MCKENZIE/O’BRIEN
TSDC
RELATIONS
RELATIONS FILE
RELATIONS FILE ............................................................................................................................ 1
CONSULT CP .................................................................................................................................. 2
1NC – China ............................................................................................................................... 3
EXTENSIONS ................................................................................................................................... 5
Cooperation Solvency ................................................................................................................ 6
AT: China ≠Cooperation .......................................................................................................... 8
Net Benefit Ext. .......................................................................................................................... 9
AFF ............................................................................................................................................... 10
No Solvency .............................................................................................................................. 11
Solvency Turn .......................................................................................................................... 13
RELATIONS DISADVANTAGE ........................................................................................................ 14
1NC – China ............................................................................................................................. 15
EXTENSIONS ................................................................................................................................. 18
Uniqueness Ext......................................................................................................................... 19
Link Ext. ................................................................................................................................... 20
I/L Ext. ...................................................................................................................................... 22
AFF ............................................................................................................................................... 23
Non-Unique .............................................................................................................................. 24
No Impact ................................................................................................................................. 25
1
MCKENZIE/O’BRIEN
TSDC
RELATIONS
CONSULT CP
2
MCKENZIE/O’BRIEN
TSDC
RELATIONS
1NC – CHINA
PLAN TEXT: THE UNITED STATES FEDERAL GOVERNMENT SHOULD ENTER INTO PRIOR BINDING CONSULTATION
WITH THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA ABOUT ______________________________.
AND, CONSULTATION WITH CHINA OVER LATIN AMERICA HAS EMPIRICAL PRECEDENCE
ELLIS ’12 (Dr. R. Evan Ellis is a professor of national security studies, modeling, gaming, and simulation with the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, with a
research focus on Latin America’s relationships with external actors, including China, Russia, and Iran. Dr. Ellis holds a Ph.D. in political science with a specialization
in comparative politics. “The United States, Latin America and China: A “Triangular Relationship”?” May 2012
http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/IAD8661_China_Triangular0424v2e-may.pdf, DD: 6/30/13 RAM/COB)
In April 2006, then-US Assistant Secretary for Western Hemisphere Affairs Thomas Shannon traveled to the
People’s Republic of China (PRC) for a landmark meeting with his Chinese counterpart Zeng Gang, head of the Foreign
Ministry Department of Latin American Affairs. It marked the first-ever formal consultation between the countries’
policymakers on Latin America. It also served as implicit recognition by both of a “triangular” relationship
among China, the United States and Latin America in which the interests and actions of each party in the region
were acknowledged to potentially affect the others. This interaction, officially designated a “subchapter” of the ongoing US-China Strategic
Economic Dialogue, implicitly put the weight of diplomacy behind the concept that interactions among the United States, the PRC and the countries of Latin America
could be conceived as a “triangle.” The first major reference to this “triangular relationship” was “Latin America, China, and the United States: a Hopeful Triangle,” the
brief 2007 essay by Juan Gabriel Tokatlian. However, it was arguably Barbara Stallings’ 2008 article, “The US-China-Latin America Triangle: Implications for the
Future,” that most definitively introduced the concept; it appeared in China’s Expansion into the Western Hemisphere, the first English-language book by a major
publisher on the China- Latin America relationship.3Since that time, the term has been used in other significant works on China’s engagement with the region,
including the January 2011 study “China, Latin America, and the United States: The New Triangle,” published by the Woodrow Wilson Center, the Institute of the
Americas and the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.
MOREOVER, CHINA WANTS TO COOPERATE WITH US OVER LATIN AMERICA
ELLIS ’12 (Dr. R. Evan Ellis is a professor of national security studies, modeling, gaming, and simulation with the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, with a
research focus on Latin America’s relationships with external actors, including China, Russia, and Iran. Dr. Ellis holds a Ph.D. in political science with a specialization
in comparative politics. “The United States, Latin America and China: A “Triangular Relationship”?” May 2012
http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/IAD8661_China_Triangular0424v2e-may.pdf, DD: 6/30/13 RAM/COB)
Despite references to a China-US-Latin America triangle in press accounts and academic literature, the term is not a well analyzed academic construct, making it more
of a label whose use is associated with a certain level of “intuitive validity.” At a superficial level, the logic of the term proceeds from the close historical linkage of the
United States and Latin America, both in a positive and a negative sense. It
is difficult to talk about the PRC’s significant expansion in
the region without reflexively thinking of the reaction of US policymakers or the possible impacts on US
corporations and interests. Ironically, China’s own political traditions and strategic interests also lead it to pay particular attention to the United States as it
engages with Latin America. Despite emphasis on a “south-south” approach to its interaction with developing countries,
such as those of Latin America, the PRC has proceeded very cautiously when forming relations. This can be seen, to
some degree, as implicit recognition of the region as a US “sphere of influence” and mirrors the PRC’s likely desire to see the United States treat Asia as a “Chinese
sphere of influence.” Although
the PRC has publicly rejected the concept of “G-2” diplomacy, coordinating with the
United States to “administer” the current global order, its strategic dialogue with the United States over Latin
America gave the appearance that it was willing to conduct precisely such “coordination.”
3
MCKENZIE/O’BRIEN
TSDC
RELATIONS
FINALLY, COOPERATIVE US-SINO RELATIONSHIP KEY TO SOLVE MAJOR WORLD PROBLEMS – CONFLICT, CLIMATE
CHANGE, TERRORISM, PANDEMICS, PROLIFERATION, ETC
GARRETT ’10 (Banning Garrett, Director of the Asia Program at the Atlantic Council and senior fellow for innovation and global trends for the Atlantic
Council’s Strategic Foresight Initiative, Atlantic Council, “U.S.-China Relations: Gone Fishin’, December 2, 2010, http://www.acus.org/new_atlanticist/us-chinarelations-gone-fishin’ Date Accessed: 6/27/13 RAM/COB)
Voicing our concerns about our policy differences is essential as we continue to struggle with China on a wide range of bilateral and international issues. But
we
also must try to keep the larger strategic picture in the forefront and try to land the elusive “big one” — a more
cooperative U.S.-China relationship to deal with the great strategic challenges of the 21st century. While China and the
United States will always be reluctant partners at best, leaders of both countries have acknowledged that we are in the same boat when it comes to critical 21st century
challenges. We
are compelled to pull together to maintain a growing and stable global economy, mitigate climate
change and adapt to its effects, ensure energy security and transition to a global, low-carbon economy, move to
more sustainable economic models as resource scarcities loom as billions of people seek to join the global
middle class — and combat terrorism, proliferation, piracy, international crime, pandemics, failing states and a
host of other non-traditional threats. This summer's unprecedented heat and forest fires in Russia and the massive, destructive floods in Pakistan may
be the most recent warning signs that global warming is already altering our planet’s climate, causing extreme weather and other first-order effects that will have
cascading impacts on virtually all countries. The
implications for the global economy, societies and governments and the
security of nations and peoples are potentially destabilizing and even catastrophic. The United States and China — the two
largest economic powers — will not be immune from the impact of climate change. Nor, as the biggest energy consumers and producers of greenhouse gases, will they
escape blame from the rest of the world if they fail to act and to cooperate. In the United States, there is growing anxiety about the pace of shifting power and a range of
Chinese behaviors that are perceived as Beijing seeking to challenge a wide range of U.S. interests. The Chinese leadership, for its part, and especially elements of the
People’s Liberation Army, is flush with a sense of their country’s rapidly rising power, which has been turbo-boosted in the last two years by its superior performance
in the global financial crisis. Beijing seems to be emphasizing narrow national interests and making a new push to gain recognition for an expanding list of “core
interests” which now apparently includes China’s territorial claims in the South China Sea. The Chinese seem reluctant to place a priority on their “core interests” in
ensuring their prosperity and security by cooperating with other nations, especially the United States, on long-term global challenges and threats. We
should ask
what the prospects are for human civilization in this century as well as for American and Chinese interests if the
United States and China do not cooperate on global challenges — and even more ominously, if they have a
highly competitive and antagonistic relationship, much less engage in actual military conflict. We may not have much
time to fish in the depleting stream of potential cooperation. The United States and China need to change course soon. The two giants now
seem caught in an eddy of deepening suspicion of each other’s intentions — despite the stated conviction of the leaders of both countries that they need to work
together.
