Philsopher ValueViews book
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Philsopher ValueViews book 0 ACTIVISM GOOD.................................................................................................................................18 SOCIAL ACTIVISM WORKS .......................................................................................................................................... 18 MANY EXAMPLES PROVE SOCIAL ACTIVISM IS SUCCESSFUL ..................................................................................... 19 ACTIVISM BAD ....................................................................................................................................20 ACTIVISM FAILS THE BUDDHIST CRITIQUE ................................................................................................................. 20 EVEN IF ACTIVISM IS SUCCESSFUL, IT ULTIMATELY fAILS .......................................................................................... 21 ALTRUISM GOOD ................................................................................................................................22 ALTRUISM IS A PARAMOUNT VALUE ......................................................................................................................... 22 ALTRUISM SHOULD BE SUPPORTED AS THE HIGHEST VALUE ................................................................................... 23 ALTRUISM BAD ...................................................................................................................................24 UPHOLDING ALTRUISM HURTS SOCIETY ................................................................................................................... 24 ALTRUISM IS NOT MOST IMPORTANT ....................................................................................................................... 25 ANARCHISM GOOD.............................................................................................................................26 ANARCHISM IS JUSTIFIED ........................................................................................................................................... 26 ANARCHISM IS A SUPERIOR VALUE ........................................................................................................................... 27 ANARCHISM BAD................................................................................................................................28 ANARCHISM REPRESENTS THE HERD MENTALITY, NOT FREEDOM ........................................................................... 28 ANARCHISM INCORRECT VISION FOR FUTURE SOCIETY ............................................................................................ 29 ANIHILATING NIHILISM .......................................................................................................................30 THE ORIGINS OF NIHILISM ......................................................................................................................................... 30 EARLY INFLUENCES .................................................................................................................................................... 30 NIETZSCHE.................................................................................................................................................................. 31 THE DEATH OF GOD ................................................................................................................................................... 32 WHAT IS THE ALTERNATIVE? ..................................................................................................................................... 33 THE ALLEGED 20TH CENTURY VALIDATION OF NIHILISM ........................................................................................... 33 ANSWERING NIHILISM ............................................................................................................................................... 34 OTHER PROBLEMS: NIETZSCHE S NATURALISTIC FALLACY ........................................................................................ 36 THE NECESSITY OF VALUES ........................................................................................................................................ 37 TOWARDS A MORE OPTIMISTIC VIEW OF HUMANITY .............................................................................................. 38 BIBLIOGRAPHY ........................................................................................................................................................... 39 NIHILISM IS PHILOSOPHICALLY FLAWED AND FOUNDATIONLESS ............................................................................. 40 NIHILISM FAILS BECAUSE IT CANNOT RESOLVE ANY CONFLICTS ............................................................................... 40 VALUE JUDGMENTS ARE INEVITABLE ........................................................................................................................ 41 NIHILISM’S IMMORALITY THREATENS TO DESTROY HUMANITY ............................................................................... 42 NIHILISM DESTROYS FREEDOM ................................................................................................................................. 43 RELATIVISM IS INCORRECT ........................................................................................................................................ 44 ANIMAL RIGHTS GOOD .......................................................................................................................45 ANIMALS HAVE INHERENT RIGHTS ............................................................................................................................ 45 SPECIESISM IS MORALLY EQUIVALENT TO RACISM OR SEXISM ................................................................................ 46 ANIMAL RIGHTS BAD ..........................................................................................................................47 ANIMAL RIGHTS IS AN INVALID PROPOSITION .......................................................................................................... 47 ANIMALS SHOULD NOT BE ATTRIBUTED RIGHTS ....................................................................................................... 48 ANIMAL RIGHTS RESPONSES ...............................................................................................................49 INTERACTION WITH HUMANS BENEFITS ANIMALS ................................................................................................... 55 USE OF ANIMALS IN SCIENTIFIC TESTING IN NECESSARY .......................................................................................... 56 ANIMALS DON’T POSSES “RIGHTS” IN THE SENSE THAT HUMANS DO ..................................................................... 57 ANIMAL TESTING IMMENSLY BENEFITS HUMANS ..................................................................................................... 58 AUTONOMY GOOD .............................................................................................................................59 AUTONOMY GOOD .............................................................................................................................59 AUTONOMY IS A PARAMOUNT VALUE ...................................................................................................................... 59 WITHOUT AUTONOMY, OTHER THINGS CANNOT EXIST ........................................................................................... 60 AUTONOMY IS A SIGNIFICANT VALUE ....................................................................................................................... 61 1 AUTONOMY BAD ................................................................................................................................62 CRITIQUES OF AUTONOMY ARE INVALID .................................................................................................................. 62 AUTONOMY IS NOT ABSOLUTE.................................................................................................................................. 63 PATERNALISM IS NOT ALWAYS UNDESIRABLE .......................................................................................................... 64 AUTONOMY IS NOT A PARAMOUNT VALUE .............................................................................................................. 65 AUTONOMY LACKS ANY PRACTICAL APPLICATION .................................................................................................... 66 BIOCENTRISM GOOD ..........................................................................................................................67 MUST HAVE BIOCENTRISM FOR JUSTICE ................................................................................................................... 67 BIOCENTRISM DOES NOT IGNORE HUMANS ............................................................................................................. 68 MUST REJECT ANTHROPOCENTRIC NOTIONS FOR SURVIVAL ................................................................................... 68 BIOCENTRISM IS A DESIRABLE PERSPECTIVE ............................................................................................................. 69 BIOCENTRISM IS A VALID PERSPECTIVE ..................................................................................................................... 70 BIOCENTRISM BAD .............................................................................................................................71 BIOCENTRISM IS AN INVALID PERSPECTIVE ............................................................................................................... 71 BIOCENTRISM IS AN UNDESIRABLE FRAMEWORK ..................................................................................................... 72 BIOCENTRISM IS ANTHROPOCENTRIC ....................................................................................................................... 73 BIOCENTRIC NOTIONS JUSTIFY NAZI-STYLE ATROCITIES ........................................................................................... 73 BIOCENTRISM IS SELF-CONTRADICTORY ................................................................................................................... 74 BIOCENTRISM STOPS TRUE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION .................................................................................... 74 BIOLOGY BAD .....................................................................................................................................75 LIFE GAINS MEANING ONLY THROUGH EXPERIENCE NOT BIOLOGY ......................................................................... 75 THERE IS NO ABSOLUTE RIGHT TO LIFE ..................................................................................................................... 76 BIOLOGICAL DEFINITIONS OF LIFE ARE INACCURATE ................................................................................................ 76 BRAIN ACTIVITY IS ACCEPTED AS DEFINITION OF EXISTENCE OF LIFE ....................................................................... 77 LIFE IS NOT THE ULTIMATE VALUE............................................................................................................................. 77 LIFE CONSISTS OF MORE THAN PHYSICAL EXISTENCE ............................................................................................... 78 ACTUAL BEGINNING OF A HUMAN LIFE CANNOT BE DETERMINED .......................................................................... 78 BIOTECHNOLOGY GOOD .....................................................................................................................79 BIOTECHNOLOGY IS NECESSARY FOR THE ENVIRONMENT AND FOOD ..................................................................... 79 BIOTECHNOLOGY CAN IMPROVE HUMANS AND STOP DISEASE ............................................................................... 80 BIOTECHNOLOGY BAD ........................................................................................................................81 BIOTECHNOLOGY IS OUT OF CONTROL ..................................................................................................................... 81 BIOTECHNOLOGY IS AN IMMORAL RISK .................................................................................................................... 82 BUDDHISM GOOD ..............................................................................................................................83 BUDDHISM SOLVES SOCIETY'S PROBLEMS ................................................................................................................ 83 OBJECTIONS TO BUDDHISM ARE WRONG ................................................................................................................. 84 BUDDHISM BAD .................................................................................................................................85 BUDDHISM HAS INTERNAL CONTRADICTIONS .......................................................................................................... 85 BUDDHISM HAS MANY PROBLEMS............................................................................................................................ 86 BUDDHISM HAS NO GROUNDING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ........................................................................................... 87 BUDDHISM DOESN’T USE RIGHTS LANGUAGE, EMBRACES DUTIES .......................................................................... 88 CAPITALISM GOOD .............................................................................................................................89 CAPITALISM HAS CREATED INDUSTRIAL PROGRESS .................................................................................................. 89 CAPITALISM HAS CREATED EQUALITY ....................................................................................................................... 89 CAPITALISM DECREASES TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY .............................................................................................. 90 CAPITALISM IS FUNDAMENTALLY A MORAL SYSTEM ................................................................................................ 90 DISCRIMINATION IS NOT CAUSED BY CAPITALISM .................................................................................................... 91 CAPITALISM INCREASES POLITICAL FREEDOM ........................................................................................................... 91 CAPITALISM INCREASES WORLD PEACE .................................................................................................................... 92 CAPITALISM IS MOST EFFICIENT ECONOMIC SYSTEM ............................................................................................... 92 CAPITALISM DOES NOT CREATE POLITICAL INEQUALITY ........................................................................................... 93 CAPITALISM BAD ................................................................................................................................94 CAPITALISM CREATES WASTE AND DESTRUCTION .................................................................................................... 94 CAPITALISM IS OPPRESSIVE TO WOMEN ................................................................................................................... 94 2 CAPITALISM IS DETRIMENTAL TO A HEALTHY ECONOMY ......................................................................................... 95 CAPITALISM RESULTS IN DISCRIMINATION................................................................................................................ 95 CAPITALISM CREATES VIOLENCE ............................................................................................................................... 96 CAPITALISM RESULTS IN A BREAKDOWN OF SOCIETY ............................................................................................... 97 CAPITALISM EXPLOITS THE WORKING CLASSES ......................................................................................................... 97 CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE GOOD.......................................................................................................98 CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE IS THE BEST MORAL GUIDELINE .................................................................................... 98 CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE IS RATIONAL AND CONSISTENT ..................................................................................... 99 CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE BAD........................................................................................................ 100 CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE IS AN INAPPROPRIATE FRAMEWORK .......................................................................... 100 THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE CANNOT MEDIATE MORAL DISPUTES .................................................................. 101 OPPORTUNITY FOR CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE IS NECESSARY IN DEMOCRACY ............................................................... 102 CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE IS A MECHANISM TO CHANGE SOCIAL INJUSTICES ................................................................ 103 CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE IS JUSTIFIED IN AMERICAN DEMOCRACY ............................................................................... 104 CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE DOES NOT CREATE WIDESPREAD ANARCHY .......................................................................... 105 CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE IS JUSTIFIED AS A MEANS OF LAST RESORT ........................................................................... 105 THE PURPOSE OF CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE IS TO CREATE JUSTICE................................................................................ 106 THREAT OF VIOLENCE CREATES A CIVIL SOCIETY ..................................................................................................... 106 THERE IS NO ALTERNATIVE TO WARFARE IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA ............................................................ 106 CAUSALITY GOOD ............................................................................................................................. 107 CAUSALITY IS NECESSARY TO MAKE GOOD POLICY ................................................................................................. 107 CAUSALITY IS NEEDED FOR EDUCATION .................................................................................................................. 107 CAUSALITY IS A GOOD VALUE .................................................................................................................................. 108 CAUSALITY IS DIFFICULT TO DETERMINE ................................................................................................................. 108 COMMUNITARIANISM GOOD ........................................................................................................... 109 COMMUNITY PROVIDES THE BEST UNDERSTANDING OF HUMAN NATURE ........................................................... 109 COMMUNITARIANISM LIBERATES THE INDIVIDUAL ................................................................................................ 110 COMMUNITARIANISM DOES NOT LEAD TO TYRANNY ............................................................................................ 110 COMMUNITARIANISM PROVIDES THE BEST MODEL OF SOCIETY ........................................................................... 111 COMMUNITARIANISM PRESERVES INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY ........................................................... 112 COMMUNITARIANISM AND MORALITY GO HAND IN HAND ................................................................................... 113 COMMUNITARIANISM BAD .............................................................................................................. 114 COMMUNITARIANISM IS A VAGUE AND MISLEADING IDEOLOGY .......................................................................... 114 COMMUNITARIANISM DISRESPECTS INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS ...................................................................................... 115 COMMUNITARIAN IDEAS ARE PHILOSOPHICALLY UNSOUND ................................................................................. 116 COMMUNITARIANISM DESTROYS FREEDOM .......................................................................................................... 117 COMMUN1TARIANISM IS BAD FOR SOCIETY ........................................................................................................... 118 COMMUNITY GOOD ......................................................................................................................... 119 COMMUNITY SHOULD BE THE PARAMOUNT VALUE............................................................................................... 119 COMMUNITIES ARE MORE BENEFICIAL THAN NON-COMMUNITIES ....................................................................... 120 COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS BAD............................................................................................................ 121 COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS IGNORES MORAL ISSUES IN DECISION MAKING .............................................................. 121 OST-BENEFIT CRITERIA MUST DEFEND MORALITY OF EFFICIENCY .......................................................................... 122 COURT AS A VEHICLE OF SOCIAL PROGRESS RESPONSES .................................................................... 123 THE COURT LACKS THE ABILITY TO ENFORCE ITS DECISIONS .................................................................................. 129 COURT ACTIVISM BACKLASHES................................................................................................................................ 130 THE COURTS ARE LIMITED BY THE CONSTITUTION ................................................................................................. 131 COURTS CAN’T ACCOMPLISH SOCIAL CHANGE ....................................................................................................... 132 CULTURAL RELATIVISM GOOD .......................................................................................................... 133 CULTURAL RELATIVISM IS A VALID VALUE ............................................................................................................... 133 CULTURAL RELATIVISM IS NOT AN UNDESIRABLE VALUE ....................................................................................... 134 CULTURAL RELATIVISM BAD ............................................................................................................. 135 CULTURAL RELATIVISM IS PHILOSOPHICALLY INVALID ............................................................................................ 135 3 CULTURAL RELATIVISM IS AN UNDESIRABLE VALUE ............................................................................................... 136 CULTURAL RELATIVISM RESPONSES .................................................................................................. 137 CULTURAL RELATIVISM IS INHERENTLY CONTRADICTORY ...................................................................................... 143 CULTURAL RELATIVISM IS BAD FOR ACADAMEIA .................................................................................................... 144 RELETAVISM CEMENTS NEGATIVE BEHAVIOR ......................................................................................................... 145 CULTURAL RELATAVISM PREVENTS DISCOVERY OF THE TRUTH ............................................................................. 146 DEMOCRACY GOOD .......................................................................................................................... 147 DEMOCRACY LEADS TO PEACE ................................................................................................................................ 147 DEMOCRACY IS THE BEST FORM OF GOVERNMENT ............................................................................................... 149 THE WORLD IS BECOMING MORE DEMOCRATIC ..................................................................................................... 150 RIGHT TO VOTE INHERENT IN DEMOCRACY SECURES ALL OTHER RIGHTS .............................................................. 150 DEMOCRACY IS INTEGRALLY LINKED TO HUMAN RIGHTS ....................................................................................... 151 ONLY DEMOCRACY SAFEGUARDS FREEDOM ........................................................................................................... 151 DEMOCRACY ALLOWS FOR CHANGE AND REFORM ................................................................................................ 152 DEMOCRACY IS MORE THAN THE CONCEPT OF MAJORITY RULE ............................................................................ 152 DEMOCRACY BAD ............................................................................................................................. 153 DEMOCRACY IS AN OPPRESSIVE FORM OF GOVERNMENT ..................................................................................... 153 DEMOCRACY DENIES JUSTICE TO ETHNIC AND RACIAL MINORITIES ....................................................................... 153 REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY IS INHERENTLY FLAWED ........................................................................................ 154 DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENTS ARE INHERENTLY FLAWED ...................................................................................... 155 DEMOCRACY RESPONSES .................................................................................................................. 156 THE PROBLEM OF MAJORITY RULE .......................................................................................................................... 162 DEMOCRACY DESTROYS EXPERT DECISION MAKING .............................................................................................. 163 DEMOCRACY IN THE MODERN WORLD IS INFEASABLE ........................................................................................... 165 THE DENIAL OF DEATH ...................................................................................................................... 166 BIBLIOGRAPHY ......................................................................................................................................................... 170 DENIAL OF DEATH HAS SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES .................................................................................................. 171 INDIVIDUALS MUST ACCEPT MORTALITY TO CONQUER FEAR OF DEATH ............................................................... 172 SCIENCE CAN SOLVE IMPACTS OF DEATH AND FEAR OF DEATH ............................................................................. 173 SCIENCE SHOWS ETERNAL LIFE IS POSSIBLE ............................................................................................................ 174 DEONTOLOGY VERSUS UTILITARIANISM: NEW WAYS AROUND OLD DEBATES .................................... 175 BIBLIOGRAPHY ......................................................................................................................................................... 180 RESPECT FOR HUMAN DIGNITY MUST CHECK UTILITARIANISM .............................................................................. 181 UTILITARIAN WEIGHING OF CONSEQUENCES IS A FLAWED MORAL CALCULUS ..................................................... 182 UTILITARIANISM BEST ASSURES RESPECT FOR HUMAN DIGNITY ............................................................................ 183 THE MEANS/ENDS DISTINCTION OF DEONTOLOGY IS FLAWED .............................................................................. 184 DIRECT DEMOCRACY GOOD .............................................................................................................. 185 PEOPLE WANT DIRECT DEMOCRACY MORE THAN REPRESENTATIVE ..................................................................... 185 DIRECT DEMOCRACY IS PREFERABLE TO REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY ............................................................... 186 DIRECT DEMOCRACY BAD ................................................................................................................. 187 REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY IS BEST ................................................................................................................... 187 DIRECT DEMOCRACY HAS SERIOUS FLAWS ............................................................................................................. 188 DUTY TO FUTURE GENERATIONS GOOD ............................................................................................ 189 WE HAVE AN ETHICAL DUTY TO FUTURE GENERATIONS ........................................................................................ 189 FUTURE GENERATIONS HAVE MORAL STANDING ................................................................................................... 190 DUTY TO FUTURE GENERATIONS BAD ............................................................................................... 191 ATTEMPTING TO BENEFIT FUTURE GENERATIONS DESTROYS THEM ...................................................................... 191 FUTURE GENERATIONS LACK INDEPENDENT MORAL STANDING ............................................................................ 192 ECOCENTRISM GOOD........................................................................................................................ 193 ECOCENTRISM IS A DESIRABLE PERSPECTIVE .......................................................................................................... 193 ECOCENTRISM IS A VALID PERSPECTIVE .................................................................................................................. 194 ECOCENTRISM BAD........................................................................................................................... 195 ECOCENTRISM IS FUNDAMENTALLY FLAWED ......................................................................................................... 195 4 ECOCENTRISM IS EXCESSIVELY NAIVE ..................................................................................................................... 196 ECOFEMINISM GOOD ....................................................................................................................... 197 ECOFEMINISM IS A DESIRABLE OUTLOOK ............................................................................................................... 197 ECOFEMINISM IS NECESSARY FOR SURVIVAL .......................................................................................................... 198 ECOFEMINISM BAD........................................................................................................................... 199 ECOFEMINISM IS SEXIST .......................................................................................................................................... 199 ECOFEMINISM UNDERMINES FREEDOM ................................................................................................................. 200 ECOFEMINISM RESPONSES ............................................................................................................... 201 ECOFEMINISM DOMESTICATES THE EARTH ............................................................................................................ 207 ECOFEMINISM OPPRESSES WOMYN ....................................................................................................................... 208 ECOFEMINISM CREATES NEGATIVE GENDER BINARIES ........................................................................................... 209 THE MATERNAL ARCHTYPE USED IN ECOFEMINISM IS BAD FOR THE ENVIRONMENT AND WOMYN .................... 210 THE MATERNAL ARCHTYPE USED IN ECOFEMINISM IS BAD FOR THE ENVIRONMENT AND WOMYN .................... 210 ECONOMIC COMPETITIVENESS GOOD ............................................................................................... 211 ECONOMIC COMPETITIVENESS IS A GOOD VALUE .................................................................................................. 211 CRITICS OF COMPETITIVENESS ARE WRONG ........................................................................................................... 212 ECONOMIC COMPETITIVENESS BAD .................................................................................................. 213 ECONOMIC COMPETITIVENESS IS A BAD VALUE ..................................................................................................... 213 COMPETITIVENESS ADVOCATES ARE WRONG ......................................................................................................... 214 ECONOMIC GROWTH GOOD ............................................................................................................. 215 ECONOMIC GROWTH IS A DESIRABLE VALUE .......................................................................................................... 215 ECONOMIC GROWTH IS NOT HARMFUL TO THE ENVIRONMENT ........................................................................... 216 ECONOMIC GROWTH BAD ................................................................................................................ 217 GROWTH IS AN UNDESIRABLE VALUE ..................................................................................................................... 217 GROWTH IS AN INVALID VALUE ............................................................................................................................... 218 ECONOMIC JUSTICE GOOD ................................................................................................................ 219 ECONOMIC JUSTICE BASED ON FAIRNESS AND OTHER POPULAR VALUES ............................................................. 219 LACK OF ECONOMIC JUSTICE EXISTS IN MODERN SOCIETY ..................................................................................... 220 ECONOMIC JUSTICE BAD ................................................................................................................... 221 ECONOMIC JUSTICE IS UNDESIRABLE: WEALTH INEQUALITY IS NOT A PROBLEM .................................................. 221 NO NEED FOR EFFORTS TO ESTABLISH ECONOMIC JUSTICE ................................................................................... 222 EFFICIENCY GOOD............................................................................................................................. 223 EFFICIENCY IS A GOOD VALUE ................................................................................................................................. 223 EFFICIENCY HAS IMPORTANT BENEFITS .................................................................................................................. 224 EFFICIENCY BAD................................................................................................................................ 225 EFFICIENCY IS A HARMFUL VALUE ........................................................................................................................... 225 EFFICIENCY IS A BAD STANDARD FOR JUDGMENT .................................................................................................. 226 ENVIRONMENT GOOD ...................................................................................................................... 227 THE ENVIRONMENT IS MOST IMPORTANT .............................................................................................................. 227 NATURE MUST BE VALUED ...................................................................................................................................... 228 ENVIRONMENT BAD ......................................................................................................................... 229 PRO-ENVIRONMENT VIEWS LACK STRONG SUPPORT ............................................................................................. 229 ENVIRONMENTAL ETHIC IS UNWARRANTED ........................................................................................................... 231 EQUALITY GOOD............................................................................................................................... 232 EQUALITY IS NECESSARY FOR DEMOCRACY............................................................................................................. 232 GOVERNMENT MUST ENSURE EQUALITY FOR ALL CITIZENS ................................................................................... 233 ALL PEOPLE ARE EQUAL ........................................................................................................................................... 233 FAIRNESS IS AN ESSENTIAL PART OF EQUALITY ....................................................................................................... 234 AFRICAN-AMERICANS EXPERIENCE DISCRIMINATION ............................................................................................. 235 WOMEN ARE DISCRIMINATED AGAINST ................................................................................................................. 235 EQUALITY RESPONSES ...................................................................................................................... 236 EQUALITY THROUGH TAXATION IS UNJUST ............................................................................................................. 242 5 PROGRESSIVE IS FAIR, EQUAL IS NOT ...................................................................................................................... 243 AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IS GOOD ............................................................................................................................... 244 EQUALITY PREVENTS REIGHTING HISTORICAL WRONGS ......................................................................................... 245 EXTREME UTILITARIANISM GOOD ..................................................................................................... 246 ACT/EXTREME UTILITARIANISM IS THE MOST RATIONAL MORAL SYSTEM ............................................................. 246 ACT/EXTREME UTILITY SUPERIOR TO RULE/RESTRICTED UTILITARIANISM ............................................................. 247 EXTREME UTILITARIANISM BAD ........................................................................................................ 248 ACT UTILITARIANISM IS AN INSUFFICIENT MORAL SYSTEM .................................................................................... 248 RULE/RESTRICTED UTILITARIANISM BEST TO ENSURE MORALITY .......................................................................... 249 FAUX TEXT, FAUX COMMITMENT: ARGUING AGAINST THE SOCIAL CONTRACT................................... 250 INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................................................................ 250 TYPES OF CONTRACTS .............................................................................................................................................. 250 HOBBES: LAW AS SOVEREIGN COMMAND .............................................................................................................. 250 LOCKE: LAW AS REASONABLE MEDIATOR ............................................................................................................... 251 ROUSSEAU: LAW AS COLLECTIVE IDENTITY ............................................................................................................. 251 ANSWERS TO THE SOCIAL CONTRACT ..................................................................................................................... 252 THERE WAS NO CONSENT ........................................................................................................................................ 253 RESIDENCE DOES NOT IMPLY CONSENT .................................................................................................................. 254 REAPING BENEFITS DOES NOT IMPLY CONSENT ..................................................................................................... 254 THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF MINORITY RIGHTS ................................................................ 255 CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................................................................... 256 BIBLIOGRAPHY ......................................................................................................................................................... 257 SOCIAL CONTRACT THEORY IS GENERALLY FLAWED ............................................................................................... 258 SOCIAL CONTRACT THEORY HURTS MINORITY RIGHTS ........................................................................................... 259 SOCIAL CONTRACT THEORY FAILS WOMEN............................................................................................................. 260 SOCIAL CONTRACT THEORY RESULTS IN INEQUALITY ............................................................................................. 261 CONSENT PRINCIPLE OF THE SOCIAL CONTRACT IS FLAWED .................................................................................. 262 CITIZENSHIP CANNOT BE THE BASIS OF OBEDIENCE TO THE STATE ........................................................................ 262 RECEIPT OF BENEFITS IS NOT AN ADEQUATE BASIS FOR OBEDIENCE ..................................................................... 263 SPECIFIC ANSWERS TO HOBBES ............................................................................................................................... 264 SPECIFIC ANSWERS TO RAWLS ................................................................................................................................ 264 FEDERALISM GOOD .......................................................................................................................... 265 FEDERAL INTRUSION HURTS FEDERALISM ............................................................................................................... 265 STATES SHOULD HAVE MOST RESPONSIBILITY ........................................................................................................ 266 FEDERALISM BAD ............................................................................................................................. 267 STATES ARE THE WORST SOLUTION ........................................................................................................................ 267 Federalism Is A Bad Value ........................................................................................................................................ 268 FEMINISM AND ESSENTIALISM.......................................................................................................... 269 THE CRITIQUE OF ESSENTIALISM DOES NOT DEVALUE FEMINISM.......................................................................... 269 FEMINISM IS SOCIALLY DESIRABLE .......................................................................................................................... 270 FEMINISM IS EXCESSIVELY ESSENTIALIST ................................................................................................................ 