russia and Ukraine still live in Chernobyl-affected
areas. Although in most places the Chernobyl exposure is comparable with the exposure due
to natural radiation, in about 700 settlements annual individual doses exceed the value of 1
mSv (in addition to the dose due to natural background radiation) and protective measures
could be required.
In recent years, a consensus has emerged among governments and United Nations (UN)
agencies that a sustainable development approach is the way forward for the Chernobyl area.
Local communities have not fully recovered from the enormous socio-economic impact of the
accident, produced by population resettlement, psychological trauma, unemployment, broken
social ties, anxiety and fear. Investment remains scarce, infrastructure is often lacking or
neglected, and young people tend to leave the region to seek opportunities elsewhere. All
these factors have been exacerbated by the upheaval that followed the break-up of the Soviet
Union.
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TOPICAL SESSION 1
2.
UN CHERNOBYL FORUM
Between 2003 and 2006, the UN Chernobyl Forum brought together the governments of
Belarus, Russia and Ukraine, eight UN agencies and the World Bank, with the objective of
conducting a rigorous scientific investigation into the long term health, environmental and
socio-economic consequences of the accident. In a resolution A/RES/60/14 the UN General
Assembly “notes with satisfaction assistance rendered by the International Atomic Energy
Agency to Belarus, the Russian Federation and Ukraine on remediation of agricultural and
urban environments, cost-effective agricultural countermeasures and the monitoring of human
exposure in areas affected by the Chernobyl disaster” and “Notes the necessity of further
measures to ensure the integration of the assessment by the Chernobyl Forum of the
environmental, health and socioeconomic consequences of the Chernobyl nuclear accident
into the International Chernobyl Research and Information Network process through
dissemination of the findings of the Forum, including in the form of practical messages on
healthy and productive lifestyles, to the populations affected by the accident in order to
empower them to maximize social and economic recovery and sustainable development in all
its aspects”.
According to the findings and recommendations of the UN Chernobyl Forum [1, 2],
lack of information is one of the biggest challenges for those residing on the Chernobylaffected territories. The solution to this situation is seen in improved information provision
that will help dispel the misconceptions surrounding Chernobyl, promote healthy lifestyles
and encourage the restoration of community self-reliance by showing local residents that they
themselves hold the key to their own recovery, whether in health, environment, or
employment creation.
The Forum pinpointed the fact that many local people were traumatized not only by the
accident but also by their rapid relocation. They remained anxious about their health,
perceiving themselves as ‘victims’ rather than ‘survivors’. Fear and uncertainty about the long
term effects of radiation were having a detrimental effect on the health of many citizens,
translating into elevated anxiety levels, chronic stress, unexplained physical symptoms and
subjective poor health.
The Chernobyl Forum came to the conclusion that the lack of information about the
long term effects of the accident was a major problem, and that knowledge and information
were necessary in order to reassure the populations and to address psychological impacts and
mental well-being. Other public health problems such as unhealthy lifestyles and socioeconomic deprivation also needed to be addressed. A concerted cross-sectoral approach was
deemed to be necessary, in order to assist the inhabitants to live a normal life and to overcome
the dominating stigma of the Chernobyl accident.
3.
UN ACTION PLAN ON CHERNOBYL TO 2016
On 20 November 2007, the UN General Assembly voted a resolution demanding a new
action plan for the third decade after the Chernobyl accident. The aim of this ‘Decade of
Recovery and Sustainable Development’ is to ensure that, by 2016, the stigma in the area will
be overcome and a full return to normal life will be achieved.
The resolution underlines the need to disseminate the findings of the Chernobyl Forum,
by providing accurate information on the impact of radiation in accessible language. The
provision of information to affected populations should include the promotion of healthy
lifestyles and support for community-based social and economic development, as well as the
provision of evidence-based policy advice to national authorities. The UN Action Plan on
Chernobyl to 2016 is a practical framework [3] that builds on recognized IAEA mandates and
competencies. It seeks to maximize the effects of limited resources, while avoiding the
32
LESCHENKO ET AL.
duplication of efforts. ICRIN is one of the major joint UN activities foreseen under the UN
Action Plan on Chernobyl to 2016.
4.
ICRIN: A FOUR–IAEA PROJECT BY UNDP, WHO, IAEA and UNICEF
The International Chernobyl Research and Information Network (ICRIN) is a 2.5
million USD programme designed to meet the priority information needs of communities in
Belarus, the Russian Federation and Ukraine. Funded by the UN Human Security Trust Fund,
the project is operated by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the World
Health Organization (WHO), the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and IAEA.
This three-year programme, which began in 2009, aims to translate scientific
information on the consequences of the accident into sound practical advice for residents of
the affected territories. Activities planned under ICRIN include education and training for
teachers, medical professionals, community leaders and the media; providing local residents
with practical advice on health risks and healthy lifestyles; the creation of Internet-equipped
information centres in rural areas; and small-scale community infrastructure projects aimed at
improving living conditions and promoting self-reliance.
ICRIN objectives
–
–
–
–
Deliver information in non-technical language and linked to day-to-day life;
Adapt scientific knowledge to public needs;
Build the capacity of local stakeholders;
Invest in information technologies at the local level.
ICRIN main activities
– Match current scientific knowledge to local information needs and introduce efficient
methods of dissemination;
– Set up a monitoring system with a focus on changes in human security levels,
behavioural patterns and perceptions of the affected population;
– Develop practical information materials and ‘user-friendly’ recommendations for
residents of contaminated areas.
ICRIN expected outcomes
– Credible communication and communicators will help residents regain confidence and
self-reliance;
– Local stakeholders and general public will gain access to and become able to rely on
up-to-date and scientifically accurate information;
– The stigma still associated with the affected territory will be overcome;
– Poverty reduction will be achieved;
– Support will be available for innovative solutions accepted or proposed by the
communities;
– Healthy lifestyles will be promoted among all age groups;
– Success will be achieved in turning a generation of victims into a generation of proud
survivors.
UNDP
The UNDP approach is based on the recommendations of the 2002 United Nations
report [4], which outlines the shift from humanitarian to development assistance. In line with
33
TOPICAL SESSION 1
this change in strategy and at the request of the UN Secretary-General, UNDP has assumed
responsibility for the UN-wide coordination of Chernobyl issues since 2004. UNDP is also
responsible for coordinating the UCRIN project.
Before ICRIN began, UNDP conducted surveys in Belarus, Russia and Ukraine, aimed
at identifying specific information needs and at assessing public perception of the issue of
radioactive contamination. Information needs in the three countries turned out to be very
consistent. The top three answers to the question "What worries you the most?" were the
health effects of radioactivity and low standards of living/poverty, followed by radioactivity
in the environment.
Under the UN Action Plan, UNDP places particular emphasis on community
development efforts. These include:
–
–
–
–
Expanding community-development efforts in Belarus through integrated projects
that include improving the income of small private farmers by helping them
develop products that meet health and safety standards; supporting community
decision-making; advocating healthy lifestyles; improving access to primary
health-care services; and establishing school centres for radiological advice and
training;
Promoting the replication of the Bryansk local economic development centre in
other Chernobyl-affected oblasts of the Russian Federation;
Expanding the Chernobyl Recovery and Development Programme (CRDP) in
Ukraine, to bring practical infrastructure improvements, job creation, and a
message of self-reliance to affected communities;
Supporting the creation of local economic development agencies in affected areas
of Ukraine to stimulate small and medium-sized businesses and improving the
business and investment climate in the region.
UNDP’s presence in local communities will help ensure that the message of
reassurance that emerged from the UN Chernobyl Forum will reach local residents.
WHO
According to the WHO report on the health consequences of the Chernobyl accident [5],
an important aspect of the ICRIN project is the mitigation of one of the largest consequences
of the Chernobyl accident – psychological impact – by shifting the stigma away from the
inhabitants of the Chernobyl area. It is also vital to address the fears about radiation, which
are mostly caused by information gaps, and the development issues, as well as the other
public health problems which are not specific to the Chernobyl area but that remain common
throughout many former Soviet Union states. In these States, the top five causes of death are,
according to the WHO Global Health Risks report: high blood pressure, tobacco use, high
blood glucose, physical inactivity, overweight and high cholesterol levels [6]. The situation is
further aggravated by the lack of adequate resources in rural health care settings, which
resulted from economic changes following the break-up of Soviet Union.
In view of these facts, the WHO contribution to ICRIN is focused on the following
areas:
–
34
Assisting the national authorities of
technical guidance, consultation and
medical monitoring, particularly of
educational and information activities,
programmes;
the three most affected countries with
advice on health-care programmes and
high-risk groups, through a series of
such as workshops, seminars and training
LESCHENKO ET AL.
–
–
–
Translating the health findings of the Chernobyl Forum into easy-to-understand
messages and producing targeted education packages tailored for health workers,
teachers and local decision-makers;
Achieving a broad dissemination of these messages, in a format accessible to local
residents;
Shaping the Chernobyl research agenda and promoting priority research in the
area of the health consequences of the Chernobyl accident – drawing on the
recommendations of the Chernobyl Forum.
IAEA
The IAEA was the driving force behind the UN Chernobyl Forum.
The International Chernobyl Research and Information Network (ICRIN) project is a
part of the IAEA contribution to the UN Action Plan on Chernobyl to 2016. Within the
framework of ICRIN project the IAEA and will continue efforts in:
(a)
(b)
(c)
Adaptation of the scientific information about environmental and radiological
consequences of Chernobyl accident to meet public needs;
Promotion of a safety culture and the delivery of information in non-technical
language, linked to daily life;
Development of public information materials and resources about Chernobylrelated issues.
In addition to its role in the ICRIN project, under the UN Action Plan the IAEA will focus
on:
–
–
–
–
–
Radiological support for the rehabilitation of areas affected by the Chernobyl
accident and upgrading of national capabilities to control public exposure;
Assistance in the remediation of affected areas using environmentally sound
technologies;
Assistance in improving safety at the Chernobyl nuclear plant, in the
decommissioning of Units 1, 2, and 3, and in radioactive waste management;
Support to Ukraine in fulfilling its Nuclear Safeguards Agreement obligations to
report relevant nuclear material related to decommissioning and excavation at the
Chernobyl site;
Cooperation within the scope of the IAEA mandate with other organizations in the
planning, design, and implementation of projects and activities related to the
broader issue of mitigating the health, environmental, and socio-economic
consequences of the accident.
UNICEF
UNICEF has been actively participating in ICRIN development and design from the
beginning. The ICRIN Scientific Board is a welcome arena in which UNICEF is glad to
provide child-related contributions, expertise in the area of psycho-social well-being, as well
as ideas about support to vulnerable families and micro-nutrient supplementation.
UNICEF’s main contribution to ICRIN is ‘Facts for Life Chernobyl’ [7], an
empowerment tool that helps people, in particular children, young people and women, to
enjoy healthy and productive lives. This publication provides people living in affected areas
with practical information on how to cope with the environmental, social and health problems
that they face. Using 16 key messages, it provides facts on proper nutrition, young child
35
TOPICAL SESSION 1
development and iodized salt consumption for the prevention of iodine deficiency disorders.
The publication also addresses cancer prevention and provides information on health-care
services.
‘Facts for Life Chernobyl’ was first launched in March 2008 in three languages in
Ukraine, Russia and Belarus, using UNICEF regular resources. The ICRIN project will give a
decisive boost to its dissemination, enabling media advocacy and training for health workers
and teachers, in coordination with the other UN agencies.
Outside the ICRIN project, UNICEF will also invest in the promotion of universal salt
iodization. This includes enhancing national capacities for monitoring iodized salt quality,
establishing an efficient system for the prevention of iodine deficiency diseases, and helping
to investigate and disseminate information on iodine nutrition and the iodine deficiency status
of children and women.
5.
CONCLUSION: A SINGLE VOICE ON CHERNOBYL
This article has shown that several UN agencies are active in Chernobyl recovery
efforts. They are united under the principles of the UN Action Plan Chernobyl to 2016 and
share the same resolve to support the territories affected by the accident in achieving a full
return to normal life. The ICRIN project, with its emphasis on providing affected
communities with the information they need to live normal, healthy lives, offers the four UN
agencies involved an opportunity to demonstrate the benefits of joint UN action on a common
theme. A first indication of how well this effort is succeeding will be found in the SecretaryGeneral’s report on Chernobyl to the UN General Assembly, due in the course of 2010.
REFERENCES
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
36
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Environmental Consequences of the
Chernobyl Accident and their Remediation: Twenty Years of Experience, Report of the
Chernobyl Forum Expert Group “Environment”, Radiological Assessment Reports Series 8,
IAEA, Vienna (2006).
http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1239_web.pdf
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Chernobyl’s Legacy: Health,
Environmental and Socio-Economic Impacts and Recommendations to the Governments of
Belarus,
the
Russian
Federation
and
Ukraine,
IAEA,
Vienna
(2006).
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Booklets/Chernobyl/chernobyl.pdf
UNITED NATIONS (UN), Action plan on Chernobyl to 2016, UNDP (2008).
http://chernobyl.undp.org/english/docs/action_plan_final_nov08.pdf
UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, Human consequences of the
Chernobyl nuclear accident: a strategy for recovery, UNDP (2002).
http://chernobyl.undp.org/english/docs/strategy_for_recovery.pdf
WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, Health effects of the Chernobyl accident and special
health care programmes. Report of the UN Chernobyl Forum Expert Group ‘Health’. Eds: B.
Bennett, M. Repacholi and Z. Carr, WHO, Geneva (2006). Available at:
whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/2006/9241594179_eng.pdf
WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, Global Health Risks, WHO report, Geneva (2009).
http://www.who.int/healthinfo/global_burden_disease/GlobalHealthRisks_report_full.pdf
UNITED NATIONS CHILDRENS FUND, Facts for Life, Russian edition, (2008).
www.unicef.org/ukraine/media_8495.html
SUMMARY OF SESSION 1
H. Forsstroem
IAEA, Vienna
FROM ARLINGTON TO ASTANA – LESSONS LEARNED
The first session was quite short and contained only four presentations. The topics
covered were: a review of the 1999 Arlington conference, a review of international policies
and strategies for remediation, a new UN initiative on Chernobyl and a summary of
remediation activities in Kazakhstan.
Ten years ago, the IAEA organized a conference entitled ‘Restoration of Environments
with Radioactive Residues’ in Arlington, USA. This Astana conference is seen as a follow-up,
however, there are a lot of differences between the two conferences. The Arlington
conference focused on the cleanup of nuclear weapons test sites and areas affected by nuclear
accidents while this conference is concentrating on uranium mining and milling sites.
Also, at the time of the Arlington conference, there was quite a controversy surrounding
the subject of radiological criteria for remediation and so it was an important topic at that
conference. The concept of intervention had been introduced in international
recommendations – and criteria had been developed to go with it. However, many countries
continued to use criteria developed for normal operations for guiding remediation activities.
In the USA, where the conference was being held, there was a separate ongoing controversy
because of the different approaches to radiological protection being used by the regulatory
agencies.
An important element in the Arlington conference was the analysis of a number of test
cases covering different remediation situations. The analysis showed that there was a wide
variation in the radiological criteria being used as the basis for decisions on cleanup. The
criteria values at the lower end of the range were judged to be due to the influence of
social/political factors influencing decision making, that is, the low dose values that were
being used were not cost effective. The analysis also raised the question of whether the same
criterion should be used in all types of contamination situation, that is, whether a
contamination situation is due to an accident or whether it is the result of a poorly controlled
practice.
Other questions raised were, should the same criteria be used for man-made and
naturally occurring radiation, how should the public be involved in decision making, and
should criteria for the cleanup of radioactive and chemical contamination be harmonized?
These issues were addressed in Session 3 at this conference.
The second presentation in Session 3 was a review on International Policies and
Strategies for the Remediation of Land affected by Radioactive Residues. It set out the roles
of the international organizations UNSCEAR, ICRP and IAEA as, respectively, providing the
basic scientific knowledge, the radiological interpretation of that knowledge and the
development of international standards. The presentation drew attention to the problems
caused by the technical language used in this area, in particular, the term ‘contamination’ is
often used in a misleading way; for example, in the context of Chernobyl affected areas, it is
used to describe land which, on the basis of the associated risks, is fit for habitation.
The presentation was concluded by noting that the international recommendations and
standards have not yet provided a simple answer to the question “Is it safe for me and my
family to live here?”.
Chernobyl continues to cast a shadow over many countries and, in spite of the many
studies and international reviews that show radiation doses to persons living in affected areas
37
SUMMARY OF SESSION 1
to be low, many people continue to be adversely affected in the aftermath of the accident.
Unexplained physical conditions, anxiety, and mental problems are much more frequent in
Chernobyl affected populations and it has been concluded that psychological and social
effects now represent the main impact. A new United Nations action plan will seek to resolve
the situation by promoting knowledge and understanding in those affected and to relieve their
poverty. The third presentation described the plan, organized by UNDP, WHO, IAEA and
UNICEF, which will seek to do this by ‘building a bridge between science and people’.
The final presentation described the legacy of past nuclear activities in Kazakhstan; it
included the numerous areas affected by the uranium mining and milling activities, several
areas affected by nuclear weapons testing activities, the shut down fast breeder reactor at
Aktau, and the many disused sealed sources used in military and civilian activities.
– In the last ten years, Government remediation programmes for the uranium mining and
milling sites have been effective and most sites have been cleaned up;
– At the nuclear test sites, the underground testing wells and mines have been destroyed
but more remains to be done before the sites can be fully opened to the public;
– The spent fuel has been removed from the fast breeder reactor and a plan has been
developed for transporting the packaged fuel for storage at Baikal on the
Semipalatinsk Test Site;
– Disused sealed sources have been collected from all over Kazakhstan and are also
being stored at the Baikal waste storage site.
Kazakhstan has had help in its remediation work through its cooperation with other
countries and with the international organizations.
38
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND SUPPORT IN ENVIRONMENTAL
REMEDIATION
(TOPICAL SESSION 2)
Chairperson
S. VOROBIEV
Russian Federation
REMEDIATION OF RADIOACTIVELY CONTAMINATED SITES – REVIEW
OF PROJECTS SUPPORTED BY THE INTERNATIONAL SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY CENTER (ISTC)
V. RUDNEVA, W. GUDOWSKI
ISTC–International Science and Technology Center,
Moscow, Russian Federation
Abstract
The International Science and Technology Center (ISTC) is an intergovernmental organization founded in
Moscow fifteen years ago by the European Union, Sweden, Norway, Japan, the Russian Federation and the
United States of America. The ISTC has focused its mission on the human dimension of non-proliferation and
global safety and security through international cooperation on science and technology. The ISTC has developed
a broad spectrum of tools for advancing science, improving human health, stimulating economic growth,
mitigating environmental damage, and addressing other international global concerns. By January 2009, the
Center and its Partners had provided US $815 million in grants, equipment, travel and training support for almost
2650 projects in diverse areas of civilian basic and applied research. These projects engaged over 71 000
scientists and engineers from 980 institutes, research centres and production facilities in collaborative work. This
paper reviews the ISTC projects in the area of radioactive waste management and projects related to
radioactively contaminated sites.
INTRODUCTION
The International Science and Technology Center (ISTC) is an intergovernmental
organization founded by the European Union (EU), Sweden, Norway, Japan, the Russian
Federation and the United States of America (USA) in 1992. Some time later, Canada and the
Republic of Korea joined the ISTC. Presently, the ISTC ‘family’ consists of 39 members (27
from EU). The ISTC defines its goals as follows:
– Addressing the human dimension of non-proliferation, including redirecting and
engaging the intellectual potential of former weapons experts into challenging civilian
projects;
– Support of basic and applied research and technology development;
– Contribution to the solution of national and international technical problems of global
or regional dimensions;
– Contribution to the transition to market-based economies;
– Assistance in the integration of scientists from the Confederation of Independent
States (CIS) into the international scientific community.
The ISTC is a unique organization focused on the responsible use of sensitive
knowledge and technology through international cooperative scientific and technical projects.
Through these projects, based on scientific excellence, the ISTC has built up trust and
confidence among scientific communities dealing with problems of global safety and security.
The ISTC has developed a broad spectrum of tools for advancing science, improving human
health, stimulating economic growth, mitigating environmental damage, and for addressing
other global concerns.
The ISTC Secretariat has its headquarters in Moscow with branch and information
offices in six CIS countries. An internationally recruited staff manages, oversees and monitors
more than 680 active projects under the Science Project Programme, provides training and
business support to CIS project managers, and implements the Center programmes that
support the integration of scientists into the international community.
41
TOPICAL SESSION 2
The Science Project Programme is the most comprehensive activity conducted by the
ISTC. Through this programme, the ISTC solicits scientific project proposals from institutes
throughout the CIS and provides funding and logistic support to project teams. Ultimately, the
Science Project Programme together with other supplementary ISTC programmes supports
and enforces the transition to sustainable, innovation driven science and technology.
By January 2009, the Center and its Partners had provided US $815 million in grants,
equipment, travel and training support for almost 2650 projects in diverse areas of civilian
basic and applied research. These projects have engaged more than 71 000 scientists and
engineers from almost 980 institutes, research centres and production facilities, involving
many of the best scientists from Russia and other CIS countries, including many foreign
collaborators.
Statistically, ISTC projects cover fourteen technology areas. The main areas are
Biotechnology and Life Sciences, Ecology, Physics, Fission Reactors, Materials,
Instrumentation, Space and Aircraft and Surface Transportation, and Non-Nuclear Energy
(Fig. 1).
Other
18.7%
Biotechnology and Life
Sciences
13.0%
Space, Aircraft and
Surface
3.6%
Chemistry
6.3%
Physics
12.8%
Environmental
16.2%
`
Fission Reactors
10.4%
Non-Nuclear Energy
2.6%
Materials
8.2%
Instrumentation
4.6%
Information and
Communication
3.5%
FIG. 1. Technology areas supported by ISTC projects.
In 1997, the ISTC launched the Partner Programme as a tool to provide long term
cooperation between research and technology development communities in the Russian
Federation/CIS and private organizations, research institutes and other entities in ISTC
member states. Through this programme, the Partners have funded and conducted science and
technology projects using a very flexible and transparent ISTC framework which has
minimized the risks of failure and also administrative and overhead costs [1].
By January 2009, the Partner organizations had committed nearly US $245 million to
scientific research through 692 ISTC projects. The ISTC currently has more than 300
partners. Among active ISTC partners are such organizations as European Organization for
Nuclear Research (CERN), Commissariat à l’Énergie Atomique (CEA), Areva, Airbus,
Danone, Defense Advanced Research Projects IAEA (DARPA), Bayer, Boeing, General
Atomic, Cambridge Research Centre and others.
OVERVIEW OF ISTC PROJECTS RELATED TO RADIOACTIVE WASTE
MANAGEMENT
One of the most complicated ecological problems in the Russian Federation,
Kazakhstan and some other CIS countries is the management of radioactive waste
42
RUDNEVA, GUDOWSKI
accumulated as a result of past activities in the production and testing of nuclear weapons, use
of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and as a result of reductions in nuclear arms.
The radioactive waste situation in the Russian Federation required immediate actions to
achieve improvement. The safe management of radioactive waste is a challenge which is not
limited to the Russian Federation alone; it concerns all states engaged in nuclear activities.
A number of countries and international organizations have started cooperative projects
with the Russian Federation in the handling of accumulated radioactive waste and spent fuel.
In order to promote and to coordinate these efforts, a special Contact Expert Group (CEG) for
international radioactive waste projects in the Russian Federation was established under the
auspices of the International Atomic Energy Agency in 1996.
The ISTC has worked in close cooperation with CEG and ISTC projects are included in
the database of IAEA projects. New proposals are discussed at workshops of CEG, and
priorities for new projects are identified. The results of ongoing projects are presented at
international conferences, seminars and workshops.
The ISTC projects in the field of management of radioactive waste and spent nuclear
fuel are classified as follows:
1.
2.
Management of Radioactive Waste and Spent Nuclear Fuel:
– Treatment of High-Level Waste (HLW);
– Treatment of Low- and Intermediate Level Waste;
– Storage and Disposal.
Decommissioning of Nuclear Facilities:
– Decommissioning of Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs);
– Decommissioning of Nuclear Submarines;
– Decontamination and Remediation of Nuclear Sites.
The majority of ISTC projects in this field deal with the different techniques to be used
for waste volume reduction. These include: HLW solidification technology, development of
matrix compositions (glass, mineral-like and ceramic compositions) ensuring mechanical,
chemical and radiation stability during long term storage and final disposal; technologies for
incinerating the combustible part of waste, selection of geologically suitable sites,
environmental monitoring, solidified radioactive waste condition monitoring, prediction of
the environmental impact of radioactive waste storage facilities and burial sites throughout
their entire operation, development of a computer-based data system for the evaluation of the
radiation legacy of the former Soviet Union, and evaluation and development of
decontamination and rehabilitation techniques.
By January 2009, 140 projects had been funded by the ISTC Parties (about USUS $
48.5 million in funds were provided). About 50 Russian and CIS institutions are involved as
project leaders or participants. More than 75% of them are from the Russian Federation. The
most active institutions submitting projects to the ISTC have been the following: Khlopin
Radium Institute, St. Petersburg, All-Russian Scientific Research Institute of Non-Organic
Materials named after A. Bochvar, Moscow, All-Russian Research and Design Institute of
Production Engineering (VNIPIPT), Moscow, Russian Federal Nuclear Center – Zababakhin
All-Russia Research Institute of Technical Physics (VNIITF), Snezhinsk, Russian Federal
Nuclear Center-All Russian Scientific Research Institute of Experimental Physics (VNIIEF)
Sarov, Institute for Physics and Power Engineering named after A.I. Leypunsky (IPPE),
Obninsk, Nuclear Technology Safety Center, Almaty, Kazakhstan, Institute of Atomic
Energy, Kurchatov, Kazakhstan, Kurchatov Research Center, Moscow, and the All-Russian
Research Institute of Chemical Technology (VNIIKhT), Moscow.
43
TOPICAL SESSION 2
About 350 institutes, companies, and governmental organizations from the United
States of America, the European Union, Norway, Japan and the Republic of Korea have
participated in the projects related to radioactive waste management as collaborators.
The unique role of the ISTC in the promotion of cooperation to resolve the most severe
environmental problems is particularly visible in the ISTC Projects No. 245 (245, 245-2B,
245-2C) ‘Radiation Contamination Database’ and No. 2097 ‘Radio-Ecological Database’.
These projects, led by the All-Russian Research Institute of Chemical Technology, Moscow,
were financially supported by EU and Sweden. Project No. 245 had three phases and the main
result of the work was a database containing all potential and existing dangerous radiation
sources spread over the territories of CIS countries. The project led to the formation of the
‘RadLeg GeoInformational Center’ under MinAtom of the Russian Federation, where the
database is maintained. This comprehensive computerized database permits the prioritization
of territories according to potential dangers. The implementation of this project involved 26
institutions, 7 ministries, and 2 State Committees in the Russian Federation. Scientists from
Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan were also involved in the
expert-evaluation process. The Radio-Ecological Database was developed under Project No.
2097 and, this together with the modelling of the radionuclide migration processes, helped to
start an assessment of the impact of the sources on the environment and population and the
development of recommendations on countermeasures.
OVERVIEW OF ISTC PROJECTS RELATED TO THE REMEDIATION OF
NUCLEAR SITES
Like many other countries, the Russian Federation faces the challenge of
decontaminating and remediating its territories, conditioned by the ongoing process of nuclear
power plant and nuclear site decommissioning. Recognizing the global scale of these
problems, the ISTC has funded many projects in this field.
Some of the projects related to remediation of contaminated soil are:
No. 0016 ‘Development of electro kinetic and chemical methods for the rehabilitation
of soil and ground water contaminated by radionuclides and heavy metals’, with the Federal
State Unitary Enterprise Research and Development Institute of Power Engineering named
after N.A.Dollezhal, Moscow, as the Lead Institute. The aim of this project was to develop a
new technology for the decontamination of sites. Successful application of the technique was
demonstrated in the laboratory and at a site affected by 137Cs decontamination. A state-of-theart complexant for the selective removal of contaminants from soil was developed together
with a mobile installation for removing contaminants from soil.
No. 1567 ‘Use of IPEC for Remediating Soils Contaminated from Nuclear and
Industrial Activities’; with the All-Russian Scientific Research Institute of Non-Organic
Materials named after A. Bochvar, Moscow, as the Lead Institute. The project was aimed at
the development of technique for applying new polymeric stabilizers to protect soils against
wind and water erosion and to restore the plant cover. The project’s results have shown that
interpolyelectrolite complexes (IPEC)-based polymers are suitable for preventing
radionuclide spread by wind/water erosion through combining the most contaminated finely
dispersed soil fractions into larger aggregates which are more stable against erosion processes.
Accidental events leading to a real contamination require a combination of efforts directed to
soil stabilization to prevent the spread of radioactivity in the shortest possible time and with
minimum personnel exposure.
No. 2055 ‘Development and Demonstration of Technology for the Decontamination of
Solid Surfaces and Soils by Subcritical Carbon Dioxide’ with the Khlopin Radium Institute,
St Petersburg, as the Lead Institute. The main objective of the project was development of a
decontamination technology for soils and other solids (protective clothes, individual
44
RUDNEVA, GUDOWSKI
protection equipment) using subcritical CO2. The subcritical decontamination technology
developed was tested on a large scale with the use of real contaminated samples, including
soils.
No. 3189 ‘The Development of Composition and Technology of Amendment
Production for Rehabilitation of Soils Contaminated by Radionuclides and Assessment of
Their Application Efficiency’, with the Scientific and Production Association Typhoon,
Obninsk, Kaluga as the Lead Institute. This is an ongoing project; the project goal is to
develop a technology for producing the most effective and ecologically safe additives and
organo-mineral mixtures based on natural raw material and industrial waste and a method for
forecasting their efficiency. The main applications of the project are the rehabilitation of soils
contaminated by radionuclides in Belarus and Russia after the Chernobyl NPP accident.
Recommendations on the production of additives for soil rehabilitation will be produced.
No. B-247 ‘Rehabilitation of the Environmental Objects Contaminated with
Radionuclides’ with the Joint Institute of Energy and Nuclear Research - Sosny, Minsk,
Sosny, as the Lead Institute. The project is aimed at developing a decontamination method for
soil and sewage water contaminated during the Chernobyl accident and as a result of other
nuclear activities. Analytical and mathematical models were developed for the electro kinetic
process of water and soil cleanup. A method of decontamination, with the use of special
plants to accumulate radionuclides, was developed. Two Belarus patent applications were
filed on the basis of the project results.
No. B-852 ‘Development of Conversion Technology for the Isolation of Radionuclidefree Cellulose and Nitrolignin from the Straw of Agrocultures as a Method for Rehabilitation
and De-activation of Territories’ with the Belarusian State University/Institute of Physical
Chemical Problems, Minsk, as the Lead Institute. This approach was suggested for the
rehabilitation of radionuclide-polluted lands based on the implementation of a specially
developed technology for producing pulp and paper products and soil ameliorants. This
approach not only minimizes the contamination levels of affected areas but also creates a
potential market for materials produced in the affected areas.
No. K-237 ‘Development of Methods for Remediation of Soils with Increased Contents
of Heavy Metals, Radionuclides and Improvement of Soils for Ecologically Clean
Agricultural Production Systems Taking into Account the Population Health Indicators’ with
the Kazakh Research Institute of Fruit Growing and Viticulture, Almaty, Kazakhstan as the
Lead Institute. The objective of this project was to develop methods for the remediation of
polluted geosystems and for the improvement of soils for clean agricultural production and
the prophylaxis of effects on the health of the population. A new amelioration scheme for
technogenic-polluted soil was developed based on the principles of antagonism-synergism of
elements and a change of regimes of nutrition and irrigation of crops. For medium- and
heavily-polluted soils, the best ameliorates were colloid sulphur, boron with aluminum and
boron with magnesium on a bio-humus background. Recommendations were made for the
rehabilitation of public and environmental health in affected regions of south and southeast
Kazakhstan.
No. K-632 ‘Genetic Overall Examination of the Ecological Situation at the Toxic Waste
Storage Koshkar-Ata and the Development of Rehabilitation Actions’ with the National
Nuclear Centre of the Republic of Kazakhstan/Institute of Nuclear Physics, Almaty,
Kazakhstan as the Lead Institute. The purpose of the project was to investigate the current
ecological situation in the territories adjacent to the Koshkar-Ata tailings pond and to develop
rehabilitation measures, taking into consideration local soil/climatic peculiarities. A primary
outcome of the project was the development of proposals for stage-by-stage rehabilitation of
the land. Two control sites within the project are now also part of a special governmental
programme on the full-scale rehabilitation of the tailings pond. The ISTC project was central
in raising awareness among state and local authorities of the need to address rehabilitation
45
TOPICAL SESSION 2
problems at Koshkar-Ata. In 2007, the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan allocated
US $1 million from the state budget for the first stage of rehabilitation and restoration at the
tailings pool Koshkar-Ata.
CONCLUSIONS
The ISTC has played a very important role in stimulating and supporting projects
focused on environmental remediation in the Russian Federation, Kazakhstan and other CIS
countries. Research teams have concentrated their attention and scientific efforts on
technologies suitable for environmental remediation and protection.
For specific technical information on the projects, the project recipient institutes may be
contacted [2].
REFERENCES
[1]
[2]
46
The ISTC Annual reports – ISTC, Moscow (1996-2007).
ISTC website: www.istcinfo.ru.
SUMMARY OF SESSION 2
S. Vorobiev
Russian Federation
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND SUPPORT IN ENVIRONMENTAL
REMEDIATION
From the presentations in Session 2, it is clear that a wide range of international
organizations are well-positioned to undertake work in the remediation of lands affected by
radioactive contamination in Central Asia:
– The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) with a mandate for
facilitating broader environmental rights and security and heightened regional profiles;
– The European Commission, previously through its TACIS programme and now
through its Instrument for Nuclear Safety and Cooperation (INSC);
– The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) through its range of
funds dedicated to radioactive damage prevention and remediation;
– The International Scientific Technology Center (ISTC) with its wide network of
scientists, radioactive contamination database and research and development expertise;
– The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) through its active measurement and
assessment projects in this area;
– The International Atomic Energy Agency as an ideal forum for cooperation with tools
for establishing safety standards, knowledge transfer, technical and regulatory
capacity-building;
– The World Health Organization (WHO) whose mandate includes radiation health
matters; and
– The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) whose regional office in
Central Asia has already initiated cooperation between regional actors.
Several issues permeated the presentations of the representatives of all of these
organizations and of the ensuing discussion:
(a) The need for better coordination between international organizations (although all
organizations expressed their eagerness to engage with one another and provide
expertise);
(b) The importance of ownership and commitment by the national host government in its
approach to radioactive waste management;
(c) The necessity of regional, trans-boundary approaches guided by ‘master-plans’, or
‘road-maps’;
(d) The integration of regulatory aspects into international radiological assistance projects;
(e) The need to consider the problem of environmental remediation from a multi-faceted
perspective, including not only direct health effects, but also lasting economic, social,
and psychological consequences;
(f) The best ways of measuring success. Are concrete, scientific measurements and
indicators the only method or should broader criteria of social contentment also play a
role?
(g) The urgency of finally moving from talk, surveys and assessments to concrete actions;
(h) The ability of the aforementioned organizations to bring together interested
stakeholders.
47
SUMMARY OF SESSION 2
Considering the discussions of the panel of speakers, these points should form the basis
for any new approach for assessing the effectiveness of aid being rendered to countries, for
improving the quality and relevance of the aid and for strengthening the coordination of the
organizations involved in radioactive waste remediation.
One possible scenario for cooperation, which could guide the international approach to
remediation in Central Asia, is the Contact Expert Group (CEG), a model for coordination
developed by the IAEA and used with much success in relation to the environmental
problems in North-West Russia. A CEG for Central Asia would bring together all interested
states, international organizations, donor organizations, non-governmental organizations, and
independent experts for working-level meetings and annual plenary sessions. The purpose of
the CEG would be to:
(1) Stimulate cooperation, coordination, and co-funding of remediation activities;
(2) Share information on past, ongoing, and planned activities in order to maximize
effectiveness and avoid redundancy;
(3) Exchange information on best practices and experiences to avoid repeating historical
mistakes;
(4) Provide a stable platform with permanent membership for the elaboration of joint
projects;
(5) Outline what specifically needs to be funded and what regional solutions are available.
A high-level political conference designed to generate awareness, political will and
technical expertise in order to increase funding to support land remediation projects in Central
Asia is planned. It was suggested that this conference would provide a good forum for
discussing the idea of a Central Asian CEG model in the context of land remediation.
48
COMPLYING WITH SAFETY CRITERIA
(TOPICAL SESSION 3)
Chairperson
A.J. GONZÁLEZ
Argentina
THE EXISTING REGULATORY FRAMEWORK IN RUSSIA ON
ENVIRONMENTAL REMEDIATION
N.K. SHANDALA*, M.F. KISELEV**, M.I. BALONOV***, M.K. SNEVE****
*
Burnasyan Federal Medical Biophysical Centre, Moscow, Russian Federation
**
Federal Medical-Biological IAEA of Russia, Moscow, Russian Federation
***
Institute of Radiation Hygiene, St-Petersburg, Russian Federation
****
Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority, Oslo, Norway
Abstract
The paper addresses the public radiation exposures and medical consequences resulting from the
territories of the Russian Federation contaminated with residual radioactive materials due to nuclear weapons
tests and large-scale accidents. A comparison is made between the current Russian system of environmental
remediation regulation and the new international approaches of ICRP Publication 103.
1.
INTRODUCTION
The nature and extent of radioactive contamination of territories in the Russian
Federation is currently assessed in relation to the regulations established on the basis of the
Russian legislation in the fields of sanitary and epidemiological supervision of the public,
radiation safety and protection of the environment. The same regulations are used to define
harm to human health and the environment.
According to current Russian legislation, the Federal Medical-Biological IAEA (FMBA
of Russia) is responsible for medical and sanitary support as well as for state sanitary
epidemiological supervision. It covers organizations in some industrial branches at which
there are especially hazardous work conditions and the population of some Russian territories
according to a list approved by the Government. This list includes all radiation hazardous
facilities in Russia (more than 400 facilities). One of the FMBA’s principle functions is the
state regulatory supervision of safety in nuclear energy exploitation.
2.
PROBLEMS IN THE NUCLEAR INDUSTRY AND LAND AFFECTED BY
RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL RESIDUES IN RUSSIA
Routine discharges from nuclear facilities do not contribute significantly to the exposure
of the general public. In contrast, some historical radioactive releases which occurred in
emergency situations (Techa River, 1949, Kyshtim, 1957, Chernobyl, 1986) resulted in
radiation doses to population groups that significantly exceeded safe levels (see Table 1).
Exposures of this magnitude can lead to adverse health effects such as radiation
sickness and a long-term increase in the incidence of cancer in the residents of the affected
areas (Table 2). The research institutions of the FMBA study the consequences of the
contamination of Techa River, Southern Urals, due to both unauthorized radioactive
discharges from the PA Mayak in the late 1940s and the accident at Mayak in 1957. These
institutions are: the Southern Urals Institute of Biophysics and Urals Research Centre of
Radiation Medicine.
51
TOPICAL SESSION 3
TABLE 1. RADIATION DOSES FROM MAN-MADE RADIONUCLIDE RELEASES
(AFTER UNSCEAR [1])
Source
Time period
Significant nuclides
Mean dose (mSv)
Global fallout
1950-2020
137
1.1
Techa River
1949-2020
90
50-2000
Chernobyl
1986-2056
131
Cs, 90Sr, 131I, 14C, 3H
Sr, 89Sr, 137Cs, other
I, 134Cs, 137Cs, 90Sr
Effective - up to 500;
Thyroid - up to 104 (mGy)
TABLE 2. OBSERVED HEALTH EFFECTS FROM ENVIRONMENTAL EXPOSURES
(AFTER UNSCEAR [1])
Source
Number of persons exposed
Global fallout Few billions
Techa River
28 thousand
Chernobyl
Few millions
Observed health effect
None observable against a very large background
of cancer incidence
100-1000 cases of chronic radiation sickness;
leukemia and solid cancer
2000 thyroid cancers in children by 2000; more
are expected
Following some nuclear accidents, various radiobiological effects in non-human
species, e.g. plants and animals, have also been observed. Thus, managing the mitigation of
effects applies to the environment generally, as well as to humans.
In addition to the above mentioned challenges in the Russian nuclear industry, some
additional problems affecting the land areas of Russia are to be considered: the inadequacy of
the containment provided by some shallow radioactive waste storage facilities (and the
absence of any reserve of storage facilities at some NPPs) and the consequences of military
activities within the areas of nuclear submarine bases. (This latter activity has resulted in large
amounts of the spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste being accumulated at the sites of
temporary storage in the Russian Northwest and Far East.)
Radioactive contamination due to the presence of uranium tailing dumps is also a very
important environmental issue for Russia. The residents of some Russian settlements are
subjected to significant radiation exposure due to high concentrations of 222Rn in dwellings.
For example, an unsatisfactory situation in this respect exists at two areas under FMBA
responsibility. These are: Oktyabrsky village in Chita region (Eastern Siberia, the Chinese
border) and Lermontov city in the Stavropol Territory. Oktyabrsky village is situated in the
neighbourhood of the largest Russian uranium complex facility. Radiation dose rates in the
area of this village are typical for uranium containing areas. Levels exceeding the 222Rn limit
(200 Bq/m3) have been found in 39% of dwellings. The FMBA submitted the findings of its
examinations to Rosatom (the State Atomic Energy Corporation) and, at the end of 2007, the
decision was made to re-settle the residents of this village. A similar problem in Lermontov
city, which has about 1000 dwellings with high radon levels, is not yet solved.
Thus, in the foreseeable future, the Russian nuclear industry will have to solve many
resource-intensive environmental problems. For this purpose, the special Federal Target
Programme ‘Nuclear and Radiation Safety for 2008 and for the period till 2015’ is currently
in force in Russia. The FMBA is taking part in some activities within this Programme.
52
SHANDALA et al.
3.
CURRENT REGULATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL REMEDIATION IN RUSSIA
National radiation protection standards of many states, including Russia, are based on
documents of the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) and of the
International Atomic Energy Agency:
–
–
–
ICRP: Recommendations on Radiological Protection (Publication 103, 2008 [2]);
IAEA: Basic Safety Standards, 1996 [3] (now under revision);
Russia: Radiation Safety Standards (NRB-99), 1999; (to be reviewed).
NRB-99 contains guidance (intervention criteria) with respect to previously
radioactively contaminated areas. Optimized protective and remedial measures are
recommended at annual doses within the range 1 - 20 mSv; at a dose > 20 mSv, residence
within the territory is forbidden. Quite good compliance with the recommendations of ICRP
Publication 103 is evident; nevertheless, the existing application of the lower boundary (1
mSv/year) for large-scale situations (Chernobyl, Kyshtym, Techa) seems to be inappropriate.
This can be explained by the Chernobyl Law adopted on the rise of democracy at the early
1990s and by the incorrect use of the public dose limit in the case of emergency and existing
exposure situations.
4.
REGULATORY TRENDS IN ENVIRONMENTAL REMEDIATION IN RUSSIA
According to ICRP Publication 103 [2], environmental contamination can be
considered as an existing exposure situation, i.e. the exposure situation already exists when a
decision has to be made on radiation protection. This kind of exposure situation includes
prolonged exposure due to excess radiation background, after radiation accidents and
following previous radiation substance handling (including nuclear weapon manufacturing
and tests, etc.). In many respects, the Chernobyl accident resulted in the generation of such
exposure situations.
The previous ICRP publication on this subject, Publication 82 (1999) [4], and the
IAEA documents (WS-R-3 [5], WS-G-3.1 [6]) recommended the following principal
provisions with respect to remediation situations:
– Dose limits cannot be used;
– Criteria for the human protection – justification and optimization of intervention;
– General criterion of non-intervention – non-exceedance of an annual effective dose to
the public (due to all environmental sources (including background)) of 10 mSv.
Intervention should be implemented above this level.
ICRP Publication 103 [2] and a draft special ICRP Publication on remediation (2009)
reject the previously mentioned ‘intervention’ concept and introduce the ‘reference dose or
risk level’. The reference level is a level above which radiation exposure is not allowed, and
so optimized protective measures are to be taken. The regulatory body should establish the
reference level for the specific or typical situation. In the case of existing exposure situations,
the reference level of annual effective dose is suggested to be in the range from 1 mSv to 20
mSv. Higher levels are proposed to be applied for larger-scale situations.
In addition to the review of the Russian NRB-99, some special criteria for
environmental remediation are to be developed. The special environmental programmes and
Government directives serve as the legal basis for carrying out such developments:
– The Federal Law on ‘The Special Environmental Remediation Programmes of Some
Parts of the Territory under Radioactive Contamination’, 2001;
53
TOPICAL SESSION 3
– The Federal Law on ‘The Transfer of Lands from One Category to Another‘, 2004;
– The Government Directive on ‘Use of Lands under Radioactive or Chemical
Contamination, Performance of Reclamation Operations there, and Establishment of
Security Areas’, 2004.
According to these laws, remedial measures must be anticipated at the stage of the
remediation design development. The programme of site remediation must be developed for
normal living activities of the population and land use. Information on the radiation situation
must be provided in relation to the public living close to the facility in the affected zone.
International cooperation can play a significant role in regulatory aspects of
environmental remediation because of the similarity of the problems existing in the states
which have researched and developed nuclear technologies. The large-scale international
collaborative project with participation of the Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority and
the FMBAederal Medical Biological IAEA is an example of the application of up-to-date
regulations to environmental remediation in Russia. This project deals with radiation safety
regulation in Northwest Russia, in particular, at the Kola Peninsula, where two ex-navy bases
are located. At these bases, spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste from nuclear submarines
is are stored. In the course of such cooperation, the FMBA’s specialists together with their
Norwegian colleagues have developed many regulatory documents based on the findings of
scientific research. These documents include the remediation criteria and regulations relevant
to the site of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste temporary storage, taking into account
up-to-date ICRP approaches.
5.
CONCLUSIONS
– Nuclear weapons tests, large-scale radiological accidents, discharges of effluents from
nuclear facilities and poor storage of solid radioactive waste have led to the
appearance of man-made radionuclides in the biosphere as a whole and to excess
radioactive contamination of some areas of Russia. Defense activities have been the
largest contributor to this areal contamination.
– Levels of radiation exposure of environmental media, typical for the routine operation
of the nuclear energy using facilities, are hundreds and thousands of times less than
those, which can affect the biota. However, radiation effects in environmental media
have been found in limited areas within territories most contaminated after the
accidents at Chernobyl accident in 1986 and at PA Mayak in 1957.
– In many respects, the ICRP and IAEA have developed the international radiation
protection system for the existing (prolonged) public exposure situations under the
influence of the Chernobyl experience.
– The current Russian radiation protection system is not well enough arranged in its
documentation and differs from the international one, in particular, in the application
of the dose limit for planned exposure situations (1 mSv/year) for situations of
emergency and existing exposure.
REFERENCES
[1]
[2]
54
UNITED NATIONS SCIENTIFIC COMMITTEE ON THE EFFECTS OF ATOMIC
RADIATIONS, UNSCEAR 2000 Report to the General Assembly, with scientific annexes
(2000).
INTERNATIONAL
COMMISSION
ON
RADIOLOGICAL
PROTECTION,
Recommendations of the ICRP, Publication 103, Ann. ICRP 37 2-4 (2008).
SHANDALA et al.
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, International Basic Safety Standards for
Protection Against Ionizing Radiation and for the Safety of Radiation Sources, Safety Series
115, IAEA, Vienna (1996).
INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION, Protection of the
Public in Situations of Prolonged Radiation Exposure, Publication No. 82, Pergamon Press,
Oxford, New York (2000).
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Remediation of Areas Contaminated by
Past Activities and Accidents, Safety Standards Series, WS-R-3, IAEA, Vienna (2003).
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Remediation Process for Areas Affected
by Past Activities and Accidents, Safety Standards Series, WS-G-3.1, IAEA, Vienna (2007).
55
US POLICIES FOR CLEANUP AT RADIOACTIVELY CONTAMINATED
SITES
S. WALKER
US Environmental Protection IAEA,
Washington, D.C., United States of America
Abstract
The United States Environmental Protection IAEA (EPA) Office of Superfund Remediation and
Technology Innovation is responsible for implementing the long term (non-emergency) portion of a key law
regulating cleanup: the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, CERCLA,
nicknamed ‘Superfund.’ This paper provides a brief overview of the approach used by EPA to conduct
Superfund cleanups at contaminated sites, including those that are contaminated with radionuclides, to ensure
protection of human health and the environment. The theme emphasized throughout the paper is that within the
Superfund remediation framework, radioactive contamination is dealt with in a manner consistent with chemical
contamination, except to account for the technical differences between radionuclides and chemicals. This
consistency is important since at every radioactively contaminated site being addressed under Superfund’s
primary programme for long term cleanup, (the National Priorities List), chemical contamination is also present.
1.
INTRODUCTION
The United States (US) Environmental Protection IAEA (EPA) Office of Superfund
Remediation and Technology Innovation (OSRTI) is responsible for implementing the longterm (non-emergency) portion of a key law regulating cleanup: the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, CERCLA, commonly known as
‘Superfund.’ The purpose of the Superfund programme is to protect human health and the
environment over the long term from releases or potential releases of hazardous substances
from abandoned or uncontrolled hazardous waste sites. The focus of this paper is on
Superfund, including how radiation is addressed by the Superfund programme.
This paper provides a brief overview of the approach used by EPA to conduct
Superfund cleanups at contaminated sites, including those that are contaminated with
radionuclides, to ensure protection of human health and the environment. The paper addresses
how it is determined if a site poses a risk to human health and the framework used to
determine cleanup levels. The theme emphasized throughout the paper is that within the
Superfund remediation framework, radioactive contamination is dealt with in a manner
consistent with chemical contamination, except to account for the technical differences
between radionuclides and chemicals. This consistency is important since at every
radioactively contaminated site being addressed under Superfund’s primary programme for
long term cleanup, (the National Priorities List (NPL)), chemical contamination is also
present.
While every Superfund site is unique, and thus cleanups must be tailored to the specific
needs of each site, there are two requirements that must be met at each site. Firstly, CERCLA
requires that all remedial actions at Superfund sites must be protective of human health and
the environment. Therefore, cleanup actions are developed with a strong preference for
remedies that are highly reliable, provide long term protection and provide treatment of the
principal threat by permanently and significantly reducing the volume, toxicity, or mobility of
the contamination. In addition, EPA believes that site cleanups should protect ground water
that is a current or potential source of drinking water to drinking water standards whenever
practicable. Secondly, CERCLA specifically requires Superfund actions to attain the
standards and requirements found in other State and Federal environmental laws and
57
TOPICAL SESSION 3
regulations unless there is a specific basis for waiving that standard or requirement. This
mandate is known as compliance with ‘applicable or relevant and appropriate requirements’
or ARARs.
2.
REMEDY SELECTION
A comprehensive regulation known as the National Oil and Hazardous Substances
Pollution Contingency Plan or NCP contains the guidelines and procedures for implementing
the Superfund programme. The NCP sets forth nine criteria for selecting Superfund remedial
actions. These evaluation criteria are the standards by which all remedial alternatives are
assessed and are the basis of the remedy selection process. The criteria can be separated into
three levels: threshold, balancing, and modifying. The first two (of the nine) criteria are
known as ‘threshold’ criteria. They are a reiteration of the CERCLA mandate that remedies
must (1) at a minimum assure protection of human health and the environment and (2)
comply with (or waive) ARARs. They are the minimum requirements that each alternative
must meet in order to be eligible for selection as a remedy.
After the threshold criteria are applied, EPA considers the other evaluation criteria. Five
of the criteria are known as the ‘balancing’ criteria. These criteria involve assessing tradeoffs
between alternatives so that the best option will be chosen, given site-specific data and
conditions. The criteria balance long term effectiveness and permanence, reduction of
toxicity, mobility, or volume, short term effectiveness, implementability and cost. The final
two criteria are called ‘modifying’ criteria: new information or comments from the State or
the community may modify the preferred remedial action alternative or cause another
alternative to be considered.
3.
RISK-BASED CLEANUP LEVELS
Cleanup levels for radioactive contamination at CERCLA sites are generally
expressed in terms of risk levels, rather than dose (millirem or millisieverts), as a unit of
measure. CERCLA guidance recommends the use of slope factors based on the risk
coefficients contained in Federal Guidance Report 13, which is based on International
Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) publications 60 and 72.
Compliance with ARARs is often the determining factor in establishing cleanup
levels at CERCLA sites. However, where ARARs are not available or are not sufficiently
protective, EPA generally sets site-specific remediation levels for: 1) carcinogens at a
level that represents an upper-bound lifetime cancer risk to an individual of between 10 -4
to 10-6; and for 2) non-carcinogens such that the cumulative risks from exposure will not
result in adverse effects to human populations (including sensitive sub -populations) that
may be exposed during a lifetime or part of a lifetime, incorporating an adequate margin
of safety. The specified cleanup levels account for exposures from all potential pathways,
and through all media (e.g. soil, ground water, surface water, sediment, air, structures,
and biota).
The 10 -4 to 10-6 cancer risk range can be interpreted to mean that a highly exposed
individual may have a one in 10 000 to one in 1 000 000 increased chance of developing
cancer because of exposure to a site-related carcinogen. Once a decision has been made
to take an action, EPA prefers cleanups that achieve the more protective end of the range
(i.e. 10-6). EPA uses 10 -6 as a point of departure and establishes Preliminary Remediation
Goals (PRGs) at 1 × 10-6.
To assess the potential for cumulative non-carcinogenic effects posed by multiple
contaminants, EPA has developed a hazard index (HI). The HI is derived by adding the
non-cancer risks for site contaminants with the same target organ or mechanism of
58
WALKER
toxicity. When the HI exceeds 1.0, there may be concern for adverse health effects due to
exposure to multiple contaminants. Radioisotopes of uranium are generally the only
radionuclides for which EPA will evaluate the HI.
3.1. Preliminary remediation goals (PRGs)
PRGs are used for site ‘screening’ and as initial cleanup goals, if applicable. The
PRG's role in site screening is to help identify areas, contaminants, and conditions that do
not require further federal attention at a particular site. PRGs not based on ARARs are
risk-based concentrations, derived from standardized equations combining exposure
information assumptions with EPA toxicity data. PRGs based on cancer risk are
established at 1 × 10-6. PRGs are modified, as needed, based on site-specific information.
3.2. Superfund risk and dose soil and water models
EPA has developed a PRG for radionuclides electronic calculator, known as the Rad
PRG calculator. This electronic calculator presents risk-based standardized exposure
parameters and equations that should be used for calculating radionuclide PRGs for
residential, commercial/industrial, and agricultural land-use exposures, tap water and fish
ingestion exposures. The calculator also presents PRGs to protect groundwater which are
determined by calculating the concentration of radioactively contaminated soil that does not
result in leaching from soil to groundwater that would exceed MCLs or risk-based
concentrations. The Rad PRG calculator may be found at: http://epaprgs.ornl.gov/radionuclides/.
To address ARARs that are expressed in terms of millirem per year, an approach similar
to that taken for calculation of PRGs is used to calculate soil ‘compliance concentrations’
based upon various methods of dose calculation in another EPA tool, the ‘Dose Compliance
Concentrations’, or DCC calculator. The DCC calculator equations are identical to those in
the Rad PRG calculator, except that the target dose rate (ARAR based) is substituted for the
target cancer risk (1 × 10-6), the period of exposure is one year to indicate year of peak dose,
and a dose conversion factor (DCF) is used in place of the slope factor. The DCC calculator
may be found at: http://epa-dccs.ornl.gov/.
3.3. Superfund decommissioning models
EPA has recently completed two risk assessment tools that are particularly relevant to
decommissioning activities conducted under CERCLA authority. EPA developed the
Preliminary Remediation Goals for Radionuclides in Buildings (BPRG) electronic calculator
to help standardize the evaluation and cleanup of radioactively contaminated buildings at
which risk is being assessed for occupancy. BPRGs are radionuclide concentrations in dust,
air and building materials that correspond to a specified level of human cancer risk. The
BPRG calculator may be found at: http://epa-bprg.ornl.gov/.
EPA developed the Preliminary Remediation Goals for Radionuclides in Outside
Surface (SPRG) calculator to address hard outside surfaces such as building slabs, outside
building walls, sidewalks and roads. SPRGs are radionuclide concentrations in dust and hard
outside surface materials that correspond to a specified level of human cancer risk. The SPRG
calculator may be found at: http://epa-sprg.ornl.gov/.
3.4. Superfund ecological risk model
EPA is also developing the ‘Radionuclide Ecological Benchmark’ calculator. This
calculator provides biota concentration guides (BCGs), also known as ecological screening
59
TOPICAL SESSION 3
benchmarks, for use in ecological risk assessments at CERCLA sites. The calculator develops
ecological benchmarks for ionizing radiation based on cell death only.
4.
COMPLIANCE WITH ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS
Compliance with (or waiver of) ARARs is a cornerstone of CERCLA. Because the
diverse characteristics of Superfund sites preclude the development of prescribed ARARs, it
is necessary to identify ARARs on a site-by-site basis. Some of the radiation standards most
frequently used as ARARs at Superfund sites are the soil cleanup and indoor radon standards
developed to address contamination at sites that are subject to the Uranium Mill Tailings
Radiation Control Act of 1978 (UMTRCA). When used as an ARAR at Superfund sites, the
soil cleanup level for radium-226 and radium-228 combined, or thorium-230 and thorium-232
combined, is 5 picoCuries per gram (pCi/g) [0.185 Becquerels per gram (Bq/g)] above
background, while the indoor radon level is 0.02 working levels inclusive of background. For
a list of ‘Likely Federal Radiation Applicable or Relevant and Appropriate Requirements
(ARARs)’, see Attachment A of EPA's guidance ‘Establishment of Cleanup Levels for
CERCLA sites with Radioactive Contamination’ at:
http://www.epa.gov/superfund/health/contaminants/radiation/pdfs/radguide.pdf
One extremely important category of ARARs that should be noted are Maximum
Contaminant Levels (MCLs) that are established under the United States law for drinking
water standards, called the Safe Drinking Water Act. EPA believes contaminated ground
water should be restored to beneficial use, whenever practicable. This means that sites where
the contaminated ground water is a potential or current source of drinking water should be
remediated to concentrations corresponding to drinking water standards (e.g. concentrations
corresponding to MCLs or more stringent State drinking water standards). The Superfund
programme requires MCLs be met within the aquifer, not at the tap.