4
MCKENZIE/O’BRIEN
TSDC
RELATIONS
EXTENSIONS
5
MCKENZIE/O’BRIEN
TSDC
RELATIONS
COOPERATION SOLVENCY
TRILATERAL COMMUNICATION WITH CHINA-US-LATIN AMERICA KEY
XIAOYANG 6/1/13 (Chen Xiaoyang, Institute of Latin American Studies, China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, China-US Focus, “A New
Chapter on China-Latin American Cooperation”, June 1, 2013, http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/a-new-chapter-on-china-latin-american-cooperation/ DD:
6/30/13 RAM/COB)
Besides, on his way back from Latin America, Xi will meet President Obama in California. With
increased turbulence in the world and huge
uncertainty over regional hotspots, it is completely necessary for top Chinese and American leaders to
communicate with each other at appropriate times. There is reason to believe that China and the US can
cooperate in regions where their interests seem to conflict. For example, the US was quite disturbed by increased Chinese presence in
Latin America in the past decade and even mapped countermeasures. However, experience suggests that China-Latin America political, economic, trade and humanities
cooperation has not obstructed the presence of any third-party power in Latin America. On the contrary, it has contributed to regional economic prosperity and social
stability and benefited US companies. In
this connection, China and the US should actually experiment on trilateral
cooperation with Latin America and take it as a new way of developing a new type of big power relations
between them.
COOPERATION WITH CHINA KEY FOR ECONOMIC ENGAGEMENT IN LATIN AMERICA
HAIBIN 6/23/13 (Niu Haibin, Research Fellow, Shanghai Institutes for International Studies, China-US Focus, “Latin America’s Rising Status in the Sino-US
Relationship”, June 23, 2013 http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/latin-americas-rising-status-in-the-sino-us-relationship/ DD: 6/27/13 RAM/COB)
Now, it
is necessary to understand how this strengthening interest by the US and China in Latin America could
impact the Sino-US relationship as well as Latin America as a whole. From a geopolitical perspective, both sides have some
arguments to dilute each other’s influence globally. However, policy influence of such arguments is very limited. It is natural for both world powers’ diplomatic
agendas to intersect. One noteworthy argument from Chinese side is that China should enhance its engagement with regions outside of Asia as the US pivot to the Asia
Pacific attempts to contain China. This argument should be interpreted to explore the diplomatic space available for China as a global power rather than to counter US
hegemony. Also, China needs to understand the recent intensive American engagement with Latin America by following the same logic. In fact, both
countries
demonstrated their pragmatic spirit and economic-oriented approach during their recent engagements with Latin
America. The most cited achievement about President Xi's visit to Mexico was that China agreed to resume imports of Mexican pork and to import tequila. Similar
review was also given to President Obama’s visit to Mexico by arguing the trip was to focus on economic cooperation rather than drug issues. This is a good
posture considering that no Latin American country wants to choose side between the US and China.
Ultimately, Latin American countries benefit from cooperation with the world’s two largest markets. Although
both countries are trying to avoid geopolitical competition, it is important to manage their interaction in Latin
America. At the bilateral level, the United States and China have held several strategic dialogues on Latin American affairs since 2006. The purpose of
the dialogue is to enhance mutual trust and prevent miscalculations by interpreting their engagements with Latin
America. This continual dialogue can help interpret why the US government holds a positive attitude to China’s increasing ties with Latin America despite some
very conservative and suspicious attitudes in the US. The US has showed its support to both China’s permanent observer status in the Organization of American States
and China’s membership at the Inter-American Development Bank. To
build a more positive and constructive interaction among the
US, China and Latin America, the key is to hold a mutually beneficial and win-win attitude to the trilateral
relationship. First, to respect the growing independence of Latin America per se is important for both the US and China in furthering their engagement with the
region. Second, both the US and China should build a development partnership to address Latin America’s sustainable
development concerns. In doing so, the region has more chances to see a more hopeful future.
6
MCKENZIE/O’BRIEN
TSDC
RELATIONS
US-CHINA ON VERGE OF NEW RELATIONSHIP OVER LATIN AMERICA – COOPERATION IS KEY
XINHUA 5/31/13 (Xinhua News Agency, BBC Monitoring International Reports, “Chinese president's upcoming US visit may help dispel misunderstanding”,
May 31, 2013, http://www.accessmylibrary.com/article-1G1-332010289/chinese-president-upcoming-us.html DD: 6/27/13 RAM/COB)
Instead of competing with other world powers for the so-called "spheres of influence," Beijing is seeking
pragmatic cooperation for mutual benefit when building rapport with Latin American countries, which is conducive to
the region's social stability and economic growth. In the Caribbean and Latin America, Xi will show a world vision which prefers common prosperity instead of oldfashioned alliance.¶ China's relations with Latin America have already entered a fast-growing track with a 100-fold increase in bilateral trade since 1990, as China has
already become the region's second-largest trade partner. In China's global economic map, the region is gaining prominence as it emerged as a major destination for
China's growing overseas investment. Scheduled next week in California, the Xi-Obama meeting will be innovative in several ways. It is rare in history that a Chinese
president holds talks with his U.S. counterpart less than three months after assuming office. The
timing and the form of the summit will also
be unprecedented throughout the records of China-U.S. ties. Such special arrangements display the growing
maturity of the ties between the world's largest developing nation and largest developed nation. Of course, the two
leaders will discuss urgent issues such as recent challenges in the Asia-Pacific region, but they are also expected to take time to talk about
laying the groundwork for forging a new type of inter-power relations. From the Chinese perspective, a new type of relationship
between the two nations calls for a new strategic concept for them to see each other as opportunities rather than threats, and materialize the opportunities via further
cooperation. As the world's top two economies, China and the United States are the two crucial variables in a fast-changing global landscape, both having huge
responsibilities to the peace and prosperity of the human race. The two sides need to take a long-term and full-range view of their relationship and its possible impact. It
cannot be denied that the two countries have certain doubts over each other's strategic intentions, with Washington fearing its global status overtaken while Beijing
always wondering about the true purpose of Obama's so-called "Asia Pivot" and "rebalancing." To reduce suspicion and build trust, it is vital to keep the channels of
communication always open, especially at the top level. The
informal meeting between Xi and Obama will provide a golden
chance for them to know each other better in person and help dispel misunderstanding between the two sides.
CHINA AND THE US SHOULD COLLABORATE ON KEY ISSUES.
GARTHOFF, 97 (Raymond L Garthoff, specialist on arms control, the Cold War, the former Soviet Union and NATO and former U.S. ambassador to Bulgaria
and has also advised the State Department on missile treaties, “Relations With the Great Powers: Russia, Japan, China”, The Brookings Review, Spring 1997,
http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/1997/03/spring-globalgovernance-garthoff DD: 6/27/13 RAM/COB)
Lasting improvement in Sino-American relations will require that the two countries manage these problems
before new issues arise. How might this be done? Agreement on the terms for China’s accession to the World Trade Organization would be the single
biggest step the two countries could take to consolidate their new relationship. For Beijing, admission to the WTO would burnish China’s standing as a major
international power and would significantly enhance its prospects for receiving permanent unconditional most-favored-nation status from the United States. For
Washington, Chinese membership in the WTO would win Beijing’s commitment to reforms that would ultimately provide greater international access to the
Chinese market. China’s membership in the WTO would also make possible Taiwan's accession to the same organization as a separate customs territory–a major
breakthrough in Taiwan's quest for enhanced international status. China and the United States should also agree to collaborate on issues where their national
interests coincide. Cooperative
measures to promote peace on the Korean peninsula, security in the Middle East,
environmental protection, and legal reforms in China are example of such an approach.
CONTINUED CONSULTATION IS KEY TO MAINTAINING HEALTHY RELATIONS WITH CHINA.
WENFENG ’07 (Wenfeng Wang, Research with China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, June 20, 2007, “China-US dialogue best way to deal
with issues”, China Daily, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2007-06/20/content_898065.htm DD: 6/28/13 RAM/COB)
It is fair to say steady and healthy development of Sino-US relations significantly benefits both countries,
while any problems in their bilateral ties are likely to threaten their interests. Many people believe China-US ties are this century’s most important bilateral
relationship. Currently
the two countries are making progress in mutual understanding over these issues thanks
to candid exchanges during strategic dialogues. Holding a dialogue over emerging issues helps both sides
better grasp each other’s priorities, better understand each other’s other thinking, operation and policymaking
process.
7
MCKENZIE/O’BRIEN
TSDC
RELATIONS
AT: CHINA ≠COOPERATION
CHINA AND US HAVE AGREED TO CONSULTATIONS
XINHUA ’12 (Xinhua News Agency, “China, U.S. agree to hold more consultations”, May 5, 2012, http://english.sina.com/china/2012/0504/464727.html DD:
6/30/13 RAM/COB)
China and the United States here on Friday agreed to hold a series of talks, covering security, Asia-Pacific affairs, human rights and
regional policies, according to a list of achievements issued from the fourth round of China-U.S. Strategic and Economic Dialogue. China and the United
States expect a fresh round of China-U.S. Strategic Security Dialogue will be held in 2013. The second China-U.S.