271 FEMINISM IS THEORETICALLY INCOHERENT ............................................................................................................ 272 FREEDOM GOOD .............................................................................................................................. 273 HUMAN BEINGS HAVE FREEDOM TO MAKE CHOICES ............................................................................................. 273 AN IDEAL STATE PROVIDES FREEDOM TO ALL CITIZENS .......................................................................................... 274 FREEDOM IS AN ESSENTIAL PART OF DEMOCRACY ................................................................................................. 274 FREEDOM IS ESSENTIAL FOR MORALITY .................................................................................................................. 275 LIBERTY IS A PREFERRED VALUE OVER EQUALITY .................................................................................................... 275 FREEDOM IS ESSENTIAL FOR ANY POLITICAL SYSTEM ............................................................................................. 275 FREEDOM SHOULD NOT BE SACRIFICED TO EQUALITY ........................................................................................... 275 FREEDOM BAD ................................................................................................................................. 276 THERE MUST BE LIMITS ON FREEDOM .................................................................................................................... 276 TRUE FREEDOM DOES NOT EXIST ............................................................................................................................ 277 FREEDOM LEADS TO HELPLESSNESS AND DESPAIR ................................................................................................. 277 6 CITIZENS DISREGARD DUTIES UNDER ABSOLUTE FREEDOM ................................................................................... 277 FREEDOM PRODUCES UNSATISFACTORY RESULTS FOR INDIVIDUALS .................................................................... 278 ADVANCED SOCIETIES DESTROY LIBERTY ................................................................................................................ 278 FREE SPEECH GOOD .......................................................................................................................... 280 RIGHT OF FREE SPEECH IS THE HEART OF DEMOCRACY .......................................................................................... 280 THERE IS NO JUSTIFICATION FOR CENSORSHIP IN A FREE SOCIETY ........................................................................ 281 FREEDOM OF SPEECH ALSO MEANS DUTY TO LISTEN ............................................................................................. 281 FIRST AMENDMENT MUST BE ABSOLUTE IN A FREE SOCIETY ................................................................................. 282 FREE SPEECH IS A VALUED AMERICAN LIBERTY ....................................................................................................... 282 FREE SPEECH BAD ............................................................................................................................. 283 FREE SPEECH RIGHTS ARE NOT ABSOLUTE IN THE WORKPLACE ............................................................................. 283 FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS HAVE BEEN ABRIDGED IN PAST .................................................................................. 283 FIRST AMENDMENT PROVIDES NO PROTECTION DURING WARTIME ................................................................. 285 FREEDOM OF SPEECH IS NOT AN UNQUALIFIED RIGHT .......................................................................................... 286 GOVERNMENT MANIPULATION OF PRESS NEGATES NOTION OF FREE SPEECH ..................................................... 286 PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH IS LACK OF ACCESS TO DISSIDENT VIEWS .................................................................... 286 “GENOCIDE” RHETORIC GOOD .......................................................................................................... 287 WE SHOULD USE “GENOCIDE” RHETORIC TO DESCRIBE ETHNIC CLEANSING ......................................................... 287 KOSOVO IS A GOOD EXAMPLE OF WHY WE SHOULD USE GENOCIDE RHETORIC ................................................... 288 “GENOCIDE” RHETORIC BAD ............................................................................................................. 289 “GENOCIDE” Rhetoric IS USED TO JUSTIFY BAD INTERVENTIONS ........................................................................... 289 USING GENOCIDE RHETORIC OFTEN CAUSES HUGE PROBLEMS ............................................................................. 290 GROWTH RESPONSES ....................................................................................................................... 291 ECONOMIC GROWTH/DEVELOPMEDNT IS HARMFUL TO CULTURE ........................................................................ 297 ECONOMIC GROWTH/DEVELOPMENTCEMENTS PATRIARCHY ............................................................................... 298 DEVELOPMENT IS DEPENDENT ON TECHNOLOGY ................................................................................................... 299 ECONOMIC GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT ARE EUROCENTRIC .............................................................................. 300 HAPPINESS GOOD............................................................................................................................. 301 HAPPINESS IS THE GOAL OF ALL ACTS ..................................................................................................................... 301 A HAPPY PERSON CANNOT SIMULTANEOUSLY BE MISERABLE ............................................................................... 301 HAPPINESS CANNOT EXIST WITHOUT PLEASURE .................................................................................................... 303 HAPPINESS IS DEPENDENT ON ACTION ................................................................................................................... 303 HAPPINESS IS AN END STATE VALUE ....................................................................................................................... 305 ONE CANNOT BE HAPPY IN SOLITUDE ..................................................................................................................... 305 THERE MUST BE VIRTUE IN HAPPINESS ................................................................................................................... 306 MORALITY IS ESSENTIAL IN HAPPINESS ................................................................................................................... 307 HOLISM GOOD ................................................................................................................................. 308 HOLISM IS A JUSTIFIED VALUE ................................................................................................................................. 308 HOLISM IS NECESSARY FOR PLANETARY SURVIVAL ................................................................................................. 309 HOLISM BAD .................................................................................................................................... 310 HOLISM IS INEFFECTIVE ........................................................................................................................................... 310 THE ALTERNATIVE TO HOLISM, REDUCTIONISM, IS NOT BAD ................................................................................. 311 HUMAN RIGHTS RESPONSES ............................................................................................................. 312 HUMAN RIGHTS RISK INSTABILITY ........................................................................................................................... 318 HUMAN RIGHTS RELY ON THE STATE ...................................................................................................................... 319 HUMAN RIGHTS NEGLECT CULTURAL DIVERSITY .................................................................................................... 320 HUMAN RIGHTS DON’T WORK ................................................................................................................................ 321 INDIVIDUALISM GOOD ..................................................................................................................... 322 INDIVIDUALISM IS NECESSARY TO REALIZE DEMOCRATIC IDEALS .......................................................................... 322 INDIVIDUALISM IS DEMONSTRATED IN PRIVATE PROPERTY RIGHTS ...................................................................... 322 INDIVIDUALISM IS A VALUED AMERICAN TRADITION ............................................................................................. 324 INDIVIDUALISM ENCOMPASSES VALUES CENTRAL TO CAPITALISM ....................................................................... 324 INDIVIDUALISM EXHIBITS QUALITIES OF AUTONOMY............................................................................................. 324 7 INDIVIDUALISM PROVIDES FOR RATIONALITY IN HUMAN PLANNING .................................................................... 324 INDIVIDUALISM IS THE SUPERIOR ETHICAL PHILOSOPHY ........................................................................................ 325 INDIVIDUALISM IS NECESSARY FOR PERSONAL FREEDOM AND HAPPINESS ........................................................... 325 INDIVIDUALISM IS BEST FOR SOCIETY ..................................................................................................................... 327 INDIVIDUALISM BAD ........................................................................................................................ 328 INDIVIDUALISM IS PHILOSOPHICALLY UNJUSTIFIED ................................................................................................ 328 INDIVIDUALISM IS RESPONSIBLE FOR HUMAN CONFLICT ....................................................................................... 328 INDIVIDUALISM WILL DESTROY SOCIETY ................................................................................................................. 329 INDIVIDUALISM HARMS LIBERTY ............................................................................................................................. 329 INDIVIDUALISM HAS NEVER BEEN REALIZED IN THE U.S. ........................................................................................ 330 INDIVIDUALISM HAS NOT HELPED WOMEN ............................................................................................................ 330 INDIVIDUALISM RESULTS IN DISCRIMINATION ........................................................................................................ 331 TRADITION OF INDIVIDUALISM PREVENTS EQUALITY ............................................................................................. 332 INDIVIDUALISM IS A MYTH IN A CAPITALIST ECONOMY ......................................................................................... 332 INDIVIDUALISM RESPONSES ............................................................................................................. 333 THE ONCE REVOLUTIONARY PHILOSOPHY .............................................................................................................. 333 THE NOW REACTIONARY PHILOSOPHY .................................................................................................................... 334 NOZICK ..................................................................................................................................................................... 334 RAND ........................................................................................................................................................................ 335 ANTI-INDIVIDUALIST SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT ......................................................................................................... 338 MARXISM ................................................................................................................................................................. 338 FEMINISM ................................................................................................................................................................ 338 CONTEMPORARY LIBERALISM ................................................................................................................................. 339 ENVIRONMENTALISM .............................................................................................................................................. 339 APOCALYPTIC CRITICS .............................................................................................................................................. 340 AN AGE OF DISASTER ............................................................................................................................................... 341 CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................................................................... 341 BIBLIOGRAPHY ......................................................................................................................................................... 343 INDIVIDUALISM IS HISTORICALLY OBSOLETE ........................................................................................................... 344 INDIVIDUALISM AND CAPITALISM ARE UNFAIR....................................................................................................... 344 INDIVIDUALISM IS ETHICALLY FLAWED ................................................................................................................... 345 COMPETITION SHOULD BE REJECTED ...................................................................................................................... 345 INDIVIDUALIST IDEOLOGY OPPRESSES WOMEN ..................................................................................................... 346 THE CONCEPT OF PROPERTY RIGHTS IS FLAWED .................................................................................................... 347 ANSWERS TO ROBERT NOZICK .......................................................................................................... 348 ANSWERS TO AYN RAND................................................................................................................... 349 INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILTY GOOD ................................................................................................... 350 PEOPLE SHOULD ACCEPT PERSONAL RESPONSIBILTY FOR THEIR OWN ACTIONS ................................................... 350 LACK OF PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY CAUSES PROBLEMS ....................................................................................... 351 INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY BAD ..................................................................................................... 352 "PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY" DECREASES SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY ........................................................................ 352 WE HAVE RESPONSIBILITY NOT JUST FOR OUR ACTIONS, BUT OUR NATIONS ....................................................... 353 INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS GOOD ............................................................................................................... 354 INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS SHOULD BE SUPERIOR TO COMMUNITY ................................................................................. 354 CONFLICTS ARE LIKELY WITHIN COMMUNITIES ...................................................................................................... 355 SOCIETY VIEWS LEISURE AS MOST IMPORTANT ...................................................................................................... 356 INTERNATIONAL LAW GOOD............................................................................................................. 357 INTERNATIONAL LAW IS A DESIRABLE VALUE ......................................................................................................... 357 INTERNATIONAL LAW IS A VALID VALUE ................................................................................................................. 358 INTERNATIONAL LAW BAD................................................................................................................ 359 INTERNATIONAL LAW IS AN INVALID VALUE ........................................................................................................... 359 INTERNATIONAL LAW IS AN UNSUCCESSFUL VALUE ............................................................................................... 360 INTERNATIONAL LAW RESPONSES .................................................................................................... 361 INTERNATIONAL LAW DEPENDS ON STATES ........................................................................................................... 367 8 INTERNATIONAL LAWS ARE FORMED BY POWER PLAYERS ..................................................................................... 368 INTERNATIONAL LAW DESTROY’S STATE SOVEREIGNTY ......................................................................................... 369 INTERNATIONAL LAW ALLOWS THE MOST POWER ACTORS TO DICTATE TERMS AND CONDITIONS ..................... 370 INTERSECTIONALITY GOOD ............................................................................................................... 371 INTERSECTIONAL UNDERSTANDING SHOWS WOMEN ARE UNIQUELY OPPRESSED ............................................... 371 UNDERSTANDING INTERSECTIONALITY HELPS COMBAT BOTH RACISM AND SEXISM ............................................ 372 INTERSECTIONALITY BAD .................................................................................................................. 373 INTERSECTIONAL ANALYSIS MISGUIDED AND MISLEADING .................................................................................... 373 INTERSECTIONAL THOUGHT REPRODUCES INEQUITY AND DOMINANCE ............................................................... 374 JUDICIAL ACTIVISM GOOD ................................................................................................................ 375 Courts Should Be Activist ......................................................................................................................................... 375 Critics Of Judicial Activism Are Wrong ..................................................................................................................... 376 JUDICIAL ACTIVISM BAD ................................................................................................................... 377 Judicial Activism Is Detrimental ............................................................................................................................... 377 Judicial Activism Risks Collapse Of The Constitution ............................................................................................... 378 JUSTICE GOOD .................................................................................................................................. 379 SHARED CONCEPTION OF JUSTICE IS ESSENTIAL FOR A GOOD SOCIETY ................................................................. 379 THEORY OF JUSTICE IS ROOTED IN EQUALITY .......................................................................................................... 379 JUSTICE PROVIDES A MECHANISM TO DISTRIBUTE GOODS OF SOCIETY ................................................................ 381 JUSTICE IS A UNIVERSAL VALUE ............................................................................................................................... 381 RESPECT FOR OTHERS ESSENTIAL FOR JUSTICE ....................................................................................................... 382 MORALITY IS NECESSARY DIMENSION OF JUSTICE .................................................................................................. 382 AUTHORITY OF LAW IS DERIVED FROM JUSTICE ..................................................................................................... 382 JUSTICE BAD ..................................................................................................................................... 383 SOCIAL JUSTICE BASED ON CULTURAL RELATIVISM IS FLAWED .............................................................................. 383 UTILITARIAN JUSTICE IS UNDESIRABLE .................................................................................................................... 383 THEORY OF DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE DOES NOT WORK ............................................................................................. 385 UTILITARIAN CONCEPTIONS OF JUSTICE DENY BASIC RIGHTS ................................................................................. 386 RAWLSIAN DEFINITIONS OF MORALITY AND JUSTICE ARE WRONG ........................................................................ 387 WESTERN JUSTICE IS PROBLEMATIC ........................................................................................................................ 388 BUDDHISM PROVES JUSTICE IS FLAWED: KARMA IS SUPERIOR .............................................................................. 389 JUSTICE, ESPECIALLY RETRIBUTIVE, IS A WESTERN VALUE ...................................................................................... 390 WESTERN LOGIC SAYS HUMANS MUST PROVIDE JUSTICE ...................................................................................... 391 THERE IS A BASIS FOR RIGHTS IN BUDDHISM .......................................................................................................... 392 KNOWLEDGE GOOD .......................................................................................................................... 393 KNOWLEDGE IS THE STRONGEST TYPE OF POWER ................................................................................................. 393 KNOWLEDGE PROVIDES PROTECTION FROM POWER ............................................................................................. 393 HUMAN EXPERIENCE PRODUCES KNOWLEDGE ...................................................................................................... 394 POWER IS NOT INHERENTLY GOOD OR BAD ........................................................................................................... 394 THERE IS NO LIMIT TO KNOWLEDGE ....................................................................................................................... 395 POWER IS CONTROLLED BY GROUPS ....................................................................................................................... 395 LEISURE GOOD ................................................................................................................................. 396 LEISURE INCREASES SOCIETY’S PRODUCTIVITY........................................................................................................ 396 SOCIETY’S VALUE INCREASES THROUGH LEISURE ................................................................................................... 397 LEISURE BAD .................................................................................................................................... 398 LEISURE IS NOT VALUED IN SOCIETY........................................................................................................................ 398 LIBERALISM GOOD............................................................................................................................ 399 LIBERALISM IS GENERALLY DESIRABLE .................................................................................................................... 399 CRITIQUES OF LIBERALISM ARE INVALID ................................................................................................................. 400 LIBERALISM BAD............................................................................................................................... 401 LIBERALISM IS AN INADEQUATE VALUE .................................................................................................................. 401 LIBERALISM IS AN UNDESIRABLE VALUE.................................................................................................................. 402 9 LIBERTARIANISM GOOD.................................................................................................................... 403 LIBERTARIANISM IS THEORETICALLY SOUND ........................................................................................................... 403 LIBERTARIANISM IS DESIRABLE ................................................................................................................................ 404 LIBERTARIANISM BAD....................................................................................................................... 405 LIBERTARIANISM IS THEORETICALLY BANKRUPT ..................................................................................................... 405 LIBERTARIANISM IGNORES REAL PROBLEMS ........................................................................................................... 406 LIBERTARIANISM RESPONSES............................................................................................................ 407 LIBERTARIANISMS ECONOMIC POLICIES DESTROY AUTONOMY ............................................................................. 413 LIBERTARIANISM UNDERMINES LIBERAL IDEALS AND INSTITUTIONS ..................................................................... 414 LIBERTARISNISM LIMITS FREEDOM ......................................................................................................................... 415 LIBERTARIANISM PRODUCES RAMPANT CAPITALISM ............................................................................................. 416 LIFE GOOD ........................................................................................................................................ 417 LIFE IS THE HIGHEST VALUE ..................................................................................................................................... 417 OTHER VALUES DO NOT TRUMP LIFE ...................................................................................................................... 418 THE RIGHT TO LIFE IS INALIENABLE ......................................................................................................................... 419 LIFE BAD ........................................................................................................................................... 420 THE RIGHT TO LIFE IS NOT PARAMOUNT................................................................................................................. 420 HUMAN LIFE IS NOT THE GREATEST VALUE............................................................................................................. 421 LIFESTYLE VS SOCIAL ANARCHISM ..................................................................................................... 422 BIBLIOGRAPHY ......................................................................................................................................................... 427 LIFESTYLE ANARCHISM LEADS TO BAD INDIVIDUALISM AND FASCISM .................................................................. 428 LIFESTYLE ANARCHISM FAILS ................................................................................................................................... 429 LIFESTYLE ANARCHISM IS AN IMPERATIVE .............................................................................................................. 430 CRITICS OF LIFESTYLE ANARCHISM ARE MISGUIDED AND DANGEROUS ................................................................. 431 LITERATURE AS A SOURCE OF VALUES ............................................................................................... 432 BIBLIOGRAPHY ......................................................................................................................................................... 436 LITERATURE CAN SERVE AS PHILOSOPHY IN DEBATE .............................................................................................. 438 INDIVIDUAL IDENTITY IS A STRONG BASIS FOR VALUES .......................................................................................... 439 INDIVIDUALITY IS SUPERIOR TO A COMMUNITY FOCUS ......................................................................................... 440 COMMUNITY IS A BETTER VALUE THAN INDIVIDUALISM ........................................................................................ 441 LOCAL GOOD .................................................................................................................................... 442 LOCAL SELF RELIANCE IS GENERALLY DESIRABLE .................................................................................................... 442 LOCAL SELF RELIANCE IS ECOLOGICALLY SOUND .................................................................................................... 443 LOCAL BAD ....................................................................................................................................... 444 GLOBALIST FOCUS IS BETTER THAN LOCALIST ......................................................................................................... 444 LOCALISM CAN BE OPPRESSIVE ............................................................................................................................... 445 LOCALISM CAN BE OPPRESSIVE ............................................................................................................................... 445 MARXISM AND POSTMODERNISM .................................................................................................... 446 Bibliography ............................................................................................................................................................. 450 MARXISM IS “GOOD MODERNISM:” IT STRESSES DEMOCRACY AND COOPERATION ............................................. 451 POSTMODERNISM STOPS PROGRESSIVE SOCIAL CHANGE ...................................................................................... 452 POSTMODERNISM IS GENERALLY DESIRABLE .......................................................................................................... 453 MARXIST MODERNITY IS TOTALITARIAN ................................................................................................................. 454 MISANTHROPY AND EARTH FIRST! .................................................................................................... 456 The reasons this argument keeps coming up in academic journals, movement publications and elsewhere are twofold. For one thing, the issues at hand are of profound importance. There can be no jobs, no fun and no life on a dead planet. On a base level, most everybody realizes that. The other reason is that there are good arguments to be made for both sides. I don't pretend to have a monopoly on the truth here: just an eye for a great subject for debate research. BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................................................................................. 459 BIBLIOGRAPHY ......................................................................................................................................................... 460 EARTH FIRST! IS NOT MISANTHROPIC ..................................................................................................................... 461 CRITICS OF EARTH FIRST! ARE WRONG ................................................................................................................... 462 EARTH FIST! HAS EXHIBITED HORRIBLE MISANTHROPY .......................................................................................... 463 10 MISANTHROPY IS WRONG ....................................................................................................................................... 464 MODERNIZATION GOOD ................................................................................................................... 465 MODERNIZATION NEEDED BY DEVELOPING COUNTRIES ........................................................................................ 465 MODERNIZATION HELPS ALLEVIATE POVERTY ........................................................................................................ 466 MODERNIZATION BAD ...................................................................................................................... 467 MODERNIZATION DESTROYS TRADITIONAL CULTURES ........................................................................................... 467 MODERNIZATION ON BALANCE CAUSES MORE PROBLEMS THAN IT SOLVES......................................................... 468 MULTICULTURALISM GOOD .............................................................................................................. 469 MULTICULTURALISM PROTECTS MINORITY GROUPS .............................................................................................. 469 MULTICULTURAL EDUCATION INCREASES EQUALITY OF ALL STUDENTS ................................................................ 471 MULTICULTURALISM SEEKS TO REPRESENT EXPERIENCES OF ALL PEOPLE ............................................................. 471 MULTICULTURALISM BAD ................................................................................................................. 473 MULTICULTURAL EDUCATION DOES NOT WORK .................................................................................................... 473 RACISM INCREASES TENSION BETWEEN BLACKS AND WHITES ............................................................................... 473 LACK OF EQUALITY IS NOT INHERENTLY IMMORAL................................................................................................. 474 MULTICULTURALISM DESTROYS CULTURES ............................................................................................................ 474 LEGAL EQUALITY DOES NOT GUARANTEE ACTUAL EQUALITY...................................................................................... 474 NATIONALISM GOOD ........................................................................................................................ 475 NATIONALISM IS KEY TO THE FUTURE ..................................................................................................................... 475 NATIONALISM IS LINKED WITH TRUE DEMOCRACY ................................................................................................ 476 NATIONALISM BAD ........................................................................................................................... 477 NATIONALISM IS AN AMORPHOUS CONCEPT ......................................................................................................... 477 NATIONALISM IS A DANGEROUS, FANATICAL WAVE............................................................................................... 478 NATIVE AMERICAN SOVEREIGNTY ..................................................................................................... 479 BIBLIOGRAPHY ......................................................................................................................................................... 484 RESPECTING TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY IS THE ONLY MORAL COURSE OF ACTION ....................................................... 485 TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY IS JUSTIFIED .......................................................................................................................... 486 TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY VIOLATES AMERICAN PRINCIPLES ........................................................................................ 487 TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY DISCOURAGES ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ......................................................................... 488 NATURAL CAPITALISM GOOD............................................................................................................ 489 NATURAL CAPITALISM IS DESIREABLE ..................................................................................................................... 489 NATURAL CAPITALISM CAN ADDRESS CURRENT PROBLEMS................................................................................... 490 NATURAL CAPITALISM BAD............................................................................................................... 491 PROBLEMS INHERENT IN CAPITALISM, NATURAL OR NOT ...................................................................................... 491 NATURAL CAPITALISM ADVOCATES ARE MISLEADING ............................................................................................ 492 NEGATIVE UTILITARIANISM GOOD .................................................................................................... 493 NEGATIVE UTILITARIANISM IS SUPERIOR TO POSITIVE UTILITARIANISM ................................................................ 493 NEGATIVE UTILITARIANISM IS GENERALLY DESIRABLE ............................................................................................ 494 NEGATIVE UTILITARIANISM BAD ....................................................................................................... 495 NEGATIVE UTILITARIANISM JUSTIFIES MISGUIDED AND EVIL PRACTICES ............................................................... 495 POSITIVE UTILITARIANISM SAVES MORE LIVES THAN NEGATIVE UTILITARIANISM ................................................ 496 NONVIOLENCE RESPONSES ............................................................................................................... 497 VIOLENT RESISTANCE IS KEY TO OVERCOMING STATE CONTROL AND DOMINATION ............................................ 503 VIOLENCE IN ORDER TO PREVENT GENOCIDE IS LEGITIMATE ................................................................................. 504 NONVIOLENT RESISTANCE FAILS ............................................................................................................................. 506 NOT IN THEORY OR PRACTICE: ANSWERING MARXISM AND SOCIALISM ............................................ 507 NOT IN THEORY OR PRACTICE: ANSWERING MARXISM AND SOCIALISM ............................................ 507 INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................................................................ 507 UTOPIAN SOCIALISM ............................................................................................................................................... 507 RELIGIOUS COMMUNITARIANISM ........................................................................................................................... 508 THE LABOR THEORY OF VALUE ................................................................................................................................ 511 REVOLUTIONS .......................................................................................................................................................... 511 11 INITIAL SUCCESS ....................................................................................................................................................... 512 THE FALL .................................................................................................................................................................. 512 POST-STALINIST FRAGMENTATION.......................................................................................................................... 513 ETHICAL PROBLEMS WITH SOCIALISM..................................................................................................................... 513 ENDS JUSTIFY MEANS .............................................................................................................................................. 514 THE ECONOMIC PROBLEMS ..................................................................................................................................... 515 ECONOMIC CALCULATION ....................................................................................................................................... 515 SOCIALISM, WOMEN AND THE ENVIRONMENT ...................................................................................................... 515 BIBLIOGRAPHY ......................................................................................................................................................... 517 DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM IS FUNDAMENTALLY FLAWED ..................................................................................... 518 MARXIST AND SOCIALIST THEORIES OF LABOR ARE FLAWED ................................................................................. 519 CAPITALISM IS GENERALLY BENEFICIAL ................................................................................................................... 520 SOCIALISM IS DOOMED BY ITS INABILITY TO ASSESS VALUE ................................................................................... 521 SOCIALISM WOULD FAIL MISERABLY ....................................................................................................................... 522 MARXISM AND SOCIALISM FAIL TO LIBERATE WOMEN .......................................................................................... 522 MARXISM DESTROYS THE ENVIRONMENT .............................................................................................................. 523 OBJECTIVITY BAD.............................................................................................................................. 524 OBJECTIVITY DOES NOT EXIST IN HUMAN INQUIRY ................................................................................................ 524 THERE IS NO JUSTIFICATION FOR IMMORAL ACTION .............................................................................................. 524 A VALUE SYSTEM BASED ON OBJECTIVITY IS UNDESIRABLE .................................................................................... 525 PRACTICE CANNOT BE SEPARATED FROM VALUES ................................................................................................. 525 ORIGINAL INTENT RESPONSES........................................................................................................... 526 BORK'S ORIGINALISM IS HORRIBLE .......................................................................................................................... 532 IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO KNOW WHAT THE ORIGINAL INTENT WAS ............................................................................ 533 ORIGINAL INTENT PREVENTS IMPLEMENTATION .................................................................................................... 534 ORIGINALISM PREVENTS OTHER METHODS OF CONSTITUIONAL INTERPRATATION .............................................. 535 PACIFISM GOOD ............................................................................................................................... 536 PACIFISM SHOULD BE SUPPORTED AS THE HIGHEST VALUE ................................................................................... 536 PACIFISM IS SUPERIOR TO VIOLENCE ...................................................................................................................... 