The current MCLs for radionuclides are set at 4 mrem/y [0.04 mSv/y] to the whole body
or an organ for the sum of the doses from beta and photon emitters, 15 picoCuries per litre
(pCi/L) [0.555 Bq/L] for gross alpha, and 5 pCi/L [0.185 Bq/L] combined for radium-228 and
radium-226, and 30 micrograms per litre of uranium. EPA has published concentration tables
for each radionuclide that correspond to the 4 mrem/y MCL which may be found at:
http://www.epa.gov/safewater/radionuclides/pdfs/guide_radionuclides_tablebetaphotonemitters.pdf.
5.
SUMMARY
The CERCLA framework for addressing hazardous sites ensures that risks from
radioactive contamination will be addressed in a manner consistent with risks from nonradioactive contamination, except to account for technical differences posed by radionuclides.
For more information and copies of EPA guidance documents for addressing radioactively
contaminated CERCLA sites, see the EPA’s Superfund Radiation webpage. For more
information and copies of EPA guidance documents for developing cleanup levels for long
term CERCLA sites, see EPA’s Remedy Decisions webpage. These webpages may be found
at:
http://www.epa.gov/superfund/health/contaminants/radiation/index.htm
http://www.epa.gov/superfund/policy/remedy/sfremedy/index.htm
Both of these webpages contain numerous Office of Solid Waste and Emergency
Response (OSWER) Directives, which are EPA’s official guidance for the Superfund
programme and other material that is useful for cleaning up CERCLA sites.
60
PRINCIPLES OF URANIUM STEWARDSHIP: GUIDANCE FROM THE
WORLD NUCLEAR ASSOCIATION
S. SAINT-PIERRE
World Nuclear Association,
London, United Kingdom
Abstract
The World Nuclear Association (WNA) has established ‘Principles of Uranium Stewardship’ whose
purpose is to ensure that uranium and its by-products are managed so as to combine safety, environmental
responsibility, sound economics and social acceptability. The principles are equally relevant for operators,
contractors, and regulators newly engaged in uranium mining and processing. This paper outlines the
background to the principles and the essential features of the WNA principles document.
1.
INTRODUCTION
The worldwide community of professionals engaged in uranium mining and processing
recognizes that managing health and safety, waste and the environment is of paramount
importance. This recognition – and the acceptance of commensurate responsibility – is
fundamental to the vision of the World Nuclear Association (WNA), its values and measures
of success.
Responsible management of uranium mining and processing projects should be applied
at all stages of planning and activities – from exploration through to development,
construction and operations, and on to decommissioning. Today, the WNA is acting to ensure
that all parties directly involved in uranium mining and processing – including operators,
contractors, and regulators – strive to achieve the highest levels of excellence in these fields
of management. The WNA is doing this by sustaining a strong safety culture based on a
commitment to a framework of common, internationally shared principles.
These international principles build on – and are complementary to – the World Nuclear
Association’s ‘Charter of Ethics’ and its ‘Principles of Uranium Stewardship’.
The WNA Charter of Ethics is founded on the belief “... that sustainability must be the
guiding principle of global development – requiring worldwide policies that meet the needs
and aspirations of the present generation without compromising the opportunity of future
generations to fulfil their needs and aspirations".
The Waste Management and Decommissioning Working Groups (WM and DWG) of
the WNA each currently consists of over forty radiation protection experts from various
sectors of the nuclear industry and from around the world. This policy document was
developed by a subgroup which consists of relevant uranium mining experts. The WNA
Principles of Uranium Stewardship focus on the commodity on which nuclear energy is
based. The principles embody best practice and ethical conduct for the entire global nuclear
industry. The WNA programme of Uranium Stewardship is based on a commitment to ensure
that uranium and its by-products are managed so as to combine safety, environmental
responsibility, sound economics and social acceptability.
The WNA document sets out principles for the management of radiation, health and
safety, waste and the environment and is applicable to sites throughout the world. In national
and regional settings, where activities of the nuclear fuel cycle have reached advanced stages
of development, these principles already serve to underpin Codes of Practice that govern
uranium mining and processing. In any given setting, a Code of Practice is needed to guide
practical implementation of these principles according to the regional, national or site61
TOPICAL SESSION 3
specific context.
The WNA has published these principles in the belief that they hold special relevance
for emerging uranium producing countries that do not yet have fully developed regulations for
the control of radiation, health and safety, waste and the environment associated with uranium
mining and processing. Moreover, experience shows that close cooperation among these three
parties is a key to the successful management of radiation, health and safety, waste and the
environment.
While the independence of regulators is clearly essential to their function, the very
existence of these regulatory agencies derives from governmental recognition that uranium
mining can provide socially beneficial results. Thus, the ultimate purpose of such regulators is
to enable mining and processing in compliance with acceptably high standards.
Of course, each principle affirmed in the WNA document will not apply to the same
extent for each party. For example, general responsibility for installations and sites lies
fundamentally with operators, who must accept overall responsibility for the performance of
contractors. Ultimately, the precise allocation of responsibilities must be set at national and
local levels.
Once national regulations are fully developed, they can be expected to embody the
principles enunciated in WNA’s document. During any transition period during which
regulatory rules and regimes are not yet fully formed, the principles should still be applied.
The WNA document holds the status of a policy and ethical declaration by the full
WNA membership, which encompasses most of the wide range of enterprises that comprise
the global nuclear industry – from uranium miners, to equipment suppliers, service providers,
and generators of electricity. In the category of uranium miners, the WNA membership
includes all major uranium mining and processing companies as well as many midsize and
junior companies.
The principles affirmed here are supported by key relevant international organizations,
including the International Atomic Energy Agency. Indeed, these principles have been
affirmed as an outgrowth of an IAEA cooperation project aimed at encouraging expanded
exchanges between professionals from governments and industry. These principles are also
supported by the global mining community through relevant international and national
associations that cover uranium mining and processing.
2.
PRINCIPLES
Principle 1: Adherence to sustainable development
Conduct all aspects of uranium mining and processing with full adherence to the
principles of sustainable development as set forth by the International Council on Mining and
Metals (ICMM). Apply these principles with emphasis on excellence in professional skills,
transparency in operations, accountability of management, and an overarching recognition of
the congruency of good business and sound environmental practices.
Discussion:
In establishing its ‘sustainable development’ principles, the ICMM adopted the
landmark definition of that term advanced by the United Nations’s Brundtland Commission in
1983: “Development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of
future generations to meet their own needs”.
To this the ICMM added: “In the mining and metals sector... investments should be
financially profitable, technically appropriate, environmentally sound and socially
responsible”. In emphasizing the practical necessity of financial profitability, the ICMM
underscored that economic profitability and sustainable development, far from being at odds,
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SAINT-PIERRE
must be consistent and reinforcing goals. This congruency of purpose is reflected in the
ICMM commitment to “seek continual improvement in performance and contribution to
sustainable development so as to enhance shareholder values”.
Principle 2: Health, safety and environmental protection
In all management practices, ensure adequate protection of employees, contractors,
communities, the general public, and the environment, as follows:
Mining safety – Ensure safe, well maintained site conditions for the protection of
employees and the public from all conventional mining hazards, including those related to
airborne contaminants, ground stability and structure, geological and hydrogeological
conditions, storage and handling of explosives, mine flooding, mobile and stationary
equipment, ingress and egress, and fire.
Radiation safety – Comply with the principles of Justification, Optimization and
Limitation, as follows:
Justification: Authorize the introduction of any new practice involving radiation
exposure, or the introduction of a new source of radiation exposure within a practice, only if
the practice can be justified as producing sufficient benefit to the exposed individuals or to
society to offset any potential radiation harm.
Optimization and Limitation: Optimize radiation exposure to as low as reasonably
achievable, taking into account all socioeconomic factors. Ensure compliance with the
occupational and public dose limits laid down by the appropriate national and international
regulatory and advisory bodies. In so doing, classify, according to risk, site personnel and
work areas that are subject to radiation exposure. Plan and carefully monitor employee and
contractor doses, radioactive discharges and emissions as well as resulting environmental
concentrations and exposure rates. Estimate potential radiological impacts on the public and
the environment.
Personal protective equipment – Ensure that employees and visitors are provided
personal protective equipment (PPE) appropriate for the hazard being controlled and
compliant with relevant standards or specifications to control exposure to safe levels. Ensure
that relevant personnel remain properly trained in the use and maintenance of this equipment.
Ventilation – Ensure that workplaces are adequately ventilated and that airborne
contaminants are minimized in workplaces. Pay particular attention to controlling radon and
related radiation exposures in uranium mines and processing facilities.
Water quality – Develop and implement site specific water management practices that
meet defined water quality objectives for surface and ground waters (focusing particular
attention on potable water supplies). Subject water quality objectives to periodic review to
ensure that people and the environment remain protected.
Environmental protection – Overall, avoid the pollution of water, soil and air. Optimize
the use of natural resources and energy and minimize any impact from the site and its
activities on people and the environment. In so doing, include considerations of sustainability,
biodiversity and ecology in guarding against environmental impact.
Principle 3: Compliance
Support the establishment of a suitable legal framework and relevant infrastructure for
the management and control of radiation, occupational and public health and safety, waste and
the environment. Ensure that all activities are authorized by relevant authorities and
conducted in full compliance with applicable conventions, laws, regulations and requirements,
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TOPICAL SESSION 3
including, in particular, the Safety Standards of the IAEA. In recognition that effective
interaction of operators (including contractors) and the appropriate regulatory authorities is
essential to safety, ensure that operators and contractors are licensed, having met the
requirement of relevant authorities.
Principle 4: Social responsibility
At all stages of uranium mining and processing, properly inform – and seek, gain and
maintain support from – all potentially affected stakeholders, including employees,
contractors, host communities, and the general public. Establish an open dialogue with
affected stakeholders, carefully consider their views, and provide feedback as to how their
concerns are addressed.
Principle 5: Management of hazardous materials
Manage and dispose of all hazardous materials (radioactive or non-radioactive) –
including products, residues, waste and contaminated materials – in a manner that is safe,
secure and compliant with laws and regulations.
Act systematically to establish and implement controls to minimize risks from such
waste and contaminated materials.
Take actions to maintain and treat sources of hazardous materials on-site wherever it is
practicable to do so. Control and minimize any releases into the environment, using carefully
planned strategies that involve pollution control technologies, robust environmental
monitoring, and predictive modelling to ensure that people and the environment remain well
protected. Rely, where possible, on proven, best available, industry scale technologies.
Focus particular attention on managing ore stockpiles and such potentially significant
sources of contamination as waste rock, tailings, and contaminated water or soils. With
tailings, concentrate special effort on the design and construction of impoundments and dams
and on the application of a recognized tailings management system for operations,
monitoring, maintenance and closure planning. Use risk analysis and controls to account for
the current and long term stability of waste repositories and containments. As an integral
aspect of mining and processing, characterize the ore and waste rock. Consider the
geochemistry and assess the risk of acid rock drainage (ARD); where ARD could occur,
develop an ARD management plan which accounts for ARD producing ore, rejects materials
and gangue, and provides for appropriate scheduling of mining, stockpile segregation,
processing and contaminant containment. Use effective containment designs to ensure against
long term liability from ARD producing rock. Use all opportunities to reduce the creation of
hazardous waste and contaminated materials. To the extent practicable, recover, recycle and
reuse such waste and materials, regarding waste disposal as a last resort option. At each site,
control the release or removal of waste and contaminated materials; use a ‘chain of custody’
approach, where needed. Safely manage all off-site streams for hazardous materials and
contaminated waste.
Principle 6: Quality management system
Employ a recognized quality management system – including the quality assurance
steps of ‘Plan, Do, Check and Act’ (PDCA) – in administering the management of all
activities pertinent to managing radiation, health and safety, waste and the environment.
Planning – At all development and operational stages, plan the management of
radiation, health and safety, waste and the environment. With the constant goal of avoiding
risk and optimizing the use of natural resources and energy, update such plans regularly, and
particularly in response to any significant change in activities or site conditions. Include, as a
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central element in such plans, steps for the control of emergencies and unplanned events.
Ensure that plans are well documented and communicated.
Environmental impact assessment – In developing uranium mining or processing
projects, prepare formal Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs) that deal with all
questions and concerns related to radiation, occupational and public health and safety, waste
and the environment, as well as the socio-economic impact. Submit the EIA as part of the
public review process so as to provide response opportunities for stakeholders, especially the
workforce and host communities. During the life of a project, prepare further EIAs if and as
warranted by new circumstances.
Risk management – Apply risk assessment and management procedures. Identify,
characterize and assess all risks that can impact on health, safety and environmental
protection. Mitigate risks with controls using engineering, administration and other protective
measures. Apply a hierarchy of risks and controls. Monitor risks and take timely action to
offset the emergence of new risks. Regularly review performance to improve procedures,
further reduce risk, detect weaknesses and trigger corrective measures.
Documentation – Document and report relevant data and maintain records in
compliance with regulatory requirements. Place special emphasis on data required by the
quality assurance management system.
Principle 7: Accidents and emergencies
Identify, characterize and assess the potential for incidents and accidents, and apply
controls to minimize the likelihood of their occurrence. Develop, implement and periodically
test emergency preparedness and response plans. Ensure the availability of mechanisms for
reporting and investigating all incidents and accidents so as to identify the ‘root cause’ and
facilitate corrective actions.
Principle 8: Transport of hazardous materials
Package and transport all hazardous materials (radioactive and non-radioactive),
including products, residues, waste, and contaminated materials, safely, securely, and in
compliance with laws and regulations. For radioactive materials, adhere to IAEA Regulations
for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material, relevant IAEA Safety Guides, applicable
international conventions, and local legislation.
Principle 9: Systematic approach to training
In each area of risk, provide systematic training to all site personnel (employees and
contractors) to ensure competence and qualification; include in such training the handling of
non-routine responsibilities. Extend such training, where appropriate, to visitors and relevant
persons in communities potentially affected by these risks. Regularly review and update this
training.
Principle 10: Security of sealed radioactive sources and nuclear substances
Ensure the security of sealed radioactive sources and nuclear substances, using the
‘chain of custody’ approach where practicable. Comply with applicable laws, international
conventions and treaties, and agreements entered into with stakeholders on the safety and
security of such sources and substances.
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TOPICAL SESSION 3
Principle 11: Decommissioning and site closure
In designing any installation, plan for future site decommissioning, remediation, closure
and land reuse as an integral and necessary part of original project development. In such
design and in facility operations, seek to maximize the use of remedial actions concurrent
with production. Ensure that the long term plan includes socio-economic considerations,
including the welfare of workers and host communities, and clear provisions for the
accumulation of resources adequate to implement the plan. Periodically review and update the
plan in the light of new circumstances and in consultation with affected stakeholders. In
connection with the cessation of operations, establish a decommissioning organization to
implement the plan and safely restore the site for reuse to the fullest extent practicable.
Engage in no activities – or acts of omission – that could result in the abandonment of a site
without plans and resources for full and effective decommissioning or that would pose a
burden or threat to future generations.
66
ADAPTING INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE TO REGULATORY
SUPERVISION OF LEGACY SITES IN THE CENTRAL ASIAN REPUBLICS
M. SNEVE*, M. KISELEV**, N. SHANDALA***, T. ZHUNUSSOVA*, A. KIM****,
U. MIRSAIDOV*****, B. TOLONGUTOV******
*
Department for Emergency Preparedness and Environmental Radioactivity
Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority, Osteras, Norway
**
Federal Medical-Biological IAEA, Moscow, Russian Federation
***
Burnasyan Federal Medical Biophysical Centre, Moscow, Russian Federation
****
Kazakhstan Atomic Energy Committee, Astana, Kazakhstan
*****
Tajikistan Nuclear and Radiation Safety IAEA, Dushanbe, Tajikistan
******
State IAEA for Environment Protection and Forestry of the Kyrgyz Republic
Abstract
This paper outlines progress being made within the regulatory cooperation programme between the
Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority and its sister organizations in the Russian Federation. Experience is
drawn from work at nuclear technology legacy sites, such as the Sites of Temporary Storage at Andreeva and
Gremikha, and also on the remediation of uranium mining and milling facilities. The planned application of this
experience to the enhancement of regulatory supervision in Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and the Kyrgyz Republic is
described. Preliminary observations are made concerning how this work might feed into the development of
international guidance.
1.
INTRODUCTION
In the last decade, the global community has addressed the environmental legacy from
the earlier development of nuclear technologies. In this the general objectives have been to
develop a responsible approach to environmental and human health protection and to help
ensure that future developments do not create new problematic legacies. Radiation protection
and nuclear safety are a significant part of legacy management, and strong independent
regulatory supervision is, in turn, crucial to the delivery of safety and confidence in the whole
process.
At the same time, a wide range of other issues contribute to decisions on how the
legacies should be managed. For example, radiation and radioactive material are not the only
health protection issues at sites affected by radioactive residues; there are many other
pernicious pollutants and physical safety factors to consider. Yet more broadly, decisions on
legacy site management have often to be made in the recognition that there are limited
financial and other resources. In addition, account has to be taken of many other social and
cultural factors which operate on many different temporal and spatial scales. The overall
system of norms and standards and the related regulatory process need to be strong and clear
enough to provide a proper basis for environmental as well as health and safety management
and flexible enough to allow an effective interface with the wider management issues so that
balanced and proportionate decisions can be made.
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TOPICAL SESSION 3
2.
EXPERIENCE OF REGULATORY SUPPORT IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
The Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority (NRPA) is the radiation and nuclear
safety regulatory authority in Norway. It falls naturally to NRPA to assist the Norwegian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs in implementing the Norwegian Plan of Action on Improving
Nuclear and Radiation Safety in Northwest Russia. The initial Plan of Action focused on the
safety of nuclear technology development and application and therefore included
consideration of nuclear power plants.
A significant component of the Plan of Action is for NRPA to provide support to its
sister authorities in the Russian Federation. The situation is complex because of the technical
and political history. However, over the years, a considerable degree of confidence and
mutual trust has been built up among all the relevant organizations, allowing for real progress
to be made in meeting protection objectives. This forms a strong basis for continued
cooperation to mitigate radiation risks and the prevention of the development of new legacies.
The Norwegian government has recognised the effectiveness of the programme and the
Plan of Action was updated in 2008 and extended until at least 2012 with renewed focus on
managing the nuclear legacy from the Cold War period and other operations carried out at the
time of the Soviet Union.
2.1
Who is involved?
The two key regulatory authorities for civil protection in Russia are the Federal
Environmental, Industrial and Nuclear Supervision Service of Russia (Rostechnadzor) and the
Federal Medical-Biological IAEA (FMBA). Rostechnadzor focuses on nuclear and radiation
safety and the FMBA focuses on radiological protection. Both are supported by technical
support organizations, notably the Science and Engineering Centre for Nuclear and Radiation
Safety (SEC-NRS) and the Burnasyan Federal Medical Biophysical Centre (FMBC). Many of
the legacy issues originated from the military programme. It is therefore vital that the military
authority is involved. In fact, the the Directorate of State Supervision over Nuclear and
Radiation Safety of the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation (DSS NRS) has agreed
to take part in the cooperation programme.
Regulators and operators must rigorously and transparently retain their separate
responsibilities and integrities. At the same time, an effective dialogue is necessary between
them. Thus, the programme allows for and encourages FMBA, Rostechnadzor and DSS NRS
to regularly hold information exchange meetings with other Russian authorities, notably
Rosatom. Experts from other national authorities and technical support organizations
participate through the review of project proposals and the provision of technical output. They
include the Institut de Radioprotection et de Sûreté Nucléaire, the Swedish Radiation Safety
Authority, the US Environmental Protection IAEA and the Environment IAEA of England
and Wales. International contacts are maintained with the Nordic Liaison Committee for
Atomic Energy, the European Union, the World Health Organization and the International
Atomic Energy Agency.
2.2
What are the objectives?
The objectives are:
1.
2.
68
Efficient and effective regulatory supervision of nuclear legacy projects in order
to protect western and Russian investment in nuclear legacy management.
Integrated coverage of nuclear and radiation safety, comprising:
– Worker and public safety;
– Environmental and human health protection and monitoring;
SNEVE et al.
–
–
–
3.
4.
Normal and accident conditions;
Emergency preparedness and response;
Addressing high risk issues arising from nuclear legacies, but, at the same
time;
– Addressing longer term management, site remediation and waste storage and
disposal, so as not to prejudice safety in the future, thereby avoiding the
creation of new legacies.
Long term development of an enhanced safety culture.
The development of a close working relationship with Russian authorities so that
future challenges can be addressed effectively.
2.3. What has been achieved?
The projects have helped provide the regulatory authorities with the tools they need to
carry out their responsibilities. They have resulted in:
(a) Updated Federal norms and regulations and regulatory guidance which take account of
international requirements and recommendations, as well as other relevant national
good practice;
(b) The development of effective and efficient regulatory procedures for licensing and
compliance monitoring.
The work began with the review and comparison of environmental impact assessment in
Russia, Norway and other European countries. Based on the developed understanding of the
system and situation, the industrial projects in which NRPA cooperation has supported
regulatory development and supervision have included:
(1) Decommissioning of the Lepse spent fuel storage vessel;
(2) Decommissioning of radio-thermal generators (RTG);
(3) Rehabilitation of the Sites of Temporary Storage (STS) at Andreeva and
Gremikha; and
(4) Development of waste acceptance criteria for storage of radioactive waste at
Sayda Bay.
The work has proceeded as far as the promulgation of official regulatory norms and
standards. Progress is reported in technical NRPA reports [1-3] which include English
translations of relevant regulatory guidance. The integrated coverage of radiological risks,
from optimization of especially hazardous operations to standard setting for radioactive waste
management has been especially worthwhile and effective at the Sites of Temporary Storage.
The programme of work is also widely promulgated to a broader audience in conference
papers (e.g. [4, 5]), but also in a less technical context in NRPA information bulletins, e.g. on
a joint exercise for emergency preparedness [6] and on RTG decommissioning safety in the
IAEA Bulletin [7].
Finally, it should not be forgotten that the work is fundamentally based on science, and
the programme has also resulted in the publication of peer reviewed journal articles, such as
one on the basis for remediation criteria [8].
2.4. How has it been achieved?
The NRPA policy has been to start by addressing real regulatory problems that need to
be solved in order for legacy management projects to proceed under relevant and effective
69
TOPICAL SESSION 3
supervision. Hard work, patience, tenacity and perseverance from all concerned has been
necessary but the most important factor is effective communication, particularly through
listening to the real needs of Russian colleagues and then responding robustly noting the
limits on resources and other practical factors.
3.
RELEVANCE AND APPLICATION IN THE CENTRAL ASIAN REPUBLICS
The details of situations for legacy management are different in each country, not only
because of technical and geographical differences, but also because national regulatory
frameworks are different, social and cultural attitudes are different and political choices on
resource management can constrain options in different ways. However, the strategy approach
adopted in the cooperation between the Russian authorities and the NRPA is planned to be
followed with the authorities in Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, with broadly the
same objectives.
4.
NEXT STEPS
The next steps in cooperation with the Russian authorities involve enhancement of
regulatory compliance monitoring as major industrial projects are implemented, for example
under the Strategic Master Plan V2. It is also hoped to extend the work completed at SevRAO
and other facilities in NW Russia to other sites. This is already happening, for example,
concerning the application of regulatory documents developed for the Lepse to the
decommissioning [9] of other floating nuclear objects, and the application of hygienic
standards for Very Low Level Waste Management at Sites of Temporary Storage to other
sites.
The initial phases of the work in Central Asia concern support in the development and
application of national radioactive waste management strategies and preliminary threat
assessments to determine regulatory priorities. The work will, as in Russia, be based on
practical problems at real sites.
Little if any of this work could be done were it not for the goodwill and positive attitude
to cooperation among the project participants. However, support from international and other
national organizations has also been important. The proposed establishment of a new working
group for coordinating activities in the Regulatory Supervision of Legacy Sites, under the
auspices of the IAEA, is therefore much welcomed. The key to success will be to make
international guidance as clear and precise as possible without prejudicing the regionally or
locally optimum solution.
REFERENCES
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
70
NORWEGIAN RADIATION PROTECTION AUTHORITY (NRPA), Upgrading the
Regulatory Framework of the Russian Federation for the Safe Decommissioning and Disposal
of Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generators. Stralevernrapport 2007:5, Osteras (2007).
NORWEGIAN RADIATION PROTECTION AUTHORITY (NRPA), Radiological Regulatory
Improvements Related to the Remediation of the Nuclear Legacy Sites in Northwest Russia.
Stralevernrapport 2007:11, Osteras (2007).
NORWEGIAN RADIATION PROTECTION AUTHORITY (NRPA), Regulatory
Improvements Related to the Radiation and Environmental Protection during Remediation of
the Nuclear legacy Sites in North West Russia. Report of work completed by NRPA and FMBA
of Russia in 2007. Stralevernrapport 2008:7, Osteras (2008).
KISELEV, M., SHANDALA, N., GNEUSHEVA, G., et al., Radiation protection of workers
from uranium mines and of the public living nearby uranium mining and milling facilities. In:
SNEVE et al.
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
Proceedings 12th International Radiation Protection Association Conference, Buenos Aires
(2008).
SNEVE, M.K., KISELEV, M., KOCHETKO, O., et al., Practical Application of the
International Safety Regime in NW Russia: Experience from the Norwegian Plan of Action. In:
Proceedings 12th International Radiation Protection Association Conference, Buenos Aires
(2008).
NORWEGIAN RADIATION PROTECTION AUTHORITY (NRPA), Emergency
Preparedness and Response Exercise for medical teams in Andreeva Bay. NRPA Bulletin
17:2006, Osteras (2006).
SNEVE, M.K., Remote Chance. IAEA Bulletin 28/1. Vienna (2008).
SHANDALA, N.K, SNEVE, M.K., TITOV, A.V., et al., Radiological criteria for remediation of
sites for spent fuel and radioactive waste storage in the Russian Northwest. Journal of
Radiological Protection 28 4 (2008).
SNEVE, M.K., BERGMAN, C., MARKAROV, V., Licensing Procedures for a Dedicated Ship
for Carrying Spent Nuclear Fuel and Radioactive Waste. Report from workshop held at
GOSAOMNADZOR, Moscow, 2-3 July 2001. StrålevernRapport 2001:8. Østerås: Statens
strålevern
(Norwegian
Radiation
Protection
Authority)
(2001).
http://www.nrpa.no/dav/e48eeab4ff.pdf
71
SUMMARY OF SESSION 3
A.J. González
Argentina
REGULATORY ASPECTS
This session, which consisted of five oral presentations followed by a Panel Discussion,
was mainly concerned with existing international and national safety standards for
environmental remediation.
In the first presentation, the ongoing process to update the International Basic Safety
Standards (BSS) was described. Particular emphasis was given to the incorporation of the new
standards on environmental remediation (i.e. IAEA Safety Standards No WS-R-3 of 2003)
within the new BSS and the adaptation of the BSS to the new recommendations of the
International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) (Publication 103). In the new
BSS, the remediation of land affected by radioactive residues will be considered as an
‘existing’ exposure situation, following the new ICRP classification of ‘planned’,
‘emergency’ and ‘existing’ exposure situations. However, it was pointed out in discussion that
remediation may be considered at the planning stage of some operations such as mining; in
this case, it would be treated as a ‘planned’ exposure situation. Moreover, it was also pointed
out that although remediation is usually necessary after an emergency, such a need would
normally materialize in the aftermath of the emergency and the situation therefore may be
considered a ‘de facto’ existing exposure situation.
The second presentation was concerned with the regulatory framework for
environmental remediation in the Russian Federation. There are many situations requiring
environmental remediation in Russia; they include areas affected by nuclear accidents, those
due to poorly controlled practices and those that are a legacy of past military activities. At the
present time, there are no comprehensive regulatory instruments for dealing with existing
exposure situations in Russia but the revision of the relevant regulatory documents is cleanup
and is taking account of the recent and ongoing international developments, including the
recommendations in ICRP Publication103 and the requirements of the new BSS.
The standards used by the United States Environmental Protection IAEA (USEPA) for
environmental remediation were the subject of the third presentation. These are the CERCLA
or ‘Superfund’ regulations and apply to abandoned sites at which activities such as uranium
mining and milling, thorium gas mantle production and nuclear weapons production were
previously carried out. The regulations are very detailed with specific numerical criteria for
application to environmental materials, surfaces and aquatic media. The criteria are based on
the associated risk of cancer – unlike those in international recommendations and standards
that are used by other US Federal Agencies which are based on weighted radiation dose
criteria. Because the criteria are different, ‘ad hoc’ agreements have been reached between the
US agencies to cover situations where their jurisdictions overlap.
In the fourth presentation, the new guidance from the World Nuclear Association on
principles for the decommissioning and remediation of uranium mining and milling facilities
was presented. The guidance stresses the need for proper planning at the design stage to
anticipate all of the issues which will arise - including the provision of sufficient financial
resources for decommissioning and the arrangements for the long term management of waste.
In the fifth and final presentation, a plan to assist in the regulatory supervision of legacy
sites in the Central Asian Republics proposed by the Norwegian Radiation Protection
Authority (NRPA) was described. The extensive disused uranium mining and milling sites in
73
SUMMARY OF SESSION 3
these countries are in need of remediation. Based on the previous experience of the NRPA in
Russia, the plan envisages assisting the countries by improving regulatory infrastructures and,
in particular, providing training to the regulatory body in procedures and regulatory
supervision. It was also suggested that IAEA might become involved, for example, by
promoting forums of regulators to discuss common problems.
In the Panel Discussion, some of the questions related to criteria for remediation that
remained unanswered at the Arlington conference were addressed, namely:
(1) Have consistent criteria been established that provide guidelines for the remediation
of contaminated sites?
(2) Can a single criterion be applied to the remediation of all forms of contaminated
site, be they nuclear test sites, areas resulting from accidents, the termination of
practices, mining and milling activities or legacy discharges?
(3) Should areas contaminated with manmade versus natural radioactive material have
different criteria? Can the same criteria be used for both?
(4) Should the public being involved during the decision making process?
(5) How can it be ensured that overly conservative and unrealistic modelling is not
being used which could lead to an overestimation of the risks?
(6) Have the cleanup levels and goals for sites that are contaminated with chemical and
radioactive material been harmonized?
(7) How can the removal of material from one site to another versus stabilizing the
material in place be justified?
The Panel, composed of the presenters of the papers in this session, responded to the
questions arising from the Arlington conference, as follows:
– In response to the question concerning the global unification of criteria for
remediation, it was concluded that the international recommendations of ICRP and the
intergovernmental safety standards issued by the IAEA provide a framework within
which optimized criteria can be developed taking into account country and site
specific features.
The USEPA risk based approach differs from the radiation-dose based approach
recommended by the international organizations and used in most countries. In the context of
the subject of the conference, it was noted that the risk based approach has the merit of
allowing radiation risks to be compared on the same basis as risks from chemical hazards.
However, it was observed that there are some problems with the approach and these have
been discussed by the ICRP.
The aims of any approach used should be the same, namely protecting people
adequately from the health hazards attributable to radiation exposure. However, it is noted
that a comprehensive approach that takes account of both radiation and other hazards in a
coherent and consistent manner is currently missing in international guidance.
(a) It was recognized that decisions on remediating areas contaminated with artificial
radionuclides are usually different from those for areas affected by naturally occurring
radionuclides even though the ‘natural’ doses to exposed persons might be the same
and, in some cases, many times higher than the ‘artificial’ doses. The international
system does not differentiate between the health hazards of natural and those due to
artificial radiation. A dichotomous approach for remediating artificially versus
naturally contaminated land is therefore scientifically unjustifiable. Nevertheless, such
separate approaches are used in practice, perhaps due to a perceived public reluctance
to remediate areas in which enhanced radiation levels occur naturally;
74
SUMMARY OF SESSION 3
(b) The public should be involved in decisions on remediation - but when, and to what
extent, may vary. In some countries, the public is more empowered than in others and
in those countries it will insist on having its views heard at all stages of the
remediation process.
The time available did not allow the Panel to address all of the questions arising from the
Arlington conference.
75
INNOVATIVE TECHNOLOGIES IN ENVIRONMENTAL REMEDIATION
(TOPICAL SESSION 4)
Chairperson
V. ADAMS
United States of America
INNOVATIVE MATHEMATICAL MODELLING IN ENVIRONMENTAL
REMEDIATION
G.T. YEH*, J.P. GWO**, M.D. SIEGEL***, M. H. LI****, Y.L. FANG*****,
F. ZHANG******, W.S. LUO******, S.B. YABUSAKI*****
*
**
***
****
*****
University of Central Florida, United States of America
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, United States of America
Sandia National Laboratories, United States of America
National Central University, Taiwan, China
Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, United States of America
******
Oak Ridge National Laboratory, United States of America
Abstract
Subsurface contamination problems of radionuclides, metals, and organic co-contaminants are ubiquitous.
These contaminants may exist in the solute phase or may be bound to soil particles and interstitial portions of the
geologic matrix. Innovative tools to reliably predict the migration and transformation of these radionuclides,
metals, and co-contaminants in the subsurface environment enhance the ability of environmental scientists,
engineers and decision makers to evaluate the efficacy of alternative remediation techniques and to analyze their
impact prior to incurring expense in the field. A realistic mechanistically-based numerical model that considers
feedback between fluid flow, thermal transport, and reactive transport could provide such a tool. This paper
communicates the development and applications of a mechanistically coupled fluid-flow, thermal-transport,
hydrologic-transport, and reactive biogeochemical model where both fast and slow reactions occur in porous and
fractured media. Four example problems are employed to demonstrate how numerical experimentation can be
used to evaluate the feasibility of different remediation approaches.
1.
INTRODUCTION
Groundwater has always played an important role in human history and groundwater
contamination has been subject to intensive investigations since the mid-1980s. Contaminants
in the water environment undergo changes in concentration resulting from physical, chemical,
and/or biological processes, and a capability to understand and model these processes is at the
core of water-quality management. Accurate tools for the reliable prediction of contaminant
migration and transformation are necessary to support the task. Consideration of equilibrium
chemistry, kinetic chemistry, and hydrologic transport and the interaction between fluid flow
and reactive transport is necessary in order to reflect the complexity of the many systems. For
example, solid phase reactions including precipitation and dissolution can potentially plug
pores or open fractures reducing matrix diffusion and promote rapid flow through fractures.
The development of mechanistically-based reactive chemical transport models has
increased dramatically in the last two decades [1-8]. These numerical reactive transport
models have had varied scopes. This paper describes the development and application of the
latest versions of HYDROGEOCHEM [7], a mechanistically-based numerical model for the
simulation of coupled fluid flow, thermal transport, and reactive chemical transport in
variably saturated porous and fractured media. These latest versions are among the most
versatile codes for dealing with biogeochemical processes under variably saturated flow
conditions.
79
TOPICAL SESSION 4
2.
MATHEMATICAL BASIS
The reactive transport equation of any species can be derived based on the conservation
law of material mass stating that the rate of mass change is due to biogeochemical reactions
and hydrologic transport [7]. This statement would result in M partial/ordinary differential
equations (PDEs) involving M species concentrations and N reaction rates. The number of
unkowns is (M + N), which is more than the number of PDEs. Thus, N more equations are
needed. We will asuume that the N reactions are made of NE equilibrium and NK kinetic
reactions. For each of the NK kinetic reactions, its rate is explicitly formulated based on
experimental evidence. For each of the NE equlibrium reactions, its rate is implicitely defined
with an algebraic equation, for example, a mass action equation. The substitution of explicit
rate equations for kinetic reactions into the system of PDEs results in (M + NE) unknowns in
M PDEs. This coupled with NE algebraic equations of thermodynamic realationships forms a
closed system of (M + NE) mixed differential-algebraic equations. Decoupling of the NE
unknowns of equilibrium rates from the M unknowns of species concentrations can be made
via the Gauss-Jordan reduction of reaction networks [2]. Performing matrix decomposition of
the reaction matrix, we obtain two subsets of equations as described below:
(1) M-NE transport equations for M-NE reaction extents
(1)
 Ei
 L  Eim     Dij f j , i  M  N E  in which Ei 
t
jN K 
aC
jM 
ij
j
where Ei is the i-th reaction extent [M/L3]; L is the hydrologic transport operator; Eim is
the portion of Ei, which contains the linear combination of only mobile species;  is the
moisture content [L3/L3]; {NK} = {1,2,..,NK}; fj = fj(Ci:i{M}) is an explicit function of M
Ci’s that represents the rate equation of the j-th reaction; Dij is an element of decomposed
reaction matrix; {M-NE}{M} having (M-NE) members is a subset of {M} where {M} =
{1,2,..M}; and aij is the element of a M x M matrix resulting from the matrix decomposition
of a unit matrix and it represents the coefficient of the linear combination of Cj in Ei.
(2) NE rate-equations for NE fast/equilibrium reactions
 Dik Rk 
 Ei
 L  Eim     Dij f j , k  N E , i  M E 
t
jN k 
(2)
where Dik is an element of decomposed reaction matrix corresponding to an
independent equilibrium reaction; Ei, the i-th reaction extent, is called an equilibrium variable
since it corresponds to an independent equilibrium reaction; {NE} = {1, 2, .., NE}; and {ME},
having ME (=M-NE) members, is a subset of {M}.
The (M - NE) PDEs in Equation (1) are coupled with NE non-linear algebraic equations,
Fk  Ci : i {M }  0, e. g. kE   Ci  ik /  Ci 

iM 
iM 
ik
 0, k N E 
(3)
which implicitely define the rates of NE equilibrium reactions, to form a system of M
equations for the unknowns of M species concentrations, Ci’s. In Equation (3), kE is the
modified equilibrium constant of the k-th equilibrium reaction and ik and ik, respectively,
80
YEH et al.
are the reaction stoichiometries of the i-th species in the k-th reaction associated with
reactants and products, respectively.
3.
EXAMPLE PROBLEMS
Example 1: This problem considers the release and migration of uranium from a
simplified uranium mill tailings pile. The mill tailings pile was located adjacent to a surface
that slopes down to a river. The problem consisted of a reaction network of 35 aqueous
complexation and 14 precipitation-dissolution reactions involving 56 species [6].
Diagonalization of the reaction network resulted in seven major chemical components:
calcium, carbonate, uranium, phosphate, sulphate, proton, and ferrous [6]. Simulation results
on the migration of uranium and other chemical species over 300 days were reported in Yeh
et al. [7]. The same 56-species uranium tailing problem was applied to a proposed waste
disposal site at Melton Branch Watershed. The parallel version of the code was employed and
computations were distributed over a number of processors to speed-up the computations.
Migrations of uranium, proton, carbon, and iron are given elsewhere [9].
Example 2: This problem simulated Monitored Natural Attenuation (MNA). In addition
to the processes of the previous problem, adsorption-desorption processes were also included.
The objectives were to conduct a parametric study of adsorption-desorption of uranium.
Different sorption mechanisms, including fast (or reversible), slow, and irreversible sorption,
were simulated. Three cases were studied: equilibrium sorption, kinetic-limited sorption with
slow uptake, and rapid adsorption with slow desorption. For Case 1 – fast adsorption only,
four equlibrium reactions were included. For Case 2 – mixed fast and slow adsorption, two
more equlibrium reactions and one reversible kinetic reaction were included. For Case 3 –
mixed reversible and irreversible reactions, the slow kinetic reaction was considered partially
irreversible. Simulation results indicated that (1) a dissolved uranium plume moves faster
when sorption processes are not included, (2) the amount of sorbed uranium on the fast site is
higher than on the mixed site, (3) since less uranium is sorbed on to the mixed site, the
intensity of the dissolved uranium plume is lower than at the fast site during the desorbing
period, (4) the separation and alteration of the mass centre of the dissolved uranium plume is
the effect of non-linear sorption/desorption reactions, (5) during the sorbing period, the
irreversible site can provide almost the same sorption ability as the reversible site, (6) during
the desorbing period, the irreversible site partially confines the migration of uranium, and (7)
the complete removal of adsorbed uranium from the irreversible site requires more time to
achieve than at the reversible site.
Example 3: This example investigated laboratory experiments involving extremely high
concentrations of uranium, technetium, aluminium, nitrate, and toxic metals [10]. The
experiment was modeled with a reaction network of 92 equilibrium and 5 kinetic reactions
involving 138 chemical species. The conceptual model involving 12 chemical components
was proposed for the experiments: nitrate, Na, K, Al, Si, sulphate, Ca, Mg, Mn, U, Co, and Ni
[10]. An equilibrium reaction model that considers 72 aqueous complexation reactions was
first used to perform the speciation calculation for each data point to determine the
concentrations of individual species given the pH and the total aqueous concentrations of
nitrate, Na, K, Al, Si, sulphate, Ca, Mg, Mn, U, Co, Ni, and Cl. Based on the calculated
aqueous species concentrations, the saturation index was calculated for each of the 26
minerals considered and a decision was made to include only five precipitation-dissolution
reactions. Finally, soil buffering capacity was modeled with six ionization reactions of a
polyprotic acid (H4X) and a polyprotic base (Y(OH)2). Simulation results indicated good
agreements between experiments and theoretical predictions using the proposed reaction
network.
81
TOPICAL SESSION 4
Example 4: This example modeled bioremediation field experiments conducted at a
Uranium Mill Tailings Remedial Action (UMTRA) site using acetate amendment to stimulate
microbially mediated immobilization of uranium in the unconfined aquifer. Experiments at
the Rifle site showed that the growth of acetate-oxidizing Fe(III)-reducers dominated by
Geobacter sp., was accompanied by significant uranium removal from groundwater. An
important feature of these field experiments was the eventual onset of sulphate reduction,
which was characterized by a decrease in aqueous sulphate, near complete consumption of
acetate, and less efficient U(VI) removal from groundwater. A key observation from field
experiments at the Rifle site was that longer-term, post-biostimulation U(VI) removal from
groundwater was associated with longer periods of sulphate reduction. This led to the
inclusion of abiotic chemistry for the bioreduced U(IV), Fe(II), and sulphide products of the
principal terminal electron accepting processes (TEAPs), to address their potential roles in
long term uranium immobilization. The conceptual model was developed to facilitate
understanding of the principal processes and properties controlling uranium biogeochemistry.
The model included four TEAPs involving two pools of bioavailable Fe(III) minerals
(phyllosilicate, oxide), aqueous U(VI), and aqueous sulphate, two distinct functional
microbial populations (iron, sulphate reducers), as well as aqueous and surface complexation
and mineral precipitation and dissolution. The model assumes 1) co-metabolic uranium
bioreduction via active iron reducers, 2) the onset of sulphate reduction is controlled by a
bioavailable Fe(III) threshold, 3) iron, sulphate, and uranium TEAPs occur simultaneously
during sulphate reduction, and 4) there is no abiotic U(VI) reduction. The conceptual model
reflects findings from laboratory studies that during biostimulation, 90-99% of the Fe(III)
initially reduced is in the phyllosilicate clays [11] and biogenic Fe(II) resulting from
phyllosilicate iron reduction generally remains in the layer silicate structure. Simulated and
measured breakthrough at several locations down-gradient of the injection gallery show good
agreement.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The work is supported in part by the US Department of Energy under Grant DE-FG0204ER63916 with University of Central Florida.
REFERENCES
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
82
BACON, D.H., WHITE, M.D., MCGRAIL, B.P., Subsurface Transport Over Reactive
Multiphases (STORM): A General, Coupled, Nonisothermal Multiphase Flow, Reactive
Transport, and Porous Medium Alternation Simulator, Version 2, PNNL-13108, Pacific
Northwest national Laboratory, Richland, WA 9935 (2000).
FANG, Y., YEH, G.T., BURGOS, W.D., A Generic Paradigm to Model Reaction-Based
Biogeochemical Processes in Batch Systems. Water Resources Research 33 4 (2003) 10831118.
LICHTNER, P.C., Continuum formulation of multicomponent-multiphase reactive transport, In:
Lichtner, P.C., Steefel, C.I. and Oelkers, E.H. (Eds), Review in Mineralogy. Chapter 1, In:
Reactive Transport in Porous Media. Mineralogical Society of America, Washington, D. C.
(1996).
PRUESS, K., TOUGH2: A General Purpose Numerical Simulator for Multiphase Fluid and
Heat Flow, Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory Report LBL-29400, Berkeley, CA (1991).
STEEFEL, C.I., YABUSAKI, S.B., OS3D/GIMRT, Software for MulticomponentMultidimensional Reactive Transport: User’s Manual and Programmer’s Guide, PNL-11166,
Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, Richland, WA 99352 (1996).
YEH et al.
[6]
YEH, G.T., TRIPATHI, V.S., HYDROGEOCHEM: A Coupled Model of HYDROlogical
Transport and GEOCHEMical Equilibrium of Multi component Systems, ORNL 6371, Oak
Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, TN. 37831 (1990).
[7] YEH, G.T., SUN, J.T., JARDINE, P.M. et al., HYDROGEOCHEM 5.0: A Three Dimensional
Model of Coupled Fluid Flow, Thermal Transport, and HYDROGEOCHEMical Transport
through Variably Saturated Conditions Version 5.0. ORNL/TM-2004/107, Oak Ridge National
Laboratory, Oak Ridge, TN 37831 (2004).
[8] ZYVOLOSKI, G.A., ROBINSON, B.A., DASH, Z.V., et al., Models and methods Summary for
the FEHM Application. FEHM MMS SC-194. Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos,
New Mexico (1994).
[9] http://www.csm.ornl.gov/~g4p/chapman_1/isosurface.htm
[10] ZHANG, F., LUO, W., PARKER, J.C. et al., Geochemical reactions affecting aqueous-solid
partitioning metals during titration of uranium contaminated soil. Environmental Science and
Technology 42 21 (2008) 8007-8013.
[11] KOMLOS J., PEACOCK, A., KUKKADAPU, RK., Long term Dynamics of Uranium
Reduction/Reoxidation under Low Sulphate Conditions. Geochimica Et Cosmochimica Acta 72
(2008) 3603-3615.
83
ADVANCES IN THE APPLICATION OF ELECTRICAL TECHNIQUES FOR
SITE REMEDIATION
D.F. OSBORNE
Linkforce Pty Ltd,
Mawson Lakes, Australia
Abstract
Electrical techniques in site remediation have advanced over the past 10-15 years as a result of the
experience gained in their application to various types of waste and sites. The main advances have been in the
equipment design and construction combined with improvement in the understanding of the vitrification process.
An overview is given of the advances together with an account of an application to a particular remediation
problem.
1.
INTRODUCTION
GeoMelt is a technique that has been in commercial use since 1989. It was invented by
the Battelle Institute for the United States Department of Energy (DOE) for use in the ‘in situ’
treatment of radioactively contaminated sites. Until recently, the process was used exclusively
in a mobile form with the equipment being assembled on site. Now, permanent treatment
facilities have been established in which the contaminated soil is brought to the plant for
treatment – this is the case at the Japanese Daiei Kankyo facility.
The initial design was for fixed electrodes (initially six molybdenum electrodes) to be
drilled into the area to be treated. Then electricity was applied to the fixed electrodes to
promote the melting process. Over the years, the equipment has been modified with items
such as the electrodes being changed - with graphite collars fixed over molybdenum inner
rods. Nowadays, commercially available ‘off-the-shelf’ type graphite electrodes are used. The
number of electrodes has been reduced to four, and sometimes only two electrodes are used
for specific ‘in container’ type melts.
The ‘off-gas’ capture hoods were initially made from a heat resistant fabric but after a
fire they were replaced by hoods of fabricated stainless steel. These were effective but not
easy to assemble. Later, a change to modular type panel hoods was made; this allows ease of
assembly and reduces the requirements for lifting equipment on site to move the hoods
between melts.
Today the technology is used in different configurations (in situ, in container, staged
and planar (starting the melts subsurface)) and the basic technology has become a very
flexible and adaptable process capable of many different applications. Individual melts have
been achieved in excess of 1000 tons in total.
2.
PROCESS DESCRIPTION
GeoMelt vitrification uses graphite electrodes to supply alternating current from a
GeoMelt transformer through the electrodes and into the contaminated soil or waste being
treated. Gases generated by the vitrification process are captured in a hood covering the
treatment area and drawn through an ‘off-gas’ treatment system before being released to the
atmosphere.
The temperatures reached in the process can be as high as 2000º C. Organic materials in
the soil are destroyed and heavy metals and radionuclides are incorporated into the vitrified
product and immobilized.
85
TOPICAL SESSION 4
Substantial volume reduction is achieved, usually a minimum of 50% and, depending
on the contents of the soil/waste mixture, the volume reduction can be as high as 75-80%. Soil
is the normal medium to which the technique is applied, but when it is applied to materials
containing high levels of asbestos or fly ash, little or no soil is required in the melting process.
The off-gas treatment system used is varied depending on the waste being treated and
the regulatory requirements applicable to the project. Usually, the configuration consists of a
pre- or roughing filter, a thermal oxidiser (if required), a scrubber and mist eliminator, a
heater and high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) and/or carbon filters. Specific additional
requirements can be added if materials containing mercury and arsenic, for instance, are
encountered.
Electrodes
In Situ
Contaminated
Soil
Hood
Melt
Hood diagram in half for
clarity of process
In-Situ Process Configuration
Treatment Cell
Boundary
Staged Soil
and Wastes
Staged in Cell Process
Configuration
In-Container Process
Configuration
FIG. 1. Diagrams of the GeoMelt process application.
86
OSBORNE
3.
APPLICATIONS
GeoMelt has been applied to many varying types of waste containing organic and heavy
metal contaminants or combinations of radionuclides and mixed waste. Summary tables
(Tables 1 and 2) show previously treated waste types and radionuclides.
TABLE 1. SUMMARY OF SOME MATERIALS PREVIOUSLY TREATED
Heavy metals
Pb
As
Cd
Cr
Ni
Ba
Zn
Hg
Cu
Al
Fe
Nd
Rb
Liquid organics
PCBs
Dioxins
Furans
TCE
PCE
Benzene
Toluene
Acetone
Formaldehyde
Methylene chloride
Ethylene glycol
MEK
Carbon tetrachloride
Solid organics
Wood
Rubber
Asphalt
PVC
Polyethylene
Neoprene
Paper
Cotton
Polypropylene
DDT,DDD,DDE
TBT,RDX,HMX
Hexachlorobenzene
Ion exchange resins
Solid debris
Concrete
Steel plates
Structural steel
Tires
Drums
Rocks
Bricks
Clay pipe
Glass bottles
Ash
Tanks
The materials in Table 1 have been treated either as part of an overall waste stream or
individually, e.g. with items such as Hexachlorobenzene or ion exchange resins.
TABLE 2. EXAMPLES OF RADIONUCLIDES TREATED
Am-241
Ag-110m
Cs-134
Cs-137
Co-57
Co-58
Co-60
Eu-152
Eu-154
Eu-155
Mn-54
Ni-59
Pu-238
Pu-239
Pu-240
Ru-106
Sr-90
Sb-125
Tc-99
U-234
U-237
U-238
Zn-65
Zr-95
87
TOPICAL SESSION 4
4.
PROJECT EXAMPLE
The rehabilitation of the Maralinga nuclear test site is representative of contaminated
soil remediation at a large scale and in a remote location. The traditional in-situ technique was
applied; this allowed the greatest sized batch to be achieved.
Control Room & GeoMelt
Transformer
Offgas System
HV Generators
GeoMelt Hoods
Completed Melt
Maralinga Rehabilitation Project –
remote South Australia
FIG. 2. Layout of application at the Maralinga site (Taranaki burial pits).
The Maralinga site is a former nuclear weapons test range in South Australia used by
the British Government in the 1950s and 1960s for above-ground nuclear testing. Several
hundred experiments involving conventional explosives resulted in plutonium (Pu), uranium
(U), and beryllium (Be) being dispersed in the environment.
At the Taranaki area of Maralinga, 12 minor tests were performed that involved the
explosive dispersal of 22 kg of Pu, resulting in large amounts of contaminated debris and soil
that were placed in burial pits. The Taranaki pits were typically excavated by blasting in the
native limestone. Several years later, concrete caps were placed on tops of the pits.
The Cleanup of the Taranaki burial pits was part of the Maralinga Rehabilitation
Programme managed by the Commonwealth of Australia. In 1989, GeoMelt was identified as
the preferred technology for remediating the burial pits in a cooperative British/Australian
study by the Maralinga Technical Assessment Group. Confirmatory testing and radioactive
demonstrations were performed before dedicated equipment was designed and manufactured
for remediating the pits. The pits were believed to contain ~2 to 4 kg of Pu; a similar amount
of U; various metals including lead (Pb), barium (Ba), and beryllium (Be); and large amounts
of debris (e.g. massive steel plates, steel beams, lead bricks, barytes shielding bricks, cable,
and organic-based materials).
A mound of silica sand was placed over each pit, and the GeoMelt equipment was
positioned for treatment. The sand provided a level and uncontaminated base for workers to
prepare the system. Melting was initiated in the sand layer. The sand augmented the melt
chemistry by providing more glass-forming ions, which improved the chemical and physical
characteristics of the vitrified product.
88
OSBORNE
This project was completed in 1999 and achieved its primary objective of converting the
loose, friable, radioactive contamination in the pits into dense, hard, intrusion-resistant
vitrified masses, eliminating the long term hazards of subsidence or human intrusion. The
resulting vitrified monoliths of each pit were intrusively sampled and examined to
characterize the vitrified product and confirm the completeness of treatment.
Specific project results are as follows:
– No partitioning or elevated concentrations of Pu were found in any of the monoliths;
– There was no indication that Pu was present in the melted steel phase, when such a
phase was present at the base of the vitrified monoliths;
– Pu retention in the melts was >99.99%, which minimized the level of equipment
contamination and the radiological hazard to workers. The hoods and off-gas piping
did not require decontamination after any one melt;
– Samples of vitrified product from two of the full-scale melts were subjected to the
Product Consistency Test (PCT). The normalized release rates for the major oxides
from the 28-day tests were substantially <1 g/m2.day, with most release rates <0.1
g/m2.day. Long term leach rate measurements (4.5 years) established that the
normalized leach rates decline with time. The normalized leach rate for Pu decreased
by over 1000 times during the leaching period, demonstrating that the vitrified product
has outstanding leach resistance.
Vitrified Block – note electrode’s
embedded into the vitrified product.
FIG. 3. Vitrified monolith of what was previously a burial pit.
The costs associated with traditional methods of containing waste such as uranium mine
tailings are initially less than those of the GeoMelt process, but the ongoing costs of
maintenance, dewatering, monitoring and repair/replacement of the containment media are
substantially more than a permanent solution such as vitrification.
89
TOPICAL SESSION 4
Cost
Permanent Solutions
Traditional Containment Methods
Time
Construction/Treatment Phase
Ongoing Maintenance Phase
FIG. 4. Comparison of costs of remediation solutions.
5.
SUMMARY
Advances made in the GeoMelt process of electric vitrification since its initial
commercialization in 1989 have greatly increased its capability and flexibility. Projects such
as that at Maralinga clearly show that the GeoMelt process of vitrification can be used for
radioactively contaminated soil sites, such as mine tailings.
90
SITE REMEDIATION IN PRACTICE
A. VÁRHEGYI, G. FÖLDING, Z. BERTA , M. CSÖVÁRI
MECSEK-ÖKÓ Zrt,
Pécs, Hungary
Abstract
This paper describes the remediation of a former uranium mining area in Hungary. The work was carried
out using stringent quality controls and special attention was paid to the radiological survey during the cleanup
works on the roads, on pipe lines and yards, on the mill site and places used earlier for heap leaching.
Groundwater quality control and the related groundwater quality restoration were the most important aspects of
the post remediation phase which was aimed at the long term protection of the nearby drinking water aquifer.
The expenditure for the remediation was about 100 million US dollars. The estimated cost for long term
monitoring and water treatment is about 4 million US dollars/year.
1.
INTRODUCTION
Uranium mining and processing were developed in the southern part of the country in
the Mecsek Hills, near to the county town of Pecs. The uranium mining activity lasted from
1958 to 1997. Approximately 47 million tonnes of rock were mined from 5 shafts and 19
million tonnes of ore were processed using acid leaching. Approximately 7.2 million tonnes
of low-grade ore were heap leached by an alkaline process. The uranium mining and
processing was terminated in 1997 because of the high production cost. Remediation of the
site started immediately after the termination of the production and was practically finished by
2008.
The mine ore, after radiometric sorting, was divided into three grade-groups according
to its uranium content:
– Waste rock (U < 100 g/t), dumped into three major waste rock piles (WP1, WP2 and
WP3) and 6 smaller piles;
– Low grade ore (processed by alkaline heap leaching);
– Upgraded ore (processed in the mill using sulphuric acid leaching).
Elaboration of the remediation plan for the waste rock piles (WPs), heap leaching
residues, mill tailings, etc. started with the estimation of the quantity and quality of waste, the
composition of the seepage from the waste rock piles, the expected mine water composition
and groundwater contamination in the immediate vicinity of the WPs. Based on preliminary
site investigations and appropriate laboratory studies, field trials and feasibility studies, the
general remediation plan was compiled. The overall plan comprised 10 sub-projects according
to the type of work to be carried out. In the separate sub-projects, the main technical data and
schedules regarding the planned work were determined together with the arrangements for
quality assurance. The expenditure for the remediation was provided from the State budget.
During the remediation operations, particular attention was paid to the protection of the
groundwater quality.
2.
CHARACTERIZATION OF WASTE
Some important data for the characterization of solid waste are presented in Table 1. It
can be seen that the uranium content and other radiological characteristics of the waste are
much higher than those due to the naturally occurring radionuclides in the region; therefore
the waste had to be remediated. First of all, it had to be covered with non-radioactive earth to
91
TOPICAL SESSION 4
isolate it from the possible direct contact with humans and to reduce further pollution of the
environment.
The composition of the liquid waste is summarized in Table 2. The waters can be
divided into two main groups:
– Waters with elevated uranium concentration (mine water, seepage from the waste rock
piles);
– Groundwater with elevated dissolved solids (TDS) in the vicinity of the tailings ponds
(TPs).
Remediation measures included water treatment for removing the uranium and quality
restoration for groundwater in the vicinity of the tailings ponds. The groundwater restoration
was a task of great importance because the water aquifer is situated almost in the immediate
vicinity of the tailings ponds.