Strategic Security Dialogue was held on Wednesday in Beijing. The two sides expressed willingness to make joint efforts and further
develop the dialogue mechanism, and enhance mutual trust between the two countries. To safeguard the common interests
and face common challenges in the Asia-Pacific region, China and the United States will hold another consultation regarding China-U.S. Asia-Pacific affairs in the
second half of 2012. Meanwhile, on the basis of equality and mutual respect, China and the United States agreed to hold a human rights dialogue this summer in
Washington. In
addition, the two countries decided to hold a series of consultations on regional issues, including the
Middle East, Africa, Latin America, South Asia and Central Asia. But the date and places of those engagements are to be confirmed.
During the two-day dialogues, both China and the United States reiterated they are willing to strengthen communication
and cooperation on major international security and other non-proliferation issues. Both sides give strong backing to the
maritime security dialogue mechanism which is due to be built by the Maritime Safety Administration of China and the United States Coast Guard, the first dialogue of
which will be held this autumn.
CHINA AND US COOPERATING NOW ON SECURITY ISSUES
XINHUA 6/7/13 (Xinhua News Agency, “China, U.S. hold security, arms consultation”, June 7, 2013, http://english.people.com.cn/90883/8275726.html DD:
6/30/13 RAM/COB)
China and the United States have held their sixth consultation on strategic security and multilateral arms control
in Beijing, according to a Thursday statement from the Foreign Ministry. The statement said both sides exchanged views on building
relations, regional issues and multilateral arms control issues. The two sides will continue to conduct dialogue and
cooperation on the basis of mutual respect, equality and mutual benefit, it said. They agreed to enhance mutual
trust, boost the development of bilateral relations and jointly work for both global and regional peace and
stability, the statement said.
AN ESTABLISHED CONSULT MECHANISM FOR US-CHINA-LATIN AMERICA ISSUES ALREADY EXISTS
WANMING ’12 (Yang Wanming, director-general of the Department of Latin American and Caribbean Affairs of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, Interview with
China Daily News, January 17, 2012, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2012diplomats/2012-01/17/content_14469266.htm DD: 6/30/13 RAM/COB)
In recent years, the
independence of Latin American countries is growing and its economic growth momentum
becomes more diverse than before. The rapid development of China-Latin America relations is on the basis of
mutual benefit and win-win for both sides and is within the needs of Latin American countries' diversified diplomacy and development strategy. It will not only
benefit development of both, but also contribute to the world's stability and development . China and the US have already established a
consultation mechanism on Latin America, and through four different consultations, the two parties have enhanced their mutual trust on this issue.
And the US has repeatedly stressed in their consultations that strengthening relations between China and Latin
American countries will be good for Latin America's stability and development.
8
MCKENZIE/O’BRIEN
TSDC
RELATIONS
NET BENEFIT EXT.
POWER STRUGGLES OVER LATIN AMERICA ARE INEVITABLE, SO COOPERATION IS KEY TO QUELL CONFLICT
HONGBO 6/3/13 (Sun Hongbo, associate research fellow at the Institute of Latin American Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Global Times, “Latin
America arena for global powers”, June 3, 2013, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/786399.shtml#.UdA805V_1WR DD: 6/27/13 RAM/COB)
It is also unavoidable that Latin America has become an arena for another round of power struggles. The US is
trying to regain its influence in Latin America, while Russia, India and Japan, no matter whether out of
consideration of Latin America's resources and market or the need to readjust their foreign policy, are also
looking to take a share. Both traditional powers and emerging economies are looking for leverage in the region. Every major power is speculating on the
changes inside Latin America. The dominant US position in this region has started to decline. Brazil is a rising power, but it is uncertain
whether it can establish leadership in this region. Meanwhile, left-wing governments in Latin America are being challenged over the sustainability of their policies. And
most Latin American countries are readjusting their foreign policies for a diverse system of foreign relations.
Major powers are reevaluating their interests and readjusting their policies in this region to compete for
influence. But whether they can live up to their own expectations depends on their national strength and future growth, and more importantly, whether they can
balance their interests with Latin America's. Both China and the US have denied any intention of rivalry in Latin America, but
the thriving relationship between China and Latin America has already impacted the traditional US influence
over this region. Latin America has become an unavoidable topic if China and the US want to establish a new pattern of relationship. Setting up
mechanisms to enhance communication, negotiation and mutual trust between both countries over this region
should be a top priority. More challenges than opportunities will prevail in the future relationship between the US and Latin America. The challenges are
mostly left over by history, such as immigration, drug dealing and US policies toward Cuba and Venezuela. Besides, its domestic policy has blocked the development
of its Latin America policy. There might be a strong resistance if the US wants to improve its relationship with Latin America. For China, it will embrace more
opportunities than challenges in this area. Although frictions have taken place in Sino-Latin American economic relationship, they are auspicious signals that the
relationship between China and Latin America is in a booming development. These problems, produced by prosperity, will also be addressed amid such development.
Both China and the US are seeking ways to foster a constructive mechanism, so that trilateral cooperation
among China, the US, and Latin America will be achieved. Nonetheless, the trust deficit is the major
obstruction that blocks both countries to deepen this cooperation. And China also needs to learn how to better
respect Latin America's interests. More importantly, all three parties, including China, the US and Latin
America, have to find out feasible areas of cooperation.
CONFLICT WITH CHINA OVER US UNILATERAL ACTION IS EXTREMELY PROBABLE
MILLER ’11 (Paul Miller, political scientist at the nonprofit, nonpartisan Rand Corp, former CIA analyst, assistant professor of International Security Affairs at
the National Defense University in Washington, D.C., “How Dangerous Is the World? Part II”, December 16, 2011,
http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/12/16/how_dangerous_is_the_world_part_ii?wp_login_redirect=0 DD: 6/28/13 RAM/COB)
China in 2011 is even more clearly a danger equal to or greater than the danger it posed during the Cold War.
We
went through two phases with China: from 1950 to 1972 the United States and China were declared enemies and fought to a very bloody stalemate in the Sino-America
battles of the Korean War, but the overt hostility was less dangerous because of China's crippling economic weakness. From 1972 to 1989, the U.S. and China lessened
their hostility considerably, but China's power also began to grow quickly as it liberalized its economy and modernized its armed forces. In other words, in phase one,
China was hostile but weak; in phase two, more friendly but also more powerful. We
have never faced a China that was both powerful and
hostile. That is exactly the scenario that may be shaping up. China's economic and military modernization has clearly made it one of the
great powers of the world today, including nuclear weapons, a ballistic-missile capability, and aspirations for a blue-water navy. At the same time, Chinese
policymakers, like their Russian counterparts, continue to talk openly about their intent to oppose American unipolarity,
revise the global order, and command a greater share of global prestige and influence. There are several
flashpoints where their revisionist aims might lead to conflict: Taiwan, the Korean Peninsula, the South China
Sea, etc. And U.S. relations with China are prone to regular downward spikes (as during the Tiananmen Square Massacre in
1989, the 1996 cross-straits crisis, the accidental embassy bombing in 1999, the EP3 incident in 2001, the anti-satellite missile test in 2007, and the current trade and
A militarized conflict with China is more likely today, with
greater consequences, than at almost any point since the Korean War.
currency dispute, to say nothing of our annual weapons sales to Taiwan).
9
MCKENZIE/O’BRIEN
TSDC
RELATIONS
AFF
10
MCKENZIE/O’BRIEN
TSDC
RELATIONS
NO SOLVENCY
RECENT SUMMIT DOESN’T EQUATE TO STRONG RELATIONS – PROVES DIALOGUE DOESN’T WORK.
LAFRANCHI 6/7/13 (Howard LaFranchi, Christian Science Monitor, “US-China summit gamble: Can relaxed format boost rapport over rivalry?”, June 7,
2013, http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Foreign-Policy/2013/0607/US-China-summit-gamble-Can-relaxed-format-boost-rapport-over-rivalry DD: 6/30/13 RAM/COB)
Skeptics of the importance of personal rapport between world leaders are dubious that the southern California
summit this weekend between President Obama and China’s new president, Xi Jinping, will amount to much.
Even though the two leaders are expected to discuss everything from military and corporate cybersecurity to North Korea, territorial disputes in the South China Sea,
and US-China trade, the summit’s emphasis on building their personal relationship leaves doubters unimpressed. “If we
actually saw a substantial agreement on countering cyberthreats … or saw the Chinese throttle back on territorial claims, that would be significant,” says Dean Cheng, a
research fellow in Chinese political and security affairs at the Heritage Foundation in Washington. But Mr. Cheng, who insists that “tone”
and whether or
not two leaders get along matter little in defending national interests, says he anticipates little of substance from
the summit at the Sunnylands estate in Rancho Mirage, Calif.