537 PACIFISM BAD .................................................................................................................................. 538 PACIFISM DOES NOT WORK ..................................................................................................................................... 538 HISTORY HAS PROVEN PACIFISM FAILS AND IS COUNTERPRODUCTIVE .................................................................. 539 PARTICIPATORY ECONOMICS GOOD ................................................................................................. 540 PARTICIPATORY ECONOMICS PROMOTES FREEDOM .............................................................................................. 540 PARTICIPATORY ECONOMICS BEST ECONOMIC MODEL.......................................................................................... 541 PARTICIPATORY ECONOMICS BAD..................................................................................................... 542 PARTICIPATORY ECONOMICS BAD FOR FREEDOM .................................................................................................. 542 PARTIPATORY ECONOMICS UNFEASIBLE ................................................................................................................. 543 PARTICIPATORY ECONOMICS ............................................................................................................ 544 BIBLIOGRAPHY ......................................................................................................................................................... 549 PARTICIPATORY ECONOMICS IS FEASIBLE AND WOULD WORK WELL .................................................................... 550 PARTICIPATORY ECONOMICS IMPROVES OTHER STRUCTURES IN SOCIETY ............................................................ 551 PARTICIPATORY ECONOMICS IS UNWORKABLE ...................................................................................................... 552 PARTICIPATORY ECONOMICS WOULD UNDERMINE LIBERTY .................................................................................. 553 PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY ............................................................................................................... 554 BIBLIOGRAPHY ......................................................................................................................................................... 558 SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY IS SUPERIOR TO PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY .................................................................... 559 INDIVIDUALS ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR USES OF US POWER ...................................................................................... 560 PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY IS BETTER THAN SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY .................................................................... 561 USES OF US POWER ARE BENEVOLENT ................................................................................................................... 562 PHILOSOPHY GOOD .......................................................................................................................... 563 PHILOSOPHY HELPS EVERYONE, EVEN NON-PHILOSOPHERS .................................................................................. 563 PHILOSOPHY LEADS TO HUMAN FREEDOM............................................................................................................. 564 PHILOSOPHY BAD ............................................................................................................................. 565 12 PHILOSOPHY IS NOT HELPFUL .................................................................................................................................. 565 PHILOSOPHY IMPEDES INTELLECTUAL PROGRESS ................................................................................................... 566 PLURALISM GOOD ............................................................................................................................ 567 PLURALISM MORE REALISTIC AND LOGICAL THAN ALTERNATIVES ......................................................................... 567 PLURALISM BRINGS STABILITY AND A MORE DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY ..................................................................... 568 PLURALISM BAD ............................................................................................................................... 569 PLURALIST ANALYSIS OF THE WORLD OBSCURES REAL TRUTHS ............................................................................. 569 PLURALIST OUTLOOK STOPS SOCIAL HARMONY, LEADS TO DISCRIMINATION ....................................................... 570 POSTMODERNISM GOOD.................................................................................................................. 571 POSTMODERNISM IS A DESIRABLE VALUE............................................................................................................... 571 POSTMODERNISM STOPS DOMINATION ................................................................................................................. 572 POSTMODERNISM BAD..................................................................................................................... 573 POSTMODERNISM ENTRENCHES THE VERY CAPITALIST SYSTEM IT CRITIQUES ...................................................... 573 SHOULDN'T TRY TO MOVE OUT OF MODERNISM ................................................................................................... 574 PRAGMATISM GOOD ........................................................................................................................ 575 PRAGMATISM AS ESPOUSED BY RORTY IS GOOD .................................................................................................... 575 CRITICS OF RORTY ARE MISTAKEN ........................................................................................................................... 576 PRAGMATISM BAD ........................................................................................................................... 577 RORTY’S PRAGMATISM IS UNDESIREABLE ............................................................................................................... 577 RORTY’S PRAGMATISM LEADS TO INEQUALITY ....................................................................................................... 578 PRAGMATISM RESPONSES ................................................................................................................ 579 PRAGMATISM HARMS WOMEN .............................................................................................................................. 585 PRAGMATISM IS INNEFICIENT ................................................................................................................................. 586 PRAGMATISM FAILS TO ACHIEVE ANYTHING .......................................................................................................... 587 TRADITIONAL PHILOSOPHICAL QUESTIONS HAVE VALUE ....................................................................................... 588 PRAXIS GOOD ................................................................................................................................... 589 WE NEED PRAXIS TO OVERCOME OPPRESSION ....................................................................................................... 589 VALUES WITHOUT FRAMEWORK FOR ACHIEVING THEM ARE USELESS .................................................................. 590 PRAXIS BAD ...................................................................................................................................... 591 PRAXIS HURTS HUMAN CULTURE AND SPIRITUAL LIBERATION .............................................................................. 591 CRITICAL ANALYSIS KEY TO ANY FUTURE CHANGE .................................................................................................. 592 THEORETICAL CRITICISM IS NECESSARY FOR THE RIGHT MINDSET ......................................................................... 592 PRIVACY GOOD ................................................................................................................................ 593 RIGHT TO PRIVACY IS COVERED BY LAW ..................................................................................................................... 593 ORIGINAL DOCTRINE OF RIGHT TO PRIVACY IS STILL RELEVANT .................................................................................. 593 VIOLATION OF PRIVACY RIGHTS THREATENS FREEDOM .............................................................................................. 593 FIRST AMENDMENT SHOULD NOT ALWAYS SUPERSEDE PRIVACY RIGHTS ............................................................. 595 INDIVIDUALS SHOULD CONTROL THEIR OWN RIGHTS TO PRIVACY ........................................................................ 595 PRIVACY BAD ................................................................................................................................... 596 RIGHT TO PRIVACY CAN SUPERSEDE FIRST AMENDMENT CLAIMS ......................................................................... 596 PRIVACY UNDERMINES INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM ....................................................................................................... 596 PRIVACY DAMAGES SOCIETY ................................................................................................................................... 597 RIGHT TO PRIVACY SHOULD NOT INFRINGE ON OTHER RIGHTS ............................................................................. 597 PROGRESS GOOD.............................................................................................................................. 599 PROGRESS IS A GOOD VALUE .................................................................................................................................. 599 PROGRESS IS NOT ENVIRONMENTALLY INSENSITIVE .............................................................................................. 600 PROGRESS HAS GOOD CONSEQUENCES .................................................................................................................. 601 PROGRESS BAD................................................................................................................................. 602 PROGRESS IS A DESTRUCTIVE VALUE--ESPECIALLY TO THE ENVIRONMENT ........................................................... 602 PROGRESS IS HARMFUL SOCIALLY ........................................................................................................................... 603 PROPERTY RIGHTS GOOD.................................................................................................................. 604 PROPERTY RIGHTS ARE BENEFICIAL ......................................................................................................................... 604 13 PROPERTY RIGHTS ARE A DESIRABLE VALUE ........................................................................................................... 605 PROPERTY RIGHTS BAD..................................................................................................................... 606 PROPERTY RIGHTS LACK JUSTIFICATION AND SUPPORT ......................................................................................... 606 PROPERTY RIGHTS ARE AN UNDESIRABLE VALUE ................................................................................................... 607 RATIONALITY GOOD ......................................................................................................................... 608 RATIONALITY IS THE PARAMOUNT VALUE .............................................................................................................. 608 NO OBSTACLES EXIST TO BEING RATIONAL ............................................................................................................. 609 RATIONALITY BAD ............................................................................................................................ 610 TOO MANY OBSTACLES PREVENT RATIONALITY FROM OCCURRING ...................................................................... 610 RATIONALITY EQUALS UNHAPPINESS ...................................................................................................................... 611 RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY ............................................................................................................... 612 Bibliography ............................................................................................................................................................. 617 RATIONAL CHOICE IS A SUPERIOR PARADIGM FOR POLITICAL DISCUSSIONS ......................................................... 618 RATIONAL SELF-INTEREST OUGHT TO GUIDE DECISIONMAKING ............................................................................ 619 RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY IS FLAWED ................................................................................................................... 620 RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY IS DESTRUCTIVE ........................................................................................................... 621 REALISM GOOD ................................................................................................................................ 622 REALISM IS A WELL SUPPORTED PARADIGM ........................................................................................................... 622 REALISM IS A DESIRABLE FRAMEWORK ................................................................................................................... 623 REALISM BAD ................................................................................................................................... 624 REALISM IS A FAILED FRAMEWORK ......................................................................................................................... 624 REALISM IS AN UNDESIRABLE FRAMEWORK ........................................................................................................... 625 REPUBLICANISM GOOD .................................................................................................................... 626 REPUBLICANISM/ELITE DEMOCRACY BEST FOR SOCIETY ........................................................................................ 626 REPUBLICANISM IS BEST: POPULAR DEMOCRACY IMPOSSIBLE AND INEFFECTUAL ................................................ 627 REPUBLICANISM BAD ....................................................................................................................... 628 REPUBLICANISM/ELITE DEMOCRACY IS TOTALITARIAN .......................................................................................... 628 REPUBLICAN DEMOCRACY/SAYING THE WISE SHOULD RULE IS INCORRECT .......................................................... 629 REVOLUTION GOOD.......................................................................................................................... 630 RIGHT TO REVOLT IS ESSENTIAL TO A DEMOCRACY ................................................................................................ 630 REVOLUTIONS ARE NECESSARY TO LIBERATE SOCIETY............................................................................................ 631 REVOLUTION IS JUSTIFIED TO OVERTHROW THE STATUS QUO .............................................................................. 631 REVOLUTION BAD............................................................................................................................. 632 VIOLENCE IS NECESSARY FOR SUCCESSFUL REVOLUTION ....................................................................................... 632 REVOLUTIONS IMPEDE PROGRESS IN A SOCIETY .................................................................................................... 632 RIGHTS GOOD .................................................................................................................................. 633 SOCIETY MUST PROTECT RIGHTS ............................................................................................................................. 633 RIGHTS ARE LEGITIMATE AND BENEFICIAL .............................................................................................................. 634 RIGHTS ARE PARAMOUNT ....................................................................................................................................... 634 RIGHTS BAD ..................................................................................................................................... 636 RIGHTS ARE HARMFUL AND ILLEGITIMATE ............................................................................................................. 636 RIGHTS ARE NOT ABSOLUTE .................................................................................................................................... 637 GRANTING RIGHTS JUST UNDERMINES OTHER RIGHTS .......................................................................................... 638 SECURITY GOOD ............................................................................................................................... 639 SECURITY SHOULD BE THE PARAMOUNT VALUE ..................................................................................................... 639 SECURITY IS DESIRABLE ............................................................................................................................................ 640 SECURITY BAD .................................................................................................................................. 641 MANY THINGS ARE NEEDED FOR SECURITY TO EXIST ............................................................................................. 641 SECURITY IS IMPOSSIBLE .......................................................................................................................................... 642 SELF-DETERMINATION GOOD............................................................................................................ 643 SELF-DETERMINATION IS ESSENTIAL FOR RIGHTS ................................................................................................... 643 SELF-DETERMINATION IS MORALLY CORRECT ......................................................................................................... 643 SELF-DETERMINATION DOES NOT EQUAL HORRIFIC SECESSIONISM ...................................................................... 644 14 SELF-DETERMINATION BAD............................................................................................................... 645 BETTER VALUE ALTERNATIVES TO SELF-DETERMINATION EXIST............................................................................. 645 SELF-DETERMINATION DESTROYS DEMOCRACY ..................................................................................................... 646 SOCIALISM GOOD ............................................................................................................................. 647 SOCIALISM WILL SAVE HUMANITY FROM DESTRUCTION OF CAPITALISM .............................................................. 647 SOCIALISM IS BENEFICIAL TO WOMEN .................................................................................................................... 647 TRUE COMMUNISM WILL CREATE EGALITARIAN SOCIETY ...................................................................................... 648 END OF COLD WAR IS AN OPPORTUNITY FOR SOCIALISM ...................................................................................... 649 SOCIALISM PROTECTS PRIVATE PROPERTY .............................................................................................................. 649 SOCIALISM BAD ................................................................................................................................ 650 COMMUNIST REGIMES DENY PRINCIPLES OF DEMOCRACY .................................................................................... 650 SOCIALISM IS DYING THROUGHOUT THE WORLD ................................................................................................... 650 SOCIALIST STATISM DESTROYS ECONOMIES ........................................................................................................... 651 MARXIST PHILOSOPHY HAS RESULTED IN SOCIAL FAILURE ..................................................................................... 651 SOCIALISM DOES NOT IMPROVE ECONOMIC CONDITIONS .................................................................................... 652 MARXISM IS OPPRESSIVE TO AFRICAN-AMERICANS ............................................................................................... 652 STATISM RESPONSES ........................................................................................................................ 653 THE STATE IS CRITICAL TO PROTECTING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS ................................................................................. 659 STATES CREATE A BETTER WORLD BY PREVENTING VIOLENCE ............................................................................... 660 THE STATE BEST PROVIDES NECESSITIES FOR LIVING .............................................................................................. 661 THE STATE BEST RUNS THE ECONOMY .................................................................................................................... 662 SUFFERING CAUSES NEW AWARENESS ................................................................................................................... 663 SUFFERING SHOWS US THE MEANING OF LIFE ....................................................................................................... 663 THE WAY WE ACCEPT SUFFERING IS KEY ................................................................................................................. 664 SUFFERING BAD................................................................................................................................ 665 ALLOWING SUFFERING IS IMMORAL AND UNJUST ................................................................................................. 665 SUFFERING DOES NOT CAUSE TRANSFORMATION.................................................................................................. 667 SUSTAINABILITY GOOD ..................................................................................................................... 668 SUSTAINABILITY IS A DESIRABLE VALUE SYSTEM ..................................................................................................... 668 SUSTAINABILITY IS A VALID VALUE SYSTEM ............................................................................................................ 669 SUSTAINABILITY BAD ........................................................................................................................ 670 SUSTAINABILITY IS AN UNDESIRABLE VALUE ........................................................................................................... 670 TAX RELIEF GOOD ............................................................................................................................. 671 TAX RELIEF IS NECESSARY ........................................................................................................................................ 671 ECOLOGICAL TAXES RELIEVE TAX BURDEN, HELP ENVIRONMENT .......................................................................... 672 TAX RELIEF BAD ................................................................................................................................ 673 TAX RELIEF IS NOT WARRANTED ............................................................................................................................. 673 ECOLOGICAL TAXES ARE NOT JUSTIFIED .................................................................................................................. 674 TECHNOCENTRISM BAD .................................................................................................................... 675 TECHNOCENTRISM IS SHALLOW AND UNSUSTAINABLE .......................................................................................... 675 TECHNOCENTRISM IS AN UNDESIRABLE APPROACH TO NATURE ........................................................................... 676 TECHNOLOGY GOOD......................................................................................................................... 677 TECHNOLOGY HAS RAISED OUR STANDARD OF LIVING .......................................................................................... 677 WOMEN MUST PARTICIPATE IN TECHNOLOGY ....................................................................................................... 677 BENEFITS OF TECHNOLOGY OUTWEIGH RISKS ........................................................................................................ 679 TECHNOLOGY SHAPES OUR CULTURE ..................................................................................................................... 679 TECHNOLOGY’S PRESENCE PERMEATES SOCIETY .................................................................................................... 680 TECHNOLOGY CAN IMPROVE SOCIETIES WORLDWIDE ........................................................................................... 681 TECHNOLOGY BAD ............................................................................................................................ 682 TECHNOLOGICAL AND SCIENTIFIC PROGRESS MANIPULATE SOCIETY .................................................................... 682 VALUE AND MORALITY OF TECHNOLOGY MUST BE ADDRESSED ............................................................................ 683 NOT ALL TECHNOLOGY IMPROVES THE QUALITY OF LIFE ....................................................................................... 684 15 INCREASED TECHNOLOGY DOES NOT INCREASE KNOWLEDGE ............................................................................... 684 TECHNOLOGY HAS DESTROYED THE ENVIRONMENT .............................................................................................. 685 TECHNOLOGY OF ADVANCED SOCIETIES DESTROYS THE INDIVIDUAL .................................................................... 685 TECHNOLOGY GOOD......................................................................................................................... 686 TECHNOLOGY IS THE PROTECTOR OF HUMANITY ................................................................................................... 686 TECHNOLOGY PROTECTS THE JOB MARKET ............................................................................................................ 687 TECHNOLOGY IS KEY TO COMMUNICATION ............................................................................................................ 688 TECHNOLOGY IS NOT INCOMPATIBLE WITH ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH ................................................................ 689 TECHNOLOGY BETTERS HUMAN EXISTENCE ............................................................................................................ 690 TECHNOLOGY BAD ............................................................................................................................ 691 TECHNOLOGY DESTROYS SOCIETY ........................................................................................................................... 691 TECHNOLOGY DEVALUES HUMAN LIFE ................................................................................................................... 692 TECHNOLOGY EMPIRICALLY HARMS HUMANITY ..................................................................................................... 692 TECHNOLOGY RESPONSES................................................................................................................. 693 TECHNOLOGY DEHUMINIZES ................................................................................................................................... 698 TECHNOLOGY IS A TOOL OF DOMINATION ............................................................................................................. 700 TECHNOLOGY DEHUMINZES .................................................................................................................................... 701 TECHNOLOGY IS DETRIMENTAL TO THE ENVIRONMENT ........................................................................................ 702 TELEOLOGICAL VISION GOOD............................................................................................................ 703 TELEOLOGICAL VISION SUPERIOR TO DEONTOLOGICAL ......................................................................................... 703 TELEOLOGY BEST FOR ENVIRONMENTAL UNDERSTANDING ................................................................................... 704 TELEOLOGICAL VISION BAD ............................................................................................................... 705 TELEOLOGY IS INFERIOR: INTENT, NOT OUTCOME, IS KEY TO MORALITY ............................................................... 705 MORAL LAWS MUST BE UNIVERSAL AND NON-TELEOLOGICAL .............................................................................. 706 THIRD PARTIES GOOD ....................................................................................................................... 707 THIRD PARTIES HELP DEMOCRACY .......................................................................................................................... 707 THIRD PARTIES ARE EFFECTIVE ................................................................................................................................ 708 THIRD PARTIES BAD .......................................................................................................................... 709 THIRD PARTIES ARE INEFFECTIVE............................................................................................................................. 709 MANY BARRIERS TO THIRD PARTY SUCCESS ............................................................................................................ 710 TRADITION GOOD............................................................................................................................. 711 TRADITION IS A GOOD VALUE .................................................................................................................................. 711 TRADITION IS NECESSARY FOR CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN CULTURE ................................................................. 711 LACK OF TRADITION WOULD BE HARMFUL ............................................................................................................. 713 TRADITION BAD................................................................................................................................ 714 TRADITION IS A BAD VALUE ..................................................................................................................................... 714 TRADITION FOR ITS OWN SAKE IS WRONG ............................................................................................................. 715 TRASHING AND PROPERTY DESTRUCTION ......................................................................................... 716 BIBLIOGRAPHY ......................................................................................................................................................... 720 ANTI-PROPERTY VIOLENCE IS GOOD ....................................................................................................................... 721 PROPERTY ITSELF IS HARMFUL, THUS DESTRUCTION OF IT IS JUST ........................................................................ 722 VIOLENCE IS COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE ...................................................................................................................... 723 TRASHING IS MISGUIDED ......................................................................................................................................... 724 TRUTH GOOD ................................................................................................................................... 725 TRUTH IS INTRINSICALLY AND INSTRUMENTALLY DESIRABLE ................................................................................. 725 FALSEHOOD IS INTRINSICALLY AND INSTRUMENTALLY UNDESIRABLE ................................................................... 726 TRUTH BAD ...................................................................................................................................... 727 TRUTH IS AN INADEQUATE VALUE........................................................................................................................... 727 TRUTH IS AN UNDESIRABLE VALUE .......................................................................................................................... 728 UTILITARIANISM GOOD .................................................................................................................... 729 UTILITARIANISM IS THE BEST FRAMEWORK ............................................................................................................ 729 UTILITARIANISM RESOLVES DISPUTES BETWEEN MORAL CLAIMS .......................................................................... 730 UTILITARIANISM IS BETTER THAN ALTERNATIVES ................................................................................................... 731 16 UTILITARIANISM BAD ....................................................................................................................... 732 UTILITARIANISM USES FAULTY VALUES ................................................................................................................... 732 UTILITARIANISM IS A FAULTY FRAMEWORK ............................................................................................................ 733 UTILITARIANISM CANNOT FIND MORALITY ............................................................................................................. 734 UTILITARIANISM SUFFERS FROM SERIOUS THEORETICAL PROBLEMS .................................................................... 735 UTOPIA GOOD .................................................................................................................................. 736 UTOPIANISM PROMOTES BENEFICIAL SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION......................................................................... 736 UTOPIANISM IS GENERALLY DESIRABLE .................................................................................................................. 737 UTOPIA BAD ..................................................................................................................................... 738 UTOPIANISM IS UNDESIRABLE ................................................................................................................................. 738 UTOPIANISM DESTROYS FREEDOM ......................................................................................................................... 739 UTOPIAN THINKING GOOD ............................................................................................................... 740 UTOPIAN THINKING IS GOOD FOR SOCIETY............................................................................................................. 740 UTOPIANISM IS KEY TO THE SURVIVAL OF OUR SPECIES ......................................................................................... 741 UTOPIANISM BAD............................................................................................................................. 742 UTOPIANISM CAN NEVER BE ACHIEVED .................................................................................................................. 742 A UTOPIAN FANTASYLAND WOULD DESTROY THE HUMAN RACE .......................................................................... 743 VIOLENCE GOOD............................................................................................................................... 744 VIOLENCE IS NEEDED TO STOP STATE OPPRESSION ................................................................................................ 744 VIOLENCE HELPS THOSE WHO ARE OPPRESSED ...................................................................................................... 745 VIOLENCE IS JUSTIFIED IN APPROPRIATE CIRCUMSTANCES .................................................................................... 746 VIOLENCE BAD.................................................................................................................................. 747 VIOLENCE IS WRONG ............................................................................................................................................... 747 VIOLENCE IS HARMFUL ............................................................................................................................................ 748 VIOLENCE DOES NOT TRANSFORM SOCIETY FOR THE BETTER ................................................................................ 749 NON-VIOLENCE IS SUPERIOR TO VIOLENCE ............................................................................................................. 750 WESTERN RIGHTS GOOD ................................................................................................................... 751 BUDDHIST and WESTERN RIGHTS ARE COMPATIBLE .............................................................................................. 751 17 Activism Good SOCIAL ACTIVISM WORKS 1. EMPIRICALLY, ACTIVISM SUCCEEDS WHERE THE SYSTEM FAILS Brian Tokar, teacher at the Institute for Social Ecology and Goddard College in Vermont, Z MAGAZINE, February 1995, p. 12. While the battle for James Bay may not be over, Parizeau's announcement was clearly a victory for grassroots environmentalists and native solidarity activists. While mainstream environmental groups suffer the bruises of interminable defensive battles and compromise away their rapidly diminishing integrity for the sake of watereddown legislative "victories," the James Bay campaign demonstrates that grassroots movements can win where working entirely within the system cannot. 2. SYSTEMIC STRATEGIES ARE INFERIOR TO GRASSROOTS ACTIVISM Brian Tokar, teacher at the Institute for Social Ecology and Goddard College in Vermont, Z MAGAZINE, February 1995, p. 12. National environmental groups like the Audubon Society, the Sierra Club and NRDC did play a role around the James Bay issue, but they generally took a back seat to the initiatives of local community activists. Not that they didn't try to take control of the issue. On many occasions, the national groups sought to capture the initiative around James Bay, with promises of more funds and higher visibility for local campaigns. On a few occasions, they did play an important supporting role: Audubon was the first organization to publicize the issue nationwide, and NRDC used its influence to get a well-publicized hearing for Cree Grand Chief Matthew Coon-Come before the New York State legislature. But while grassroots campaigns made James Bay a highly visible issue in communities throughout the region, the mainstream groups were most notable for their incessant turf battles, broken promises, and continued exploitation of the issue to fuel their own direct mail fundraising appeals. 3. ACTIVIST EFFORTS HAVE BEEN SUCCESSFUL THROUGH DIVERSE TACTICS Steve Chase, activist, Z MAGAZINE, March 95, p. 32. Citizen action in America would have a far less successful record if activists had limited themselves to voting, lobbying, law suits, and the arts of political persuasion. Most of the reforms we hold dear -- from collective bargaining, the forty-hour work week, bans on child labor, voting rights, social security, desegregation, antidiscrimination legislation, to ending the U.S. invasion of Vietnam -- were made possible through boycotts, strikes, sitins, marches, and civil disobedience. These tactics have also been key to the success of environmental groups -- from the anti-nuke alliances of the 1970s and 1980s, Earth First's more recent Redwood Summer campaign, and numerous local environmental justice groups. 4. MANY EXAMPLES OF GRASSROOTS ACTIVISM SUCCEEDING Brian Tokar, teacher at the Institute for Social Ecology and Goddard College in Vermont, Z MAGAZINE, February 1995, p. 12. James Bay is not the only issue where grassroots campaigns of public education, community organizing and direct action have succeeded where the behind-the-scenes lobbying campaigns of the large mainstream groups have accomplished little, while draining the movement's scarce financial resources and activists' morale. The 1980s and early 1990s saw a massive effort to promote incineration as the solution to a growing solid waste crisis in communities across the U.S. A new generation of incinerators were vigorously promoted as sources of renewable energy as well as cost-effective waste disposal, claims which rapidly lost credibility against findings of poor economic performance and uncontrollable emissions of dioxins and other toxic substances. According to Peter Montague of the Environmental Research Foundation, community groups defeated 280 proposed incinerators between 1985 and 1994, some 80 percent of all those proposed. Environmental justice activists, local Green groups, public health advocates, and many others contributed to what may be the most decentralized, least publicized, and probably the most successful multiracial popular movement in the U.S. today. 18 MANY EXAMPLES PROVE SOCIAL ACTIVISM IS SUCCESSFUL 1. ANTI-NUCLEAR MOVEMENT PROVES ACTIVISM’S SUCCESS Brian Tokar, teacher at the Institute for Social Ecology and Goddard College in Vermont, Z MAGAZINE, February 1995, p. 12. Local groups from New York State to California have resisted the federal government's plans to site regional dumps for low level nuclear waste in communities across the country. While these facilities are promoted as repositories for medical waste and radioactive tools, activists have discovered that their main purpose would be to bury the highly radioactive reactor vessels from the scores of nuclear power plants that will face decommissioning in the next several decades. Efforts to prevent the siting of these nuclear dumps have drawn on the methods of the grassroots anti-nuclear power movement of the 1970s and early 1980s that succeeded in reducing the number of nuclear power plants in the U.S. from a planned 300 to 1,000, based on the industry estimates of the mid-1970s, to just over 100. Despite tens of billions of dollars a year in federal subsidies, the nuclear power industry has been unable to license a single new plant since the Three Mile Island accident of 1979. 