TABLE 1. CHARACTERIZATION OF THE ORIGINAL SOLID WASTE
Type of waste
Volume
(million tonne)
Uranium content
(g/t)
Gamma-dose rate
(mGy/h)
50
65
Radium
concentration
(Bq/g)
~0.6
~1.2
Waste rocks
Heap leaching
residues
Mill tailings
Background in
the region
19.2
7.2
20.3
68
~4-10
~12
~5*10-2
3-8*
~0.1-0.2
~0.5
~1
* Depending on the tailings pond area selected.
TABLE 2. COMPOSITION OF THE LIQUID WASTE
Type of water
U
TDS
pH Na
Ca
Mg
SO4
Cl
Ra
(mg/L) (mg/L)
(mg/L) (mg/L) (mg/L) (mg/L) (mg/L) (Bq/L)
8
1600
7.1 260
205
140
890
120
0.7
Mine water* (Shaft
N1 2001)
Contaminated
0.7
groundwater in the
vicinity of WP
(2001)
Contaminated
0.02
groundwater in the
vicinity of tailings
pond (1998)
1250
7.3 160
320
160
390
60
0.02
14 700
7.2 740
490
1580
6680
1500
0.06
* Including collected seepage from waste rock piles.
3.
SITE REMEDIATION AND MONITORING
3.1. Preliminary investigations
To determine the appropriate remediation measures it was necessary to carry out
preliminary investigations. It was considered that the determination of the water
contamination (groundwater and run-off waters) on and around the sites had highest priority.
For screening, e.g. on the tailings ponds site, a geophysical multi-electrode survey was used
92
VÁRHEGYI et al.
(Fig. 1). This measurement provided valuable information on the electric conductivity of the
soil, and consequently on the contamination of the groundwater with inorganic compounds
originating from the tailings water. This method proved to be very useful for determining the
extent of the contaminated area and the depth penetration of the inorganic contaminants from
the tailings ponds. Low resistive zones around the tailings ponds were found not only in the
shallow zones but also in deeper zones because of the penetration of highly contaminated
tailings water into these zones.
For the estimation of the amount of the contaminants in the groundwater, data from the
material balance of the mill process was used. Taking into account the amount of the
consumed acid (sulphuric acid for leaching, hydrochloric acid for the ion exchange process)
and the amount of the neutralizing agents (lime, dolomite of the processed ore, etc.) and some
other data, the loading of the tailings ponds with dissolved solids during the mill process was
calculated. On the basis of these data, the concentration of the total dissolved solids in process
water was estimated for the full period of the ore processing. The data are presented in Fig. 2.
These data show that on average the total dissolved solids in water was about 20 g/L
and in total about 700 thousand tonnes of dissolved compounds (mainly MgSO4, and NaCl)
have been discharged into the tailings ponds. The dispersion of these dissolved solids around
the tailings ponds was detected by means of the geoelectric survey.
3.2. Environmental monitoring
The environmental monitoring consisted of radiological, hydrological, geochemical,
geotechnical, and geophysical monitoring, as presented in Fig. 3.
93
TOPICAL SESSION 4
FIG. 1. Geophysical multi-electrode profiling of the tailings ponds site.
TDS
TDS in discharged tailings water
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
FIG. 2. TDS in process water discharged into the tailings ponds.
Radiological monitoring was essential during the cleanup of different areas (yards,
pipeline areas, roads, heap leaching sites, the mill site etc.)
Yearin order to meet the cleanup
standards. In practice, the excavation of the contaminated soil was carried out at the same
time as gamma-dose rate monitoring and the measurement of the specific activity of the soil.
The cleanup procedure was continued until the relevant standards were met.
The radiological monitoring was important also for the estimation of the equivalent
radiation dose to the population living in the vicinity of the remediated areas; this work was
carried out using an automatic monitoring station placed in the village.
Hydrological monitoring was essential for protecting the surface and ground water
quality. The results were used for the cleanup of the contaminated sites, the planning of
ground water restoration systems etc. The monitoring provided input data for the integrated
water management of the former uranium mining and ore processing site, allowing the
controlled discharge of all kinds of waters from the former uranium-mining site through one
94
TD
TD
VÁRHEGYI et al.
common discharge basin. There were 612 sampling points in 2007 from which 1472 samples
were collected and analyzed for radio-elements and other components.
Environmental Monitoring System
Soil
Water
Radiology
Radiology
(U, Ra, Th, dose)
Hydrology
(Chemical
pollution:CH,
acid,
trace
elements)
Geotechnic
(soil mechanics,
erosion)
(U, Ra)
Hydrology
Air
Biosphere
Radiology
Radiology
Radio activity
of the
aerosol,
(Chemical
pollution:
fallout,
Inorganic, CH,
Radon
progeny
(radio-elements in
vegetation)
Human
dosimetry,
and
(labour hygiene)
Trace elements,
Water level and
volume)
Geophysics
(soil movement,
geoelectric
probing )
FIG. 3. Scheme of the environmental monitoring system.
3.3. Basic methods of radiological and hydrological monitoring
– In situ measurements and investigations (ambient gamma dose rate, 222Rn, short-lived
radioactive aerosols etc., pH, Eh, electrical conductivity, etc.);
– Sampling and laboratory analyses of samples (soil, plant, aerosol, fall-out, specific
activity, gamma-spectrometry, U, Ra concentrations in water, chemical composition,
etc.);
– Automatic monitoring stations (dose components, different water parameters).
4.
WATER TREATMENT
An inevitable part of the remediation is water treatment. This consists of the treatment
of the mine water to remove the uranium (in the form of commercial concentrate) and the
95
TOPICAL SESSION 4
treatment of the extracted groundwater to reduce the total dissolved solids in the discharged
water. The methods used are described in some earlier publications (1-3).
REFERENCES
[1]
[2]
[3]
96
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY , Treatment of liquid effluents from
uranium mines and mills during and after operation. Report of a co-ordinated research project
1996-2000, IAEA-TECDOC-1419, Vienna (2004).
BÁNIK, J., et al., Water treatment issues at a former uranium mining site, In: Uranium
Production and Raw Materials for the Nuclear Fuel Cycle - Supply and Demand, Economics,
the Environment and Energy Security, Proceedings of an International Symposium held in
Vienna, 20–24 June 2005, 277-285, International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna (2006).
FÖLDING, G., et al., Post-closure water management practice on the former uranium mining
site in Hungary, Proceedings of the 10th IMWA Congress 2008, Ed. Nada Rapantova,
Published by VSB –Technical University of Ostrava (2008).
MONITORED NATURAL ATTENTUATION OF METALS AND
RADIONUCLIDES IN SOIL AND GROUNDWATER
M. DENHAM, K. VANGELAS
Savannah River National Laboratory,
Aiken, South Carolina,
United States of America
Abstract
Natural attenuation processes, which include a variety of physical, chemical, or biological processes, can
work to bring about the remediation of a contaminated site. Monitored natural attenuation (MNA) is a
remediation approach which relies on these processes. The United States Environmental Protection IAEA has
established a four-tier system for demonstrating that MNA is a viable solution for metal and radionuclide
contaminated sites. To meet the criteria specified by this guidance requires a fundamental understanding of how
geochemical conditions will change in the future. The United States Department of Energy has funded an applied
research initiative led by the Savannah River National Laboratory aimed at increasing the understanding of the
geochemical evolution of sites in the context of remediation. This paper describes the relevant regulatory
framework and the use of geochemical gradients established by plumes as a framework for understanding waste
site evolution.
1.
INTRODUCTION
Although it has been ten years since Monitored Natural Attenuation (MNA) first
became recognized as a viable remedy for groundwater remediation, there are relatively few
records of decisions involving MNA being implemented for sites with metal or radionuclide
contaminants. In the past, remediation has primarily consisted of attempts to remove
contaminants from the subsurface by excavation or ‘pump-and-treat’ systems. Increasingly
these approaches have come to be seen as inefficient and ‘in situ’ immobilization of
contaminants is now the favoured remedy at most sites. Whether explicitly stated or not, ‘in
situ’ remedies must ultimately rely on natural attenuation processes to keep contaminants
immobile; this is, in fact, the desired end-state of MNA.
A common misconception is that invoking Monitored Natural Attenuation after active
remediation is a means of abandoning the site without further obligation. To the contrary, the
use of MNA in a remediation strategy requires a long term commitment to the site and can be
a complicated process. Unlike organic contaminants that degrade, metals and radionuclides
can persist in the subsurface indefinitely. The exceptions are radionuclides with short halflives. However, uranium isotopes, plutonium isotopes, 99Tc, 129I, and many of the actinides
present at United States Department of Energy (USDOE) sites persist for thousands to
millions of years. The continued presence of these in the subsurface following active ‘in situ’
remediation requires site owners to prove, to the satisfaction of regulators and stakeholders,
that the contaminants will not be a threat to human health and the environment over long time
periods.
Three initiatives in the United States are directed toward facilitating the use of
Monitored Natural Attenuation in the context of metal and radionuclide contamination. The
United States Environmental Protection IAEA (USEPA) has issued two guidance documents
describing the level of proof expected for demonstrating that MNA will be effective and the
specific technical aspects that should be considered for selected metals [1, 2]. Forthcoming
documents from the USEPA are: a volume pertaining to MNA for selected radionuclides and
an official policy statement on the use of MNA for inorganic contaminants. The Interstate
Technology and Regulatory Council (ITRC) has convened a team to provide a framework for
site owners, regulators, and stakeholders to evaluate MNA as an option for metal and
97
TOPICAL SESSION 4
radionuclide contaminated sites. The third initiative, funded by the USDOE and led by the
Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL), is focused on developing approaches, tools,
and guidance that will facilitate achieving the required monitored natural attenuation endpoint for metal and radionuclide contaminated sites.
2.
REGULATORY HISTORY OF MONITORED NATURAL ATTENUATION IN THE
UNITED STATES
Natural attenuation strategies have been incorporated into environmental regulations
and technical guidance since the early 1990s. The early guidance involved the attenuation of
petroleum hydrocarbons; this was followed by guidance on chlorinated volatile organic
contaminants (CVOCs), and, most recently, guidance on metals and radionuclides. From a
technical perspective, the development of technical guidance has followed a logical
progression from contaminants most amenable to destruction by robust and simple
mechanisms to those that are not destroyed or for which destruction only occurs on the order
of geologic timeframes. Many organizations have produced technical guidance related to the
natural attenuation of petroleum hydrocarbons and CVOCs. In the United States, the policy
document that all natural attenuation based guidance documents are based upon is the USEPA
Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response (OSWER) Directive No. 9200.4-17P, titled
‘Use of Monitored Natural Attenuation at Superfund, RCRA Corrective Action, and
Underground Storage Tank Sites’ [3]. This document lays out the groundwork for all MNA
remedies. It defines MNA as:
“the reliance on natural attenuation processes (within the context of a carefully
controlled and monitored site cleanup approach) to achieve site-specific
remediation objectives within a time frame that is reasonable compared to that
offered by other more active methods. The ‘natural attenuation processes’ that
are at work in such a remediation approach include a variety of physical,
chemical, or biological processes that, under favourable conditions, act without
human intervention to reduce the mass, toxicity, mobility, volume, or
concentration of contaminants in soils or groundwater. These ‘in situ’ processes
include biodegradation, dispersion, dilution, sorption, volatilization, radioactive
decay, and chemical or biological stabilization, transformation, or destruction of
contaminants.”
Regarding inorganics (metals and radionuclides), USEPA [3] states that:
“natural attenuation of inorganic contaminants is most applicable to sites where
immobilization or radioactive decay is demonstrated to be in effect and the
process/mechanism is irreversible.”
The Directive also provides guidance in terms of specific objectives that need to be
considered for implementation of MNA.
The USEPA has subsequently issued two volumes that provide guidance for the
implementation
of
MNA
for
inorganic
contaminated
sites
http://www.epa.gov/ada/pubs/reports.html):
Volume 1 outlines the regulatory aspects of Metals/Radionuclides MNA and then
describes a tiered approach for implementation and the use of modelling in the tiered
screening process. After describing the chemical and microbiological controls over the fate of
inorganic contaminants, Volume 1 reviews general site characterization requirements for
Metals/Radionuclide MNA.
98
DENHAM, VANGELAS
Volume 2 discusses the contaminant-specific factors affecting the MNA of Arsenic,
Cadmium, Chromium, Copper, Lead, Mercury, Nickel, Nitrate, Perchlorate, Selenium, and
Zinc. Chapters are devoted to each of these and contain sections on Occurrence and
Distribution, Geochemistry and Attenuation Processes, Site Characterization, Long term
Capacity, and the application of Tiered Analysis for the particular contaminant.
A third volume on the MNA of radionuclides, including isotopes of Americium,
Caesium, Iodine, Plutonium, Radium, Radon, Strontium, Technetium, Thorium, and Uranium,
as well as Tritium, is in preparation.
The first three tiers in the approach for evaluating a site for MNA are progressive layers
of evidence that contaminants will not pose a future threat [1]. If the criteria of the first tier
are not met, MNA is not a viable option and the site owner can avoid the more complicated
and expensive analyses required in Tier 2. Likewise, the site owner would only advance to
collecting the additional data required for Tier 3, if the criteria of Tier 2 are met. The fourth
tier is the design of a long term monitoring system and a contingency plan in the event that
MNA fails.
The ITRC team on ‘Attenuation Processes of Metals and Radionuclides’ is currently
developing a framework and flowchart, based on the USEPA four-tiered approach, to guide
users through the process of evaluating MNA for metal and radionuclide contamination.
3.
THE USDOE APPLIED SCIENCE INITIATIVE
The USDOE applied science initiative is focused on improving understanding of the
geochemical evolution of waste sites contaminated with metals and radionuclides and its use
to increase the efficiency of remediation at these sites. It is fostering an approach to
remediation that begins with the recognition that the desired end-state of ‘in situ’ remediation
of metals and radionuclides is MNA. The approach encourages the idea that the
characterization of a site and the selection of a remedy should be consistent with the
geochemical evolution of the site.
If a site meets all of the criteria up to and including Tier 3 of the USEPA approach for
evaluating sites for MNA, then it has been sufficiently demonstrated that contaminants are
unlikely to be significantly remobilized in the future. To achieve this requires a fundamental
understanding of the future geochemical evolution of the site, since, with the exception of
radioactive decay, all other mechanisms of attenuation and enhanced mobility are highly
dependent on geochemical conditions within the aquifer.
To predict attenuation in the future is complicated because the factors controlling
attenuation evolve with time. A contaminant plume is a transient perturbation of natural
subsurface conditions that can change the chemistry, mineralogy, and microbiology within the
aquifer as the plume migrates. Over time, as the contamination source is depleted or
contained, the plume will eventually migrate to an exposure point or dissipate and background
uncontaminated groundwater will migrate through the zone traversed by the plume. The result
of this sequence will be the long term evolution of the chemical, mineralogical, and
microbiological conditions within the affected portion of the aquifer. As these overall
biogeochemical conditions evolve, attenuation processes of any contaminant metals and
radionuclides will change in rate and magnitude. Thus, the long term prediction of whether
natural attenuation processes can limit contaminant concentrations to below regulatory
standards at exposure points requires an understanding of the overall biogeochemical
evolution of the waste site.
One organizing principle to simplify the understanding of the overall biogeochemical
evolution of waste sites is that the most dynamic changes in contaminant attenuation occur at
biogeochemical gradients induced by the plume. Fig. 1 shows a cartoon of a plume emanating
from an industrial source at the surface. When the contaminant plume is introduced to the
99
TOPICAL SESSION 4
subsurface, a biogeochemical gradient is created at the leading edge of the plume, at the
interface of the contaminant plume and natural groundwater. Dilution of the plume, reaction
with aquifer minerals, adsorption of plume constituents, desorption of natural constituents,
and changes in microbiology can all occur at this gradient. In point of fact, different types of
gradients move at different rates, though all are driven by the same hydrodynamic forces. For
example, a leading gradient caused by dilution alone moves according to hydrodynamic
forces and is unimpeded by chemical reactions. In contrast, a pH gradient is impeded by the
buffering reactions associated with aquifer mineral dissolution and adsorption of free protons
(H+) to mineral surfaces. Likewise, a leading redox gradient can be impeded by
microbiological reactions and reaction with redox sensitive aquifer minerals.
FIG. 1. Cartoon showing a leading gradient at the front of a contaminant plume.
Trailing gradients form where natural up-flow groundwater meets the infiltrating plume
or enters the zone affected by the plume. As long as plume infiltration is relatively constant,
the trailing gradient is stationary. Once the plume flux from the vadose zone to the saturated
zone is eliminated or substantially reduced, the trailing gradient migrates into and through the
plume zone (Fig. 2). Trailing gradients are controlled by hydrodynamic forces, dilution,
reaction with plume-altered minerals, and the influx or elimination of nutrients to sustain
microbial growth.
FIG. 2. Cartoon showing a trailing gradient at the back end of a contaminant plume.
Examples of reactions with plume altered minerals are desorption of free protons from
plume zone minerals or oxidation of reduced minerals created within the plume zone.
One way in which consideration of biogeochemical gradients simplifies the long term
prediction of natural attenuation is that, for sites with multiple contaminants, the contaminants
can be grouped according to how their migration is controlled. Some contaminants will be
controlled only by dilution, some predominantly by pH, and others predominantly by redox
conditions. Large changes in contaminant mobility only occur across sharp gradients in these
factors. Thus, the attenuation of contaminants is controlled by the migration rates of these
gradients.
The other way in which consideration of biogeochemical gradients simplifies long term
prediction of natural attenuation is that it compartmentalizes characterization and modelling
into zones of importance. This is because large changes in mobility only occur across
controlling gradients. Characterization and modelling should be focused on the leading and
100
DENHAM, VANGELAS
trailing gradients, which are most important in controlling overall contaminant mobility.
Consider, for example, an acidic plume with contaminants that are predominantly controlled
by adsorption, which in turn is controlled by pH. It is more important to characterize what is
present and down flow of the leading pH gradient than what is between the leading and
trailing gradient. Likewise, it is more important to understand and model the processes
occurring in those parts of the aquifer in the vicinity of the gradients; less emphasis can be
given to parts of the aquifer between these gradients.
The use of geochemical gradients in the remediation of a waste unit at the Savannah
River Site is discussed in reference [4]. At the waste unit site there is an acidic plume
containing concentrations of uranium isotopes, 90Sr, and 129I that exceed regulatory limits.
A remediation system that is consistent with the evolution of the waste site has replaced a
costly ‘pump-and-treat’ system. The pH of groundwater passing through the gates of a hybrid
funnel-and-gate system is neutralized, resulting in stronger adsorption of 90Sr and uranium.
Essentially, an artificial pH gradient has been installed that accelerates the return of the
groundwater to its natural pH of 6; this system will be active until the natural trailing pH
gradient reaches the funnel-and-gate. At this point, additional treatment will not be required
and the desired end-state of MNA will be achieved. An injectable amendment to immobilize
129I in a way that is consistent with the evolution towards higher pH has been developed by
SRNL and field testing is currently cleanup.
REFERENCES
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION IAEA, Monitored Natural Attenuation
of Inorganic Contaminants in Ground Water Volume 1 - Technical Basis for Assessment,
EPA/600/R-07/139 (2007).
UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION IAEA, Monitored Natural Attenuation
of Inorganic Contaminants in Ground Water Volume 2 - Assessment for Non-Radionuclides
including Arsenic, Cadmium, Chromium, Copper, Lead, Nickel, Nitrate, Perchlorate, and
Selenium, EPA/600/R-07/140 (2007).
UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION IAEA, Use of Monitored Natural
Attenuation at Superfund, RCRA Corrective Action, and Underground Storage Tank Sites,
Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response (OSWER) Directive 9200.4-17P (1999).
DENHAM, M., VANGELAS, K., Biogeochemical gradients as a framework for understanding
waste site evolution, Remediation Journal 19 5-17 (2008).
101
SUMMARY OF SESSION 4
V. Adams
United States of America
INNOVATIVE TECHNOLOGIES IN ENVIRONMENTAL REMEDIATION
This session contained seven presentations concerned with technologies for use in
environmental remediation with emphasis on some innovative approaches.
The first presentation provided an overview of the science and technology behind the
application of cover systems in the remediation of contaminated sites. It was pointed out that
no universal solution is available. Moreover, if remediation is not planned in the initial stages
of an operation, the available options will decrease and costs will increase significantly. The
involvement of stakeholders in the planning process is essential for a successful project. The
main factor affecting the long term performance of dry covers is erosion and, because of that,
it is critical to observe the potential interactions between vegetation, the cover material, the
waste and the associated transport mechanisms (gas and water) in developing an appropriate
cover design. This is an area where more guidance could usefully be provided by international
organizations to Member States.
The use of bioremediation as a technique to remediate contaminated groundwater was
reviewed in the second presentation. The remediation of groundwater contaminated by metals
and radionuclides involves the conversion of the contaminants into more complex states,
sorption, precipitation, or valence state changes at multiple scales. For the successful
application of bio-remediation, an integrated approach involving site characterization and
monitoring (using hydro-geological, geochemical, geophysical and microbiological methods
supported by mathematical modelling) is needed. It has been demonstrated that for the long
term remediation of uranium contaminated sites, organic carbon should be supplied naturally
to offset continuous influxes of dissolved oxygen. This technique may be the only viable
solution for deep and widely dispersed plumes of heavy metals and radionuclides, which are
otherwise inaccessible. It can be used for complex mixtures of contaminants provided that
appropriate microorganisms are employed.
In the third presentation, the technique of Monitored Natural Attenuation was described.
The technique is gaining acceptance by regulatory bodies in the context of remediation of
contaminated groundwater. It was highlighted that the approach must not be seen as a ‘do
nothing option’. On the contrary, justification for the adoption of this strategy depends
heavily on appropriate modelling of the fate and transport of pollutants in groundwater. It was
pointed out that the forecasting and monitoring strategies need to be discussed with the
relevant stakeholders to ensure that the predictions and their limitations are well understood.
The strategy is gaining acceptance worldwide because the costs of treating water over long
periods of time have been shown to be prohibitively high. The US Environmental Protection
IAEA is making available guidance on the use of this approach.
The fourth presentation described innovative mathematical modelling approaches
applied to environmental remediation. The presenter emphasized that the use of mathematical
models based on Kd approaches can lead to very conservative estimates and, instead, reactive
geochemical transport modelling should be used wherever possible. Good interaction between
proponents and regulators is a critical issue and mutual understanding about the overall
simulation details must exist.
Vitrification, as a means of immobilizing and isolating contaminated soil zones, has
been used at various locations in the world. The fifth presentation described the improvements
that have taken place in the technique over the last 10-15 years. These improvements have
103
SUMMARY OF SESSION 4
been achieved through its application to various problems and from an increased
understanding of the melting process. It was argued that the technique avoids many of the
problems of other remediation approaches by providing an almost ‘permanent’ solution that
does not require active maintenance. Furthermore, the public is said to be convinced by the
technique. The costs, while initially higher than other techniques, are said to become
comparable or less over time because of the absence of the need for maintenance or storage.
Mitigative approaches are now being applied to address the safety issues which were
associated with use of the technique in the past, e.g. incidents involving steam explosions
caused by groundwater heating.
The final presentation described the remediation of an actual uranium mining site in
Hungary. Restoration of rock piles, ponds and heap leaching sites was necessary. The steps
needed to reduce radiation levels on the site, roads, pipelines and in groundwater to
acceptable values were described.
In all of the presentations, the importance of stakeholder involvement was emphasized.
The confidence of stakeholders, including the affected public, must be obtained when
applying the various techniques described in this session.
104
LIFE CYCLE PLANNING AND STAKEHOLDER ISSUES IN ENVIRONMENTAL
RESTORATION
(TOPICAL SESSION 5)
Chairperson
M. PAUL
Germany
BALANCING THE URANIUM PRODUCTION CYCLE: CENTRAL ASIA AS A
CASE STUDY
A.T. JAKUBICK*, D.R. METZLER*, P.WAGGITT*, R. EDGE**
*
**
Uranium Mining and Remediation Exchange Group (UMREG)
IAEA, Vienna, Austria
Abstract
This paper examines the lessons learned from studies of the status of uranium mining and milling legacy
sites in the countries of Central Asia. A review is given of the condition of the sites, of the potential risks
associated with them and of the remediation needs. Drawing on experiences from around the world, guidance is
given on how to avoid some of the problems of the legacy sites when entering into new uranium production
programmes.
1.
URANIUM PRODUCTION LEGACY SITES AND WHAT THEY TEACH US
REGARDING MANAGEMENT OF THE URANIUM PRODUCTION CYCLE
1.1. Introduction
During the Cold War era the global uranium production industry generated huge
volumes of radioactive mining and processing waste and caused a degradation of land and
surface and ground water resources on an unprecedented scale.
The end of the Cold War coincided with a period of low uranium prices. As a
consequence, several of the companies which generated these legacies went out of business,
leaving the former production sites unremediated. In most cases this was because there were
no regulations regarding remediation and long term safety and no requirements to deposit
remediation funds.
In response to the increase in environmental awareness of this problem, in the period
from 1989 to the early 1990s, governments in several countries deployed large scale
programmes for mitigating the liabilities caused by the uranium industry. The most well
known of these programmes are:
– The US Department of Energy’s Uranium Mill Tailings Remedial Action (UMTRA)
Programme;
– The Wismut Remediation Programme of the German Federal Ministry of Economics;
– Programmes in Canada (e.g. the National Uranium Tailings Programme and
decommissioning at Elliot Lake and elsewhere) and Australia (e.g. Rum Jungle); and
– The European Commission’s multi-country Phare pilot projects for remediation of the
uranium legacy sites in Central and Eastern European Countries.
1.2. Analysis of the unit remediation costs
Taking the year 1992 (i.e. 3 years after end of the Cold War) as a baseline for comparison, an
analysis of the above ‘old’ remediation programmes provides the remediation costs per unit of
‘yellow cake’ production, Table 1 [1, 2, 3].
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TOPICAL SESSION 5
TABLE 1. TOTAL PRODUCTION AND UNIT COSTS OF REMEDIATION PER
URANIUM PRODUCTION (IN ORDER OF INCREASING CUMULATIVE
PRODUCTION)
Country
Sweden
Slovenia
Spain
Hungary
Gabon
Namibia
Australia
South Africa
Germany (Wismut)
Canada
USA (UMTRA, Title I)
USA (UMTRA, Title II)
Cumulative production by end of Unit remediation costs
1992 (metric tonnes of U3O8)
(US $ / kg U3O8)
200
89.0
379
80.5
3 777
11.0
19 970
3.7
21 446
1.2
53 074
0.9
54 225
1.3
143 305
0.5
232 000
22.6
257 702
0.3
56 000
32.4
254 000
1.0
Table 1 indicates that the unit cost of remediation (except for a few outliers) generally
decreases with the volume of production. However, a more detailed look reveals that beyond
production size, the unit remedial costs are affected by a series of other factors. In the case of
large remediation programmes, the indicators are based on average remediation costs, which
depend on the range of variation of the individual project costs. For instance, the costs for
Uranium Mill Tailings Remedial Action (UMTRA) Project Title I sites in the United States
are based on 22 tailings remediation projects (i.e. on a large number of projects dealing with
the remediation of the tailings ponds only), the costs of which vary from US $2.6 to US $375
per kg of U3O8.
The WISMUT Remediation Programme comprised the full scale of uranium mining and
processing wastes remediation; it included remediation of underground mines, an open pit
mine, waste rock dumps, tailings ponds, area remediation, decommissioning and demolition.
The programme costs (approximately US $6.2 billion) also included compensation for
damages caused during the period of production, social mitigation and corporate restructuring.
The mines Rudnik Žirovski Vrh, RŽV (Slovenia) and Ramstad (Sweden) can be used as
examples of small projects. At RŽV, approximately 380 te of uranium were produced from
1984 to 1990 and approximately US $ 36 million was spent on closeout and remediation
(until 1992). Accordingly, the unit costs were approximately US $80 per kg of U3O8. These
costs are at the upper end of the unit costs in Table 1. Although the project in Ramstad is
comparable in terms of total production (200 te U) and remediation costs (approximately US
$89 per kg of U3O8), the technical comparison is flawed because Ramstad was an open pit
mine and RŽV, an underground mine.
Thus, the ‘real’ unit costs of U production and remediation depend on the characteristics
of the specific site and on the design selected and agreed upon (with regulator and
stakeholders) for implementation.
2.
ASSESSMENT OF PRIME LEGACY SITES OF URANIUM PRODUCTION IN
CENTRAL ASIA
Based on the results and observations during the International Atomic Energy Agency’s
(IAEA) Technical Cooperation Regional Project on Monitoring and Assessment of the
Uranium Production Legacy Sites in Central Asia, 2005 – 2008, a preliminary expert opinion
is provided in Table II on the prime uranium legacy sites in the region. In spite of the IAEA
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JAKUBICK et al.
Regional Programme and numerous other international programmes, there is still a shortage
of reliable and systematic measurements from the Central Asian legacy sites. For this reason,
the characterization and comparison of the legacy sites and facilities cannot be based on
‘classical’ Environmental/Radiological Impact Assessments (EIA). The assessment in Table
II goes beyond environmental and radiological aspects, taking into account ‘politically’
justified remediation criteria as well as cross-boundary and socio-economic impacts and
possible economic benefits from re-treatment of legacy waste for recovery of valuable
constituents (Au, Ag, Mo, V, rare earth element residues, etc.).
Although qualitative in nature, the structure of Table II follows the principles of risk
assessment:
Risk = Likelihood x Consequences
where
Likelihood or Probability is
(Frequency of impact) x ((Frequency of failure events) / (Lifetime of waste facility))
Frequency of Impact = How often the release of contaminants occurs
and
Consequences or Impact includes: Severity (how much contamination is released);
Extent (how many people are affected, size of territory involved etc.); and, Duration (of
damage, exposure after release and/or cumulative effect of continuous small releases)
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TABLE 2. ASSESSMENT OF PRIME URANIUM PRODUCTION LEGACY SITES IN
CENTRAL ASIA
Country: Kazakhstan, Kz
Vulnerability and
Potential impact
likelihood of release
Robust piles; direct
Steady local accumulation of
radiation and wind
contaminants from seepage
erosion prevented by
and discharge in soil,
remediation
aquifer(s) and river sediments
Seasonal release of
Geomechanical damages to
contamination into
open pit mines
ground water
Contaminated water left in
Sustainability of
open pits
remediation results
Seasonal exposure of summer
needs regular
house residents using
maintenance
contaminated water for
flooded open pit mines irrigation
left unremediated
Koshkar Ata:
Stable TP
Local accumulation of
Tailings pond (TP) Contaminants release
contamination in soil due to
on the Caspian
due to dusting from
continuous dusting
Sea, near Aktau
the dry tailings surface No public exposure due to
Hydrogeology of site
long distance from Aktau
prevents leakage from TP is an obstacle to
TP
development of town to a sea
Scrap metal
side resort
scavenging prevented
by a concrete cover in
parts of TP
Stepnogorsk TP
TP in operation and
Local accumulation of
at Aksu:
under operational
contamination in soil due to
3 compartments
monitoring
continuous dusting, occasional
filled to 95% with Contaminants release
seepage and leakage through
legacy tailings
from the dry tailings
base of TPs
surface due to dusting Leakage from TP does not
Responsibility for
reach the deep ground water
legacy tailings unclear No public impact
Site and waste
facilities
Sites in N, E and S
Kazakhstan:
Mines, ore and
mine waste piles*
*(national
remediation
programme;
completion in
2010)
110
Remedial measures
needed
Assess
contamination
release via water
pathway
Establish long term
monitoring and
maintenance
programme
Assess
contamination
release via air
pathway
International peer
review prior to
remedial works
Assess
contamination
release via air
pathway
Enforce legal
commitment to
legacy remediation
JAKUBICK et al.
Site and waste
facilities
Mailuu Suu:
Mine and mine
waste, tailings
piles
Ak Tuz:
Mine and mine
waste, 4 tailings
ponds
Min Kush:
Mine and mine
waste
TPs:
Tuyuk Suu,
Taldy Bulak
Orlovka:
TPs
Country: Kyrgyzstan, Kg
Vulnerability and
Potential impact
likelihood of release
Tailings piles prone to Threat of damming up of river
sliding on mountain
and contamination of site
slopes; Some relocated eliminated
and/or confined
Assessment of radiation
Release probability
exposure insufficient
aggravated due to
potential earthquakes
Failure of some TPs
Animal grazing at
likely due to
contaminated site
questionable dam
Potent. ‘tailings flow’ would
stability and neglected damage and contaminate the
maintenance
downstream plains
Water diversion canals Release would cause radiation
not functional
exposure of local population
Release probability
Potential contamination of the
aggravated by seasonal transboundary Chu River
surface water runoff
Potential dispute with Kz
from mountains and/or Potential for tailings reearthquakes
treatment
Potential acid mine
Increased contamination due to
drainage (AMD) may
AMD would limit use of mine
enhance contaminants water for irrigation
release in mine water
Potential ‘tailings flow’ after
discharge
dam failure at Tuyuk Suu
Tuyuk Suu:
would damage and
Probability of
contaminate the river valley
overtopping and loss
below Min Kush
of containment likely
Radiation exposure of
due to a landslide,
population at Min Kush
seasonal surface runoff mainly due to use of
from the mountains
radioactive ash for insulation
and earthquake
of houses
Taldy Bulak: Failure
Potential tailings release at
of crucial drainage
Taldy Bulak would
pipe under load of
contaminate a small,
tailings and seasonal
uninhabited mountain valley
mountain runoff
without regular
maintenance very
likely
Water diversion canals Potential tailings release would
not functional
damage and contaminate the
Stability of TP
transboundary Chu River
Burdinskoye
Potential dispute with Kz.
questionable
Potential for tailings retreatment
Remedial measures
needed
Completion of
remediation in
agreement with
radiation safety
standards
Enforce site security
Perform EIA
Remediate TPs
Regular maintenance
and monitoring
Re-treatment to be
made conditional on
remediation
Testing for AMD
potential; EIA
Feasibility study of
Tuyuk Suu
remediation options:
(a) In situ
remediation with
regular maintenance
(b) relocation of
tailings
Taldy Bulak:
thorough
maintenance
programme
EIA
Feasibility study of
remediating TP
Burdinskoye
Monitoring and
maintenance
Re-treatment to be
made conditional on
remediation
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TOPICAL SESSION 5
Site and waste
facilities
Degmay (near
Chkalovsk):
Tailings pond
(TP)
Taboshar:
Open pit mine
Mine waste, Low
grade U-ore pile
Tailings
112
Country: Tajikistan, Tj
Vulnerability and
Potential impact
likelihood of release
Dry tailings surface
Steady local accumulation of
exposed to wind
contaminants in soil due to
erosion
continuous dusting
Leaky base of TP and
Continuous leakage of
steady release of
contaminants in ground water;
contaminants
Extensive contamination of
aquifer(s); Downstream
distance to Syr Darya River 9
km
Radiation exposure of local
population due to use of
contaminated ground water,
scavenging of scrap metal and
animal grazing on
contaminated site
Potential disputes with Uz due
to contamination of
transboundary Syr Darya River
Continuous discharge
Continuous exposure of
from flooded open pit
population by use of
mine through
contaminated discharge from
dewatering tunnels on the open pit due to lack of
outskirts of town
alternatives
Steady erosion of
Steady accumulation of
unprotected U-ore pile contamination of the local
by wind and runoff
creeks and flood plains on the
water
site due to release of
Seasonal release of
particulates from pile and
highly contaminated
discharge from tailings
seepage through
Potential AMD would
damaged and
fundamentally affect remedial
inadequate tailings
strategy
covers
Animal grazing on site
Potential AMD in
Partial use of contaminated
tailings would enhance materials for construction
contaminants release
Remedial measures
needed
EIA; assessment of
ground water
contamination and
impact on Syr Darya
River
Feasibility study of
remediating TP
Installation of an upto-date ground water
monitoring system
Treatment of water
discharging from
open pit
Enforcement of site
security
Testing of tailings
for AMD
EIA
Feasibility study for
a complex
remediation plan
International peer
review prior to
remedial works
JAKUBICK et al.
Site and waste
facilities
Cherkasar 2:
Mine and mine
waste
Yangiabad:
Mine and mine
waste
Country: Uzbekistan, Uz
Vulnerability and
Potential impact
likelihood of release
Abandoned mine
Contaminants discharge from
works present a safety shaft into local river
hazard
Animal grazing on
Open shaft allows
contaminated site
water discharge and
Use of radioactive materials
radon exhalation
for construction in town
Perimeter wall allows
Economic depression of
access to site
former mining town
Abandoned mine
Contaminants discharge from
presents a safety
mine into local river
hazard and allows
Potential radiation exposure
water and radon
due to unsecured access to
discharge
mine and waste rock piles
Uncovered mine waste
piles exposed to wind
and water erosion
Remedial measures
needed
EIA; assess in-door
radon levels;
Feasibility study for
remediation
Improve site security
Educate local
population
Monitor site
EIA
Feasibility study for
remediation
Improve site security
Educate local
population
Monitor site
The assessment in Table 2 shows that the 5 priority (most risky) legacy sites/facilities in
Central Asia are the:
– Degmay tailings pond,
– Taboshar site,
– Tailings ponds no. 2 and 4 at the Ak Tuz site,
– Burdinskoye tailings pond, and
– Tuyuk Suu tailings pond at the Minkush site.
The remediation priorities of these sites/facilities are justified (in addition to the local
radiological risk) at Degmay by the ongoing release of contaminants into the ground water
and the closeness of the site to the Syr Darya River, at Taboshar by the extensive use of the
contaminated water from the open pit mine by the population, by the high concentration of
contaminants released from the low grade uranium ore pile and tailings into the creeks and by
the central role the flooded open pit mine would play in any remediation strategy designed for
the site. Security of the tailings piles at the Ak Tuz site primarily depends on the water
diversion works, which are not functional; the dams at TP2 and TP4 are in a badly
deteriorated state and the site is subject to a significant risk of seismic events and excessive
water runoff from the mountains. A potential release of tailings in the form of a slurry wave
would severely affect the agricultural plains downstream of the site and the transboundary
Chu River. The same arguments apply at the Orlovka site and to a lesser degree at the
Minkush site.
Only localized impacts can be expected at the Cherkasar and Yangiabad sites.
Nonetheless, these sites should also be the subject of a detailed environmental impact
assessment and a monitoring and maintenance programme should be established. The major
tailings impoundment at Navoi in Uzbekistan, containing large volumes of uranium legacy
tailings, is in operation but is presently receiving non-radioactive ‘gold’ tailings. Although the
‘gold’ tailings discharge regime is adjusted to serve the remediation of the legacy tailings, the
long term performance of this remediated site warrants an international peer review.
The quantification of the specific risk factors for each site and the calculation of the
health and environmental impacts is a task to be tackled in the preparatory phase of the
respective remediation projects. From a pragmatic point of view, it should be sufficient to
assume that a waste facility is safe if the risk = {[(failure × release) probability] × impact} is
in compliance with the regulatory requirements of the respective country. To reduce risk
113
TOPICAL SESSION 5
levels to as low as reasonably achievable, it is a good policy to follow existing internationally
recommended procedures and standards for the safe management or remediation of the waste
facilities. The maintenance of safety at the legacy sites requires the establishment of long term
legacy sites management programmes (for contaminated water treatment, site maintenance
and monitoring, etc.) in each country.
3.
OPTIMIZATION OF THE URANIUM PRODUCTION CYCLE
One of the most important lessons learned from the completed remediation
programmes/projects is that prevention is less costly than the creation of new legacy sites and
that minimization of waste generation is the best uranium production strategy.
Whenever a new uranium mine development is evaluated it is important to evaluate the
costs of the whole uranium production cycle (UPC) which comprises all the activities
involved, from exploration, feasibility studies, environmental impact studies, development of
production facilities, mining and processing through to, decommissioning, remediation and
post-remedial management of the sites (i.e. from cradle to grave). Environmental issues
arising at all stages of the cycle are an integral part of the UPC. Consequently, responsible
decisions must be based on cost/benefit calculations derived for the lifetime costs of the entire
UPC. At major decision making points, this includes taking into account any requests of the
legitimate stakeholders, in order to obtain a ‘social licence’ from the public in addition to all
the necessary legal permissions and authorizations.
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TABLE 3. OPTIMIZATION OF THE PRODUCTION/WASTE GENERATION IN THE
URANIUM PRODUCTION CYCLE
Stage
No.:
1
2
Uranium production
(Goal: Maximization of production and
revenue)
Exploration →Resources
Pre-feasibility assessment
Detailed exploration →Reserves
Feasibility assessment
Design of mining and processing options
Planning of operations
3
Mining of ore
4
Ore processing →
‘yellow cake’(U3O8)
5
Closure planning
Decommissioning and demolition
6
a) Remedial preparation:
Design and planning; target levels
according to clearance criteria and
planned utilization;
b) Remedial works and water treatment
c) Regulatory clearance
d) Assignment of long term institutional
control of the legacy site
Waste generation, discharges and spills
(Goal: Minimization of waste, risk and
expenses)
Segregation of radioactive (e.g. ore samples,
cores) and conventional waste and disposal
EIA and reference environmental baseline
For each option: Assessment of waste
generation, discharges, risks and associated costs
over the lifetime of the facility
Contamination of land, water and waste
Monitoring of operations and baseline
Adjustments and continuous optimization
Contamination of land, water and waste
Monitoring of operations and baseline
Continuous optimization and adjustments
Segregation of generated radioactive/nonradioactive waste → orderly storage
Monitoring of operations and baseline
a) EIA of long term impacts for each option,
including water treatment requirements
b) Monitoring of works and baseline
c) Reclaimed land utilization; provision of
clean water
d) Long term stewardship and maintenance
(LTSM): legacy site management and
supervision of confinement integrity
The minimization of waste generation (and, thus, of the health, environmental and
socio-economic risks) cuts across the whole uranium production cycle and solutions must
emerge from actions at each stage of the cycle. Although corporate commitment is crucial, the
involvement of the employees at each stage should be solicited and their proposals, if
promising, implemented in the planning. It is assumed that production management is carried
out at each stage as efficiently as possible, but the decision making should include both
prevention and minimization criteria and be an integral part of corporate operations that link
the production cycle throughout the corporate planning process.
3.1
The effect of a lifetime cost/benefit assessment on decision making: an example
To be able to decide during the project preparation (the design, development and
engineering stage) from among the options available for the development of a new mine/
processing site or remediation of a legacy site, it is essential to make the comparison on the
basis of the lifetime costs. Sub-optimal design stage decisions are difficult to correct after
implementation of the works and can result in cost differences of 10s to 100s millions of
USD. For instance, using a probabilistic risk assessment for comparison of wet tailings
remediation (such as implemented at Elliot Lake, Ontario, Canada) with dry tailings
remediation (such as implemented by Wismut in Saxony and Thuringia, Germany) it was
shown that the initial investment cost advantage of a wet remediation can be entirely reversed
when the post- remedial phase is included in the assessment, as shown in Fig. 1 [4].
115
TOPICAL SESSION 5
The case study is based on the situation of the Helmsdorf tailings pond in Germany. The
Helmsdorf tailings pond contains approximately 50 million tonnes of tailings. It is an
upstream, valley type of impoundment. In 1992, the main dam was 1800 m long and 59 m
high and did not meet the safety standards for water retaining structures. In the case of a
complete dam failure, 6 million m3 of pond water and 15 – 30 million m3 of tailings slurry
would have been released containing, among other contaminants, 80 tonnes of uranium and
600 tones of arsenic. Approximately 1000 inhabitants would have been affected by the slurry
wave directly, and approximately 6500 people would have been affected by the damming up
of the Mulde river. An area of approximately 1000 hectares would have been damaged and
contaminated.
100
95
80
65
Percentiles
60
“Wet” Tailings Remediation
Remediation
“Dry” Tailings Remediation
40
Comparison based on case
of the Helmsdorf tailings
pond, Wismut, Germany
20
0
0
250
Initial investment costs
500
750
1000
1250
2500
2750
Million Euro
FIG. 1. Example of increase of cumulative probabilities of equivalent costs for maintenance,
damages and mitigations over the lifetime of a tailings pond for wet and dry tailings
remediation options in a low to moderately seismic zone (based on the Helmsdorf tailings
pond, Wismut, Germany)[4].
After having worked out the risk-cost relationship for the entire lifetime of the
Helmsdorf tailings pond (Wismut, Germany), a remediation leading to a dry landscape proved
to be both safer and more economic than the ‘wet’ remediation option, which had lower initial
investment costs.
Both technical options were feasible except for the long term risk management. Because
the regulator and the main stakeholder (the local community that would be impacted in case
of a failure) requested a safety performance of 95%, the initial cost advantage of a wet
remediation option was lost because in the range above the 65% safety level, the cost/benefit
ratio of the dry remediation was considerably more favourable. This, however, does not mean
that the wet remediation is, in all cases, worse. Unlike the Elliot Lake site, the Helmsdorf site
has a history of seismic activities that made it imperative to design for a 95% safety
performance.
As demonstrated, fundamental decisions - irrespective of whether it concerns the
development of a mine, processing plant, waste management or waste containment facility should only be made on the basis of full lifetime costs.
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JAKUBICK et al.
4.
REGULATORY CHALLENGES OF THE NEW URANIUM MINING PROJECTS IN
CENTRAL ASIA
The orderly management of the uranium production cycle requires that an appropriate
legislative and regulatory framework, a responsible regulatory IAEA and national policies,
programmes and plans are in place in this regard.
In view of the lessons learned from the legacy sites, the rush to develop new uranium
mines in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan presents a considerable challenge for the existing
legislative and regulatory systems. The regulators in these countries have to realize that it is
not sufficient to rely on ‘end-of-the-pipe’ regulations. Instead, the regulatory policy should
aim to ensure that uranium mining companies consider and manage potential environmental
liabilities as part of their fundamental business practice and ensure that these activities are
accounted for in both the project financing and plans submitted for approval. The costing of
the projects must be based on the lifetime costs of the uranium production cycle.
After closure of most of the conventional uranium mines in Central Asia in 1995, the
new mining projects focused on in-situ-leach mining (ISL) for uranium. During the last
decade, ISL mining has been continuously growing in the region because of the low capital
expenditure required and because it can exploit low grade ore deposits. Besides economic
advantages, compared to conventional mining, the ISL process generates little waste and has
only a small impact on the surface. Current ISL plants use an ‘enclosed system’ for the
recovery and ion exchange process steps thereby reducing the possibilities of radon release;
furthermore, vacuum dryers are used (rather than higher temperature calciners) with little, if
any, particulate emissions. Taking into account all these advantages, a further growth of ISL
mining in Central Asia can be expected over the coming years.
From a long term perspective, however, there is a need in Central Asia to give greater
attention to the prevention of aquifer degradation and the protection of scarce ground water
resources. ISL requires that mining operators have good control of the injection and recovery
flows and therefore a good monitoring system for the well-field is essential. For this reason,
cautious ISL operators install, in addition to monitoring wells in the aquifers below and above
the mined unit, observation wells in the well field itself (trend wells) to obtain a better control
of the dynamics in the mined unit. In addition, these wells can act as an ‘early warning’
system. Unfortunately, the transfer of the most modern ISL technologies to Kazakhstan and
Uzbekistan has not been matched by the introduction of up-to-date ground water monitoring
instruments and methods.
Experience from Kazakhstan shows that, due to the convenient geology of the ISL
aquifers, there is no immediate need to remediate the mined units afterwards; the acidic
conditions in the units become neutralized relatively quickly. In this connection, it should be
noted that the required environmental impact assessment and monitoring for ISL facilities
places the same requirements as those applied to conventional mills (i.e. the aquifers are
considered as receptors instead of being assessed as a mined medium). The remediation bond
can accordingly be kept very low (sometimes less than USD 1 million per ISL field).
Even in the case where the leached-out ISL field really does not require any
remediation, the regulators would be well advised to request the installation of some
monitoring wells in the abandoned mining fields to observe the rate of reinstatement of
natural conditions in the aquifers. The natural buffering capacity of the mined aquifer can
come to an end with the progress of ISL from mining unit to mining unit.
The return of the aquifer to natural conditions or restoration to conditions consistent
with the original designated use of the groundwater is essential for long term use. If needed,
the restoration of the ‘mined out’ units is usually done in stages. This involves pumping of
residual fluids from the well field and conventional treatment of the fluid; the radioactive
constituents, primarily radium-226, are removed by standard methods, such as barium117
TOPICAL SESSION 5
sulphate precipitation, reverse osmosis, etc., and disposed of subsequently as a small volume
of naturally occurring radioactive material (NORM) residue.
In view of the ever increasing withdrawal of water for agricultural purposes in Central
Asia, the economics of water resources management is bound to change drastically in the near
future. From a macroeconomics point of view, when considering the revenues generated from
U3O8 production by ISL it should be borne in mind that it takes, on average, approximately
one litre of water to produce one calorie from food crops.
To achieve the remediation of the numerous legacy sites and to master the present
uranium ‘boom’ in a balanced way, it will require pragmatic policies, programmes and plans
at the policy making level, a well established legislative framework and effective regulatory
institutions in the Central Asian countries. The international community, and primarily the
IAEA, should face up to this challenge and provide as much assistance in this matter as
possible.
5.
CONCLUSION: A NEW BUSINESS MODEL OF URANIUM PRODUCTION
The amount of long term savings in a life-cycle based costing comes not only from
adjusting production, there are important planning and accounting issues as well. The
proposed changes have to respect that cash flow projections show the fair value of the mining
project but must at the same time address the environmental and stakeholder issues affecting
the mining corporation from the earliest stages of the mining project.
International co-operation and co-ordination are essential to support these efforts and
any State action aimed at regulating uranium production. National regulations need to be
attuned to individual circumstances by implementation of suitable policies, programmes and
plans at the level of governments. However, uncoordinated actions using diverging
instruments will only confuse uranium producers and distort competition.
What is needed is a strengthening of the leadership role of the international
organizations, such as the IAEA, through their engagement with the industry, stakeholders
and regulators in creating an environment which is protective of the public and the
environment whilst simultaneously encouraging economic development of uranium mining
and production.
REFERENCES
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[2]
[3]
[4]
118
HAGEN, M., JAKUBICK, A.T., LUSH, D., METZLER, D., Integrating Technical and NonTechnical Factors in Environmental Remediation: Conclusions and recommendations of the
UMREG’02 Meeting Wismut GmbH (2003).
BMWI, Study No. 90/95, Costs of decommissioning and remediation of uranium mining and
milling projects in international comparison, Final report of the research project No. 37/93,
Uranerzbergbau GmbH (UEB) (1995).
WISMUT GMBH, Audit Report, Investment Programme for the Remediation Tasks of
Abandonment of the Hungarian Uranium Industry (1999).
ROBERDS, W., VOSS, C., JAKUBICK, A.T., et al., Multi-Attribute Decision Analysis of
Remediation Options for a Uranium Mill Tailings Impoundment in Eastern Germany, American
Nuclear Society, Proceedings of International Topical Meeting on Probabilistic Safety
Assessment (PSA '96) - Moving Towards Risk Based Regulations, Park City, Utah (1996).
IAEA PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT OF THE FORMER FRENCH NUCLEAR
TEST SITES IN ALGERIA
D.W. REISENWEAVER
Alion Science & Technology,
Los Alamos, United States of America
Abstract
In 1999, the International Atomic Energy Agency received a request from the Government of Algeria to
perform an assessment of the radiological conditions of the former sites used by the French government in the
early 1960s for the testing of nuclear weapons. This paper describes the history and the nature of the test site and
the tests that were performed, the methodology of the IAEA assessment and the results and conclusions drawn
from the mission of international experts.
1.
INTRODUCTION
In 1999, the International Atomic Energy Agency received a request from the
Government of Algeria to perform an assessment of the radiological conditions at the former
sites used by the French government in the early 1960s for the testing of nuclear weapons. In
response to this request, in late 1999, the IAEA sent an international team of experts to
perform a radiological assessment. The expert team was composed of experts from France,
New Zealand, Slovenia, the USA and the IAEA.
The terms of reference for the expert mission were to:
– Make a preliminary assessment of the existing radiological situation at the Reggane
and In-Ekker test sites by performing radiation/radioactivity measurements at the sites
and at selected inhabited locations;
– Collect selected environmental and food samples for analysis; and
– Based on the results of these measurements, perform a preliminary dose assessment
and develop a plan for monitoring the test sites more comprehensively, if justified.
The mission was able to achieve more than initially expected because of the detailed
information provided by France related to the history and location of the tests.
2.
TEST SITES
Nuclear tests were performed at two test sites in Algeria, they were Reggane and InEkker. Both of these sites are located in the southern central part of the country and are shown
in Fig. 1.
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TOPICAL SESSION 5
FIG.1. Location of Algerian test sites.
Reggane test sites
The Reggane test sites were used for above ground nuclear weapons tests and are
located approximately 50 km south of Reggane, a small oasis village and 150 km south of
Adar, a city of approximately 50 000 inhabitants. The following table provides information
concerning the four atmospheric tests performed at the Reggane site.
TABLE 1. ATMOSPHERIC NUCLEAR TESTS CONDUCTED AT REGGANE
Test
Date
Type
Yield, W (kt)
Gerboise Bleue
Feb 1960
Tower, 100 m
40<W<80
Gerboise Blanche
Apr 1960
Surface
W<10
Gerboise Rouge
Dec 1960
Tower, 50 m
W<10
Gerboise Verte
Apr 1961
Tower, 50 m
W<10
The largest contribution to the radiation dose that can be measured at the present time is
due to 137Cs; other fission or activation products contribute less than 5% to the dose rates. Fig.
2 shows the radiation dose rates and surface activity levels of 137Cs in the surface areas of the
fallout zones. The Gerboise Blanche test was performed on the surface and a crater was
produced that was later filled in. Consequently, a large amount of the residual activity remains
in material buried under several metres of sand.
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OUGHTON
GERBOISE BLEUE
GERBOISE VERTE
GERBOISE ROUGE
N
N
Z1
N
Z2
Z5
0.15 km2
0.08 km2
0.15 km2
0.22 km2
0.56 km2
0.5 km
0.5 km
0.5 km
GERBOISE BLANCHE
N
0.002 km2
Z0
0.006 km2
0.015 km2
0.05 km
1 km2
0.5 km
from 0.05 to 0.5 Gy/h (from 0.02 to 0.2 MBq/m2)
from 0.5 to 1.5 Gy/h (from 0.2 to 0.6 MBq/m2)
from 1.5 to 5 Gy/h (from 0.6 to 2 MBq/m2)
from 5 to 15 Gy/h (from 2 to 6 MBq/m2)
FIG. 2. Radiation dose rates and surface activities of 137Cs at Reggane (in 1999).
In the area of the Gerboise Rouge test site, an additional series of tests was performed to
measure the velocity shock wave in a pellet of plutonium. 35 experiments were performed,
each using a plutonium pellet weighing about 20 g. These tests were performed in pits
designed to limit dispersal. The majority of the plutonium remained in the pits after the tests,
but low residual activity can still be detected near to the pits. The pits have been backfilled
with sand.
In-Ekker test site
In-Ekker consists of two sites, Taourirt Tan Afella and Adar Tikertine. Underground
nuclear weapons tests were performed in tunnels that were dug into the granite massif at
Taourirt Tan Afella. This area was virtually uninhabited at the time of the tests. Thirteen tests
were performed at this site; details are given in Table 2. All of these tests were performed in
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TOPICAL SESSION 5
tunnels that were designed so that the radioactive products would be confined within the
mountain at the ground zero point in rock that would become molten at the moment of firing.
TABLE 2. UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR TESTS CONDUCTED AT TAOURIRT TAN
AFELLA
Test
Date
Yield, W (kt)
Agate
Nov 1961
W<10
Beryl
May 1962
10<W<40
Emeraude
Mar 1963
10<W<40
Amethyste
Mar 1963
W<10
Rubis
Oct 1963
10<W<40
Opale
Feb 1964
W<10
Topaze
Jun 1964
W<10
Turquoise
Nov 1964
W<10
Saphir
Feb 1965
W>80
Jade
May 1965
W<10
Corindon
Oct 1965
W<10
Tourmaline
Dec 1965
10<W<40
Grenat
Feb 1966
10<W<40
Nine of the tests (Agate, Emeraude, Opale, Topaze, Turquoise, Saphir, Corindon,
Tourmaline and Grenat) were fully contained. Two tests (Rubis and Jade) were not fully
contained and some radioiodines and gases were released from the tunnel openings. Two tests
(Beryl and Amethyste) were only partially contained and significant releases of radioactive
material occurred. All of the tests, except these last two, did not produce any significant
radiological residues outside the tunnels.
To contain the tests, a spiral shaped tunnel opened into the firing chamber as shown in
Fig. 3. The spiral was designed to be closed off by the shock wave before the lava could reach
the entrance to the tunnel. During the Beryl and Amethyste tests, this blocking of the main
tunnel did not occur. During the Amethyste test, a small quantity of molten rock was
deposited near the tunnel entrance. In 1965, the residual dose rate 1 metre above the lava
surface was reported as exceeding 50 Gy/h. In 1999, the residual dose rates were just above
1 Gy/h. The Beryl test resulted in a much more significant release to the environment.
Approximately 5–10% of the test product activity was released as lava, aerosols and gaseous
products. Most of the residual contamination is fixed in the lava. The 1999 estimated dose
rates in the area of contamination are shown in Fig. 4. These levels are not insignificant but
the Beryl test site is located in an area that is very difficult to gain access to. Nevertheless, to
prevent access, the area contaminated by the test was fenced off and appropriate warning
signs were affixed to the fence. However, over time, this fence has become ineffective as
shown in Fig. 5.
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OUGHTON
FIG. 3. Arrangement of tunnel used for weapons testing.
FIG. 4. Radiation dose rates in 1999 in the area contaminated by the Beryl test.
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TOPICAL SESSION 5
FIG. 5. Typical fence surrounding area where nuclear tests were performed.
Five additional experiments were performed about 30 kilometres south-west of Taourirt
Tan Afella, in the region of Adar Tikertine. The purpose of these experiments (called the
Pollen experiments) was to simulate an accident involving plutonium and to measure its
consequences, including the degree of contamination that might be produced in the vicinity of
the tests. The method involved measuring the amounts of plutonium aerosols generated by
pyrotechnic dispersal. The experiments involved 20 to 200 g of plutonium and were
performed when the wind was blowing across the area planned for collection of the fallout.