SUMMIT DID NOTHING FOR IMPROVING RELATIONS
WHITE 6/11/13 (Hugh White, professor of strategic studies at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, ANU, The Age, “Road to good relations a long and
hard one”, June 11, 2013, http://www.theage.com.au/comment/road-to-good-relations-a-long-and-hard-one-20130610-2nzz2.html DD: 6/30/13 RAM/COB)
An important opportunity was lost at last weekend's Sunnylands Summit to build a durable, peaceful
relationship between America and China. Presidents Obama and Xi agreed on the urgent need to avoid rivalry
and discord, but revealed diametrically opposed ideas of how that can be done, and hours of talk did nothing to
bring them closer. This was the first time leaders of America and China have had such long and informal conversations, and the fact they have done so - and
plan to do it again - is welcome. But meetings alone achieve nothing and the differences of approach between Obama and Xi were starkly clear over the weekend.
While both spoke of their hopes for good relations, Barack Obama focused on specific concerns on which America wants China to act - human rights, North Korea,
cyber security and trade. He thinks better US-China relations are best built one matter at a time, essentially by China doing what America wants. Xi Jinping took exactly
the opposite approach. Rather than focus on specific questions, he spoke of the US-China relationship as a whole. He repeatedly spoke of his hopes to build ''a new
model'' of power relations between the two countries. ''China and the United States must find a new path'', he said. ''One that is different from the inevitable
confrontation and conflict between the major countries of the past. And that is to say the two sides must work together to build a new model of major country
relationships''. For Xi, then, tensions between Washington and Beijing will not be fixed simply by addressing specific topics one by one. It requires a fundamental
change in the underlying structure of the relationship. It was therefore Xi rather than Obama who drew the obvious but ambitious parallel between their meeting and
Nixon's historic journey to Beijing to meet Mao in 1972, which really did create a new model of US-China relations. Xi drew the parallel because he hopes he and
Obama can redefine the foundations of the US-China relationship as radically as did Nixon and Mao 40 years ago. He wants to replace the Nixon-Mao model because it
requires China to accept American strategic primacy in Asia. That does not fit what Xi calls the ''Chinese Dream'' of regaining its traditional position of leadership in the
region. Unfortunately, Xi has not explained what he'd like to replace the old Nixon-Mao model with. He wants America to concede much more power and influence to
China, but it is not clear how much, or on what terms. Xi said during the weekend that the Pacific was big enough for both of them, but this tells us little about how
much influence he is willing for America to maintain on China's side of that wide ocean. Obama didn't mention Nixon and Mao precisely because he does not want to
emulate their achievement by fundamentally changing the basis of the US-China relationship. He wants things to stay as they are, with America in charge. What's
worrying is that this difference in approach reflects the fundamental incompatibility of their underlying objectives towards one another and their roles in Asia. America
wants to retain strategic leadership in Asia, and China wants to displace it. Both are sincere about wanting peace and stability but have radically different views of what
that will look like and how to get there. Meanwhile, new barriers to co-operation keep appearing. The latest is America's preoccupation with what
US national security adviser Tom Donilon called ''cyber-enabled economic theft - theft of intellectual property and other kinds of property in the public and private
realm in the United States by entities based in China.'' He told reporters after the summit that this was now such an important topic to the US that it threatened the entire
relationship. It was, he said, ''now really at the centre of the relationship'', and ''inconsistent with the kind of relationship that we want to build with China''. ''If it's not
addressed, if it continues to be this direct theft of United States property, this was going to be a very difficult problem in the economic relationship and was going to be
an inhibitor to the relationship really reaching its full potential.'' These strong words suggest the US has adopted a rather remarkable policy. It is willing to threaten the
whole future US-China relationship over concerns about this category of cyber crime of which Donilon was not willing to provide concrete examples. No doubt such
crimes are real, and genuinely significant, but are they more important to America than a good long-term relationship with China? Hardly. And
it seems Xi
did nothing more than note Obama's concerns. So if, as seems likely, Beijing does nothing to stop the cyber crimes, what exactly will Obama do?
My bet is nothing. He has set yet another red line he cannot enforce, and looked shrill and weak to the Chinese as a result. So there is not much good news out of
Sunnylands. A
bold and confident new Chinese leader and his charming and intelligent counterpart can meet and
talk for many hours in a relaxed and beautiful setting and still find new things to disagree about, and reach no
consensus about how to keep the world's most important relationship off the rocks.
11
MCKENZIE/O’BRIEN
TSDC
RELATIONS
CHINA WON’T BELIEVE THE CP IS A GENUINE GESTURE - CHINESE BELIEFS ABOUT US MOTIVATIONS MEAN PLAN
SPUN AS CONTAINMENT NOT AS CONCESSION.
LIEBERTHAL ’10 (Ken Lieberthal, Director John Thornton China Center Brookings Institution, 2010, “Discussion of THE PERILS OF PROXIMITY: CHINAJAPAN SECURITY RELATIONS” Brookings Institution, October 18, 2010 http://www.brookings.edu/events/2010/1018_china_japan.aspx accessed tm 12/24)
MR. LIEBERTHAL: Well, it clearly is a dangerous dynamics. It’s interesting. If you go back to President Obama’s trip to Beijing last November and look at the joint
statement that was issued there, that was the most authoritative major statement put out by our governments jointly since the third communiqué back in 1982. So this is
a serious thing to examine. And to my knowledge, for
the first time the two governments jointly acknowledged that one of the
major problems in the relationship is a lack of mutual trust. Basically, what we anticipate the other side’s goals
are vis-à-vis us over time. And that that was a problem that needs to be worked on. I agree with that completely. It’s somewhat ironic that since
then mutual trust has deteriorated significantly and the narrative in China now that I hear everywhere from people who I
know, you know, overmany years basically had a very strong desire to see a strong U.S.-China relationship and so forth, is that the U.S. is really acting
now to constrain China and disrupt its rise. And the basic assumption is the hegemon cannot tolerate the rise of
a truly competitive power. And with that assumption that there is a capacity to put almost any American action
into this narrative in the sense that it’s all part of some sort of conspiracy in one way or another to bog China
down, divert it from what it ought to be doing, give it responsibilities it isn’t prepared to take on, and rally
countries around its periphery to call for a bigger U.S. presence to offset China’s growing powers.
12
MCKENZIE/O’BRIEN
TSDC
RELATIONS
SOLVENCY TURN
IDEOLOGICAL DIFFERENCES DOOM ANY STRATEGIC TRUST BETWEEN US AND CHINA – THIS CRUSHES RELATIONS.
ROY 6/7/13 (Dennis Roy, Senior Fellow at the East-West Center in Honolulu, The Diplomat, “U.S.-China Relations: Stop Striving For ‘Trust’”, June 7, 2013,
https://thediplomat.com/2013/06/07/u-s-china-relations-stop-striving-for-trust/2/ DD:6/30/13 RAM/COB)
The problem is not that each country erroneously perceives the other as warlike. Both
want peace, but on their own terms. Some of what
China calls “defensive” looks to others like aggression. What America terms “stability” is “containment” to
China. Indeed, more “bluntness and honesty” might bring out additional attitudes that are not often discussed publicly and that would drive Americans and Chinese
further apart, such as the Americans hoping for the demise of the Chinese Communist Party or the Chinese suggesting that all U.S. military forces in the Asia-Pacific
should relocate to areas no further west than the Hawaiian Islands. More
transparency would not dispel mutual suspicions, it would
confirm them. “Trust” applies to a situation where two or more people discover they wish for the same things. If there is something akin to trust in international
politics, it occurs when states become convinced that they share important bedrock values and interests. As Alexander Wendt has pointed out, Americans are
The United States has this kind of trust-like
relationship with a few governments where there is a common liberal political ideology and democratic political
system, long experience working together as allies, and a convergence of interests calling for the same kind of
world. None of these factors exists in U.S.-China relations. A second problem with the pursuit of “trust” in the world’s most important
comfortable with Britain having 500 nuclear weapons but cannot accept North Korea having five.
bilateral relationship is that is plays into the Chinese agenda of ushering U.S. influence out of the Asia-Pacific region. As PRC officials, diplomats and other messengers
make clear, in their view the path to establishing “strategic trust” begins with each side “properly handling each other’s core interests.” That means Americans must
stop selling arms to Taiwan, “intervening” in the South China Sea disputes, “encouraging” Japan in the East China Sea dispute by re-stating intent to fulfill U.S. treaty
commitments, disrespecting Chinese feelings by holding naval exercises with ally South Korea in the Yellow Sea, allowing the Dalai Lama to visit the United States,
and so on. Surveillance of China from within the PRC’s exclusive economic zone (between 12 to 200 nautical miles off the Chinese coastline), although legal under the
UN Law of the Sea Treaty (to which China is a signatory), is “unfriendly” and erodes trust. So does U.S. security cooperation with the regional governments that are
worried about Chinese bullying. So does accusing the Chinese government of involvement in the massive, organized cyber-attacks that originate from China. If
the
price of “trust” is the cessation of all U.S. policies in the Asia-Pacific that the Chinese dislike, or an effective
U.S. retirement from being a regional great power, the price is too high and the objective should be something
different. Strategic trust will not be attainable for the foreseeable future. The U.S. and China have many areas of fruitful
cooperation, which can and should go forward without waiting for trust to break out. In other more sensitive areas, the two countries should strive to manage their
inevitable bilateral strategic tensions by reaching agreements where both see a benefit and where compliance is measurable. Reducing the chances of unintended
incidents at sea or over the sea between U.S. and PRC military units is certainly is a worthy example. For these inherent rivals and potential adversaries, the emphasis
belongs on “verify,” not “trust.”