2. FOREST PROTECTION SHOWCASES THE SUCCESS OF ACTIVISM Brian Tokar, teacher at the Institute for Social Ecology and Goddard College in Vermont, Z MAGAZINE, February 1995, p. 12. Grassroots groups throughout the country have also protected countless acres of National Forest land from logging over the past several years. Small groups of wilderness advocates, field ecologists and activist lawyers have contested logging permits, exposed corporate abuses, and rallied public support for preserving some of the last intact forest land in North America. Meanwhile, efforts to enforce better forest policies through legislation have rarely succeeded on the national level, and Clinton's Forest Service appointees have proved to be as beholden to the timber industry as their predecessors, despite their apparent command of ecological science and environmentalist rhetoric. Several Forest Service and Interior Department employees who were emboldened to speak out for reform by Secretary Bruce Babbitt's early supportive public statements have been summarily fired or simply removed from policy-making positions. It has been up to small, underfunded groups of activists to do the basic work of regulatory enforcement that they once believed the Clinton administration would acknowledge its legal responsibility for. 3. LOBBYING ISN’T THE ANSWER, GRASSROOTS ACTIVISM IS Brian Tokar, teacher at the Institute for Social Ecology and Goddard College in Vermont, Z MAGAZINE, February 1995, p. 12. Many of the environmental laws we now take for granted once represented the system's defensive responses to political and legal pressure for more stringent protections. This echoes the pattern of most of the progressive legislation implemented over the past 50 years. Environmental laws have offered a predictable regulatory framework for abuses that were vehemently opposed by growing numbers of people. However, for the current crop of environmental professionals and lobbyists, legislation is an end in itself. They have become practitioners of what Robert Gottlieb, author of the most politically astute history of U.S. environmentalism (Forcing the Spring: The Transformation of the American Environmental Movement, Island Press, 1993), terms "a kind of interest group politics tied to the maintenance of the environmental policy system." Though Gottlieb tends to underestimate many of the gains of what he terms the alternative environmental movements of the 1980s and 1990s, he carefully documents how mainstream environmentalism came to be redefined "less as a movement and more directly as an adjunct to the policy process." This brand of back-room politics has made it easier for significant numbers of people to be mobilized in reactionary campaigns against further regulation to protect public health and the integrity of ecosystems. In a period when state and corporate bureaucracies exercise unprecedented control over the lives of millions of people, right wing demagogues have been able to depict environmental regulations as excessive constraints on individual freedom, handed down by faceless government bureaucracies. Voters are mobilized by cynical campaigns against "government," while expressions of anxiety over increasing corporate control are dismissed as futile gestures against the inevitable. This trend is unwittingly supported by environmental managers who are more comfortable wielding the instruments of state power -- or the mere illusion of power -- than aiding in the development of participatory means for popular mobilization. 19 Activism Bad ACTIVISM FAILS THE BUDDHIST CRITIQUE 1. BUDDHIST ACTIVISM PROVIDES A WAY AROUND ACTIVISM'S PROBLEMS Peter D. Hershock, East-West Center Asian Studies Development Program, JOURNAL OF BUDDHIST ETHICS, Volume 6, 1999, p. 152. While many Buddhists are rightly committed to working in the public sphere for the resolution of suffering, there are very real incompatibilities between the axiomatic concepts and strategic biases of (the dominant strands of) both current human rights discourse and social activism and such core Buddhist practices as seeing all things as interdependent, impermanent, empty, and karmically configured. Indeed, the almost startling successes of social activism have been ironic, hinging on its strategic and conceptual indebtedness to core values shared with the technological and ideological forces that have sponsored its own necessity. The above-mentioned Buddhist practices provide a way around the critical blind spot instituted by the marriage of Western rationalism, a technological bias toward control, and the axiomatic status of individual human being, displaying the limits of social activism's institutional approach to change and opening concrete possibilities for a dramatically Buddhist approach to changing the way societies change. 2. WESTERN BIASES RENDER ACTIVISM'S PROBLEMS INVISIBLE Peter D. Hershock, East-West Center Asian Studies Development Program, JOURNAL OF BUDDHIST ETHICS, Volume 6, 1999, p. 152. In a liberal democratic context, such a thesis verges on political and philosophical heresy, and if we are hard pressed to take it seriously, it is only because the positive and progressive nature of the changes wrought by social activism are so manifestly self-evident. Unfortunately, if our prevailing standards of reason and critical inquiry are not entirely neutral, the manifestly positive and progressive nature of social activism's history might be the result of a critical blind-spot. In that case, the ironic nature of social activist success would be effectively invisible. 3. BUDDHIST ACTIVISM CHALLENGES BIASES, SOLVES PROBLEMS Peter D. Hershock, East-West Center Asian Studies Development Program, JOURNAL OF BUDDHIST ETHICS, Volume 6, 1999, p. 152. As a way around any such critical lacunae, I will be appealing to such core Buddhist practices as seeing all things as impermanent, as karmically configured, and as empty or interdependent. These practices and the theories adduced in their support mark a radical inversion of the critical and logical priorities constitutive of the philosophical, religious, and political traditions that have governed our dominant conceptions of freedom and civil society. By systematically challenging our bias for subordinating values to facts, relationships to the related, uniqueness to universality, and contribution to control, Buddhist practice makes possible a meaningful assessment and revision of social activist strategy. Importantly, it also opens the possibility of critically evaluating the phenomenon of "engaged Buddhism" and its ostensibly corrective relationship with the root conditions of suffering. 4. ACTIVISM PRESERVES BAD VALUE OF SELFISHNESS Peter D. Hershock, East-West Center Asian Studies Development Program, JOURNAL OF BUDDHIST ETHICS, Volume 6, 1999, p. 152. For the social activist, independence and freedom are inconceivable without secure boundaries between who we 'are' and who and what we 'are-not'. The rhetoric of Western liberalism is that we must be free to resist subordinating, institutional definition -- free, that is, to assert or claim boundaries that are finally self-willed, even idiosyncratic. Freedom, so construed, depends on limited responsibility, limited demands on our time and attention. As the Platonic analogy above suggests, regulation is essential to identity precisely because we are essentially rational beings -- beings who measure and who can be measured; who divide the world into near and far, private and public; who thrive on distinctions of every sort, in fact. Securing the integrity of the individual members of a given class of people in a given society is at bottom a process of legal rationalization -- the creation of an anonymously ordered and yet autonomy-supporting domain. The aims of social activism may be ostensibly 'selfless', but in practice social activism directs us toward the increasing regulation and generic preservation of selfishness. 20 EVEN IF ACTIVISM IS SUCCESSFUL, IT ULTIMATELY fAILS 1. EVEN SUCCESSFUL ACTIVISM BLINDS US TO TRUE PROBLEMS Peter D. Hershock, East-West Center Asian Studies Development Program, JOURNAL OF BUDDHIST ETHICS, Volume 6, 1999, p. 155. Formally established tolerance of dissent and internal critique has become a mark of distinction among contemporary societies. Indeed, with economic globalization and the rhetoric of democracy acting in practically unassailable concert, the imperative to establish and maintain the conditions under which political protest and social activism are possible has become the keystone challenge to developing nations throughout Africa, Asia, and Central and South America. It is not my intention here to question the legitimacy of this challenge. The possibility of dissent is crucial to realizing a truly responsive society capable of correcting its own errors of judgement and organizational practice, and institutional changes of the sort brought about by political protest and social activism have undeniably been instrumental in this process. What I want to question are the prevalent strategies for bringing about such corrections and the axiological presuppositions on which they pivot. Although it may be true that "nothing succeeds like success," it is also true that nothing more readily blinds us to inherent flaws in the means and meaning of our successes than 'success' itself. Critical inattention to the strategic axioms underlying the successful engineering of political and social change might, in other words, finally render our best-intended efforts self-defeating. 2. ACTIVISM REPRODUCES THE CONDITIONS IT TRIES TO SOLVE Peter D. Hershock, East-West Center Asian Studies Development Program, JOURNAL OF BUDDHIST ETHICS, Volume 6, 1999, p. 156. My thesis, then, is a disquieting one: social activism's successes have hinged on its strategic and conceptual indebtedness to core values shared with the technological and ideological forces that have sponsored its own necessity. That is, the same conditions that have made successful social activism possible have also made it necessary. With potentially tragic irony, social activist practices -- and theory -- have been effectively reproducing rather than truly reducing the conditions of institutionalized disadvantage and dependence. 3. ACTIVISM INEFFECTIVELY FIGHTS FIRE WITH FIRE Peter D. Hershock, East-West Center Asian Studies Development Program, JOURNAL OF BUDDHIST ETHICS, Volume 6, 1999, p. 156. Until now, social activists have been able to effectively contest institutionalized disadvantage and dependence at the institutional level, securing basic civil and human rights by using many of the same values and technologies employed in first establishing and then maintaining structural inequity. To the extent that it has been noted, the shared genealogy of social activist solutions and the problems they address has been subsumed under the rubric of a pragmatically justified separation of means and ends. If the present critique has any merit, our thankfulness for the apparent gains made by social activists in promoting basic human dignities must not be allowed to distract us from appreciating the rapidity with which we are approaching a point of no return beyond which fighting fire with fire will no longer be an option. 5. SOCIAL ACTIVISM IS A SELF-PERPETUATING PROBLEM Peter D. Hershock, East-West Center Asian Studies Development Program, JOURNAL OF BUDDHIST ETHICS, Volume 6, 1999, p. 156. With no intended disregard of the passion many activists bring to their work, social activism has aimed at globally reengineering our political, economic and societal environments in much the same way that our dominant technological lineage has been committed to re-making our world -- progressively "humanizing" and "rationalizing" the abundantly capricious natural circumstances into which we human beings have found ourselves "thrown." This shared strategic genealogy is particularly disturbing, suggesting that -- like all technologies oriented toward control -social activism is liable to rendering itself indispensable. If the history of social activism is inseparable from the rise and spread of influential technologies and subject to similar accelerating and retarding conditions, so is its future. 21 Altruism Good ALTRUISM IS A PARAMOUNT VALUE 1. ALTRUISM IS KEY TO THE SURVIVAL OF HUMANKIND Therese Brosse, Head of the Cardiological Clinic of the Faculty of Medicine of Paris University, EXPLORATIONS IN ALTRUISTIC LOVE AND BEHAVIOR, 1950, p. 119. Whatever the socially baleful effects of the lack of altruism may have been in the past, mankind has never before faced the terrifying threat which hatred has produced today. Formerly, the antagonism between men could exhaust itself in innumerable but always more or less limited destructive actions. Today our material civilization has reached a point where, if mankind is to survive at all, an altruistic attitude extending itself over the whole world is essential. In order to met the requirements of the world’s problems and the needs of the present stage of evolution, the feelings of man have to become more and more universal, and integrated in a self consciousness which recognizes itself as being at one with all others. 2. ALTRUISM IS MORALLY DESIRABLE Lawrence A. Blum, University of Massachusetts, Boston, FRIENDSHIP, ALTRUISM, AND MORALITY, 1980, p. 153. One target of Kant’s thoughts here is a certain kind of Romanticism, glorifying in dramatic and intense feeling for its own sake. It should be clear that such a conception has little to do with my view, in which the point is for one to have sympathy, compassion, or concern when appropriate or desirable, not whether one is showy or dramatic about the emotion. Emotion for the sake of emotion is alien to my view. Rather it is because altruistic emotions are forms of (appropriate) responsiveness to others weal and woe that they claimed to be morally desirable. 3. EVEN IF CONCERNED WITH SELFISHNESS, THE BENEFIT OF ALTRUISM OUTWEIGHS Nancy Eisenberg, Author, Arizona State University, ALTRUISTIC EMOTION, COGNITION, AND BEHAVIOR, 1986, p 210 According to the definition of altruism guiding our model, a behavior is altruistic if motivated by: (1) sympathy; (2)self-evaluative emotions (or anticipation of these emotions)associated with specific internalized moral values and (3) cognitions concerning the values, norms, responsibilities, and duties unaccompanied by discernible selfevaluative emotions; or (4) cognitions and accompanying affect (e.g., of discomfort due to inconsistencies in one’s self image) related to self-evaluation vis a vis one’s moral self-image (Blasi, 1983). One could argue that some of these motivations (especially 2 and 4) are not altruistic because they involve regulation of one’s own negative affect; however, such motives are consistent with most definitions of altruism because there is no expectation of external reward for nay of these motivations, and any negative affect is internally generated. 22 ALTRUISM SHOULD BE SUPPORTED AS THE HIGHEST VALUE 1. ALTRUISM IS NECESSARY FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION Gerald Marwell, Department of Sociology, University of Wisconsin, COOPERATION AND HELPING BEHAVIOR, 1982, p 212 At first glance, the importance of altruism for collective action seems obvious, almost necessary. If the logic arising from assumptions of implacably self-interested behavior produces free riding, then the answer to the problem is likely to be behavior that is not self-interested, or altruism. People are seen to cooperate, and to join collective action, because of their desire to help others. 2. LACK OF ALTRUISM IS THE SOURCE OF SOCIAL TENSIONS Therese Brosse, head of the cardiological clinic of the Faculty of Medicine of Paris University, EXPLORATIONS IN ALTRUISTIC LOVE AND BEHAVIOR, 1950, p. 143. Lack of altruism is a source of social tensions which impede the development of altruism, whatever the groups concerned may be (ideological or national). Again, this antisocial attitude appears to be very closely connected for many individuals with the lack of creative training and opportunities for creative self-expression. 3. ALTRUISTIC EMOTIONS ARE STILL GOOD, EVEN WITHOUT TANGIBLE RESULTS Lawrence a. Blum, University of Massachusetts, Boston, FRIENDSHIP, ALTRUISM, AND MORALITY, 1980, p 156. Objecting to the morality of altruistic emotions on the grounds that it encourages us top~ our energies into our emotional responses rather than into genuinely helpful activities falsifies that view in another way. For no matter how much of our own life we actively fashion, thus choosing where to put our energies, inevitably we are faced with many situations in which others are suffering or in difficulty, and in which we are not in a position to help. This will be so no matter how much we choose actively to pursue projects built around beneficent ends and actuated by altruistic motives. And so it is not a matter of coldly turning away from the former situations to seek out the latter. The point is, if my argument is correct, that it is good to respond with sympathy and concern, even when one cannot help, and doing so can convey a good to the person involved even if he is not thereby helped. 4. EVEN IS ALTRUISTIC EMOTIONS ARE WEAK, THEY SHOULD STILL BE PURSUED Lawrence A. Blum University of Massachusetts, Boston, FRIENDSHIP, ALTRUISM AND MORAUTY, 1980, p. 4. Altruistic emotions are distinct from personal feelings, such as liking and affection. The former are grounded in the weal and woe of others, whereas the latter are grounded in personal (but not necessarily moral)characteristics and features of the other person. Altruistic emotions towards someone can occur in the absence of personal feelings towards him; and vice versa. That altruistic emotions can sometimes be weak, transitory and capricious does not mean that we should shun emotional motivation in favor of duty and rational principle. For altruistic emotions are themselves capable of the strength and reliability which the Kantian demands of moral motivation. 23 Altruism Bad UPHOLDING ALTRUISM HURTS SOCIETY 1. ALTRUISM IN NOT WORTH THE COST Morris Silver, Professor of Economics, City College of the City University of New York, AFFLUENCE, ALTRUISM, AND ATROPHY, THE DECLINE OF WELFARE STATES, 1980, p.159. Given the difficulty of comprehending how societies operate and of equal importance, the negligible influence that one individual can exert on social policy, it is predictable that even the most altruistic person would likely conclude that the cost to him or her of becoming more informed exceeded the expected return in social improvement. 2. ALTRUISM WITHOUT FREEDOM WOULD LOSE ITS MEANING J.B. Rhine, Professor of Psychology and Director of the Parapsychology Laboratory at Duke University, EXPLORATIONS IN ALTRUISTIC LOVE AND BEHAVIOR, 1950, p. 173. More specific to the research on altruism, and yet basic too for all mankind, is the question: How free is the individual to love, to cultivate affection, to learn to appreciate others? Now in an entirely physical system such a question of course does not arise; but with the psychocentric view of man, with thought and brain as two relatively different kinds of interacting systems within the individual’s universe, one of these can be to some extent free in its differential functioning from the lawfulness of the other. Freedom could not exist without two or more systems of profoundly different order and character; freedom always means freedom of thing from another. The nature and degree of this freedom seems crucial to the understanding and cultivation of fraternal relations among men. Without some measure of volitional freedom, all other types of freedom have but limited meaning. Altruism without freedom of choice would lose much if not all of its value. 3. MUST HAVE CREATIVITY TO HAVE ALTRUISM Therese Brosse, head of the cardiological clinic of the Faculty of Medicine of Paris University, EXPLORATIONS IN ALTRUISTIC LOVE AND BEHAVIOR, 1950, p. 119. We cannot indeed promote a universally altruistic attitude unless we strive to develop creativity at the same time. Altruism and creativity have a close relationship in their mutual expansion, which we shall examine when we come to deal with the functional unity that presides over the specific problem of human biology. Besides, if civilization is to be perfect at any given period, it must build up constitutions and institutions that will fill the highest ideal of contemporary consciousness. Those human beings who already experience this universal love in themselves facilitate by this very fact the decrease of exploitation and misunderstanding. But the better they are trained to develop an efficient creativity, the better they will help to build this new civilization. 4. SELF CONCERN PREVENTS ALTRUISM Jacueline R. Macaulay, Department of Psychology, University of Wisconsin, and Leonard Berkowitz, Department of Psychology, University of Wisconsin, ALTRUISM AND HELPING BEHAVIOR, 1970, p6 Berkowitz suggests that selfconcern dampens altruism and his paper in this volume presents evidence to support this hypothesis. To the extent that we are self-concerned, we are not likely to recognize the consequences of our behavior for others, and perhaps are concerned with equity considerations at the expense of others’ needs, etc. The research Berkowitz describes indicates that variation in the individual’s internal state - m the degree of self-preoccupation - is at least a partial determinant of whether cues for prosocial behavior will e effective. 5. OVERT ALTRUISTIC ACTS ARE NOT ENOUGH, YOU MUST ALSO HAVE EMOTION Lawrence A. Blum, University of Massachusetts, Boston, FRIENDSHIP, ALTRUISM, AND MORALITY, 1970, p. 143. So the emotion which prompts the act of beneficence has significance beyond its merely producing or being the motive for that act. For the beneficence which is appropriate to the situation will require more than an overt act,, externally described; it will also require certain emotions accompanying the act, or, rather, emotions as integral parts of the action as a whole. 24 ALTRUISM IS NOT MOST IMPORTANT 1. MUST HAVE ENERGY FOR ALTRUISM J.B RHINE, Professor of Psychology and Director of the Parapsychology Laboratory at Duke University, EXPLORATIONS IN ALTRUISTIC LOVE AND BEHAVIOR, 1950, p. 173. Whatever altruism is, this feeling and acting toward another as if he were identified with one’s self we all agree that it is an attracting and restraining force in human life; it exerts power over the work people do in their overt actions. So far as we know too, energy is necessarily expended in the process of directing energy. We are therefore dealing with something energetic, in the accepted sense of the word, in the chain of processes producing altruistic conduct. No matter how far back we go in searching of the starting point, since the result is energetic, the guiding element may be inferred to be energetic too. Love, to be effective, must have some kind of energy. 2. SOCIETY’S PUSH TOWARDS ALTRUISTIC ACTS JEOPARDIZES THE WEALTH OF SOCIETY Morris Silver, Professor of Economics, City College of the City University of New York, AFFLUENCE, ALTRUISM, AND ATROPHY, THE DECLINE OF WELFARE STATES, 1980, p. 159. Altruism, or the “taste” for helping others, is one of the higher needs described by the psychologist Abraham H. Maslow. An examination of the implications of modern consumer- choice theory, together with the review of a substantial body of behavioral evidence, suggests that affluence markedly increases the altruistic desire. Several considerations, including that of inefficiencies associated with the private provision of a public good, cause affluent societies to substitute amelioration by the state for private wealth transfers. Adolph Wagner’s law predicting a rising share of government expenditures seems to hold for altruism. Unfortunately, there is good reason to believe that the persistent and massive nature of the effort to eliminate social problems and improve people’s lives ultimately jeopardizes the health of society. 3. GROUPING TOGETHER IS MORE FAVORABLE THAN ALTRUISM Laurent Dechesne, Professor of Liege University, Emeritus, and Member of the Royal Academy of Belgium, EXPLORATIONS IN ALTRUISTIC LOVE AND BEHAVIOR, 1950, p.229. Social life brings together mainly those persons who are similar, who have common aspirations and emotions and hold the same points of view. They are placed in a mutual position of sympathy, a term which also expresses the affectionate feeling that is inherent in it. Therefore grouping together, life in common, seem to be favorable to the expansion of altruism. The truth of the above statement can be verified in different social groups: villages, cities, nations, and associations of all kinds. It occurs in the same way among workers in the same shop. They are bound by solitary feelings of mutual aid which cannot be found among isolated workingmen. This is the reason that factory wok, which brings the workers together physically, fosters the development of a feeling of fraternity among them and the setting up of unions for the defense of their common interests. 4. MUST HAVE EMPATHY FOR ALTRUISM Jacueline R. Macaulay, Department of Psychology, University of Wisconsin, and Leonard Berkowitz, Department of Psychology, University of Wisconsin, ALTRUISM AND HELPING BEHAVIOR, 1970, p 2 For Aronfreed, altruism is a dispositional component (not a specific form) of behavior which is controlled by anticipation of its consequences for another individual. He regards empathy as essential for altruism. Unless the actor responds empathetically to social cues conveying another’s experience (or to cognitive representation of another’s experience), the behavior cannot be called altruistic. External outcomes to the actor are irrelevant, according to this definition. Behavior controlled by expectation of increased self-esteem is also said to be nonaltruistic. The actor must experience empathic or vicarious pleasure, or relief of distress, as a result of behaving in a way that has consequences for another. 25 Anarchism Good ANARCHISM IS JUSTIFIED 1. ANARCHISM PROMOTES EQUALITY AND RESPECT FOR ALL BEINGS Peter Kropotkin, Anarchist Philosopher, KROPOTKIN'S REVOLUTIONARY PAMPHLETS, 1970, p. 99. By proclaiming ourselves anarchists, we proclaim before-hand that we disavow any way of treating others in which we should not like them to treat us; that we will no longer tolerate the inequality that has allowed some among us to use their strength, their cunning or their ability after a fashion in which it would annoy us to have such qualities used against ourselves. Equality in all things, the synonym of equity, this is anarchism in very deed. It is not only against the abstract trinity of law, religion, and authority that we declare war. By becoming anarchists we declare war against all this wave of deceit, cunning, exploitation, depravity, vice --in a word, inequality--which they have poured into all our hearts. We declare war against their way of acting, against their way of thinking. The governed, the deceived, the exploited, the prostitute, wound above all else our sense of equality. It is in the name of equality that we are determined to have no more prostituted, exploited, deceived and governed men and women. 2. EQUALITY IS THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE OF ANARCHISM Peter Kropotkin, Anarchist Philosopher, KROPOTKIN'S REVOLUTIONARY PAMPHLETS, 1970, p. 98. Besides this principle of treating others as one wishes to be treated oneself, what is it but the very same principle as equality, the fundamental principle of anarchism? And how can any one manage to believe himself an anarchist unless he practices it? We do not wish to be ruled. And by this very fact, do we not declare that we ourselves wish to rule nobody? We do not wish to be deceived, we wish always to be told nothing but the truth. And by this very fact, do we not declare that we ourselves do not wish to deceive anybody, that we promise to always tell the truth, nothing but the truth, the whole truth? We do not wish to have the fruits of our labor stolen from us. And by that very fact, do we not declare that we respect the fruits of others' labor? By what right indeed can we demand that we should be treated in one fashion, reserving it to ourselves to treat others in a fashion entirely different? Our sense of equality revolts at such an idea. 3. ANARCHISTS REJECT POPULAR PHILOSOPHIES FOR TRUE MORALITY Peter Kropotkin, Anarchist Philosopher, KROPOTKIN'S REVOLUTIONARY PAMPHLETS, 1970, p. 83. Such was the way in which the youth of Russia reasoned when they broke with old-world prejudices, and unfurled this banner of nihilist or rather of anarchist philosophy: to bend the knee to no authority whatsoever, however respected; to accept no principle so long as it is unestablished by reason. Need we add, that after pitching into the waste-paper basket the teachings of their fathers, and burning all systems of morality, the nihilist youth developed in their midst a nucleus of moral customs, infinitely superior to anything that their fathers had practiced under the control of the "Gospel," of the "Conscience," of the "Categorical Imperative," or of the "Recognized Advantage" of the utilitarian. 4. FALSE MORALITY COMES FROM THE STATE, TRUE MORALITY IS INNATE Peter Kropotkin, Anarchist Philosopher, KROPOTKIN'S REVOLUTIONARY PAMPHLETS, 1970, p. 98. Even if we wished to get rid of it we could not. It would be easier for a man to accustom himself to walk on fours than to get rid of the moral sentiment. It is anterior in animal evolution to the upright posture of man. The moral sense is a natural faculty in us like the sense of smell or of touch. As for law and religion, which also have preached this principle, they have simply filched it to cloak their own wares, their injunctions for the benefit of the conqueror, the exploiter, the priest. Without this principle of solidarity, the justice of which is so generally recognized, how could they have laid hold on men's minds? Each of them covered themselves with it as with a garment; like authority which made good its position by posing as the protector of the weak against the strong. By flinging overboard law, religion and authority, mankind can regain possession of the moral principle which has been taken from them. Regain that they may criticize it, and purge it from the adulterations wherewith priest, judge and ruler have poisoned it and are poisoning it yet. 26 ANARCHISM IS A SUPERIOR VALUE 1. AFFIRMING THE STATE AFFIRMS ENDLESS WAR AND SLAVERY Michael Bakunin, Anarchist Philosopher, MARXISM, FREEDOM AND THE STATE, 1990, p. 29. But whoever says State, necessarily says a particular limited State, doubtless comprising, if it is very large, many different peoples and countries, but excluding still more. For unless he is dreaming of the Universal State as did Napoleon and the Emperor Charles the Fifth, or as the Papacy dreamed of the Universal Church, Marx, in spite of all the international ambition which devours him to-day, will have, when the hour of the realization of his dreams has sounded for him--if it ever does sound--he will have to content himself with governing a single State and not several States at once. Consequently, who ever says State says, a State, and whoever says a State affirms by that the existence of several States, and whoever says several States, immediately says: competition, jealousy, truceless and endless war. The simplest logic as well as all history bear witness to it. Any State, under pain of perishing and seeing itself devoured by neighbouring States, must tend towards complete power, and, having become powerful, it must embark on a career of conquest, so that it shall not be itself conquered; for two powers similar and at the same time foreign to each other could not co-exist without trying to destroy each other. Whoever says conquest, says conquered peoples, enslaved and in bondage, under whatever form or name it may be. 2. THE STATE WILL ALWAYS DENY HUMANITY ITSELF Michael Bakunin, Anarchist Philosopher, MARXISM, FREEDOM AND THE STATE, 1990, p. 29. It is in the nature of the State to break the solidarity of the human race and, as it were, to deny humanity. The State cannot preserve itself as such in its integrity and in all its strength except it sets itself up as supreme and absolute be-all and end-all, at least for its own citizens, or to speak more frankly, for its own subjects, not being able to impose itself as such on the citizens of other States unconquered by it. From that there inevitably results a break with human, considered as universal, morality and with universal reason, by the birth of State morality and reasons of State. The principle of political or State morality is very simple. The State, being the supreme objective, everything that is favourable to the development of its power is good; all that is contrary to it, even if it were the most humane thing in the world, is bad. This morality is called Patriotism. 3. ANARCHISM PROVIDES REAL JUSTICE, POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC FREEDOM Peter Kropotkin, Anarchist Philosopher, KROPOTKIN'S REVOLUTIONARY PAMPHLETS, 1970, p. 52-3 Anarchists recognize the justice of both the just-mentioned tendencies towards economic and political freedom, and see in them two different manifestations of the very same need of equality which constitutes the very essence of all struggles mentioned by history. Therefore, in common with all socialists, the anarchist says to the political reformer: "No substantial reform in the sense of political equality and no limitation of the powers of government can be made as long as society is divided into two hostile camps, and the laborer remains, economically speaking, a slave to his employer." But to the state socialist we say also: "You cannot modify the existing conditions of property without deeply modifying at the same time the political organization. You must limit the powers of government and renounce parliamentary rule. To each new economic phase of life corresponds a new political phase. absolute monarchy corresponded to the system of serfdom. Representative government corresponds to capital rule. Both, however, are class-rule. But in a society where the distinction between capitalist and laborer has disappeared, there is no need of such a government; it would be an anachronism, a nuisance. Free workers would require a free organization, and this cannot have any other basis than free agreement and free cooperation, without sacrificing the autonomy of the individual to the all-pervading interference of the State. The no-capitalist system implies the nogovernment system." 27 Anarchism Bad ANARCHISM REPRESENTS THE HERD MENTALITY, NOT FREEDOM 1. ANARCHISM CAUSES 'MORAL TYRANNY,' WORSE THAN POLITICAL Paul Edwards, Editor In Chief, THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, 1967, p. 114-5. The problem of reconciling social harmony with complete individual freedom is a recurrent one in anarchist thought. It has been argued that an authoritarian society produces antisocial reactions, which would vanish in freedom. It has also been suggested, by Godwin and Kropotkin particularly, that public opinion will suffice to deter those who abuse their liberty. However, George Orwell has pointed out that the reliance on public opinion as a force replacing overt coercion might lead to a moral tyranny which, having no codified bounds, could in the end prove more oppressive than any system of laws. 2. ANARCHIST NOTIONS OF FREEDOM ARE WRONG Friedrich Nietzsche, Philosopher, BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL, 1989, p. 88. How much trouble the poets and orators of all peoples have taken--not excepting a few prose writers today in whose ear there dwells an inexorable conscience--'for the sake of some foolishness,' as utilitarian dolts say, feeling smart--'submitting abjectly to capricious laws,' as anarchists say, feeling 'free,' even 'free-spirited.' But the curious fact is that all there is or has been on earth of freedom, subtlety, boldness, dance, and masterly sureness, whether in thought itself or in government, or in rhetoric and persuasion, in the arts just as in ethics, has developed only owing to the 'tyranny of such capricious laws'. 3. ANARCHISM REFLECTS THE HERD MENTALITY Lewis Call, Professor of History at Cal-Poly SLO, NIETZSCHE AS CRITIC AND CAPTIVE OF ENLIGHTENMENT, 1995, p. np. A consideration of Nietzsche's views on anarchists will make clear the difficulties involved in placing him within the tradition of anarchism. He writes in Twilight of the Idols: "when the anarchist, as the mouthpiece of the declining strata of society, demands with a fine indignation what is 'right,' 'justice,' and 'equal rights,' he is merely under the pressure of his own uncultured state, which cannot comprehend the real reason for his suffering--what he is poor in: life." Nietzsche goes on to associate the anarchist with the Christian, and to decry both as "decadents." Clearly, these are some of the strongest criticisms available to Nietzsche. That which was Christian, decadent and poor in life was inevitably what he attacked most enthusiastically. Goyard-Fabre suggests that "the reactive passion of the anarchists makes them, like the socialists, men of resentment." Anarchists sought revenge on society; this was precisely what Nietzsche hated in the herd man. Bergmann suggests that Nietzsche saw direct evidence of this anarchistic quest for revenge as he witnessed the particular kind of anarchism that was becoming prevalent in Europe during the 1880s, a brand of anarchism that was heralded by Prince Kropotkin and that became inarticulate in its love affair with dynamite. The anarchist, like the liberal, the socialist and the nationalist, remains for Nietzsche an example of the political herd man, unable to transcend the political tradition of the Enlightenment. 28 ANARCHISM INCORRECT VISION FOR FUTURE SOCIETY 1. RISE OF THE STATE NEED NOT VIOLATE ANYONE'S RIGHTS Robert Nozick, Professor of Philosophy at Harvard University, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA, 1974, p. xi. Since I begin with a strong formulation of individual rights, I treat seriously the anarchist claim that in the course of maintaining its monopoly on the use of force and protecting everyone within a territory, the state must violate individuals' rights and hence is intrinsically immoral. Against this claim, I argue that a state would arise from anarchy (as represented by Locke's state of nature) even though no one intended this or tried to bring this about, by a process which need not violate anyone's rights. 2. ANARCHY WOULD LEAD TO ENDLESS FEUDS, RETALIATION AND VIOLENCE Robert Nozick, Professor of Philosophy at Harvard University, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA, 1974, p. 11. In a state of nature, the understood natural law may not provide for every contingency in a proper fashion and men who judge in their own case will always give themselves the benefit of the doubt and assume that they are in the right. They will overestimate the amount of harm or damage they have suffered, and passions will lead them to attempt to punish others more than proportionately and to enact excessive compensation. Thus private and personal enforcement of one's rights (including those rights which are violated when one is needlessly punished) leads to feuds, to an endless series of acts of retaliation and enactions of compensation. 3. ANARCHIST ARGUMENT ABOUT STATE VIOLATING RIGHTS IS FLAWED Robert Nozick, Professor of Philosophy at Harvard University, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA, 1974, p. 52. Hence, so the argument continues, when the state threatens another with punishment if he does not contribute to the protection of another, it violates (and its officials violate) his rights. In threatening him with something that would be a violation of his rights if done by a private citizen, they violate moral constraints. To get to something recognizable as a state we must show 1) how an ultraminimal state arises out of the system of private protective associations; and 2) how the ultraminimal state is transformed into the minimal state, how it gives rise to that "redistribution" for the general provision of protective services that constitutes it as the minimal state. To show that the minimal state is morally legitimate, to show that it is not immoral in itself, we must show also that these transitions in 1) and 2) are each morally legitimate. In the rest of Part I of this work, we show how each of these transitions occur and is morally permissible. We argue that the first transition, from a system of private-protective agencies to an ultraminimal state, will occur by an invisible-hand process in a morally permissible way that violates no one's rights. 4. WE ARE MORALLY OBLIGATED TO PRODUCE A MINIMAL STATE Robert Nozick, Professor of Philosophy at Harvard University, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA, 1974, p. 52-3. Secondly, we argue that the transition from an ultraminimal state to a minimal state morally must occur. It would be morally impermissible for persons to maintain the monopoly in the ultraminimal state without providing protective services for all, even if this requires "redistribution". The operators of the ultraminimal state are required to produce the minimal state. 