After each test, the most contaminated area was covered with asphalt to limit resuspension.
Low levels of residual activity can still be detected near the ground zero point.
3.
FIELD SAMPLING
Some field sampling was performed during the mission. This sampling was not as
comprehensive as would be required for a full scale radiological monitoring programme and
only a limited number of samples were taken. All samples were analyzed at the IAEA
laboratory in Seibersdorf, Austria.
Soil, water and vegetation samples were taken. Soil samples were taken for evaluating
the resuspensible fraction that might expose intermittent visitors and travelers as a
consequence of high winds in the area. The water from three different wells in the area of InEkker was sampled by collecting water directly from the buckets used by travellers.
Vegetation samples were taken from near the Beryl tunnel entrance where the largest release
occurred. The plant types collected were known to be used by camels as food.
The results of these samples are provided in the IAEA report of this mission [1].
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OUGHTON
4.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The two areas that had the highest residual activity were:
– The ground zero locations at the Gerboise Blanche and Gerboise Bleue atmospheric
test sites located near Reggane; and
– The vicinity of the tunnel where highly radioactive lava was ejected during the Beryl
underground test.
Two additional areas had residual activity but at a lower level: the vicinity of the tunnel
for the Amethyste test and at the Adrar Tikertine site where the Pollen tests were performed.
All of the other areas had little residual activity. A conclusion of the assessment was that
environmental remediation is not required at any of the test areas in order to reduce doses
below established safety standards, and that any possible exposures at Taourirt Tan Afella can
be controlled through access restrictions. However, future decisions by the Algerian
authorities to carry out further remediation or to further limit public access might be
appropriate if economic conditions change in the area and a more permanent presence of
people is indicated.
4.1. Specific conclusions
Reggane
Radiation doses to visitors to the remote desert tests sites area are estimated to be less
than a few Sv/day. Residual steel fragments and fused sand, if removed from the site, do not
present any significant radiological risk. However, if fused sand were ground to respirable
dust without respiratory protection, this could present an inhalation hazard.
Calculated radiation doses to residents of the town of Reggane from the airborne
transport of dust from the test areas are predicted to be very low, much less than 1 Sv/y.
Taourirt Tan Afella
Nomadic camel and goat herders grazing their animals on the sparse vegetation in the
area of the Beryl and Amethyste galleries might receive small doses, principally from external
radiation, of less than about 50 Sv/y. Persons scavenging metals in the immediate vicinity of
the lava from the Beryl tunnel might receive doses of up to about 0.5 mSv in 8 hours. Current
external exposure dose rates are less than one-tenth of those existing in 1966. These dose rates
are decreasing annually due to the decay of 137Cs (1999 maximum concentrations were 2
kBq/g). The alpha activity concentration in the lava is in the range 40 – 400 Bq/g, which is
roughly similar to that of natural rock with 0.2 percent uranium content, and below that of a
commercial uranium ore body.
Adrar Tikertine
The concentration of plutonium was determined in a small number of sand samples too few to be representative of the area. Nevertheless, the activity concentration of
anthropogenic radionuclides in those samples measured was generally below laboratory
detection limits. Thus, it is expected that the residual surface contamination from the
plutonium dispersion experiments is unlikely to give rise to doses to nomadic herdsmen or
their families exceeding 1 Sv/a.
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TOPICAL SESSION 5
4.2. Recommendations
The integrity of the fence constructed in the 1960s after the accident at Taourirt Tan
Afella should be restored and maintained to avoid exposures arising from human and animal
intrusion in the region around the Beryl tunnel entrance or through any removal of samples of
lava from the site.
The upper bound evaluation of the radiological conditions assessed in this preliminary
study is considered robust, and further extended sampling for radiological assessment is not
considered necessary. Corroboration of the predicted low inhalation doses arising from the
Reggane site could be readily achievable through an appropriate air sampling programme, and
it is recommended this be carried out.
Similarly, corroboration of the findings of no dose impact to the local herdsmen and
nomadic people in the In-Ekker area should be achieved by an appropriate environmental
monitoring programme, in particular, water from wells adjacent to the Taourirt Tan Afella test
site could be analyzed.
Better descriptions of the lifestyles of the people that frequent these areas would add
credibility to the findings of the assessment.
REFERENCES
[1]
126
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Radiological Conditions at the Former
French Nuclear Test Sites in Algeria: Preliminary Assessment and Recommendations,
Radiological Assessment Reports Series, IAEA, Vienna (2005).
SOCIAL AND ETHICAL ISSUES IN REMEDIATION
D.H. OUGHTON
Norwegian University of Life Sciences,
Aas, Norway
Abstract
The contamination of environments with radionuclides can give rise to consequences additional to the
health risks from exposure to radiation. As experience from Chernobyl has demonstrated, both accident and
remediation measures can have serious social, ethical and economic consequences. This paper presents a review
of some of these issues and presents a ‘check-list’ of the socio-ethical aspects of remediation measures. The
paper also discusses remediation measures that are directed towards benefits other than dose reduction.
1.
INTRODUCTION
Remediation measures can do much to alleviate anxiety and restore the way of life in
communities living in contaminated areas. However, remediation is rarely without sideeffects: the Chernobyl accident showed that remediation can be expensive, socially disruptive,
or damaging to the environment [1–4]. On the other hand, remediation can have benefits that
go beyond radiation dose reduction, such as restoring ecosystems, increasing public
understanding and control, restoring consumer confidence in a product, or securing the
livelihood and social structure of affected populations.
While the primary objective of remediation is usually dose reduction, for an action to be
justified, the benefits from dose reduction or averted dose should outweigh the costs of
implementing the countermeasure [5]. It follows that a decision on how to reduce exposure to
radiation will involve an ethical judgement: a choice is being made about which doses to
reduce and at what cost. While the main criteria for remediation are usually based on
technical or economic constraints, an extended evaluation can include social factors such as
public perceptions of risk and dialogue with affected communities, as well as ethical aspects
such as informed consent and the fair distribution of costs and benefits [1, 2, 6]
This paper reviews the main social and ethical issues associated with remediation
decisions. It includes a summary of the generic social and ethical aspects of remediation, and
concludes with a presentation of some of the remediation measures that are not primarily
intended to reduce radiation dose.
2.
MULTI-DIMENSION ASPECTS OF REMEDIATION
The multi-dimensional aspects of remediation were an important part of the
STRATEGY 5th Framework EU project – Sustainable Restoration and Long term
Management of Contaminated Rural, Urban and Industrial Ecosystems [www.strategyec.org.uk], and the follow-up EURANOS project (www.euranos.fzk.de), both of which
included a number of remediation evaluation criteria, such as practicality and acceptability,
socio-ethical aspects, environmental consequences and indirect side-effect costs [6, 7].
Stakeholder evaluation of countermeasures suggested that many options were as likely to be
rejected on socio-ethical grounds as on technical and economic grounds [8]. Examples
included a strong aversion to any measure that would bring about contamination of previously
uncontaminated foods (e.g. mixing milk from different sources) or environments. Legal
constraints also play an important role, particularly with respect to environmental legislation
(e.g. habitat protection) and labour rights [1]. The summary of social and ethical factors below
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TOPICAL SESSION 5
is taken from previously published work carried out under the STRATEGY and EURANOS
projects [1, 6, 9]. The focus in this paper is on issues that are grounded in fundamental ethical
values, and which are relevant to any risk assessment. Obviously, the list is not exhaustive
and can provide only an illustration of some of the issues that might be considered, hence
descriptions and examples are rather general.
Self-help/disruptive: ‘Self-help’ adresses the extent to which the affected persons
themselves can implement actions and their degree of control or choice over the situation.
Voluntary actions that are carried out by the public or affected individuals themselves, or that
increase personal understanding or control over the situation, are usually deemed positive as
they respect the fundamental ethical values of autonomy, liberty and dignity. Concrete
examples include the provision of counting equipment, dietary advice and certain agricultural
procedures that could be carried out by the farmer. On the contrary, imposed measures that
are highly disruptive, infringe upon liberty, or restrict normal practices can often be judged to
be negative. Examples include relocation, bans on amenity use, or a radical change in farming
practice.
Welfare: Doses, costs and side-effects: The averted radiation dose and the calculated
cost of remediation have direct consequences for the welfare of society and/or individuals,
and are thus also important ethically relevant aspects. Remediation may have additional
impacts on community or cultural values in a number of ways. Negative side-effects can
include rural breakdown, loss of consumer faith in a product, and the stigma of being
‘contaminated communities’. Disruptions to existing social and cultural patterns – such as
those requiring changes in employment or lifestyle – are generally taken as negative, and the
community can benefit from protection against such factors. Creation of local employment
opportunities can benefit communities.
Free informed consent of workers: The issue of consent is strongly linked to the
fundamental ethical value of autonomy. Employers have a duty to obtain the informed
consent of any worker who may be exposed to chemical and or radiation risk. This is
particularly important if lower paid workers are employed to carry out the measure, as it has
been suggested that the necessary conditions for free-informed consent are often violated for
these groups [10]. The increased risk may justify some form of compensation via higher wage
premiums, but compensation itself can raise questions of whether or not this may coerce
people into taking risks they would otherwise not have [10]. Experience from Chernobyl
illustrates the problems of compensation in promoting the ‘victimization’ of affected
populations [2-4].
Distribution of dose, costs and benefits: The way in which remediation impacts on the
distribution of costs, risks and benefits, has significance due to the fundamental ethical values
of equity, justice and fairness. Costs, benefits and risk may vary over both space and time, and
between different members of a community. The radiation dose distribution is obviously a
main consideration for radiation protection, and many remediation measures that reduce
collective dose may change the distribution of dose, for example, from consumers to workers
or populations around waste facilities. The question of who is paying the monetary and social
costs of remediation and who will receive the benefits must also be addressed. Another
question is whether the action has implications for vulnerable or already disadvantaged
members of society (children, ethnic or cultural minorities)? Who is being affected? Who is
paying?
Liability and/or compensation for unforeseen health or property effects: Employers
usually hold legal and ethical responsibilities over their employees, and contractors or
industries may be held legally or financially liable for any damage they may cause to public
or private property. The matter of who bears liability is relevant both from considerations of
responsibility (moral and legal) and because of links to equity issues. Liability can become
particularly important if outside contractors are paid to carry out remediation, both for the
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OUGHTON
contractors themselves – Will I be sued if the actions cause unforeseen damage? – and the
workers/property owners who may risk injury – Will I be compensated if the remediation
causes me damage?
Change in public perception or use of an amenity: If remediation has an effect on the
public’s use of a particular amenity (such as restricting access to a park), then this will have
an influence on acceptability. As was seen in the Chernobyl case, people place a large value
on places with strong community and personal ties, such as those having childhood memories.
Such effects can have deeper relevance than whether or not people are able to use the
amenity. Perceptions can include, for example, that something has changed from being
‘natural’ to ‘unnatural’ or ‘clean’ to ‘damaged’. Alternatively, remediation that brings into use
a previously restricted amenity will be socially more robust.
Uncertainty: Uncertainty in this context can be taken to refer to an evaluation of the risk
(environmental, technical, social) associated with remediation, and relate to the question of
what the possible consequences of the remediation might be and the probability that those
outcomes can occur. What are the main uncertainties associated with the remediation
strategy? What action might be taken to avoid or reduce these uncertainties, and are some
inevitably indeterminate? What are the consequences of being wrong?
Environmental risk from ecosystem changes, groundwater contamination, etc:
Remediation actions that change or interfere with ecosystems (e.g. ploughing or changing
catchment drainage) may produce negative environmental consequences. In addition to the
obvious questions of uncertainty, environmental risk raises a variety of ethical issues
including consequences for future generations, sustainability, cross-boundary pollution, and
balancing harm to the environment/animals against benefit to humans. The ethical
acceptability of remediation will clearly depend on the ecological status of the area and the
degree to which the action diverges from usual practice. In most cases, environmental
legislation must be considered. Any countermeasure involving the generation of waste and/or
its treatment will have ethical relevance (and controversy) in itself. Treatment of waste ‘in
situ’ can be positive as it av oids problems arising from ‘dilute and disperse’ or the
‘redistribution’ of exposures to persons living close to disposal sites. Such issues were seen as
being very important in some European countries after the Chernobyl accident [8]. But ‘in
situ’ treatment may also have negative side effects because it can complicate future waste
removal.
3.
NON DOSE-REDUCING REMEDIATION STRATEGIES
For certain remediation measures, reduction in radiation dose need not be the only
benefit, or even the main benefit. In the STRATEGY and EURANOS projects, a number of
remediation measures were evaluated in which dose reduction was not the primary aim [7, 9].
These included measures such as: the provision of medical check-ups and dietary advice, the
setting up of public information centres, the instigation of education programmes,
compensation, the provision of counting equipment and the stimulation of stakeholder
involvement in the decision-making process. Indeed, it is to be hoped that many of the
procedures, specifically those directed towards communication and stakeholder involvement
would be generic to any remediation process.
Provision of counting equipment and independent monitoring are methods that have
been successfully applied in Chernobyl affected communities. A study carried out Belarussian
villages concluded that the approach not only resulted in reducing exposures with minimal
social and psychological side effects, but was also more economically cost effective than the
standard ‘top-down’ management procedures [11]. A recent stakeholder study following up
on Norwegian farming communities most affected by Chernobyl fallout indicated that access
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TOPICAL SESSION 5
to local food monitoring stations was particularly important [12]. Independent monitoring
following waste disposal are commonly requested in community stakeholder processes.
4.
CONCLUSION
Any remediation strategy will be strengthened by an approach to remediation that
integrates economic, ecological, and health measures; it is not sufficient to simply focus on
the dose reduction aspects of radiation protection. This is supported by many
multidisciplinary research projects on the long term management of radioactive
contamination. The projects highlight the importance of including the affected populations
with regard to self-help measures and involvement in decision-making processes. In addition
to respecting people’s fundamental right to shape their own future, and thereby increasing
trust and compliance, such approaches can lead to significant improvements in the
effectiveness of remediation measures and in their acceptance by communities.
REFERENCES
[1]
OUGHTON, D.H., et al., An ethical dimension to sustainable restoration and long term
management of contaminated areas, J. Environ.Radioactivity 74 (2004) 171-183.
[2] BAY, I., OUGHTON, D.H., Social and economic effects, In: Chernobyl, Catastrophe and
Consequences (eds J. Smith and N.A. Beresford), Springer-Verlag, Berlin (2005)239-262.
[3] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Chernobyl’s Legacy: Health,
Environmental and Socio-Economic Impacts, The Chernobyl Forum, IAEA, Vienna (2005).
[4] UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME (UNDP), The Human Consequences of
the Chernobyl Nuclear Accident - A Strategy for Recovery (2002).
[5] INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION, Optimisation and
decision making in radiological protection, Annals of the ICRP, Publication No. 55, Oxford,
Pergamon Press (1989).
[6] HOWARD, B.J., et al., Sustainable restoration and long term management of contaminated
rural, urban and industrial ecosystems, Radioprotection - colloques 37 (C1) (2002) 1067–1072.
[7] EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Generic handbook for assisting in the management of
contaminated food production systems in Europe following a radiological emergency,
Deliverable from the EURANOS Project, EURANOS(CAT1)-TN(06)-06 (2006).
[8] NISBET, A.F., Management options for food production systems contaminated as a result of a
nuclear accident, Radioprotection-Colloques, vol 37, C1 (2002) 115-120.
[9] OUGHTON, D.H., BAY-LARSEN, I., VOIGHT, G., Social, Ethical, Environmental and
Economic Aspects of Remediation, In: Radioactivity in the Environment, Volume 14 (2009)
428-451.
[10] BULLARD, R.D., Dumping in Dixie: Race, Class and Environmental Quality. Westview Press,
Boulder, CO (1990).
[11] HERIARD DUBREUIL, G.F., et al., Chernobyl post-accident management: the ETHOS project,
Health Physics 77 (1999) 361–372.
[12] OUGHTON, D.H., et al., Long-term Rehabilitation of Contaminated Areas in Norway: Results
of co-expertise meetings in Norway, Deliverable for the EURANOS project (CAT3)RT-08
(2008).
130
A GUIDE FOR THE REMEDIATION OF RADIOACTIVELY
CONTAMINATED SITES: EURSSEM
L.P.M. VAN VELZEN*, L. TEUNCKENS**, M. VASKO**, E. HAJKOVA***,
V. DANISKA***, K. KRISTOFOVA***
*
Nuclear Research and Consultancy Group,
Arnhem, The Netherlands
**
AF-Colenco AG,
Baden, Switzerland
***
Decom a.s.,
Trnava, Slovakia
Abstract
A first draft of EURSSEM (European Radiation Survey and Site Execution Manual) has been developed
within the framework of the ‘Co-ordination Network on Decommissioning of Nuclear Installations’ project
(2005-2008) funded by the European Community. The objective of EURSSEM is to provide a consensus
approach and guidance to conduct all actions at radioactively contaminated and potentially radioactively
contaminated sites and/or groundwater - up to their release for restricted or unrestricted (re)use. This approach
and guidance is intended to be both scientifically rigorous and flexible enough to be applied to a diversity of site
(surface) cleanup conditions. A brief description is given on the background and the need for a document such as
EURSSEM, about key issues such as stakeholder involvement and archiving for future referencing, including the
follow-up of the further development of EURSSEM.
1.
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of the Co-ordination Network on Decommissioning of Nuclear
Installations (CND) was to organize and operate this Network with organizations from the
European Union as well from candidate countries involved in decommissioning activities [1].
An important aim of the CND was to encourage a continuous improvement in capabilities and
effectiveness that should lead to increased competitiveness. The CND was managed by a
Steering Group that had the objective of driving the CND forward to increase and transfer
knowledge and to exchange experience so that organizations could derive the maximum
benefit from this EC funded project.
One of the main topics/work packages in the CND was ‘Site Characterization,
Remediation and Reuse’. The aim of this work package was to improve the exchange of
knowledge between specialists and especially experts of the European Community in this
field; it had the following objectives:
– To promote common understanding of key issues in the fields of site characterization,
remediation and reuse;
– To identify good/best practices in characterization, remediation and reuse of sites
based on practical experience and to disseminate good practice in areas that will
benefit from a better characterization, remediation and reuse of sites;
– To promote the exchange of information in these fields.
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TOPICAL SESSION 5
The intention at the start of the project was that each of the three topics, e.g. site
characterization, remediation and reuse could be dealt with separately. However, although a
number of commercial firms had interests in these topics, and especially in the results and
experiences of competitors, the same firms were reluctant to share their own experiences with
others. For this reason, it was very difficult to demonstrate that participating in the CND
project and in this working group had a real added value. Therefore, the Steering Committee
of the CND decided to change course in order to meet the project objectives. This change of
course meant that the effort would be made by a motivated group of partners to develop the
intended guidance documents. This effort resulted in this first draft of EURSSEM.
2.
DEVELOPMENT OF THE FIRST DRAFT OF EURSSEM
2.1. Purpose and scope
The purpose of EURSSEM is to provide a consistent guideline for the execution of an
environmental remediation programme for radioactively or potentially radioactively
contaminated land and/or ground water. The guidance and approaches should be both
scientifically rigorous and flexible enough to be applied for a diversity of sites (surfaces) and
ground waters.
2.2. Point of departure
The following points of departure were defined for the development of EURSSEM:
(a) EURSSEM should be written from an advisory or a consultancy point of view. This
means that EURSSEM can contain all existing information and information on future
developments in approaches etc. that deal with the development, implementation and
execution of an environmental remediation programme applying the best options and
practices for a particular site. Due to the fact that the guidance is generic and no
national or international regulations/laws are taken into account, the regulatory body
in the country where it is used should be consulted. Further, it is evident that the
advice given will not necessarily correspond with the viewpoint of a site owner, a
regulator or a public community;
(b) Commercial interest. The authors do not have any commercial intentions considering:
(i) The use and the distribution of EURSSEM by third parties. It is evident that the
use of EURSSEM is the responsibility of the user;
(ii) The inclusion of commercial information, e.g. company names, specific
commercial products, process, etc. in EURSSEM;
(c) EURSSEM is available for all companies, regulators, members of the public (all
stakeholders) involved in or interested in environmental remediation programmes;
(d) The level of information provided in EURSSEM should be acceptable for an
interested member of the public as well as for specialists in the field;
(e) EURSSEM should be free from any judgement about preferred strategies, approaches,
procedures, equipment that can be applied in an environmental remediation
programme.
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VAN VELZEN et al.
2.3. Need for a document such as EURSSEM
Over the last decades, organizations like the International Atomic Energy Agency [2],
the United States Interstate Technology and Regulatory Council (US-ITRC) [3], the
Construction Industry Research and Information Association (CIRIA) [4], United Kingdom
governmental agencies (Safety and Environmental Guidance for the Remediation of
Contaminated Land on UK Nuclear and Defence Sites (Safegrounds Learning Network) [5]),
US governmental agencies (Multi-IAEA Radiation Survey and Site Investigation Manual
(MARSSIM) [6]), and various other national institutes, etc. have performed a substantial
amount of work to improve knowledge and understanding of ‘best practices’ in an
environmental remediation programme. EURSSEM incorporates information provided in
documents prepared by the above-mentioned organizations and the importance and the quality
of the information and know-how presented in their documents is acknowledged. However,
this existing information was, until now, not combined into one consistent document or
guideline.
Independent of their origin (e.g. IAEA, US-ITRC, etc.), the available documents and
guidelines have a kind of common structure: they present global information on all aspects
that have to be considered in the design, planning and execution of an environmental
remediation programme, although the level of the treatment can vary and, for specific aspects,
very detailed information may presented. In Fig. 1, as an example, an overview of
topics/documents is presented that can be found on the website of the US-ITRC. However,
these documents are not combined into one consistent guide.
FIG. 1. Overview of the document topics at the US-ITRC website [2].
Relevant documents for performing an environmental remediation programme have
been prepared over a period of 10 to 15 years. During this time period:
(a) Knowledge has increased; both theoretical and practical experience has been obtained;
(b) Viewpoints and insights into the relevant science have changed;
(c) During the preparation of these documents, a large number of authors/scientists from
many fields of science were involved;
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TOPICAL SESSION 5
(d) The level of the published documents is not always the same;
(e) The applied terms and definitions have not always been consistent.
As a result, it will be difficult for some stakeholders involved in an environmental
remediation programme to judge the true merits of the advice. Therefore, combining the
available information into one consistent guideline will be a help for all stakeholders.
2.4. Literature study
An extensive literature study has been performed using internet and references in
leading documents. All literature was sorted according to the different aspects of an
environmental remediation programme. After sorting, emphasis was put on how to combine
and re-edit the collected information to create an approach that is as consistent as possible for
all aspects. The next step was to combine and re-edit the selected literature. The last step in
the process was to perform a second literature study to fill in the gaps of missing
information/examples and/or expanding the level of detail.
Although a lot of work has been performed by the authors/editors, they do not claim
that the information on all aspects of an environmental remediation programme is equal in
depth or detail.
3.
FIRST DRAFT OF EURSSEM
3.1. Use of the manual
Potential users of this manual are companies, government agencies and other parties
that can be described as stakeholders involved in processes to remediate or restore
radioactively contaminated sites for restricted or unrestricted (re)use. The manual is intended
for a technical as well as a non-technical audience.
3.2. Structure of the manual
EURSSEM begins with guidance on how to decide if EURSSEM guidance or part(s) of
EURSSEM guidance are applicable. It is followed by the section ‘Development of a
contaminated land strategy’ which provides a clear context and objectives, as well as
information about effective external participation (stakeholder involvement) whether it is
required by organizational policy or by regulations to meet stakeholder expectations or to
improve decision-making. This section focuses in detail on the strategy to be applied,
describing two major topics, i.e. stakeholder involvement in the process and the
requirements/establishment of an ‘archive for future referencing’. These two topics are linked
to all actions in the process. The document provides guidelines for the formulation of all
necessary plans at a generic level, e.g. historical site assessment, risk assessment approaches,
a health physics plan, a safety and security plan, an environmental protection plan, waste
management and transport, record keeping, etc. The ‘archive for future referencing’ has not to
be seen as a special part of the project file, but as an archive that will contain information that
can be consulted in the short term and the long term future for answering questions concerned
with former radioactive contaminants present at the site and/or in the groundwater.
In the next section, the focus is on the radiological characterization of a site and on the
processes involved in doing this, e.g. the design of field-based site characterization,
determining the radioactive contaminants and their behaviour, sampling, sampling
frequencies/locations/patterns, intrusive and non-intrusive methods, field and laboratory
equipment, analysis of samples, data interpretation, reporting, common mistakes, etc. and
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VAN VELZEN et al.
how to decide if the data obtained meet the remediation or the release criteria to an acceptable
degree of uncertainty.
Remediation and post-remediation activities (restoration) guidelines are presented in the
next section. These guidelines are focused on the design of a remediation plan that can be
accomplished safely. Different planning approaches are described, but also, guidance is given
on criteria for the evaluation of an approach or technique. Further, an extensive overview is
given of available remediation techniques presented in literature, guidance on the selection of
applicable remediation techniques as well as on implementing remediation and postremediation (restoration) actions.
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TOPICAL SESSION 5
1. Decide whether EURSSEM guidance or part(s) of
EURSSEM guidance applies
Stakeholder
involvement
2. Develop contaminated land strategy
 Context and objectives
 Stakeholder involvement
 Historical site assessment
 Preliminary risk assessment
 Formulate plans
o Health
physics,
safety,
security
and
environmental protection plan
o Site characterisation
o Remediation
o Waste management plan
o Stewardship
o Record keeping
o Quality assurance and quality control
 Assessment criteria for short term and long term
land use
 Archive for future referencing
Archive for
future
referencing
3. Characterisation of radioactively contaminated
sites and/or groundwater
 Measurements of site and/or groundwater specific
data on the levels and distribution of residual
contamination and background
 Decide whether data obtained meet the remediation
or release criteria within an acceptable degree of
uncertainty
4. Environmental remediation
 Strategy for environmental remediation and
objectives
 Develop a remediation plan that can be
accomplished safely
 Selection of applicable remediation technologies
 Implementing remediation activities
 Disposal of waste
 Conducting post-remediation activities
5. Stewardship
 Decide if short term or long term stewardship has to
be implemented
 Establish short term or long term management
strategy for whole a site or part of a site and
priorities for specific areas
 Establish most appropriate management option for
each contaminated area
FIG. 2. The five interrelated parts of EURSSEM. (For simplicity, in Fig. 2 the iterative issue
has been omitted).
The last section provides information and guidelines on ‘Reuse and Stewardship’. It is
evident that not all radiological contaminated sites and/or groundwater can be cleaned and
released for unrestricted use within an acceptable time scale. Sometimes, this is not needed,
136
VAN VELZEN et al.
for example, for industrial areas. Therefore, guidance is given on decision making and the
implementation of short term or long term stewardship.
EURSSEM is presented in a modular format, with each module containing guidance on
conducting specific aspects of, or activities related to the process. If followed in the related
order, each module leads to the generation and the implementation of a complete plan. Where
appropriate, examples and/or checklists are included that condense and summarize the major
points in the process. The checklists may be used to verify that every suggested step is
followed or to flag a condition in which specific documentation should be provided to explain
why a step was not needed.
A schematic overview of the content of the first draft of EURSSEM is presented in
Fig. 2.
4.
FUTURE WORK
At this moment EURSSEM is available at http://www.eurssem.eu/. The authors/editors
are looking forward to working with other specialists, companies and institutes to update this
draft at regular time intervals. It is intended that the website will become a forum where
specialists and non-specialists can exchange information. The website will also offer the
opportunity to upload improvements and new information. These improvements and
information will be reviewed and if they contain material with an added value, it will be
incorporated into the next version of EURSSEM.
In the future, EURSSEM will be extended by including an appendix containing
abstracts of published articles dealing with cases or aspects of environmental remediation.
5.
CONCLUSION
By creating EURSSEM, a gap and a need is being filled so that the design,
implementation and execution of environmental remediation programmes can be performed
according to the latest approaches, techniques, etc.
By making EURSSEM available to everyone via the internet and in combination with a
forum, EURSSEM can contribute to a better understanding of environmental remediation
programmes and to the harmonization of approaches.
REFERENCES
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
TEUNCKENS, L., Co-ordination Network on Decommissioning of Nuclear Installations; 3rd
Annual Report (2008).
http://www.iaea.org/
http://www.itrcweb.org/gd.asp
http://www.ciria.org/index.html
http://www.safegrounds.com/index.html
http://www.marssim.com
137
IMPROVING RADIOACTIVE WASTE AND SOURCE MANAGEMENT AT
THE VINČA INSTITUTE
M. RECIO, J. KELLY, M. KINKER
International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna
Abstract
The Vinča Institute Decommissioning Project (VIND) represents the largest project in the history of the
Technical Cooperation Programme of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Its scope is subdivided into three
tasks: (1) spent fuel repatriation to the country of origin, (2) waste management, and (3) decommissioning of the
RA research reactor and associated facilities. One major project involves the dismantling and decommissioning
of old waste management facilities, along with processing of the waste and conditioning of the sealed sources
stored in those facilities. This paper describes the progress made and problems encountered in implementing the
waste management and decommissioning projects.
1.
INTRODUCTION
The Vinča Institute of Nuclear Sciences (referred to as the ‘Vinča Institute’) is located
within 20 km of Belgrade, Serbia, which has a population of approximately 2 million people.
The Vinča Institute was built in the mid-1950s to provide nuclear research services to the
former government of Yugoslavia. Two research reactors were established: a research reactor
for high power irradiation services for a variety of experiments (the RA reactor), and a zero
power research reactor to provide criticality research data (RB reactor).
2.
BACKGROUND
The RA reactor, which is a 6.5 MWt, tank-type, heavy water moderated and cooled
research reactor containing highly enriched uranium (HEU) and low enriched uranium (LEU)
fuel of Russian origin, began operations in 1959 and was ‘temporarily’ shut down in 1984 but
was never restarted. This was linked to the severe economic crisis in Serbia during the same
period. In 2004, a programme was instituted by a decision of the Serbian Government to
begin decommissioning activities at the RA reactor and associated nuclear facilities at the
Vinča Institute. This decision resulted in the establishment of the Vinča Institute Nuclear
Decommissioning (VIND) Programme to decommission the nuclear facilities at the Vinča
Institute.
The Programme has attracted support from a number of organizations, including the
Serbian Ministry of Science and Technological Development, the United States Department
of Energy, the European Commission (EC), the Slovenian Nuclear Safety Administration, the
Czech Republic, private donors (e.g. the Nuclear Threat Initiative) and the International
Atomic Energy Agency. For the IAEA, the project represents the largest project in the history
of the IAEA’s Technical Cooperation Programme. The VIND Programme began in 2004 and
will continue until at least 2011, and is forecast to cost as much as US $75 million dollars
(US) to conduct and complete all planned activities.
3.
VIND PROGRAMME
The VIND Programme consists of three major tasks:
(1) Spent fuel repatriation to the country of origin;
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TOPICAL SESSION 5
(2) Decommissioning of the RA research reactor and associated facilities; and
(3) Radioactive waste management.
Task 1 (spent fuel repatriation project) is part of a United States, Russian Federation,
and IAEA co-operation under the Russian Research Reactor Fuel Return programme. Nonirradiated (fresh) fuel was repatriated in 2002 and the repackaging of spent fuel will begin in
August 2009. Preparations for the transport of the spent fuel are currently on schedule, and
transport activities are scheduled to be completed by the end of 2010.
Task 2 decommissioning activities are also on schedule; the draft decommissioning plan
has been completed, 90% of the excess/abandoned materials have been removed, and physical
dismantlement of related facilities (e.g. old waste hangars) is scheduled to begin in 2010.
However, additional storage capacity is needed for the waste generated during the fuel
repatriation and decommissioning.
Task 3 focuses on improving radioactive waste management at the Vinča Institute. The
Serbian government and international donors (USA, Nuclear Threat Initiative, UK, and
Slovenia) are supporting the construction of new waste storage and processing facilities. The
EC is contributing to this project by funding the procurement of equipment for the new
facilities, including waste containers for the spent nuclear fuel repatriation project and other
decommissioning projects. Currently, solid RAW from the entire former Yugoslavia is being
stored in storage Hangars 1 and 2 - both of which are in a poor condition. The stored waste
comprises several hundred drums of unconditioned and uncharacterized waste that includes
yellow cake, metallic uranium, hundreds of high radiation dose-rate disused radioactive
sources, and thousands of excess and disused sealed sources, many of which are of IAEA
Hazard Category 1 and 2. Liquid transuranic waste is stored in four underground tanks. None
of the waste inside Hanger 1 is properly characterized or packaged in accordance with
international standards.
In order to support the VIND radioactive waste management activities, three new
facilities have been built and are expected to be operational in 2009: they comprise a new
Waste Storage Facility (WSF), a Secure Storage Bunker, and a new Waste Processing Facility
(WPF). In addition, a former isotope production facility is in the process of being upgraded
for use as a Source Conditioning Facility (SCF).
Progress on this project is dependent upon completion of construction of the new waste
storage facility (WSF) and the associated waste processing facility (WPF). Significant
progress has been made towards facility construction, and several of the major equipment
items have been purchased. Each of these facilities is scheduled to be in start-up mode at the
beginning of the waste management work; therefore, in addition to the requirements for
facility licenses and Final Safety Analysis Reports (FSAR), Vinča will also need developed
operational strategies, production schedules, safety and security strategies, and staff training.
In 2008, the EC began its contribution to supporting specific waste management
activities under Tasks 2 and 3 above, with a focus on resolving long term waste management
issues. These comprise the decommissioning and dismantlement of the old waste storage
facilities, along with the processing of the associated waste and the conditioning of the sealed
sources stored in those facilities. The projects will be jointly managed and implemented by
the Vinča Institute and the IAEA.
4.
IAEA CONTRACTING APPROACH
The Vinča Institute does not have sufficient staffing or experience to implement all of
the projects under the VIND Programme within the objective timeframes. The Vinča Institute
also lacks clear operational/safety and security strategies and schedules for implementing non140
RECIO et al.
fuel projects. Therefore, additional staff with specific expertise will be needed to support the
start-up and early operation of the new waste processing and storage facilities; the dismantling
and/or decontamination and decommissioning of the old waste storage facilities; the training
of Serbian technicians, and to ensure that all programme activities are being performed in a
safe and professional manner consistent with the applicable procedures, regulations,
international standards, and best practices. For this reason, it was decided that external
contractors with expertise and experience in these areas would be hired. IAEA contracting
therefore focused on augmenting Vinča capabilities in these areas.
The projects were expected to begin in early 2009. In order to reach this objective, three
primary areas of preparatory activities were identified to achieve the work and funding
schedules: Consolidation and Coordination of Contracts and Inputs, EC Contribution
Agreements and Financial Assistance Agreement, and Procurement. Initial contract
specifications were developed from the original 2009–2011 VIND Programme Design.
An expert panel met in October 2008 in order to develop detailed technical
specifications and bidder evaluation criteria. The expert panel further consolidated the
specifications and developed them into detailed technical specifications for 12 service
contracts. These contracts were further revised to incorporate new guidance from the IAEA
Office of Procurement Services, and, as a result, two service contracts were developed: (1) to
provide radiation protection services for overall waste management work, and (2) to perform
much of the site characterization, waste removal and dismantling and decommissioning of the
old waste storage Hangers 1 and 2, source conditioning, and waste processing and storage in
new waste facilities recently constructed at the Vinča Institute.
The Request for Proposal (RFP) packages were sent to over 20 companies which had
international experience in RAW and sealed source management. The outcome of the bidding
process was disappointing. Only a single bid was received for the radiation safety service RFP
within the specified timeframe. No bids were received for the waste management service
RFP. A technical evaluation was performed on the single bid received in order to determine
whether it met the technical requirements identified in the bidder requirements, and to provide
recommendations for future submittals of this RFP. The expert panel concluded its evaluation
of the bid with the determination that the single received bid was not of sufficient quality or
detail to justify an award. The panel also recommended that the RFPs be revised to take
account of the bidder’s recommendations. After discussions with other potential bidders, the
expert panel identified a number of factors resulting in their failure to produce bids. These
factors, which include available human and financial resources, international teaming
arrangements, manpower qualification, etc., will need to be taken into consideration for future
bidding processes.
5.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Currently, the IAEA is working with EC and the Serbian Ministry to restructure the VIND
projects, resulting in some activities being deleted, and most or all activities being postponed
to late 2010 or early 2011. This is being driven by two factors: (1) the continuous delays in
construction and commissioning of the waste management facilities and the source
conditioning facility, and (2) the need to ensure adequate funding for spent fuel repatriation
activities, all of which are critical to the new projects. As the IAEA begins the process of reevaluating the VIND Project contracts, it is likely that the waste management and
decommissioning activities will need to be re-evaluated, with priority being given to
‘incremental decommissioning’ of the old waste storage Hangers 1 and 2, underground liquid
waste tanks, spent fuel storage pool, reactor hot cells, and the RA reactor structure. Other
VIND waste management and radiological infrastructure activities, including waste and
source management activities, the Orphan Source Search and Recovery programme, a site141
TOPICAL SESSION 5
wide radiological assessment, and upgrades to the radiation protection and emergency
response facilities, will be given a lower priority.
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SUMMARY OF SESSION 5
M. Paul
Germany
LIFE CYCLE PLANNING AND STAKEHOLDER ISSUES
This session consisted of eight presentations and dealt with two important topics in
environmental remediation: life cycle planning and stakeholder issues. One general concern
expressed in this session was that the upsurge in nuclear power plant building will lead to new
demands for uranium and a ‘new wave’ of uranium exploration and extraction. It is vital that
lessons should be learnt from the past and that new legacy sites should not be created.
A working group that involves experts from different disciplines has been established in
France. Its purpose is to provide an appraisal of the residual environmental situation after the
completion of remediation works at a former uranium production centre. The participation of
international organizations in the activities of this group adds value to its outcome and
reassures the public of the credibility its findings and reports. Adaptations of this working
methodology could be usefully considered in other countries in order to improve the process
of stakeholder involvement in decision making on environmental remediation programmes. A
negative aspect that was discussed during the presentation is that, in order to be effective, the
work of this group has involved several meetings leading to an intense agenda.
An approach to quantitatively assess the environmental impacts of any industrial
activity throughout its entire life-cycle was described. This approach allows the identification
of potential opportunities for improving operations so that there are reductions in material and
energy consumption as well as reductions in discharges to the environment; it also integrates
the idea of considering environmental remediation as part of the whole life cycle of the
operation.
In another presentation dealing with life cycle management, it was stressed that to
ensure a low environmental impact and to minimize possible remediation costs arising after
operations cease, new uranium mine developments should follow a ‘whole-of-life mining
cycle approach’. Through this approach, the need for post-operation remediation can be
minimized by effective planning at the design and operational stages. In developed uranium
producing countries, the appropriate involvement of stakeholders, such as neighbouring
communities, public representatives, independent scientists and non-governmental
organizations (NGOs), is very much in the interest of the operators of uranium mines or
implementers of remediation projects. Companies need to obtain the support of the public to
receive - in addition to the regulatory licences and permits - a ‘social licence’ from the local
community and district in which the project is being operated.
Environmental remediation was addressed from the point of view of project
management - based on the experiences of the US Department of Energy (DOE), although the
experience presented is useful for all environmental remediation programme implementers
and managers. In the past, insufficient project management at DOE led to inefficiency and a
waste of money. Nowadays, the DOE uses well established protocols for environmental
remediation project management. The work done is accurately measured and accounted for so
as to avoid unnecessary expenditures. It was emphasized that the participation and integration
of regulators in project management is essential to guarantee the success of the project
implementation.
Environmental remediation was also assessed from the ethical point of view. One key
element is that the people involved in presenting the different issues related to environmental
remediation must use credible and accurate information and numbers. If the wrong figures are
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SUMMARY OF SESSION 5
used it can promote confusion and distrust; this can ultimately turn the process against the
interests of the population that should be the beneficiaries of the environmental remediation
project. This occurred after the Chernobyl accident where misinformation led to many
undesirable decisions and unnecessary fear. It was suggested that ethical evaluation can aid in
structuring decision making in environmental remediation.
A scheme to guide the implementation of environmental remediation projects called
EURSSEM was presented. This will be released for free use on the internet by the end of
September 2009 and it is expected become an important tool to aid in the structuring of
environmental remediation projects.
An assessment, by a team of international experts of the radiological situation in the
desert environment of Algeria, where nuclear weapons testing was conducted by the
Government of France in the 1960s, was described. The tests were conducted above ground
and in mountain caverns. Remediation of the affected areas was carried out after the testing
period ended. The expert team was able to detect evidence of the testing but, when the habits
of the sparse local population were taken into account, the assessed potential radiation doses
were very small. A full report of the assessment is published in the IAEA’s Radiological
Assessment Reports Series.
The final presentation addressed the issues that can make it difficult when international
organizations like the IAEA give assistance to countries. A case study concerned the
decommissioning of the Vinca nuclear research institute facilities in Serbia. Constraints in the
bidding process, problems with employing local manpower and the difficulties that companies
face when taking jobs outside Western Europe were some of the issues that had to be faced.
144
CASE STUDIES (ENVIRONMENTAL REMEDIATION IN CENTRAL ASIAN
COUNTRIES)
(TOPICAL SESSION 6)
Chairperson
A. KIM
Kazakhstan
ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS OF POSSIBLE LANDSLIDES IN THE AREAS
OF RADIOACTIVE WASTE STORAGE IN KYRGYZSTAN
I.A. TORGOEV, Y.G. ALESHIN, G.E. ASHIROV
Institute of Physics and Rock Mechanics of the National Academy of Sciences,
Kyrgyzstan
Abstract
This paper describes the problems caused by the location of uranium mine and mill tailings in the
mountainous regions of Kyrgyzstan which are subject to potentially disrupting natural events such as landslides
and flooding. It describes the modelling analyses which have been carried out to provide an improved predictive
capability of potential future events, On the basis of these analyses, strategies have been developed to avoid
some of the worst consequences of the natural events.
1.
LANDSLIDE GEOENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS IN MAILUU-SUU
A former large industrial mining complex was located in the Mailuu-Suu area of the
north-eastern foothills of the Fergana depression (Fig. 1). Landslide activity in this unstable
geological environment has been enhanced by the mining operations (uranium, coal, oil) and
associated infrastructure developments in the area.
Kazakhstan
Uzbekistan
China
Fergana
valley
FIG. 1. Map of landslide susceptibility in Kyrgyzstan.
Landslides occur most frequently (98%) in the mid-stream of the Mailuu-Suu River
(Fig. 2), in a band of mid-mountain (900–1600 m) topography, on a propagation zone of
Meso-Neozoic sediments strongly crushed in folds, which, due to their lithologic (presence of
loess-like loams and clays) and stratigraphic (alternation of water-permeable and waterproof
soils) features, are predisposed to slumping. Hence, the presence within the study area of both
ancient and new folded and disjunctive structures of various kinds, high geodynamic regional
activity conditioned by the meridional compression of Tien-Shan, and the wide propagation
of old landslides have caused the active development of new landslides, of which 50% are
confined to slopes of ancient origin.
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TOPICAL SESSION 6
FIG. 2. Landslides and tailings in Mailuu-Suu valley.
At the present time in this area, more than 200 new landslides of various scales, ages,
and development stages have been registered. Based on the situation at the beginning of 2008,
the whole area affected by landslides is estimated to be 6.37 km2, and the total volume of
landslide masses moved during 1950–2005 is 260 000 000 m3. More than 30 landslides are in
a ‘preparation stage’, before the main movement, and they pose a direct danger to the
population and to building structures, roads etc. as well as to stored radioactive waste tailings.
Due to a deficit of suitable and available areas, housing estates, roads and industrial
structures, including radioactive waste tailings (tailing dumps and stockpiles), were placed
along riverbeds, in floodplains and over-floodplain terraces of the Mailuu-Suu river and its
tributaries, on mountain foothills and/or on the slopes themselves, as well as on weakly stable
old landslide sites (Fig. 2). For these reasons, landslides represent a source of great risk for
Mailuu-Suu town.
The landslides, which are formed on the edges of the river valley and its tributaries
(Fig. 2), are the most hazardous because their development, and, particularly their final stage,
often has a synergetic character (domino effect). Landslide events in narrow river valleys can
trigger a series of other hazardous phenomena by the following scenario: landslide rockslide-landslide blockage of riverbed or river valley - landslide dam upstream
submergence - breach of this dam - downstream flood or mudflow. During the last 17 years in
the Mailuu-Suu area, more than 10 landslide movement episodes involving the blockage of a
river and its tributaries have been registered. The most destructive of them was a river
blockage in the Tektonik landslide zone in June 1992, when, as a result of landslide mass
movement, a dam of 15 m height and 800 m length was formed and simultaneously a smallsized mine tailing storage (No 17) was pushed into the river.
A special hazard of such synergetic scenarios can be their effects on tailings and dumps
of radioactive waste located along riverbeds of the Mailuu-Suu, Karagach and Kulmen-Sai
(Fig. 2). In such cases, the propagation area of the radioactive materials stored in them may be
substantially expanded owing to their transfer through the drainage network of the MailuuSuu river to the Syrdarya river basin.
The environmental risks related to the destruction of tailings stores as a result of the
direct fall of landslide masses have been assessed [1]. The risks associated with tailings store
submergence after dam breach and mud-flow effects are significant, taking into account a
series of previous incidents in the study area [2]. In April 1958, following the No 7 tailing
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TORGOEV et al.
dam destruction triggered by extremely heavy rainfall and increased seismic activity in the
nearest zone (R < 100 km), the mass of radioactive tailings, with a volume of 400–600
thousand m3, burst from this tailings dam, was propagated as a mudflow with 250m3/s water
discharge downstream into the Mailuu-Suu river, causing the destruction of some civil and
industrial structures and the radioactive contamination of a river bed, a floodplain and the
valley train of the river, including some areas in Uzbekistan.
At the present time, the largest risk is at the site of the vast (V > 5-7 million m3) Koitash
landslide (Fig. 2). In the case of a river valley blockage during the simultaneous unloading of
this landslide, a dam of 15–25 m height may be formed, and the weakly stable tailings Nos 5
and 7 with a total volume about 800 thousand m3, may be enclosed within this submergence
zone. The largest submergence risk is in the spring season and at the beginning of summer,
when water discharge to the Mailuu-Suu river (at the crest segment) may reach 100 m3/s. The
computation shows that, based on the most pessimistic scenario - absolute destruction of
tailings Nos 3, 5, 7, 8, 18 (Fig. 2) through the direct or indirect influence of Tektonik and
Koitash landslides - the total volume of radioactive tailings which may be dispersed on the
flood-plain and on the debris cone of the river, may be approximately 1 million m3 (total
activity is about 1014 Bq).
In order to reduce the risk of uranium tailings landslide destruction at Mailuu-Suu, it is
planned, during the next 2–3 years, to introduce a series of preventive measures and projects,
including the southern flank unloading of the Tektonik landslide, the transportation of Nos 3
and 8 tailings to a safer zone, a bypass tunnel construction on a site of possible river blockage
by the Koitash landslide, as well as the provision of monitoring and an early warning system
for landslide hazards in the area of the uranium tailings.
2.
GEOENVIRONMENTAL RISKS IN MIN-KUSH SETTLEMENT
Within the last years, an emergency situation has arisen in the area of the Tuyuk-Syy
uranium tailings store located directly in a river-bed (Fig. 3) linked to the Naryn river basin
(Syrdarya). These tailings are at a height of more than 2000 m above sea level, and they
occupy a 5 hectare zone, in which 640 000 m3 of Kavak uranium tailing waste, including
450 000 m3 of radioactive tailings, have been concentrated.
FIG. 3. View of the tailings and landslide in valley of river Tuyuk-Suu.
Based on the results of a comparative risk analysis of the Tuyk-Syy tailings, it is
considered that, at the present time, the greatest risk is associated with the destruction of the
supporting dam and the by-pass channel. This could happen if mudflows passed through it
following a landslide event. Such a landslide began to develop during the moisture-abundant
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TOPICAL SESSION 6
spring of 2004 on the right hand side of a narrow valley 120–150 m lower than the study
tailing area (Fig 3).
FIG. 4. Modelling results of a landslide blockage of the river in the lower part of the TuyukSu tailings.
The development of this landslide movement, predicted to occur during Spring 2009,
would be dominated by blockage of this narrow valley with a landslide dam, of height,
according to calculations, of more than 30 m over the Tuyuk-Suu river bottom (Fig. 4). An
under-pond lake would be created with a volume of more than 500 000 m3 which would lead
to tailings submergence. The results of a stability assessment of the lower supporting
radioactive waste dam showed that, due to water saturation of the tailings body, the stability
factor is rather low even without taking into consideration the submergence and/or dynamic
forces from possible earthquakes. In the case of the unexpected breaking of the dam due to
landslides, an outburst flow (wave) with an initial water discharge up to 600 m3/s capturing
and entraining radioactive tailings in its movement, could occur. In the final analysis, there is
a high probability of, not only the destruction of the Min-Kush settlement housing located in
the adjoining zone of the Tuyuk-Suu river outfall, but of the subsequent extensive
contamination of Min-Kush, Kokomeren, Naryn riverbeds and flood-plains by radioactive
waste.
As preventive measures, landslide movement monitoring is being carried out and
special arrangements have been planned for the controlled water discharge in the case of river
blockage by landslide masses. The longer-term plan is to transfer the Tyuk-Suu tailings to the
safer zone adjoining the Min-Kush settlement.
3.
CONCLUSIONS
The high probability of hydrodynamic accidents and environmental catastrophes of both
regional and transboundary character in storage areas for radioactive and toxic mining waste
in Mailuu-Suu, Min-Kush and other areas of Central Asia is mainly due to the fact by that
these waste stores are located in the influence zones of hazardous geological processes
(earthquakes, landslides, avalanches, mudflows), which are typical for the geodynamic active
mountain areas of Tien-Shan.
During the designing and building of these stores planners did not take into
consideration the specificity of the mountain region with high geodynamic activity, the weak
geomechanical stability of mountain slopes when influenced by anthropogenic activities, the
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propagation of hazardous natural processes and phenomena in mountain areas and the high
environmental vulnerability of mountain zones to climate changes. The short-sighted
engineering decisions made during the storage of radioactive and toxic waste in catchment
areas in narrow river valleys and on slopes with landslide hazards have, after 40–50 years, led
to the transformation of local landslide hazards into regional and transboundary health and
environmental risks associated with radioactive contamination.
REFERENCES
[1]
[2]
TORGOEV, I.A., ALESHIN, Y.G., MELESHKO, A.V., et al., Hazard Mitigation for Landslide
Dams in Mailuu-Suu Valley (Kyrgyzstan), Italian Journal of Engineering Geology and
Environment, Special Issue on Security of Natural and Artificial Rockslides Dams, NATO
ARW, Bishkek (Kyrgyzstan) (2004) 99–102.
TORGOEV, I., ALESHIN, Y., KOVALENKO, D., et al., Risk assessment of emergency
situation initiation in the uranium tailings of Kyrgyzstan, Uranium in the Environment, Springer
Verlag (2006) 563–570.
151
THE RADIOLOGICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL SITUATION NEAR TO THE
DECOMMISSIONED URANIUM MINES IN UZBEKISTAN
E.A. DANILOVA*, A.A. KIST*, R.I. RADYUK*, G.A. RADYUK*, U.S.
SALIKHBAEV*, P. STEGNAR**, A. VASIDOV*, A.A. ZHURAVLEV*
* Institute of Nuclear Physics,
Tashkent, Uzbekistan
**
Jozef Stefan Institute,
Ljubljana, Slovenia
Abstract
Uzbekistan is an important producer of uranium. There are several operational as well as decommissioned
uranium production enterprises in Uzbekistan which lack appropriate strategies for remediation, mainly due to
the unavailability of the necessary information. Their remediation is complicated because many of the mining
and tailing sites are located in mountainous areas and in the vicinity of rivers (which are potential drinking water
supplies). Many of the tailings sites are endangered by possible mudflows. Radioactivity measurements have
been carried out in the vicinity of several of the decommissioned mining and tailing sites, such as Yangiabad,
Chorkesar and Krasnogorsk. Outdoor and indoor radon levels have been measured and the results obtained have
been used for radiation dose assessment purposes. In addition, the concentrations of radionuclides have been
determined in soil, water and foodstuff specimens collected near to the decommissioned mining and milling
sites. The results obtained have been used for a preliminary radiological and environmental assessment as a basis
for establishing an appropriate strategy for remediation.
1.
INTRODUCTION
Uzbekistan, along with other Central Asian Republics, is a significant producer of
uranium. As a result of uranium mining in the past, there are dumps of tailings and rocks
which contain radioactive and toxic elements. In many cases, the dumps are located in
mountain areas near to rivers, which are sources of water for the population. Many of the
dumps are endangered by periodic mudflows which may transfer materials into the rivers. All
of these conditions create environmental and potential health problems, since the local
population obtains its livelihood from agriculture in the neighbourhood of the tailings piles.
For these reasons, there is a need to carry out radiological examinations in such territories
with the purpose of estimating the risk to the public and, if necessary, developing strategies
for health protection and environmental remediation.
It is noted that this problem is very important for all countries of the Central Asian
region because of the commonality of climate and hydrosphere and because of the exchange
of foodstuffs between them. Some mines are close to the Uzbekistan border. For example, one
of the largest decommissioned mines in Kyrgyzstan is only 8 km from the Uzbekistan border
and the potential hazard to local populations in Kyrgyzstan is likely to be greater than to those
in Uzbekistan. Fig. 1 shows the location of mines in Uzbekistan and their proximity to
country borders.
2.
ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING
Environmental monitoring missions have been carried out to measure gamma dose
rates, indoor and outdoor concentrations of radon (Radon-222) in air, and to collect samples
of water, soil and foodstuffs in the areas of the former uranium mines. Measurements were
carried out in Yangiabad (Tashkent district), Krasnogorsk (Tashkent district) and Chorkesar
(Namangan district in Fergana valley).
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FIG. 1. Uranium mines in Uzbekistan and mines close to the state border.
The village of Yangiabad is situated 140 km from the capital of Uzbekistan, Tashkent.
The territory of Yangiabad is about 77 hectares in area. In the village there is a municipal
hospital, a kindergarten, a children’s day nursery, a school, private houses and other
buildings. The buildings of the village were built in the 1950s using mainly imported
materials; only some of the buildings were built using local raw materials (some of the
building material may have been taken from the vicinity of the local mine). Close to the
village is the mining and milling site. In the neighbouring area are radioactive waste deposits
from mining covering an area of 50 km2. The total amount of radioactive waste is about
500 000 m3. The gamma radiation dose rates in the polluted areas are in the range 0.60 to
2.0 Sv/h.
The village of Chorkesar is situated 20 km from the regional centre Pap of the
Namangan district (Fergana valley). There are schools, a kindergarten, a hospital and other
buildings. This village is very close to two decommissioned uranium mines, Chorkesar-1 and
Chorkesar-2. Uranium was produced using mining and underground leaching techniques to
depths of 280 m. The radioactive waste is stored in dumps covered with soil which, in places,
has been washed away by rainfall. The total activity of the radionuclides in the waste dump is
estimated to be 3х1013 Bq. The total volume of the tailings is estimated to be 480 000m3 deposited on an area of 206 000m2. There are three large tailing sites and one open cast site.
They are separated from the local settlement by a 1m stone fence. However, the fence is
damaged in several places and access to the territory of the mine is possible for the local
population and cattle. Radiation dose rates here are in the range 3.0–4.5 Sv/h. Underground
water flows from several of the mines. This water contains high concentrations of uranium,
radium and radon and may be used by inhabitants and livestock.
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The village of Krasnogorsk (14 000 inhabitants) is situated at 40 km from Tashkent.
There are three tailing sites near to the village. Radiation monitoring has been carried out in
this area, doses to the local population have been estimated and the natural radiation
background of the area has been measured. Measurements have been made of radon (by
active and passive methods), gamma radiation (dose rate and gamma spectra), and
environmental samples have been taken for analysis.
3.
RADON MEASUREMENTS
The elevated concentration of radon-222 is correlated with the content of uranium in
rocks. Sources of radon can be soils, water, mining and mill tailings, ores, and building
materials. The hazard to the health of the population is connected not only to the level of
radiation dose received but also to the duration of the exposure and the age of the exposed
population. The risk of development of a cancer from radon decreases with age, and for
smokers this hazard is increased by about 10 times [1, 2]. The indoor levels of radon in air
were measured in the 30 most frequently visited buildings (school, kindergartens, first-aid
post, hospital, magistrates office, living houses, etc.) in Yangiabad, in 5 rooms in
Krasnogorsk and in 18 similar premises in Chorkesar. The concentration of radon in
Yangiabad was in the range 70–350 Bq/m3 (the average was 200 Bq/m3). Significantly
elevated levels were found in buildings constructed from local materials (up to 770 Bq/m 3).
The concentration of radon in Krasnogorsk was in the range 30-100 Bq/m3. In Chorkesar, the
concentrations of radon were in the range 80–390 Bq/m3 (average 250 Bq/m3). High levels
were found in two premises (670 and 1410 Bq/m3). According to national regulations, the
average annual concentration of radon in the air of inhabited rooms should not exceed 80
Bq/m3 [3].
The effective annual exposure doses of the population were calculated. In Yangiabad,
the effective dose was found 0.9–4.0 mSv/y (average 3 mSv/y) and for two rooms with high
concentrations of radon it was 5.4 and 19.2 mSv/y. This means that in Yangiabad, the
effective annual exposure dose does not exceed the permissible value, except for the
occupants of the two rooms. In Krasnogorsk, the effective dose was 0.6–2.3 mSv/y. In
Chorkesar, the effective dose was 2.0–6.5 mSv/y (average 4.5 mSv/y). In three rooms it was
8.7, 8.8 and 13.5 mSv/y.
Gamma dose rates were also measured in the same premises. In Yanghiabad they were
0.2–0.4 Sv/h, in Krasnogorsk 0.15–0.27 Sv/h. and in Chorkesar 0.3–0.75 Sv/h.
4.
RADIONUCLIDES IN WATER AND SOIL
In the Chorkesar area there are leakages of water from mine drifts close to the village.
Water samples (5 L) were taken from this area. To prevent sorption of elements on the walls
of flasks, the samples were acidified using high purity nitric acid. Samples of soil (1 kg) were
dried, milled, sieved and averaged by quartering. In water taken from the mine shaft, the
following levels were found: Pb-214 - 5.2 Bq/kg, Bi-214 - 4.0 Bq/kg and Ra-226 – 2.7 Bq/kg.