CHINA COOPERATION BAD – THEY WOULD STEAL OUR TECHNOLOGY, THEN USE IT AGAINST US
KLOMP ‘10 [Jeremiah O., April, 2010, Air Command and Staff College, Air University, “Is Space Big Enough For A US-Sino
Partnership?” http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA537174&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf, accessed June 24, 2011]
Since China is potentially one of our key peer competitors in the future, it does not seem wise to give them any additional advantage by first showing our hand to them,
and then aiding them in the development of their own capabilities which would then likely be used against us. 22 Any
collaboration with China would
have to be strictly monitored to prevent either side from sharing or gathering more information than intended.
Such actions would undermine relations, rather than improve them. Proliferation issues provide perhaps the strongest rationale against
collaboration with China. Their historical lack of respect for intellectual property, as well as demonstrated willingness to
engage in ‘unintentional technology transfers’ and outright piracy are strong detractors to a partnership in which
cutting-edge technology would be used and/or shared. However, regarding intelligence gathering, partnering with China may give us some
insight into the levels to which Chinese space has advanced and allow us to more accurately determine the 20 stages of their development and help us refine our strategy
towards them. China has traditionally maintained a close hold an all things military, particularly with their space programs. Pursuing a partner-type relationship might
help open a dialogue that would otherwise be stifled.
13
MCKENZIE/O’BRIEN
TSDC
RELATIONS
RELATIONS DISADVANTAGE
14
MCKENZIE/O’BRIEN
TSDC
RELATIONS
1NC – CHINA
1. UNIQUENESS: RELATIONS HIGH BUT NOW IS KEY BECAUSE OF ISSUES RAISED BY SNOWDEN
DYER, NOBLE, AND CLOVER 6/25/13 (Geoff Dyer in Washington, Josh Noble in Hong Kong and Charles Clover in Moscow, Financial Times, June
25, 2013, “US attacks China as Snowden stays free”, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/3861666e-dcbc-11e2-b52b-00144feab7de.html#axzz2XiQDH2UX DD: 6/30/13
RAM/COB)
Hong Kong authorities said there was no legal reason to prevent Mr Snowden from leaving for Russia and that they had
not been informed by the US that his passport had been revoked before he travelled. However, that position was contradicted by the White House. “I can say that the Hong
Kong authorities were advised of the status of his travel documents in plenty of time to have prohibited travel as
appropriate,” said Mr Carney. He said the US and China had recently begun a new push to build “strategic trust”. “We
think that they have dealt that effort a serious setback. If we cannot count on them to honor their legal
extradition obligations, then there is a problem.”
The
2. LINK: U.S. ACTION PAIRED WITH RECENT CHINA ACTIONS PROMOTES A “FIGHT” FOR THE LATIN AMERICAN
REGION.
CLARK 13 (Lesley Clark, McClatchy Washington Bureau,” China’s moves in Western Hemisphere have U.S. stepping up its game”, May 30, 2013,
http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2013/05/30/192624/chinas-moves-in-western-hemisphere.html#.UdBboJV_1WR#storylink=cpy DD: 6/30/13 RAM/COB)
China’s courting of Latin America and the Caribbean – signaled anew this week by a visit by its president – is prodding the United
States to step up its outreach to the rapidly emerging economies, which are showing greater global clout. President
Xi Jinping’s weeklong trip to Trinidad and Tobago, Costa Rica and Mexico starting Friday comes in the wake of President Barack Obama’s recent trip to Mexico and
Costa Rica, and follows by just a day Vice President Joe Biden’s three-nation tour of the region. Xi will meet with Obama at the close of his trip, June 7-8 in California.
China has eclipsed the United States as Brazil and Chile’s largest trading partner, purchasing soybeans, iron ore and oil to fuel its rapidly expanding economy. Latin
American exports to China accounted for just $5 billion in 2000; by 2012, they topped $104 billion. The
global giant’s rising influence in the
hemisphere hasn’t gone unnoticed in Washington, in part prompting what Biden dubbed the “most active stretch
of high-level engagement” in Latin America and the Caribbean in a “long, long time.” In addition to Obama’s and Biden’s
trips, the White House will host Peru’s President Ollanta Humala and Chile’s President Sebastian Pinera next month. And in October, Obama will hold a rare state
dinner for President Dilma Rousseff of Brazil. “Nothing
motivates Washington faster than competition,” said Eric Farnsworth,
the vice president of the Council of the Americas and the Americas Society, noting that trade deals with
Colombia and Chile were accelerated when it became apparent that Canada and China were moving in. “There is
recognition in Washington that we need to begin to contend more actively for the Americas, that Latin America is not a region we can take for granted anymore – if we
are still in many ways the preferred partner but we’re not the
guaranteed partner, and we’ve got to fight for the region in a way that maybe we haven’t had to traditionally.”
ever did – because the region does have options,” Farnsworth said. “We
15
MCKENZIE/O’BRIEN
TSDC
RELATIONS
3. INTERNAL LINK: CHINESE OFFICIALS EXPECT US TO NOT VIOLATE THEIR REGIONAL SOVEREIGNTY.
BENKO 6/6/13 (Ralph Benko, former junior official in the Reagan Whitehouse, Global Times, “China’s expanding sphere inevitable for waxing power”, June 6,
2013, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/787350.shtml#.UdBca5V_1WR DD: 6/30/13 RAM/COB)
Chinese President Xi Jinping's meeting with US President Barack Obama, in a low-key setting this week, is of potentially
the greatest significance. This meeting is being designed to foment a climate of "equality and mutual trust," as Xi
has put it. These are themes that very likely resonate with Obama. But what could possibly go wrong? "What China expects from the US is a clear
commitment that it will not do things to harm China's sovereignty," Chen Mingming, a retired Chinese diplomat, told media recently.
Respect for its sovereignty is a most legitimate expectation by China. But very few fully grasp the implications
of the difference inherent in nonlinear Chinese and linear American views of sovereignty. For the linear-minded, West
geographical boundaries are defined by lines on a map upon which all parties, with due ceremony, once upon a time agreed. This makes intuitive sense to Westerners.
Yet it has led to strange outcomes. For example, departing European colonial powers often drew national borders arbitrarily. This set the stage for unrest, tragedy, and
even genocide. In the classical Asian worldview, geographical boundaries are nonlinear. There are always grounds for claims, sometimes going back millennia, to
different boundaries. When a state grows strong, it will project a greater sphere of influence, extending its boundaries. In Asia, unlike in Europe and the Americas,
organic spheres of influence, which wax and wane, determine boundaries. Some Asian countries have made sweeping claims on their former territories, which were
ceded to major powers based on the "unfairness" of previous treaties. To most linear-minded Westerners, relitigating the justice of an ancient treaty makes little sense.
In contrast, to a nonlinear Asian mind, to whom this does not appear as ancient, it is a matter of simple justice. Neither view is wrong. But failure to grasp the
distinction is potentially problematic. Instead, it would be better for our nations and our leaders to grasp this distinction in order to achieve great unity. China's power is
waxing. Its growing strength naturally increases its sphere of influence. This
will inevitably push it to assert old territorial claims dating
to previous times. Some of those claims fall within the spheres of influence of some of US allies. This can put
the US in an awkward position. A harmonious relationship of equality and mutual trust is invaluable to all. China
would greatly benefit by mindfulness of the important distinction between how each society thinks, as would the US. Whatever other issues come up between the two
presidents, and there are sure to be many, the
potential for misunderstanding about sovereignty may be the most delicate.
China will defend its sovereignty above all. Yet the last thing China, or the world, needs is a Chinese
confrontation with a belligerent hyperpower. The US is a hyperpower. But Americans are not by nature belligerent. Neither are the
Chinese. If both leaders have been thoroughly briefed on the distinctions that derive from their respective linear and nonlinear views of national boundaries, harmony
between these two great nations can be secured. China can afford to be patient so long as the legitimacy of its claims is not contradicted. In taking back full sovereignty
over Hong Kong at the expiration of the UK's lease, China patiently, and prudently, issued a 50-year guarantee of Hong Kong's political and economic system. Both
dignity and harmony were served. The US need not be blinded by lines on a map to the concept that China's sense of its sovereign boundaries is dictated by the natural
ebb and flow of the sphere of influence of a strong Beijing.