5. MINIMAL STATE PROVIDES RIGHTS AS WELL AS INDIVIDUAL DIGNITY Robert Nozick, Professor of Philosophy at Harvard University, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA, 1974, p. 333-4. The minimal state treats us as inviolate individuals, who may not be used in certain ways by others as means or tools or instruments or resources; it treats us as persons having individual rights with the dignity this constitutes. Treating us with respect by respecting our rights, it allows us, individually or with whom we choose, to choose our life and realize our ends and our conceptions of ourselves, insofar as we can, aided by the voluntary cooperation of other individuals possessing the same dignity. How dare any state or group of individuals do more. Or less. 29 ANIHILATING NIHILISM “Life itself is essential assimilation, injury, violation of the foreign and the weaker, suppression, hardness, the forcing of One’s OWfl forms upon something else, ingestion and --at least in its mildest form--exploitation.” (Nietzsche, BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL, 1978, P. 201). The nihilism critique has been a popular position in the last year. Its intended purpose is to call into question the assumptions made in value debate. These assumptions include the idea that one must actually propose and defend a “value” in order to contextualize one’s case. As an answer to resolutions which themselves require value analysis, nihilism serves as a critique of the entire resolution. As a philosophy, nihilism seems relatively new; Nietzsche died at the end of the 19th Century, and since then, young people have often been interested in his works. His unashamed attack on conventional morality strikes many people as progressive. Others see it as the ultimate blasphemy. This notenety and popularity has made it difficult for either side to really be objective about nihilism, since it is difficult to be dispassionate about the philosophy. Many people see the use of the nihilism critique in debate as inappropriate, since it seems to be a critique of advocacy itself, rather than a critique of specific types of advocacy. As with the normativity critique in policy debate, many people see nihilism as an indictment of the debate process itself, and see no alternative to having some level of advocacy--after all, if we do not advocate things, what do we do when we debate? But those advocating the critique respond that there is an alternative; the alternative offered by Nietzsche was a post-value, or post-moral approach to the issues of life, an approach which need not be based on the supposedly eternal truths which had guided humanity until they were no longer capable of being defended. The nihilism position, for example, would say that an affirmative advocating individual rights should simply say why those rights are desirable for the people who receive them, rather than making a plea to some transcendent principle called “freedom.” Likewise with other topics: It is not only unnecessary to advocate a value, debaters of nihilism say; it is also destructive and inauthentic. Nietzsche writes: “Man, a complex, lying, artificial, and inscrutable animal, weird-looking to the other animals not so much because of his power but rather because of his guile and shrewdness, has invented the clear conscience, so that he might have the sensation, for once, that his psyche is a simple thing. All of morality is a continuous courageous forgery, without which an enjoyment of the sight of man’s soul would be impossible” (BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL, 1978, p. 230). In this section we will explore the basic history and ideas of nihilism, then concern ourselves with how to answer this intriguing and disturbing critique of values. THE ORIGINS OF NIHILISM Western philosophy has always had a fascination with Eastern thought. Western thinkers have envied Buddhism’s surrender of control and acknowledgment of silence and nothingness, all concepts which European and American thought cannot grasp because such concepts seem to have no technological or economic value. In the West, such philosophy is usually imported through the “counter-culture,” and Eastern culture makes its way into music or literature before it is taken seriously as a method of thinking. In many ways, nihilism is the Western attempt to do the Eastern shuffle (turn, pivot, step outside of yourself) while holding to the philosophical conventions of Western Enlightenment and rationality. EARLY INFLUENCES Nihilism advertises itself as something new, but the idea of the will to power and the attack on absolutes is as old as Buddhism, as well as the ideas found among the ancient Greek Sophists, contemporaries of Socrates, who argued against the view that there is no absolute truth, that, in the words on Anaximander, “Man is the measure of all things.” Three hundred years ago, in the era of Romanticism, criticism of rationality gained an air of literary and philosophical respectability. Romanticist poets Byron and Shelley believed in something closer to humanity than 30 science, which put humans on the level of animals; reason was only one way of comprehending the world that only centuries before had been seen as a beautiful, terrible, mystical dream; religion which, although it captured the essence of Mans divinity, also separated men from men, and substituted earthly power for divine grace; or progress, which the somewhat Romantic Rousseau had declared to be an illusion, a sign of self-reproducing sickness, which creates the very problems it is employed to solve. Philosophically, Romanticism was concerned with the contradictory nature of The Natural Man, the divine, yet earthly creature in the dangerous and terrible universe. Mysticism was accepted as a legitimate method of comprehension. Significantly, the individual was seen as the starting point, the basis of our own experience and understanding. But oddly, Romantics pitted the individual against nature, a dark and impersonal force resembling the mother-god of old. In the 19th Century, many German thinkers revolted against that country’s “official” philosopher, Hegel, and his belief that existence is a big, mighty, spiritual “System.” Among these was Arthur Schopenhaur, who would make a major impression on the young Nietzsche and who developed an analysis of the will, The World as Will and Idea. that was more comprehensive than Nietzsche’s. Like Nietzsche, Schopenhauer hated women; feared them, really. Schopenhauer was not a “happy” philosopher by any means, with his negative view of the world as the product of malignant human wills and a rough environment. Outside of Germany, Danish philosophical wonder Soren Kierkegaard would change philosophy and introduce existentialism into the phenomenology of everyday life, never having to leave 19th Century Copenhagen. Spurned early in life by the woman of his dreams, Kierkegaard became a reclusive, prolific hermit, writing incredible criticisms of institutional theology, attacking the churches of his time as hypocritical and apostatic, and passionately rejecting Hegelian, or indeed any, rationalism. The cold and impersonal world which had come upon humanity at the advent of Newton, Bacon, and eventually Kant and Hegel, was long removed from the spirit which demanded faith and mutual love and submission from its adherents. Kierkegaard wrote of Abraham nearly sacrificing Isaac at the Lord’s request, reflecting on the kind of radical faith, radical suspension of disbelief, which Kierkegaard believed must have defined Abraham at that moment. In essence, Kierkegaard asks, are we no longer capable of that kind of leap of faith? Rather than basing the personal gesture of belief solely on reason, Kierkegaard rebels, and declares: “I believe because it is absurd.” - Absurdity, the nonsense of the undefined portion of human experience which reason and science cannot grasp, would, because of Kierkegaard, become the slogan of existentialism, which, as an ethical theory, was never more than nihilism with a few morals added. But Kierkegaard’s influence on nihilistic thinking would come from his belief that reason, constructed and systemic knowledge, is oppressive to one’s person. The personal encounter, for Kierkegaard, was “primal” and irreducible to logic. Likewise, Kierkegaard would influence nihilism with his belief that morality cannot truly be systematized. For him, this was because the encounter with God is absolute and transcends all intellectual grasp. Although nihilism theoretically rejects the existence of God, or the ability to found a morality upon God, the idea that systematizing morality actually renders it harmful and oppressive would become a keystone of nihilist thinking. NIETZSCHE One of the least understood of all the philosophers, Nietzsche was fond of scandalizing his contemporaries by asserting the futility and hypocrisy of morality. In order to understand the basis of this argument, it is important to spend a moment on how Nietzsche viewed the world philosophically. To begin with, Nietzsche believed humans were essentially prideful and power-seeking beings. In fact, Nietzsche apparently believed this was true of all living beings, in that they struggle for not only their own preservation, but also to increase their vitality of being. Humans, however, possess traits which distinguish us from “lesser beings,” namely our intellect and creative ability. But whereas most philosophers, influenced by the Enlightenment, believed these traits to be desirable and a blessing, Nietzsche saw them as problematic, at least in a world where truth31 construction occurred as it did. This is because, according to Nietzsche, we use this intellect and this creative ability to invent myths which cover up our more essential traits of power and exploitation. There was a time, says Nietzsche, referring to the Classical period, when humans knew the difference between “good” and “bad” not as moral terms, but as terms which reflected the celebration of life and power. Strong and powerful, f~ that time, meant “good,” while “bad” was a term designating the weak and unmoored. Nietzsche did not offer a great deal of proof for this claim, but it made at least some sense when considering the difference in conventional moral leanings before and after the advent of Christianity. As he put it himself: “Now the first argument that comes ready to my hand is that the real homestead of the concept “good” is sought and located in the wrong place: the judgment “good” did not originate among those to whom goodness was shown. Much rather has it been the good themselves, that is, the aristocratic, the powerful, the high-stationed, the highminded, who have felt that they themselves were good, and that their actions were good, that is to say of the first order, in contradistinction to all the low, the low-minded, the vulgar, and the plebeian”(”The Genealogy of Morals” in THE PHILOSOPHY OF NIETZSCHE, 1954, p. 634). Christianity, said Nietzsche, was, like socialism and other “collectivist” moralities, a denial of our genuine powerseeking being. The “morality” of Christianity, like utilitarianism, was actually “anti-power” since it sought to punish and demonize those who knew how to get what they wanted out of life. Christian morality was also a strategy, performed consciously or unconsciously, to actually increase the power of the weak, in a subversive way, by making people ashamed of power and glory. Oppressed peoples, Nietzsche pointed out, always invent a moral code to “punish,” albeit ineffectively, their oppressors. All the talk of moral absolutes was part of the lie, Nietzsche contended. The problem with such absolutes is that they place limits on things which should be unlimited; there was no reason for humans not to be excessive, Nietzsche reasoned, since that is in fact what we are all about. In place of the glorification of beauty and excitement, the “ascetic” lifestyle eschewed any kind of glory in existence itself. To further explain this notion that arguments which hold that humans should be “humble,” or ashamed of their “baser” qualities, were really hypocritical lies, Nietzsche sought to divide people’s (and cultures’) natures into either Appolonian or Dionyssian types. The former comes from Appolo, who was essentially a god of order, logic and sobriety. The latter comes from Dionyssius, the well-known Greek god of ecstasy, of wine and parties, of loss of control, of living life sensually for absolute primal pleasure; even the hedonists wouldn’t go that far. But Nietzsche would. He longed for humans to embrace naked joy and ecstasy rather than stone-cold rationality. THE DEATH OF GOD “Today, eveiy sort of dogmatism occupies a dismayed and discouraged position--if, indeed, it has maintained any position at all. For there are scoffers who maintain that dogmatism has collapsed, even worse, that it is laboring to draw its last breath. Seriously speaking, there are good grounds for hoping that all philosophic dogmatizing, however solemn, however final and ultimate it has pretended to be, may after all have been merely a noble child’s-play and mere beginning. And perhaps the time is veiy near when we shall again and again comprehend how flimsy the cornerstone has been upon which the dogmatists have hitherto built their sublime and absolute philosophical edifices.” Nietzsche, BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL (1978, p. XI) The Nietzschean phrase (from Thus Spoke Zarathustra) “God is Dead” is often quoted and is the material for many jokes. It is also viewed, understandably, as a blasphemy against believers everywhere. But rather than dwelling on the mere phrase, it is important to understand the larger meaning of what Nietzche meant. After Zarathustra says “God is dead,” he continues, “We have killed Him.” What does this mean? Simply, it means that modern thinking, the systemic and rationalistic paradigms which attempt to bring humanity closer to “scientific” truth, has rendered God “obsolete” as an explanation for the world. Additionally, the believers themselves killed God, Nietzsche claims, because of the hypocrisy of hierarchal religions. 32 Rather than simply interpreting the phrase to mean that a single, all-powerful deity called “God” has died, it is more philosophically useful to interpret the statement as an obituary for absolutes in general, and absolute notions of morality in particular. Morality is “dead” because traditional morals can no longer guide humans in a complex world. In Human. All Too Human, he puts it this way: “The man who wants to gain wisdom profits greatly from having thought for a time that man is basically evil and degenerate: this idea is wrong, like its opposite, but for whole periods of time it was predominant and its roots have sunk deep into us and into our world. To understand ourselves we must understand it; but to climb higher, we must then climb over and beyond it. We recognize that there are no sins in the metaphysical sense; but, in the same sense, neither are there any virtues; we recognize that this entire realm of moral ideas is in a continual state of fluctuation, that there are higher and deeper concepts of good and evil, moral and immoral. A man who desires no more from things than to understand them easily makes peace with his soul and will err (or sin, as the world calls it) at the most out of ignorance, but hardly out of desire.”(1984, p. 53) There are many things being said here, but the most important point is that morality itself is a “weak” perspective that fails to recognize the complexity of human beings. That humans have become this complicated is seen as a vice by the world of morals. Nietzsche, however, recogmzes it as a piece of good news. WHAT IS THE ALTERNATIVE? The “good news” is that humans are ready to stop thinking in terms of absolutes. They are ready to move beyond the traditional conceptions of morality and certitude and recognize the most vital attributes of being human: glorification of power, beauty and ecstasy. But in order for this to happen, humans must give up the search for values. Values separate human beings from one another in an unnatural way, ironically, they also join humans together in an inappropriate way, a way which puts everyone in the same categories instead of recognizing the natural differences which exist, and ought to exist, among us; divisions between nobility and peasantry, between master and slave. From this vision, the idea of nihilism as a “method” began to take shape. The idea is that there are no absolutes, and those philosophical methods which DO assume absolutes (nearly all philosophies, in fact) need to be revealed as being a denial of the ability of humans to figure things out for themselves, not to look behind the real things of this world to find some mystical force, a unifying force, which is unworldly. Again, this need not be religious absolutism; even “atheistic” philosophies like Marxism are absolutist, spiritual, as nihilism sees them, because they assume the existence of transcendent truths. Marxism, for example, assumes a transcendent historical dialectic which shapes history, assumes that humans are subordinate to those larger historical forces. Nihilism sees such metaphysics as a subordination of humans to inhuman principles, and calls for the rejection of such approaches in favor of an authenticity of being grounded in real nature; power, ecstasy, etc. The alternative to absolute values, then? Absolute authenticity. Nietzsche admitted that he was neither the “New Man” of whom he wrote, nor even a leader in the post-absolutist society to come. But he saw himself as heralding the entrance of a new age. He had one foot in the old world, he thought, and one foot in the new. He challenged philosophers to come up with an ethical philosophy based on the truth of who we are: power-seeking, exploitive beings. Nihilism fancies itself a liberator of authentic human knowledge from value-laden knowledge. By recognizing the dishonest nature of value advocacy, nihilism hopes to recover the truth of that which is valued. THE ALLEGED 20TH CENTURY VALIDATION OF NIHILISM Early 20th Century European history seemed to validate much of what Nietzsche was saying. The sudden explosion of technology and industrialization appeared to draw humans away from the core morality characteristic of earlier ages. Two world wars, both involving acts of tremendous aggression and brutality, the latter of the two including the systematic attempt at genocide against certain races, suggested to many people in Europe that we were living in a time in which humanity had been severed from all ties to decency. 33 The theory of cultural relativism, originally nothing more than a useful tool for anthropologists to be more objective when studying different peoples, has also been used to lend a great deal of weight to the contention that there are no absolute values. Cultural relativism holds that each society deteruxines what things are moral and immoral. If indigenous peoples in Canada and Alaska allow their female offspring to die of exposure, for example, we should not condemn them for murder, since to condemn murder is to make a judgment based within our perspective, and which does not account for the perspectives of other cultures. Moral philosopher James Rachels has distinguished six characteristics of cultural relativism, all of which are compatible with a nihilistic view of morals: “1. Different societies have different moral codes. 2. There is no objective standard that can be used to judge one societal code better than another. 3. The moral code of our own society has no special status; it is merely one among many. 4. There is no ‘universal truth’ in ethics--that is, there are no moral truths that hold for all peoples at all times. 5. The moral code of a society determines what is right within that society; that is, if the moral code of a society says that a certain action is right, then that action is right, at least within that society. 6. It is mere arrogance for us to try to judge the conduct of other peoples. We should adopt an attitude of tolerance towards the practices of other cultures. Although it may seem that these six propositions go naturally together, they are independent of one another, in the sense that some of them might be true even if others are false” (Rachels, 1986, pp. 14-5). Interestingly, inspired by nihilism, we could substitute the word “people” for “societies,” and “personal” for “culture.” We would end up with absolute relativism, which many see as the current state of Western society. Such radical relativism would say that different people have different moral codes; that there is no objective standard, that “my” own code of morals has no special status, and so on. In fact, we would be justified in doing this, since it seems completely arbitrary to assume that a society has more authority than any one individual, once we have rejected the notion of moral absolutes. Western Culture has seemingly “lost” its morality. The nihilists think they were right all along. ANSWERING NIHILISM To really refute nihilism requires first an understanding of what nihilism is NOT. It is not the base statement that no truths exist, although the questioning of such truths is critical to its method; nor is it the popular cultural conception of nihilism which calls for people to reject life in general. So many philosophers have assumed this about nihilism that it is safe to say that the philosophy is seldom engaged so much as it is misinterpreted and dismissed. Instead, like all philosophical systems, nihilism must be answered “on its own terms.” This may be more difficult in the case of nihilism because it proports to be a critique of all systems. But that produces a paradox which is the real secret of answering nihilism: It is a system which says no systems are valid, and it fails to apply that truth to itself, knowing that if it did apply such a test, it would then be unable to sustain itself as a critique of other philosophical systems. A philosophy must be able to do certain things. To begin with, it must be consistent with itself. But nihilism cannot be self-consistent, as Chow argues in the evidence in this section, because at some point it must commit to a point of reference within valuing itself. Take, for instance, the metaphysical assumption that Nietzsche makes when he says that all human beings, and indeed all creatures, are driven by the will to power. If any other philosophical system made such a claim, Nietzsche and other niliiists would probably say that the claim was merely an invented truth; indeed, nihilism does not so much say “there is no truth” as it says “all truth is constructed in some way as to obscure the motives that originally existed for creating that truth.” 34 If this is true, then it appears nihilism rests on the very type of assumption that its conclusions would call for us to reject: that there is a covering law, a comprehensive truth, about humanity. Where is the “proof’ that all beings desire power? If it is to be found in science, well, then, nihilism also questions the truthfulness of scientific law. Scientists, after all, are also motivated by things other than the simple search for truth, so their views are as suspect as those of any moralist. Thus, nihiists must be forced to conclude that th~re is no provable motive for the creation of truth. But if there is no provable motive, then there is no way to prove that the search for truth, whether in morality and values or in any other area, is dubious. Nihilism cannot both reject all metaphysics and also embrace the metaphysical notion of the will to power. Another thing a philosophy must be able to do, at least if it is to be a guide for action in real life, is to resolve competing claims. A philosophy is a kind of criteria that justifies choosing one thing over another when the two are in conflict. Utilitarianism, for example, would say that, given two possible courses of action, an ethical person would choose that action that is likely to result in the greatest good for the greatest number of people. Marxism would say that one should choose the action that has the most potential to empower and liberate oppressed classes and groups. But nihilism can give no such guidance, and in fact believes that such guidance is futile anyway. What sort of things does this open the door to? For one thing, it suggests that the only real way to resolve things is to resort to force. Might makes right. As Chow and others will argue in their evidence, this line of reasoning is worse than having no philosophy at all, because the moment force is allowed to resolve claims, we have lost our reasoning ability. Nihiists might reply that, in reality, such claims are resolved through force anyway, so why should we pretend otherwise? But there are two problems with this. First, we don’t really always resolve things through force; for every example of brute competition in the world we can also spot an example of mutual cooperation, the kind of respect that nihiists say is not at all genuine. Once nihilism begins making judgments like that, it becomes its own metaphysical and unproven system. Or to put it in strict logical terms: 1. We should reject all value claims. 2. The claim that we should reject all value claims is itself a value claim. 3. Therefore, we should reject the claim that we should reject all value claims. The second problem with discounting any rational way to solve problems is that it makes the very endeavor of problem-solving meaningless, and this meaninglessness cuts against nihilism as much as it does any other philosophy. It is here where the contradiction Chow speaks of is found. Nihilism claims that individuals are fundamentally autonomous and should exalt their own power. But the moment it allows force to resolve claims, autonomy is no longer possible; power relations are a zero-sum game. The reductio ad absurdum of this thinking is obvious: 1. If nihilism is true, then individuals decide which philosophy is correct by resorting to force. 2. Nihilism is a philosophy. 3. It is possible that opponents of nihilism may be more powerful than nihilism’s supporters. 4. It is therefore possible that nihiists will be defeated in a protracted war of force. 5. It is therefore possible that nihilism will be proven incorrect by force. 6. But if this is possible, then nihilism is both true and potentially untrue. What makes nihilism’s failure to resolve competing claims especially ironic is that nihilism advertises itself to be “the last philosophy” which renders any further systemic philosophy irrelevant and unnecessary. Considering that claim, nihilism should at least be able to resolve simple competing claims. Instead, nihilism defers the question, both claiming its own correctness and claiming no determination of correctness is possible. 35 OTHER PROBLEMS: NIETZSCHE S NATURALISTIC FALLACY PhilosQphy normally makes a distinction between normative claims (those which say a certain state of affairs SHOULD BE) and descriptive claims (those which say a certain state of affairs IS in reality). However, across various philosophical systems, it becomes clear that there is considerable confusion between those two claims and their functions, and there is considerable overlap as well. This is especially true when we confront nihilism’s view of the barbarism of power relations. A reasonable philosophy, or indeed any reasonable observation of the world, would look at the way humans treat one another and wonder, first, if such a thing were desirable, and then, if it were not desirable, how it might be changed for the better. Nihilism cannot do this with respect to power relations because Nietzsche and his followers have assumed a descriptive claim in order to prove a normative claim. The descriptive claim is that all humans strive towards power and exploit one another to that end. The normative claim, however, is essentially the same thing: Humans should openly exploit and embrace their power relations. True, the normative claim also includes a call for authenticity, along the lines of: “Well, if that is what we really do, we shouldn’t lie to ourselves about it.” But this call for authenticity does not yield the conclusion that it is desirable for humanity to return to a state of affairs where power relations were blatant and expected, where masters had slaves and where only the strong survived. One could just as easily claim the complete opposite: That we should be honest with ourselves about how we exploit one another (which nihilism claims we should be) and that FURTHER, we should seek that honesty in order to change ourselves. Nihiists cannot refute that possible opposite conclusion, because to do so, nihilists would have to claim that such a progression would be impossible (an unprovable claim and one which, moreover, smacks of a thoroughly metaphysical fatalism, which no self-respecting nihilist would want), or that such a change would be undesirable (a claim which rests on certain value hierarchies, the entirety of which nihilism claims are unnecessary and undesirable). The contradictions go on and on... What makes nihilism especially dangerous where brutality is concerned is that it actually seems to either blatantly justify barbarism, as explained above, or at the very least, it gives no coherent argument AGAINST the use of barbarism, and in fact makes several claims open to further analysis which must finally conclude that there is no reason we should not treat each other as violently as possible, each person trying to further his or her own ends. What this comes down to is that nihilism says we should reject all faith-based, assumedly true assumptions, and this does two things: 1. It turns upon nihilism in order to prove its absurdity, as explained above; and 2. It justifies the holding of any belief, provided that individuals can defend their beliefs through force. This second implication may very well be a description of how humans behave; it is certainly not grounds for the prescription to behave in such a manner. It is certainly true that humans are often ruthless, unfair to one another, and mean-spirited. But humans can also be quite charitable, loving and forgiving towards one another. There is no justification for either supposing the former traits are ‘more natural’ than the latter, or for discouraging attempts to subvert the former in favor of the latter. Here is where the optimistic, Enlightenment view of humanity must be defended against nihilistic pessimism. Enlightenment thinking sees humans as always self-transcendent, always seeking, many times successfully, to shed traits which they deem to be negative. There is nothing philosophically brilliant about denying the possibility of humans to become better people. There is nothing “novel’ about discouraging attempts to better ourselves. Nor is such pessimism justified in the face of history. After all, we no longer enslave people based on their race; we have decided this is beneath our collective dignity. We no longer allow husbands to beat their wives. We no longer do many things we have collectively decided were brutal and dehumanizing. True, we still allow a great deal of injustice to occur. But we recognize it as injustice, in most cases, and we do our best. One of Nietzsche’s successors, Michel Foucault, has written a series of books calling human progress into question. Foucault argued that those things which we think are progressive in areas such as morality, science, medicine, 36 criminology and the like are actually nothing more than new and improved versions of domination. One example of this is Foucault’s Discipline and Punish, a book dedicated to the notion that we are just as brutal towards criminals as we were five hundred years ago; in fact, Foucault argues, we may be more dominating now than we were then. Hundreds of years ago, we tortured prisoners’ bodies. Now, he argues, we manipulate their minds in order to rehabilitate them. Such mental manipulation, he suggests, is far more dominating and dehumanizing than treating criminals as criminals and not attempting to change them. THE NECESSITY OF VALUES For Leo Strauss, who in this section argues against relativism and for the explicit acknowledgment of values, nihilism is more than simply philosophically unsound; it is also dangerous. Strauss is one of many conservative philosophers who believe that values MUST be seen as universal to prevent humans from stumbling towards self-destruction. Strauss discounts the relativist claim that, since everyone has differing conceptions of values, there are no absolute ones. He makes three important arguments in this regard. First, he argues that even though there is widespread disagreement about what things are good and what things are bad, there is still a universal notion of what it means to value things in the first place. He points out that all societies have transcendent values which they see as sacred; these values might differ in certain ways, but the concept of transcendent values is itself universal. For Strauss, this is one reason to reject relativism. His second major argument is a familiar one: There are, in fact, widely held and common values across all cultures. Two of these are the sanction against murder and the sanction against incest. While it might be pointed out that the sanction against murder is not universal, since certain cultures commit infanticide and others favor the death penalty, these exceptions only prove the general nile: Infanticide was permitted because the survival of the entire tribe was often at stake in areas, such as Alaska, where resources are seasonally limited. In the case of the death penalty, it might be pointed out that, whatever the morality of the practice, its intent at least is to send a message regarding the absolute sanctity of life, the absolute prohibition against murder. The existence of common values across cultural differences cuts against the notion that there is no absolute morality. Finally, Strauss argues that these differing conceptions of morality only prove the need to find and hold on to an objective standard of value. The fact that we have not yet been able to find the universality of morality should be an incentive, he argues, not a discouragement, to finding the universals. Strauss believes that societies which allow themselves to move away from common standards of morality are invariably brutal and lack the solidarity necessary for civilization’s survival. Conservatives believe this is true from their observations about contemporary society. Every day we seem to read or hear of incidents which make us fear for who we are: incoherent murders, committed for the sake of a few dollars or a pair of shoes, or motivated by racism or homophobia. We hear about political leaders lying (and getting away with it) and gradually cease to wonder why so many of our children lie as well. This, Strauss suggests, is the outcome of the abandonment of morals. Nietzsche thought we would be better people once we abandoned the archaic notions of morality that governed humanity for so many centuries. Strauss suggested otherwise, and contemporary society may vindicate Strauss far more than Nietzsche. In addition, Strauss makes an even more provocative argument about value judgements: they are inevitable. We cannot avoid them. This is certainly true in the case of nihilism, since to say that values are “bad” is obviously a value judgment. Strauss believes it is true in all cases. Scientists studying phenomena bring their own senses of importance and unimportance into their studies; political scientists and sociologists have notions of good and bad which they may try to hide, but ultimately such deception is unsuccessful. Transc~ident moral principles do exist, he says, and what is more, we search for them in everything we do, whether consciously or not: “All political action aims at either preservation or change. When desiring to preserve, we wish to prevent a change to the worse; when desiring to change, we wish to bring about something better. All political action is then guided by some thought of better or worse. But thought of better or worse implies thought of the good. The awareness of the good which guides all our actions has the character of opinion: it is no longer questioned but, on reflection, it 37 proves to be questionable. The very fact that we can question it directs us towards such a thought of the good as is no longer questionable--towards a thought which is no longer opinion but knowledge. All political action has then in itself a directedness towards knowledge of the good: of the good life, or of the good society. For the good society is the complete political good” (Strauss, POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY, 1975, p. 3). In fact, Strauss argues, trying to hide these value judgments simply makes the values reappear elsewhere, and often in distorted, potentially desctructive forms. At some point we must accept a few things that we cannot necessarily prove. The failure to do this will not make us healthy nihilists; instead, it will make us pathetic skeptics who are unable to function as human beings, period. TOWARDS A MORE OPTIMISTIC VIEW OF HUMANITY In a nutshell, the problem with nihilism is that humanity is not as Nietzsche says it is. True, sometimes we lie to ourselves and to others. Sometimes we cover our brutality up, disguising it as virtue. But we do not ALWAYS do these things, and if we can know the difference between doing them and not doing them, then the possibility exists that we can do them considerably less than we do now. Nietzsche believed some people were born to lead (masters) and others to follow (slaves). He referred to moral codes which advocate equality and cooperation as “slave moralities,” systems invented by the weak in order to impress the powerful into surrendering some of their power. He wrote: “Slave-morality is essentially a utility-morality. Here is the cornerstone for the origin of that famous Antithesis “good vs. evil.” Power and dangerousness, a certain frightfulness, subtlety and strength which do not permit of despisal, are felt to belong to evil. Hence according to slave morality, the “evil” man inspires fear; according to master morality, the “good” man does and wants to, whereas the “bad” man is felt to be despicable” (BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL, p. 206). Are we all either masters and slaves? Hardly. The progress of civilization has shown that different people are “masters” at different things. We have learned that powerful people can lose their power, sometimes involuntarily, sometimes in acts of unbelievable self-sacrifice. The democracy and egalitarianism that Nietzche derided has resulted in a complex society where people once thought to be “weak” and “useless,” such as women, minorities, and the physically challenged, can excell at things that make them valuable both to themselves and to others. There may very well be a “will to power,” but it is better to locate the nexis of that power within society itself, rather than individuals struggling against each other. The atomistic dog-eat-dog world of Nietzsche is as metaphysical, unjustified, and wishful than any metaphysical system he ridiculed. It is curious why nihiists believe that the moral demand of self-restraint is a sign of weakness. From another, more historically aware perspective, it can be argued that such a desire for peace and cooperation is a recognition of our potentially destructive strength, a recognition far more realistic and more grounded in experience than the nihilists realize. Even if, as Nietzsche believed, power is something desirable, niihiists must at some point admit that we will all be much more powerful if we do not destroy ourselves through petty (and not so petty) struggles over resources, prestige and pride. 38 BIBLIOGRAPHY Ansell-Parson, Keith. AN INTRODUCTION TO NIETZSCHE AS POLITICAL THINKER (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994). Devme, Philip E. RELATIVISM, NIHILISM, AND GOD (Notre Dame, md.: University of Norre Dame Press, 1989). Crosby, Donald A. THE SPECTER OF THE ABSURD: SOURCES AND CRITICISMS OF MODERN NIHILISM (Albany: SUNY Press, 1988). Stack, George J. KIERKEGAARD’S EXISTENTIAL ETHICS (Birmingham: University of Alabama Press, 1977). Rosen, Stanley. NIHILISM: A PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAY (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969). Gillespie, Michael Allen. NIHILISM BEFORE NIETZSCHE (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995). Connolly, William E. THE AUGUSTINIAN IMPERATIVE: A REFLECTION ON THE POLITICS OF MORALITY (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1993). Krell, David Farrell. INFECTUOUS NIETZSCHE (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996). Haar, Michael. NIETZSCHE AND METAPHYSICS (Albany: SUNY Press, 1996). Lampert, Lawrence. LEO STRAUSS AND NIETZSCHE (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996). Warren, Mark E. NIETZSCHE AND POLITICAL THOUGHT (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1988). Diethe, Carol. NIETZSCHE’S WOMEN: BEYOND THE WHIP (Berlin, NY: W. deGruyter, 1996). Moser, Shia. ABSOLUTISM AND RELATIVISM IN ETHICS (Springfield, Ill.: Thomas, 1968). Ladd, John. ETHICAL RELATIVISM (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1973). Harman, Gilbert. MORAL RELATIVISM AND MORAL OBJECTIVITY (Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1996). Melchert, Norman. WHO’S TO SAY?: A DIALOGUE ON RELATIVISM (Indianapolis: Hacket, 1994). 39 NIHILISM IS PHILOSOPHICALLY FLAWED AND FOUNDATIONLESS 1. NIETZSCHE’S WILL TO POWER IS INFINITELY REGRESSIVE Stanley Rosen, Professor of Philosophy at Boston University, THE MASK OF ENLIGHTENMENT: NIETZSCHE’S ZARATHUSTRA, 1995, pp. 56-7. The will to power is in fact an infinite regression of points of force. This is what Nietzsche means when he refers to the will as an exotic concept. No apparent cohesions, or what one might call fields of force, have a unifying identity. Hence personal identity is an illusion. 2. NIETZCHEAN CONCEPT OF GOODNESS IS INTERNALLY CONTRADICTORY Stanley Rosen, Professor of Philosophy at Boston University, THE MASK OF ENLIGHTENMENT: NIETZSCHE’S ZARATHUSTRA, 1995, p. 248. Nietzsche’s perception of nobility suffers from two internal flaws that render it unstable. On the one hand, he combines a classical elegance and Heiterkeit, or serene distance, with the sensibility of late-modern skepticism. On the other hand, his perception of human existence is decisively colored by the ideology of nineteenth century materialism, which is incapable of encompassing the concept of nobility, even when it attempts to apply that concept to itself. 3. NIHILISTS CANNOT MAINTAIN THEIR POSITIONS CONSISTENTLY Daniel C.K. Chow, Associate Professor, The Ohio State University College of Law, TULANE LAW REVIEW, December, 1990, p. 224 Nihilism is a difficult position to maintain consistently because it leads to an extreme skepticism and the total rejection of reason, law, and ethics as a means of settling disputes. Indeed, as I argue, even the most avid nihiists, such as Joseph Singer and Cary Peller, must eventually retreat from nihilism and act contrary to the radical consequences of their position. NIHILISM FAILS BECAUSE IT CANNOT RESOLVE ANY CONFLICTS 1. NIHILISM FAILS TO GIVE ANY SOLUTION TO DIFFERING OPINIONS Daniel C. K. Chow, Associate Professor, The Ohio State University College of Law, TULANE LAW REVIEW, December, 1990, p. 290. The nihilists start with the fundamental contradiction. The price of living with others is some compromise of individual autonomy since conflict among individuals is inevitable. At the same time, we cannot do without others since they are necessary to our self-fulfillment. Although others threaten our individual autonomy with “annihilation,” they are nevertheless a necessary part of our lives. The result of living with others, then, is the need to protect our autonomy from violation by others in certain cases. It is impossible~ not to use coercion in our daily lives with others. The fundamental contradiction is precisely that we coerce others in order to maintain our individual autonomy. 2. NIHILIST INDIVIDUAL STRUGGLE CREATES A PHILOSOPHICAL CONTRADICTION Daniel C.K. Chow, Associate Professor, The Ohio State University College of Law, TULANE LAW REVIEW, December, 1990, p. 291. Either extreme position compromises the nihilists’ fundamental contradiction. A position that permits tyranny allows arbitrary violation of individual autonomy and is a rejection of the individual. A position that espouses absolute individual autonomy means that we cannot live with others and thus satisfy our longing for others. Absolute individual autonomy implies an incredible solipsism and a rejection of others. Under either extreme position, tyranny or absolute individual autonomy, we cannot maintain our own individual autonomy, and at the same time engage in satisfying relationships with others. 40 VALUE JUDGMENTS ARE INEVITABLE 1. VALUE JUDGMENTS ARE INEVITABLE Leo Strauss, political philosopher. POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY, 1975, pp. 16-7. It is impossible to study any social phenomena, i.e., all important social phenomena, without making value judgments. A man who sees no reason for not despising people whose horizon is limited to their consumption of food and their digestion may be a tolerable econometrist; he cannot say anything relevant about the character of a human society. A man who refuses to distinguish between great statesmen, mediocrities, and insane impostors may be a good bibliographer; he cannot say anything relevant about politics and political histoiy. A man who cannot distinguish between a profound religious thought and a languishing superstition may be a good statistician; he cannot say anything relevant about the sociology of religion. Generally speaking, it is impossible to understand thought or action or work without evaluating It. 2. TRYING TO REMOVE VALUE ANALYSIS SIMPLY HIDES IT ELSEWHERE Leo Strauss, political philosopher. POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY, 1975, p. 17. The value judgments which are forbidden to enter through the front door of political science, sociology, or economics enter these disciplines through the back door; they come from that annex of present-day social science which is called psychopathology. Social scientists see themselves compelled to speak of unbalanced, neurotic, maladjusted people. But these value judgments are distinguished from those used by the great historians, not by greater clarity or certainty, but merely by their poverty: a slick operator is as well adjusted as--he may be better adjusted than--a good man or a good citizen. Finally, we must not overlook the invisible value judgments which are concealed from undiscerning eyes but nevertheless most powerfully present in allegedly pure descriptive concepts. 3. WE MUST, AT TIMES, BELIEVE UNJUSTIFIABLE IDEAS Daniel C.K. Chow, Associate Professor, The Ohio State University College of Law, TULANE LAW REVIEW, December, 1990, p. 295. Like all other philosophy and like traditional legal theory itself, nihilism must at some point assert beliefs that cannot be rationally and conclusively defended against a skeptical challenge. A life without any belief does not seem possible even for the most radical skeptic. The nihilist must at some point retreat from his extreme skepticism and admit that we must hold some beliefs although we can never justify them. 4. WE MUST CREATE VALUES WE CAN’T OBJECTIVELY PROVE Simone DeBeauvoir, French philosopher. THE ETHICS OF AMBIGUITY, 1972, p. 57. The nihilist is right in thinking that the world possesses no justification and that he himself is nothing~. But he forgets that it is up to him to justify the world and to make himself exist validly. Instead of integrating death into life, he sees in it the only truth of the life which appears to him as a disguised death. However, there is life, and the nihilist knows that he is alive. That’s where his failure lies. He rejects existence without managing to eliminate it. He denies any meaning to transcendence, and yet he transcends himself. 