The concentration of radium-226 exceeds the permissible value (0.5 Bq/kg) by about 5 times
[3]. The concentrations of radionuclides in soil taken from the area where there is leakage of
water from shaft are given in Table 1.
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TOPICAL SESSION 6
TABLE 1. RADIONUCLIDE CONTENTS OF SOIL (BQ/KG)
Nuclide
Tl-208
Pb-212
Bi-212
Pb-214
Bi-214
Ra-226
Concn.
349
1100
1200
4900
4600
62 800
Nuclide
Th-234
U-235
Pa-234m
Ra-223
Pb-210
Conc.
22 100
2700
73 600
3900
15 000
These data show that the soil is contaminated and that remediation or removal and
burying of the soil is necessary.
5.
FOODSTUFFS
Some foodstuffs are produced in contaminated areas near to decommissioned mines
(fruit, vegetables, meat, milk, etc.). To study this problem, the typical daily diet in Yangiabad
and Chorkesar was determined. It was observed that the foodstuffs: milk, bread, flour,
pancakes, pasta, carrots, fruits, tomatoes, beet, radish, onion, cabbage, meat, water, were
bought in local shops and markets (bazaars). A model daily diet was prepared. The diet was
analyzed using gamma spectrometry and neutron activation analysis. The daily radionuclide
intake is given in the Table 2.
TABLE 2. DAILY INTAKE OF RADIONUCLIDES WITH FOODSTUFFS (BQ)
Nuclide
40
К
226
Ra
238
U
Yangiabad
140 ± 17
< 1.0
< 2.0
Krasnogorsk
270 ± 17
< 1.0
<1.0
Chorkesar
133 ± 15
19 ±3
12 ± 8.04
In Chorkesar, the intake of radium-226 and uranium-238 with foodstuffs is significantly
higher than in Yangiabad and Krasnogorsk.
6.
CONCLUSION
– The results obtained show that the decommissioned mines have a serious impact on
the environment and possibly on the health of the local inhabitants;
– The results show that the elaboration of a strategy for the remediation of the territories
is needed as well as some additional studies;
– It is also necessary to carry out a more complete estimation of the concentrations and
of the behaviour of radionuclides and toxic elements in the environment of the
decommissioned mines and to compare the data obtained with health statistics data;
– It is necessary to carry out measurement and assessment studies over wider areas
because of the long transport distances of the radioactive and toxic elements;
– Additional useful information may be obtained by analyzing additional types of
samples, including bottom sediments, airborne particles, human bio substrates (human
hair); etc.
– For a more complete estimation of the hazard it would be interesting to study
experimentally the leaching of the radioactive and toxic elements from waste by the
river water to obtain a better indication of the consequences of transport of the tailings
into rivers by mudflows;
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– It is important to promote, possibly through international projects, the wider exchange
of results obtained among Central Asian countries because of the similarity of
conditions and the interconnection of transport media (e.g. rivers).
REFERENCES
[1]
[2]
[3]
POLKA, J., Health Risks of Radon are given a New Look, NatureV.331 6152 (1988) 107.
CASTRÉN, O., Strategies to Reduce Exposure to Indoor Radon, Radiation Protection
Dosimetry 24 1–4 (1988) 487-490.
SANITARY NORMS AND REGULATIONS IN RADIATION SAFETY, Uzbekistan, No
0193–2006, (2006) (in Russian).
157
MULTIPLE STRESSORS – ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT AT SITES
CONTAMINATED WITH RADIONUCLIDES AND METALS
B. SALBU
Norwegian University of Life Sciences,
Aas, Norway
Abstract
Various nuclear events have contributed to the radioactive contamination of the environment. At most of
the affected sites, however, the contamination includes not only radionuclides but also other contaminants, such
as metals. Following nuclear events such as nuclear weapon tests, nuclear accidents with reactors, releases from
nuclear installations and leaching from dumped nuclear waste, a major fraction of refractory radionuclides, such
as the isotopes of uranium and plutonium, are associated with particles containing metals. Particles containing
radionuclides and metals have also been identified at uranium mining and tailings sites, for instance, at sites in
Central Asia. Here, the uranium isotopes and uranium daughter radionuclides are integrated in mineral structures
with elevated levels of heavy metals. As radionuclides and metals can induce free radicals and affect the same
biological endpoints, multiple stressor exposures may lead to additive, antagonistic or synergetic effects in
exposed organisms, both in humans and biota. Therefore, the multiple stressor concept should be integrated into
radioecology, as the observed effects may not be attributed to one stressor alone but to the action of mixtures.
This paper presents some challenges related to the multiple stressor effects in radioecology and for the
assessment of the environmental impacts associated with contaminated sites.
1.
INTRODUCTION
Radionuclides, artificially produced or naturally derived, rarely occur alone. Sources
contributing to radioactive contamination often contain a mixture of radionuclides as well as
metals. Processes affecting ecosystem behaviour, mobility, biological uptake, metabolism and
the accumulation of radionuclides will also influence trace metals. Furthermore, radiation
induced free radicals resulting in biological umbrella endpoints such as reproduction failure,
immune system failure, genetic instability and mutation, morbidity, and mortality can also be
induced by free radicals arising from metals exposure. In mixed contaminated areas,
organisms are exposed to a cocktail of contaminants, i.e. multiple stressors [1]. One single
stressor may induce multiple biological effects if multiple interactions occur or if interactions
with different biological targets take place. In mixtures with several different stressors,
multiple types of interactions and interactions with multiple target sites may occur. For
contaminants having the same mode of interactions with the same target sites, effects can be
concentration-additive (1+1=2), antagonistic (1+1  2) or synergistic (1+1 >2). If
contaminants have different modes of interaction, and act at different target sites, they should
act independently. As information on interaction mode and target sites for most contaminants
is scarce, well-controlled mechanistic experiments, utilising advanced molecular and genetic
tools are needed to identify early biological responses.
To protect the environment from contaminants, authorities apply Environmental Quality
Standards (EQSs) that are based on a one dimensional concept, assessing one component
independently of others. So far, the system has been directed towards contaminants such as
metals and organic compounds, while attempts are being made to derive EQSs also for
radionuclides. Problems arise from extrapolating toxicity data: from acute to chronic effects,
from laboratory to field conditions, from effect concentration to no-effect concentration and
from isolated test-species to complex systems. According to the Organization for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD), uncertainties in extrapolation can be covered by
Safety Factors, being 100, 10, and 1 for acute, chronic and field data, respectively [2]. Taking
the multiple stressor approach into account, including synergisms and antagonisms, the
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uncertainties could go far beyond those estimated for individual stressors. Therefore, there is
an urgent need to improve the scientific bases for establishing EQSs for mixed contaminants
and to assess the impact from mixtures.
2.
SOURCES CONTRIBUTING TO MIXED RADIONUCLIDE AND METAL
RELEASES
Over the years, artificially produced and naturally occurring radionuclides have been
released to the environment from a variety of sources related to nuclear weapons and the civil
nuclear cycle; releases have occurred from nuclear weapons tests, accidents with vehicles
carrying nuclear weapons, nuclear reactor accidents, such as fires or explosions, nuclear waste
dumped at sea, effluents from the operation of nuclear installations as well as from uranium
mining and tailings sites. Radionuclides are seldom released individually, but as mixtures, and
the environmental impact from radioactive contamination can be attributed to mixtures rather
than to individual radionuclides.
Releases of radionuclides usually contain other environmental ‘stressors’, such as stable
trace metals. To identify multiple stressor releases, the techniques of advanced particle
analysis can be utilized, since a major fraction of released refractory radionuclides such as the
isotopes of uranium is associated with particles. This has been clearly demonstrated within the
International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) Co-ordinated Research Project (CRP) on the
characterization of radioactive particles from different nuclear sources [3]. Radioactive
particles in the environment are defined as localized aggregates of radioactive atoms that give
rise to an inhomogeneous distribution of radionuclides significantly different from that of the
matrix background [3, 4]. ‘Hot spots’ identified in the field reflect the presence of particles.
Based on radioautography (P-imaging), environmental scanning electron microscopy (ESEMEDX) and synchrotron radiation X-ray microscopic techniques such as µ-XRF and µ-XRD,
[3, 4], radioactive particles have been identified in the environment. Examples are:
– Nuclear weapons tests, including peaceful nuclear detonations at Semipalatinsk,
Kazakhstan;
– Accidents associated with the detonation of nuclear weapons by conventional
explosives (Palomares, Spain, and Thule, Greenland);
– Reactor accidents such as Chernobyl;
– Effluents from nuclear installations (Sellafield and Dounreay, United Kingdom; La
Hague, France; Krasnoyarsk and Mayak, Russian Federation);
– Leaching from radioactive waste dumped at sea;
– The use of depleted uranium ammunition (Kosovo, Kuwait);
– Uranium mining and tailings in Central Asia.
These techniques have been utilized for the characterization of particles with respect to
radionuclide and metal composition as well as crystalline structures. Radioactive particles
from most of these sites contain a variety of radionuclides as well as different trace metals.
Furthermore, the radionuclide and metals composition of the released particles depend on the
source, while particle characteristics, such as particle size distribution, crystallographic
structures, oxidation states and weathering rates, also depend on the associated release
scenarios [5, 6].
2.1. Case: mixed particles released during the Chernobyl accident
Following the Chernobyl accident, radioactive particles varying in composition, size,
shape, structure and colour were identified, ranging from compact small-sized crystalline
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SALBU
single particles to large amorphous aggregates [5, 7]. Fragments and large particles settled
close to the site, while small-sized particles were transported to more than 2000 km from the
site [5]. Based on synchrotron-radiation X-ray micro-techniques, it has been shown that inert
fuel particles with a core of UO2 and with surface layers of U-C or U-Zr were released during
the initial explosion. In contrast, more soluble fuel particles with a UO2 core and surface
layers of oxidised uranium were released during the fire [5]. The particle weathering rate and
soil to plant transfer was low for particles released during the explosion and high for particles
released during the fire [6]. Using advanced techniques, a variety of fission products, as well
as trace metals, were identified within individual U particles. Therefore, particle weathering
results in the remobilization and ecosystem transfer, not only of radionuclides, but also of
trace metals [5–7].
2.2. Case: mixed particles associated with uranium mining sites
During the Cold War, the Central Asian Republics (Kazkhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan,
Uzbekistan) were the major suppliers of uranium for the nuclear weapons and nuclear energy
programmes of the former Soviet Union. Mining sites were established to extract uranium
from different enriched resources such as hydrothermal and sedimentary deposits. At the
mining sites, ore crushing took place, and, at some of the sites, the first steps in the chemical
leaching procedure (acid leaching) were performed. The operation of uranium mining and
milling enterprises produced a large volume of low-level radioactive waste in the form of
crushed rock deposits, rock spoil heaps, hydro-metallurgical plant tailings dumps, and basins
of mine waters. In recent years, detailed investigations of the radionuclide and metal
contamination at selected sites in the Central Asian countries have been performed by the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) RESCA project and the Joint Project between
Norway-Kazakhstan- Kyrgyzstan-Tajikistan. From the results of these projects, it has been
demonstrated that elevated levels of a variety of metals can be observed at all investigated
sites, although the levels of the metals vary according to ore deposits and geological
characteristics. Using advanced techniques, metals and radionuclides can be identified within
individual particles. In many places, the observed elevated levels of metals, such as arsenic,
require restrictions/remediation action even without considering the radioactivity levels.
Taking the multiple stressor concept into account, remedial measures at several sites may be
needed.
3.
MULTIPLE STRESSORS
Some stressors, such as radiation and trace metals, induce free radicals in organisms due
to the excitation and ionisation of water molecules in cells and Haber–Weiss and Fenton
reactions. The free radicals produced are extremely reactive and will recombine and produce
various reactive compounds in cells (e.g. HO2, H2O2, H2, O2) which may result in damage to
membranes, tissues, enzymes, proteins and DNA/RNA. Following free radical induction, a
number of biological endpoints can be influenced, such as superoxide dismutase (SOD),
catalase, the glutathion cycle, and lipid peroxidation, enzyme inactivation and DNA strand
breakage. Mixed exposures, in particular, long term chronic exposure to low concentrations of
contaminants, may result in a variety of negative biological responses: free radical production
and induced oxidative stress, causing important biomolecules such as chromosomes to change
or degrade; effects on the immune system, altering susceptibilities to infectious diseases;
effects on the neurological system, affecting developmental and differentiation processes.
Traditional endpoints, like survival and growth, are not sufficiently sensitive to detect
the various potential chronic effects. Mechanistic studies performed under well-controlled
exposure conditions utilising modern advanced molecular and genetic tools to identify
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TOPICAL SESSION 6
induced effects are needed for studying effects following low dose chronic exposures of
multiple stressors [8].
3.1. Case: Multiple stressor exposure experiments
To illustrate the combined effects of radionuclide and metal mixtures (multiple stressor)
exposures, experiments with Atlantic Salmon (Salmo salar) have been carried out. The
experiments were designed to identify cellular effects in key organs in salmon after exposure
‘in vivo’ to low dose gamma radiation and subtoxic levels of aluminum (Al) and
cadmium(Cd), alone or in combination, using a reporter cell line for the determination of
stress signal activity (Bystander effects). Radiation doses as low as 4 mGy delivered over 5
hours, alone or in combination with Cd and/or Al, caused bystander signals to be produced in
tissues harvested from ‘in vivo’ exposed salmon. The effects varied between different organs
and were not consistently additive or synergistic for a given treatment. Tissue type also
appears to be critical, with gill cells showing high degrees of synergism between radiation and
metal exposure. Most data for Cd suggest also that lower toxicity is found when the metal is
used in combination with radiation exposure [9, 10]. Compared to responses induced by the
individual stressors, the combination of metals and low gamma doses resulted in responses
that would not be predicted from the extrapolation of toxicity data for single stressors.
4.
CONCLUSIONS
When radionuclides are released to the environment, they are rarely released as single
radionuclides but, rather, they are in mixtures containing other radionuclides and other
stressors such as stable trace metals. As a result of historic events, mixtures of stressors have
been released to the environment. In most radioactively contaminated areas, organisms are
therefore exposed to a ‘cocktail’ of contaminants, i.e. multiple stressors. Despite this fact,
impact assessments and regulations tend to be based on one dimensional concepts, assessing
one component independently of the others; one stressor at a time.
The scientific basis for protecting the environment from radiation associated with one
single radionuclide still represents a challenge, as concepts associated with low dose chronic
exposure and related effects are, to a certain extent, based on cancer in man. Thus,
improvements in knowledge about dose–effect units, radiation effects, dose rate effects,
internal–external radiation effects and dose–biological endpoint relationships for biota for one
radionuclide and for radionuclide mixtures are still crucial topics in radioecology.
It is internationally recognised that there are severe gaps in basic knowledge with
respect to biological responses to multiple stressor exposures. The identification of biological
responses to mixed exposure calls for early warning biomarkers, utilising modern molecular
and genetic tools. Information on dose–response relationships (on/off mechanisms),
sensitivity (detection limits, thresholds), and synergetic and antagonistic effects, as well as the
role of protecting agents such as antioxidants, is therefore needed. The development of
advanced techniques to characterize mixed exposures and to link mixed exposures to early
responses in sensitive organisms, utilizing advanced biomarkers, should be encouraged in
order to increase knowledge about biological impacts from multiple stressors in the future
[11].
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future, Journal of Environmental Monitoring 7 1–2 (2005).
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[2]
ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, (OECD).
(http://puck.sourceoecd.org/vl=3238197/cl=45/nw=1/rpsv/periodical/p15_about.htm?jnlissn=16
07310x)
[3] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Radioactive Particles in the Environment:
Sources, Particle Characterization and Analytical Techniques, IAEA-TECDOC-1663, IAEA,
Vienna (2011).
[4] SALBU, B., Fractionation of radionuclide species in the environment, Journal of Environmental
Radioactivity 100 4 (2009) 283-289.
[5] SALBU, B., KREKLING, T., LIND, O.C., et al., High energy X-ray microscopy for
characterisation of fuel particles, Nuclear Instruments and Methods, Part A, 467 (21) (2001)
1249–1252.
[6] KASHPAROV, V.A., OUGHTON, D.H., PROTSAK, V.P., Kinetics of fuel particle weathering
and 90Sr mobility in the Chernobyl 30 km exclusion zone, Health Physics 76 (1999) 251–259.
[7] SALBU, B., Speciation of Radionuclides, Encyclopaedia Analytical Chemistry 12993–13016
(2000).
[8] MOTHERSILL, C., SEYMOUR, R.J., SEYMOUR, C.B., Bystander effects in repair-deficient
cell lines, Radiation Research 161 (2004) 256–263.
[9] MOTHERSILL, C., SALBU, B., HEIER, L. S., Multiple stressor effects of radiation and metals
in salmon (Salmo salar), Journal of Environmental Radioactivity 96 1–3 (2007) 20–31.
[10] SALBU, B., DENBEIGH, J., SMITH, R.W., Environmentally Relevant Mixed Exposures to
Radiation and Heavy Metals Induce Measurable Stress Responses in Atlantic Salmon, Environ.
Sci. Technol. 42 (2008) 3441–3446.
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163
INDUSTRIAL ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING — A LAND
RESTORATION COSTS TRACKING TOOL
M. ISKAKOV, M. NURGAZIYEV, B. ELEYUSHOV, P. KAYUKOV
National Atomic Company, (Kazatomprom),
Almaty, Kazakhstan
Abstract
This paper describes a procedure in use in Kazakhstan for controlling the rehabilitation of sites damaged
by undersurface operations. It sets out the legal requirements and a methodology for Production Environmental
Control in which a procedure is established for monitoring and impact assessment and for optimizing
remediation approaches, taking into account the environmental impact and the associated costs of different
options.
1.
INTRODUCTION
In operations which involve activities in the subsurface zone, e.g. near-surface mining,
the organization and implementation of the subsequent reclamation of the disturbed land has
an important role. In this context, reclamation means the works necessary for restoration of
the land which was lost as a result of the land disturbance caused by the subsurface
operations. ‘Land disturbance’ is considered to have a broad meaning and includes the loss of
economic value or the reduction in the potential utility of the area due to damage of the soil
cover, the hydrological regime or other adverse changes. In accordance with national
legislation in Kazakhstan, provisions for the restoration of land and other natural bodies
disturbed as a result of subsurface operations are being made by establishing an abandonment
fund and a remediation programme.
2.
NATIONAL REGULATIONS
In Kazakhstan, the utilization of natural resources and their environmental impacts is
controlled by a number of regulations. The basic regulation, in this context, is the
Environmental Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated January 9, 2007 No.212-Sh ZRK.
This regulation sets out special environmental requirements for users of natural resources,
among which are requirements concerning the reclamation of disturbed lands. Some of these
requirements are given below:
– Production techniques must be applied which are in compliance with sanitary and
epidemiologic requirements and which prevent operations from causing harm to the
health of people and damage to the environment by implementing the best available
technologies;
– Actions must be taken for the reclamation of disturbed lands and the restoration of
land to its previous state.
The requirements for land and subsurface resource protection and for the
decommissioning of nuclear facilities are also described in other regulations of the Republic
of Kazakhstan. According to the Law ‘On the resources and subsoil use’, the right to carry out
works involving subsoil use can only be exercised after the establishment of a contract
between the Government and the subsoil user. By filing for an application for subsoil use, a
company already takes on a reclamation obligation and according to the contract terms and
conditions, an abandonment fund has to be established by the subsoil user to remove the
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effects of subsoil use operations. The amount of the contributions to the fund and the
procedure for implementation is stipulated by the contract. The abandonment fund money can
be used upon authorization by the competent body (the regulator in the field of subsoil use).
Thus, right from the start of the development of a subsurface activity, the applicant must
begin to think about the reclamation of land and subsoil resources after the completion of
activities at the site.
3.
PRODUCTION ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL
In in-situ leaching operations, mining soil and vegetation cover undergo significant
changes and, even at the outset of reclamation activities at in-situ leaching mining facilities,
there is strong evidence of this impact.
Due to the rapid development of the in-situ leaching technique in uranium deposit
mining, proper solutions do not yet exist which take account of the new objectives for
environmental protection. The use of modern techniques for uranium mining has provided an
increase in production efficiency and a decrease in solid, liquid and gaseous waste. At the
same time, in-situ leaching mining can produce significant impacts on the environment when
environmental requirements are not met during mining operations and when preventive
measures to avoid or mnimize environment pollution are not available.
The application of Production Environmental Control at all stages of the land
reclamation process for land areas damaged by uranium exploration and mining has proved to
be very effective in achieving successful land reclamation programmes; this is one of the
forms of control stipulated by the environmental law.
TABLE 1. LIFE CYCLE OF LAND RECLAMATION ACTIONS
Period prior to reclamation
Design Stage
Restoration Period
Post-reclamation period
Review of environment conditions. Obtain data on natural
background concentrations of chemical and radioactive
substances in the environment prior to deposit development. Mine
designing and construction.
Mine operation. Environmental monitoring to meet the objectives
of the expected reclamation as contained in the Production
Environmental Control programme.
Reclamation Project - Environment Impact Assessment including
Production Environmental Monitoring programmes.
Land plots reclamation in accordance with design solutions
Implementation of environmental measures
Implementation of Production Environmental Control
Radiation and sanitary control at abandoned facilities
Implementation of Production Environmental Control
Accounting and Reporting
As can be seen from the life cycle chart in Table 1, there is a period prior to reclamation
during which the environment monitoring of land areas where reclamation is to be carried out
is required. Such an approach is required for the purpose of minimizing environment pollution
and for saving funds during the budgeting of reclamation expenditures; it includes design and
exploration surveys, soil and field surveys, laboratory analysis, and mapping. All such
activities must be included in the Production Environmental Control Programme. As part of
this, environmental and radiation monitoring data are to be collected and analyzed for the
estimation of future reclamation costs.
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ISKAKOV et al.
Production Environmental Control in the life cycle period prior to reclamation means:
– A mechanism to identify, study and assess obvious and hidden damage to the natural
state of environmental components which might lead to its degradation or
deterioration;
– A tool for the control of the environmental impact of the operation and for preventing
and eliminating violations of environmental standards and rules;
– A method for providing information to the public about any environmental and
population health risks associated with the operation;
– An instrument for providing inputs to decision making on possible future activities of
the enterprise (reconstruction, renewal, conversion, temporary closure, closing down
of individual sites).
The content and volume of the work performed is defined primarily by the tasks
prescribed in the Production Environmental Control System. The list of such tasks may be
rather long and specific. Among the typical tasks of Production Environmental Control to be
implemented within the pre-reclamation period of in-situ leaching mining are the following:
– System analysis and evaluation of environmental aspects, continuous radioecological
monitoring of production technological processes (possibly based on an automated
system of continuous environmental and radiation monitoring on the lands to be
reclaimed);
– Minimization of adverse environmental impacts;
– Use of natural and energy resources;
– Creation of an environmental monitoring database on the territory of the enterprise,
the sanitary protection area and neighbouring populated areas;
– Prevention of accidental environment pollution and development of planned corrective
actions (in case it happens);
– Record keeping – timely submission of reports on the results of Production
Environmental Control to State authorities.
Thus, the system of Production Environmental Control is represented at every stage of
the land reclamation. The main elements can be presented as the following sequence of
actions:
– First – collection and handling of information at the source of contamination
(monitoring);
– Second stage – detection and elimination of deviations from the technological
requirements relevant to the source (clear task distribution among the staff plays a
determining role during this stage.);
– Last – the basis of the whole interaction chain is taking management decisions aimed
at the end effect – minimization of environmental pollution through compliance with
ecological standards and requirements. This is directly connected to the modernization
or reprofiling of production and the fulfillment of environmental actions.
The planning of environmental and radiation monitoring at sites subject to rehabilitation
should be done within the framework of the Programme for Production Environmental
Control developed by an enterprise. It should be noted that environmental monitoring
includes experimental (on a measurement basis) or indirect (on a calculation basis) evaluation
of the conditions of the production process, the emissions (and radiation exposure) as a result
of operations, and the state of the environment in accordance with the requirements set by the
relevant legislation. Direct measurements can be done by staff or by outside accredited
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TOPICAL SESSION 6
laboratories. Irrespective of the monitoring organizational structure, the enterprise conducting
special environmental management is fully responsible for information quality.
Uranium-mining enterprises that are a part of JSNAC Kazatomprom are obliged to
develop a Programme for Production Environmental Control and to implement it based on the
most effective approaches (direct and indirect) with regard to the monitoring of operational
characteristics, emissions and the state of the environment. An important role in Production
Environmental Control during land reclamation belongs to the Environmental Services of the
enterprise whose functions are as follows:
– Personnel training and education on the forms and methods for organizing monitoring
at a facility;
– Analysis of the reasons for non-compliance with the environmental requirements and
norms for radiation security at a contaminated site;
– Making decisions on the elimination of deviations and providing for compliance with
environmental aspects of the technological process;
– Formation of an environmental management system with clear allocation of
responsibilities for compliance with environmental laws, environmental quality
standards and radiation standards.
On the basis of the foregoing discussion, the importance of the role of the Production
Environmental Control and Management organization can be seen in the process of the
development and exploitation of uranium deposits, in the minimization of environmental
pollution as a result of such activities, and in the reduction of the financial costs associated
with the rehabilitation of the environment after its exploitation.
REFERENCES
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
168
ENVIRONMENTAL CODE OF THE REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN, No. 212 – III LRK
dated January 9, 2007 (2007).
LAW OF THE REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN, dated January 27, 1996, No. 2828, ‘About
subsoil and subsoil use’ (1996).
LAND CODE OF THE REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN.
LAW OF THE REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN, dated April 14, 1997 No. 93–I ‘On usage
of nuclear energy’ (1997).
JSNAC KAZATOMPROM, ST NAC 17.1-2008, Standard Programme for Production
Environmental Control of in-situ leaching enterprises (2008).
MINISTER FOR ENVIRONMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN, Rules for
Coordinating the programmes for Production Environmental Control and requirements on
reporting the results of Production Environmental Control, dated April 24, 2007, No. 123-p.
(2007).
JSC VOLKOVGEOLOGY, Environmental impact assessment of uranium mining by in-situ
leaching method at abandoned deposits – Northern Karamurun, Kanzhugan, Uvanas and
Mynkuduk. Almaty (2002).
SUMMARY OF SESSION 6
A. Kim
Kazakhstan
CASE STUDIES I: ENVIRONMENTAL REMEDIATION IN CENTRAL ASIAN
COUNTRIES
This session consisted of eight plenary presentations and was concerned with the status
of sites that have been contaminated with radioactive residues in the Central Asian countries
of Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan.
The four countries in Central Asia have common problems concerning residues due to
uranium mining and milling activities conducted mainly during the Cold War years. In
addition, the territory of Kazakhstan has been affected by nuclear weapons testing on several
locations.
It is recognized that environmental management took a back seat to operations while the
uranium mining was most active and, as a result, there are large areas of territory affected by
residues. The public is concerned in all of the countries about the potential impacts of the
releases of radioactivity into the environment.
The presentations showed there to be a general lack of data concerning the
characterization of the sites and a lack of experience and funding to perform remediation
activities; these are some of the reasons why these problems are still unresolved.
Many areas have elevated radiation backgrounds caused by a variety of circumstances,
for example, arising from the residues of the mining and processing of uranium ore but also
from the mining and processing of other minerals, from oil and gas exploration, from nuclear
weapons testing and due to naturally elevated concentrations of radionuclides in the soil.
Some of these conditions have led to increases in the radon concentrations in the atmosphere
in occupied areas and to groundwater which is used for drinking and agricultural purposes
being contaminated with radionuclides and/or chemicals and metals.
Each country has its own particular conditions. In some areas, precipitation has caused
the erosion of tailing piles; in others, landslides have caused significant changes in previously
stable storage sites. In some areas, residues have been used as building material in homes and
public buildings such as schools. Because of the physical geography of some of the Central
Asian countries, contaminants from one country can be transported by rapidly flowing rivers
across national borders.
Generally, although large land areas have been affected by uranium mining activities,
the associated radiological conditions are not sufficiently serious to justify ‘intervention’ on
the basis of international safety standards but, on the other hand, the radiation exposures can
often be reduced by simple expedients.
The radiological situation in these countries is currently being assessed - sometimes
with the aid of the international organizations. However, insufficient attention is being given
to the presence of chemicals and metals in the residues; in some cases these could represent
the main hazard to humans. One presentation raised the issue of large airborne particles
containing a mixture of radionuclides and metals - which have been detected at some sites,
e.g. the Semipalatinsk Nuclear Test Site. However, the hazards presented by these particles
are difficult to assess.
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SUMMARY OF SESSION 6
The following short term actions, if implemented, would assist in mitigating some of the
concerns at the uranium legacy sites:
– Perform comprehensive environmental impact assessments for each site to include all
potential contaminants (radiological and chemical);
– Identify alternative water supplies if ground water has been contaminated;
– Implement and maintain institutional controls at the sites;
– Perform routine monitoring to ensure the controls are performing their intended
functions;
– Increase public awareness of the local situation and answer public concerns about
safety issues.
While these near term actions are being implemented, longer term actions can be
identified and planning can be started to find permanent solutions.
It was clear from the presentations that there are a number of international organizations
providing support to the countries, but it was not clear if these support actions are fully
coordinated. It is also recognized that there is not a technical network which allows an
exchange of information among the countries and the coordination of activities.
170
CASE STUDIES II
(TOPICAL SESSION 7)
Chairperson
B. SALBU
Norway
CHALLENGES IN ESTIMATING PUBLIC RADIATION DOSE RESULTING
FROM LAND APPLICATION OF WATERS OF ELEVATED NATURAL
RADIOACTIVITY
P. LU*, R. AKBER**, A. BOLLHÖFER***
*
EWL Sciences,
Darwin, Australia
**
Safe Radiation Pty Ltd,
Calamvale, Australia
***
Supervising Scientist Division, Department of the Environment,
Darwin, Australia
Abstract
Ranger Uranium Mine is located in the northern wet/dry tropical region of Australia. The mine
implements a comprehensive water management programme and land application of water from its retention
pond 2 (RP2) is a part of that programme. The land application areas are located in common woodlands within
the mine lease boundary – the combined area is about 336 ha. RP2 contains run-off from the waste rock and low
grade ore stock piles and the water is therefore elevated in natural radionuclide activity concentration. When the
water is applied to the land, the radionuclides are adsorbed within a few centimeters of the surface. A
comprehensive project is cleanup to estimate the radiation dose likely to be received by the critical group during
occupancy of these areas after rehabilitation. The distribution of radionuclides and the traditional use of the land
are such that direct application of commonly used parameters in dose estimates through pathway analysis may
not be adequate. This paper describes the site, identifies the special aspects of the distribution of radioactivity on
the ground and their influence on radiation dose estimation through the different exposure pathways.
1.
INTRODUCTION
Ranger Uranium Mine is located in the Alligator Rivers uranium province in the
northern tropical region of Australia. Mining at Ranger commenced in 1980 and is still
continuing. The main uranium deposits at Ranger are hosted in altered schists and silicified
carbonates. Acid leaching is used to extract Uranium.
The total lease area of Ranger Uranium Mine is 7908 ha. It is located near the township
of Jabiru. The lease area is surrounded by Kakadu National Park which is World Heritage
listed both for its natural value and for its cultural significance due to ancient Aboriginal
habitation of the area.
The climate in the Alligator Rivers Region is monsoon-like with distinct wet and dry
seasons. Almost all of the rain falls during November to March and the dry season lasts from
about May to September. The mean average rainfall for the past 32 years at Jabiru Airport
was 1579 mm and the mean annual evaporation (2628 mm) exceeds the rainfall [1]. The
region is subject to severe weather events such as cyclones and floods. Seasonality adds to
distinctive features in the physiography of the land.
The seasonal and often unpredictable rainfall patterns pose water management
challenges for Ranger Uranium Mine. Run-off water from areas of above background natural
radioactivity is collected in retention ponds. Retention Pond 2 (RP2, Fig. 1) catches water
mainly from the waste rock and low grade ore stock pile areas at Ranger and consequently, it
exhibits elevated activity concentrations of naturally occurring radionuclides. The pond is
about 12m deep and 24.86 ha in surface area. The water volume retained at any time in the
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TOPICAL SESSION 7
pond varies – from nearly empty to its full capacity of 1 100 000m3. Some water from the
pond is used to sustain mining and milling operations, but since 1985, large volumes have
been disposed of through a technique of land application to common woodland within the
mine lease.
FIG. 1. Locations of land application areas (hatched) and retention pond 2 (RP2).
2.
LAND APPLICATION
Land application technology relies on the ability of soil and plant systems within the
application area to retain radionuclides, metals and some major ions from the applied water
volumes. As the land can be more appropriately monitored, managed and rehabilitated than
water, an advantage of successful land application of effluent waters is the transfer of the
constituents from a less manageable aqueous phase to a more containable solid phase. If
immobilized by adsorption in the soil system, the radionuclides will not reach the aquatic
ecosystems through run-off and sub-surface flow during subsequent wet seasons.
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LU et al.
TABLE 1. LAND APPLICATION AREAS AT RANGER URANIUM MINE
Location
Section
Magela
Original
Extension
Original
Extension
Original
Extension
RP1
Djalkmara
Jabiru East
Corridor Creek
Size (ha)
33
20
46
8
18
20
52
141
Year
commissioned
1985
1994
1995
2006
1997
1999
2006
2007
Water quality
unpolished
unpolished
polished
unpolished
polished
polished
unpolished
unpolished
The area of land application at Ranger has gradually increased (Table 1). Overall, 336
ha of land is now set aside for this purpose. Raw RP2 water is applied to most land
application areas. In some areas, polished (wetland filtered) RP2 water is applied; this has a
lower concentration of radionuclides than the raw RP2 water. Water is applied through a grid
of sprinklers with a 6 to10m radius. The application rate is controlled such that no runoff
occurs. Total applied volumes have varied from year to year, ranging from 6.3 × 104 to 1.3 ×
106 m3 between 1985 and 2008. No water was applied to the land in 1990 or 1999. When
compared to natural waters, RP2 water contains elevated concentrations of 238U, 226Ra and
210
Pb with values around 12, 0.3 and 0.15 Bq.L-1 respectively.
3.
DISTINCTIVE FEATURES OF NORM DISTRIBUTION IN LAND APPLICATION
AREAS
Soils from different land application areas have been investigated for their ability to
retain RP2 water solutes [2, 3]. In particular, the original Magela land application area has
been extensively investigated. The studies based on batch and column experiments showed
that the soils have a strong adsorption capacity for radionuclides such that during land
application they are likely to be retained within a few centimetres of the ground surface.
Gamma spectrometry analyses of sections of soil cores from the land application area
demonstrate this. The signal decreases rapidly with depth and, typically, below 10 cm it
reduces to natural background levels. Water and a number of other, less reactive, chemical
species infiltrate to the subsurface [2, 3]. Land application of RP2 water has therefore created
areas of relatively high radioactivity in a surface zone (a few centimetres in depth) over 336
ha of common woodland. The spatial distribution of radioactivity is non-uniform; higher
values occur closer to the sprinklers.
The mine operators are committed to rehabilitate the land application areas such that
future occupancy does not lead to radiation doses exceeding the regulatory limits. Special
consideration is required for the traditional local life styles which are based on a strong
relationship with the land, some food gathering and hunting activities.
4.
IMPLICATIONS FOR DOSE ESTIMATES
To determine above background radiation doses to members of the public that may
enter the lease area after rehabilitation of the mine, Ranger Uranium Mine has developed a
project to assess the radiological condition of the land application areas so that appropriate
rehabilitation plans can be developed and remediation actions taken if required. Exposure
pathways that must be considered are direct irradiation, inhalation of radon and its progeny,
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TOPICAL SESSION 7
inhalation of resuspended long-lived radionuclides in dust, and direct ingestion of
radionuclides in soils or through the consumption of bush foods collected from the land
application areas.
This project has identified that standard values of a number of different parameters that
are commonly used in models for estimating radiation doses in areas in which mining and
milling of radioactive ores is carried out may not be strictly applicable to the special case of
land application – the discrepancies in some cases may be up to several orders of magnitude.
The differences arise mainly due to the fact that adsorbed radionuclides are likely to be
present at the mineral grain surface, rather than being distributed throughout the mineral
matrix. The radionuclides are also retained within the surface zone of the soil. By contrast,
naturally occurring radionuclides, are likely to be more or less evenly distributed in the bulk
of the soil grains and throughout the deeper soil layers. In addition, the traditional use of bush
foods is an important factor to be considered [4, 5]. Due to their significance for radiological
assessments, the differences are identified in this paper:
1. In traditional life styles, the bare skin may be exposed to ground surfaces. For this
reason external radiation dose measurements should take into account both the nonpenetrating Hp(0.07) and penetrating Hp(10) radiation;
2. With regards to the 222Rn source term, 226Ra presence near the surface of grains will
lead to higher 222Rn emanation rates than expected from bulk soil 226Ra distribution. In
addition, as the applied 226Ra is retained close to the soil surface, 222Rn is likely to
diffuse more readily;
3. Atmospheric radon concentration is typically measured at a height of 1-2 metres, but
the traditional Aboriginal life style may involve sitting and sleeping on the ground.
Radon concentration above ground may vary as a function of height, wind speed and
due to the presence or absence of perennial vegetation [6];
4. Resuspension factors are commonly used to estimate the expected concentration of
airborne radioactivity in dust relative to that on the surface of the ground (to a few
centimetres depth). These factors have been developed for the wet-dry tropical areas in
northern Australia [2, 7]. Corrections are required to determine the contribution of
suspended dust in land application areas. This is because a strong gradient exists in the
soil activity concentration as a function of depth and also, because of the larger surface
area to volume ratios (as smaller particles tend to have higher adsorbed activity
concentrations). Additionally, preliminary observations show differences in the dust
loading values as a function of heights representative for a person lying down, sitting,
a juvenile standing and an adult standing;
5. Conventionally determined concentration factors for edible fruit and forage may also
not be valid for the land application areas. During the operational phase, foliage and
fruit in the land application area may be sprayed directly by the water derived from the
mine areas. Following rehabilitation, the uptake is likely to be through root system
only. For larger fruit bearing trees, roots may be distributed underground to depths of
greater than a few centimetres and may not be influenced by the applied radionuclides
which are retained near the surface.
Taking account of these issues, a comprehensive programme of direct measurements
has been established. This programme is now cleanup and the results will become available in
due course.
176
LU et al.
REFERENCES
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
AUSTRALIAN BUREAU OF METEOROLOGY, Climate averages at Jabiru airport.
AKBER, R.A. (Ed.), Proceedings of the Workshop on Land Application of Effluent Water from
Uranium Mines in the Alligator Rivers Region. Jabiru, 11–13 September 1990, Supervising
Scientist for the Alligator Rivers Region, AGPS, Canberra (1992).
WILLETT, I.R., BOND, W.J., Fate of manganese and radionuclides applied in uranium mine
waste water to highly weathered soils, In Proceedings of the First International conference on
Contaminants and the Soil Environment, Geoderma 84 (1997) 195211.
MARTIN, P., HANCOCK, G.J., JOHNSTON, A., MURRAY, A.S., Natural-series
radionuclides in traditional north Australian Aboriginal foods. Journal of Environmental
Radioactivity 40 (1998) 37–58.
RYAN, B., MARTIN, P., ILES, M., Uranium-series radionuclides in native fruits and
vegetables of northern Australia, Journal of Radioanalytical and Nuclear Chemistry, 264 2
(2005) 407–412.
BOLLHÖFER, A., The geographical variability of airborne radon concentration at the
rehabilitated Nabarlek mine site during the dry season 2005, Internal Report 527, Supervising
Scientist, Darwin. Unpublished paper.
BOLLHÖFER, A., HONEYBUN, R., ROSMAN, K., Atmospheric transport of radiogenic lead
in the vicinity of Ranger uranium mine determined using lead isotope ratios in dust deposited on
acacia leaves, Internal Report 451, August 2003, Supervising Scientist, Darwin, Unpublished
paper.
177
EXPERIENCE OF THE CONSTRAINTS AFFECTING THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF DECOMMISSIONING/REMEDIATION
PROGRAMMES AT URANIUM MINING SITES
M.R. FRANKLIN
Institute of Radiation Protection and Dosimetry,
Brazilian Nuclear Energy Commission,
Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
Abstract
It is well known that the need for extensive remediation programmes derives from the lack of appropriate
planning at the beginning of mining operations, i.e. remediation is not adequately taken into consideration in the
overall mining development. As a consequence of this, the implementation of remediation work generally faces
several constraints that prevent the adoption of the necessary cleanup procedures. These constraints can be of an
economic, technical, regulatory or social nature. In Brazil, the remediation of the uranium mining site of Poços
de Caldas constitutes a very significant challenge for the mine operator and regulatory organizations. Many
research/technical projects have been carried out by different institutions but the integration of the results of
these works into a coordinated framework has never been achieved. There is also a lack of synergism between
the environmental and nuclear regulatory authorities, and the mine operator does not seem to have a clear plan of
action to deal with the problem. As a result of this situation, the expertise existing in the country is not being
properly utilised to facilitate the development of the necessary actions. Also, members of the public have not yet
been properly involved in the decision making process and this will constitute a serious problem in the near
future. This paper discusses potential actions to overcome these constraints based on international experience.
1.
INTRODUCTION
In Brazil, activities related to the exploration, production and processing of uranium
ores are implemented by the state-owned company Indústrias Nucleares do Brasil (INB).
Uranium is produced to supply the domestic demand, presently represented by two PWR-type
nuclear reactors. As a result of the decision not to depend on the external supply of uranium, the
exploration of the available and known low-grade ore bodies in Brazil has been undertaken.
The first deposit to be exploited was the one located at the municipality of Poços de
Caldas. This deposit was discovered in the 1970s. The ore grade was of about 0.1% uranium,
which occurred as pitchblende, associated with pyrite (FeS2), fluorite (CaF2), and zirconium
and molybdenum minerals. The Uranium Mining and Milling Facility of Poços de Caldas
(UMMFPC) started operations in 1982. After 13 years of non-continuous operations, the
mining activities were finally suspended. The total uranium production was 1242 tonnes of
U3O8 [1].
At the present time, the UMMFPC is in the first phase of a
decommissioning/remediation process and a general project for the mine closure is cleanup.
Several scientific and technical projects have been developed by different organizations
dealing with the closure and remediation of this installation. However, a well-defined plan of
action has not yet been conceived.
This paper discusses the reasons for this situation, i.e. why there are problems in
implementing the UMMFPC remediation works. The Brazilian situation is used as the basis
for this analysis but it is expected that some of the lessons learned may serve to aid the
implementation of remediation programmes at other sites that share similar problems.
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TOPICAL SESSION 7
DESCRIPTION OF THE MINE SITE – ACID MINE DRAINAGE PROBLEM
2.
The uranium production centre of Poços de Caldas is located on the Poços de Caldas
plateau, in the Southeast region of Brazil. This alkaline complex corresponds to a circular
volcanic structure whose formation began in the upper Cretaceous period (87 ma (million
years ago)) and evolved in successive steps until 60 ma. The uranium enrichment in the Poços
de Caldas mine is related to hydrothermal events (primary mineralization) and to later
weathering processes (secondary mineralization). The uranium in this mine was extracted by
open pit operations. About 45×106 m3 of ores were processed which gave rise to
approximately 12×106 m3 of waste rock, while the mill process generated a volume of
approximately 2.4×106 m3 of tailings [2].
The main sources of pollutants to the environment are the tailings dam (TD), the waste
rock piles (WRPs) and the open pit (OP). Pyrite oxidation was found to be the driving force in
leaching metals and radionuclides into the environment. It has been estimated that acid
drainage generation will last for 600 and 200 years from the waste rock piles and the tailings
dam respectively [2]. The long timescale involved in the oxidation of sulphidic materials
implies a need to adopt permanent remedial solutions.
It was also estimated that the release of untreated effluent from the tailings dam and
waste rock piles into the environment, without any treatment, would result in radiation doses
as high as 8.0 mSv/y to members of the public. These values are higher than the primary dose
limit for members of the public established by the Brazilian regulatory authority, i.e. 1.0
mSv/y [2, 3].
3.
REGULATORY CONSTRAINTS
One of the first issues to constrain the implementation of remediation works in Brazil,
especially at uranium mining sites, is concerned with the regulatory framework. Uranium
mining operations are regulated both by the Federal Environmental IAEA (IBAMA) and by
the Nuclear Regulatory Authority (CNEN). However, when the mine was developed, the
environmental legislation, now available, was not in place. As such, the mining developer did
not have to present an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) prior the operation of the
mining and milling facilities. The licensing process was mainly dictated by the Nuclear
Regulatory Authority because uranium mining and milling facilities are considered to be
nuclear installations in Brazil. From the point of view of the Nuclear Authority (CNEN), the
decommissioning/environmental remediation of a mining facility is treated as ‘abandonment
of the installation’. The requirements are rather generic in nature and the actions to be
implemented regarding the post-operational phase of facilities were not prescribed. The
requirements include the following actions to be implemented by the operator:
– Backfilling of the open pit with mine debris and sealing of all wells, holes, galleries or
any other excavation for research or ore removal, in the surface or sub-surface, to
prevent the occurrence of accidents;
– Actions to limit the potential risks to human health and safety;
– Classification of areas in the mine to avoid the release of toxic substances to the
environment;
– Implementation of an abandonment and area restoration plan, to be approved by the
Regulatory Authority. This plan should contain, to the extent possible, predictions of
possible future uses of the area.
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FRANKLIN
These criteria are contained in the regulatory document CNEN–NE–1.13 (1989)
(www.cnen.gov.br) which also contains the regulatory requirements to be applied in the
licensing of uranium and thorium mining and milling facilities. Numerical standards however,
are not provided but it seems to be implicit that the releases to the environment should not
exceed those authorized for the operational phase of the installation.
More specific requirements are available for the management of tailings dams (Standard
CNEN–NE–1.10 (1980) (www.cnen.gov.br)). It is required that waste shall be stabilized
physically and chemically in order to ensure that effluents leaving the system comply with the
appropriate regulatory levels. Stabilization should begin immediately after the termination of
waste disposal. The systems should be provided with means to seal or eliminate contaminated
drainage sources in order to avoid, as much as possible, the collecting and treatment of the
drainage. The system should also be protected against natural drainage by means of
engineering works, such as dykes and embankments. It should also be controlled and marked
in order to restrict intrusion by members of the public and to prevent non-authorized use of
the waste. The stabilization, control and maintenance of the system in the long term should be
documented and this record must be part of any commercial transaction involving the area.
CNEN should also be informed promptly about any new landowner.
After 1986, EISs began to be required for any operation in Brazil that could cause
significant impacts in the environment. The EIS document should be presented to the IBAMA
for approval. In addition, every project involving mineral extraction in the country should
make available an ‘Area Restoration Plan’, based on the decree No 97623 of April 10, 1989
linked with the Brazilian Constitution (article 225, paragraph 2). The decree also establishes
that, in the case of a new project, the plan must be presented during the environmental
licensing of the project. Economic aspects of the environment restoration are also to be taken
into account and the costs related to this activity must be part of the overall project cash flow.
As the uranium mining and milling operations in Poços de Caldas began before the
above dates, the Environmental IAEA (IBAMA), in July/2002, made use of a mechanism
known as ‘Terms of Environmental Commitment (TEC)’. By signing this, the operator
commits himself/herself to present a Degraded Area Restoration Plan (DARP), to be inserted
in the Decommissioning Project of the installation. In the Terms of Reference (ToR) that have
been elaborated to guide the operator in complying with the safety requirements established in
the DARP, different elements related to the appropriate and definitive remediation of the
tailings disposal area, open pit and waste rock dumps are clearly defined.
The resulting situation is that, if the operator does not wish to declare the mine as
abandoned, i.e. if it is intended to continue water treatment operations indefinitely, no
constraint will be made by the Nuclear Regulatory Authority as long as the emissions level is
below that leading to radiation doses to members of the public of 0.3 mSv/y. On the other
hand, the Environmental IAEA requires the adoption of a remediation plan as soon as
possible, but as long as radiological issues are involved and while the IBAMA does not have
the necessary expertise to deal with them, a ‘grey area’ exists and this can only be solved by
means of proper negotiations and mutual understanding between the relevant parties. It is
important to mention that other stakeholders must also be involved in this process in an
appropriate way.
4.
MANAGERIAL CONSTRAINTS AND TECHNICAL ISSUES
Unlike some other mining sites in the world (that are located in dry areas) the mining
site of Poços de Caldas is located in an area characterized by high precipitation rates, i.e. 1800
mm/y, meaning that, if the water treatment is not functioning, undue emissions of
radionuclides and heavy metals into the environment will occur. On the other hand, when the
181
TOPICAL SESSION 7
water is being treated, large amounts of material (sludge) – containing significant levels of
radionuclides and heavy metals - have to be disposed of. Because of this, disposal areas at the
mining site have to be made available. As the tailings dam is not capable of containing any
more waste, the material resulting from water treatment is disposed of in the mine pit (an
operation that was not predicted in the mining operation plan).
Because of this, it seems to be clear that the starting point for any remediation plan for
the site should be the abatement of acid drainage generation. Unfortunately, the mine
operator, despite several studies already carried out at the site, has not understood and drawn
the proper conclusions from the results of these studies. Instead of channeling resources to
pursue solutions for the problem of acid drainage, efforts have been directed towards the
implementation of ineffective solutions. For example, resources have been wasted in the revegetation of the waste-rock piles; in trying to decrease the amount of water infiltrating these
systems, in applying – without appropriate understanding and calculations – a clay layer on
the top of the waste rock piles; and in enhancing the disposal volume of the tailings dam.
Another important managerial flaw is the lack of effort in trying to collect and organize
the relevant information about the site. This includes, for example, descriptions of the mining
operations, environmental monitoring data, publications related to the site, etc. This situation
is aggravated by the fact that a large part of the work force has left the company or has been
relocated to other productions centres or has been retired. As a result, the memory of the site
will soon be lost to a very large extent.
Finally, the full dismantling of the industrial area and site remediation do not constitute
priorities for the company. Since these operations are resource consuming and no funding
mechanism (e.g trust fund) has been created to support them, the company prefers to invest
the available resources in the development of the mining and processing operations of the new
production centre in Caetité in the northeast region of the country. The problem is that acid
drainage has been estimated to last for at least 600 years and, in the long term, it will require a
very significative amount of resources. In other words, procrastination of the implementation
of effective solutions for the remediation of the site is not a wise managerial decision. Instead,
the operator should seek appropriate support from experienced professionals in the pursuit of
the design and implementation of an adequate remediation plan.
5.
LEGAL CONSTRAINTS
In December/2002 to attend to the requirements embodied in the Terms of
Environmental Commitment (TEC), the operator started an international bidding process to
contract specialized consulting services for the development of the necessary studies for the
elaboration of the DARP. The type of bidding was based on the lowest price and was open to
contractors from outside Brazil, as long as the technical requirements (based on the terms of
reference) were fulfilled. This process was not concluded because of problems in complying
with Brazilian legislation (mainly problems related to the exchange rate variation). At the end
of 2004, another bidding process was opened, but reduced to a national outreach while
allowing for the possibility of establishing partnerships between Brazilian and international
companies. A consortium between a European consulting company and a Brazilian one won
the bidding. However, the contract was cancelled in June of 2006 by INB due to technical
problems. At the end of 2006, a third bidding attempt was opened by INB. Once again the
process was not concluded. This time no proposal could comply with the requirements
established in the bidding process. According to information obtained from INB (personal
communication) it is foreseen that another bidding procces will be started in 2009.
The main problems that the operator faces in the bidding process relate to the
legal/bureaucratic constraints resulting from the legal status of the company, i.e. a state182
FRANKLIN
owned company. This prevents flexibility and imposes serious constraints in the setting up of
good contracts. Another factor that contributes to the inefficiency of the process is the lack of
experienced companies in the country dealing with the remediation of radioactively
contaminated/nuclear sites. While a considerable amount of research work has been carried
out dealing with the decommissioning and remediation of the site [4 – 11] practical
remediation experience is still lacking in the country. To make things worse, there is no
contact (or synergism) among the different research projects and the results are not being
assimilated by the regulatory authorities or the operator.
6.
CONCLUSIONS
The uranium production centre of Poços de Caldas is the first uranium production centre
to be decommissioned and remediated in Brazil. Due to the lack of experience in developing
uranium mining operations and also due to the lack of an appropriate regulatory framework,
significant environmental liabilities have been generated. Eleven years after the termination of
the mining and milling operations at the site, a well-defined site remediation plan has not yet
been designed. As demonstrated in this paper, this situation results from three main issues:
regulatory, managerial and legal constraints. Lack of financial resources certainly plays a role,
but overcoming the first steps may contribute to reducing the costs associated with site
remediation. It would also avoid the waste of financial resources in the implementation of
inappropriate and/or ineffective solutions.
Individual measures to improve the overall situation can be suggested. They would
include:
– Commitment of the upper hierarchies of the company and regulatory authorities to the
implementation of a remediation programme;
– Coordination of actions amongst the different regulatory authorities;
– Integration of the results arising from the technical and scientific work;
– Greater autonomy of the operator to conduct the bidding process
– Involvement of all relevant stakeholders;
– Allocation of appropriate financial, material and human resources
The adoption of any one of the above elements in isolation would not be enough to
improve the overall situation. Lessons learned from other countries that have had to face
similar challenges reveal that it is essential to establish administrative arrangements that lead
to the formation of a working group that can discuss and propose a road-map for the design
and implementation of the remediation plan. This group should be made up of representatives
of the operator (and its consultant company), the regulators (at the federal and state level),
relevant technical and scientific institutions and other relevant stakeholders.
REFERENCES
[1]
[2]
[3]
MAJDALANI, S.A.,TAVARES, A.M.,. Status of uranium in Brazil. In: Proceedings of a
Technical Committee meeting on Assessment of uranium deposit types and resources – a world
perspective, International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna (2001) 119–127.
FERNANDES, H.M., FRANKLIN, M.R., Assessment of acid rock drainage pollutants release
in the uranium mining site of Poços de Caldas – Brazil. Journal of Environmental Radioactivity
54 (2001) 5–25.
FERNANDES, H.M., FRANKLIN, M.R., VEIGA, L.H.S., Acid rock drainage and radiological
environmental impacts. A study case of the Uranium mining and milling facilities at Poços de
Caldas. Waste Management v.18 (1998) 169–181.
183
TOPICAL SESSION 7
[4]
FERNANDES, H.M.; VEIGA, L.H.S., FRANKLIN, M.R., et al., Environmental impact
assessment of uranium and milling facilities: a study case at the Poços de Caldas uranium
mining and milling site, Brazil. Journal of Geochemical Exploration v.52 n.1–2 (1994) 161–
173.
[5] FERNANDES, H.M., FRANKLIN, M.R., VEIGA, L.H.S., et al., Management of uranium mill
tailings: geochemical processes and radiological risk assessment. Journal of Environmental
Radioactivity v.30 n.1 (1996) 69–95.
[6] WIIKMANN, L.O., Caracterização química e radiológica dos estéreis provenientes da
mineração de urânio do planalto de Poços de Caldas. Universidade de São Paulo – USP. 98p. (in
portuguese)(1998).
[7] FERNANDES, H.M., FRANKLIN, M.R., Assessment of acid rock drainage pollutants release
in the uranium mining site of Poços de Caldas – Brazil. Journal of Environmental Radioactivity
v.54 (2001) 5–25.
[8] RODRIGUES, J.A., 2001, Drenagem Ácida do Bota-Fora 4 (Mina de Urânio de Caldas – MG):
Aspectos Hidroquímicos e Hidrogeológicos. Departamento de Geologia, Programa de PósGraduação em Evolução Crustal e Recursos Naturais, Universidade Federal de Ouro Preto UFOP, Ouro Preto – MG. 194p. (in portuguese) (2001).
[9] FRANKLIN, M.R., FERNANDES, H., GENUCHTEN, M.T.V., et al., Application of Water
Flow and Geochemical Models to Support the Remediation of Acid Rock Drainage from the
Uranium Mining Site. In: Proceedings 11th International conference on Environmental
Remediation and Radioactive Waste Management ICEM2007, Bruges, Belgium (2007).
[10] CIPRIANI, M., Mitigação dos Impactos Sociais e Ambientais Decorrentes do Fechamento
Definitivo de Minas de Urânio. Tese de Doutorado. Instituto de Geociências, Universidade
Estadual de Campinas, 332p. (in portuguese) (2002).
[11] FAGUNDES, J.R.T., Balanço hídrico do bota-fora BF4 da mina de Urânio Osamu Utsumi,
como subsídio para projetos de remediação de drenagem ácida. Escola de Minas, Departamento
de Engenharia Civil, Programa de Pós–Graduação em Engenharia Civil, Universidade Federal
de Ouro Preto, Ouro Preto – MG. 147p. (2005) (in portuguese).
184
LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE REMEDIATION AT VILLA ALDAMA
URANIUM EXTRACTION PLANT
R. FABIAN ORTEGA
Nuclear Safety and Safeguards National Commission,
Mexico City, Mexico
Abstract
From 1969 to 1971, a uranium extraction plant operated in close proximity to Villa Aldama city in
Chihuahua state, the plant ceased operations in 1971 leaving 30 000 tons of uranium tailings, 1735 tons of
uranium ore and contaminated equipment and buildings. The whole facility and the radioactive material
remained almost unattended for more than 20 years. During this time the tailings and ore contaminated the soil
around them. At the same time, the city of Villa Aldama expanded and its houses began to approach the site
boundary. Because of this and other factors, such as the potential contamination of groundwater, remediation
actions were required by the Nuclear Safety and Safeguards National Commission. These actions were,
basically, the decontamination of the site and the disposal of the radioactive waste generated in the process. This
paper describes the remediation efforts that brought the facility to a safe status.
1.
INTRODUCTION
In 1967, the Mexican Mining Development Commission, which was a decentralized
entity of the federal government, set up a project for the operation of a uranium and
molybdenum ore processing facility in Chihuahua State in the north of the country. For this
purpose, a small city called Villa Aldama (the name was later changed to Ciudad Aldama)
was selected, because of favourable factors for the siting and operation of the facility – such
as its relative proximity to the uranium mining sites (located 50 km north of the city) and the
easy access to urban services such as electric power and water supplies and also the
availability of a work force.