16
MCKENZIE/O’BRIEN
TSDC
RELATIONS
4. INTERNAL LINK: RISK OF NUCLEAR MISUNDERSTANDING WITH CHINA REMAINS HIGH
KULACKI ’12 (Gregory Kulacki, Senior Analyst & China Project Manager for the Global Security Program at the Union of Concerned Scientists, Huffington
Post, “The Risk of Nuclear War with China”, September 21, 2012, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/gregory-kulacki/the-risk-of-nuclear-war-w_b_1903336.html DD:
6/29/13 RAM/COB)
Although the United States is unwilling to make a similar commitment, U.S.
superiority in conventional weapons and overall military
capabilities makes it unlikely the United States would consider using nuclear weapons for any purpose other
than preventing a Chinese nuclear attack on the United States. The most recent U.S. Nuclear Posture Review, in an effort to deemphasize
the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. defense policy, declared that the "fundamental role of U.S. nuclear weapons...is to deter a nuclear attack on the United States, our
allies and partners." The
risk of a nuclear war with China lies in the potential for misunderstanding or
miscommunication during a conventional conflict. China's current strategy for employing its conventional and
nuclear missile forces during a future conflict with the United States is self-consciously designed to create
uncertainty, with the expectation that uncertainty will restrain U.S. military action. Unfortunately, China's strategy could also
precipitate a large-scale U.S. attack on China's missile forces. There are several Chinese military policies that might confuse U.S. decision-makers in a time of war.
Some Chinese conventional missiles are located on the same missile bases as Chinese nuclear missiles. Some
Chinese missiles, particularly the DF-21, can be armed with either a conventional or a nuclear warhead. Chinese conventional war plans call for long-range "strategic"
conventional missile strikes at key enemy targets, including U.S. military bases on allied soil and the continental United States. If this were not confusing enough
already, The Science of Second Artillery Operations contains a section on "lowering the nuclear threshold" that details procedures for alerting China's nuclear forces in
a crisis for the express purpose of forcing a halt to an enemy's conventional attacks on a select group of targets, such as Chinese nuclear power plants, large dams and
civilian population centers. Although the Science of Second Artillery Operations unambiguously states that if alerting China's nuclear missile forces fails to halt
conventional enemy attacks China will hold firm to its "no first use" commitment, U.S. decision-makers might not believe it. Indeed, U.S. interlocutors have repeatedly
told their Chinese counterparts that they do not find China's "no first use" pledge credible. The
combination of these factors makes a nuclear
exchange between the United States and China not only plausible, but also probable if the two countries were to
become embroiled in a military conflict. As Lewis and Xue explain, "If, in a time of high tension, the Chinese command authorized a conventional
missile attack as an act of preemptive self-defense, the enemy and its allies could not know if the incoming missiles were conventional or nuclear. In a worst-case
scenario, a
Chinese first-strike conventional attack could spark retaliation that destroys Chinese nuclear assets,
creating a situation in which escalation to full-scale nuclear war would not just be possible, but even likely."
5. IMPACT: U.S. INFRINGEMENT ON CHINESE SOVEREIGNTY MAY BE MISUNDERSTOOD, AND LEAD TO NUCLEAR
CONFLICT ALL OVER THE WORLD.
STRAITS TIMES ‘00 [“No One Gains in War over Taiwan,” 6/25/00, Lexis COB]
THE high-intensity scenario postulates a cross-strait war escalating into a full-scale war between the US and China. If Washington
were to conclude that splitting China would better serve its national interests, then a full-scale war becomes unavoidable. Conflict on such a scale would
embroil other countries far and near and -horror of horrors -raise the possibility of a nuclear war. Beijing has already told the US and
Japan privately that it considers any country providing bases and logistics support to any US forces attacking China as belligerent parties open to its retaliation. In the
east Asia will be set on fire. And the
conflagration may not end there as opportunistic powers elsewhere may try to overturn the existing world order. With the
US distracted, Russia may seek to redefine Europe's political landscape. The balance of power in the Middle East may be
similarly upset by the likes of Iraq. In south Asia, hostilities between India and Pakistan, each armed with its own nuclear arsenal,
could enter a new and dangerous phase. Will a full-scale Sino-US war lead to a nuclear war? According to General Matthew Ridgeway, commander of the US
region, this means South Korea, Japan, the Philippines and, to a lesser extent, Singapore. If China were to retaliate,
Eighth Army which fought against the Chinese in the Korean War, the US had at the time thought of using nuclear weapons against China to save the US from military defeat. In his book The
Korean War, a personal account of the military and political aspects of the conflict and its implications on future US foreign policy, Gen Ridgeway said that US was confronted with two
choices in Korea -truce or a broadened war, which could have led to the use of nuclear weapons. If the US had to resort to nuclear weaponry to defeat China long before the latter acquired a
similar capability, there is little hope of winning a war against China 50 years later, short of using nuclear weapons. The US estimates that China possesses about 20 nuclear warheads that can
destroy major American cities. Beijing also seems prepared to go for the nuclear option. A Chinese military officer disclosed recently that Beijing was considering a review of its "non first use"
principle regarding nuclear weapons. Major-General Pan Zhangqiang, president of the military-funded Institute for Strategic Studies, told a gathering at the Woodrow Wilson International
military leaders
considered the use of nuclear weapons mandatory if the country risked dismemberment as a result of foreign
intervention. Gen Ridgeway said that should that come to pass, we would see the destruction of civilisation. There would be no victors in such a war. While the
prospect of a nuclear Armaggedon over Taiwan might seem inconceivable, it cannot be ruled out entirely, for China puts
sovereignty above everything else.
Centre for Scholars in Washington that although the government still abided by that principle, there were strong pressures from the military to drop it. He said
17
MCKENZIE/O’BRIEN
TSDC
RELATIONS
EXTENSIONS
18
MCKENZIE/O’BRIEN
TSDC
RELATIONS
UNIQUENESS EXT.
RECENT SUMMIT MARKS SIGNIFICANT HIGH POINT IN US-SINO RELATIONS
NG 6/7/13 (Teddy Ng, South China Morning Post, “Low-key Xi-Obama meeting masks significance of talks”, June 7, 2013,
http://www.scmp.com//news/china/article/1255133/low-key-xi-obama-meeting-masks-significance-talks DD: 6/29/13 RAM/COB)
Major outcomes, or concessions from either side, are not expected, but the trip is still significant because the two leaders will share close moments together, setting the
tone for the Sino-US relationship in the remaining decade of Xi's reign. In addition to serious talks on various issues, the two presidents will reportedly eat breakfast
together and stroll around the retreat, taking in its sweeping mountain views and lush golf course. Xi's wife, Peng Liyuan , will accompany him, but her US counterpart,
Michelle Obama, will be absent. Observers
said the talks, after a tour by Xi to "America's backyard" that included visits to three Latin American and
be crucial for crisis management because of rising frictions between the two great powers
given America's declared "pivot to Asia". The first meeting between the two presidents since Xi succeeded Hu Jintao in March were originally
scheduled for September, on the sidelines of the G20 summit in Russia, but both sides believed they should reach out to each other earlier. "There is some
sense of urgency to prevent any further deterioration in US-China relations," said Professor Susan Shirk, chairwoman of the 21st
Caribbean nations, would
Century China Programme at the University of California, San Diego. "The two leaders don't want another cold war." Professor Jia Qingguo , an international relations
specialist at Peking University, said there was a consensus in both nations that a meeting in September would be "too late". "This
is the right time for the
two nations to see how they should proceed for smooth relations," he said. The trip is also designed for both
leaders to address their domestic audiences, showing they pay high regard to bilateral ties but will not bow to
pressure from the other side.
SNOWDEN CASE PROVES US-CHINA RELATIONS ARE SHAKY NOW; NEXT FEW WEEKS KEY.
PECQUET 6/24/13 (Julian Pecquet, The Hill correspondant, “US-China relations chill over Snowden”, June 24, 2013,
http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/307511-us-china-chill-over-snowden DD: 6/27/13 RAM/COB)
The White House upbraided China on Monday for allowing Edward Snowden to board a plane out of Hong
Kong, warning the move represented a “serious setback” in relations. Press secretary Jay Carney blasted China in unusually blunt
terms as the administration hunted for Snowden, the leaker of National Security Agency documents who is now believed to be hiding out in Russia. Carney
dismissed Hong Kong’s legal justification for allowing Snowden to leave — “we do not buy the suggestion that
China could not have taken action” — and said there would be consequences. “The Chinese have emphasized
the importance of building mutual trust,” Carney said. “And we think that they have dealt that effort a serious
setback. If we cannot count on them to honor their legal extradition obligations, then there is a problem. And
that is a point we are making to them very directly.” The escalating tensions threaten to derail President Obama’s careful outreach to newly
elected Chinese President Xi Jinping, which began earlier this month with a summit in California. A former senior NSA official said Carney’s statement “reflects the
strong sentiment that the Chinese did mess up on this.” “There’s no way around it. The Chinese messed up,” the official said. “This is a real screw-up on their part, and
it’s not helpful and was not in the same vein as the recent summit in California [between Obama and Xi]. “This does put a chill on things after the warmth of California.