41 NIHILISM’S IMMORALITY THREATENS TO DESTROY HUMANITY 1. WE SHOULD REJECT ANY PHILOSOPHY WHICH ALLOWS REPUGNANT MORALS Daniel C.K. Chow, Associate Professor, The Ohio State University College of Law, TULANE LAW REVIEW, December, 1990, P. 286 My argument is that, as a philosophy for a society, nihilism would permit others to hold any moral position because it becomes impossible to argue for or against any moral position if we do not start with some assumptions. Some individual or groups may then espouse atrocious moral views. This is permitted in a nihilist world. My argument is that we do not wish to adopt any philosophy or position, such as nihilism, that would even permit such a view, whether such a view ultimately becomes adopted or not. 2. NIHILISM THREATENS HUMANITY THROUGH CIVILIZED BARBARISM Nimrod Aloni, Professor of Philosophy at Columbia, BEYOND NIHILISM, 1991, p. 98. There is one aspect of ethical nihilism, however, that is characteristically modem and that constitutes a major threat to contemporary humanity: the rise of the ‘civilized barbarian,” namw-minded scholar, or of the “inverse cripple” and “fragment of humanity” as Nietzsche calls this new type of man. Following the identification of knowledge with scientific knowledge, the increasing tendency to define practical problems as technical issues, and the specialization of knowledge and higher education, we have been witnessing the departmentalization and fragmentation of man himself. 3. NIHILISM SEEKS TO MAKE MURDEROUS AND DESTRUCTIVE ACTS MORE EFFICIENT Nirnrod Aloni, Professor of Philosophy at Columbia, BEYOND NIHILISM, 1991, p. 100. At the same time, individuals and institutions which identify the expert with his expertise, would tend to consider his existence primarily in terms of its utility; they would do, on their part, all they can to utilize the expert’s knowledge and skills and to provide him with the best materials and facilities for the purpose of advancing their own interests and goals. Thus, this particular combination of interests promotes the development of a situation in which highly learned professional persons--who may regard moral, social and political issues as outside their scope--willingly contribute their highly developed skills to the execution of projects and operations whose desirability, or they ends they serve, have been examined carelessly at best. Or eves worse, this may result--as many social and political events in the twentieth century have demonstrated--in efficient utilization of these skills to cany out some of the cruelest, most murderous, destructive, and dehumanizing acts in the history of mankind. 42 NIHILISM DESTROYS FREEDOM 1. NIHILISM JUSTIFIES UNRESTRAINED FORCE, CONTROL AND DOMINATION Daniel C.K. Chow, Associate Professor, The Ohio State University College of Law, TULANE LAW REVIEW, December, 1990, P. 284-5 Opponents of nihilism often attempt to rebut nihilism by charging that it permits the use of force as the final arbiter of human affairs and that nihilism leads to the conclusion that “might makes right.” If there is no rational way to prove that any actions are right or wrong, then ethics and morals will no longer constrain the dark side of human nature. Individuals will engage in an unbridled quest for wealth and power and the powerful will indulge their lust for control and domination. Since power is concentrated in the government, the government will feel free to exercise this power without any limitations whatsoever. Individual autonomy is left completely unprotected from the tyranny of the powerful. 2. IMPOSSIBILITY OF MORALITY LEADS TO THE JUSTIFICATION OF TYRANNY Daniel C.K. Chow, Associate Professor, The Ohio State University College of Law, TULANE LAW REVIEW, December, 1990, p. 285 Yet, the bite of the argument that nihilism permits tyranny is not based simply on the credibility of some empirical assertions about psychological and sociological attitudes. We do not wish to adopt any theory that permits certainmoral positions that are repugnant to our intuitive moral sensibilities, whether there are now some persons who are ready to adopt such positions. If we take nihilism seriously, then it does permit persons to hold repugnant moral positions. Since nihilism asserts that it makes no metaphysical assumptions whatsoever as starting points, then it is impossible to reject any moral position. If we do not start with some assumptions that lead us logically or otherwise to prefer some moral beliefs over others, then it is not possible to argue that any moral belief, no, matter how atrocious, is wrong and cannot be held. 3. NIHILISM MAKES TYRANNY A MORAL ALTERNATIVE Daniel C.K. Chow, Associate Professor, The Ohio State University College of Law, TULANE LAW REVIEW, December, 1990, p. 285-6 In a world without any initial moral assumptions, tyranny becomes an available moral alternative. It becomes possible, for example, for an individual or a group to undertake the view that there is no need to provide a moral, legal, or any form of justification for any acts, including acts imposingsevere deprivations on others through force or coercion. While others may not agree with such a view, under nihilism, they cannot claim that such a view is wrong or should be rejected since there are no shared moral assumptions that provide the starting points for any discussion or arguments. We can only conclude that some positions are wrong if we share some initial metaphysical assumptions about what is right or wrong. If, as the nihilists argue, they have no starting assumptions that are shared, the nihilists are freeto reject some positions for themselves, but they cannot compel others to reject any moral position, no matter how abominable. The nihilists can attempt only to persuade groups to abandon certain views, but if such groups refuse to do so,the nihilists cannot force them to do so. Moreover, the nihiists also cannot assert that these groups are morally wrong. 43 RELATIVISM IS INCORRECT 1. RELATIVISM IS PHILOSOPHICALLY FLAWED Leo Strauss, political philosopher. POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY, 1975, pp. 146-7. The historicist thesis is then exposed to a very obvious difficulty which cannot be solved but only evaded or obscured by considerations of a more subtle character. Historicism asserts that all human thoughts or beliefs are historical, and hence deservedly destined to perish; but historicism is itself a human thought; hence historicism can be of only temporary validity, or it cannot simply be tine. To assert the historicist thesis means to doubt it and thus to transcend it. 2. RELATIVISM IS SELF-CONTRADICTORY Leo Strauss, political philosopher. POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY, 1975, p. 147. Historicism thrives on the fact that it inconsistently exempts itself from its own verdict about all human thought. The historicist thesis is self-contradictory or absurd. We cannot see the historical character of “all” thought--that is, of all thought with the exception of the historicist insight and its implications--without transcending history, without grasping something trans-historical. 3. RELATIVISM CANNOT JUSTIFY ITS OWN ASSUMPTIONS Leo Strauss, political philosopher. NATURAL RIGHT AND HISTORY, 1968, p. 97. For our present purpose it is sufficient to give an analysis of the standard argument used by conventionalism. That argument is to the effect that there cannot be natural right because “the just things” differ from society to society. This argument has shown an amazing vitality throughout the ages, a vitality which seems to contrast with its intrinsic worth. As usually presented, this argument consists of a simple enumeration of the different notions of justice that prevail or prevailed in different nations or at different times within the same nation. As we have indicated before, the mere fact of variety or mutability of “the just things” or of the notions of justice does not warrant the rejection of natural right except if one makes certain assumptions, and these assumptions are in most cases not even stated. 4. DIFFERENT MORALITY ONLY PROVES THE NEED FOR AN OBJECTIVE STANDARD Leo Strauss, political philosopher. POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY, 1975, p. 132. Above all, knowledge of the indefinitely large variety of notions of right and wrong is so far from being incompatable with the idea of natural right that it is the essential condition of the emergence of that idea: realization of the variety of notions of right is the incentive for the quest for natural right. 44 Animal Rights Good ANIMALS HAVE INHERENT RIGHTS 1. ANIMALS ARE SUBJECTS-OF-A-LIFE THAT DEMANDS RESPECT Gaxy L. Francione, Professor of Law and Nicholas B. Katzenbach Scholar of Law and Philosophy at Rutgers University School of Law and co-director of the Rutgers University Animal Rights Law Center, RUTGERS LAW REVIEW, Winter, 1996, PP. 418-419. The basic moral right to respectful treatment is universal: all relevantly similar individuals have it, and they have it equally. Further, the right to respectful treatment is no stronger in the case of moral agents than in the case of moral patients. Both agents and patients have inherent value (based on the subject-of-a-life criterion) and both possess it equally. The right to respectful treatment prohibits treating those affected as mere “receptacles” of intrinsic values, as advocated by the utilitarians. From the right to respectful treatment, another right can be derived: the prima facie right of the moral agent or patient not to be harmed. The harm principle can be derived from the respect principle in that all those who satisfy the subject-of-a-life criterion will have an experiential welfare that can be harmed or benefited, and will be regarded as having equal inherent value. As a prima facie matter, harming the interests of a subject-of-a-life shows disrespect for the inherent value of that moral agent or patient. 2. ANIMALS AND HUMANS SHARE MORAL PREREQUISITES FOR RIGHTS Henry Cohen, book review editor, FEDERAL LAWYER, November/December, 1996, p. 46. But let’s back up a bit. Why should we deem animals to have moral rights? Simply, for exactly the same reason we deem people to have rights: because each has inherent value, for himself or herself, and not, like property, value merely as a means to others’ ends. All but the most primitive species of animals are, like people, sentient creatures who feel pain the same as we do, and who possess beliefs, desires, memories, perceptions, and intentions in ways similar to us. If we have rights on the basis of attributes like these, then animals too should be deemed to have rights rights that may not be sacrificed or violated merely for human benefit. - - 3. ANIMALS AND HUMANS HAVE EQUAL INHERENT VALUE Gary L. Francione, Professor of Law and Nicholas B. Katzenbach Scholar of Law and Philosophy at Rutgers University School of Law and co-director of the Rutgers University Animal Rights Law Center, RUTGERS LAW REVIEW, Winter, 1996, p. 419. The reason for Regan’s abolitionist position should be apparent in light of the foregoing analysis. Regan believes that humans and nonhumans are subjects- of-a-life that have equal inherent value. The respect principle requires that no innocent individual be harmed unless it can be justified without assuming that the fundamental interests of human or nonhuman rightholders can be treated in an mstmmental way. The use of animals for food, sport, entertainment, or research all involve treating animals merely as means to ends and this constitutes a violation of the respect principle. Moreover, ani mal exploiters have no liberty to use animals because the liberty principle allows for harming innocent individuals only when their equal inherent value has been respected. By definition, this is not the case when animals are treated solely as means to ends. 45 SPECIESISM IS MORALLY EQUIVALENT TO RACISM OR SEXISM 1. DENYING RIGHTS TO ANIMALS IS SPECIESISM LOGICALLY EQUIVALENT TO RACISM Gaiy L. Francione, Professor of Law and Nicholas B. Katzenbach Scholar of Law and Philosophy at Rutgers University School of Law and co-director of the Rutgers University Animal Rights Law Center, RUTGERS LAW REVIEW, Winter, 1996, pp. 411-412. In Animal Liberation, Singer argues that in assessing the consequences of human actions--including those actions affecting animals--it is necessary to take the interests of animals seriously. Any adverse effects on animal interests must be weighed as part of the consequences of human actions. Humans fail to do this, Singer argues, because of a species bias, or speciesism, that has resulted in the systematic devaluation of animal interests. Singer claims that speciesism is no more morally defensible than racism, sexism or other forms of discrimination that arbitrarily exclude humans from the scope of moral concern. When people seek to justify the horrific way in which animals are treated, they invariably point to supposed animal “defects,” such as the inability of animals to use human language or to reason as intricately as humans. But there are severely retarded humans who cannot speak or reason (or, at least, can do so no better than many nonhumans), and most of us would be appalled at the thought of using such humans in experiments, or for food or clothing. Singer maintains that the only way to justify our present level of animal exploitation is to maintain that species differences alone justify that exploitation. That is no different, Singer argues, from saying that differences in race alone or sex alone justify differential treatment. - 2. EXPLOITATION OF ANIMALS IS DIRECTLY LINKED TO EXPLOITATION OF HUMANS Adam M. Roberts, lobbyist and researcher for animal protection issues, HOUSTON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, Winter, 1996, pp. 595-596. Famed attorney and nemesis of social inequality, William M. Kunstler, provides an eloquent forward to this volume which should make all who are concerned with a positive legal revolution for the welfare of animals saddened not only by his death, but by the fact that it was not until late in his life that Kunstler realized the importance of legal protection for animals. He made the intellectual and emotional leap into the recognition that animal rights is an issue to be taken seriously by asserting that “our exploitation of animals has a direct link to our exploitation of our perennial human victims: African- Americans, poor whites, J..atinos, women.., to name a few disempowered groups.” More importantly, Kunstler admits that beyond the animal-human relationship, animals are individuals with interests. He accurately surmises that “(j)ustice for nonhumans requires that we recognize that all sentient beings have inherent worth that does not depend on our humanocentric and patriarchal valuation of that worth.” 3. ANIMAL EXPLOITATION HAS THE SAME MORAL STRUCTURE AS HUMAN SLAVERY Gary L. Francione, Professor of Law and Nicholas B. Katzenbach Scholar of Law and Philosophy at Rutgers University School of Law and co-director of the Rutgers University Animal Rights Law Center, RUTGERS LAW REVIEW, Winter, 1996, p. 444. Although there were supposedly laws that protected slaves from particular types of treatment, such as “excessive” beatings or “unnecessary” punishment, the law usually assumed that the master was the best judge of how slave property ought to be used and that the master would act in a self-interested way with respect to that property. Indeed, Virginia had a law that a master who killed a slave as part of disciplining the slave could not have been said to have acted with malice (a prerequisite for a murder conviction) because of a presumption that the master would not intentionally destroy the master’s own property. Whether slaves should have rights is an entirely different question from what rights slaves ought to have. To say that slavery should be abolished is nothing more or less than to maintain that slaves should be removed from the class of legal entities known as things and placed instead in the class of legal entities known as persons. To do so would mean that people who were formerly regarded as things that could not have nonbasic rights can now have these rights; however, it does not specify the content of such rights. Society may agree that slavery should be abolished, but may disagree that former slaves should be given nonbasic rights such as a right to a certain level of material wealth. For these reasons, we cannot really talk about animals’ rights, as long as animals are regarded as property. 46 Animal Rights Bad ANIMAL RIGHTS IS AN INVALID PROPOSITION 1. ANIMAL RIGHTS IMPLY A DANGEROUSLY AUTHORITARIAN STATE David R. Schmahmann and Lan J. Polacheck, associates in Nutter, McClerman and Fish, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW, Summer, 1995, p. 760. The question which must arise in the context of any proposal that the government endow rights on animals is how such a notion can be reconciled with the very definition of “rights” in a constitutional democracy. Any real acceptance of the notion must mean reposing in the government a wholly new and undefined set of powers, presumably to be exercised on behalf of an entirely new and vague constituency. The notion contemplates the creation of a vast, unprecedented, intrusive, and uncircumscribable jurisprudence in which the government erects barriers to human conduct on the strength, not of competing human interests--be they economic, esthetic, or humanitarian--or the delegation of power to it by individuals, but of assumptions about the interests of animals assessed by the government apart from human interests or experience. Not only may this be impossible, but in the contemplated nonspeciesist world, where there would be no hierarchy within the animal kingdom just as there would be no hierarchy between humans and animals, the “rights” of individual animals would exist in competition with the rights of individual humans. Thus, no rat could be harmed, chicken cooked, or rabbit dissected without government permission or the prospect of government scrutiny. If some government agency were given the power to act in the interest of animals, the result would be the creation of a vast, intrusive structure which would erect barriers to human conduct on the strength, not of competing human interests, but of assessments of the interests of animals conducted without reference to human interests or experience. 2. DARWINISM SUPPORTS HUMANITY’S RIGHT TO USE ANIMALS Jeff Bucholtz, nqa, THE WASHINGTON POST, June 16, 1990, p. A21. Or if McCarthy is uncomfortable with Immanuel Kant’s conception of morals and ethics, he could try Darwin’s. McCarthy agreed with Singer’s equation of speciesism, the belief in the primacy of one’s own species, with racism and sexism. But according to Darwin, the primary motivation of all life is the perpetuation of one’s species. Whether one species is “better” than another in abstract moral terms is irrelevant. The natural predilection toward speciesism is not evil, but the supreme law of nature. 3. HUMAN INTERESTS MUST BE THE TOP PRIORITY David R. Schmahmann and Lori J. Polacheck, associates in Nutter, McClennan and Fish, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW, Summer, 1995, p. 761. The only measure--true north, the touchstone--must be human interests. These interests could be aesthetic or humanitarian and could seek to weigh all the factors the range of human dialog about animals includes. But it is human interest, whether it be in the environment, the need to show compassion, or the need to. advance science, that must be weighed, not any supposed interest in an anthropomorphized rat or a Disneyfled rabbit. When overpopulation of deer threaten a water supply the deer must be culled, and without due process for the deer. When rabbits ruin vital crops the rabbits must be exterminated. When human medical advances require vivisection, vivisection may continue without unnecessary harm but with such harm as may be necessary for its purpose. We do not see how a legal system in which human rights are enshrined could approach these matters differently. Our moral and legal systems cannot accommodate a theory that purports to detach decisions as to how we should treat animals from an anthropocentric reference point and have these decisions revolve around some other concept, such as that of “civil rights” for beings that cannot articulate their own interests and about whose true sapience, awareness, knowledge of death, and value of life we know so little. 47 ANIMALS SHOULD NOT BE ATTRIBUTED RIGHTS 1. ATTRIBUTING RIGHTS TO ANIMALS IS A DANGEROUS DOCTRINE David R. Schmahmann and Lori J. Polacheck, associates in Nutter, McClennan and Fish, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW, Summer, 1995, P. 752. It would be both implausible and dangerous to give or attribute legal rights to animals because such extension of legal rights would have serious, detrimental impacts on human rights and freedoms. This Article is not, however, aimed at those who urge that we interact with animal life in ways that are humane, esthetic, and environmentally sound. Nor is this Article aimed at those who worry that society’s present ways of producing food and conducting research may be wasteful and disruptive of nature’s balance. Instead, this Article is aimed at those who believe that every individual animal, in itself, possesses certain rights which, when violated, give rise to claims that may be pursued legally at the animal’s “behest” and for relief running to the animal’s “benefit.” 2. ANIMALS LACK THE BASIC PREREQUISITES FOR HAVING RIGHTS Julian Simon, population biologist, THE ULTIMATE RESOURCE 2, 1996, pp. 457-458. The idea of rights is one that a group defines for itself, and/or fights for. True rights cannot be assigned by others. When rights are assigned, the system is dictatorship, and the rights continue to exist just so long as the dictator bestows them. Self-defined rights, on the other hand, involve such matters as laws, a constitution, courts, and the like. The notion of self-defined rights obviously is nonsensical for species other than humans, and calls into question the idea of rights for them. 3. ABILITY TO SUFFER IS NOT ENOUGH TO EXTEND RIGHTS David R Schmabmann and Lori J. Polacheck, associates in Nutter, McClennan and Fish, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW, Summer, 1995, p. 752. You can’t find an animal rights book, video, pamphlet, or rock concert in which someone doesn’t mention the Great Sentence, written by Jeremy Bentham in 1789. Arguing in favor of such rights Bentham wrote “The question is not can they reason? nor, can they talk? but, can they suffer?” The logic of the animal rights movement places suffering at the iconographic center of a skewed value system. Whether or not animals suffer, however, only begins the analysis. As interesting as it is to dwell on the relative capacities for suffering of various species and the possibility that some animals may suffer less under human control than when left alone, the ability to suffer cannot, standing alone, be the sole tool with which access to legal rights and remedies is analyzed. 4. ANIMALS LACK MORAL MORAL CLAIMS TO RIGHTS Jeff Bucholtz, nqa, THE WASHINGTON POST, June 16, 1990, p. A21. In his fawning, one-sided tribute to animal-rights activist Peter Singer, Colman McCarthy maintained that “the ethical case for butchery and torture of animals can’t be made because none exists.” He’s wrong. For starters, there is the Kantian argument that we have a moral obligation to behave “ethically” only to those beings also possessed of the capacity of moral judgment. Under this ethical scheme, a being’s “rights” are derived from its ability to perceive the moral value of those rights and to reciprocate them. Since animals are incapable of this, they have no moral claim to “rights.” 5.HUMANITY MUST BE KEPT DISTINCT TO PROTECT HUMANS David R. Schmahmann and Lori J. Polacheck, associates in Nutter, McClennan and Fish, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW, Summer, 1995, p. 752-753. Before Singer wrote Animal Liberation, one philosopher wrote: If it is once observed that there is no difference in principle between the case of dogs, cats, or horses, or stags, foxes, and hares, and that of tsetse-flies or tapeworms or the bacteria in our own blood-stream, the conclusion likely to be drawn is that there is so much wrong that we cannot help doing to the brute creation that it is best not to trouble ourselves about it any more at all. The ultimate sufferers are likely to be our fellow men, because the final conclusion is likely to be, not that we ought to treat the brutes like human beings, but that there is no good reason why we should not treat human beings like brutes. 48 Animal Rights Responses Though animal rights activists vary across a wide spectrum of ideologies involving animals, this essay will attempt to consolidate their position and provide arguments to defeat that position in the course of a debate round. For the purposes of this essay, we will define animal rights as living without human interference. That is, animals have as many rights as human beings do. Peter Singer once explained that the question we should ask about other beings is not whether or not they can think, but whether or not they can feel. Since animals can feel pain, they deserve the same rights as any other creature who can feel pain. We must therefore not subject animals to any behavior or treatment that we would consider unethical if done to a human being. Undoubtedly, this mindset is not widely accepted in the United States and the world today. As one author discussing animals today noted, “I will pay you the honor of skipping a recital of the horrors of their lives and deaths. Though I have no reason to believe that you have at the forefront of your minds what is being done to animals at this moment in production facilities (I hesitate to call them farms any longer), in abattoirs, in trawlers, in laboratories, all over the world, I will take it that you concede me the rhetorical power to evoke these horrors and bring them home to you with adequate force, and leave it at that, reminding you only that the horrors I here omit are nevertheless at the center of this lecture.”1 I, too, will skip a lengthy discussion of the abuse that animal rights activists see in the world around them, and instead focus on the answers to their arguments. INTERACTION WITH HUMANS BENEFITS ANIMALS Animal rights activists would have us believe that animals are only harmed by humans. The philosophy they advocate would have human beings leave animals alone, to their own activities and desires. However, in many instances, not only does human interaction with animals not cause those animals harm, but helps them as well. This involves largely the mentality of a caretaker. Author Mike Appleby alludes to that role in his book, What Should We Do About Animal Welfare? He returns to the Biblical story of Noah and the ark, where Noah gathered two each of every kind of animal to preserve their species when the great flood came. Appleby states, “The humans, then, were looking after all the other, non-human species of animal. Humans are animals, of course, but humans are also different from other species.”2 Appleby notes the preservation aspect of human interaction with animals. In the book Ethics, Animals, and Science, author Kevin Dolan outlines several other ways in which human interaction benefits animals. The first area that interaction with humans benefits animals is in terms of domestication. Domestication stretches back into prehistory. Some suspect that it may have even been initiated by animals, who were looking for comfort from the cold and found a caveperson’s fire. Scientists have even argued that animals like the dog and cat are predisposed to domesticity because of delayed adulthood. 3 There are several benefits that animals receive as a result of domesticity. The first is protection in a world that previously offered them none. Whether they are in the coop, the paddock, or the home; animals are safer in a domestic setting than they are in the wild. This protection includes the ability to not worry about predators, and to have a shelter from wind, rain, or sun. Extremes of weather can actually kill, and that is a problem that domesticated animals do not encounter. Domesticated animals receive a regular supply of food and water that they do not have to hunt or find. Food itself has been developed for particular animals, increasing their nutrition and energy levels.4 Governments have laws that protect domesticated animals from mistreatment, and this protects the animals’ welfare. The breeding that happens selectively has also improved upon the animals. They have in some instances grown larger, stronger, better adapted to a specific purpose, or more intelligent.5 All of these benefits would not be enjoyed by animals if they had not been domesticated. A second area where interaction with humans benefits animals is regarding veterinary medicine. The benefits that stem from veterinary medicine do not stop with those animals that are possessed by humans, but rather have been extended to animals in wildlife hospitals and sanctuaries. An abundance of medicines and vaccines have been produced, and animals like cattle, pigs, and sheep are all healthier than they were without veterinary advances. Similarly, more of the young that these animals have survive thanks to veterinary medicine. Anti-parasitic drugs and 49 antibiotic drugs in particular have been helpful and prevented the deaths of many animals. 6 Animals lead longer, healthier lives thanks to veterinary medicine. A third area where interaction with humans has benefited animals is in terms of transport. As Dolan puts it, “As the human race has spread over the globe it has taken its animals with it. Various benefits have accrued to these animals from the new terrain and climates in which they found themselves. Animals themselves, independent of nomads, have hitched rides with human travellers.”7 Dolan offers the example of the rat that has depended upon humanity to survive and move. A fourth area where interaction with humans has benefited animals is in the area of conservation. It is true that this aspect of human help is a more recent historical development, however, it is still valuable. Past views of animals in the wild revolved around either hunting or game. The newer and more enlightened, less anthropocentric view is that species should be protected regardless of their association with human beings. Rare species are especially being protected in an effort to avoid extinction. Human involvement in breeding animals has also led to more diverse species and a greater chance of survival. 8 Many will undoubtedly point out that human beings are the largest cause of animal species being rare or extinct. This does not deny, however, that conservation efforts help animals and are a result of their interaction with human beings. With all of these benefits being given to animals due to interaction with humans, it is clear that animals should not just be left alone and given the same treatment that fellow humans would be given. Instead, the validity of these benefits should be noted and the animals rights position rejected. THERE ARE RELEVANT DIFFERENCES BETWEEN HUMANS AND ANIMALS Animals rights advocates make arguments that animals should be treated in the same way that human beings are treated. They do not maintain that animals are the same as humans, rather, they argue that the differences between the two are irrelevant. As one author notes, “If we can find no morally relevant differences between humans and animals that serves as the most powerful tool in the investigation of the moral status of animals.” 9 In examining the two categories of humanity and animals, there are significant and relevant moral differences. The first difference is the dominion of humanity. This argument goes back to the Bible, where it is understood that humanity is the caretaker of animals. However, it is also made without theology by examining how humanity is at the top of the evolutionary pyramid. Humans rank at the top due to intelligence, which is the ability to control, vanquish, or dominate. Power is also in the hands of humanity.10 While these characteristics can be used either positively or negatively, they do set humans apart from the rest of the animal kingdom. The second difference is the most important: reason, language, and moral concern. Bernard E. Rollin explains these make up, “the most serious and important criterion of demarcation that has historically served to delineate the scope of moral concern. At least since Plato and Aristotle, and even in the Catholic tradition, the notion of the soul providing the basis for excluding animals from moral concern has been given philosophical content by equating the soul with the rational faculty of the ability to reason. Men are rational, or at least have the capacity for rational thought, while animals do not, and for this reason, the scope of morality does not extend beyond men.” 11 Gendered language aside, this quotation reflects the way that philosophers have historically viewed the divide between humanity and animals. Therefore, this establishes that human beings alone are moral agents. A theory dating all the way back to the Sophists explains why being a moral agent should be equated with being a moral object. This view states that, “only creatures capable of acting morally, i.e., rational creatures, are themselves deserving of moral concern. Moral laws and principles are the product of convention, or of social contract, and only rational beings are capable of participating in a social contract or, indeed, in any agreement at all.” 12 The social contract, in that sense, is a guarantee that rational individuals treat others in the way they will be treated in return. This difference is enforced by Immanuel Kant’s theory of reason. Kant believed that, “only rational beings can count as moral agents and, even more important for our purposes, that the scope of moral concern extends only to rational beings.” 13 Other differences exist. Animals lack moral agency and some animals have a different grade of quality of life. 14 50 Some will certainly point out that modern experimentation and research has revealed high critical thinking abilities in certain animals, like apes and dolphins. However, such instances are not enough to justify considering animals the same as human beings. Given their morally relevant differences, it is justified to treat animals differently than one would treat human beings. USE OF ANIMALS IN SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH IS NECESSARY One of the most heated areas of the debate about the treatment of animals is regarding the use of animals for scientific research. However, many groups and organizations still defend the use of animals for such purposes. Animal testing does not involve useless cruelty. Instead, it is a valuable way to make advances in the field of medicine and improve the quality of life for people around the world. It also may be instrumental in saving lives in the long run. The Research Defence Society found that in 1991, 32.4 million animals were used in research in the United Kingdom. That is approximately 0.05 animals per person used for scientific research in their population of 60 million. The Research Defence Society also correctly pointed out that hip replacement was perfected and practiced on dogs, goats, and sheep.15 The International Council of Laboratory Sciences is also attempting to raise awareness worldwide about well-conducted and well-controlled experiments using animals. They know that these sorts of tests and experiments are necessary for cancer research and drug trials.16 In order to continue to move forward and cure diseases that are effecting people around the world, animal testing must continue. It is a necessary tool in the battle to ultimately end pain and suffering. There are also organizations to ensure that laboratory animals are not treated cruelly for no reason. The Universities Federation for Animal Welfare seeks to improve the welfare of experimental animals by working with researchers. They have published a handbook on treating animals well, and are focused on the future. Perhaps someday alternatives will exist, but in the meantime, the Universities Federation for Animal Welfare is making sure that those animals used in experimentation are treated well.17 Even activist groups like the Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals and the Scottish Society for the Prevention of Vivisection admit the need for some animal experimentation.18 The scientists who conduct experiments on animals are not all evil people looking for chances to be cruel. Instead, they are advancing their research and abiding by legal standards. The law even demands the use of animals for testing possibly hazardous substances in some areas. 19 Alternative forms of research are not yet at the point where the same results can be achieved without testing on animals. That is, “The most telling argument in favor of at least sometimes using the whole living animals is that, in biology unlike in mathematics, the sum total of the parts do not equal the whole. Even the greatest amount of research in depth on the effects of a hazardous substance on hepatic tissue cannot vive you the complete and real picture of what reactions might occur between the same substance and a liver functioning in a living organism and acted upon by the various metabolic cycles.” 20 There can be no denying the benefits that have resulted from animal experimentation. As Kevin Dolan puts it, “There is no hesitation in using the plural since the benefits accruing over the centuries from animal experimentation have been numerous.” 21 The benefits of animal experimentation must be examined in order to consider if it is a cause worth harming animals for. Scientists are not out to deliberately harm animals for no reason, but rather to advance humanity and life as a whole. A historical view reveals exactly how much progress has resulted from such experimentation. In around 300 BCE, Arasistratus used animals in Alexandria to study nerves and anatomy. Aristotle also used animals and justified publishing a book on veterinary surgery. Galen, a Greek physician in Rome, used apes and pigs and increased the knowledge of medicine enormously, publishing 500 medical treatises. Harvey in the 1500’s made progress using animals by describing the circulation of the blood in animals. A century later, research using animals established a basis to measure blood pressure. Vaccinations by Pasteur and Jenner came from work on animals. Charles Darwin testified that animal research should not be banned and viewed refraining from using animals in research a greater evil because of the knowledge that could be gained. In this century, more and more useful discoveries have resulted from animal testing. Antibodies, vitamin description and insulin were all understood in greater detail thanks to 51 animal testing. In the 1930’s, animal testing resulted in the mechanism of the nervous system being fully explored and the development of modern surgery. In the 1940’s, the understanding of embryonic development and antibiotics increased. The 1960’s saw advances on methods of treatment of mental illness using animals. Tested drugs in the 1970’s were only allowed thanks to animals. In the 1980’s, advances were made in immune reactions, viral diseases, and other medical problems. The 1990’s saw research on the brain and the causes of inherited diseases. Humankind would not have knowledge of the body so extensive or even the vaccine for polio without animal experimentation. The knowledge is also spread to assist animals in veterinary medicine. This benefit is continuing, “The valuable contribution to the well-being of animals and humans alike continues. A single injection that will protect against the dominant form of meningitis could soon be available thanks to genetically engineered vaccnes.”22 These advances would not have been possible without animal experimentation. Lives have been saved and strengthened thanks to the medical field, and that is only with animals as a research tool. Animals rights as a theory that denies that option, therefore, and must be rejected in order to advance all of humanity and the animal kingdom though medical achievement. ARGUMENTS AGAINST ANIMAL RESEARCH ARE FLAWED Carl Cohen outlines three fallacious arguments that are made against the use of animals in medical research and scientific experimentation. He then answers each of them, showing that the most commonly made arguments against animal testing are false. The first argument against animal research is that, “although animals have been used by medical science in the past, they need no longer be used, because recent technological developments make it possible to replace them; the critical experiments in which animal subjects previously were used may now go forward, it is said, without using live animals. If animals can be replaced in medical experimentation without harm to humans, the argument runs, they should be.”23 As we alluded to above, the premise of this argument is false. That is, animals cannot be replaced adequately in testing. In most medical research, a substitution cannot suffice. The safety and efficacy of a drug or treatment must be asses via its impact on a whole and living organism. This is reinforced by the recent discovery that human beings have far less genes than once thought. This mans that responses to stimuli in humans cannot be traced to a single gene. Scientists who need to know how an organism will react will be misled if they examine only pieced of an organism out of its organic context. Zoologist Stephen Jay noted, “Organisms must be explained as organisms, and not as summation.”24 The second argument against animal research is attacking the usefulness of animals in medicine. “Their use, liberationists commonly contend, has no scientific reliability at all. It is ‘junk science.’ Animal experiments are worse than unnecessary because they mislead investigators and actually hinder scientific advance.” 25 Animals have proven effective, however, at examining multiple levels of medical advances. They are used to determine toxicity, dosage, and side effects. As Cohen explains, “The animals used to test for efficacy are chosen because (in view of their known anatomical similarities to humans, and in light of extensive previous experience with animals of that species) they are believed to be good models for the human organism. Of course, no model is perfect. But better by far to work with an imperfect model first than to use no model at all.” 26 The final argument against animal research is, “that even if animal research does yield results helpful in treating human disease, it ought to be abandoned because the advances it produces encourages the large-sale misdirection of medical resources.”27 This argument encourages a move toward prevention and away from treatment. As Cohen notes, “This argument deserves little respect. It is the desperate resort of animal liberationists who see no way to deny that animals do in fact greatly serve the interests of the human sick.”28 Prevention and treatment can be studied using animals, and neither has to take precedence in the world of medical research. Given the fallacious nature of the arguments made against animal testing, it is clear that animal liberation should be rejected to enable medical advances using animal testing. ANIMALS DO NOT POSSESS ‘RIGHTS’ IN THE SENSE THAT HUMANS DO 52 Animal behavior is different than human behavior at multiple levels, which is one reason why it interests humanity. 29 This behavior, however, does not mean that animals possess “rights” in the sense that humans do. Author Carol Cohen outlines why rights are not intrinsic to animals. If his arguments hold weight, then a large portion of the rational for treating animals like humans would be eliminated. Cohen explains these arguments in terms of obligations that moral beings have to each other. Cohen outlines seven reasons why animals do not have the same rights that human do. First, he notes that obligations come from commitments that are freely entered into by moral agents. Animals do not have the ability to act in such a capacity. Second, he explains that obligations come from the possession of authority. Third, obligations come from a consequence of special relations. Shepherds are obligated to this dogs, but humans are not obligated to all of animals. Fourth, faithful service can engender obligations; but most of the animal kingdom does not play the role of a faithful servant to humanity. Fifth, family connection can cause obligation. Sixth, duties of care freely taken are obligations. This can be given, but not demanded as a right. Seventh, spontaneous kindness can leave an obligation to return the gift, but such a return cannot be demanded. 