Then, In June 1969, the plant was transferred to URAMEX (short for Mexican
Uranium), which also was a federal entity (now extinct). The purpose of this transfer was that
URAMEX would use the facility as an experimental plant focusing only on the extraction of
uranium. The operation of the experimental uranium extraction plant started in 1969 and
ended two years later due to its demonstrated low profitability. The plant ceased operations in
1971 but remained under the responsibility of URAMEX until 1985, the year in which
URAMEX was liquidated. The facility was returned to the Mining Development Commission
along with approximately 35 000 tons of uranium tailings generated during the two years of
plant operation, and around 1735 tons of non-processed uranium ore.
The tailings were deposited on a non-stabilized provisional impoundment located on the
site – west of the main building in an area called zone 1 (see Fig. 1). The ore was deposited in
an area to the east of the main building in zone 2. Zone 3 included the grinding section, the
processing building, the machine room, the laboratory, and transit areas between buildings.
(This layout and nomenclature were adopted for the remediation and dismantling activities).
In September 1992, the Mining Development Commission was also liquidated and the
facility and the radioactive material were transferred to the Mining Development Trust
(FIFOMI). This transference also included rights, obligations and non-fulfilled commitments.
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TOPICAL SESSION 7
FIG. 2. Villa Aldama Plant Layout.
2.
NEED FOR REMEDIATION MEASURES
The facility, the tailings and the ore were given little attention for more than 20 years
until 1991, the year in which the Nuclear Safety and Safeguards National Commission
(CNSNS) identified the need for remediation actions due to the following facts:
(1) The growth of Ciudad Aldama. The plant and the onsite impoundment for the tailings
were located only a few hundred metres from houses and other inhabited buildings.
Projections suggested that the population of the city would continue growing at an increasing
rate, raising the risk of direct exposure to radiation and the risk of intake of radioactive
material by members of the public;
(2) The original impoundment and the ore were located over a ground water body from
which water is extracted to be used as a part of the city’s urban services. (Groundwater is
approximately 20-30 metres beneath the surface at the site);
(3) The original impoundment and the ore were located on the slope of a hill which is part
of a rainwater basin;
(4) The edges of the original impoundment were made of non-stabilized filling soil, and
therefore the material was not properly immobilized and the integrity of the impoundment
was not assured.
3.
REMEDIAL ACTIONS
In order to decide how to proceed for the remediation of the site, several meetings,
involving the main entities were held in 1991. Those involved were: CNSNS as the regulatory
body, FIFOMI as the owner of the site, Ciudad Aldama Government as the affected party (but
also in a role of supporting party), and the Nuclear Research National Institute (ININ) as
FIFOMI’s technical support organization. As a result of these meetings, it was decided to
carry out the following actions (to be performed by the ININ):
(1)
The removal of the tailings from the site (zone 1)
These activities were divided into two stages.
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FABIAN ORTEGA
The first stage started in July 1994. During the first stage 35 000 tons of uranium
tailings and 1735 tons of uranium ore were removed from the site. The tailings were taken to
the Peña Blanca uranium mining site, which is the place where the uranium mineral came
from. It was necessary to construct a new impoundment at Peña Blanca for the disposal of the
uranium tailings removed from the Villa Aldama facility. However, due to the long period
that the tailings had remained at the Villa Aldama Site in an impoundment without
impermeable layers, the soil beneath the tailings was contaminated by the uranium tailings.
This soil did not meet the criteria established by the CNSNS, so it was determined that a
second removal stage was necessary. The second stage started in 1996 and ended in 1997.
During this period, an additional 30 000 tons of contaminated soil were taken to the Peña
Blanca disposal site, making a total amount of 65 000 tons of waste disposed.
(2)
The removal of uranium ore (zone 2)
The 1735 tons of uranium ore were also moved to the Peña Blanca site, and deposited in
the amortizing zone of the impoundment facility.
(3)
The decontamination of the buildings and the equipment (zone 3)
Mineral, tailings and other material with high concentrations of uranium, were removed
from the process buildings. Walls, floors and process equipment were decontaminated using
aggressive methods such as high pressure water (hydro-laser), mechanical brushing and the
use of strong solvents (fuel oil and mixed acids). The decontamination of zone 3 spanned the
time period December 1993 until March 1994.
The goal of the decontamination of buildings and equipment was to take the
contamination to levels below the criteria given by the CNSNS. However, some components
could not be decontaminated as required by the authority and they had to be dismantled and
removed. The destination for this radioactive material was a mine gallery called Las
Margaritas at the Peña Blanca mining site. The amount that had to be moved was about 30
tons. After that, the mine gallery entrance was sealed with concrete.
4.
CRITERIA APPLIED FOR CLEARANCE
At the time that the remediation actions were required by the regulatory body (1991),
the regulation involving soil and buildings clearance had not yet been established. The
CNSNS had therefore to issue provisional specific clearance criteria for the release of soil,
buildings and equipment. These criteria were issued specifically for application to the
remediation activities at the Villa Aldama Uranium Extraction Plant, and were not to be used
elsewhere. The criteria and requirements established by the CNSNS [1] were as follows:
(1)
The average concentration of Radium-226 in 100m2 of land shall not be above the
background levels by more than:
– 0.185 Bq/g (5 pCi/g) averaged over the first 0.15 m of the soil;
– 0.555 Bq/g (15 pCi/g) averaged over 0.15 m thick layers of soil more than 0.15 m
below the surface;
(2)
For occupied or habitable buildings:
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TOPICAL SESSION 7
– The average annual concentrations of Radon-222 short lived decay products
(including the background) shall not exceed 0.02WL;
– The exposure rate shall be reduced to as low as reasonable achievable, but shall not be
above the radioactive background by more than 20 µR/h;
(3)
In order to release the facility, equipment and any other components for unrestricted
use, they shall comply with the following requirements:
– No paint or any other cover shall be applied to contaminated surfaces of equipment or
structures unless a reasonable effort has been made to reduce contamination below the
applicable limits stated in Table I of the Regulatory Guide 1.86 of the US Atomic
Energy Commission; this shall be determined by direct measurements, and appropriate
records shall be generated;
– Reasonable efforts for the removal of the residual contamination shall be carried out;
– Contamination levels shall be determined on the internal surfaces of process piping,
drain lines or ducts; this determination shall be carried out by direct measurements in
appropriate accessible points representative of the contamination levels inside such
pipes lines or ducts.
5.
RESULTS OF THE REMEDIATION ACTIONS
Despite the efforts applied in the removal of uranium ore, tailings and contaminated
soil, the contamination in the land area of the facility (zone 2 and 3) still persisted, although at
lesser concentrations than previously. The options considered to address this situation were:
– To take even more contaminated soil to the disposal facility at Peña Blanca site; or
– To cover the soil with a 0.15 m thick layer of alluvium, establishing restrictions for the
use of the land.
The involved parties CNSN, ININ, FIFOMI, and the Local Government, discarded the
first option and agreed to proceed according to the second one. The results obtained from
applying this option were quite good in terms of the resulting exposure rate [2].. However, in
terms of contamination, a few persistent spots remained with concentrations of Radium-226
slightly above the given criteria. Therefore, the CNSNS established the following conditions
[3] for the restricted use of the land and buildings on the site:
– Agricultural activities and shepherding of cattle will not be allowed;
– The construction of habitation buildings will not be allowed;
– Drilling for water wells will not be allowed;
– The minerals yard (zone 2) can be used only as a transit zone as long as the radiation
levels remain slightly above the background levels;
– For any activity carried out in the property, it shall be guaranteed that the personnel
will not stay more than 40 hours a week, averaged on an annual basis.
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FABIAN ORTEGA
The above restrictions are still in force and the CNSNS periodically carries out visits to
the site to verify that these conditions are met. At the present time, the local government of
Ciudad Aldama is responsible for the former facility including the land and buildings. The
main processing building of the plant is now used as a warehouse for several types of
construction materials that will be used in public works; the yards of the property are now
used as parking areas and a service station for local government vehicles (zone 2) and as a
depository for plastic residues that will be recycled (zone 3).
6.
LESSONS LEARNED
The remediation actions at the former Villa Aldama Uranium Extraction plant prevented
a potential risk situation for the population of Ciudad Aldama. However, remediation could
have been avoided if a proper and timely decommissioning of the facility had been carried
out. Because responsibilities for the site passed from one entity to another, there was a delay
in concluding the decommissioning activities. This delay was enough to allow the migration
of contaminants to the underlying soil with the resulting potential for groundwater
contamination. The delay also allowed the expanding city of Ciudad Aldama to approach too
close to the site. Additionally, the site selection process for the plant was performed in the late
1960s when no regulation or recommendations existed at national, or even at international
level, and so more priority was granted in the siting process to having easy access to urban
services, and less to issues with potential safety impacts such as projections of future
activities and populations in the region or the proximity of the facility to groundwater.
REFERENCES
[1]
[2]
[3]
COMISIÓN NACIONAL DE SEGURIDAD NUCLEAR Y SALVAGUARDIAS, Criterios
Para garantizar la seguridad radiológica de la población y el medio ambiente, durante el
desmantelamiento de la Planta de Villa Aldama, AOO.211/646/94, México D.F. (1994).
FABIAN ORTEGA, R., Decommissioning of Villa Aldama Uranium Extraction Plant, in
Proceedings of the International conference on Lessons Learned from the Decommissioning of
Nuclear Facilities and the Safe Termination of Nuclear Activities, 11-15 December 2006,
Athens, Greece, International Atomic Energy Agency, Contributed Paper IAEA-CN-146-026,
IAEA, Vienna (2006).
COMISIÓN NACIONAL DE SEGURIDAD NUCLEAR Y SALVAGUARDIAS, Liberación
Condicional del predio de Villa Aldama, AOO.200/116/98, México D.F (1998).
189
OCCUPATIONAL EXPOSURE DURING REMEDIATION WORK AT A
URANIUM TAILINGS PILE
M.L. DINIS, A. FIÚZA
Geo-Environment and Resources Research Centre,
University of Porto, Portugal
Abstract
The aim of this study is to assess the occupational exposure at an abandoned uranium mining site due to
work activities involving tailings pile remediation. A hypothetical scenario has been created in which the
workers involved in the remediation activities are exposed to radiation through internal and external pathways.
The results indicate that occupational radiation doses may reach a significant fraction of occupational radiation
protection limits. For future tailing site remediation projects, which are planned in Portugal, individual dose
levels should therefore be carefully measured, controlled and registered. Also, optimization techniques to reduce
individual and collective doses in the remediation work activities should be implemented.
1.
INTRODUCTION
The exploitation of uranium ore in Portugal took place from 1913 to 2000. There were
mining activities at 61 sites, mostly at small open pits, although there were also some
underground mines. The great majority of the mining sites are located in the districts of
Guarda and Viseu (central-east Portugal). In this region, the country’s most important mine,
the Urgeiriça mine, is located. From 1913 to 1944, it was only mined for radium. After World
War II, its purpose changed and in 1951 a chemical treatment plant for the production of lowgrade uranium concentrates was built. Later, the plant was modified for the production of high
grade uranium concentrates. The ores from the Urgeiriça mine, as well as from other
Portugese uranium mines, were processed in the uranium mill facility built near to Urgeiriça.
Tailings from this facility include most of the radionuclides contained in the processed ores
(those of the uranium decay chains), as well as some minor amounts of residual chemicals [1].
Since 1996, the Portuguese government has had to deal with the decommissioning of
the mines, mills and other facilities and the rehabilitation of the mining sites. In particular, for
the remediation of the Urgeiriça uranium site, a reclamation programme was instituted on July
20th, 2005. At this site, the rehabilitation of the Old Dam was considered to be a key element
of the overall environmental remediation programme. The programme at the Urgeiriça site
also included remediation of the industrial area, where the remains of the former milling and
processing plants were located, as well as two former stockpile areas, one for ore and another
for waste rock. Some of the waste arising from the industrial area had to be transferred to the
tailings pile. After remediation, the tailings were to be fenced off to prohibit public access [1].
These works were planned for completion before the end of 2007. In fact, the tailings pile
rehabilitation was concluded in April 2008.
This paper focuses on the potential occupational exposure during the Old Dam
remediation. The tailings at this site were a source of external radiation and also a significant
source of radon gas and airborne dusts. During the remediation only external radiation doses
were monitored. In fact, the workforce could have been exposed to radiation through three
main exposure pathways: i) inhalation of radon decay products, ii) inhalation of dust-borne
long-lived alpha emitters and iii) external radiation. This paper describes a preliminary
assessment with limited data and focuses, in particular, on radon inhalation and external
(gamma) radiation exposures.
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TOPICAL SESSION 7
2.
METHODS AND MATERIALS
2.1. Occupational exposure in remediation/rehabilitation activities
Occupational exposure is defined by the International Commission on Radiological
Protection (ICRP) as all exposures incurred at work as a result of situations that can
reasonably be regarded as being the responsibility of the operating management [2]. The
European Council Directive 96/29 EURATOM stipulates a limit on exposed workers of
100mSv in a consecutive 5 year period subject to a maximum effective dose of 50mSv in any
single year. Below this dose limit, the principle of optimization requires that any radiation
exposure should be kept as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA). When the annual dose
limit is exceeded, the regulatory body can permit this exposure by considering the individual
case and/or imposing work conditions and dose restrictions for the successive years.
The exposure scenario adopted in this study considers both internal and external
radiations exposures. The critical group is represented by an average adult worker, involved in
the remediation of the tailings, assumed to be exposed during an 8-hour work day, 5 days per
week, 48 weeks per year (assuming that he/she is away on vacation for 4 weeks per year), for
3 years. It was also assumed that all of the working time is spent outdoors. It is recognized
that these assumptions are conservative and are likely to result in dose estimates at the upper
end of the likely range. The relevant pathways considered for the workers exposure are radon
inhalation and gamma radiation from the tailings.
2.2. Sampling
A radon survey over a 13.3 ha area of the tailings pile was carried out during two field
campaigns: in March 2001 (45 sampling points) and in August of 2002 (22 sampling points).
The radon concentrations in the atmospheric air measured at 1 m above the soil ranged from
195 to 1205 Bq/m3, with an average value of 557 Bq/m3 [3].
To assess the external dose, in the absence of direct measurements of external radiation,
the doses were estimated based on radionuclide concentrations in the soil determined for
individual radionuclides by gamma-spectrometry (Table 1).
TABLE 1. ESTIMATED RADIONUCLIDE CONCENTRATIONS IN SOIL AND DOSE
COEFFICIENTS [4, 5]
Radionuclide
Average soil concentration (Csoil,i)
(Bq/kg) ± 
Dose coefficients (DCext)
(Sv/s)/(Bq/m2)
U
483 ± 975
1.48 x 10-16
234
Th
6506 ± 14 262
8.32 x 10-18
226
Ra
3004 ± 5692
6.44 x 10-18
235
192
210
Pb
3046 ± 5541
2.48 x 10-18
137
Cs
9.9 ± 10.1
2.85 x 10-19
40
K
1738 ± 871
1.46 x 10-16
DINIS, FIÚZA
3.
RESULTS
3.1. Effective dose assessment
The effective dose received by a worker depends on many factors including the radon
concentration, the exposure time, the exposure frequency and the characteristics of the radon
decay products are given by equation (1):
DRn  CRn  DCinh  E f  f eq
(1)
where
DRn is the annual dose resulting from radon inhalation (mSv/year),
CRn is the average radon concentration in air breathed at the tailings pile (Bq/m3),
DCinh is the radon effective dose equivalent factor, (mSv/(Bq.h/m3),
Ef
is the outdoor exposure frequency (hour/year),
feq
is the equilibrium factor for radon decay products.
The recommendations of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of
Atomic Radiations (UNSCEAR) for the conversion of potential alpha energy exposure (Bq.
h/m3) to effective dose equivalent (nSv) have been adopted [6]. A value of 9 nSv per Bq.h/m3
was adopted for the radon effective dose equivalent factor. This conversion factor
incorporates an adult average breathing rate of 19.2 m3/d. An outdoor exposure frequency of
1920 hours per year and an equilibrium factor for radon decay products of 0.4 were assumed.
For external exposure due to contaminated ground surfaces (Dext,i), the dose coefficients
(Table I) were converted into the appropriate units by assuming a soil density of 1600 kg/m3
() and a soil depth contamination of 1 m (Ts) [5].
Dext ,i  Csoil,i  DC ext  E f  3600    Ts
(2)
The dose estimates obtained from the assessment of exposure from external radiation
and from intake of radon were combined for the assessment of the value of total effective
dose for comparison with dose limits.
3.2. Summary results
For the hypothetical exposure scenario, the effective dose for one year’s radon exposure
at 557 Bq/m3 is 3.85 mSv while, for external exposure, the estimated gamma radiation dose is
4.5 mSv/year. The total effective dose is obtained by summing the doses resulting from
internal and external exposure. The value for the total effective dose is 8.35 mSv/year.
4.
CONCLUSIONS
This assessment, because of limited data and the associated uncertainties, should be
regarded as only indicative of the likely exposures received by workers. Nevertheless, it is
clear that the workers involved in the Old Dam remediation could have been exposed to
significant radiation doses via both internal and external pathways. In addition, radiation
doses due to the inhalation of dust containing radionuclides, which were not considered in the
assessment, may also contribute significantly. External exposure to gamma radiation (54%)
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TOPICAL SESSION 7
and internal exposure due to the inhalation of radon (46%) were both found to contribute
significantly to the total dose.
The results show that occupational radiation doses for this assumed exposure scenario
reach a significant fraction of the protection limits. If it is assumed that their exposure to work
activities is for three years, the dose would be about 25% of the 100 mSv limit for the
consecutive five years of exposure. These calculations were done assuming that no radiation
protection precautions were applied during work activities.
Further remediation actions are planned for other former uranium tailings sites in the
vicinity of the Old Dam. This preliminary assessment indicates that, for these planned
remediation projects, improved radiation protection procedures and surveillance of workers
should be implemented. The individual worker dose levels, therefore, should be carefully
measured, controlled and registered. Optimization techniques to reduce individual and
collective doses should be established. Radiation exposure of the workers should be reduced
by proper planning and use of protective equipment in order to keep doses as low as
reasonably achievable (ALARA). Implementing some simple precautions, such as the
wearing of appropriate work clothes and dust masks would contribute to this objective.
Additionally, workers should be monitored and controlled periodically in order to assess the
exposure being received.
REFERENCES
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
194
EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Verifications Under the Terms of Article 35 of the Euratom
Treaty, PT-06/07 (2006).
INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION, The 2007
Recommendations of the International Commission on Radiological Protection, Publication
103, Annals ICRP 37(2–4), Elsevier, Amsterdam (2007).
EXMIN, Estudo Director de Áreas de Minérios Radioactivos – 2.ª fase. Companhia de Indústria
e Serviços Mineiros e Ambientais, SA (2003).
FALCÃO, J.M., et al., MinUrar, Minas de Urânio e seus Resíduos: Efeitos na Saúde da
População, Relatório científico I, Publ. INSA, INETI, ITN (2005).
ECKERMAN K.F., RYMAN J.C., Federal guidance Report n.º12, Exposure-to-Dose
Coefficients for General Application, Based on the 1987 Federal Radiation Protection
Guidance, EPA-402-R-93-081 (1993).
UNITED NATIONS SCIENTIFIC COMMITTEE ON THE EFFECTS OF ATOMIC
RADIATION, Sources, Effects and Risk of Ionization Radiation. United States Scientific
Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation, Report on General Assembly (2000).
BASELINE RADIOLOGICAL SURVEY OF THE URANIUM–BEARING
REGION OF POLI (NORTHERN CAMEROON)
S. SAÏDOU***, F. BOCHUD*, S. BAECHLER*, K.N. MOÏSE**, P. FROIDEVAUX*
*
University Institute for Radiation Physics,
Lausanne, Switzerland
**
Centre for Atomic Molecular Physics and Quantum Optics,
University of Douala, Douala, Cameroon
***
Institute for Geological and Mining Research,
Yaoundé, Cameroon
Abstract
This paper describes a baseline study of the uranium-bearing region of Poli where it is expected that the
uranium deposit of Kitongo will be exploited in the near future. Soil, water and foodstuffs were sampled. The
results show that activity concentrations of natural radionuclides in soil and water samples are low and
comparable with global averages, but higher in foodstuffs (vegetables) (210Po and 210Pb). Further elaborated
studies of this type should be undertaken by the company that develops the mine, prior to the beginning of
operations.
1.
INTRODUCTION
Many reported studies reveal the impact of uranium mining and milling in the
environment [1–9]. Prior to any uranium mining and milling, a baseline radiological study is
necessary. Thus, measurements of naturally occurring radioactive materials (NORM) carried
out within the framework of this study will be helpful to assess the environmental impact of
the mining and milling of the Kitongo uranium deposit on the Poli region of Cameroon and
later, to the site remediation after these processes are completed [9].
Since 1950, many geological studies for assessing the uranium potential of the Kitongo
deposit have been carried out [10–12]. This deposit may be exploited in the near future by the
Government of Cameroon [13]. To date, no radiological study in the area of this deposit has
been undertaken. The main objective of the present work is to carry out the first part of a
baseline study of the uranium-bearing region of Poli. This study has involved the sampling of
soil, water and foodstuffs. Indoor radon concentrations were also measured in some dwellings
as radon can contribute significantly to the radiation dose to the public.
2.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
2.1. Sampling
The uranium-bearing area zoned during uranium prospecting corresponds to a surface of
6710 km2 as illustrated in Fig. 1 [10–12]. In the present work, a surface of 144 km2 was
sampled. The sampling plan comprises a square grid on which soil samples were collected at
points separated by distances of 4 km. Each sampling point corresponds to a square surface
area of 1 m2. At each point, a sample to 0-5 cm depth was taken giving an average sample
whose dry mass is around 500 g. At Gata, a soil profile was sampled (0–5 cm, 5–10 cm, 10–
15 cm, 15–20 cm and 20–25 cm of depth) to study the vertical distribution of the
radioactivity. In total, 20 soil samples were taken. In addition, 10 water samples and 10
195
TOPICAL SESSION 7
foodstuff samples were collected in the small town of Poli and its neighbourhood. The water
samples were taken from rivers, wells and drinking fountains. All of the soil and foodstuff
samples collected were dried, sieved (2 mm) and homogenized.
FIG. 1: Strategy of sampling for the uranium-bearing region of Poli including the town of Poli
and the Kitongo deposit. The points A, B, C and D circumscribe the area (6710 km2) over
which a German institute undertook an airborne survey [10–12].
2.2. Methods for radioactivity measurement
The measurement procedure for uranium and thorium isotopes used in this study has
been described in [14] and the procedure for 210Po determination is fully described in [15].
Uranium measurements were performed using thin films containing diphosphonate and
sulphonate groups that have been shown to have the required selectivity for uranium [16]. For
226
Ra measurement, a thin film containing MnO2 in 100 ml of water sample was used [16].
After exposure, the thin films were dried at ambient temperatures and measured using αspectrometry.
For 210Po measurements, a silver disc coated on one face with plastic rubber was put
into weakly acidified water containing 50 mBq of the 209Po tracer. 210Po and 209Po were
spontaneously deposited on to the disc. The silver disc, dried at ambient temperatures was
measured using α-spectrometry.
Gamma spectrometry measurements were performed using a Canberra p-type HPGe
well detector (GCW4523) with a total active volume of 206 cm3, a relative photopeak
196
SAÏDOU et al.
efficiency of 45%, and a resolution at 122 and 1332 keV of 1.24 and 1.93 keV, respectively.
Treatment of the data was carried out using GENIE 2000 software. The spectrometer was
calibrated using a liquid solution of 241Am, 109Cd, 57Co, 139Ce, 137Cs, 88Y and 60Co traceable to
international standards and emitting γ-rays in the energy range 59-1836 keV. Coincidencesumming corrections for 88Y and 60Co were determined by Monte Carlo calculations [17]. The
self-absorption correction factors were also calculated by Monte Carlo simulation [18].
2.3. Measurements of radon in dwellings
Indoor radon concentrations were measured in five dwellings in the uranium-bearing
region of Poli by using electret detectors (E-perm) [19]. These detectors were exposed in
dwellings (bedrooms, classrooms and offices) for a three month period.
3.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
3.1. Radioactivity in soil
The measurements in 20 soil samples are summarised in Fig. 2. The activities of 210Po
and Pb are higher compared to other members of the 238U series. The results presented in
Fig. 3 show an exponential decrease of the 210Po and 210Pb activity concentrations with
sampling depth. The enrichment of soil surface (0–5 cm) in 210Po and 210Pb is explained by
the deposition of radon progeny coming from the disintegration of radon in atmosphere after
emanation. A similar result was observed for 210Po and 210Pb around closed uranium mines in
Portugal [8]. 208Tl activity is lower than the equilibrium value due to the branching ratio
(36%) of its mother product, 212Bi.
210
Activity (Bq/kg)
1000
100
10
FIG. 2. Box plot of the activity (Bq/kg) distribution of 40K and natural series
232
Th in 16 soil samples from the uranium-bearing region of Poli.
235
K40
Tl208
Bi212
Pb212
Ra224
Th228
Ac228
Th232
Po210
Pb210
Bi214
Pb214
Ra226
Th230
U234
Th234
U238
U235
1
U,
238
U and
The average activities observed in the world are 420 Bq/kg for 40K, 38 Bq/kg for 238U
and 45 Bq/kg for 232Th [20]. Activities of 40K measured in 20 soil samples, as illustrated in
Fig. 2, show a median activity of 552±10 Bq/kg, a mean activity of 506±3 Bq/kg and a
maximal value of 1124±27 Bq/kg (Mont Tchegui sampling point). Fig. 2 shows median
activities of 25±2 Bq/kg for 238U, 23.3±6.3 Bq/kg for 226Ra and 30.5±1.7 Bq/kg for 232Th.
Radioactivity levels in the region of Poli are comparable to global averages and, as might be
197
TOPICAL SESSION 7
expected, lower than reported results from measurements [8–9] undertaken in the
environments of closed uranium mines.
Sampling depth (cm)
5
Po-210
Pb-210
10
15
20
25
20
FIG. 3. Vertical distribution of
point.
40
60
Activity (Bq/kg)
210
Po and
210
80
Pb in materials sampled at the Gata sampling
Activity (Bq/kg)
100
10
1
0.1
0.01
U235
U238
U234 Th230 Ra226 Pb210 Po210 Th232 Th228
K40
FIG. 4. Box plot of the activity concentration (Bq/kg) distribution in foodstuffs frequently
consumed in the region of Poli.
3.2. Radioactivity in foodstuffs
From Fig. 4., it can be observed that activity concentrations of 40K are high compared to
the values observed for the other radionuclides. This is not of great concern from the
standpoint of radiation protection due to the homeostatic regulation of 40K in the human body.
The activities of 210Po and 210Pb are higher in vegetables due to the deposition of radon
progeny. The activities measured in beef are 5±0.5 Bq/kg for 210Po and 5±1 Bq/kg for 210Pb;
this can also be explained by the deposition of radon progeny in pastureland as well as the
ingestion of soil by cattle.
3.3. Radioactivity in water
All measurements of 226Ra in water were under the limit of detection of α-spectrometry
(10 mBq/L). Fig. 5 presents activities of 238U, 234U and 210Po respectively. All the reported
results show that radioactivity in water of the region of Poli is low compared, for instance,
with radioactivity around the closed uranium mine of Rayrock [7].
198
SAÏDOU et al.
16
Activity (mBq/l)
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
U235
U238
U234
Ra226
Po210
.
FIG. 5. Box plot of activity distribution in water (river, well and drinking fountain) of the
uranium-bearing region of Poli. 226Ra is represented by its limit of detection in water.
3.4. Radon in dwellings
Table 1 presents the results of 222Rn measurements in dwellings in the Poli region. The
average indoor concentration (without values obtained for the office) is 120±21 Bq/m3. The
value obtained for the office is 2000±100 Bq/m3 which is very high compared to the world
average value of 40 Bq/m3 and this value was identified as being in need of further
investigation.
Many studies have been reported on measurements of radon in dwellings [4, 21–25].
The reported results reveal the large variation in the radon level in houses. It has been
recognised that in most houses with high radon levels, the main source is not the building
material but the convective radon influx from the soil. The radon level depends also on
geological and meteorological factors, ventilation conditions and other factors [26].
TABLE 1. CONCENTRATION OF 222RN IN 5 DWELLINGS OF THE URANIUMBEARING REGION OF POLI
Exposure area
Inn
Room
Classroom
Parlour
Office
4.
Concentration (Bq/M3)
11519
11318
10619
13718
2000100
CONCLUSION
In this environmental baseline study of the uranium-bearing region of Poli, it has been
found that soil, drinking water and food do not contain high levels of radioactivity, although
the leaves of vegetables contain relatively higher levels of 210Pb and 210Po.
Any changes in environmental radioactivity due to mining activities will be evident by
comparison with the results of this study and further studies of this kind. Once uranium ore is
brought from depth to the surface, 222Rn emanation and 210Pb and 210Po deposition might lead
to an increase in the radiation dose to the population of the Poli area. Thus, no mining licence
199
TOPICAL SESSION 7
should be given by national authorities without the mining company being required to
undertake an adequate monitoring programme. Well water may also be an interesting
component in which to assess any damage from mining to the environment because of the
very low levels of uranium and radium radioisotopes in water at the present time.
REFERENCES
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
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VANDENHOVE, H., SWEECK, L., MALLANTS, D., et al., Assessment of radiation exposure
in the uranium mining area of Mailuu Suu, Kyrgyzstan. J Environ Radioactivity 88 (2006) 118139.
MARTIN, P., TIMS, S., RYAN, B., et al., A radon and meteorological measurement network for
the Alligator Rivers Region, Australia. J of Environ Radioactivity 76 (2004) 35-49.
MARTIN, P., TIMS, S., MC GILL, A., et al., Use of airborne -ray spectrometry for
environmental assessment of the rehabilitated Nabarlek uranium mine, Australia. Environ Monit
Assessm 115 (2006) 531-553.
GORJANACZ, Z., VARHEGYI, A., KOVACS, T., et al., Population dose in the vicinity of
closed Hungarian uranium mine, Rad Prot Dosim 118 (2006) 448-452.
UZUNOV, I., DIMITROV, M., STEINHÄUSLER, F., Environmental radiation levels and
occupational exposure due to uranium mining and milling operations in Bulgaria, Radiat Prot
Dosim. 45 (1992) 141-143.
VAUPOTIC, J., KOBAL, I., Release of radium from an abandoned uranium mine site: Zirovski
Vrh Uranium mine, Slovenia. J of Radioanal Nucl Chem 1 (1999) 107-111.
VESKA, E., EATON, R.S., Abandoned Rayrock uranium mill tailings in the Northwest
Territories: environmental conditions and radiological impact, Health Phys. 60 (1991) 399-409.
CARVALHO, F.P., MADRUGA, M.J., REIS, M.C., et al., Radioactivity in the environment
around past radium and uranium mining sites of Portugal, J of Environ Radioactivity 96 (2007)
39-46.
WINKELMANN, I., THOMAS, M., VOGL, K., Aerial measurements on uranium ore mining,
milling and processing areas in Germany, J Environ Radioactivity 53 (1981) 301-311.
GEHNES, P., THOSTE, V., Rapport sur la mission d’expertise du projet –Prospection
d’uranium au Nord-Cameroun, 16 Oct-19 Déc 1980, rapport non diffusé, Hanovre (1981).
OESTERLEN, M., Uranium exploration in North Cameroon, region of Poli. The Kitongo
uranium exploration, Nov. 1982-Apr. 1983. Unpublished report, Hannover (1981).
THOSTE, V., Uranium exploration in North Cameroon, region of Poli. Project definition,
execution and results, Jan. 1982- Dec. 1984. Unpublished report, Hannover (1985).
MEADON, H.M, Nuclear Energy Corporation, Geological review of the Kitongo uranium
deposit, Poli area, Northern Cameroon (2006).
SAÏDOU, BOCHUD, F., LAEDERMANN, J-P., et al., A comparison of alpha and gamma
spectrometry for environmental radioactivity surveys, Appl Radiat and Isot 66 (2008) 215-222.
SAÏDOU, BOCHUD, F., LAEDERMANN, J-P., et al., Calibration of an HPGe detector and selfattenuation correction for 210Pb: Verification by alpha spectrometry of 210Po in environmental
samples, Nucl Instr and Meth A 578 (2007)_ 515-522.
SURBECK, H., Alpha spectrometry sample preparation using selectively adsorbing thin films,
Appl Radiat Isot 53 (2000) 97-100.
DÉCOMBAZ, M., GOSTELY, J.J., LAEDERMANN, J-P., Coincidence-summing corrections
for extended sources in gamma-ray spectrometry using Monte Carlo simulation, Nucl Instr and
Meth A 312 (1992) 152-159.
BOCHUD, F., BAILAT, C.J., BUCHILLIER, T., et al., Simple Monte Carlo method to calibrate
well-type HPGe detectors, Nucl Instr and Meth A 569 (2006) 790-795.
KOTRAPPA, P., BRUBAKER, T., DEMPSEY, J.C. et al., Electret ion chamber system for
measurement of environmental radon and environmental gamma radiation, Radiat Prot Dosim 45
(1992) 107-110.
SAÏDOU et al.
[20] UNITED NATIONS SCIENTIFIC COMMITTEE ON THE EFFECTS OF ATOMIC
RADIATION, Sources and effects of ionizing radiation, United Nations (2000).
[21] COMMISSION FEDERALE DE LA PROTECTION CONTRE LES RADIATIONS ET DE
SURVEILLANCE DE LA RADIOACTIVITE, Analyse des contributions à l’irradiation de la
population Suisse en 2004 (2005).
[22] MAGALHAES, M.H., AMARAL, E., SACHETT, I., et al., Radon-222 in Brazil: an outline of
indoor and outdoor measurements. J of Environ Radioactivity 67 (2003) 131-143.
[23] FAISCA, M.C., TEIXEIRA, M., BETTENCOURT, A. O., Indoor radon concentrations in
Portugal: a national survey, Radiat Prot Dosim. 45 (1992) 465-467.
[24] BINNS, D., FIGUEIREDO, N., MELO, V.P., et al., Radon-222 measurements in a uraniumprospecting area in Brazil, J of Environ Radioactivity 38 (1998) 249-254.
[25] SOMLAI, J., GORJANACZ, Z., VARHEGYI, A., et al., Radon concentration in houses over a
closed Hungarian uranium mine, Sci Total Environ. 367 (2006) 653-665.
[26] INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION (ICRP), Protection
against radon-222 at home and at work, Pergamon Press, Oxford (1993).
201
ROMANIAN EXPERIENCE IN THE REMEDIATION OF NORM
CONTAMINATED SITES – A CASE STUDY
O. VELICU*, A. TOMA**
*
**
National Commission for Nuclear Activities Control,
Bucharest, Romania
Nuclear Activities Autonomous Administration,
Pitesti, Romania
Abstract
In January 2006, the National Commission for Nuclear Activities Control (CNCAN) received an official
letter from the Mayor of a village claiming that an area of the local environment was radioactively contaminated
due to some past liquid discharges from gas exploitation in the area. This paper describes the steps taken by
CNCAN to investigate the situation and to resolve it by a programme of remediation which involved the
polluter, the local community, the radiological assessment organization and local and national regulatory
authorities.
1.
INTRODUCTION
In Romania, naturally occurring radioactive materials (NORM) have been produced as a
result of various industries, such as uranium and non-uranium mining and milling facilities,
chemical fertilizer production, oil and gas extraction and exploitation, etc. These industrial
facilities are at different stages in their life cycles: some are still operating but many of them
have ceased operations and are, at present, at an advanced stage of decommissioning.
The nuclear field in Romania is governed by the Law No. 111/1996, on the safe
deployment, regulation, licensing and control of nuclear activities. The general radiation
protection requirements stipulated by this law are detailed by the Fundamental Norms on
Radiological Safety, approved by the National Commission for Nuclear Activities Control
(CNCAN) Presidential Order No. 14/2000. Chapter VII of these Norms is dedicated to
situations of significantly increased exposure due to natural sources and Chapter X to
radiation protection in the case of interventions. More detailed requirements on radiological
safety during working activities involving NORM were issued in November 2008 as a result
of the European Communities’ Phare project No. 017-519-03.03, ‘Development of CNCAN
capabilities regarding the regulatory aspects of Naturally Occurring Radioactive Materials
(NORM) and Technologically Enhanced Naturally Occurring Radioactive Materials
(TENORM) related activities’. However, these regulations do not address past activities.
There are no specific requirements for intervention in the case of chronic exposure to
radiation or to environmental radioactive contamination.
The principles and general requirements for environmental protection in Romania are
established under the Romanian Government Urgent Ordinance no. 195/2005, approved with
modifications and completions by the Law no. 265/2006. Specific requirements for the
investigation and assessment of soil and sub-soil pollution, as well as for the remediation of
affected areas are established by the Romanian Government Decisions no. 1408/2007 and
1403/2007, but they do not address radioactive contamination. In 2008, the Ministry of
Environment and Sustainable Development initiated a process of developing similar
Government Decisions for radioactively contaminated sites; a first meeting of the working
group was held, in order to justify the need to develop such Decisions.
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TOPICAL SESSION 7
2.
CASE PRESENTATION
2.1. Identification of radioactively contaminated land
In January 2006, CNCAN received an official letter from the Mayor of a village situated
in the west of the country, claiming that an area of the local environment was radioactively
contaminated due to some past liquid discharges from gas exploitation in the area. CNCAN
investigated the area in February 2006, performing measurements and environmental
sampling for laboratory analysis.
Fig. 1 shows the investigated area, located to the north-easterly limit of the forest in the
vicinity of the village and comprising a drainage channel (2 m wide, 475 m long) and a
woodless area with a meandering water flow (4 m wide, 80 m long) linked to a drainage ditch
(1 m wide, 155 m long). The drainage channel is almost covered with bushes and small trees.
At the time of the investigation, both the drainage channel and ditch were partly covered with
ice.
FIG. 1. The contaminated site.
The ambient gamma radiation dose rate values measured in the area are generally within
the typical range of natural background, except for the drainage channel, where values two to
three times higher than background were measured on the banks. The middle of the channel
showed the highest values (up to 6 times higher than natural background).
Four samples of water, soil and sediment were collected from the hotspots for
subsequent gamma-spectrometric analyses. The water sample showed a 40K activity
concentration equivalent to natural background levels. In the soil and sediment samples,
radionuclides from the 238U and 232Th series were identified at concentrations one order of
magnitude higher than the average concentrations in undisturbed soil of Romania.
204
VELICU, TOMA
Consequently, CNCAN confirmed the presence of the radioactive contamination on the
land but noted that it did not represent a significant radiological risk for the local population.
However, it also noted that due to the fact that the neighbouring land has been sold and that
houses are being built in the vicinity of the contaminated area, the presence of the enhanced
NORM might become a real radiological risk in the near future.
2.2.1. Regulatory dispositions
The polluter company was identified and, based on the provisions of the Fundamental
Norms on Radiological Safety, it was asked:
(a) To mark the perimeter of the contaminated area and to limit the access of the public
inside the perimeter;
(b) To assess the level of radioactive pollution of the contaminated area; and
(c) To send the results to CNCAN, in order for it to establish the appropriate remediation
actions.
2.2.2. Immediate actions
Warning signs were posted in March 2006. The building of a fence around the
contaminated area took more than 6 months, due to all of the authorizations and approvals
necessary from different public authorities (local public administration, land administration,
forest administration, gas transport company) but also because of the time taken to identify all
the owners of the land (including one private person).
2.2.3. First assessment of the radioactive pollution of the contaminated area
In order to assess the level of radioactive pollution of the contaminated area, the polluter
company contracted the Pitesti Nuclear Research Branch, (Radiation Protection Laboratory),
which is approved by CNCAN, to perform radioactivity measurements in environmental
samples. It was led by a qualified radiation protection expert. The radiological investigation
was performed in 2007, while both the drainage channel and the drainage ditch were flooded,
and it consisted of:
– Radiological mapping, performed by systematic measurements of the radiation count
rate 10 cm above the ground at different steps along three mapping elements;
– Measurement of the ambient equivalent dose rate 1 m above ground;
– Field sampling and laboratory spectrometry analysis: 8 soil samples were collected
from hot spots by core drilling down to 80 cm. In order to determine the depth
migration profile of the radionuclides, the cores were divided into 5 segments
representing different depths (0 – 20 cm, 20 – 35 cm, 35 – 50 cm, 50 – 65 cm, 65 – 80
cm). Five background soil samples were collected, including one depth profile; the
others were taken from the 20 cm top layer of soil. Ten samples of vegetation were
collected (one background), to assess the radionuclide transfer from soil to plants.
Four surface water samples were collected from the contaminated area and one sample
of well water from the Gas Separators Station. All samples were prepared following
laboratory procedures and were analyzed by high resolution gamma spectrometry.
The count rate values obtained by direct measurement were converted in units of
ambient equivalent radiation dose rate and processed via a bi-variate interpolation method
following grid generation by a linear kriging method. In Fig. 2, these values are presented as
dose rate maps for each of the radiological mapping regions.
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TOPICAL SESSION 7
Area were considered to be contaminated when the background ambient dose rate was
exceeded by at least two times. On this basis it was concluded that the extent of the
contamination was approximately 1500 m2.
The ratios between 238U and 232Th progeny concentrations in soil samples from the area
and in the background sample are generally higher than 1 in the 0–20 cm and 20–35 cm
layers, with higher values in the first layer. Maximum values of the ratios are registered for
226
Ra in the first layer and they vary between 7 and 47. For each sample, excepting one, the
radionuclide concentrations decrease to the average concentrations of the background depth
profile within 20 to 35 cm. One soil core shows a greater depth migration of radionuclides,
probably because it was collected from near the discharge point.
FIG. 2. Radiological mapping of: (a) drainage channel, (b) woodless area, (c) drainage ditch.
The radionuclide concentrations in the water samples from the area are similar to that of
the background sample. The contaminant transfer factors from soil to vegetation are in good
agreement with the ranges of values indicated in the literature for the radionuclides under
consideration.
Taking into account the extent and the depth of the contaminated soil layer, it is
estimated that there is a maximum of 550 m3 of contaminated material.
The assessment of the radiation doses to the public was done using the RESRAD 6
computer code, developed by Argonne National Laboratory in the United States of America.
The source term was derived from the soil measurement results. A contaminated surface of
1500 m2 was assumed and, for conservative reasons, the recipient was placed directly above
the contaminated area. A 35 cm thick layer of contaminated soil was assumed - without a
covering layer. The following additional assumptions were made: density of soil 1.7 g/cm3,
average wind velocity 1 m/s, annual precipitation rate 1000 L/m2 and the annual rate for soil
irrigation 200 L/m2. The dose conversion factors were taken from The US Environmental
Protection IAEA’s (EPA) Federal Guidance Reports Nos. 11 and 12. The consumption data
206
VELICU, TOMA
for the public are the default values contained in the RESRAD code. On this basis, the
additional dose to the population was calculated to be 25.4 mSv/y, of which 24.3 mSv/y is
due to radon in homes built directly above the contaminated soil and inhabited for 24h/day. If
the contaminated area is not used for building houses, the additional dose to population will
be less than 1.1 mSv/y, representing about half of the dose received due to natural background
radiation, but slightly exceeding the public dose limit of 1mSv/y.
2.2.4. Proposals for remedial actions
The results of the study were presented to CNCAN in July 2007, together with the
following proposals for further actions:
(a) Removal of vegetation and drainage of water from the contaminated area;
(b) Removal of a soil layer up to 35 cm thick in areas in which the radiation dose rate
exceeds twice the natural background, under radiological supervision;
(c) Final disposal of the removed material by one of the following methods: dispose of it
in the National Low and Intermediate Level Radioactive Waste (LILW) Repository or
in a sludge pile of the National Uranium Company; make a slurry of the soil and inject
it into an oil extraction well or, dilute the contaminant concentration by mixing the
contaminated soil with uncontaminated soil at the same location.
In August 2008, during a meeting involving all stakeholders (the polluter company, the
local environmental protection IAEA, the Mayor of the commune, CNCAN and the team
responsible for the study), these proposals were discussed, with the following conclusions:
(a) The removal of the vegetation and water from the contaminated land must be followed
by another set of measurements, in order to check that there are no other hot spots;
(b) The precise volume of the soil to be removed must be decided after this second study
is completed;
(c) The final disposal of the removed material in the National LILW Repository is not
acceptable;
(d) The National Uranium Company did not accept such material for disposal in its sludge
piles;
(e) The injection of the sludge into an extraction well is not feasible;
(f) The dilution of the contaminated soil with uncontaminated soil was not agreed to by
the Mayor of the commune, nor by CNCAN.
2.2.5. Second assessment of the radioactive pollution of the contaminated land
In 2008, the same laboratory was contracted to perform new measurements and analyses
in the same area, after the vegetation and water had been removed. All of the water and
vegetal material removed was checked for radioactivity. It showed natural background values.
The new study was performed in July 2008 using the same methods with slightly different
approaches:
– The radiological mapping was performed in smaller steps along the drainage channel;
– The value of 300 nSv/h of ambient dose rate measured in contact was selected as a
criterion for deciding if land is contaminated. With this, 8 hot spots were identified
and marked on the field;
– From each hot spot, soil samples were collected by core drilling down to 60 cm; the
cores were scanned by in situ gamma-spectrometry and then divided into 4 segments
of 15 cm each; 1 soil background sample was collected, representing one depth
profile.
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TOPICAL SESSION 7
Using the 300 nSv/h operational intervention level, the extent of the contamination was
reduced to 560 m2. It was also calculated that removing the 35 cm top layer of soil from the
hot spot areas would ensure the removal of 50% of the radioactive inventory. Taking into
account the extent and the depth of the contaminated soil layer, a maximum of 200 m3 of
contaminated material is estimated to be present.
New calculations of the additional dose to the public resulted in similar values to those
previously estimated, that is: 23 mSv/y, of which 21.8 mSv/y is due to radon in a house built
on the contaminated land and inhabited for 24 h/d. If the area is not used for house building,
then the dose would be 1.2 mSv/y.
3.
REMEDIAL PROPOSALS
These new results were presented to CNCAN in November 2008, together with the
following proposals:
(a) Removal of the 35 cm top layer of soil from the hot spot areas, under radiological
supervision;
(b) Intermediate storage of the removed material, in one of the polluter’s facilities, located
near to the contaminated site;
(c) Disposal of the contaminated soil in one of the future disposal facilities designed for
hydrocarbon contaminated soil.
CNCAN accepted these solutions, with the following conditions:
(a) The removal of the contaminated soil will be approved only if the operations are
assisted by radiologically qualified staff and performed under such conditions that the
workers will not receive radiation doses higher than the public dose limit (1 mSv/y);
(b) The intermediate storage of the contaminated soil will be approved only if the polluter
company can demonstrate that it has the capacity to store it in a safe condition;
(c) The site will be released from regulatory control only if, after the removal of the
contaminated material, it can be demonstrated by measurements that the doses to the
public will not exceed the legal dose limit (1 mSv/y);
(d) If agreed by the environmental protection authorities, the disposal of the contaminated
soil in one of the disposal facilities for hydrocarbon contaminated soil will be
approved provided that the results of a radiological safety assessment of the disposal
facility are acceptable.
Due to weather constraints, the removal of the material cannot be carried out until
March 2009. By the end of March, the polluter company must present to CNCAN its practical
solutions for removing and storing the contaminated soil documented in such a manner as to
demonstrate the observance of the previously stated conditions.
4.
CONCLUSIONS
From this example, several lessons can be learned. The remediation of a land area
contaminated with radioactive material requires, first of all, an understanding of the physical
processes taking place in the local environment. Unexpected delays must always be expected,
starting with those involved in the search for persons owning the land and finishing with the
problems caused by the different (technical) languages spoken by the authorities and
companies involved in the process. The perception of the radiological risk by the public has
also to be taken into consideration. Finally, it is a matter of finding the proper balance
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VELICU, TOMA
between the need for an intervention, public concern, regulatory requirements, the capabilities
(and financial resources) of the polluter and the actual possibilities for effective remediation.
REFERENCES
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Radiation Protection and the Management
of Radioactive Waste in the Oil and Gas Industry, Safety Reports Series No. 34, IAEA, Vienna
(2003).
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Extent of Environmental Contamination
by Naturally Occurring Radioactive Material (NORM) and Technological Options for
Mitigation, Technical Reports Series No. 419, IAEA, Vienna (2003).
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Regulatory and Management Approaches
for the Control of Environmental Residues Containing Naturally Occurring Radioactive Material
(NORM) IAEA-TECDOC-1484, Vienna (2006).
ARGONNE NATIONAL LABORATORY ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT DIVISION,
An Assessment of the Disposal of Petroleum Industry NORM in Nonhazardous Landfills,
DOE/BC/W-31-109-ENG-38-8 (1999).
ARGONNE NATIONAL LABORATORY ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT DIVISION,
Potential Radiological Doses Associated with the Disposal of Petroleum Industry NORM via
Land spreading, DOE/BC/W-31-109-ENG-38-5 (1998).
RAAN – SCN PITESTI, Nota tehnica nr. 5442/17.04.2007, Studiu de estimare a poluarii
radioactive in zona Dumbravita, Timis (2007).
RAAN – SCN PITESTI, Nota tehnica nr. 17012/07.10.2008, Studiu de estimare a poluarii
radioactive in zona Dumbravita, Timis, etapa 1 (2008).
209
RADIOECOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT AND REMEDIATION PLANNING OF
URANIUM MILLING FACILITIES AT THE PRIDNEPROVSKY CHEMICAL
PLANT IN UKRAINE
T.V. LAVROVA*, O.V. VOITSEKHOVYCH*, M.G. BUZINNY**
*
**
Ukrainian Hydrometeorological Institute,
Kiev, Ukraine
Marzeev Institute Hygiene and Medical Ecology,
Kiev, Ukraine
Abstract
During the last 3 years, comprehensive radiological studies at the largest uranium production legacy site
in the Ukraine, the Pridneprovsky Chemical Plant, have been carried out. The studies included gamma-dose
mapping, radon-222 indoor and outdoor measurements, characterization of the dump sites and other hazardous
facilities in this territory, as well as the preliminary dose assessment for people working at the industrial site. The
paper describes the current status of remediation planning and the development of a new concept for the
decontamination of the former uranium extraction facilities.
1.
DESCRIPTION OF THE CURRENT STATUS OF THE LEGACY SITE
Uranium mining was carried out intensively in Ukraine from the end of the 1940s to the
beginning of the 1990s [1]. The former State Industrial Enterprise, the Pridneprovsky
Chemical Plant (PChP), was one of the largest metallurgical facilities in the Former Soviet
Union. Uranium ores were processed there from 1948 until 1991. During that time, uranium
extraction was carried out on raw ore products delivered from Central Asia, Germany and the
Czech Republic.
In addition to imported ores, the PChP processed uranium-bearing sludge obtained from
the smelting of iron ore from the uranium mines of Ukraine. In the early 1990s, due to
disintegration of the former Soviet Union and consequently the uranium industry, the PChP
was split into several separate enterprises and the processing of uranium was stopped.
Nine tailings impoundments were created in an area containing about 42 million tonnes
of uranium extraction residues with a total activity of 3.2 × 1015 Bq (86 000 Ci) [1]. Some of
the highly contaminated equipment and metals used at the facilities were deposited at the
storage sites within the area of the industrial zone of Dnieprodzerzhinsk, and other residues
were disposed of about 14 km to the south east of the site. Each tailing impoundment has been
inventoried based on information obtained from limited studies carried out during the past
decade under a programme initiated by the Ministry of Fuel and Energy of Ukraine. However,
the quality of the information available for each particular facility is not always reliable and
more specific studies are required.
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TOPICAL SESSION 7
FIG. 1. The PChP uranium production legacy site. 1-Tailing Zapadnoe, 2 – Tailing Centralny
Yar, 3 - Tailing Yugo-Vostochnoe, 4 - Tailing D (Dnieprovskoe).
The PChP territory is demarcated by a concrete fence. The area of the former PChP is
divided by a railway into two large areas – the upper and lower parts. The main former
uranium extraction facilities of PChP are situated in the upper part of the territory, and the
largest tailings dump, Dnieprovskoe, is in the lower part, south of the Konoplyanka River –
also referred to as the drainage canal (see Fig. 1). The upper part of the PChP territory, where
the facilities are located, is much more contaminated with uranium-thorium series
radionuclides than the lower part, due to the influence of the former uranium extraction
facilities. No proper engineered barriers were provided for most of the tailings. After full
capacity was reached, each tailing impoundment was usually covered with local soils, debris
and other industrial waste.
The distinctive feature of this site and its uranium residue tailings is that it is located
within the populated area of Dnieprodzerzhinsk town (about 276 thousand citizens). The
residential area is situated close to the industrial zone at a distance of 1–2 km from the nearest
tailings (see Fig. 1). Therefore, the planning of the remediation of the former uranium
production facilities is very sensitive to the opinions of the local population.
2.
CURRENT ACTIVITIES IN AND AROUND THE PCHP TERRITORY
In 2008, about 20 enterprises were still in operation in the PChP area. Most of the
enterprises are not related to the former uranium processing activities. However, the
workplaces of these enterprises are situated close to the highly contaminated tailings dumps
and former buildings used for ore milling and extraction. The presence of contamination from
these facilities may expose workers – externally due to gamma-radiation and internally due to
radon–222 emanations and alpha-aerosol dispersion [2]. Some small enterprises make use of
facilities which were not decontaminated in a proper way. The regulatory constraints for
enterprises within this territory are still not well developed and require improvement.
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LAVROVA et al.
In addition to the enterprises already operating on this territory, there is significant
interest in the further exploitation of the empty buildings on the site. For example, some
workshops of the former hydrometallurgical plants that were used in the past for the
extraction of the uranium concentrate have been sold to a new owner who intends to use these
workshops for the processing of raw materials containing gold. It is clear that such ‘reprofiling’ of the former uranium facilities requires the complete decontamination of the
facilities.
Assessments have shown that there is an environmental impact at most sites where there
are uranium tailings and waste. The impact is mainly due to releases of radionuclides from the
uranium decay series (238U, 230Th, 226Ra, 210Pb and 210Po) to surface waters and to the
groundwater table, as well as to radon emissions and dust dispersion into the air.
Typical external gamma dose rates in the territory are generally rather low: 0.15 – 0.30
µSv/h. However, in some places, e.g. at the tailings surface, external gamma dose rates may
reach 1 – 3 µSv/h and even 30 – 60 µSv/h. In such local ‘hotspots’ (e.g. the Central Yar
tailings), 226Ra activity in soils at the surface of tailings reaches 0.1 – 0.2 kBq/g. The radon
exhalation at such hot spots was measured to be 2 – 6 Bq/m2.s. Surveillance studies showed
that the surface cover on such tailings is not sufficient to reduce the exhalation rates [2, 3].
Surface contamination on machinery, equipment, metal scrap etc. from the period of
uranium production still exists and these items are kept in close proximity to the former
uranium production workshops. Some of the most contaminated debris and metal were
dumped together with uranium residues at the tailings sites. This material contains, among
other nuclides, 226Ra and the long-lived radon daughter nuclides 210Pb and 210Po on the
surfaces of contaminated equipment and scrap. Monitoring has shown that the activity
concentration of 238U and 226Ra within the territory of PChP varies from hundreds to several
thousands of Bq/kg; this may be compared with local soils which contain only 15–30 Bq/kg.
The main long-lived radionuclides in the tailings are 234U, 238U, 230Th, 226Ra and 210Pb/ 210Po
with activities of up to 105 Bq/kg. Aerosol pollution is also relatively high at the legacy site in
comparison to naturally occurring background levels in the vicinity and is the result of wind
driven resuspension and the dispersion of radon-progeny radionuclides over this area.
The main contributor to radiation exposure in this territory is indoor radon.
Concentrations of radon in some buildings used by workers in the industrial premises were
found to be between 103 – 105 Bq/m3. The highest concentrations were found at some indoor
working areas where highly contaminated facilities are still in place (uranium extraction
facilities, transport tubes etc.). Maximum measured outdoor concentrations of radon are 2–4
102 Bq/m3.
Preliminary dose and risk assessments carried out recently have shown that the current
levels of alpha activity in surface water are rather low and lead to doses less than the
permissible levels in Ukraine [1]. However, according to [3], the pore water in aquifers
around tailing dumps is highly contaminated (the highest concentrations of alpha emitting
radionuclides were 105 Bq/m3) and can pose a potential risk in the event of the protective dyke
becoming damaged. This could result in the spillage of the highly polluted tailings pore water
into the drainage canal and on to the Dnieper River. Under natural conditions, the pore water
moves in the aquifer towards the Dnieper River very slowly. At present, the water in the
drainage canal (Konoplyanka River) has gross alpha activity levels of between 0.3 and 0.6
Bq/L; this is 10 to 20 times higher than the background levels that have been found in the
Dnieper River upstream of the drainage water inlet to the reservoir. The most significant
source of Dnieper River pollution is tailings pile D, the closest pile to the Konoplyanka River.
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TOPICAL SESSION 7
3.
PRELIMINARY DOSE ASSESSMENT AND CONCLUSIONS BASED ON
MONITORING DATA ANALYSES
Radiation exposures due to external radiation, inhalation of contaminated aerosols and
radon, and soil ingestion were calculated [2]. The results showed that external exposure and
radon inhalation make the highest contribution to the total dose. Depending on the scenarios
chosen, annual dose rates may exceed the dose limits for both Worker Categories A and B,
i.e. 20 and 5 mSv per year, respectively.
The radiation doses to people living in the vicinity of the PChP site are estimated to be
less than 1 mSv per year for any potential scenario. However, an accidental situation which
affected the tailing dams and removed the tailings cover could lead to significant radiological
consequences which would still require long term surveillance for periods of 100 - 1000
years, or longer.
For most workers whose workplaces are in buildings which are not contaminated or
who are mainly working in non-contaminated areas of the site, annual doses are estimated to
be in the range 0.1–0.5 mSv per year. The annual doses to workers whose workplaces are
located near to tailing dumps or near to the contaminated buildings or who are regularly
inspecting/monitoring the tailing dumps may vary from 1–12 mSv per year depending on their
specific duties and the time spent in the contaminated areas or contaminated premises. The
highest doses (30–45 mSv/a) will be received by those who have regular access to the
contaminated premises and are involved in remediation activities involving the removal and
utilization of the tailing materials and/or of the most contaminated equipment.