There’s going to need to be some real heart to heart in the coming weeks and months.”
CHINA INCREASING FOCUS ON LATIN AMERICA NOW
HONGBO 6/3/13 (Sun Hongbo, associate research fellow at the Institute of Latin American Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Global Times, “Latin
America arena for global powers”, June 3, 2013, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/786399.shtml#.UdA805V_1WR DD: 6/27/13 RAM/COB)
New Chinese President Xi Jinping chose Latin America as part of the destinations for his second state visit, a
sign that the new leadership will concentrate more on Latin America's role and influence in the transforming
global pattern. There are likely to be more major steps forward to tune up Sino-Latin American cooperation.
China's investment in Latin America will be enlarged dramatically, along with a more specific and practical policy aiming to actively balance the different expectations
of the interests of both sides. Obviously, China
has become an important strategic partner with Latin America in terms of
economic exchanges and foreign affairs. Compared with other regions such as the Asia-Pacific and the Middle East, Latin America is not pivotal in
the change of the international pattern. Nevertheless, Latin America is becoming more fully engaged with international affairs. More importantly, Latin America is no
However,
challenges still remain in those countries' China policies in terms of policy coordination and implementation. It
requires both China and Latin America to make efforts to guide and design the direction of the bilateral
relationship.
longer constrained to a US-dominated Western hemisphere, but is developing relationships with emerging economies from the rest of the world.
19
MCKENZIE/O’BRIEN
TSDC
RELATIONS
LINK EXT.
US ACTION IN LATIN AMERICA CONTRIBUTES TO RIVALRY WITH CHINA
REGENSTREIF 6/12/13 (Gary Regenstreif, editor of special projects at Reuters, editorial liaison to the World Economic Forum, June 12, 2013, “The looming
U.S.-China rivalry over Latin America”, http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2013/06/12/the-looming-u-s-china-rivalry-over-latin-america/ DD: 6/30/13 RAM/COB)
Though the U.S. and Chinese presidents heralded a “new model” of cooperation at their weekend summit, a growing
competition looks more likely. The whirlwind of activity before President Barack Obama met with President Xi Jinping in the California desert revealed
that Beijing and Washington’s sights are set on a similar prize — and face differing challenges to attain it. Their
focus is Latin America and the prize is increased trade and investment opportunities in a region where economic
reforms have pulled millions out of poverty and into the middle class. Latin America is rich in the commodities
and energy that both China and the United States need, largely stable politically and eager to do deals. Consider the
travel itinerary: Obama visited Mexico and Costa Rica last month. Vice President Joe Biden recently went to Colombia, Trinidad and Tobago and Brazil. Chile’s
president paid Obama a visit last week, Peru’s leader arrived Tuesday and Brazil’s is due in October. Meanwhile, just after Biden left Trinidad, Xi arrived, part of a tour
that also took him to Costa Rica and Mexico to promote trade and cooperation. Both
U.S. and Chinese officials, however, are finding a
more self-confident Latin America, able to leverage its new strength to forge better agreements and find
multiple trading partners. That will likely force Washington to work harder to maintain its leading trade position
against China — which has money to burn in the region. “There is a more energetic [U.S.] tone, a more optimistic mood about economic
agenda in second term than [the] first time,” Michael Shifter, president of the Inter-American Dialogue, a Washington policy group, told me. “There’s something
happening in the region and the U.S. wants to be part of it. Whether there’s a well-thought-out vision or policy remains a question. But there is more of an affirmation
of the region and a willingness to engage.”
US ACTION IN LATIN AMERICA WILL COUNTERACT GROWING CHINESE INFLUENCE
CERNA ’11 (Michael Cerna, graduate student in International Policy Management at Kennesaw State University, China Research Center, Vol. 10, No. 1, April 15,
2011, “China’s Growing Presence in Latin America: Implications for U.S. and Chinese Presence in the Region”, http://www.chinacenter.net/chinas-growing-presencein-latin-america-implications-for-u-s-and-chinese-presence-in-the-region/ DD: 6/30/13 RAM/COB)
With both the U.S. and China making gains in the region in different sectors, there is seemingly room for each
side to grow; which implies that, in fact, trade with Latin America is not a zero-sum game. China presents an alternative to the United
States, but that is not necessarily a bad thing. The U.S. is much more diversified than China at the moment and therefore does not need to enter into direct competition.
However, as China responds to calls from Brazil and diversifies its investments, there
is increasing worry that China is going to outmatch
U.S. trade in the region. These fears may be economically based, but there are potentially harmful political
consequences – primarily, providing Latin America with a quasi-world power as an alternative to the U.S. Since the Monroe Doctrine, Latin America has been
considered a secure sphere of influence for the U.S. The fact that China presents a less democratic alternative to U.S. influence
presents a major problem. The third BRICS summit in April provided more insight into the potential consequences of China’s growing place in Latin
America via its relations with Brazil. One proposal to emerge from the summit of the five nations (Brazil, India, China, Russia and South Africa) was a broad-based
international reserve currency system providing stability and certainty. The idea was to set up a new exchange rate mechanism that would bypass the U.S. dollar as the
reserve currency of the world. In addition, banks of the five BRICS nations agreed to establish mutual credit lines in their local currencies, not in U.S. currency. While
the chances of such a proposal gaining support are debatable, it sets a clear example of a
possible shift in power away from the U.S. and
toward a more global organization, one that is arguably anchored by China. If China becomes a preferred
partner in Latin America, it will show that U.S. dominance around the globe also is at risk.
20
MCKENZIE/O’BRIEN
TSDC
RELATIONS
US ACTION IN LATIN AMERICA WILL COUNTERBALANCE CHINESE INFLUENCE
CERNA ’11 (Michael Cerna, graduate student in International Policy Management at Kennesaw State University, China Research Center, Vol. 10, No. 1, April 15,
2011, “China’s Growing Presence in Latin America: Implications for U.S. and Chinese Presence in the Region”, http://www.chinacenter.net/chinas-growing-presencein-latin-america-implications-for-u-s-and-chinese-presence-in-the-region/ DD: 6/30/13 RAM/COB)
So what does China’s growing place in the region mean for the future? Depending on whom this question is posed to, there are
two probable answers. The first is that China’s intensifying relations with Latin America offer a clear sign of
the end of U.S. dominance in the region, and in a greater sense, the entire world. There is enough evidence to show that the
tides have changed in favor of China. The other answer is that it means nothing. The U.S. is obviously still the more dominant power in the region,
and Chinese presence will eventually subside, again leaving the United States as the region’s premier partner. The real answer probably falls somewhere in the middle.
the United States should not take its place in
the region for granted. There is clear evidence of an increasingly symbiotic relationship with China throughout
Latin America. While the U.S. is the most dominant trade partner to the region as a whole, it is losing ground in
key countries, namely Brazil, which is blossoming on the world stage and is emerging as the clear leader in the
region. Increasing trade and investment can be beneficial for all, but the power that China can derive from its
growing economic influence could bring increased political and ideological influence that the U.S. might find
unnerving. China already has replaced the U.S. as the largest trading partner for Brazil and Chile, and is on pace to do the same in Peru and Venezuela. At the very
Is China the preferred partner for Latin America? At this point, the definitive answer is no. However,
least, this should cause the U.S. to pay more attention to its southern neighbors and take steps to make sure that China only benefits economically and not politically at
the expense of the U.S. The world will be watching. As it stands, the Chinese are not broadening their relations with the region in a way that directly competes with the
United States. China is strictly concerned with commodities, including oil. U.S. President Barack Obama recently signed an agreement with Brazil’s Petrobras that will
allow the oil company to drill in the Gulf of Mexico. This symbolic move could cause tensions to increase as the world’s two largest oil consumers battle over rights to
Brazilian oil. In that regard, the
competition may go beyond a race to Latin commodities and move into the realm of
fighting for political influence. It is odd to think that the United States would need to compete for hemispheric
dominance with a country on the other side of the globe, but China’s actions and increasing integration into the
region tell us that such a scenario may one day arise. Given the proximity and importance of Latin America to the United States, this
region could be the symbolic battle that best measures the continued hegemony of the U.S. versus China. With both
the U.S. and China jockeying for influence in a world where political power relations are changing, Latin America has the most to gain. The primary concern for the
region is that it does not become a battle ground for a neo-Cold War between China and the U.S. Brazil already has clearly stated its concerns regarding Chinese
influence. Yet, despite this tension, Brazil is now too reliant on China to turn away from the path on which Lula set the country. Agricultural exports to China are
crucial to Brazil’s economy. Lula’s Brazil supported China politically and made clear moves away from the United States. Now Rouseff’s administration has welcomed
Barack Obama with open arms. With all three major actors going through stages that could influence the global economic and political landscape – China implementing
its 12th five-year plan, Brazil cementing itself as a prominent world player and the U.S. still recovering from a terrible financial crisis – this dynamic relationship is one
that deserves close attention from all those concerned with the future of China-U.S. relations. Where
Brazil and the rest of Latin America were
once looking for an alternative to U.S. influence and found China, the region may now be looking to the U.S. to
strike a balance with growing Chinese influence. With the global ambitions of Latin America, namely Brazil, it is essential to maintain close
ties with both the United States and China. The world will be watching.