30 In that sense, while there can be claims that human beings are obligated to take care of animals, there is no basis to assign animals the right to demand such care. The notion of rights being different in consideration of humans and animals means that animal rights should be rejected. SOCIETY CANNOT PAY THE COST OF ADOPTING ANIMAL RIGHTS Let us momentarily put ourselves in the position of animal rights advocates. These would be individuals who agree with Tom Regan that, “On the rights view we cannot justify harming a single rat merely by aggregating ‘the many human and humane benefits’ that flow from doing it...Not even a single rat is to be treated as if that animal’s value were reducible to his possible utility relative to the interests of others.” 31 However, if the world were to confirm to this view, the costs would be astronomical. I do not use the world cost in an economic sense, but rather in terms of looking at the overall benefits and harms of taking an action. As Cohen notes, “If Regan were correct in this, we are forbidden by morality from doing the experiments that alone might yield the vaccines, drugs, and other compounds and therapies that humans desperately need...very many humans will suffer terribly; many humans will die who might otherwise live happy lives if (as on your view) the rights of rats trump human interests.”32 These humans would be able to give back economically, philosophically, and morally to society in a way that would be lost if their lives were ended. Animal rights denies society the benefits of some members of the human race who could be saved with animal testing. Cohen addresses the seriousness of the claim that animals have rights, saying, “The supposition of animal rights entails very much more than that. The animal rights movement, as we have seen, explicitly aims for the total abolition of the use of animals in science and the total dissolution of commercial animal agriculture. These objectives are the logical consequences of believing that animals have rights.” 33 In light of the horrible consequences of assigning animals rights, it is clear that the best alternative is to not assign such rights and reject animal rights as a philosophy. SUMMARY Though the defense of animal rights is actually a diverse category of viewpoints, we have explored the position that animals deserve as many rights as humans and should be free from meddling. However, this position is seriously flawed. Initially, interaction with humans actually benefits animals in various ways. There are also relevant differences between humans and animals that must be taken into consideration. The use of animals in scientific research is necessary, and is leading to breakthroughs and forward progress. Arguments being made against the use of animals for research are flawed. Animals do not possess “rights” in the sense that humans do, and therefore merit different treatment. Our present society cannot afford the costs of adopting the mentality of animal rights, as too many problems would ensue. Answering arguments about animal rights is sure to be difficult and sensitive. It is tough to be on the side of an argument that emotionally may not appeal to an audience. However, given the logical ends of animal rights as a 53 philosophy, the arguments about costs and benefits lead to a rejection of such sentiment. In this argument, it is best to concede that whenever possible, all accommodations should be made to treat animals well and kindly. You are not responsible for defending cruelty to animals or abuse- rather, you are responsible for defending that humans and animals are different. If such a difference can be proven, then there is ample justification for treating the two classes of beings differently. _____________________________ 1 Coetzee, J.M. The Lives of Animals. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999, pg. 19. 2 Appleby, Mike. What Should We Do About Animal Welfare? Oxford: Blackwell Science Ltd., 1999, pg. 2. 3 Dolan, Kevin. Ethics, Animals, and Science. Oxford: Blackwell Science Ltd., 1999, pg. 144. 4 Ibid, pg. 144-145. 5 Ibid, pg. 145. 6 Ibid, pg. 146. 7 Ibid, pg. 146-147. 8 Ibid, pg. 147. 9 Rollin, Bernard E. Animal Rights and Human Morality. New York: Prometheus Books, 1981, pg. 7. 10 Ibid, pg. 8. 11 Ibid, pg. 10. 12 Ibid, pg. 11. 13 Ibid, pg. 15. 14 Orlans, F. Barbara. In the Name of Science: Issues in Responsible Animal Experimentation. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993, pg. 32. 15 Dolan, Kevin. Ethics, Animals, and Science. Oxford: Blackwell Science Ltd., 1999, pg. 170-171. 16 Ibid, pg. 171. 17 Ibid, pg. 171. 18 Ibid, pg. 172. 19 Ibid, pg. 179. 20 Ibid, pg. 189. 21 Ibid, pg. 214. 22 Ibid, pg. 215-216. 23 Cohen, Carl. The Animal Rights Debate. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc., 2001, pg. 70-71. 24 Ibid, pg. 71. 25 Ibid, pg. 72. 26 Ibid, pg. 74. 27 Ibid, pg. 80. 28 Ibid, pg. 81. 29 Dolan, Kevin. Ethics, Animals, and Science. Oxford: Blackwell Science Ltd., 1999, pg. 266. 30 Cohen, Carl. The Animal Rights Debate. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc., 2001, pg. 28-29. 31 Ibid, pg. 23. 32 Ibid, pg. 23. 33 Ibid, pg. 24. 54 INTERACTION WITH HUMANS BENEFITS ANIMALS 1. DOMESTICATION IS BENEFICIAL FOR ANIMALS BECAUSE IT HAS BROUGHT THEM PROTECTION’S NOT AFFORDED IN THE WILD Dolan, Kevin. Professor of Pastoral Theology. Ethics, Animals, and Science. Oxford: Blackwell Science Ltd., 1999, pg. 144-145. There is no doubt that humans have reaped great benefits from bringing animals into their homes but equally the advantages to the domesticated animal has been numerous; indeed, one could say without fear of contradictions, tremendous. The coop, the paddock and most of all the herdsman brought a form of protection to animals completely lacking in the wild. The constant fear of predators endured in the wild by their prey have been alleviated by domestication; a little-mentioned privilege of the laboratory mouse. Without a doubt, the greater survival potential accorded by their domestic status has benefited billions of animals though the ages and extends to numerous species. Even the provision of a humble shelter for our animal associates has been a welcome protection from cold, rain, wind and sun for beasts which would otherwise be exposed to great extremes of weather and might easily perish from such hardship. The alleviation of thirst has also been a great boon to the kept animal in many parts of the world. 2. BECAUSE OF THEIR IMPORTANCE HUMANS PROTECT ANIMALS AS WELL AS ENHANCE THEIR QUALITY OF LIFE Dolan, Kevin. Professor of Pastoral Theology. Ethics, Animals, and Science. Oxford: Blackwell Science Ltd., 1999, pg. 145. Because of the great economic importance of domestic animals to any nation, legislatures have shown an interest in their protection. Laws have been enacted to ensure the welfare of these animals. There have been numerous such statues used in the UK; for example the Agriculture (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1968 and its accompanying Codes of Recommendation, leading on to the more legally binding “The Welfare Livestock Regulations 1994.” By Selective breeding, conducted for their own gain, humans have produced improved models of the wild animal: larger or faster, more intelligent, more productive, or more adapted to a particular purpose. It can hardly be argues that this is always a disadvantage to the animals themselves. It could be claimed that it enhances this quality of their life. It certainly increases their worth, which should bring increased care for an asset of value. 3. INTERACTIONS WITH BETWEEN ANIMALS AND HUMANS HAS LED TO THE BREAKTHROUGH OF VETERANARY MEDICINE, WHICH IS THE MOST BENEFICAL THING TO COME OUT OF THE RELATIONSHIP. Dolan, Kevin. Professor of Pastoral Theology. Ethics, Animals, and Science. Oxford: Blackwell Science Ltd., 1999, pg. 146. The development of veterinary medicine is surely the most apparent benefit to animals from their contact from humans and the advantages have not been confined to those animals possessed by humans. The ministering services of veterinary surgeons and the therapeutic drugs developed in research are frequently made available to animals, particularly in wildlife hospitals and sanctuaries. It is with respect to pets and domestic animals that research has produced an abundance of medicines and vaccines. On the farm, cattle, pigs and sheep are healthier and many more of their young survive to maturity, Not long ago a hill farmer could lose more than half his young lamb and sheep through various diseases. Now there is a good range of effective and safe vaccines and medicines to prevent such losses. Anti-parasitic drugs are now available and antibiotic drugs are widely used for many infectious diseases of animals. It has been estimated that new treatments preventing dehydration have saved each year about 1000,000 calves in Britain alone. Most antibiotics used as veterinary medicines, such as penicillin, were developed for humans but it is difficult to imagine how a small animal or farm veterinary proactive could manage without them. The list of vaccines for animals which have been developed by research is indeed impressive. These vaccines have been the result of both animal experimentation and in vitro procedures, such as that which produced a distemper vaccine by the use of tissue culture. It is estimated that 100 million animals have been saved by anthrax and cattle plague vaccines. 55 USE OF ANIMALS IN SCIENTIFIC TESTING IN NECESSARY 1. THE ALTERNATIVES ARE INADEUQATE Dolan, Kevin. Professor of Pastoral Theology. Ethics, Animals, and Science. Oxford: Blackwell Science Ltd., 1999, pg. 189. In the exposition on alternatives in practice and the pursuit of the three R’s, so well outlined in a recent pamphlet (UFAW 1998), specific difficulties will be dealt with in detail. Here it is merely a matter of looking in general at the possible deficiencies of alternatives to animal use in research. In spite of the laudable progress in the development and the use of alternatives, there are factors that mitigate against a complete abandonment of the use of animals in research. The reliability of results of research is paramount if they are to be accepted into medical practice or are to be regarded as guarantees of the safety in use of various suspect substances. It is essential therefore that the reliability of any suggested alternative will need to be compared with accepted animal tests, involving of course the use of animals. 2. THE VALUE OF ALTERNATIVES IS RELATIVE Dolan, Kevin. Professor of Pastoral Theology. Ethics, Animals, and Science. Oxford: Blackwell Science Ltd., 1999, pg. 189. Unfortunately, once the use of alternatives becomes widespread and diverse, their relative value is liable to become a matter of opinion, as will also, their relative merit in comparison with animal experimentation. Pressure groups would be quick to force acceptance of non-animal tests without taking valid scientific arguments into account. For instance, I witnessed on television a spokesman for Greenpeace admit, but rather late in the day, the scientific inadequacy of their arguments in the Brent Spar Rig controversy in 1996. The most telling argument in favor of at least sometimes using the whole living animal is that, in biology unlike in mathematics, the sum total of the parts do not equal the whole. Even the greatest amount of research in depth on the effects of a hazardous substance on hepatic tissue cannot give you the complete and real picture of what reaction might occur between the same substance and a liver functioning in a living organism and acted upon by various metabolic cycles. 3. CAN TEST OF ANIMALS AND STILL BE ETHICAL Dolan, Kevin. Professor of Pastoral Theology. Ethics, Animals, and Science. Oxford: Blackwell Science Ltd., 1999, pg. 188. An emphasis on the importance of finding alternatives to animals in research springs naturally from a utilitarian approach to the question. The essential hedonism of utilitarianism obviously views pain as evil and thus calls for the reduction of suffering to a minimum and that includes the suffering of animals. Consequently, the meticulous weighing up of the relative worth of alternatives is not a form of casuistry to be rejected by a common-sense approach. Such attention to details of possible alleviation of animal suffering is fully in line with the ideal of ‘the greatest happiness of the greatest number’. The ideal implies allowing for a relative priority of desirability, The endproduct of an application of this ethic is: first, a minimum use of animals and a minimum level of suffering of those used and second, a greater good accompanied by the realization that worthwhile benefits accrue to animals and humans from animal experimentation. 56 ANIMALS DON’T POSSES “RIGHTS” IN THE SENSE THAT HUMANS DO 1. ANIMALS DON’T HAVE CONCIOUSNESS LIKE HUMANS DO Dolan, Kevin. Professor of Pastoral Theology. Ethics, Animals, and Science. Oxford: Blackwell Science Ltd., 1999, pg. 152. Consciousness is that summation or totality of sensations and a correlation of these sensations by the organism involved in them. It is, therefore, something more than mere neural activity; rather, it is a full interpretation of neural activity; rather, it is a full interpretation of neural activity. In the past, consciousness has, by some, been attributed solely to humans. This denial of the existence of consciousness outside the human species supported the opinions such as Descartes who thought that animal did not suffer. A belief of this kind did, of course, remove the need for any concern for animal suffering in circumstances such as their use in research. The literature on the use of animals in research contains abundant material on the arguments about animal consciousness because consciousness was not only associated with feeling but was regarded by some as the specific quality which rendered an individual a person, that is, one having rights. 2. LACK OF A CONSCIOUSNESS IN ANIMALS JUSTIFIES THEIR LACK OF RIGHTS Dolan, Kevin. Professor of Pastoral Theology. Ethics, Animals, and Science. Oxford: Blackwell Science Ltd., 1999, pg. 152. Ernard Rolling deals with this matter in great detail, often re-fighting old academic battles. He, rightly, realized that the existence of absence of consciousness in a creature is crucial to whether that creature can suffer or not. In short, concern for animal welfare turns on the presence of consciousness in animals. Though crudely put, the old adage, ‘Where there’s no sense there’s no feeling’, has a certain validity, and its consequences have ethical relevancy (Rolling 1989). Some biologists and psychologists, particularly behaviorists, called into question the existence of consciousness, regarding it as an unscientific concept. There is no doubt that vital activity can occur without consciousness. Physiological experiments and pathological lesions prove that in our own and in other organisms the mechanism of the nervous system is sufficient, without the intervention of consciousness, to produce muscular movements of a highly co-ordinate and apparently intentional character. The acceptance, however, of some unconscious activity does not directly obviate the supposition of the presence of consciousness. 3. AWARNESS IS KET TO THE BESTOWAL OF RIGHTS Dolan, Kevin. Professor of Pastoral Theology. Ethics, Animals, and Science. Oxford: Blackwell Science Ltd., 1999, pg. 151. The presence of awareness is fundamental to concern about the supposed suffering and pain of other creatures. Moral concern for others is cogent only on the presumption that other have subjective experiences, that we can more or less know them, that their subjective states matter to them more or less as ours matter to us, and that our actions have major effects on what matters to them and on what they subjectively experience. If we genuinely did not believe that others felt pain, pleasure, fear, joy, etc., there would be little point to moral locutions or moral exhortation. Morality supposes that the objects of our moral concern have feelings. 57 ANIMAL TESTING IMMENSLY BENEFITS HUMANS 1. HUMANS HAVE BEEN BENEFITING FROM ANIMAL TESTING SINCE ANCIENT TIMES Dolan, Kevin. Professor of Pastoral Theology. Ethics, Animals, and Science. Oxford: Blackwell Science Ltd., 1999, pg. 215. Medical skill and the living sciences progressed through the use of animals in research probably before the time of Arasistratus (c. 300 BCE). In Alexandria he used animals in his study of nerves and anatomy, he explored and named the trachea as well as developing the catheter. About the same times in Athens, Aristotle, the founder of biology, was extending his knowledge by a hands-on use of animals. The use of animals in research had advanced far enough to justify the publication of a book on veterinary surgery in AD 64 (Oascoe et al. 1968). Galen (AD 129-200), the great Greek physician in Rome, through his studies using apes and pigs, was able to increase the knowledge of medicine enormously, published 500 medical treatises. 2. THE BENEFITS OF ANIMAL TESTING HAVE ONLY INCREASED WITH TIME Dolan, Kevin. Professor of Pastoral Theology. Ethics, Animals, and Science. Oxford: Blackwell Science Ltd., 1999, pg. 215-216. As time passed, each century increased our knowledge in the living sciences by the use of animal in research. The effective use of animals produced the advances by the use of animals in research. The effective use of animals produced the advances by Harveu (1578-1657) in hematology. He first described the circulation of the blood in animals De Motu Cordis et Sanguinis in Animalibus ( On the Motion of the Heart and Blood). The title indicates how he achieved the great progress in medical science. He stated categorically the need to use animals in research. It is said that he used more than 40 species of animals in his experiments. By the next century, similar research using animals established a basis for measuring blood pressure. In the nineteenth century, the use of experimental animals brought us vaccination through the work of such scientists as Pasteur and Jenner. Charles Darwin, who deplored some forms of animal experimentation, testified to the Royal Commission (1875) that he thought that a ban on animal experimentation would be ‘a great evil’. The implications of this remark was that he appreciated the many advantages which had accrued from the use of animals in research. He regarded refraining from animal experimentation as a greater evil than ignoring and tolerating suffering that cold be alleviated by research using animals. 3. ANY MORATORIUM ON ANIMAL TESTING WOULD HAVE HAD DISATOURS IMPLICATIONS IN THE PAST AND COULD HAVE CATASTROPHIC RESULTS IN THE FUTURE. Dolan, Kevin. Professor of Pastoral Theology. Ethics, Animals, and Science. Oxford: Blackwell Science Ltd., 1999, pg. 216. All these benefits have, of course, where possible, been spread to animal and adopted by veterinary medicine. In fact, some research establishments are solely concerned with the therapeutic needs of animals. This is not the place to produce long lists of achievements. Suffice it to point out that had there been a mandatory moratorium on the use of animals in research at any time in the past, there could have been dire consequences for the progress of medicine and the living sciences. Such a moratorium in 1910, for example, could have depraved humankind, in the years immediately following, of extensive knowledge regarding vitamins. In the same vein, such a moratorium in 1950 could have deprived that particular generation of the polio vaccine. The valuable contribution to the well-being of animals and humans alone continues. A single injection that will protect against the dominant form of meningitis could soon be available thanks to genetically engineered vaccines (IAT 1997). 58 Autonomy Good AUTONOMY IS A PARAMOUNT VALUE 1. AUTONOMY SHOULD BE THE PARAMOUNT VALUE Richard Lindley, Professor at Bradford University, AUTONOMY, 1986, p. 13. Imagine now a society where ‘humane’ human fanning was practice. The society is governed by a cannibalistic aristocracy of scientists. They have developed sophisticated techniques of brain control, so that they are able to produce a population of compliant slaves. Throughout their lives, during which they are well-fed, and offered many amusements, the slaves’ main pleasure comes from serving their masters, and indeed they have very pleasurable lives. When the time comes for them to be killed for the table, they experience little fear, and are glad that the main purpose of their life is soon to be realized. Perhaps the best way to express what is wrong is to say that this is a society where no respect is shown for people’s autonomy. Happily the one context in which the policies of such a society are likely to be proposed is in a satirical work of fiction such as Jonathan Swift’s classic work of the Irish problem. This is because it is widely accepted that autonomy is an essential characteristic of humanity, and it is wrong to treat autonomous beings simply as means to ends. We exist as ends in ourselves. 2. AUTONOMY IS AN EXTREMELY IMPORTANT VALUE Richard Lindley, Professor at Bradford University, AUTONOMY, 1986, p.74. Act utilitarians in the tradition of Bentham would regard autonomy as merely of instrumental value. According to them its value consists simply in being an effective means to the promotion of pleasure and the avoidance of pain. If there are any conflicts between the claims of autonomy and those of pleasure-and-the-avoidance-of-pain, a Benthantite would have to sacrifice the claims of autonomy. A Benthamite has no serious principled objection to life in Huxley’s Brave New World nor to permanent existence on Robert Nozick’s ‘experience machine’. As long as the machine really could provide an exciting range of experiences, which on balance were pleasant (and not boring), a Benthamite would have to say that it would be best for most, if not all of us, to plug into this machine for life. The thought experiment of the experience machine is set up by Nozick as a reductio ad absurdum of Bentharnite utilitarianism. The fact that few people would choose a life on the experience machine shows that we value things for there own sake, other than pleasant mental states. In particular autonomy is viewed as intrinsically valuable. 3. AUTONOMY SHOULD BE VALUED OVER FREEDOM AND LIBERTY Robert Young, Professor at Princeton University, PERSONAL AUTONOMY: BEYOND NEGATIVE AND POSITIVE LIBERTY, 1986, p. 1. The autonomous person (like the autonomous state) must not be subject to external interference or control but must, rather, freely direct and govern the course of his (or her) own life. The autonomous person’s capacities, beliefs and values will be identifiable as integral to him and be the source from which his actions spring. Since such a conception of human thought and action require more than just the absence of constraints and instead extends to the charting of a way of life for oneself and thus has a comprehensive dimension, it is more appropriate to frame the discussion in terms of autonomy than of freedom or liberty. 4. THE IMPORTANCE OF AUTONOMY IS SEEN IN EVERYDAY LIFE Robert Young, Professor at Princeton University, PERSONAL AUTONOMY: BEYOND NEGATIVE AND POSITIVE LIBERTY, 1986, pp. 2-3. Finally, in everyday life we acknowledge the importance of autonomy in that we lament its lack among those who are oppressed or who are severely mentally or physically ill, in wanting our children to develop in ways that permit them to exercise it and in the fact that our own self-images fluctuate according to the degree to which we can realistically think of ourselves as being autonomous. 59 WITHOUT AUTONOMY, OTHER THINGS CANNOT EXIST 1. AUTONOMY IS NECESSARY FOR HAPPINESS Richard Lindley, Professor at Bradford University, AUTONOMY, 1986, p. 186. Liberal democratic societies pride themselves on their respect for negative liberties such as freedom of expression, freedom of the press, and freedom of political association. Whilst I believe these freedoms are very important, they axe not intrinsic values. Their main worth consists in being necessary conditions for the development, maintenance and exercise of autonomy. The Kantian view, central to liberal democracy, that it is wrong to treat an individual simply as a means to an end, derives its appeal from the fact that people have the capacity for autonomy. Mill defended the liberty principle because be believed that autonomy is constitutive of happiness itself. 2. AUTONOMY ALLOWS FOR RESPECT Richard Lindley, Professor at Bradford University, AUTONOMY, 1986, p. 74. One of the most attractive features of the Kantian treatment of autonomy, which it shares with Mill’s, is the enormous weight given to respect for autonomy. Autonomy is so precious that we are asked by Kant to act in such a way that we always treat ourselves and each other never simply as means, but also as ends in ourselves. Using people for even laudable goals is strictly forbidden. 3. PERSONAL AUTONOMY CAN DEVELOP POLITICAL AUTONOMY Diana T. Meyers, Professor at Cornell University, SELF, SOCIETY, AND PERSONAL CHOICE, 1989, p. 10. Advocates of democracy sometimes argue that the conception of political autonomy as justice between nations is secondary to a domestic conception. According to this view, no nation state that is not legitimate is autonomous, and legitimacy can only be derived from the consent of the citizens. Since these individuals can only grant their consent through fair elections, political autonomy requires that mechanisms for popular sovereignty be instituted. On this view, then, political autonomy presupposes recognition of and respect for democratic rights of participationthe right to vote in contested elections, the right to run for public office, the rights to freedom of assembly and speech, and so forth. Here political autonomy touches upon personal autonomy. Insofar as these political rights secure means of expressing one’s views and means of pursuing one’s goals, they can be seen as supports for personal autonomy. 4. ONE CAN BE AUTONOMOUS IN A COMMUNITY Richard Schmitt, Professor of Philosophy at Brown University, BEYOND SEPARATENESS, 1995, p. 10 Although everyone acknowledges that problem, few philosophers are moved by it (Bernstein, 1983; Friedman, 1986; Wolf, 1989). Most philosophers believe that one can claim autonomy for oneself even if much of one’s thinking is directly affected by one’s social context and situation. Of course, our character and outlook are formed by the influences and the training we receive as children from parents and teachers. Of course, we do not think in isolation from others. Of course, we learn from others, consult them on difficult issues, and ask them for advice. But we are nevertheless capable of thinking and choosing for ourselves. Socialization does not prevent us from being autonomous. 5. AUTONOMY CAN EXIST IN A SOCIETY Richard Schmitt, Professor of Philosophy at Brown University, BEYOND SEPARATENESS, 1995, p. 11. All of these philosophers lay down fairly stringent conditions for achieving autonomy in the face of the complex social influences that shape each of us. But in a variety of ways all of them echo Feinburg’s verdict that “we may all be, in some respects, irrevocably the ‘products of our culture’ but that is no reason why the self that is such a product cannot be free to govern itself as it is.” We are shaped by childhood socialization, but while we are being so shaped we are also developing an autonomous self. Growing up is not a totally passive process and thus while we grow into adults we accept a good deal from others but we are also busy making ourselves into certain kinds of persons. Most philosophers seem confident that however powerful socialization is, it is not all-powerful. 60 AUTONOMY IS A SIGNIFICANT VALUE 1. AUTONOMY IS GROUNDED IN OUR INTUIT WE SENSE OF PERSONHOOD Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Professor of Law at Harvard Law School, STANFORD LAW REVIEW, April, 1994, p. 878. When used in another sense, however, autonomy reflects what is morally troubling about paternalism. Employed as an ascriptive concept, autonomy represents the purported metaphysical foundation of people’s capacity and also their right to make and act on their own decisions, even if those decisions are ill-considered or substantively unwise. We all experience ourselves as agents, not objects, and a moral intuition of dignity and entitlement accompanies our sense of agency. 2. ALL PERSONS HAVE AN EQUAL RIGHT TO PERSONAL AUTONOMY Stephen Gardbaum, Associate Professor at Northwestern University School of Law, STANFORD LAW REVIEW, January, 1996, p. 413. According to comprehensive liberalism based on the ideal of autonomy, by contrast, what must be equally respected is each individual’s capacity for choice regarding conceptions of the good and (at least presumptively) the choices that result from it. On the interpretation offered here, for the government to treat its citizens with equal respect requires that it treat each citizen’s interest in autonomy as equal, and that it respect and enhance the capacity of each citizen to choose her own ends and not have them determined or unduly influenced by others. 3. AUTONOMY IS A FOUNDATIONAL VALUE--BOTH MORALLY AND POLITICALLY Christina E. Wells, Associate Professor University of Missouri School of Law, HARVARD CIVIL RIGHTS-CIVIL LIBERTIES LAW REVIEW, Winter, 1997, p. 165-166. In the Kantian ethic, “every rational being exists as an end in himself.” Thus, Kant equates autonomy and personhood. Scholars interpret autonomy, in this sense, as less a right than a capacity of persons to “make and act on their own decisions.” Significantly, our innate autonomy (or freedom or dignity) does not leave us entirely free to act to satisfy our desires. Rather, each individual’s autonomy implies an obligation to respect the freedom of others and imposes responsibility when we fail to do so. Kantian autonomy is considered to be a foundation for moral precepts--in other words, what we ought to do given the innate dignity of all persons. Nevertheless, autonomy is not a concept limited to the moral realm. Instead, Kant’s notion of autonomy has a significant place in his political theory, defining not only the role of the State but also the legal rights and obligations of citizens toward each other. According to Kant, the ultimate justification of the State is to protect the autonomy of its citizens.. - 4. WE HAVE AN ACTIVE DUTY TO PROTECT EVERYONE’S GENUINE AUTONOMY Stephen Gardbaum, Associate Professor at Northwestern University School of Law, STANFORD LAW REVIEW, January, 1996, pp. 413-414. In other words, contrary to the very essence of political liberalism, the principle of equal respect should not be understood as a purely political value: one whose scope is limited to the political sphere. Taking it seriously means that each individual’s autonomy regarding ways of life must be protected generally. This does not imply the obviously implausible claim that each individual is required to treat every other with the same respect in all matters, or to take everyone else’s interests and concerns equally into account in determining how to act. It means rather that the government has a duty to protect the autonomy of each citizen in determining her way of life, as exemplified by Wisconsin v. Yoder. 5. AUTONOMY IS A SIGNIFICANT VALUE Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Professor of Law at Harvard Law School, STANFORD LAW REVIEW, April, 1994, p. 902-903. Autonomy is an ideal with distinctive importance in modern life. In the cacophony of pluralist culture, the “idea has entered very deep” that every person possesses her own originality, and that it is of “crucial moral importance” for each to lead a life that is distinctively self-made. Autonomy both expresses this idea and promotes its realization. 61 Autonomy Bad CRITIQUES OF AUTONOMY ARE INVALID 1. METAPHYSICAL QUESTIONS OF FREE WILL DO NOT DEJUSTIFY AUTONOMY Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Professor of Law at Harvard Law School, STANFORD LAW REVIEW, April, 1994, P. 892-893. To view the will as an uncaused cause, unaffected by taste and character, would give a random aspect to human action that undermines the very notions of desert and moral responsibility that free will is invoked to support. Although ascriptive autonomy can be defended in Kantian terms, its essential elements require no suppositions about metaphysical freedom of the will. Even if the truth of causal determinism were somehow established, our lives would remain to be led, and our “reactive attitudes” to the quality of will displayed by others their contempt, indifference, or sympathy, for example -would be unlikely to change significantly. In particular, we would almost certainly go on resenting strangers who insist they know our own best interests better than we do; we would feel the same entitlement to go about our lives without being frustrated by others claims of superior knowledge or insight. The deeply entrenched status of reactive attitudes such as resentment of paternalism, coupled with the fact that we cannot help but experience ourselves as bearers of free will and as self-validating sources of rights, seems to me sufficient to establish ascriptive autonomy as a fundamental moral and political value that ought to matter to First Amendment theory. - 2. UBIQUITY OF CONSTRAINT IS NOT A REPUDIATION OF AUTONOMY Morris Lipson, J.D. candidate, YALE LAW JOURNAL, June, 1995, p. 2249. For it is almost certainly a mistake to identify autonomy with negative liberty, if negative liberty itself is thought of as freedom from all constraints. The problem for autonomy, rather, arises when constraints are imposed on an agent’s choices or actions by someone or something other than the agent. Thus, the more plausible view (to which I will refer as individualism) is that an autonomous agent is one who possesses negative liberty in the sense that he is free from any externally imposed constraints. As Robert Paul Wolff has put it, the autonomous person may be bound by a variety of constraints, as long as “he alone is the judge of those constraints.” That is, a person need not, at every turn, be “free” to choose or act precisely as he is inclined at that moment. A constrained choice or act can be an autonomous one, as long as, and insofar as, the source of the constraints is the person himself. 3. DIFFICULTY OF DEFINITION DOES NOT DEJUSTIFY AUTONOMY Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Professor of Law at Harvard Law School, STANFORD LAW REVIEW, April, 1994, p. 893. Given the vagueness of the moral attitudes in which ascriptive autonomy is grounded, I doubt that a clear and determinate conception is even possible. Nonetheless, ascriptive autonomy captures something too important to be ignored: our experience of ourselves as moral agents with both the capacity and the right to make decisions for ourselves, even when those decisions are insufficiently informed, self-aware, and self-critical to count as autonomous under any very stringent standards of descriptive autonomy. If ascriptive autonomy deserves recognition on this basis, it properly includes elements of both negative and positive liberty. Conceived as the presupposition of much of our thought about rights and responsibility, ascriptive autonomy implies an entitlement to personal sovereignty in some sphere of self-regarding action. Ascriptive autonomy also mandates at least the political rights identified by the naffowest, positive libertarian conceptions: equal rights to participate in democratic self-government. 4. AUTONOMY DOES NOT PRESUME ATOMISM OR IGNORE SOCIALIZATION Stephen Gardbaum, Associate Professor at Northwestern University School of Law, STANFORD LAW REVIEW, January, 1996, p. 394. Valuing autonomy neither presupposes the existence of atomistic individuals preformed, self-sufficient actors who interact only instrumentally with society nor ingenuously overlooks or denies the powerful effects of socialization. Indeed, a commitment to the value of autonomy may itself be best understood as a response to the profound reality of the “social construction of individuality.” Only if individuals were “so” socially constituted that exercising partauthorship of their lives is an impossibility would the normative claim and the state’s efforts to promote it fail to make sense. - - 62 AUTONOMY IS NOT ABSOLUTE 1. AUTONOMY IS NOT THE MOST IMPORTANT VALUE Stephen Gardbaum, Associate Professor at Northwestern University School of Law, STANFORD LAW REVIEW, January, 1996, P. 417. Autonomy is not, however, the only thing of value. This observation suggests an approach to solving the traditional “problems” or “paradoxes” of using autonomy to make bad choices (for example, to choose evil or to enslave oneself to another person or to drugs) and exercising one’s autonomy in a way that denies autonomy to another person or group. It is not necessary to attempt to dissolve the problem of evil choices semantically by denying that such choices are “really” autonomous or that they are autonomous but lack value. More straightforwardly, choosing slavery or drugs, for example, may conflict with (and be trumped by) other essential liberal values such as human dignity or equality. The same holds for the denial of autonomy to other groups. Such other values are also constituent parts of an overall liberal account of a valuable human life and a good political society. 2. ABSOLUTIST VIEWS OF AUTONOMY ARE UNSUSTAINABLE Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Professor of Law at Harvard Law School, STANFORD LAW REVIEW, April, 1994, p. 900-901. The view of what it means to be a person that underlies ascriptive autonomy resists translation into the metric of interests, for it insists that a sovereign prerogative, possibly with metaphysical foundations, trumps all interests that might weigh against respect for individual choice. As I have argued, however, the metaphysical pretensions of ascriptive autonomy may be impossible to sustain. In addition, virtually no one consistently maintains that respect for ascriptive autonomy precludes some version of “soft” paternalism, which permits at least temporary, coercive intervention to ensure that a person’s decision to act in a self-destructive way is informed and rational. Once these concessions are made, the only practical alternative to reductionism would be renunciation of ascriptive autonomy altogether. But this, also for reasons suggested earlier, would seem to me a clear mistake. We cannot help experiencing our selves as free or resenting interference with our exercise of agency. Moreover, our moral intuition of agency as a ground of sovereign independence ought to be supported, not deprecated, as an antidote to hyperrational conceptions of descriptive autonomy. 3. AUTONOMY IS ONLY INSTRUMENTAL TO THE GOOD LIFE Stephen Gardbaum, Associate Professor at Northwestern University School of Law, STANFORD LAW REVIEW, January, 1996, p. 397. This latter point leads us back to our unanswered question: What measure of first-order neutrality does comprehensive liberalism require of the state? Must a state that seeks to promote second-order autonomy be completely indifferent to the particular ways of life that its citizens choose freely? If not, what considerations counsel partiality? We value autonomy because it expresses the attractive ideal that each of us should be partauthor of his own life. Autonomy is valuable in particular cases when individuals exercise it to be part-authors of worthwhile lives; other things being equal, authoring a worthless life does not add to, and indeed affirmatively detracts from, the moral value of that life. 4. NOT ALL CONCEPTIONS OF AUTONOMY ARE IMPORTANT Martin A. Kotler, Associate Professor of Law at Widener University School of Law, TULANE LAW REVIEW, December, 1992, p. 360. First, one must attempt to identify exactly what rights or values are being protected when a court seeks to advance “autonomy.” Confusion arises in this context because, contrary to common belief, autonomy is not a unified concept. In fact, there are multiple components of “autonomy,” not all of which will be considered essential or core values at any given time. It would appear that what can be described as the two primary components of autonomy actually define two competing conceptions of autonomy. The first is ownership of one’s own body, and the second is ownership of private property. For a long period of time, promotion of autonomy was seen chiefly as protection of real property rights. Gradually, however, that conception has given way to our current view of autonomy as the protection of one’s bodily integrity. 63 PATERNALISM IS NOT ALWAYS UNDESIRABLE 1. PATERNALISM OFTEN ENHANCES SOME FORMS OF AUTONOMY Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Professor of Law at Harvard Law School, STANFORD LAW REVIEW, April, 1994, P. 877-878. When autonomy is used as a descriptive concept, two facts stand out. First, autonomy is a matter of degree. People who are able to deliberate with critical insight and self-awareness and to choose from abundant options are highly autonomous. Others who unthinkingly do whatever others expect of them, or who lack self-restraint, or whose most basic choices are dictated by economic necessity may not be veiy autonomous at all. Second, paternalism can sometimes be defended as a means of preserving or promoting autonomy. For example, if cigarette advertising creates misleading images that mampulatively lure people into addiction, regulation might help to promote descriptive autonomy. In the long run, people who would become addicted to smoking if tempted by image-based advertising, but otherwise would not, will be more autonomous if image-based advertising is prohibited. Whether their gain in autonomy outweighs any loss to the autonomy of others, through the restriction of speech and reduced access to ideas and information, is at least partly an empirical question. - - 2. DEFERENCE TO TRADITION OR AUTHORITY CAN BE ACCEPTABLE Stephen Gardbaum, Associate Professor at Northwestern University School of Law, STANFORD LAW REVIEW, January, 1996, p. 395. When a person acts on the basis of tradition or authority, the reason for acting is the determination of the tradition or authority that this is how the person should act. By contrast, when a person chooses to act in the way that a tradition or authority has determined, that person exercises independent judgment, and the reason for acting is either the merit of the action or of following tradition or authority, as that person perceives it. Thus, there is an important difference between choosing a traditional or authorized way of life and adopting a way of life on the basis of tradition or authority. This is the difference, for example, between the highly-educated woman who chooses to live the “traditional” life of wife and mother and the woman who does so because she so inhabits this tradition that she effectively has no alternative. It is also the difference between the person who chooses to live the religious life and the one who does so because it is God’s~ will, or between the Muslim woman who chooses to wear a veil and the one who wears one because her tradition mandates it. 3. PATERNALISM CAN ACTUALLY MAXIMIZE RATHER THAN MINIMIZE AUTONOMY Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Professor of Law at Harvard Law School, STANFORD LAW REVIEW, April, 1994, p. 890. In common with other conceptions of descriptive autonomy, the conception that I have outlined is relative, or a matter of degree, and it depicts autonomy as capable of being either promoted or stifled. Indeed, as I noted above, acceptance of descriptive autonomy as a moral, political, or constitutional value is arguably consistent with a good deal of paternalism, defined as action or legislation that protects people against consequences of decisions that they themselves would not voluntarily make. To recur to an earlier example, if cigarette advertising creates false images concerning the effects of smoking and thereby manipulates its audiences, or if it draws people into addiction that reduces their capacity to act in accord with their higher-order goals, restrictive legislation might well promote, rather than diminish, descriptive autonomy. 