The preliminary assessment concluded that the main priorities of the remediation plan
should be the cleanup of the former uranium extraction facilities, proper surface coverage of
the tailings or removal of the tailings to specially prepared tailing sites (with engineering
barriers). Predictions based on the radionuclide migration model incorporated into the
radiological assessment tool ‘Ecolego’ showed that proper soil coverage and removal of the
tailing materials from the largest tailing site D would decelerate radionuclide transport into
the Dnieper River for the next 500 years [4].
A new concept for remediation has been developed; it involves establishing the
following pre-feasibility actions in further remediation planning:
– To re-consider some of the legislative and regulatory norms - as a basis for safe
management of the former uranium facilities (the new rules to be improved according
to the principles of the International Basic Safety Standards [7]);
– To extend the tailing dump characterization and inspection programmes taking into
account the recommendations of the International Atomic Energy Agency;
– To consider re-treatment (re-processing) options for some tailings materials as a part
of the remediation process.
The pre-feasibility studies are to be implemented by 2010 and will help in the selection
of the most appropriate and economically justified options for remediation at the PChP
industrial site. The experience gained from global best uranium facility remediation practices
will be applied [5, 6].
Among the most pressing remediation problems still awaiting attention are: the highly
contaminated buildings at the industrial sites; the phospogypsum cover, the integration of the
largest tailing pile, Dnieprovskoe (tailing D), with other tailing materials; and the wet
uranium Sukhachevskoe tailing pile (tailing S), which is still partly covered with water. One
option to be considered is the deepening of the Konoplyanka creek to serve as a natural
drainage canal for both the industrial site and the tailings pile D.
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LAVROVA et al.
The new concept considers, as the most preferable action, the removal of the relatively
small tailing dumps over the territory and their transportation to the surface of the largest
tailing D (about 1 km) with further conservation of the tailings pile using a multilayer soil
cover. The State Programme of 2003 suggested removing all tailing dumps and contaminated
materials to the tailing S – a distance of about 14 km. This would dramatically increase the
project costs. However, both options are still to be finally evaluated taking into consideration
social and long term ecological considerations by using multi-attribute assessment
procedures.
REFERENCES
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Radiological Conditions in the Dnieper
River Basin, IAEA Radiological Assessment Reports, IAEA, Vienna (2002).
ENSURE: Assessment of Risks to Human Health and the Environment from Uranium Tailings
in Ukraine, FACILIA, Phase-1, Final Report, Swedish Radiation Protection Institute – SIUS under contract UA401A/ 2007-09-24, Stockholm (2008).
VOITSEKHOVYCH, O.V., et al., Substantiation of radionuclide transfer reduction to the
environment and human body in uranium sites, Interim Project Report, Ukrainian
Hydrometeorological Institute, STCU Project No. 3290 (2007).
SKALSKY, A., et al., Problems of the hydrogeological monitoring at the Pridneprovsky
Chemical Plant (Dneprodzerzhinsk, Ukraine), in Uranium Mining and Hydrogeology,
September 2008, Freiberg, Germany, Springer (2008).
UMTRA, Uranium Mill Tailings Remedial Action, U.S. Uranium production facilities:
operating history and remediation cost under uranium mill tailings remedial action project as of
2000, Energy Information Administration, Official Energy Statistics from the US Government,
(2005).
http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/nuclear/page/umtra/title1map.html
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Uranium Mine Remediation in Times of
Revival of Production, UMREG Monograph, Selected Paper - limited distribution, IAEA,
Vienna (2008).
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, International Basic Safety Standards for
Protection against Ionizing Radiation and for the Safety of Radiation Sources, Safety Series No.
115, IAEA, Vienna (1996).
215
EXPERIENCE GAINED IN TRANSFERRING WISMUT RADIATION
PROTECTION KNOW–HOW TO INTERNATIONAL PROJECTS IN
URANIUM MINING REMEDIATION
P. SCHMIDT*, C. KUNZE**, J. REGNER*
* Wismut
GmbH,
Chemnitz, Germany
** WISUTEC
Wismut Umwelttechnik GmbH,
Chemnitz, Germany
Abstract
Since 1990, the federal-owned corporation WISMUT GmbH has been rehabilitating the legacies left
behind by some 40 years of intensive uranium ore mining and processing operations in Eastern Germany.
Starting in 1996, WISMUT has been involved in transferring the know-how gained in the rehabilitation of the
WISMUT sites to projects outside of Germany. As a rule, radiation protection management and radioecological
issues are key elements of these activities. In this work, benefits have been obtained both from the substantial
similarities prevailing in the countries of the former Soviet Union and in Eastern Germany after termination of
uranium production and from the commonality of the problems to be resolved. This paper describes the
possibilities and limits of transferring radiation protection know-how to countries where the rehabilitation of
uranium mining liabilities is often to be carried out under circumstances of limited financial, material, and
human resources. It also describes some lessons learnt. Conclusions for application to future projects are derived.
1.
INTRODUCTION
Forty years of intensive mining and processing of uranium ores in the heart of densely
populated areas in Eastern Germany left behind considerable liabilities. They are being
cleaned up by the federal-owned corporation WISMUT GmbH under an environmental
restoration project which is unique in terms of complexity and size. Since 1996, the
corporation has also been involved in transferring the know-how gained in the rehabilitation
of WISMUT sites to projects outside of Germany. These projects have been funded by the
European Community, the World Bank, and other international organizations. In 2002, the
WISMUT subsidiary WISUTEC (Wismut Umwelttechnik GmbH) was established with a
view to marketing the know-how gained during the rehabilitation of uranium mining sites in
Eastern Germany. So far, more than 25 projects have been successfully implemented outside
Germany. The know-how transfer has been primarily targeted at countries of the former
‘Eastern Bloc’, to the Russian Federation and countries of the Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS) in Central Asia, but also to countries in Africa and North America. As a rule,
consulting activities focus on key elements such as radiation protection management and
radioecological issues.
Given the commonality of the inherited histories, the similarity of environmental
problems to be resolved, and, last but not least, the former working-level contacts between the
experts of WISMUT and their counterparts in countries in Eastern Europe and the former
Soviet Union, WISMUT was (and still is) well positioned for the task of transferring knowhow to Eastern Europe and CIS countries. Examples of recent or ongoing projects are listed in
Table 1 below.
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TOPICAL SESSION 7
TABLE 1. EXAMPLES OF TRANSFER OF KNOW-HOW BY WISMUT/WISUTEC
Project/beneficiary country
Task
Phare Project PH4.2 / BUL, CZ,
EST, HU, PO, RO, SV
Provision of means to assess
radiological risks
Environmental Impact Assessment
(EIA), conceptual design,
supervision
EIA, identification of remedial
measures, stakeholder involvement
EIA, optimization of remedial
measures, supervision of
implementation
Sillamäe Tailings Pond
Remediation Project /Estonia
EUROPAID Project
Lermontov/Russia
Disaster Hazard Mitigation
Project Mailuu Suu/Kyrgyzstan
2.
FromTo
19971999
Funded
by
EC
19992008
NEFCO
20042005
EC
2005-
World
Bank
CHARACTERISTICS OF PRE-REMEDIAL CONDITIONS IN BENEFICIARY
COUNTRIES AND PROBLEM DEFINITION
The termination of uranium production in the beneficiary countries (and at WISMUT)
was marked by the following features:
(1)
(2)
Uranium production was often carried out in complete disregard for the most
elementary rules of occupational health and safety and of environmental protection. As
a consequence, an existing long term radiological situation was left behind which
requires the application of radiological protection principles for intervention situations;
Operations were chiefly terminated in a very abrupt way: no preparations had been
made for closure, knowledge of remediation concepts and know-how on techniques
were almost non-existent, regulations and methodology for rehabilitation design were
usually absent, generally few expert personnel were available, and the technical
equipment necessary for conducting remediation (including the means for radiological
data acquisition and for radiological assessment) was lacking;
During the production operations, no financial provisions had been made for
rehabilitation. Due to the economic situation prevailing in the countries, the state-owned
corporations were unable to carry out remediation according to international standards.
Remediation had to be implemented under the conditions of constrained resources;
The old culture of secrecy prevailed. Arrangements for communicating with the local
population and the culture of ‘stakeholder involvement’ were hardly developed.
(3)
(4)
The following is a typical list of issues which the experts from WISMUT/WISUTEC
have had to deal with:
– Definition of evaluation criteria, in collaboration with national authorities;
– Radiological impact assessment as an integral part of an Environmental Impact
Assessment (EIA);
– Introduction of appropriate measurement techniques for the determination of
contamination levels as well as procedures for measuring releases, including QA/QC
procedures;
– Development of a radiological monitoring system, including individual monitoring;
– Optimization of remediation measures;
– Introduction of procedures to document the progress of the remediation effort;
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SCHMIDT et al.
– Ensuring practical radiation protection of employees, minimization of remediationrelated radiological exposure of the population;
– Management of radioactive waste and residues;
– Licensing management;
– Training and further education of employees involved, capacity building;
– Public relations, stakeholder involvement.
3.
EXPERIENCE WITH MEANS OF KNOW-HOW TRANSFER
3.1. Body of rules and regulations, licensing management
There was a tendency in CIS countries for authorities to wish to retain the standards of
the former Soviet Union. This phenomenon made it difficult to develop country-, site-, and
object-specific solutions and to assign pertinent priorities. As an example, in the case of a
geo-mechanically unstable waste dump located far from residential areas and in conditions of
limited national financial resources, it seemed to be justified to limit remediation efforts to
regrading (in order to eliminate immediate hazards), while refraining from capping (which is
required by national standards). In this particular case, the idea was somewhat difficult to
transmit to national authorities. In matters like these, WISMUT has been successful when
presenting arguments based on international documents. The Safety Standards, Technical
Reports and Technical Documents of the International Atomic Energy Agency [1–5] as well
as the recommendations of the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP)
[6] and of other international agencies provided a sound basis. In addition, case studies of
remediation actions conducted in Germany proved helpful in overcoming a reluctance to
move from previous approaches.
3.2. Provision of means
From the 1990s through to the present time, various programmes have provided
countries with instrumentation and software for radiological measurements, modelling, and
interpretation. There have been shortcomings in coordinating such provisions both in the
donor organizations and within beneficiary countries. Also, issues related to providing
practical training in the use of hardware and software, to providing for Quality
Assurance/Quality Control (QA/QC) (e.g. in radiation metrology), and to long term funding
of operating costs, did not always receive due attention. In implementing the European Union
Phare Project PH4.2, under the terms of which technical equipment designed to establish the
radiological situation at uranium mining sites was provided to seven East European countries
from 1997 to 1999, WISMUT contributed, in almost the same proportion, to the purchase of
hardware, on the one hand, and to the efforts for training, QA/QC means, and the continuation
of operations, on the other.
3.3. Training
Workshops and training courses are essential elements of assistance, irrespective of
whether conducted in a beneficiary country or in the country of the project consultant.
Choosing appropriate candidates is a key to success. Training courses should put a great deal
of emphasis on imparting practical skills. WISMUT/WISUTEC’s project experience shows
that best results are achieved by ‘on-the-job’ training schemes. Funded by the IAEA, the
European Union, and other organizations, more than 10 experts have completed study visits at
WISMUT on radiological aspects of uranium mining site remediation in recent years.
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TOPICAL SESSION 7
Accompanied by WISMUT specialist staff, these experts went on field trips to perform joint
measurements, carried out laboratory work or worked together on modelling etc.
3.4. Joint project work
As a rule, projects begin with the acquisition of data and the subsequent radiological
evaluation of that data. Rather than distinguishing between consultant and beneficiary,
emphasis is again on joint efforts for concept building, acquisition and evaluation of data.
Seeking and finding common ground and learning from each other – this approach has also
provided benefits to WISMUT. In 2001 and 2002, for instance, WISMUT and the DIAMO
Corporation (from the Czech Republic) initiated a project located in the German-Czech
border region which was designed to adjust the methods used to acquire and evaluate
radiological data. The project was conducted in the two neighbouring towns of
Johanngeorgenstadt (on the German side) and Potucky (on the Czech side) along the common
border in the Ore Mountains. Jointly performed measurements, modelling, exposure
assessments, and the exchange of results brought about harmonization in dealing with
radiological issues in adjacent former uranium mining regions.
3.5. Radiation protection management under conditions of constrained resources
A ‘performance-based regulatory framework’ is better suited than a ‘prescriptive
regulatory framework’ for supporting radiation protection management under conditions of
constrained resources. State-of-the-art of science and technology are not always
implementable under these conditions. Focussing on essentials, assigning priorities and
selecting the proper degree of required accuracy can help to provide sufficient radiological
data for the justification and optimization of radiation protection measures, irrespective of the
scarcity of available means. An example of such an approach is WISMUT's combination of
field and laboratory measurement methods by making use of statistical evaluation procedures
and of problem-oriented follow-up calibration (see the flow chart in Fig. 1). Under such a
scheme, the calibration and the laboratory measurement programme is reduced to a minimum
while local experts on site perform field measurements with a limited but sufficient degree of
accuracy.
3.6. Stakeholder involvement
After forty years of uranium production in Eastern Germany, conducted to some extent
under severe secrecy regulations, finding ways of dispelling mistrust and ‘building bridges’
with the local population was the only possible way for WISMUT to implement its
environmental restoration project. This was achieved by active public relations work, by
disclosing the whole range of environmental data and integrating the public concerned into
the process of identifying optimized remedial options. Area rehabilitation was and is being
carried out with the goal of returning reclaimed land to productive reuse (for example, the
integration of rehabilitated mine dumps into the park landscape of the Schlema spa centre). In
the framework of consulting projects performed in Eastern Europe, experience gained in
stakeholder involvement was actively described and illustrated (for example, by inviting
political and societal decision makers to attend site visits at WISMUT). As a result, diverging
stakeholder interests in identifying remedial solutions in have been overcome.
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SCHMIDT et al.
Problem Definition
Approach
Large quantities of materials or large-area
contaminations, respectively, require determination
of representative activity levels
Intelligent combination of field and laboratory
measurements, statistical evaluation of field
measurement series
Step 1:
Sampling, laboratory determination of nuclide
vectors, identification of key nuclides or
parameters, respectively
Step 2:
Selection of appropriate field measurement
method to determine key parameter
Step 3:
Problem-oriented
follow-up
calibration
between lab and field measurement methods
Step 4:
Field measurements, Quality Assurance by
accompanying laboratory analyses
Step 5:
Establishment of representative activity levels by
statistical evaluation of field data
FIG 1. Flow chart of the combination of field and laboratory measurement methods for
release measurements of materials and areas.
4.
LESSONS LEARNED AND CONCLUSIONS
Key elements in successfully transferring radiation protection know-how in the
framework of international projects designed to remediate the legacies of uranium mining and
processing operations are:
– The application of international standards and technical documentation, in particular,
those published by IAEA and ICRP;
– Transferring personal experience gained, with due regard to country-specific
conditions;
– Development of site and object specific solutions;
– Imparting practical skills by ‘learning on the job’ schemes;
– Ensuring stakeholder involvement; and
– Implementation of process-oriented solutions consistent with conditions of limited
resources.
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TOPICAL SESSION 7
REFERENCES
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
222
FOOD AND AGRICUTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS,
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR
ORGANIZATION, OECD-NEA, PAN AMERICAN HEALTH ORGANIZATION, WORLD
HEALTH ORGANIZATION, International Basic Safety Standards for Protection against
Ionizing Radiation and for the Safety of Radiation Sources, Safety Series No. 115, IAEA,
Vienna (1996).
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Decommissioning of Facilities for Mining
and Milling of Radioactive Ores and Close Out of Residues, Technical Report Series No. 362,
Vienna (1994).
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Planning for Environmental Restoration of
Uranium Mining and Milling Sites in Central and Eastern Europe, TECDOC 982, Vienna
(1997).
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Generic Models for the Use in assessing
the Impact of Discharges of Radioactive Substances to the Environment, Safety Reports Series
No. 19, Vienna (2001).
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Environmental and Source Monitoring for
Purposes of Radiation Protection, Safety Standards Series, RS-G-1.8, Vienna (2005).
INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION, 1990
Recommendations of the International Commission on Radiological Protection, Publication 60,
ICRP (1990).
JUSTIFICATION OF REMEDIATION STRATEGIES IN THE LONG TERM
AFTER THE CHERNOBYL ACCIDENT
S. FESENKO*, P. JACOB**, A. CHUPOV*, A. ULANOVSKY**, I. BOGDEVICH***,
N. SANZHAROVA****, A. PANOV****, N. ISAMOV****, V. KASHPAROV*****,
Y. ZHUCHENKA******
*
International Atomic Energy Agency,
Vienna, Austria
**
Institute of Radiation Protection,
Neuherberg, Germany
***
Research Institute for Soil Science and Agrochemistry,
Minsk, Belarus
****
*****
******
Russian Institute of Agricultural Radiology and Radioecology,
Obninsk, Russia
Ukrainian Institute of Agricultural Radiology,
Chabany, Ukraine
Gomel University,
Gomel, Belarus
Abstract
Following the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant, a number of different remedial actions were
developed and implemented in Belarus, Russia and Ukraine. Recommendations on the application of
countermeasures and remedial actions were published by the International Atomic Energy Agency in 1994.
Since then, new information on the behaviour of radionuclides in the environment and on the effectiveness of
countermeasures in the long term has been obtained. On this basis, a new approach has been developed on
remediation strategies for contaminated areas and has been successfully implemented in the affected countries.
1.
INTRODUCTION
The accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant (NPP) was the most serious radiation
accident in the history of nuclear energy generation. More than 4.5 million hectares of
agricultural lands were contaminated in Belarus, Russia and Ukraine. Consumption of
contaminated products was, and remains, one of the main radiation exposure pathways for the
population of the affected regions [1]. To protect people against radiation exposure, various
large-scale remedial actions have been implemented in the affected areas. In all three
countries, there are laws or acts of government requiring the optimization of countermeasures
so as to reduce annual doses to the population. In this context, the International Atomic
Energy Agency initiated a regional technical collaboration project called ‘Radiological
support for the rehabilitation of the areas affected by the Chernobyl nuclear power plant
accident’. In the frame of this project, a software tool called ReSCA (Remediation Strategies
after the Chernobyl Accident) has been developed [2]. The software is based on experiences
over two decades with countermeasures against radioactive contamination in the aftermath of
the Chernobyl accident [3]. The International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP)
in its Publication No. 103 recommends, for radiation protection purposes, the assessment of
223
TOPICAL SESSION 7
the dose to a ‘representative person’. The representative person is defined as: “a hypothetical
construct, receives a dose that is representative of the more highly exposed individuals in the
population”. The present work utilises this concept and the dose to the representative person is
one of the main quantities used in the optimization process for remediation.
The present study summarizes information on settlements which have less than 10 000
inhabitants (rural settlements) and for which the effective dose to a representative person
exceeds 1 mSv/y. Practically all of these settlements have a rural character. External radiation
and intakes of radionuclides from the consumption of locally produced foodstuffs, especially
milk from private cows and mushrooms, are the major factors causing radiation doses from
contamination of Chernobyl origin. The objectives of this study were: (i) to assess the present
and future numbers of inhabitants of the settlements with annual effective doses to the
representative person still exceeding 1 mSv; (ii) to discuss possible remediation strategies,
their costs and impacts on the dose distribution; (iii) to provide general recommendations on
remediation strategies more than two decades after the Chernobyl accident.
2.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Settlements with less than 10 000 inhabitants, which had, according to official dose
catalogues for 2004, annual doses to individuals exceeding 1 mSv, were defined as study
settlements1. The data collected for the study settlements included the number of inhabitants,
the number of grassland areas for cows, the mean 137Cs ground contamination density, the
mean 137Cs concentrations in pork, potatoes and mushrooms, and the average consumption of
locally collected mushrooms relative to the average consumption of mushrooms in the
country. The data for the grassland areas include the number of cows, the distribution of soil
types, information about countermeasures previously or presently applied, and the mean 137Cs
concentrations in milk and beef.
3.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
For each of the study settlements, calculations were performed to evaluate the effective
dose to the representative person, defined by the sum of the averages of the upper 10% of the
effective dose distributions from external and internal exposure. The internal dose estimates
were validated with data sets on whole body measurements in the course of the study. The
external dose estimates had been validated previously. All study settlements which have,
according to the ReSCA calculations, annual doses to representative persons in 2004
exceeding 1 mSv were defined as ‘affected’ and eligible for consideration for the
implementation of remedial actions.
Six remedial actions were included in the current analysis: radical improvement of
grassland (RI); application of ferrocyn to cows (FA); feeding pigs with uncontaminated
fodder before slaughter (FP); application of mineral fertilizers to potato fields (MF);
information campaign on mushrooms and other forest produce (IM); removal of contaminated
soil from populated areas (RS).
Among the 545 study settlements, there were 290 settlements in which the effective
dose to the representative person exceeded 1 mSv in 2004. In total, these affected settlements
had 78 172 inhabitants, most of them (57 960) in Russia. The number of settlements with
annual effective doses to the representative person exceeding 1 mSv is predicted to decrease
1
Three of the affected towns in Russia (Klimovo, Klintsy and Novozybkov) are not considered in the present
study as they are non-rural.
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FESENKO et al.
because of natural reduction processes and radioactive decay to 121 by 2020 with a total of 35
044 affected inhabitants. Thus, without remedial actions the decrease is quite slow. The
collective dose assessed for 2004 in the affected settlements is about 130 person-Sv, three
quarters of this being accumulated in Russia. The distribution of the dose between external
and internal exposures is very different in the affected settlements of the three countries: in
Belarus, external exposure dominates; in Russia, both pathways are equally important; in
Ukraine, the dose is nearly exclusively due to internal exposure. In about half of the
Belarusian and Russian affected settlements, the annual dose from mushrooms is comparable
to the annual dose from milk. In Ukraine, however, milk is the dominant contributor to
internal exposure in most of the affected settlements.
To consider possible alternatives, the results of the assessments were summarized for
two options: remediation strategies 1 and 2. In the frame of the first strategy, the ‘social
strategy’, higher attention was given to the acceptability of the suggested remedial actions.
Strategy 2 is based on lowering costs per averted dose. Remediation strategies have been
evaluated using expected annual doses in 2010 based on data for year 2004. If only very
limited resources are available for remediation, then Strategy 1 (focussing on a high degree of
acceptability) consists nearly exclusively of radical improvement of grassland. This has a
remedial effect on the milk contamination for several years. Strategy 2, focuses, first on
application of ferrocyn to cows, which has to be applied continuously, and in Belarus and
Russia, on removal of highly contaminated soil from populated areas, which, on the one hand,
reduces the exposure for all time, but, on the other hand, requires the disposal of
contaminated soil. In Belarus and Ukraine, Strategy 2 is considerably more cost-effective than
Strategy 1. General information on the effectiveness of the remediation strategies is given in
Table 1.
TABLE 1. COSTS, AVERTED DOSES AND COSTS PER AVERTED DOSE FOR TWO
REMEDIATION STRATEGIES CALCULATED UNDER THE ASSUMPTION THAT
1 M€ IS AVAILABLE FOR REMEDIATION IN EACH AFFECTED COUNTRY
Country Cost of remediation, k€ Averted dose (person-Sv)
Strategy 1
Strategy 2
Belarus
1003
1002
Russia
1011
1003
61.1
73.0
17
14
378
2383
45.3
127.8
23.5
123.9
30
27
16
19
Ukraine
Total
b
1372
3386
Strategy 1
Strategy 2
Costs of 1 person-Sv averted, k€
21.4
Strategy 1
27.3
Strategy 2
47
37
In Belarus, Strategy 1 shares the resources between radical improvement (RI) or
ferrocyn application (FA) and removal of contaminated soil from populated areas (RS), while
Strategy 2 is totally focused on RS. In Russia, Strategy 1 focuses on RI and FA, while
Strategy 2 shares the resources between RI and FA, on the one hand, and RS on the other
hand. In Ukraine, Strategy 2 reduces annual doses in all affected settlements below 1 mSv
with costs of less than 0.4 M€. Strategy 1 is considerably less cost-effective and requires
larger amounts of money for the remediation of grasslands by radical improvement. A large
collective dose in the order of 120–130 person-Sv can be averted by the remediation
strategies. Nevertheless, the number of inhabitants in Belarusian and Russian settlements with
annual doses exceeding 1 mSv remains substantial. Compared to international values for the
cost-effectiveness of actions to reduce occupational exposures, the recommended remediation
strategies for rural areas affected by the Chernobyl accident are quite cost-effective (about 20
k€/person-Sv).
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TOPICAL SESSION 7
The effect of the remediation is dependent both on site-specific factors, which were
directly included into the analysis, and on funds available for remediation purposes. If only
very limited resources are available, then there are considerable differences between the two
strategies discussed earlier (Fig. 1). Strategy 1 consists nearly exclusively of radical
improvement of grassland. This has a remedial effect on the milk contamination for several
years. Strategy 2, however, focuses first on the application of ferrocyn to cows, which has to
be applied continuously, and in Belarus and Russia on the removal of highly contaminated
soil from populated areas, which, on the one hand, reduces the exposure for all time, and on
the other hand, requires the disposal of contaminated soil. As might be expected, in Belarus
and in Ukraine, Strategy 2 is considerably more cost-effective than Strategy 1.
If more than 1 M€ is available for remediation, the situation becomes country-specific.
In Belarus, the two strategies become more similar in terms of the effectiveness of
remediation with increasing resources. In Russia, the difference between the two strategies
persists up to resources of several M€, because of the large number of affected settlements.
Strategy 1 starts to become less cost-effective for higher expenditures (Fig. 1). In Ukraine,
Strategy 2 reduces annual doses in all affected settlements below 1 mSv with costs of less
than 0.4 M€. Strategy 1 is considerably less cost-effective and requests larger amounts of
money for the remediation.
160
Averted collective dose (person-Sv)
Averted collective dose (person-Sv)
40
Belarus
30
20
10
Strategy 1
Strategy 2
0
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
Total cost of remediation (MEuro)
140
Russia
120
100
80
60
40
Strategy 1
Strategy 2
20
0
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
Total cost of remediation (MEuro)
Averted collective dose (person-Sv)
70
60
Ukraine
50
40
30
20
10
0
0.0
Strategy 1
Strategy 2
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
Total cost of remediation (MEuro)
FIG 1. Averted dose versus available funds for remediation purposes in Belarus, Russia, and
Ukraine.
The number of settlements with annual doses exceeding 1 mSv after application of the
two remediation strategies is quite similar in Belarus and Russia. In Ukraine, remediation
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3.0
FESENKO et al.
Strategy 2 is considerably more effective in terms of the number of settlements with annual
doses exceeding 1 mSv than Strategy 1; with a relatively small expenditure of resources, the
annual dose in all settlements can be reduced below 1 mSv.
4.
CONCLUSIONS
The present analysis of possible strategies for remediation of rural areas affected by the
Chernobyl accident, i.e. where annual effective dose to the representative person exceeds 1
mSv, shows that, even two decades after the Chernobyl accident, the application of remedial
actions is still cost-effective. Thus, further remediation of the affected areas will result in
considerable reduction of the radiation exposure of rural populations.
REFERENCES
[1]
[2]
[3]
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Guidelines for agricultural
countermeasures following an accidental release of radionuclides, Technical Reports Series No.
363, Vienna (1994).
JACOB, P., FESENKO, S., FIRSAKOVA, S.K., et al., Remediation strategies for rural
territories contaminated by the Chernobyl accident, J Environ Radioactivity 56 (2001) 51-76.
ULANOVSKY, A., JACOB, P., FESENKO, S.V. et al., ReSCA – decision support tool for
remediation planning after the Chernobyl accident, Radiat Environ Biophys 50 1 (2011) 67-83.
227
EXPERIENCES IN THE REMEDIATION OF CONTAMINATED LAND
I. ADSLEY, R. MURLEY, L. FELLINGHAM, K. STEVENS
Nuvia Limited,
Didcot, United Kingdom
Abstract
This paper provides details of a series of projects related to the remediation of contaminated land. Sites
with different contamination issues have been selected to show the extent of the problems that may be
encountered. The sites described include a nuclear bomb testing range, a radium luminizing site, an old nuclear
experimental facility, and a tritium factory. Relevant aspects of legislation, assay and safety issues are
considered for each site.
1.
INTRODUCTION
The paper describes the remediation of four sites contaminated with radioactive
materials and, in some cases, chemicals. The sites represent a range of contamination
situations resulting from various nuclear processes. The sites considered are:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
2.
The Maralinga Nuclear Weapons Test Site in Australia;
The former United Kingdom Admiralty Research Centre at Ditton Park;
The Southern Storage Area at UK Atomic Energy Authority, Harwell;
A tritium contaminated site at Hayes in London.
CASE STUDIES
2.1. Maralinga
The Maralinga test site occupies some 3200 km2 and is located on the northern edge of
the Nullabor Plain in South Australia, approximately 900 km north-west of Adelaide.
Between 1953 and 1963, the British Government carried out seven atmospheric nuclear
weapons tests and approximately five hundred and fifty small scale experiments (‘minor
trials’) using nuclear materials at the site. These latter trials resulted in the dispersal of over
23 kg of plutonium, 22 kg of enriched uranium, 8447 kg of natural and depleted uranium and
102 kg of beryllium, as well as smaller amounts of other materials at various locations over
the range. During the operation of the test site, various ’housekeeping‘ radiation surveys and
cleanup operations were undertaken. Some of the materials used in the trials were gathered
up and buried in various numbered and unnumbered pits throughout the range.
As part of the work, an initial helicopter-based aerial survey was undertaken of all the
significant sites to map the distributions of the significant gamma-ray emitters: 241Am, 60Co
and 137Cs.
The rehabilitation programme for the site was specified as a ‘risk reduction exercise’,
not as a ‘cleanup’. The underlying assumption was that the site would be returned to its
former Aboriginal owners, the Maralinga Tjarutja. They would return to live in their semitraditional lifestyle, albeit supplemented by certain modern accompaniments, such as
imported foodstuffs, motor vehicles and health care. This semi-traditional lifestyle is
associated with the intake of much higher levels of dust than is characteristic in the life
patterns of western societies. Hence, the inhalation of plutonium-contaminated dust has been
identified as the dominant pathway for radiation dose accumulation. The critical group was
identified as Aboriginal children and the rehabilitation strategy was devised to ensure that the
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TOPICAL SESSION 7
annual dose to individuals did not exceed 5 mSv. This dose limit was translated by the
Australian Radiation Laboratory (ARL) into acceptable residual contamination levels for
various parts of the site. These levels ranged from 1.8 to 4 kBq/m2 of 241Am; this radionuclide
was used as a marker for the plutonium present.
The key components of the risk reduction works were:
(a) The construction of three large, 15 m deep, burial trenches at Taranaki, TM100/101
and Wewak;
(b) The removal of contaminated soil to an average depth of 150 mm from approximately
2.2 km2 at Taranaki, TM100/101 and Wewak and its placement into the corresponding
disposal trenches;
(c) The removal of the concrete caps from the twenty one numbered pits in central
Taranaki, followed by in-situ vitrification of their contents, using the Geosafe process,
and replacement of the concrete caps and restoration of the surfaces to their natural
levels;
(d) The excavation of various other pits containing plutonium-contaminated debris and
placement of the contents in the burial trenches;
(e) The restoration of various other numbered and unnumbered pits by collection and
burial of surface debris, compaction, importation of clean soil, re-contouring and the
re-introduction of vegetation;
(f) The installation of 100 km of marker posts at 50 m intervals throughout the outer
plume areas to warn the Aboriginal population that they may hunt and traverse the
area, but should not camp there permanently;
(g) The removal of access routes to certain areas by destroying roads; and
(h) The re-vegetation of selected areas.
The bulk of the soil was removed using scrapers; an excavator was used to remove
small areas requiring further treatment. In some areas the soil cover was very limited, and
vacuum and rotary brush attachments were used to clean rock surfaces. The major hazard to
the operators arose from the generation of plutonium-bearing dusts. The dust also caused
recontamination during the rehabilitation process. A variety of measures were undertaken to
minimise such dust generation. These included modifying facilities to reduce dust generation,
e.g. by covering loads, restricting plant operating spreads and spraying areas with water prior
to working them.
In order to minimize risks to workers, operations were designed to keep the number of
personnel present during the removal of active materials as low as possible. All vehicles were
modified to have positively pressurised, sealed cabins with absolute filtered air supplies.
Contaminated areas were surveyed at the end of each day and material was removed in
sequence during the following day. This enabled a ‘survey – removal’ process to be adopted
and allowed the process of personnel surveying during dust generation processes during the
day to be dispensed with. Areas were re-monitored after clearance of active material and reworked if found to be still contaminated. All treated areas were independently surveyed by
ARL, using a specially modified vehicle with a boom mounted, high purity germanium
detector, to certify that all clearance criteria had been met. Finally, areas to be re-vegetated
were treated to return the site to a condition close to its original state.
2.2. UK admiralty research centre at Ditton Park
Ditton Manor Park is a 68 ha site located adjacent to the M4 motorway some 2 km to
the south east of the town of Slough in the United Kingdom. The site was formerly used by
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ADSLEY et al.
the UK Admiralty for the development, manufacture and testing of compasses. These
activities involved the use of radium-based luminizing paints.
In March 1998, Ditton Manor Park was purchased from the UK Ministry of Defence
(MoD) to become part of the corporate headquarters of a major computer software company.
It comprised a listed moated manor house with various out-buildings, which had been
extended and used as workshops and laboratories. Investigations had revealed widespread
localized radioactive contamination of the ground over much of the site. In addition, many of
the buildings were contaminated with radium and mercury. A site waste tip had been used and
this was contaminated with radium, heavy metals and polyaromatic hydrocarbons.
A remediation programme was developed to remove all significant historic
contamination from the ground and fabric of buildings and to leave the site suitable for
redevelopment without the need for any future special precautions. The current and future
risks to the environment were to be eliminated. The remediation criteria were set on the basis
of a quantitative risk assessment in close consultation with the prime regulator, the
Environment IAEA, and also with the Local Authority. The criteria were established, based
upon the proposed uses of the site and with public access to all areas outside the moat. They
were also compatible with sensitive multifunctional use, e.g. for housing.
A novel feature was the extensive use of the GroundhogTM gamma area surveying
system in the characterization, remediation and validation of all land clearance. The
Groundhog system comprises a highly sensitive NaI scintillation radiation detector linked to a
GPS detector for position location and a data logger. A plot of a Groundhog survey showing
regions of contamination is shown in Fig. 1.
FIG. 1. Regions of contamination at Ditton Manor Park.
At the onset of the works, comprehensive surveys were undertaken to further
characterize the contamination present. Surveys were either conducted manually with a
portable Groundhog system, or with four detectors mounted on a vehicle. These surveys set
the scope for the remedial works and helped to finalize the areas requiring excavation and
backfilling. In addition, the advanced surveys identified contamination of the building
structures and defined the areas requiring remediation.
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TOPICAL SESSION 7
The remedial works involved:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
(g)
(h)
(i)
Advance surveys;
Remediation of ground contamination - both chemical and radioactive;
Remediation of non-listed buildings prior to demolition;
Remediation of ground after demolition of non-listed buildings;
Remediation of radioactive (radium) contamination of listed buildings;
Remediation of chemical (mercury) contamination of listed buildings;
Investigation and moat sediments and their subsequent remediation;
Remediation of the cottage gardens along the estate edge;
Extensive consultation with all key stakeholders.
Regular liaison was established with the prime regulator, the Environment IAEA, in
order to ensure that remediation criteria, waste handling and disposal methods met with their
approval.
This was the largest remediation project which had been undertaken in the United
Kingdom of a site contaminated with 226Ra from luminising operations - in terms of both
scale and cost. The works were successfully completed within a period of 9 months. All
identified contamination was removed to below levels of concern.
2.3. Remediation of the southern storage area at UK Atomic Energy Authority
(UKAEA), Harwell
The Southern Storage Area (SSA) is a separate, security-fenced site, which is located
approximately 1 km south of the main Harwell nuclear licensed site in the UK. It is
approximately 7.3 hectares in area. The site was the main munitions storage area for RAF
Harwell, which was a Second World War bomber and training aerodrome. It was
subsequently used for radioactive waste storage, treatment and disposal operations by
UKAEA during the early UK nuclear research programmes. A cleanup of the site was carried
out during 1988–90 in order to eliminate the need for the site to be licensed under the Nuclear
Installations Act; this was also required for the main Harwell site. As a result of the historical
operations on the site, there were three main liabilities. They were the chemical pits, the
beryllium pits and the common land, which is the remainder of the site. It was known that
radioactive and chemical contamination was present due to past storage in the various pits.
The waste segregation strategy was a key component of the programme. It was based on
the following key steps:
(a) Use of previous characterization results plus in-situ and excavation bucket monitoring
for radioactive and chemical contamination by gamma, beta surface, volatile organic
compound and mercury probes to provide initial segregation into
exempt/special/controlled and low-level waste streams;
(b) Packaging of the bulk of waste, excepting large artefacts, etc, into 1 m3 cube bags,
which became the standard packaging volume;
(c) Sampling of the waste during the filling of the 1 m3 bags and other waste containers;
(d) Gamma and contamination monitoring of the faces of each bag. The former provided
evidence of any significant gamma sources in each bag;
(e) Gross / analysis of the homogenized sample from each bag;
(f) High-resolution gamma spectroscopy of every bag of the potentially exempt waste.
All waste arising from the site was consigned as low-level, exempt, controlled and/or
special waste. The latter was dependent upon the levels of chemical contaminants present.
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ADSLEY et al.
Finally, in order to facilitate the remedial works, two authorizations were granted by the
Environment IAEA. The first authorization was to accumulate and dispose of radioactive
waste on the site. The second authorization was granted for a gaseous discharge from the
SSA. Special sampling arrangements were made to comply with these authorizations.
2.4. Tritium contamination on a storage site at Hayes
An industrial unit at Hayes near London was vacated after a 25 year lease had expired.
It had been used by a company which collected redundant gaseous tritium light devices
(GTLD). It was found that low level tritium contamination was left after the removal of these
devices.
Nuvia Limited was initially contracted to undertake a detailed survey of the
buildings. In this first stage of the survey, a limited number of building samples were taken
to gauge the spread and penetration of the tritium into the building fabric. This showed the
contamination to be much greater and more widespread than previously thought and resulted
in a further extensive survey, which included concrete cores from the floor slab together with
soil samples from below the slab. The outbuildings were found to have widespread
contamination in the range of thousands of Bq/g of tritium on the concrete base. Tritium had
also migrated into the soil below the concrete slab. The main building slab and sub-soil were
also contaminated with tritium up to levels of hundreds of Bq/g.
Nuvia led negotiations with the Environment IAEA on behalf of the landlord to
establish and agree a remediation plan and an end-point. The landlord wished to re-use the
contaminated site and also to enable the use of the large adjacent area of industrial and
commercial buildings that he leased to other tenants. Although the environmental impact of
the contamination was not excessive, the definition of radioactive waste in the UK means that
any material with anthropogenic radiological contamination above 0.4 Bq/g is radioactive
waste. The amount of building materials and soil contaminated above 0.4 Bq/g was estimated
to be 1500 te. Disposal of this amount of material would cost several million pounds.
Some investigations and trials were undertaken to establish whether soil and concrete
washing would remove the tritium to acceptable levels. However, it was soon established that
the cost and commercial risk of soil washing did not make this an attractive option. The only
disposal site available in the UK for this material is the National Low Level Waste Depository
at Drigg in Cumbria. This site is both costly for disposal and represents a limited national
resource so it was not the ideal disposal solution. Nuvia established that a commercially
operated active incinerator was prepared to accept the waste for treatment. This process would
drive off the tritium contamination from both concrete and soil and it could then be either
collected from the flue gas as a liquid or dispersed to atmosphere with acceptably low
environmental impact.
Further negotiation with the Environment IAEA resulted in agreement that the
incineration method of waste treatment for the concrete and soil contaminated with higher
levels of tritium was acceptable. It was also agreed that soils at greater depth and
contaminated to a level slightly above 0.4 Bq/g could be left in place without conditions being
imposed on the development of the site. It was shown that this would not influence the site
development work and that after re-development, the tritium would disperse and decay from
these areas over time with minimal environmental impact. Nuvia undertook all of the
demolition work and remediated the site to the agreed standards.
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TOPICAL SESSION 7
3.
SUMMARY
Four completed projects which required the identification, assessment and removal of a
variety of radioactive contaminants in land and buildings have been briefly described. All of
the work was conducted to prescribed safety standards and within relevant legal
environmental requirements.
234
ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT DOSES FROM URANIUM TAILINGS
R. AVILA*, O. VOITSEKHOVYCH**, I. ZINGER*, P. KEYSER***
*
**
***
Facilia AB
Stockholm, Sweden
EcoMonitor,
Kiev, Ukraine
Swedish Radiation Safety Authority,
Stockholm, Sweden
Abstract
Assessments of radiation doses have been carried out in and around existing uranium tailings in Ukraine,
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Radioactive contamination at these sites can potentially impact human health as
nearby areas are often heavily populated. As an example, the current doses to humans were assessed in detail for
one site. These first assessments should help in building more realistic scenarios and dose estimates. This work
may be used as part of decision making on the most suitable remediation options based on the long term intended
uses of the sites.
1.
INTRODUCTION
This paper summarises studies carried out around existing uranium tailings in Ukraine,
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan in 2008. Specific assessments were carried out in Ukraine as part of
a collaborative project between Swedish and Ukrainian authorities [1] and as part of expert
missions on behalf of the International Atomic Energy Agency to Tajikistan and Uzbekistan
[2] to define scenarios for dose assessments for the uranium mill tailings disposal sites.
1.1. Brief description of sites
The following is a brief overview of the sites studied; more details are included in [1,
2]. In general, contamination at all sites is not spatially homogeneous; large variations exist in
radionuclide levels in different parts of a given site.
– Dniprodzerzhinsk (Ukraine). Nine tailing impoundments were created in the area; they
contain about 42 million tonnes of radioactive waste with a total activity of 3.2 × 1015
Bq. Some of the waste was deposited within the territory of the industrial zone of
Dniprodzerzhinsk, and some at about 14 km to the southeast of the site. The sites are
located in and near to the Pridneprovsky Chemical Plant (PChP) in the town of
Dniprodzerzhinsk (about 280 000 inhabitants);
– Taboshar (Tajikistan). Tailings occupy a 54 ha area and contain about 7.6 million
tonnes of waste. They are located a few kilometres away from the town (12 000
inhabitants). Some of the tailings are without any cover and represent a source of
highly contaminated drainage and seepage water, which is migrating into surface
water and to the shallow groundwater table. Due to hot climatic conditions, the
drainage waters evaporate resulting in the precipitation of carbonate, sodium and
sulphate complexes of uranium. This creates a salt cover of white colour with yellow
uranile crystals, containing concentrations around 10–20 Bq/g of 238U;
235
TOPICAL SESSION 7
– Degmay (Tajikistan). This is the largest single uranium mill tailings site in Central
Asia. It extends over 90 ha and contains about 20 million tonnes of uranium residue
waste. The estimated total activity is about 1.6 × 1013 Bq. It is located 2 km
from the Chkalovsk settlement (22 000 people) and 10 km from the town of Khudjand
(164 000 inhabitants). Due to hot climatic conditions, the water from the tailings’
surface has evaporated, and the tailings pile has cracked leading to high 222Rn
exhalation (36–65 Bq/m2.s). The 222Rn ambient concentration in air at the site varied
from 200 to 1000 Bq.m-3;
– Charkesar in (Uzbekistan). This is a uranium legacy site located in the suburb of the
village of Charkesar (2500 people). The site extends over 20.6 ha and contains 482
thousand m3 radioactive waste with a total activity of 3 x1013 Bq. The ventilation shaft
currently discharges contaminated water containing 238U at concentrations ranging
from 26 to 36 Bq/L.
2.
METHODOLOGY
The assessments to derive current radiation doses to humans living in the vicinity of
these sites were performed using the same approach for each site:
– First, monitoring data was used to identify the hazardous areas;
– For each hazard, exposure pathways, and associated models, were determined;
– The hazards were then quantified in term of radiation dose rates from each pathway
per unit time or for a given use of contaminated media, such as water and food.
Once the exposed groups had been identified it was then possible to assess the existing
radiation doses to the particular exposed population groups based on defined scenarios.
This approach produces results which are only indicative of the current situation. In
order to quantify the actual risks to individuals, further analyses are needed based on both
current and future scenarios. These steps are not described in this paper.
3.
IDENTIFICATION OF HAZARDS
In this study, a hazardous area is defined as an area with elevated radionuclide or
radiation levels, as compared with background levels. These areas pose an additional
radiological hazard, as their occupancy by the population can result in radiation doses above
those due to natural background radiation. Radiological hazards can also be caused by
elevated radionuclide levels in water bodies, such as underground and surface waters.
Monitoring data were used for each site to identify the hazardous areas, using
information such as:
– Gamma radiation dose rates outside and inside of buildings;
– Radionuclide concentrations in aerosols, soils and tailing materials;
– Radon concentrations outside and inside of buildings;
– Radionuclide concentrations in water and food products, such as milk and meat (not
yet done at the Ukraine site).
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AVILA et al.
3.1. Dniprodzerzhinsk – Ukraine
The monitoring data helped to identify a number of contaminated locations: inside and
outside contaminated buildings (closed to public and due to be demolished); the PChP north
part; hot spots in the forest; tailing Zapadnoe; tailing Central Yar; tailing Yugovoctochnoye;
tailing Dniprovskoye; ponds near tailing Central Yar.
From the description of the current activities on the PChP territory, it is clear that
workers on the site receive the highest radiation doses if they spend part of their working
hours near the hot spots, in the contaminated buildings or working at the tailings surface
where the cover is not sufficient. The development and analysis of scenarios has been focused
on critical groups of workers. Expansion of the scenarios to address risks to members of the
public is scheduled for 2009.
3.2. Taboshar – Tajikistan
The following radiological hazards were identified at the Taboshar site: elevated
radionuclide and radiation levels a) outdoors at the Taboshar settlement; b) indoors at the
Taboshar settlement; c) at the uranium tailings piles, which may affect the population which
have free access to the tailing sites and use the tailings surface for the grazing of domestic
animals; d) at the uranium pits (waste rock piles), where some local citizens spend part of
their time visiting the waste rock piles and former uranium pits for swimming and for other
private needs; d) in waters contaminated by the uranium tailings; and e) in waters
contaminated by the uranium pits.
3.3. Degmay – Tajikistan
The main exposure pathways for persons visiting this site are external exposure to
gamma radiation and inhalation of radon and particulate bearing dusts. The following
radiological hazards were identified at the Degmay site: elevated radionuclide and radiation
levels a) in the Degmay settlement; b) at the uranium tailings; and c) in ground waters (water
from local wells).
3.4. Charkesar – Uzbekistan
It was found that the main radiological problem at Charkesar is that local citizens, in
many cases, use tailing materials for the construction of their houses. The following
radiological hazards were identified in the Charkesar site: elevated radionuclide and radiation
levels in a) areas of the Charkesar settlement that are close to the industrial site (‘near
settlement’); b) areas of the Charkesar settlement that are far from the industrial site (‘far
settlement’); c) at the industrial site; d) in spring waters; e) in the mine waters; and f) in the
river waters.
4.
CURRENT RADIATION DOSE RATES
4.1. Derivation of doses
To provide a basis for exposure assessments at sites of this type, the German Federal
Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Reactor Safety has published a
document containing appropriate models and parameters [3]. This document provides
equations for estimating radiation exposures through all pathways that can be relevant at
uranium mining and processing sites, namely:
237
TOPICAL SESSION 7
– External exposure caused by soil contamination for reference persons inside and
outside buildings;
– Exposure through contaminated aerosols inside and outside buildings;
– Radiation exposure from locally grown foodstuffs;
– Exposure through the direct ingestion of soil;
– Determination of activity concentration in foodstuff; and
– Exposure from the inhalation of 222Rn and its short-lived progeny.
According to this methodology [3], the radionuclides to be considered for calculating
doses are included in the following three decay chains: 1) 238U > 234U > 230Th > 226Ra > 210Po
> 210Pb; 2) 235U > 231Pa > 227Ac; and 3) 232Th > 228Ra > 228Th.
In the present study, dose calculations were only performed for the seven radionuclides:
238
U, 234U, 230Th, 226Ra, 210Po, 210Pb and 228Th, due to limitations in the availablility of data.
This may lead to a slight underestimation of doses. The equations for dose calculations from
the German report [3] were implemented in the software package Ecolego [4].
4.2. Predicted dose rates
Table 1 summarises the estimated radiation dose rates for the exposure pathways used
in the model calculations. The results [1, 2] showed that external exposure and radon
inhalation contributed the most to the total doses.
Fig. 1 compares the four sites. Similar results are found at the sites, except for
Dniprodzerzhinsk, Ukraine, where the measurenents were taken in highly contaminated
locations aimed at worker dose estimation rather than in areas occupied by the local
population.
TABLE 1. DERIVED DOSE RATE RANGES IN µSV/H FOR THE FOUR STUDIED
SITES
Site
Hazard
Taboshar,
Tajikistan
Settlement outdoors
Settlement indoors
Tailings
Uranium pit
Settlement
Tailings
Far outdoors
Far indoors
Near outdoors
Near indoors
Industrial site
Outside polluted building
Inside polluted building
PChP north part
Hot spots
Tailing Yugovoctochnoye
Tailing Zapadnoe
Tailing Dniprovskoye
Tailing Central Yar
Ponds (near tailing Central Yar)
Degmay,
Tajikistan
Charkesar,
Uzbekistan
Dniprodzerzhinsk,
Ukraine *
*
Results based on experimental data.
238
Total dose rates µSv/h
Minimum
Maximum
0.10
0.53
0.11
0.53
0.11
0.77
0.15
2.40
0.04
0.31
2.70
13.00
0.22
1.20
0.22
2.70
0.28
1.30
0.56
4.40
0.22
1.90
0.56
7.17
5.70
21.80
0.15
0.49
4.93
18.40
1.30
30.60
0.09
2.65
0.15
0.49
0.52
3.29
0.53
2.35
AVILA et al.
µSv/hr
maximum
minimum
35,00
30,00
25,00
20,00
15,00
10,00
5,00
0,00
S7
Dniprodzerzhinsk
- Ukraine
S5
Charkesar – Uzbekistan
Degmay, Tajikistan
S3
Taboshar, Tajikistan
S1
FIG. 3. Minimum and maximum dose rates (µSv/h) in and around the four studied uranium
tailings sites in Ukraine, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.
4.3. Current doses to exposure groups
Once the radiation doses from the exposure pathways have been evaluated it is possible to
assess the doses that different groups of individuals may receive based on their life styles.
Both studies [1, 2] present such results, but here one example is provided. At the Taboshar
site, five groups were identified:
– Group 1. People that live in Taboshar, relatively far from the tailing dump site, and
stay most of the time in houses. The houses are not contaminated because materials
from the tailing have not been used for house construction. They obtain all their
drinking water from the non-contaminated river Utken-Suu;
– Group 2. People from this group have the same occupancy of the hazardous areas as
Group 1, but they use water from the mine for drinking and for irrigation of
vegetables;
– Group 3. People from this group use water from the mine for drinking and irrigation
(as for Group 2). They also live in Taboshar, relatively far from the tailing dump site,
and stay most of the time in houses, but they regularly visit the areas in the vicinity of
town where the uranium waste rock piles are situated;
– Group 4. People from this group make the same use of the water from the mine as
people from Group 3. They differ from the other group in that spend some time at the
tailings pasturing their cows and sheep and in that they obtain 30% of their meat and
milk from cows that drink tailing waters;
– Group 5. People from this group work 30 hours per week during 46 of the weeks of
the year in areas near the uranium pit. Like the other groups, they live in Taboshar,
relatively far from the tailings dump site, and stay most of the time in their houses.
239
TOPICAL SESSION 7
Table 2 presents the assumptions used and the derived annual radiation dose rates for
the five groups.
TABLE 2. ESTIMATED RADIATION DOSE RATES (MSV/Y) TO VARIOUS GROUPS
OF THE POPULATION AT THE TABOSHAR SITE
Exposure (h/y) to different hazards
Group
Outdoor
at tailings
Outdoor
at waste
rock piles
Indoor in
houses
1
2
3
4
5
0
0
0
1 460
0
0
0
730
730
1 380
5 840
5 840
5 110
5 110
5110
Group
1
2
3
4
5
5.
Percentage of annual consumption %
Meat and Irrigation of Drinking
Outdoor at milk (water vegetables
water
the town
from
(water from from
tailings)
mine)
mine
2 920
0
0
0
2 920
0
30
30
2 920
0
30
30
1 460
30
30
30
2 270
0
0
0
Dose mSv/y
Minimum
Maximum
0.93
4.70
1.20
5.10
1.20
6.50
1.30
6.80
1.00
7.20
Contribution %
External Radon Others
12
88
0
11
80
9
32
59
8
39
49
12
48
50
2
SUMMARY
A consistent approach for deriving radiation doses to groups of people exposed to
uranium tailings contaminants has been applied at four locations. By identifying the hazards
and quantifying them based on exposure pathways, radiation dose rates can be calculated and
form the basis for quantifying the exposure to given groups of the population. As stated in the
main report [2] “… the data generated will support prioritization of the legacy sites for
remediation and preparation of the necessary remedial feasibility assessments”. Further work
is being pursued at all four sites.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The authors would like to thank both the International Atomic Energy Agency and the
Swedish Radiation Safety Authority for sponsoring part of the work that is presented in this
paper as well as all local counterparts who assisted in the work. The authors also acknowledge
that many staff at EcoMonitor and Facilia also contributed to producing the results that are
presented in this paper.
240
AVILA et al.
REFERENCES
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
ZINGER, I. (Ed.), ENSURE: Assessment of Risks to Human Health and the
Environment from Uranium Tailings in Ukraine – Phase 1 report, Facilia Report:
TR/SIUS/01 for the Swedish Radiation Protection Authority, Sweden (2008).
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Annex: Assessment of doses from
exposures to elevated levels of natural radionuclides in areas close to uranium tailings in
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, in Safe Management of Residues from former Mining and
Milling Activities in Central Asia: project results 2005–2008, Regional Technical
Cooperation Project RER/9/086, Draft report (in preparation), November 2008.
BMU, Berechnungsgrundlagen zur Ermittlung der Strahlenexposition infolge
bergbaubedingter Umweltradioaktivität (Berechnungsgrundlagen – Bergbau),
[Assessment principles for estimation of radiation exposures resulting from miningrelated radioactivity in the environment (Assessment principles for mining)], German
Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Reactor Safety, Berlin
30.07.1999 (1999).
AVILA, R., BROED, R. and PEREIRA, A., Ecolego – A toolbox for radioecological
risk assessment, Proceedings of the International conference on the Protection from the
Effects of Ionizing Radiation, Stockholm, IAEA–CN–109/80, International Atomic
Energy Agency, Vienna (2003).
241
SUMMARY OF SESSION 7
B. Salbu
Norway
CASE STUDIES II
From the eight presentations and the discussion in this session, a number of valuable
lessons were learned. As a general lesson, it is clear that there is no substitute for competent
regulators, operators and good science. This underscores the need for training, education and
national capacity building in order to meet the challenges associated with contaminated sites.
Life cycle planning (or lack of it) was a reoccurring theme in many of the presentations
in the session. Life cycle planning is needed in order to prevent significant problems from
occurring in the latter stages of a uranium mining and milling operation. A robust regulatory
system (i.e. one that requires an environmental impact assessment prior to the start of a
mining operation) and good coordination between the regulatory body, the operators and the
research community, are also very important. The regulatory body should be independent of
the operator. It was clearly demonstrated there is a strong need for stakeholder involvement
throughout the whole period of a project.
The experience gained in the remediation of a uranium extraction plant in Mexico
showed that if the organization that is performing the remediation is different from that
responsible for long term care of the site, there needs to be good coordination between them
to ensure a smooth transition of responsibilities. The study showed the need for adequate
compliance verification of the remediation plan, for example, by the use of proper
institutional controls.
One presentation discussed an innovative way to calculate radiation doses when
background radiation makes the radiation caused by human activities difficult to measure. The
presentation also emphasized the need to take due account of the habits of local potentially
exposed population groups in dose assessments and provided an example of this in relation to
the Aborigines in Australia.
Radiation monitoring programmes and radiation dose assessments to workers involved
in remediation activities at uranium mine sites and to the public were described in several
presentations. The public perception of radiation risks was raised as an issue in at least one
presentation and the need for improved approaches for risk communication was emphasized.
Experience in the implementation of remediation schemes in different countries has
shown that:
– What may work in one part of the world may not work in another, e.g. for cultural,
climatic and physical geographic reasons;
– Having a site conceptual model is valuable for targeting limited resources towards the
activities that will give the greatest risk reduction;
– Stakeholder involvement may be more challenging than the technical solutions.
Furthermore, it was noted that many of these legacy sites have common issues:
–
–
–
–
242
Operations were terminated abruptly;
There was improper or no management of waste and residues;
No funding exists for post mining/milling activities; and
There was no stakeholder involvement due to the secret nature of the sites.
SUMMARY OF SESSION 7
An important conclusion from the presented studies on the radiological impact of
uranium mining and milling legacy sites is that, in almost every case, with a few localized
exceptions, the radiation doses are low. This underscores the need to evaluate these legacy
sites individually using a site-specific, evidence based approach. Only in this way can the true
risks to the public and the environment be properly evaluated and addressed.
243
EXPEDITING AND ENHANCING EXPERIENCE EXCHANGE
(TOPICAL SESSION 8)
Chairperson
D. LOUVAT
IAEA
THE ENVIRONET – NETWORK ON ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT
AND REMEDIATION
H. MONKEN-FERNANDES
International Atomic Energy Agency,
Vienna
Abstract
This paper describes ENVIRONET, a new initiative of the International Atomic Energy Agency to
facilitate information exchange between persons concerned with environmental remediation projects in different
counties. The rationale for the development of the ENVIRONET network and the main the functions and
facilities of the network are described.
1.
BACKGROUND
The successful implementation of environmental remediation projects depends on the
appropriate combination of factors that include both technical and non-technical issues. In
most cases, the major constraint in implementing of these projects is the lack of financial
resources. Environmental remediation activities tend to be very expensive and because, in the
past, companies, both private and state-owned, did not provide the necessary financial
provisions for environmental remediation, it is not uncommon that resources for remediation
are unavailable. For these reasons, the costs of remediation projects have generally to be faced
by the State. Often, the national organizations in charge of implementing remediation works
rely on the support of international organizations to fund the projects – especially in the case
of countries with weak economies.