21
MCKENZIE/O’BRIEN
TSDC
RELATIONS
I/L EXT.
US UNILATERAL ACTION INSURES A CHINESE BACKLASH.
LAMPTON ’07 (David M. Lampton 2007
George and Sadie Hyman Professor of China Studies at Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies
(SAIS). He is Director of China Studies at SAIS “Alternative Security and Foreign Policy Futures for China: 2020” Asia Policy, Number 4 (July 2007), 7–15
<muse.jhu.edu/journals/asia_policy/v004/4.lampton.pdf>)
A second set of variables concerns major power alignments that provide the geopolitical context in which China operates.
The key major power
configuration is the Sino-Japanese-U.S. “triangle.” Given history in the region and American-Japanese ideological affinities, it will be a
constant temptation for the United States and Japan to define their interests and behavior as an offset to Chinese power. This vision, and the behaviors of
Washington and Tokyo to which it would give rise, would bring out the worst tendencies in the Chinese body
politic and foreign and national security policy apparatuses. A future major power configuration in which Japan, China, and the United
States define their interests cooperatively and mutually would produce more stabilizing and cooperative behavior from Beijing. How other major (or growing) powers
such as India and Russia relate to China is important in creating the broader context as well, but the U.S.-Japan-China nexus appears to be key. A
U.S. policy
that de-emphasizes multilateralism and emphasizes maintaining preemptive and hegemonic supremacy (a la the U.S.
“National Security Strategy” of 2002 and 2006) will increase the likelihood of a conflict-laden scenario. Using Japan as the U.S. deputy in
Asia to constrain China is a fundamentally flawed and counter-productive conception.
DETERIORATION OF US-CHINA RELATIONS LEADS TO CHINESE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE
MOLTZ ’06 (James Clay Moltz, November 2006. Deputy director and research professor at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, and associate Professor on the
National Security Affairs faculty of the Naval Postgraduate School. “FUTURE NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION SCENARIOS IN NORTHEAST ASIA,” The
Nonproliferation Review 13.3, Informaworld Herm )
Chinese nuclear modernization and the growth of its arsenal from an estimated 400 weapons to as many as 500_1,000 weapons, recent analysis suggests that
China’s deployed nuclear arsenal may number only 80_130 weapons.17 China first tested nuclear weapons in
1964 and has had time to produce material for at least a few thousand bombs, so it is surprising*in the context of the U.S.-Soviet
arms race*that China did not build a larger arsenal. Indeed, China has been perhaps the single most restrained nuclear power to date,
particularly given its hostile relationship during much of the Cold War with both of the superpowers, whose arsenals peaked at 32,000 (United States) and 45,000
(Soviet Union) deployed weapons, respectively.18 As Jeffrey Lewis commented recently: ‘‘The
Chinese leadership seems to have concluded
that technical details such as the size, configuration, and readiness of nuclear forces are largely irrelevant.’’19 If
this is the case, Beijing may be the only major world power to have concurred with military strategist Bernard Brodie
in believing that minimum deterrence works. Yet it must be remembered that China has enough material and
production capability to at least double its arsenal in 10 years; it also has adequate funds to construct new
delivery systems, and could deploy multiple warhead missiles. Thus, a deterioration in relations with the United
States or heightened threat perceptions due to a Japanese decision to deploy nuclear weapons could result in a
rapid increase in China’s arsenal.
22
MCKENZIE/O’BRIEN
TSDC
RELATIONS
AFF
23
MCKENZIE/O’BRIEN
TSDC
RELATIONS
NON-UNIQUE
CYBERSECURITY ISSUES THREATEN US-CHINA RELATIONS
THE INDIAN EXPRESS 6/27/13 (The Indian Express News, “Massive cyber-attacks threatens US-China relations: Lawmakers”, June 27, 2013,
http://www.indianexpress.com/news/massive-cyberattacks-threatens-uschina-relations-lawmakers/1134538/ DD: 6/27/13 RAM/COB)
Top American lawmakers and experts have warned that the
massive cyber-hacking emanating from China seriously threatens the
bilateral relationship and urged the Obama administration to take all necessary measures to counter the threat.
"We've seen in the last few years it's not only American companies that are the targets, it's media and it's human
rights organisations - something particularly important to Congressman Smith and me. Journalist writing about corruption in China find their computer
systems hacked and their passwords stolen," Senator Sherrod Brown said during a Congressional hearing yesterday. " For human rights organisations
and activists dealing with hacking attacks from China is almost a daily fact of life. We can't sit idly by. That's
why I support a comprehensive common sense bipartisan approach to hold China accountable," he said. "With the
growing prevalence of computer networks in America's heavily wired economy, cyber-attacks represent an increasingly growing threat alongside more traditional forms
of intellectual property theft. China
simply doesn't play by the same rules as we do. Chinese governments deny these
attacks even though there is evidence of Chinese involvement," he added.
24
MCKENZIE/O’BRIEN
TSDC
RELATIONS
NO IMPACT
N/! US CHINA RELATIONS WILL WITHSTAND DISRUPTION –ECONOMY WILL DRAW THEM TOGETHER
FRIEDBERG 05, [Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, 03-05 was Deputy Assistant for Ntional Security Affairs and Director of
Policy Planning in the Office of the Vice President, International Security Vol 30 No
2, http://dl2af5jf3e.scholar.serialssolutions.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/?sid=google&auinit=AL&aulast=Friedberg&atitle=The+Future+of+USChina+Relations:+Is+Confi
ct+Inevitable%3F&id=doi:10.1162/016228805775124589&title=International+security&volume=30&issue=2&date=2005&spage=7&issn=0162-2889 July 14th]
Liberal optimists believe that bilateral economic exchange creates shared interests in good relations between
states. The greater the volume of trade and investment flowing between two countries, the more groups on both
sides will have a strong interest in avoiding conflict and preserving peace. Liberal optimists note that economic exchange between
the United States and China has increased dramatically since the onset of market reforms in China in the late 1970s. From the start of reform in 1978 to the end of the
twentieth century, the value of the trade moving between the two countries grew by more than two orders of magnitude, from $1 billion to almost $120 billion
annually.11 By 2004 that figure had doubled to a reported total of $245 billion.12 [End Page 12] Capital flows have also risen, with U.S. investors pouring significant
resources each year into China.13 As China enters the World Trade Organization (WTO) and opens its markets even wider to foreign goods and capital, the density of
commercial linkages between the United States and the PRC will increase.14 Economic
interdependence has already helped to create a
strong mutual interest in peace between the two Pacific powers. Barring some major disruption, economic
forces will probably continue to draw them together, constraining and damping any tendencies toward
conflict.15
N/! MILITARY DETERRENT AND ECONOMIC TIES PREVENT CONFLICT
SIMONS ’11 [Simons, 1-19-11, Pulitzer-winning Journalist U.S.-China relations: a newfound maturity, 6-21-11,
http://www.usatoday.com/news/opinion/letters/2011-01-20-column20_ST_N.htm]
as the Chinese grow wealthier and more content, it is only natural that
they should want to protect their wealth and comforts. Upscale homeowners in the United States do this by moving into gated communities and securing
their McMansions with alarm systems. China is doing it by, for example, adding J-20 stealth fighters to its arsenal — just as the U.S.
Air Force did with the F-22 more than two decades ago. It is no less natural that the arrival of the J-20 at the same time that Defense Secretary Robert Gates was hinting he
will eliminate a $14.4 billion program to develop a new Marine Corps landing vehicle makes some Americans jittery. But we may rest assured that with China spending
between one-seventh and one-fifth of what the United States does on defense, our security is assured well into the future. Our fighting force is the biggest
and most expensive — perhaps even the best — the world has ever known. Chess moves in Southeast Asia As to China's
raising its profile in Southeast Asia, this should be viewed primarily in the context of geographic and cultural proximity. In the wake of the Bush administration's
largely having ignored this strategic region, Obama is wise to be getting us re-involved. Best of all, as numerous people in the region tell
me, we are welcome. Yes, they are happy to have China investing in their economies. And, yes, they are happy to have us
doing the same. This is balance of power. It is peaceful competition. It is good for Southeast Asia, good for
China and good for the United States. There is a lesson here for Americans: Don't get angry; get going. Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist Lewis M. Simons has
From the American perspective, this will require us to understand that
covered Asia since 1967
25