However, even if financial resources are available there are a number of other issues to
be tackled. They include, but are not limited to: the technologies to be used, the availability of
appropriate staff and the regulatory infrastructure (including laws, regulations, and regulatory
organizations). Planning is a topic of crucial importance for the successful implementation of
environmental remediation projects but in many cases it is not appropriately considered by
those in charge of the implementation of projects. Finally, consideration has to be given to the
role to be played by different stakeholders in the decision making process. Consideration has
to be given to procedures for taking their views into consideration and for involving them
effectively in the process. Solutions have to be found that are both technically and
scientifically sound at the same time as being understood and accepted by the different
stakeholders.
Some countries have achieved more successful outcomes in the implementation of
environmental remediation projects than others. As a result they have experience on how to
deal with some of the issues mentioned above. However, solutions for environmental
remediation problems are not universally applicable, i.e. a technology has proven to be
effective at one site may not be the most appropriate one to be applied to another one. One
example of this is the use of dry covers. A cover designed for an arid region may not be
appropriate for use in humid conditions. There is a need to understand the scientific rationale
behind the functioning of the cover in order to design an appropriate cover for a specific
situation. Interaction with stakeholders is another example where universal solutions do not
exist. The socio-political and cultural characteristics of communities and societies may often
differ so that an approach used in one country may not be the best approach to be used in
another.
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TOPICAL SESSION 8
Taking all these elements into account the International Atomic Energy Agency has
been working to provide its Member States with relevant support in this area. It has been
promoting technologies that can aid in the implementation of environmental remediation
projects. These are aimed at improving the environmental conditions in areas affected by
radioactive contamination in the past. At the same time the IAEA has been encouraging the
adoption of good environmental management practices with the objective of avoiding the
creation of new legacy sites and/or the need of extensive remediation works after the
termination of operations.
The IAEA tries to fulfil this important mission by: i) publishing technical documents
and safety standards, ii) organising training courses, workshops and seminars and providing
for the implementation of scientific visits and experts missions under the activities of its
Technical Cooperation Department, iii) organising international conferences and iv) providing
and supporting peer-review missions.
2.
NETWORKING
It has been noted that there is room for improvement in the type of assistance that the
IAEA provides to its Member States. One reason is that there are different types of potential
recipients of IAEA assistance. Sometimes the guidance given in its technical documents may
be too generic or superficial for use by some while for others it may not be achievable. The
IAEA publications tend to consolidate the experience of more developed countries on a
specific topic and this experience may not be readily applicable in a country with
comparatively modest resources (human and/or finance). For various reasons countries often
need more than published advice in order to be able to tackle the problems of environmental
remediation. It has become evident from interaction with many of the Member States affected
by environmental contamination that the IAEA should strive to provide help in more practical
and tangible ways.
2.1. IAEA Networks – the ENVIRONET
At the present time, the Waste Technology Section of the IAEA is operating four
information networks: the first one to be created was the URL (Underground Research
Laboratory Network). It was followed by the IDN (International Decommissioning Network)
and the DISPONET (Waste Pre-disposal Network).
The ENVIRONET, which was launched in 2009, is an information network dealing
with legacy sites (existing contaminated sites) as well as life-cycle approaches for minimizing
the need for future remediation measures due to the operations of nuclear facilities and
NORM (naturally occurring radioactive materials) industries. It is intended to aid Member
States in solving the problems created in the past by improving the efficiency of information
exchange and the transfer of knowledge and assistance. Topics to be covered by the
ENVIRONET include: i) Life-cycle planning of both facility operations and environmental
remediation; ii) Project planning (quality control and assurance); iii) Data management, iv)
Integration and communication; v) Site characterization; vi) Modelling (fate and transport,
engineering design and economics); vii) Risk assessment; viii) Remediation technology
development and selection; ix) Monitoring; x) Stakeholder involvement and communication;
xi) Regulation and policy development; xii) Risk communication; xii) Stewardship –
Institutional Control and xiii) Funding.
The planned methods of work include a variety of products and services aimed at
expediting the exchange of information and experiences. The ultimate goal is to build
248
MONKEN-FERNANDES
capacity in Member States and to facilitate the full implementation of remediation projects.
These products and services include: website (document repository of educational materials);
discussion forum; partners directory (online profiles); schedule of events; workshops,
conferences, training sessions, long-distance training, fellowships/internships and peer
reviews. The products will be: proceedings; dedicated publications; training materials, case
studies, annual reports and newsletters.
The vision underlying the implementation of networks is that the involvement of
interested groups through the network on a specific topic will promote an effective flow of
information and experience sharing. ENVIRONET will also aim at the transfer of knowledge
while providing for the education of those in need. In principle, information will flow from
more experienced partners to those with less experience. However, in many situations the
advantages of integration through a network is mutual, as a lot of positive and valuable
information can flow in a reverse way. With the aid of the new tools provided by the
development of the Internet, virtual forums can be established, and this will allow an intensive
circulation of information amongst the participants of the network. Modern web-base
resources will also allow new educational tools, such as video materials, to be posted on the
web.
Finally, networking will allow the IAEA to capture the needs of a greater number of
technical people in the each Member State.
More information and further contact with IAEA Waste Technology Section networks
can be obtained at:
www.iaea.org/OurWork/ST/NE/NEFW/wts_NETWORKS_homepage.html. For further
contact with the ENVIRONET Scientific Secretary the email address environet@iaea.org is
also available.
249
SUMMARY OF SESSION 8
D. Louvat
IAEA
INTERNATIONAL ASSESSMENT AND INFORMATION EXCHANGE
In this short session there were three presentations covering an internationally
sponsored review of uranium mining legacy sites in countries of Central Asia and the
programmes of two international organizations in the field of environmental remediation.
These presentations were followed by a final discussion.
The secrecy surrounding the sites in former times led to a lack of disclosure of
information. Nowadays, more data is available, but the reliability of the information is an
issue. Therefore, it is essential for measurements to be carried out to validate and complete the
information. The quality and accuracy of dose assessments depend on the reliability of the
data used in the models. Under the NATO RESCA project a number of field missions have
been carried out involving measurement and radioactive dose assessment, among other
activities. The overall conclusion is that, in general, radiation levels are not very high, except
at very specific locations within some sites or when there is easy access to radioactive
material that potentially could be misused. The dose assessments were, however, very
preliminary since the radiological characterization of the sites has not been completed. Indoor
radon generally makes the highest contribution to the dose. Drinking water makes a smaller
contribution and other pathways make even smaller contributions.
A short summary of the goals of NATO in the field was presented and, in particular, the
organization and objectives of the Science for Peace and Security Committee were described.
The activities of the Committee are non-military and are for civil science cooperation. The
main topics dealt with by the Committee are oriented towards defence against terrorism and
other threats, including environmental security. The work is implemented in many cases in
association with other international initiatives. Working groups and subgroups deal with a
wide range of subjects connected to environmental hazards and man-made induced
degradation of the world’s natural resources, among other topics. In particular, two large
projects related to the former nuclear test site at Semipalatinsk in Kazakhstan have been
implemented.
In the final presentation, ENVIRONET, an IAEA initiative on a ‘network of centres of
excellence on environmental remediation’ was described. The objectives of ENVIRONET are
to provide coordinated support, to organize training and demonstration events, to foster
information exchange and to establish a forum. ENVIRONET will cover a wide range of
topics, e.g. site characterization and remediation, but its final structure is still being designed,
including the roles and functions of the partners. The establishment of the network will be
formally announced at the next General Conference of the IAEA in October 2009.
The Chairperson started the discussion session by reminding the participants that there
are several ongoing and planned international initiatives in relation to remediation of uranium
legacy sites.
In the subsequent discussion, the ENVIRONET project was generally appreciated and
well supported. Detailed questions as to its scope, content, mechanisms and resources for its
support were raised.
While appreciating the ENVIRONET initiative, it was noted that a separate forum for
regulators is needed. Most problems (no maintenance, lack of planning) have resulted from
251
SUMMARY OF SESSION 8
poor regulatory infrastructure and organization of the regulatory bodies. The establishment of
a global network of regulators in this field is needed.
It was pointed out that the issue of site maintenance had not been properly addressed at
the conference. IAEA has issued guidance on this but it needs to be strongly emphasized in
projects otherwise remediation actions will fail in the long term.
The Conference participants heard of a number of international initiatives related to the
remediation of legacy sites in Central Asia. It is important that these are properly coordinated
so as to avoid wasting resources in the countries of Central Asia, in the international
organizations and in their supporting Member States. The international organizations should
urgently address this potential problem.
252
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS OF THE CONFERENCE
Report of the Conference President1
Mr Timur Zantikin
Conference President
Kazakhstan Atomic Energy Committee (KAEC)
Ulitsa Lisy Chaikina, 4
050020 Almaty
KAZAKHSTAN
The need for the remediation of legacy sites resulting from nuclear weapons testing,
nuclear accidents, poorly operated practices and abandoned facilities became evident after the
end of the Cold War in 1989. Since then, the full extent of the global remediation problem has
become clear and, in response, the International Atomic Energy Agency organized several
radiological assessments of major affected sites around the world. In 1999, the IAEA held the
International conference on the Restoration of Environments with Radioactive Residues in
Arlington, USA. The Arlington conference was mainly focused on the remediation of areas
affected by nuclear weapons testing and nuclear accidents and on the issue of radiological
criteria to guide cleanup decisions. By 2009, the emphasis had moved to the remediation of
uranium mining and milling legacy sites and the technology for use in site remediation. These
are the main topics of this week’s conference in Astana, Kazakhstan.
The Conference has attracted participants from all over the world and presentations
from many countries and organizations, but the emphasis of our discussions this week has
been on the problems caused by uranium mining and milling legacy sites in the countries of
Central Asia.
The conference addressed the important issue of international regulatory standards for
remediation and noted the progress being made towards incorporating regulatory
requirements and guidance for remediation into the revised International Basic Safety
Standards on Radiation Protection (BSS). The revised BSS will include a radiological
protection framework for remediation which allows criteria for remediation to be developed
by a process of optimization, taking due account of national and local circumstances.
In the context of regulations, the Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority (NRPA)
announced a plan during the Conference to assist in the regulatory supervision of legacy sites
in the Central Asian Republics. Based on its previous experience in the Russian Federation, in
which it helped to improve the regulatory capabilities of the nuclear regulator, the NRPA
proposes to assist the countries of the Central Asian Republics by improving regulatory
infrastructures and, in particular, providing training to the regulatory body in procedures and
regulatory supervision. It was also suggested that IAEA might wish to become involved, for
example, by hosting meetings of the coordination forum.
Many of the old uranium mines were developed in an era in which efficiency of
uranium production was the only concern – with no attention being given to the damage
inflicted on the environment or to the residues left behind. The environmental consequences
of the first phase of uranium mining and milling were therefore often significant and could
have been avoided. This has prompted concern that the same mistakes might be repeated in
the new wave of uranium mining. The Conference supported the strategy of avoiding the
creation of future legacy sites by proper planning (life cycle planning) and good operating
1
The views and recommendations expressed here are those of the President of the Conference and the participants, and do
not necessarily represent those of the IAEA.
253
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS OF THE CONFERENCE
practices and by promoting an environmental protection culture among the mining companies.
It was also recognized that much could be achieved by establishing appropriate regulations
and a strong regulatory body in the country in which the mining operations are conducted.
Many of the countries with legacy uranium mining sites share common problems, such
as, a lack of funds to deal with the problem, a lack of local expertise and equipment and, as a
result, inadequately characterized sites. Furthermore, the radiological conditions of people
living near to the sites may not be known.
In most of the major industrialized uranium producing countries of the world, the
uranium mining sites have been successfully remediated. During the conference the
experience obtained in attempting to transfer this experience to developing countries was
shared with the participants. Some of the key points were:
– It is necessary to build capacity through training so that the local organizations
become capable of managing and regulating their own remediation activities;
– In many countries, resources are limited and the remediation solutions which have
been used in industrialized countries may not be ideally suited to the application;
usually, simple rather than sophisticated solutions are to be preferred;
– It is necessary to involve local stakeholders and to be sensitive to their concerns;
sometimes it may not be appropriate to apply the most effective technical solutions
because of social considerations, such as, maintaining the wellbeing of local people
and securing their employment;
– Precautions may need to be taken to ensure the long term viability of supplied
equipment, for example, by providing spares and arrangements for maintaining and
servicing it.
New and innovative technologies were discussed at the Conference and information was
provided on such technologies for application to monitoring, assessing and restricting the
movement of radionuclides in soil and ground water.
The Conference gave strong support to ENVIRONET – a new initiative of the IAEA
which has the aim of promoting mutual interests and the sharing of information in the area of
environmental remediation.
Many presentations dealt with the characterization and radiological assessment of sites.
In most of the cases considered, there are chemical (metals) hazards as well as those due to
ionizing radiation and these must be taken into account in any assessment – too often only
radiological hazards are considered.
A number of posters were displayed throughout the week describing studies additional
to those presented in the oral sessions; they were mainly related to uranium mining and
milling. All of the conference papers and posters will be useful and a help to persons wishing
to learn from the experience of others.
The involvement in the Conference of many international organizations is a reflection of
the importance being given to this problem. The World Bank, the United Nations
Development Fund, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the World Health Organization,
the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe, the European Commission and the IAEA have all been represented
and almost all have made presentations. The aims of most of these organizations are similar in
that they wish to provide assistance in the remediation of uranium mining and milling legacy
sites in the countries of Central Asia. Most of them favour a regional approach and see the
need for a well defined road map before proceeding with any project. They recognize the
importance of developing regulatory capabilities in the countries and agree on the need to
have well defined indicators of success. It is evident that they are already in contact with each
254
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS OF THE CONFERENCE
other, but this conference has shown more clearly that there is a need for increased
coordination between them.
In this context the IAEA has a special role. It is the only one of the organizations with
formal international responsibilities and specialized knowledge in the areas of radiation
protection and radioactive waste management. For this reason, if such a joint regional project
were to be established, the IAEA would be the appropriate international organization to
provide the technical safety justification for it on the basis of its safety standards.
The discussions at the Conference have resulted in a number of initiatives and proposals
being put forward for cooperative action at the regional level; these are elaborated in the
Session Summaries of the conference. It is now up to the international organizations to
deliberate on these and to decide if and when to take action, taking into account the demands
from other sectors.
I am sure that you have all benefitted from the exchange of information which has been
possible during this conference and that you have made many useful contacts. These are often
the main benefits from such meetings.
255
CHAIRPERSONS OF SESSIONS
Opening Session
Session 1
Session 2
Session 3
Session 4
Session 5
Session 6
Session 7
Session 8
Closing Session
T. ZANTIKIN
H. FORSSTROEM
S. VORBIEV
A. J. GONZALEZ
V. ADAMS
M. PAUL
A. KIM
B. SALBU
D. LOUVAT
T. ZANTIKIN
Kazakhstan
IAEA
ISTC
Argentina
United States of America
Germany
Kazakhstan
NATO
IAEA
Kazakhstan
PRESIDENT OF THE CONFERENCE
T. ZANTIKIN
Kazakhstan
SECRETARIAT OF THE CONFERENCE
H. MONKEN-FERNANDES
R. EDGE
H. SCHMID
E. POSTA
G. LINSLEY
H. RATCLIFFE
A. JUNGER
R. de SILVA
Scientific Secretary (IAEA)
Scientific Secretary (IAEA)
Conference Services (IAEA)
Conference Services (IAEA)
Proceedings Editor
Administrative Support
Administrative Support
Administrative Support
PROGRAMME COMMITTEE
Chairperson
V. Adams
United States of America
Members
T. Akhmetov
S. Berezin
P. Crouchon
E. Fillion
M. Iskakov
I. Kadyrzhanova
S. Nordstrom
P. Stegnar
H. Monken-Fernandes
R. Edge
Kazakhstan
Kazakhstan
France
France
Kazakhstan
Kazakhstan
Norway
Slovenia
IAEA
IAEA
257
ORGANIZING COMMITTEE IN KAZAKHSTAN
Chairperson
S. Mynbaev
Ministry of Energy and
Mineral Resources
Members
A. Magauov
Ministry of Energy and
Mineral Resources
Astana Mayor’s Office
Ministry of Culture and Information
Ministry of Environmental Protection
Ministry of Trade and Industry
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Ministry of Internal Affairs
State Sanitary and Epidemiological
Control Committee
Customs Control Committee
NAC Kazatomprom
National Nuclear Centre
Ministry of Energy and
Mineral Resources
T.Nurkenov
B. Aytkazin
A. Tauteev
K. Alkeev
B. Sadykov
K. Zhanisbaev
A. Askarov
D. Tulemisov
S. Yashin
S. Lukashenko
T. Akhmetov
Local Coordination
G. Yeligbayeva
Ministry of Energy and
Mineral Resources
258
AUTHOR INDEX
AUTHOR INDEX
Adsley, I.: 229
Akber, R.: 173
Aleshin, Y.G.: 147
Ashirov, G.E.: 147
Avila, R.: 235
Baechler, S.: 195
Balonov, M.I.: 51
Berta, Z.: 91
Berkovskyy, V.: 31
Bochud, F.: 195
Bogdevich, I.: 223
Bollhöfer, A.: 173
Buzinny, M.G.: 211
Carr, Z.: 31
Christie, D.H.: 31
Chupov, A.: 223
Csővári, M.: 91
Danilova, E.A.: 153
Daniska, V.: 131
Denham, M.: 97
Dinis, M.L.: 191
Edge, R.: 107
Eleyushov, B.: 165
Fabian Ortega, R.: 185
Fang, Y.L.: 79
Fellingham, L.: 229
Fesenko, S.: 223
Fiúza, A.: 191
Földing, G.: 91
Franklin, M.R.: 179
Froidevaux, P.: 195
González, A.J.: 21
Gudowski, W.: 41
Gwo, J.P.: 79
Hajkova, E.: 131
Iskakov, M.: 165
Isamov, N.: 223
Jacob, P.: 223
Jakubick, A.T.: 107
Li, M.H.: 79
Magauov, A.M.: 17
Metzler, D.R.: 107
Mirsaidov, U.: 67
Moϊse, K.N.: 195
Monken-Fernandes, H.: 247
Murley, R.: 229
Nurgaziyev, M.: 165
Oughton, D.H.: 127
Osborne, D.F.: 85
Panov, A.: 223
Radyuk, G.A.: 153
Radyuk, R.I.: 153
Regner, J.: 217
Reisenweaver, D.: 13, 119
Recio, M.: 139
Rudneva, V.: 41
Saïdou, S.: 195
Saint-Pierre, S.: 61
Salbu, B.: 159
Salikhbaev, U.S.: 153
Sanzharova, N.: 223
Schmidt, P.: 217
Shandala, N.K.: 51, 67
Sherstyuk, E.: 31
Siegel, M.D.: 79
Sneve, M.: 51, 67
Stanislavov. E.: 31
Stegnar, P.: 153
Stevens, K.: 229
Teunckens, L.: 131
Tolongutov, B.: 67
Toma, A.: 203
Torgoev, I.A.: 147
Ulanovsky, A.: 223
Vangelas, K.: 97
Van Velzen, L.P.M.: 131
Várhegyi, A.: 91
Vasidov, A.: 153
259
LIST OF PARTICIPANTS
Karankevich, A.: 31
Kashparov, V.: 213
Kayukov, P.: 159
Kelly, J.: 136
Keyser, P.: 224
Kim, A.: 68
Kinker, M.: 136
Kiselev, M.F.: 52, 68
Kist, A.A.: 149
Kristofova, K.: 130
Kunz, C.: 207
Lavrova, T.V.: 202
Leshchenko, O.: 31
Lu, P.: 168
Luo, W.S.: 78
260
Vasko, M.: 130
Velicu, O.: 195
Vinton, L.: 31
Voitsekhovych, O.V.: 202, 224
Waggitt, P.: 104
Walker, S.: 57
Yabusaki, S.B.: 78
Yeh, G.T.: 78
Zhang, F.: 78
Zhuchenka, Y.: 213
Zhunussova, T.: 68
Zhuravlev, A.A.: 149
Zinger, I.: 224
LIST OF PARTICIPANTS
LIST OF PARTICIPANTS
Abdikarim, U.
L.N. Gumilyov Eurasia National University,
Munaitpassova Street 5,
Astana, Kazakhstan
Abdikhalikova, S.
Kazakhstan Atomic Energy Committee,
Orynbor Street, Ministries Building, 13 Entrance,
010000 Astana, Kazakhstan
Adams, V.
U.S. Department of Energy,
EM-12/Cloverleaf Building,
1000 Independence Avenue S.W.,
Washington, D.C. 20585-2040,
United States of America
Email: vincent.adams@em.doe.gov
Adsley, I.
Nuvia Ltd, The Library, 8th Street, Harwell,
Science Campus, Didcot OX11 ORL,
United Kingdom
Fax: +441235514857
Email: ian.adsley@nuvia.co.uk
Aitbaeva, A.
L.N. Gumilyov Eurasia National University,
Munaitpassova Street 5,
Astana, Kazakhstan
Akhmetov, T
Kazakhstan Atomic Energy Committee,
Orynbor Street, Ministries Building, 13 Entrance,
010000 Astana, Kazakhstan
Fax: +77172503074
Email: atz@kaec.kz
Akhmetova, Z.
Ministry of Health, State Sanitary-Epidemiological
Surveillance Committee, Moskovskaya, 66,
473000 Astana, Kazakhstan
Fax: +73172317811
Email: z.akhmetova@mz.gov.kz
Arisheva, A.
L.N. Gumilyov Eurasia National University,
Munaitpassova Street 5,
Astana, Kazakhstan
Askay, B.
Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources,
Kabanbay Batyra Street 22,
Astana, Kazakhstan,
Fax: +7717231729769
Atygaev, A.
Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources,
Kabanbay Batyr Street, 22,
010000 Astana, Kazakhstan
Aydarova, S.
K. Satpaev National Technical University,
Almaty, Kazakhstan
Bahari, I.
University Kebangsaan Malaysia,
School of Applied Physics,
261
LIST OF PARTICIPANTS
43600 Bangi, Malaysia
Email: ismailbaharisn@yahoo.com
Bakhtin, M.
Medical Academy, Sary Arka Street 35,
Astana, Kazakhstan
Email: radbiol7@mail.ru
Basibekov, K.
Kazakhstan Atomic Energy Committee,
Orynbor Street, Ministries Building, 13 Entrance,
010000 Astana, Kazakhstan
Beishenkulova, R.
Department of the State Sanitary and Epidemilogical
Survaillence, Ministry of Health,
Frunze Street 535, P.O. Box 720033,
Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan
Fax: +996312263756
Email: r_beishenkulova@yahoo.com
Belben, G.
United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority (UKAEA),
Harwell Science and Innovation Campus,
Didcot, Oxfordshire OX11 0RA,
United Kingdom
Fax: +441235431914
Email: gaey.belben@ukaea.co.uk
Belorusov, V.
Stepnogorksy Mining and Chemical Complex LLP,
Microdistrict 4, Building 2, P.O. Box 021500,
Akmolinskaya oblast,
Stepnogorsk, Kazakhstan
Fax: +77164562816
Email: info@sghk.kz
Bensman, V.
“Ecoservice S”, Tole bi 202a,
050009 Almaty, Kazakhstan
Fax: +77272503408
Email: ecoservic@mail.ru
Berezin, S.
National Nuclear Centre,
071100 Kurchatov, Kazakhstan
Fax: +73225123858448206
Email: berezin@nnc.kz
Burkitbayev, M.
Al-Farabi Kazakh National University,
95a Karasai-batyr Street,
050012 Almaty, Kazakhstan
Fax: +77272923731
Email: mburkit@nursat.kz
Carr, Z.
World Health Organization, 20 ave Appia,
1211 Geneva, Switzerland
Email: carrz@who.int
Chakam Tagheu, P.
MINRESI, P.O. Box 1457,
Yaounde, Cameroon
Fax: +23722221336
Email: pulchakam@yahoo.fr
JC “Ecomet-C”,
Moscow, Russian Federation
Cheremisin, P.
262
LIST OF PARTICIPANTS
Chunkibyeva, A.
Kazakhstan Atomic Energy Committee,
Orynbor Street, Ministries Building,
13 Entrance,
010000 Astana, Kazakhstan
Email: A.Chunkibayeva@kaec.kz
Cingaev, V.
National Nuclear Centre, 6, Tauelsisdik,
071100 Kurchatov, Kazakhstan
Crochon, P.
AREVA NC/BU, Mines/DI/DQSSE,
Tour AREVA, 1 place Jean Millier,
92084 Paris La Defense, France
Fax: +33134693900
Email: philippe.crochon@areva.com
Csovári, M.
MECSEK-ÖKO Zrt, Esztergár L.u.19,
7633 Pécs, Hungary
Fax: +3672535390
Email: csovarimihaly@mecsekoko.hu
Dairbekov, T.
Kazakhstan Atomic Energy Committee,
Orynbor Street, Ministries Building,
13 Entrance,
010000 Astana, Kazakhstan
Danenov, N.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Tanelsizdik Street 20,
Astana, Kazakhstan
Danilova, E.
Institute of Nuclear Physics Tashkent, Ulugbek,
100214 Tashkent, Uzbekistan
Email: Danilova@inp.uz
Dauletov, A.
Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources,
Kabanbay batyra Street 22,
Astana, Kazakhstan
Fax: +7717231729769
Demin, V
National Nuclear Centre, 6, Tauelsisdik,
071100 Kurchatov, Kazakhstan
Dinis, M. de Lurdes
Faculdade de Engenharia da Universidade do Porto,
R. Dr. Roberto Frias, Porto, Portugal
Email: mldinis@fe.up.pt
Djenbaev, B.
National Academy of Science,
Institute of Biology and Pedology, Chui Avenue 265,
720071 Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan
Fax: +996312657943
Email: bekmamat2002@mail.ru
Djunushaliev, T.
Ministry of Emergency Situations of the
Kyrgyz Republic, 11 Mominov Street,
723500 Osh, Kyrgyzstan
Fax: +996322220471
Email: mchs.osh@elcat.kg
NRCN, P.O. Box 9001,
Beer Sheva 84190, Israel
Dody, A.
263
LIST OF PARTICIPANTS
Fax: +9726567690
Email: dodik@bgu.ac.il
Dogalova, G.
Kazakhstan Atomic Energy Committee,
Orynbor Street, Ministries Building, 13 Entrance,
010000 Astana, Kazakhstan
Durucan, S.
Imperial College London, Exhibition Road,
London SW7 2AZ, United Kingdom
Email: s.durucan@imperial.ac.uk
Dyusekeev, T.
Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources,
Kabanbay batyra Street 22,
Astana, Kazakhstan
Fax: +7717231729769
Edge, R.
International Atomic Energy Agency,
Division of Radiation, Transport and Waste Safety,
Vienna International Centre, P.O. Box 100,
1400 Vienna, Austria
Fax: +43126007
Email: R.Edge@iaea.org
Egizbaev, A.
Ministry of Emergency Situations,
Beybitshilik 22,
Astana, Kazakhstan
Eleushov, B.-B.
JSC National Atomic Company “Kazatomprom”,
168, Bogenbay Batyr,
050012 Almaty, Kazakhstan
Fax: +77272503541
Email: beleushov@kazatomprom.kz
Erkasov, R.
Pavlodar University,
Astana, Kazakhstan
Ermatov, A.
Kazakhstan Atomic Energy Committee,
Orynbor Street, Ministries Building, 13 Entrance,
010000 Astana, Kazakhstan
Esposito, A.
Sogin, Centrale Nucleare del Garigliano,
Via Appia km 160.400,
Sessa Aurunca (CE), Italy
Fax: +390823055930
Email: aesposito@sogin.it
Fawaris, B.
Tajoura Nuclear Research Centre,
Algerian Square, P.O. Box 464,
Tripoli, Libya
Fax: +21821361414243
Email: nyrkj@yahoo.com
264
LIST OF PARTICIPANTS
Faybishenko, B.
Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory,
1 Cyclotron Road, MS 90-1116, Berkeley,
94720 California, United States of America
Fax: +5104865686
Email: bafaybishenko@lbl.gov
Fillion, E.
AREVA NC/D3SE, 33 rue La Fayette,
75442 Paris Cedex 09, France
Fax: +33134960239
Email: eric.fillion@areva.com
Földing, G.
MECSEK-ÖKO Zrt, Esztergár L.u. 19,
7633 Pécs, Hungary
Fax: +3675535390
Email: foldinggabor@mecsekerc.hu
Forsstroem, H.
International Atomic Energy Agency,
Department of Nuclear Energy,
Division of Nuclear Fuel Cycle and Waste Technology,
Vienna International Centre, P.O. Box 100,
1400 Vienna, Austria
Fax: +43126007
Franklin, M.
Brazilian Nuclear Energy Commission,
Institute of Radiation Protection and Dosimetry,
Av. Salvador Allende, S/N-Recreio,
P.O. Box 37750,
Rio de Janeiro, ZIP 22780-160, Brazil
Fax: +552124422699
Email: mariza@ird.gov.br
Gigase, Y.
European Commission/ADICO A4,
Jozef II Straat 54 07/235,
1049 Brussels, Belgium
Fax: +3222995206
Email: yves.gigase@ec.europa.eu
Gluchshenko, V.
Institute of Nuclear Physics,
National Nuclear Centre, 1 Ibragimov,
050032 Almaty, Kazakhstan
Fax: +77273866454
Email: vik@inp.kz
Gomes Mortagua, V.
Industrias Nucleares do Brasil S/A-INB,
Rua Miguel Yunes 115, CEP 04444-000,
Jurubatuba – São Paulo, Brazil
Fax: +551156317611
Email: valtermortagua@inb.gov.br
González, A.J.
Autoridad Regulatoria Nuclear (ARN),
Av. Del Libertador 8250,
1429 Buenos Aires, Argentina
Fax: +541163231771
Email: agonzalez@arn.gob.ar
Gorbatenko, O.
JSC National Atomic Company “Kazatomprom”,
168, Bogenbay Batyr,
050012 Almaty, Kazakhstan
Fax: +77272503541
Email: ogorbatenko@kazatomprom.kz
265
LIST OF PARTICIPANTS
Halvorsen, D.
Royal Norwegian Embassy, 12 Samal microdistrict,
Astana Tower Busniess Centre, 13th Floor,
010000 Astana, Kazakhstan
Fax: +77172580087
Email: dmh@mfa.no
Harlander, E.
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development,
Exchange Square, Primrose Street,
London, EC2A 2JN, United Kingdom
Fax: +442073387175
Email: harlande@ebrd.com
Hein, G.
Cameco Corporation, 2121 11th Street West,
Saskatoon, Saskatchewan S7M 1J3,
Canada
Fax: +77272506415
Email: ghein@inkai.kz
Hulka, J.
SURO – National Radiation Protection Institute,
Bartoškova 28,
14000 Praha 4, Czech Republic
Fax: +420241410215
Email: jiri.hulka@suro.cz
Idrissova, M.
Kazakhstan Atomic Energy Committee,
Orynbor Street, Ministries Building, 13 Entrance,
010000 Astana, Kazakhstan
Ilyas, Z.
BAPETEN, Jl. Gajah Mada No. 8,
Jakarta, Indonesia
Fax: +622163851028
Email: z.ilyas@bapeten.go.id
Imasheva, B.
Medical Academy, Sary Aska Street 35,
Astana, Kazakhstan
Fax: +77172539439
Email: bagdat_imasheva@mail.ru
Isaev, N.
Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources,
Kabanbay Batyra Street 22,
Astana, Kazakhstan
Fax: +7717231729769
Isaeva, A.
Research Institute of the South Kazakhstan University,
Tauke-khan Avenue, 5,
Chimkent City, Kazakhstan
Iskakov, M.
JSC National Atomic Company “Kazatomprom”,
168, Bogenbay Batyr,
050012 Almaty, Kazakhstan
Fax: +77272503541
Email: m.iskakov@kazatomprom.kz
Ivanov, A.
Centre of Radiation Technology and Technical Diagnostics,
Akatu, Kazakhstan
Jakubick, A.
UMREG, Am Reuteberg, Eichenweg 14,
78269 Volkertshausen, Germany
Fax: +493718120107
Email: alexjakubick@gmail.com
266
LIST OF PARTICIPANTS
Jamsangtong, J.
Thailand Institute of Nuclear Technology,
Division of Research and Development on Nuclear
Science and Technology, 9/9 Moo 7, Sai Mun,
Ongkarak, 26120 Nakornnayok, Thailand
Fax: +6637392913
Email: jantanee11@yahoo.com
John, G.
AMEC, 601 Faraday Street, Birchwood Park,
Birchwood, Warrington WA3 6GN,
United Kingdom
Fax: +441925675006
Email: Gordon.john@amec.com
Jousten, N.
European Commission/ADICO A4,
Jozef II Straat 54 07/235,
1049 Brussels, Belgium
Email: Norbert.jousten@ec.europa
Kadirzhanov, K.
National Nuclear Centre,
071100 Kurchatov, Kazakhstan
Kadyrova, N.
2 Krasnoarmeiskaya Street,
071100 Kurchatov, Kazakhstan
Fax: +77225122806
Email: kadyrova@nnc.kz
Kaftaranov, M.
State Enterprise “Uranlikvidrudnik”,
Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources,
Abay 112/12, P.O. Box 76,
020000 Kokshetau, Kazakhstan
Fax: +77162401905
Email: uranlikvidrudnik@mail.kz
Kainarbayev, A.
L.N. Gumilyov Eurasia National University,
Munaitpassova Street 5,
Astana, Kazakhstan
Email: aset_mirabilieus@mail.ru
Kaligozha, A.
L.N. Gumilyov Eurasia National University,
Munaitpassova Street 5,
Astana, Kazakhstan
Kamel, Nour-el-hayet
Commissariat à l’énergie atomique,
Centre de Recherche Nucléaire d’Alger, 2,
Boulevard Frantz Fanon, B.P. 399,
16000 Alger – Gare, Algeria
Fax: +21321433538
Email: kamelhayet@yahoo.fr
Kamel, Nariman H.M.
Atomic Energy Authority (AEA),
Radiation Protection Department,
Nuclear Research Centre, P.O. Box 13759,
Cairo, Egypt
Fax: +20222730261
Email: Narimankamel@hotmail.com
Karigi, A.
Radiation Protection Board, P.O. Box 19841,
00202 Nairobi, Kenya
Fax: +254202714383
Email: alice_karigi@yahoo.co.uk
267
LIST OF PARTICIPANTS
Karlin, Y.
SIA “Radon”, Rostovky Lande, 7, 2/14,
119121 Moscow, Russian Federation
Fax: +74992481941
Email: karlinyr@yandex.ru
Kartoev, S.
Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources,
Kabanbay Batyra Street 22,
Astana, Kazakhstan
Fax: +7717231729769
Kayukov, P.
JSC “Volkovgeologia”, Bogenbay Batyr Street 156,
050012 Almaty, Kazakhstan
Fax: +77272501359
Email: priemnaya-vg@kazatomprom.kz
Kazimbet, B.
Medical Academy, Sary Arka Street 35,
Astana, Kazakhstan
Keltchewsky, A.
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe,
OSCE Centre in Astana, Beibitshilik 10,
010000 Astana, Kazakhstan
Fax: +77172328304
Email: aliya.orazbayeva@osce.org
Kerouanton, D.
AREVA/SGN, 1 Rue des Herons,
78180 Montigry le Bretonneux, France
Fax: +139487737
Email: david.kerouanton@areva.com
Kim, A.
Atomic Energy Committee,
35 Street, Ministries House,
010000 Astana, Kazakhstan
Fax: +77172503073
Email: a.kim@kaec.kz
Kim, N.
CDC/CAR, 41 Kazybek Bi Street,
Park Palace Building,
050010 Almaty, Kazakhstan
Fax: +7272501777
Email: nkim@kz.cdc.gov
Kiyazova, A.
Atomic Energy Committee of the Ministry of
Energy and Mineral Resources, 8th Building,
35th Street, Left Bank District,
010000 Astana, Kazakhstan
Fax: +77172503073
Email: A.Kiyazova@kaec.kz
Kozhakhmetov, N.
Republican Prophylactic-Epidemiological Station,
Ministry of Health,
Astana, Kazakhstan
Kuchynskyi, V.
Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant, m/b 10, 11,
1 Voennykh Stroiteley Street,
07100 Slavutich, Ukraine
Fax: +380447925946
Email: mishchuk@chnpp.gov.ua
268
LIST OF PARTICIPANTS
Kueny, L.
Autorité de Sûreté Nucléaire,
Division de Marseille, 69 Avenue du Prado,
13286 Marseille Cedex 06, France
Fax: +33491836410
Email: laurent.kueny@asn.fr
Kunze, C.
WISUTEC Wismut, Environmental Technologies GmbH,
Jagdschänkestrasse 33,
09117 Chemnitz, Germany
Fax: +493718120175
Email: c.kunze@wisutec.de
Kupchenko, V.
State Geology Enterprise “Urangeology”, 7a, Navoi,
700000 Tashkent, Uzbekistan
Fax: +10998711339774
Email: ecology@albatros.uz
Kusainov, A.
Nuclear Technology Park, Lenin Street 6,
Kurcahtov, Kazakhstan
Kuttigul, T.
L.N. Gumilyov Eurasia, National University,
Munaitpassova Street 5,
Astana, Kazakhstan
Kuturbekov, K.
Interdisciplinary Research Complex,
Ablaihana Street 2/1,
010000 Astana, Kazakhstan
Fax: +87172342078
Email: kkuterbekov@google.com
Kuyanova, Y.
Al-Farabi Kazakh National University,
95a Karasai-Batyr Street,
Almaty 050012, Kazakhstan
Email: k-yelena@mail.ru
Lacroix, E.
AREVA NC/BU Mines/DI/DQSSE, Tour AREVA,
1 place Jean Millier,
92084 Paris la Defense, France
Fax: +33134963902
Email: emilie.lacroix@areva.com
Lavrova, T.
Ukrainian Hydrometeorological Institute,
Nauki Avenue, 37,
03028 Kiev, Ukraine
Fax: +380445255363
Email: lavrova@uhmi.org.ua
Linsley, G.
International Atomic Energy Agency, Private Consultant,
23 Radley Road, Abingdon,
Oxfordshire OX14 3PL,
United Kingdom
Email: gordon_linsley@yahoo.com
Logar, Z.
Pod Plevno 14,
4220 Skofja Loka, Slovenia
Email: logar.zmago@gmail.com
Louvat, D.
International Atomic Energy Agency,
Vienna International Centre, P.O. Box 100
1400 Vienna, Austria
Lu, P.
Energy Resources Australia Pty Ltd,
GPO Box 518,
Darwin, NT 0801, Australia
Fax: +61889425790
Email: ping.lu@riotinto.com
269
LIST OF PARTICIPANTS
Lukashenko, S.
National Nuclear Centre,
Institute of Nuclear Physics, 2 Krasnoameiskaya Street,
07100 Kurchatov, Kazakhstan
Magauov, A.
Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources,
Kabanbai Batyr Street 22,
010000 Astana, Kazakhstan
Fax: +77172976943
Email: kanc@memr.kz
Mansurov, Z.
Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources,
Kabanbai Batyr Street 22, bloc A,
010000 Astana, Kazakhstan
Marignac, Y.
World Information Service on Energy (WISE-Paris),
Bureau – Office 31-33 Rue de la Colonie,
5013 Paris, France
Fax: +3314654793
Email: yves.marignac@wise-paris.org
Marinho, P.R.
Brazilian Nuclear Energy Commission,
Rua General Severiano, 90,
22290-901 Rio de Janeiro, Botafogo, Brazil
Fax: +552121732603
Email: pmarinho@cnen.gov.br
Masalimov, Z.
L.N. Gumilyov Eurasia National University,
Munaitpassova Street 5,
Astana, Kazakhstan
Massenov, C.
Atomic Energy Committee of the Ministry of Energy
and Mineral Resources, 8th Building, 35th Street,
Left Bank District,
010000 Astana, Kazakhstan
Fax: +73272646631
Email: masenov@atom.almaty.kz
Meshin, M.
National Nuclear Centre,
Institute of Atomic Energy, Krasnoarmeyskaya ulitsa 10,
071100 Kurchatov, Kazakhstan
Email: Meshin@nnc.kz
Métivier, J.-M.
Institut de Radioprotection et de Sûreté Nucléaire,
Direction de l’Environnement et de l’Intervention,
Service d’Études sur le Comportement des Radionucléides
dans les Écosystèmes, Cadarache BP3,
13115 Saint Paul les Durance, France
Fax: +33442199143
Email: jean-michel.metivier@irsn.fr
Metzger, W.
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe,
OSCE Centre in Astana, Beibitshilik 10,
010000 Astana, Kazakhstan
Email: willmetz@umich.edu
270
LIST OF PARTICIPANTS
Migliore, G.
Sogin, Centrale Nucleare de Gar, Gliano,
Via Appia km 160.400,
Sessa Aurunca (CE), Italy
Fax: +390823055930
Email: migliore@sogin.it
Minbaev, S.
Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources,
Kabanbai Batyr Street 22,
010000 Astana, Kazakhstan
Fax: +77172976943
Email: kanc@memr.kz
Mirsaidov, U.
Nuclear and Radiation Safety Agency,
Academy of Sciences, 17a Khamza Khakimzoda Street,
Dushanbe, Tajikistan
Fax: +992372215548
Email: m.ulmas@nrsa.tj
Mirzagalieva, A.
L.N. Gumilyov Eurasia National University,
Munaitpassova Street 5,
Astana, Kazakhstan
Monken Fernandes, H.
International Atomic Energy Agency,
Vienna International Centre, P.O. Box 100,
1400 Vienna, Austria
Fax: +43126007
Email: H.Monken-Fernandes@iaea.org
Morenko, S.
Institute of Nuclear Physics of the National Nuclear Centre,
Kurchatov, Kazakhstan
Mukashev, Z.
Prime Minister’s Office,
Astana, Kazakhstan
Mukhametzhanova, A.
Kazakhstan Atomic Energy Committee,
Orynbor Street, Ministries Building, 13 Entrance,
010000 Astana, Kazakhstan
Myrkhaidarov, K.
L.N. Gumilyov Eurasia National University,
Munaitpassova Street 5,
Astana, Kazakhstan
Nurakhmetov, T.
L.N. Gumilyov Eurasia National University,
Munaitpassova Street 5,
Astana, Kazakhstan
Fax: +77172344361
Email: aset_mirabilicus@mail.ru
Nurgaziyev, M.
JSC National Atomic Company “Kazatomprom”,
168, Bogenbay Batyr,
050012 Almaty, Kazakhstan
Fax: +77272503541
Email: MNurgaziev@kazatomprom.kz
Nyssanov,
L.N. Gumilyov Eurasia National University,
Munaitpassova Street 5,
Astana, Kazakhstan
271
LIST OF PARTICIPANTS
O’Kane, M.
O’Kane Consultants Inc., Suite 1740 –
246 Stewart Green S.W., AB. T3H 3C8,
Calgary, Canada
Email: mokane@okc-sk.com
Ortega Fabián, R.
Comision Nacional de Seguridad Nuclear y
Salvaguardias, Barragan 779, Colonia Narvarte,
03020 Mexico City, Mexico
Fax: +525550953293
Email: rfabian@cnsns.gob.mx
Osborne, D.
Linkforce Pty Ltd,
Suite R1A Innovation House Technology Park,
5095 Mawson Lakes S.A., Australia
Email: david.osborne@linkforceau.com
Ostroverkhov, M.
National Nuclear Centre, Lenin Street 6,
Kurchatov, Kazakhstan
Email: max@nnc.kz
Oughton, D.
NATO,
Department of Environmental and Plant Science,
Norwegian University of Life Sciences,
P.O. Box 5003,
1432 Aas, Norway
Fax: +4764948359
Email: Deborah.oughton@umb.no
Paul, M.
WISUTEC Wismut Environmental Technologies GmbH,
Jagdschänkenstrasse 29,
09117 Chemnitz, Germany
Fax: +49378120107
Email: m.paul@wismut.de
Pavel, G.
RosRAO,
24/26 Bolshaya Ordynka Street,
19017 Moscow, Russian Federation
Email: rosrao@mail.ru
Pipovarov, O.
National Nuclear Centre, 6, Tauelsisdik,
071100 Kurchatov, Kazakhstan
Poleshko, A.
Institute of Nuclear Physics,
National Nuclear Centre, 1 Ibragimov Street,
050032 Almaty, Kazakhstan
Fax: +77273865260
Email: anp@inp.kz
Polezhaev, E.
“Ecoservice S”, Eastern Branch,
Vinogradov Street 29/1,
Ust-Kamenogorsk, Kazakhstan
Fax: +87232222666
Email: ukecoservice@mail.ru
Prokhodceva, T.
Nuclear Technology Safety Centre (NTSC),
Liza Chaykina Street 4,
050020 Almaty, Kazakhstan
272
LIST OF PARTICIPANTS
Rahman, R.
University of Liverpool, H3 Philharmonic Court,
Catharine Street, Liverpool, L8 7SD, Merseyside,
United Kingdom
Fax: +441517942866
Email: rrahman@liv.ac.uk
Rakhimzhanov, B.
L.N. Gumilyov Eurasia National University,
Munaitpassova Street 5,
Astana, Kazakhstan
Raposo de Almeida, R.
Federal Fluminense University,
Rua Passo Da Patria 156 S.133,
Niteroi 24.210-240, RJ Brazil
Fax: +552126295354
Email: rraposo@globo.com
Rehman, S.-U.
International Affairs and Training,
Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission, P.O. Box 1114,
Islamabad, Pakistan
Fax: +926429260030
Email: psshafir@yahoo.com
Reisenweaver, D.
Alion Science & Technology,
1475 Central Ave, Suite 200,
Los Alamos 97544, United States of America
Email: dreisenweaver@alionscience.com
Romanenko, O.
Nuclear Technology Safety Centre (NTSC),
Liza Chaykina Street 4,
050020 Almaty, Kazakhstan
Fax: +73272646803
Email: romanenko@ntsc.kz
Rudneva, V.
International Science and Technology Centre (ISCT),
Krasnoproletarskaya ul. 32-34, P.O. Box 20,
127473 Moscow, Russian Federation
Fax: +74999784637
Email: rudneva@istc.ru
Ryabko, L.
L.N. Gumilyov Eurasia National University,
Munaitpassova Street 5,
Astana, Kazakhstan
Ryabkov, V.
ATOMTEX,
5 Gikalo Street,
Minsk 220005, Belarus
Email: e.bystrov@gmail.com
Sadykov, B.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Tanelsizdik Street 20,
Astana, Kazakhstan
Saidou, S.
Institute for Geological and Mining Research (IRGM),
Energy Research Laboratory,
Nuclear Technology Section, B.P. 4110,
Nlongkak-Yaounde, Cameroon
Fax: +23722222431
Email: saidous2002@yahoo.fr
273
LIST OF PARTICIPANTS
Saint-Pierre, S.
World Nuclear Association (WNA),
Carlton House, 221 St. James’s Square,
London – SW1Y 4JH, United Kingdom
Email: saintpierre@world-nuclear.org
Saipov, A.
L.N. Gumilyov Eurasia National University,
Munaitpassova Street 5,
Astana, Kazakhstan
Salbu, B.
Institute of Plant and Environmental Sciences,
Norwegian University of Life Sciences,
P.O. Box 5003,
1432 Aas, Norway
Fax: +4764948359
Email: brit.salbu@umb.no
Salimgereev, M.
Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources,
Kabanbai Batir Street 22, bloc A,
10000 Astana, Kazakhstan
Sametbyatova, D.
Kazakhstan Atomic Energy Committee,
Orynbor Street, Ministries Building, 13 Entrance,
010000 Astana, Kazakhstan
Santinelli, R.
Nucleco S.p.A.,
Via Anguillarese 301,
00123 Rome, Italy
Email: r_santinelli@hotmail.it
Sarsanbaev, K.
Nuclear Technology Park,
Lenin Street 6,
Kurchatov, Kazakhstan
Satibaev, E.
Astana Mayor’s Office,
Astana, Kazakhstan
Saypov, A.
Research Institute of the South Kazakhstan University,
Tauke-khan Avenue, 5,
Chimkent City, Kazakhstan
Schmidt, P.
Wismut GmbH,
Jagdschänkenstrasse 29,
09117 Chemnitz, Germany
Fax: +493718120107
Email: p.schmidt@wismut.de
Serikbaeva, U.
Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources,
Kabanbai Batir Street 22, bloc A,
10000 Astana, Kazakhstan
Seysebayev, A.
Medical Academy,
Sary Arka Street 35,
Astana, Kazakhstan
Seytkul, Z.
Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources,
Kabanbay Batyra Street 22,
Astana, Kazakhstan
Shadrack, A.
Radiation Protection Board,
Hospital Road, P.O. Box 849,
274
LIST OF PARTICIPANTS
40100 Kisumu, Kenya
Fax: +2542020078
Email: shadrackanthony@yahoo.com
Shaho, Y.
Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine,
Grushevskyi Street 5,
01008 Kiev, Ukraine
Fax: +380442552542
Email: shaho@rada.gov.ua
Shaimerdenova, M.
L.N. Gumilyov Eurasia National University,
Munaitpassova Street 5,
Astana, Kazakhstan
Shaldibaev, M.
Kazakhstan Atomic Energy Committee,
Orynbor Street, Ministries Building, 13 Entrance,
010000 Astana, Kazakhstan
Shandala, N.
Federal Medical Biophysical Centre,
Zhivopisnaya 46,
123182 Moscow, Russian Federation
Fax: +74991930585
Email: shandala-fmbc@bk.ru
Sharipov, M.
Atomic Energy Committee,
Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources,
8th Building, 35th Street,
010000 Astana, Kazakhstan
Fax: +77272607220
Email: M.Sharipov@kaec.kz
Shaymardanova, D.
Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources,
Kabanbai Batyr Street 22,
010000 Astana, Kazakhstan
Shiganakov, S.
Kazakhstan Atomic Energy Committee,
Orynbor Street, Ministries Building, 13 Entrance,
010000 Astana, Kazakhstan
Fax: +77172976870
Email: ssb@memr.kz
Shishkov, I.
JSC “Volkovgeology”,
The Central Experience Methodical Expedition,
68 Griboedova Street,
Almaty, Kazakhstan
Email: Vershina@come.kz
Simo, A.
Ministry of Scientific Research and Innovation,
P.O. Box 1457,
Yaoundé, Cameroon
Fax: +23722221336
Email: augsimo@yahoo.fr
Simone, G.
Nucleco S.p.A., Via Anguillarese 301,
00123 Roma, Italy
Email: g.simone@nucleco.it
Sizov, A.
Institute for Safety Problems of NPPS,
National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine,
275
LIST OF PARTICIPANTS
Kirova 36a, Kyiv Region,
Chernobyl, Ukraine
Fax: +380449351209
Email: asizov@gmail.com
Slavik, O.
VUJE, a.s.,
Okruzna 5,
Trnava 91864, Slovakia
Fax: +421335991494
Email: slavik@vuje.sk
Smagulova, A.
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe,
OSCE Centre in Astana, Beibitshilik 10,
010000 Astana, Kazakhstan
Email: asmagulova@osce.org
Smiroldo, E.
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
11555 Rockville Pike, MS O4E12,
20852 Rockville, United States of America
Email: exs5@nrc.gov
Sneve Karpov, M.
Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority,
Grini neringspark 13, P.O. Box 55, Osteras,
1332 Oslo, Norway
Fax: +4767167407
Email: Malgorzata.Sneve@nrpa.no
Solomatina, A.
Chu Laboratory of Ecology St. Koshomberdieva,
722030 Karabalta, Kyrgyzstan
Fax: +996313372477
Email: Solomatina_76@mail.ru
Stegnar, P.
Jozef Stefan Institute, Jamova cesta 39,
1000 Ljubljana, Slovenia
Fax: +38612519385
Email: stegnar@gmail.com
Sugralina, S.
Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources,
Division of Nuclear Energy and External Affairs,
Kabanbay Batyr Street 22,
010000 Astana, Kazakhstan
Fax: +73172976874
Email: sugralina@memr.kz
Takelekov, K.
Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources,
Kabanbay Batyr Street 22,
010000 Astana, Kazakhstan
Fax: +77172976850
Email: takelekov_k@memr.kz
Takenov, Z.
UNDP Office in Kyrgyzstan, 160 Chui Avenue,
72004 Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan
Email: zharas.takenov@undp.org
276
LIST OF PARTICIPANTS
Tazhibaeva, I.
National Nuclear Centre, Institute of Atomic Energy,
Krasnoarmeyskaya ulitsa 10,
071100 Kurchatov, Kazakhstan
Tolongutov, B. M.
The Chu Ecological Laboratory,
Koshomberdieva Street 1A,
722030 Kara-Balta, Kyrgyzstan
Fax: +996313372477
Email: ecolabug@yahoo.com
Torgoev, I.
Kyrgyzstan National Academy of Sciences,
Scientific Engineering Centre GEOPRIBOR,
98 Mederowa Street,
Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan
Email: geopribor@mail.ru
Tulegenov, M.
Atomic Energy Committee of the Ministry of Energy
and Mineral Resources, 8th Building, 35th Street,
010000 Astana, Kazakhstan
Fax: +77172503073
Email: M.Tulegenov@kaec.kz
Uralbekov, B.
Al-Farabi Kazakh National University,
95a Karasay Batyr Street,
Almaty 050012, Kazakhstan
Fax: +77272923731
Email: bulat.ural@gmail.com
Usupov, U.
Government House,
Bishkek 720003, Kyrgyzstan
Fax: +996312626359
Email: usen@mail.gov.kg
Van der Tembel, K.
Embassy of the Netherlands in Kazakhstan,
Astana, Kazakhstan
Van Velzen, L.
Nuclear Research and Consultancy Group,
Utrechtseweg 310, P.O. Box 9034,
6812 AR Arnhem, Netherlands
Fax: +31263568538
Email: vanvelzen@nrg.eu
Varhegyi, A.
MECSEK-ŐKO Zrt.,
Esytergar Lajos u. 19,
7633 Pecs, Hungary
Fax: +3672564708
Email: varhegyiandras@mecsekoko.hu
Vasilyeu, P.
ATOMTEX,
5 Gikalo Street,
220005 Minsk, Belarus
Email: vasiliev@atomtex.com
Velicu, S.-O.
National Commission for Nuclear Activities Control,
14, Libertatii Boulevard, P.O. Box 42-4,
050706 Bucharest, Romania
Fax: +40213163244
Email: sovelicu@cncan.ro
277
LIST OF PARTICIPANTS
Vorobiev, S.
International Science and Technology Centre (ISTC),
Krasnoproletarskaya ul, 32-34, P.O. Box 20,
127473 Moscow, Russian Federation
Fax: +74999781331
Email: vorobiev@istc.ru
Vurim, A.
National Nuclear Centre, Institute of Atomic Energy,
Krasnoarmeyskaya ulitsa 10,
071100 Kurchatov, Kazakhstan
Fax: +77225123125
Email: vurim@nnc.kz
Walker, S.
EPA
14212 Golden Hook Road,
Boyds, MD 20841, United States of America
Fax: +7036039132
Email: Walker.Stuart@epamail.epa.gov
Walker, N.
UNDP Office in Kyrgyzstan,
160 Chui Avenue,
72004 Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan
Fax: +996312611217
Email: neal.walker@undp.org
Wellman, D.
Pacific Northwest National Laboratory,
902 Battelle Blvd., P.O. Box 999,
MS K3-62, Richland, WA 99352,
United States of America
Fax: +15093724600
Email: Dawn.Wellman@pnl.gov
Yakovlev, I.
Centre of the Radiation Technology and
Technical Diagnosis,
Almaty, Kazakhstan
Yakovlev, V.
National Nuclear Centre,
Institute of Atomic Energy,
Krasnoarmeyskaya ulitsa 10,
071100 Kurchatov, Kazakhstan
Yeh, G.-T.
University of Central Florida,
4000 Central Florida Blvd,
32816 Orlando, Florida, United States of America
Fax: +14078233315
Email: gyeh@mail.ucf.edu
Yeligbayeva, G.
Kazakhstan Atomic Energy Committee,
Orynbor Street, Ministries Building, 13 Entrance,
010000 Astana, Kazakhstan
Fax: +77172503073
Email: G.Yeligbayeva@kaec.kz
Yessenkulova, A.
L.N. Gumilyov Eurasia National University,
Munaitpassova Street 5,
Astana, Kazakhstan
278
LIST OF PARTICIPANTS
Yunusov, M.
Deputy Director General
State Enterprise Vostokredmet
Ulitsa Oplanchuka 12
Sogdiyskaya Oblast
735730 Chkalovsk, Tajikistan
Fax: 00992 3451 50945
E-mail: yunusov2001@mail.ru
Zaytceva, I.
L.N. Gumilyov Eurasia National University,
Munaitpassova Street 5,
Astana, Kazakhstan
Zhantikin, T.
Kazakhstan Atomic Energy Committee,
Orynbor Street, Ministries Building, 13 Entrance,
010000 Astana, Kazakhstan
Fax: +77172503073
Email: t.zhantikin@kaec.kz
Zhetbaeva, S.
Kazakhstan Atomic Energy Committee,
Orynbor Street, Ministries Building, 13 Entrance,
010000 Astana, Kazakhstan
Zhumabaev, A.
L.N. Gumilyov Eurasia National University,
Munaitpassova Street 5,
Astana, Kazakhstan
Zhumabaev, S.
Prime-Minister’s Office,
Astana, Kazakhstan
Zhumabaeva, G.
Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources,
Kabanbai Batyr Street 22, bloc A,
010000 Astana, Kazakhstan
Zhumagaliev, A.
Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources,
Kabanbai Batyr Avenue, 22
010000 Astana, Kazakhstan
Zhunusbek, B.
Nuclear Technology Park,
Lenin Street 6,
Kurchatov, Kazakhstan
Zhunussova, T.
Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority,
Grini neringspark 13, P.O. Box 55,
1332 Osteras, Oslo, Norway
Email: tamara.zhunussova@nrpa.no
Zinger, I.
Facilia AB,
Gustavslundsvägen 151C,
16751 Bromma, Sweden
Fax: +468259665
Email: irene@facilia.se
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