64 AUTONOMY IS NOT A PARAMOUNT VALUE 1. AUTONOMY LEADS TO COERCION Alan S. Rosenbaum, Associate Professor of Philosophy at Cleveland State University, COERCION AND AUTONOMY, 1986, pp. 107-108. The presence of autonomy means that a victim-participant has lost some degree of autonomy over himself in the situation because of the coursers-participant’s exercise of control over the victim in that limited respect. Through an exercise of coercive control, the coursers range of autonomy is now increased, extending over the coercee’s previously held autonomous sphere and at the expense of the victim. As we shall see later in this chapter ~ in the last chapter), once someone has lost some degree of autonomy to someone else, then, unless it is reclaimed, no further coercive control of the victim in that regard is possible, since he has no social autonomy to lose. Hence, the controllee becomes in this limited way a mere instrument of the controller as the controller continues to exercise control over the controllee. Without autonomy there could be no coercion. The deep-rooted sense even a child feels for the integrity and the vitality of his or her own social autonomy lends a concept of coercion its normative character. 2. AUTONOMY IS NOT AN IMPORTANT VALUE Alan S. Rosenbaum, Associate Professor of Philosophy at Cleveland State University, COERCION AND AUTONOMY, 1986, p. 114. Autonomy, again, is not something intrinsically valuable, for it has hierarchical value in Oppenheim’s scheme: it is a type of power relation over one’s own actions with respect to others, and it may include both freedom and unfreedom (i.e., punishability and prevention) relations but never (by definition) control relations. When at least two agents are spoken of as being mutually independent, they lack power over each others actions. 3. FREEDOM SHOULD BE VALUED ABOVE AUTONOMY Alfred P.. Mele, author, AUTONOMOUS AGENTS, 1995, pp. 140-141. It is sometimes held that moral responsibility for an action requires the freedom to have done otherwise; and the same requirement has been placed on the autonomous performance of an action (or on having acted freely). However, even the weaker claim that being a morally responsible and autonomous agent requires the freedom to act otherwise than one acts on at least one occasion is false. 4. COMMUNITY SHOULD BE VALUED ABOVE AUTONOMY Diana T. Meyers, Professor at Cornell University, SELF, SOCIETY, AND PERSONAL CHOICE,, 1989 p. 20. Personal autonomy is vulnerable to socialization at three points: self-discovery, self-definition, and self direction. To achieve personal autonomy, one must know what one is like, one must be able to establish one’s own standards and to modify one’s qualities to meet them, and one must express one’s personality in action. Without self-discovery and self-definition can also be influenced socially. Introspection may find a thoroughly conditioned self. Likewise, a decision to change may reflect socially instilled values and preferences. In sum, self-administered checks on the autonomy of the individual may themselves be products of socialization, and any review of these reviews may be socially tainted, as well. 65 AUTONOMY LACKS ANY PRACTICAL APPLICATION 1. IT’S IMPOSSIBLE FOR AUTONOMY TO EXIST BECAUSE OF PEOPLE’S INDIVIDUAL GOALS Richard Lindley, Professor at Bradford University, AUTONOMY, 1986, p. 77 Although this strategy offers a plausible solution to the temporal problem, the interpersonal problem is more intractable for the Kantian view. If people’s autonomous goals never conflicted, then it would be possible always to respect fully people’s autonomy. People would share common goals if, as Kant suggests they should be, they were always motivated by strictly neutral principles; but in fact people’s goals sometimes do conflict, and in these cases the prescription of the Kantian view may be not just ethically questionable, but literally impossible to execute. 2. MUST HAVE SELF-RULE OR SELF-GOVERNMENT FOR AUTONOMY TO HAPPEN Alfred P.. Mele, author, AUTONOMOUS AGENTS, 1995, p. 5 The root notion of autonomy, again is self-rule or self-government, and autonomy as an actual condition of agents centrally involves self-rule. Not surprisingly, spelling out just what autonomy amounts to has proved difficult-both in the case of individuals, which is my concern, and in the case of groups. Part of the problem is that theorists have had quite different theoretical uses for a notion of individual autonomy. When an account of a concept is developed for a particular theoretical purpose, it can easily fail to suit other purposes. 3. AUTONOMY CAN EXIST ONLY IF REASONING DOES Alfred R. Mele, author, AUTONOMOUS AGENTS, 1995, pp. 137-138. Personal autonomy, if it exists, is a property of persons. If all or many normal human beings are autonomous to some (varying) extent, then autonomy (often, at least) is a property of relatively complicated persons-people with values, principles, beliefs, desires, emotions, intentions, and plans; people capable of reasoning effectively both about, and on the basis of, such things; and people who can judge, plan, and act on the basis of their reasoning. 4. COMMUNITY PREVENTS AUTONOMY Diana T. Meyers, Professor at Cornell University, SELF, SOCIETY, AND PERSONAL CHOICE,, 1989, p. 26. Autonomous people are in control of their own lives inasmuch as they do what they really want to do (part I). But, if people are products of their environments, it seems fatuous to maintain that the agency of individuals has any special importance, for personal choice dissolves into social influence. Moreover, it seems vacuous to maintain that their is a significant distinction between what a person wants and what a person really wants, for people have no desires apart from those that socialization has molded, if not implanted in them. The chief task of a theory of autonomy, then, is to reclaim the distinction between real and apparent desires. 5. COMMUNITY DOES NOT ALLOW AUTONOMY TO EXIST Diana T. Meyers, Professor at Cornell University, SELF, SOCIETY, AND PERSONAL CHOICE,, 1989, p. 41. Moreover, innovative ways of life are sometimes born of this process. While it is an interesting philosophical puzzle whether these phenomena are possible because people are capable of defying socialization or because socialization is not all-pervasive, it is a mistake to think that we cannot make important philosophical progress in regard to the problem of personal autonomy without solving this conundrum. We have already seen that attempts to solve the problem of personal autonomy by devising a mode of socialization-transcendence have failed. 66 Biocentrism Good MUST HAVE BIOCENTRISM FOR JUSTICE 1. MUST REJECT SPECIESISM OR LOSE CHANCE FOR ANY PEACE AND JUSTICE Michael Fox, DVM, PhD, Vice President of the US Humane Society, Board of Directors member for the Center for Respect for Life and the Environment, author of over forty books, VOICES ON THE THRESHOLD OF TOMORROW, 1993, edited by Georg and Linda Feurstein, page 349. Half a century ago Mahatma Gandhi said that “the greatness of a nation and its moral progress can be judged by the way in which its animals are treated.” The spiritual insight of St. Francis of Assissi made him call all creatures our brothers and sisters, and he called for a true democracy that embraced all of creation in respect and reverence. But today animals are treated as mere commodities by a consumer society that is today consuming the world. As Albert Schweitzer advised, without a reverence for all life, we will never enjoy world peace. The fate of the animals will be ours also. Compassion is a boundless ethic, and if we exclude animals or certain species from this circle of ethical concern and responsibility, we are guilty of a chauvinism that animal rightists rightly term “speciesism.” Politically, it is nothing less than biological fascism. 2. WE MUST HAVE A NEW EFHIC THAT RESPECTS ALL SPECIES Peter Singer, PhD and philosopher, professor at the Center for Human Bioethics at Monash University, VOICES ON THE THRESHOLD OF TOMORROW, 1993, edited by Georg and Linda Feurstein. We need to develop a wider ethic that goes beyond the bound of our own species. This is a large step forward, one that can only be compared in its scope with the step that was taken, over the last two hundred years, to abolish slavery and include all human beings within the bounds of equality. Yet it is possible. Free and secular thinking about ethics is still relatively new. I hope that the next millennium will begin by extending equal consideration of interests to all sentient beings. 3. FOR SOCIAL ETHICS, WE MUST RESPECT THE ECOLOGICAL MORAL IMPERATIVE David Foreman, co-founder of Earth First!, DEFENDING THE EARTH: A DIALOGUE BETWEEN MURRAY BOOKCHIN AND DAVE FOREMAN, 1991, page 116. I believe that the intrinsic value of living things demands direct moral consideration in how we organize our societies. I reject anthropocentrism completely and argue that besides our social commitments we also need to honor direct moral duties to the larger ecological community to which we belong. We have a moral obligation to preserve wilderness and biodiversity, to develop a respectful and symbiotic relationship with that portion of the biosphere that we do inhabit, and to cause no unnecessary harm to non-human life. Furthermore, I believe that these moral obligations frequently supersede the self-interests of humanity. Human well-being is vitally important to me, but it is not the ultimate ethical value. I agree with Aldo Leopold that ultimately “a thing is right when it tends to enhance the integrity, stability and beauty of the biotic community. For social ethics to be ecologically grounded they must become consistent with this larger ecological moral imperative. That is why I am for Earth first. 4. ECOCENTRISM PLACES EVERYTHING IN NATURE IN ITS PROPER PLACE Robin Eckersley, Ecological writer, ENVIRONMENTALISM AND POLITICAL THEORY, 1992, p. 28. In terms of fundamental priorities, an ecocentric approach regards the question of our proper place in the rest of nature as logically prior to the question of what are the most appropriate social and political arrangements for human communities. 67 BIOCENTRISM DOES NOT IGNORE HUMANS 1. BIOCENTRIC ACTIVISTS TACKLE MANY PROGRESSIVE ISSUES Kirkpatrick Sale, author, Secretary of the E.F. Schumacher Society, THE NATION, June 5, 1995, p. 785. These neoLuddites are more numerous today than one might assume, techno-pessimists without the power and access of the techno-optimists but still with a not-insignificant voice, shelves of books and documents and reports, and increasing numbers of followers -- maybe a quarter of the adult population, according to a Newsweek survey. They are to be found on the radical and direct-action side of environmentalism, particularly in the American West; they are on the dissenting edges of academic economics and ecology departments, generally of the no-growth school; they are everywhere in Indian Country throughout the Americas, representing a traditional biocentrism against the anthropocentric norm; they are activists fighting against nuclear power, irradiated food, clearcutting, animal experiments, toxic waste and the killing of whales, among the many aspects of the high-tech onslaught. They may also number -- certainly they speak for -- some of those whose experience with modem technology has in one way or another awakened them from what Lewis Mumford called ‘the myth of the machine.” 2. BIOCENTRIC VIEW RESPECTS VIEWS OF THE OPPRESSED, DEFENDS NATIVE PEOPLES David Orton, Ecologist and Forest manager, CANADIAN DIMENSION, May 1994, page 31. Putting Earth first means ecosystem rights before human rights. When considering human rights, give native/indigenous rights first consideration, but not at the expense of the ecosystem. From such a perspective, I cannot support the pulpwood logging of La Verendrye Park in Quebec, or similar situations, even endorsed by some native people. Social justice is only possible in a context of ecological justice. We have to move from a shallow, human-centered ecology, to a deeper, all-species centered ecology. MUST REJECT ANTHROPOCENTRIC NOTIONS FOR SURVIVAL 1. ANIMAL EXTINCTION IS SYMPTOMATIC OF OUR DESTRUCTIVENESS Michael Fox, DVM, PhD, Vice President of the US Humane Society, Board of Directors member for the Center for Respect for Life and the Environment, author of over forty books, VOICES ON THE THRESHOLD OF TOMORROW, 1993, edited by Georg and Linda Feurstein, page 349. Indeed, modern society is responsible for nothing less than a holocaust of the animal kingdom. Animal suffering and extinction is symptomatic of a destructive relationship with the rest of creation that may well terminate in our own extinction and is linked today with the disintegration of the atmosphere and the increasingly dysfunctional condition of both the Earth and industrial civilization. 2. OUR SURVIVAL AND WELL-BEING FOR GENERATIONS DEPEND ON BIOCENTRISM Michael Fox, DVM, PhD, Vice President of the US Humane Society, Board of Directors member for the Center for Respect for Life and the Environment, author of over forty books, VOICES ON THE THRESHOLD OF TOMORROW, 1993, edited by Georg and Linda Feurstein, page 350. Our own well-being, and of generations to come, depends on everyone recognizing that animals have interests, feelings, and a will to live, and are worthy of our respect and concern. As we destroy their habitats, so we destroy “our” environment and life-support-systems; as we crush their spirits to serve our own ends, so we demean our own. Human well-being, animal well-being, and the well-being of the natural world are one and the same. We are all one. When we take care of Earth’s creatures and creation, the Earth will take care of us. Our arrogance, nonsubsistence needs, and scientific powers should not lead us to think otherwise, since we have neither the wisdom nor the technology to create an alternative life-support system at Nature’s expense. As history will show, in the process of trying to do so, we destroy our own humanity, which cannot be fulfilled at the expense of the rest of Earth’s creation. 68 BIOCENTRISM IS A DESIRABLE PERSPECTIVE 1. BIOCENTRISM IS THE BEST HOPE FOR A WORLD IN CONFLICT Joseph R. Des Jardins, Philosophy Professor at the College of Saint Benedict and St. John’s University, ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS: AN INTRODUCTION TO ENVIRONMENTAL PHILOSOPHY, 1997, p. 130. Kenneth Goodpaster’s focus on life itself as sufficient for moral considerabiity is biocentric. An early version of a biocentric ethics is Albert Schweitzer’s “reverence for life” principle. Schweitzer wrote extensively about religion, music, ethics, history, and philosophy. He also, of course, devoted much of his life to bringing medical care to remote and isolated communities in Africa. His ethics, captured in the phrase “reverence for life,” is an extremely interesting precumor of contemporary biocentric ethics. Schweitzer’s was an active and full life committed to caring and concern for others. Yet he was also a prolific writer, devoting many volumes to diagnosing the ethical ills of modem society and seeking a cure for them. Reverence for life was the attitude that he believed offered hope to a world beset with conflict. 2. BIOCENTRISM PROPERLY BALANCES HUMAN AND NATURAL INTERESTS Susan Emmenegger, Associate Thomas Re & Partners, and Axel Tschentscher, Wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter at Hamburg University, GEORGETOWN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW, Summer, 1994, p. 589. Biocentrism is a two-way street. It allows for competing interests in both directions, opening the door for nature’s interests in many spheres traditionally reserved to human concerns. In the context of environmental damages, biocentrism waffants a change in perspective with regard to damage assessment. Traditionally, environmental damages have been calculated on an anthropocentric basis, i.e., on the basis of the infringement on the physical or mental integrity of humans or on their status as property holders. As shown previously, what nature would perceive as in~eparable damage to one of its ecosystems does not necessarily translate into a cognizable human concern. Recognizing nature’s independent existence calls for a non-anthropocentric damage assessment, i.e., a damage assessment which acknowledges that nature can suffer original harm and will allow for redress when such harm occurs. - 3. BIOCENTRISM IS NOT MISANTHROPIC David Suzuki, geneticist and analyst of social and environmental issues, THE TORONTO STAR, April 29, 1995, p. B6. Critics often accuse deep ecologists of being misanthropes, caring more for other species than our own fellow human beings. I’ve heard it said derisively: “They want to protect trees and the spotted owl and don’t care if people are thrown out of work.” To such criticism, the American poet Gary Snyder responds: “A properly radical environmentalist position is in no way anti-human. We grasp the pain of the human condition in its full complexity, and add the awareness of how desperately endangered certain key species and habitats have become... The critical argument now within environmental circles is between those who operate from a human-centred, resourcemanagement mentality and those whose values reflect an awareness of the integrity of the whole of nature. The latter position, that of deep ecology, is politically livelier, more courageous, more convivial, riskier and more scientific.” 4. BIOCENTRISM IS THE BEST METHOD TO ADDRESS ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERNS Susan Emmenegger, Associate Thomas Re & Partners, and Axel Tschentscher, Wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter at Hamburg University, GEORGETOWN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW, Summer, 1994, p. 579. Here again the criterion is which of the approaches is most likely to be adopted by the humans who initiated the acknowledging of an intrinsic value of nature. The context and language of third stage environmental instruments makes biocentrism the most appropriate approach. Protecting “every form of life,” trying to achieve the “survival” of natural entities, and conserving nature insofar as it construes “wildlife” and gives a “natural habitat” indicates that living nature is the subject of intrinsic value. This view is best represented by biocentrism. Therefore, biocentrisni is the relevant paradigm to rely on as a background rationale for the development of international environmental law. - 69 BIOCENTRISM IS A VALID PERSPECTIVE 1. INTERNATIONAL LAW VALIDATES BIOCENTRISM Susan Ernmenegger, Associate Thomas Re & Partners, and Axel Tschentscher, Wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter at Hamburg University, GEORGETOWN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW, Summer, 1994, p. 590. Our main thesis is that international environmental instruments show a step by step development towards acknowledging natures rights in a biocentric perspective. This thesis is supported by an analysis of international environmental instruments and their classification according to whose interest is protected. This leads to three stages of development. In the first stage, immediate human self-interest is the primary reason for the protection of the environment. In the second stage, this immediate interest enlarges to encompass the interests of future generations and thereby recognizes the intergenerational dimension of the protection of nature. Finally, third stage instruments transcend the anthropocentric approaches of the past by acknowledging an intrinsic value of nature. - 2. BIOCENTRIC ETHICS ARE EMPIRICALLY VIABLE Kirkpatrick Sale, ecologist, THE NATION, June 5, 1995, p. 785. For more than three centuries now the Amish have withdrawn to islands mostly impervious to the industrial culture, and very successfully, too, as their lush fields, busy villages, neat farmsteads, fertile groves and gardens, and general lack of crime, poverty, anomie and alienation attest. In Indian country, too, where (despite the casino lure) the traditional customs and lifeways have remained more or less intact for centuries, a majority have always chosen to turn their backs on the industrial world and most of its attendant technologies, and they have been joined by a younger generation reasserting and in some cases revivifying those ancient tribal cultures. There could hardly be two systems more antithetical to the industrial--they are, for example, stable, communal, spiritual, participatory, oral, slow, cooperative, decentralized, anirnistic and biocentric--but the fact that such tribal societies have survived for so many eons, not just in North America but on every other continent as well, suggests that there is a cohesion and strength to them that is certainly more durable and likely more harmonious than anything industrialism has so far achieved. 3. EXTREME CARICATURES OF BIOCENTRISM ARE JUST STRAWMAN ARGUMENTS Rocky Barker, staff, IDAHO FALLS POST REGISTER, December 3, 1995, p. A9. Moreover, Chase set up a straw man of biocentrism, the idea that all living things have equal value and rights with man, and implied that environmentalists and Park Service employees believed it religiously. The only people I know who believe a slime mold and man have equal rights are fanatical animal rights activists and they have been minor players in the environmental debates of the last 25 years. Despite the environmental classic” tag that Playing God” gets, its cartoon characterization of environmentalists beliefs led them as a group to shun Chase. 70 Biocentrism Bad BIOCENTRISM IS AN INVALID PERSPECTIVE 1. BIOCENTRISM IS RIDDLED WITH DEEP THEORETICAL FLAWS Terry L. Anderson, staff, THE DETROIT NEWS, November 15, 1995, p. np. The main contribution of this book is that it exposes the lack of any scientific basis for biocentrism and ecosystem management According to biocentrism, man’s activities (logging, for example) are not a part of the ecosystem, which would be in balance were it not for these activities. But there are two problems with this approach. First, nature is not an equilibrium system. The forests of the Pacific Northwest never have been in balance; they always have been dynamic and always will be even after man joins the dinosaurs. Second, ecosystem management is not scientific because it generates no testable propositions. For example, if spotted owls go extinct, what are the consequences? Biocentrism and ecosystem management make no predictions. They only say such extinction would be bad if it came as a result of man’s influence. 2. BIOCENTRISM IS IMPRACTICAL AND UNREALISTIC Timothy Patrick Brady, editor, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW, Spring, 1990, p. 621. Frost discusses two types of environmentalism: biocentrism, and duty-based. Biocentrism believes that humans are “indistinguishable in kind from the other inhabitants of the earth.” Because this philosophy fails to take account of people’s “dual nature-Itheiri thinking and nonthinking selves,” Frost rejects it as “impractical and unrealistic.” ... 3. BIOCENTRISM PRESENTS A FALSE VENEER OF SCIENTIFIC MERIT Terry L. Anderson, staff, THE DETROIT NEWS, November 15, 1995, p. np. Chase’s argument is that ultimately it is value judgments, not scientific analysis, that drive environmental policies. The news that the emperor has no clothes will be unbelievable for those environmentalists who have based their movement on the supposed science of ecosystem management. By embracing biocentrism and ecosystem management, Chase says environmentalists have “confused science with philosophy, facts with values, and truth with mythology.” Compelling evidence to support his conclusion comes from the fight over ancient forests in the Pacific Northwest. Initially, environmentalists claimed (without evidence) that these forests should not be harvested because they are home to an endangered species, the northern spotted owl. Though growing scientific data indicate that viable owl populations do exist, the bird remains on the endangered species list. Million of acres remain off limits to timber management at tremendous economic and social costs. But these costs and the evidence that the owl is not endangered do not matter to the environmentalists fighting over the forests. By arguing that an interconnected natural system will be destroyed if logging is allowed to continue, they have hidden their desire to stop logging under a veil of false science. 4. BIOCENTRISM IS INTERNALLY CONTRADICTORY Joel B. Eisen, Assistant Professor of Law and Director, Robert R. Merhige, Jr. Center of Environmental Law, University of Richmond School of Law, WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW, Summer, 1995, p. 10. To coexist in harmony with nature, we might establish a “biocentric democracy,” in which humans and nonhuman species have coextensive rights. This is an alternative to anthropocentrism proposed by some “Deep Ecologists,” who insist that the rights of humankind must extend to all species. To propose this is to recognize one of its many inherent contradictions: humans would still make any determination of biological egalitarianism, which would be suspect on that ground alone. 71 BIOCENTRISM IS AN UNDESIRABLE FRAMEWORK 1. ALL BIOCENTRIC PHILOSOPHIES COLLAPSE INTO ANTHROPOCENTRISM Bob Pepperman Taylor, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Vermont, OUR LIMITS TRANSGRESSED: ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICAL THOUGHT IN AMERICA, 1992, p. 127. The rejection of the progressive conservation tradition by contemporary radical environmental philosophers has created the need to find new moral ground for respecting, protecting, and valuing the nonhuman natural environment. The results of the search for a convincing biocentric or ecocentric theory, however, have been disappointing. At some point, all of these theories end up appealing to human interests by connecting our interests to the ecological community of which we are a part, thus undermining the strict biocentrism of the project. At some point, the biocentrism that is to be defended either loses its radical force or is inconsistently applied by the theorist, as a result of its obviously and unacceptably misanthropic implications and conclusions. 2. BIOCENTRISM ALIENATES HUMANS FROM THE REST OF NATURE Joseph R. Des Jardins, Philosophy Professor at the College of Saint Benedict and St. John’s University, ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS: AN INTRODUCTION TO ENVIRONMENTAL PHILOSOPHY, 1997, p. 141. Even Taylor’s careful defense of biocentric ethics faces serious challenges. The next chapters review several that have implications for environmental philosophies. First, the emphasis on noninterference as a major normative principle suggests a view of humans that is questionable at best. To say that we ought not “interfere with” nature implies that humans are somehoe outside of, or distinct from, nature: humans are separate from nature, and thus we should leave natural processes alone. Thus, the claim is that environmental change or even environmental destruction is allowable (good?) if it results from natural processes. Change or destruction is wrong if it results from human interference. But surely humans are as much a part of natural processes as any other organism. Thus, the fact that change is brought about by humans should not, in itself, have any ethical implications. - - 2. BIOCENTRISM BLURS THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN HUMANITY AND NATURE Bob Pepperman Taylor, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Vermont, OUR LIMITS TRANSGRESSED: ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICAL THOUGHT IN AMERICA, 1992, pp. 124-125. First, although Taylor does not depict the earth as a “superorganism,” his biocentric perspective has significant similarities to moral theories built on such a claim most notably, it too obscures the moral issues at stake in the human relationship with the environment by appealing to generally shared interests. As we will see, the ethical principles Taylor defends in the last to components of his theory presume that environmental ethics must concentrate on the clarification and mediation of conflicts between humans and the natural world. The biocentric outlook, in contrast, threatens to make such conflicts increasingly difficult to identify. After all, if we are an integral and equal member of the community of life, on what grounds are we to criticize our “natural” species behavior within that community? Just as with Rolston’s and Callicott’s theories, Taylor’s biocentric world view may actually undermine the original purpose of the theory: defining ethical boundaries for human behavior, through the recognition of the inherent moral worth of other organisms. The danger of the biocenti-ic perspective is that it blurs the distinction between ourselves and other living things so crucial for locating such boundaries. - 72 BIOCENTRISM IS ANTHROPOCENTRIC 1. BIOCENTRISM IS JUST AS BAD AS ANTHROPOCENTRISM Murray Bookchin, director emeritus of the Institute for Social Ecology, WHICH WAY FOR THE ECOLOGY MOVEMENT?, 1994, page 3. The “biocentrism” ideology of deep ecology and ecomysticism pivots on an ideological trick: a strict assertion of biocentric “rights,” as though no body of ethical ideas could be translated that formulated both extremes. Yet these extremes can indeed be translated in an ethics of complementarilty, in which human beings--themselves products of natural evolution, with naturally as well as culturally endowed capacities that no other life-form possesses--can play an actively creative role in evolution to the benefit of life generally. Biocentrists willfully ignore such notions--that is, when they do not willfully degrade them into a crude anthropocentrism that they can so easily oppose. 2. FOCUS ON ANTHROPOCENTRISM PARALYZES SOCIAL CHANGE Murray Bookchin, director emeritus of the Institute for Social Ecology, WHICH WAY FOR THE ECOLOGY MOVEMENT?, 1994, page 4. In deep ecology’s derogation of the social, the alienation of humans from the natural world (read: wilderness) was originally caused by human subjectivity. It is not capitalism, you see, that produced alienation from “Nature,” but alienation from “Nature,” that produced capitalism. Was this alienation effected by Christianity, as Lynn White, Jr. would have us believe? Or by egotism, as various psychoanalysts claim? Or was it in fact the same “Paleolithic spirituality’ for which deep ecologists yearn, that in fact unavoidably divided the hunter from the hunted, the natural world from the social, and animals from the human beings who manipulated them in animistic religious beliefs? In any case it is our attitudes and psychological makeup or “mindscapes” that we must explore in this most therapeutic of eras--even at the expense of addressing a “crowded agenda” of social problems that so patently yield ecological problems. BIOCENTRIC NOTIONS JUSTIFY NAZI-STYLE ATROCITIES 1. “BIOCENTRIC EGALITARIANISM” JUSTIFIES TOTALITARIANISM & DEATH OF MILLIONS Murray Bookchin, director emeritus of the Institute for Social Ecology, WHICH WAY FOR THE ECOLOGY MOVEMENT?, 1994, page 10-11. The premises of ecomysticism may lead in many directions, but a goal of social freedom seems to be rarely expressed in the literature. Indeed, deep ecology and ecomysticism generally would be reactionary and alienating if the logic of their precepts were actually carried out in practice. The logic of a seemingly benign deep ecology demand for “biocentric egalitarianism” involves the surrender of human freedom to “Nature’s” imperatives. If sociobiology predetermines a great deal of “human nature” in what E.O. Wilson calls “the morality of the gene,” deep ecology, in turn, seems to place social life into subordination--and a very real subordination--to the “hunger politics” of “voluntary simplicity” and outright asceticism. The logic of permitting “Nature” to “take its course” (as David Foreman once put it) is to render human beings no different in their “intrinsic worth” from other animals and hence subject to “natural laws” like unrelenting swings in population numbers. The tendency of deep ecology ideologists to stop halfway in thinking out the implications of their premises is matched only by their failure to “deeply” confront real social problems and their impact on the natural world. 2. BIOCENTRIC “EQUAL INTRINSIC WORTH” THEORIES LEAD TO NAZI-STYLE ATROCITIES Murray Bookchin, director emeritus of the Institute for Social Ecology, WHICH WAY FOR THE ECOLOGY MOVEMENT?, 1994, page 39. Whether biocentrism’s equation of the “intrinsic worth” of humans and lemmings will pave the ideological way to a future Aushwitz has yet to be seen. But the “moral” grounds for letting millions of people starve to death has been established with a vengeance, and it is arrogantly being advanced in the name of “ecology.” 73 BIOCENTRISM IS SELF-CONTRADICTORY 1. “EQUAL INTRINSIC WORTH” THEORY IS FLAWED AND SELF-CONTRADICTORY Murray Bookchin, director emeritus of the Institute for Social Ecology, WHICH WAY FOR THE ECOLOGY MOVEMENT?, 1994, page 46-7. Among neo-Malthusians, hardly any attempt is made to think out premises, indeed, to ask what follows from a given statement. If all life forms have the same “intrinsic worth” as deep ecologists contend, can we impact to malarial mosquitoes or tsetse flies the same “right” to exist that we accord to whale and grizzly bears? Can a bacterium that could threaten to exterminate chimpanzees be left to do so because it too has “intrinsic worth” and, perhaps, because human beings who can control a lethal disease of chimps should not “interfere” with the mystical workings of “Gaia”? Who is to decide what constitutes “valid” interference by human beings in nature and what is invalid? To what extent can conscious, rational, and moral human intervention in nature be regarded as ‘unnatural,” especially if one considers the vast evolution of life toward greater subjectivity and ultimately human intellecturality? To what extent can humanity itself be viewed simply as a single species, when social life is riddled by hierarchy and domination, gender biases, class exploitation and ethnic discrimination? 2. BIOCENTRISM IS SELF-CONTRADICTORY: THE ABORTION ISSUE PROVES Murray Bookchin, director emeritus of the Institute for Social Ecology, WHICH WAY FOR THE ECOLOGY MOVEMENT?, 1994, page 11. Yet abortion rights patently affect rates of population growth, which ecomystics of all kinds have also made into a major issue, and as such they are required fully to support women’s rights to abortion. Thus, neoMalthusian attempts to reduce social facts to biological facts divide into pro-choice demands for reproductive and antiabortionist claims to the rights of the unborn. The abortion issue, in fact, points up the absurd tangle of contradictions--partly in theory, partly in practice--which biocentrism produces and the extent to which it remains a thoroughly unthought-out, one-sided, and irrational outlook. BIOCENTRISM STOPS TRUE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 1. BIOCENTRISM WEAKENS REAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION EFFORTS Keith Schneider, former national environmental correspondent for The New York Times, executive director of the Michigan Land Use Institute, THE NEW YORK TIMES, November 19, 1995, Section 7; Page 34. The environmentalists, on the other hand, were influenced by a corrosive biocentrism, an almost religious conviction that all living things have equal value and that old-growth forests, in particular, deserved to be protected at any cost. When the two sides clashed, the result was a loss of balance that hurt small communities, dramatically weakened the environmental movement and further fueled an already rampant cynicism about the American political system’s ability to solve complex problems. 2. BIOCENTRISM BECOMES A SUBSTITUTE FOR REAL SOCIAL CRITIQUE AND ACTION Murray Bookchin, director emeritus of the Institute for Social Ecology, WHICH WAY FOR THE ECOLOGY MOVEMENT?, 1994, page 41-2. The shadowy side of suprahuman “naturalism” suggests the perilous ground on which many ecomystics, ecotheistics, and deep ecologists are walking and the dangers of de-sensitizing an already “minimalized” public, to use Christopher Lasch’s term. As the late Edward Abbey’s denunciations of Latin “genetic inferiority” and even “Hebraic superstitions” suggest, the mystical Malthusians themselves are not immune to the dangerous brew. The brew becomes themselves are not immune to the dangerous brew. The brew becomes highly explosive when it is mixed with a mysticism that supplants humanity’s potentiality to be a rational voice of nature with an all-presiding “Gaia,” an ecotheism that denies human beings their unique place in nature. Reverence for nature is no guarantee of reverence for the world of line generally, and reverence for nonhuman life is no guarantee that human life will receive the respect it deserves. This is especially true when reverence is rooted in deification--and when a supine reverence become a substitute for social critique and social action. 74 Biology Bad LIFE GAINS MEANING ONLY THROUGH EXPERIENCE NOT BIOLOGY 1. A FERTILIZED EGG IS NOT A PERSON. Stephen C. Hicks, Professor of Law, Suffolk University School of Law, FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW, WINTER, 1992, p.820. Our genetic endowment obviously differentiates us as a species and thus defines the fertilized egg and embryo as human, but it does not, without more, distinguish between the human being and human cells. Each cell is genetically complete, yet it is not the equivalent of a person. 2. SOCIAL EXISTENCE SHAPES OUR VALUE SYSTEMS Mao Tse-Tung, Former Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party, ON NEW DEMOCRACY, 1954, p.4. Marx says, “It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but on the contrary, their social existence determines their consciousness.” He also says: “The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point, however, is to change it.” This is the scientific definition that for the first time in human history correctly solved the problem of the relation between consciousness and existence. 3. GENES ONLY CONSTITUTE MEMBERSHIP IN A SPECIES NOT A PERSON. Stephen C. Hicks, Professor of Law, Suffolk University School of Law, FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW, WINTER, 1992, p. 820. It cannot be our genes that constitute our humanness except as a species. But the simple virtue of humanness is insufficient to establish our right to life as a species or as particular individuals of the species. We should treat all species and all living things equally or identify what it is about humans that is different. Thus, it has been suggested so far that neither genetic endowment, potentiality, nor continuity from fertilization constitute individuality, still less personhood. 4. LIFE DOES NOT EXIST OUTSIDE OF LIVING Stephen C. Hicks, Professor of Law, Suffolk University School of Law, FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW, WINTER, 1992, p. 821-2. Search as we may for life, we only find living. We may translate life into consciousness or the soul, but these definitions will not sustain the fertilized egg’s right to life. If there is a right to life it means a right to go on living; this means either the right to become a person, which is the potentiality argument, or that living is what rights are for, in which case we need to know what it is that is living. 5. LIFE GAINS MEANING ONLY THROUGH EXPERIENCE Stephen C. Hicks, Professor of Law, Suffolk University School of Law, FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW, WINTER, 1992, p.824. Life, therefore is a universal that we do not experience. We experience the particularities of living. As such an abstraction, “life” serves to organize for us a certain conceptual landscape. It has meaning in this enterprise, for it refers to the unity of concepts, such as living beings, living a life, consciousness, the mystery of why there exists a world, without actually referring to any one thing with specificity. 75 THERE IS NO ABSOLUTE RIGHT TO LIFE 1. THE RIGHT TO LIFE IS NOT ABSOLUTE Stephen C. Hicks, Professor of Law, Suffolk University School of Law, FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW, WINTER, 1992, p. 812. Finally, even if there is such a right to life of the human species because of nature or God, when the species claims that right over itself in particular cases some other values will be necessary to determine the accommodation of hard choices, such as survival amid limited resources. In our actual lives the human species’ right to life is not exceptionless. To talk of life, therefore, in this sense is an abstraction. We need to know what life might refer to other than the species’ instinct for self preservation even at the price of killing other members of the species. 2. DECISIONS SHOULD BE MADE BASED ON QUALITY OF LIFE Mary Catherine Bateson, NQA, OMNI, April 1992, p. 8. It is one thing to support the decision to go on living, even with pain and discomfort and dependency, as long as that choice can knowingly be taken. Those are the costs we must find ways to meet. But the proportion of medical costs devoted to futile and expensive interventions on those already dying or no longer conscious is inappropriate. Crossgenerational tension occurs not only within individual families, but in society at large, which supports heroic medical interventions for the very old at the expense of investments in the future: prenatal care, education, expanded industrial capacity, and jobs. Generations compete for resources, social security moves toward crisis, and many of the elderly feel betrayed by children unwilling to take on their care. The covenant between young and old, which is under threat today, must be premised on sustained quality of life for both generations, and a due acceptance of death that includes the expectation of full information, discussion, and planning. 3. THERE IS NO RIGHT TO LIFE Stephen C. Hicks, Professor of Law, Suffolk University School of Law, FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW, WINTER, 1992, p. 811-12. Life in this general sense or in the sense of the species as a whole cannot be the subject of rights. Rights attach to existent members of the species. Taken literally, the idea that life itself has a right is nonsense. 4. DEATH SHOULD BECOME A CHOICE Mary Catherine Bateson, NQA, OMNI, April 1992, p. 8. Just as we foresee a society in which every birth is chosen and brings forth a wanted child, so we can foresee a society in which death comes in chosen ways and seasons, freeing energies for living. If you look around at clear skin and straight teeth, at parents who have not had to face the death of children, at energetic elders working and playing to average ages never before known, you recognize that what we call health and regard as natural is in fact an artifact of culture, an extension of human choice based on increasing knowledge. This is the human pattern, and the time has come to decide how to bring death within that pattern along with the amelioration and extension of life. BIOLOGICAL DEFINITIONS OF LIFE ARE INACCURATE 1. A COMATOSE STATE IS NOT SYNONYMOUS WITH BEING BRAIN-DEAD Jim Holt, Writer, THE NEW REPUBLIC, February 21, 1994, p. 26. Being in a coma, even an irreversible one, turns out to be not the same thing as being brain-dead by the Harvard criteria, comatose patients typically have “slow” brain waves, not flat ones. Moreover, unless there is substantial damage elsewhere in the body, they are always able to breathe spontaneously, without the use of ventilators. When the plug was pulled on Karen Quinlan, for instance, she surprised everyone by wheezing along on her own for more than a decade. 2. BIOLOGICAL DEFINITION OF LIFE DENIES PERSONHOOD Thomas A. Shannon, Professor of Religion and Social Ethics at the Worcester Polytechnic Institute, COMMONWEAL, December 1993, p. 13. What in human dignity is protected by maintaining the biological processes when there is no reasonable basis for expecting any change in the person’s medical status? To maintain biological processes for their own sake gives priority to the impersonal rather than the personal, is death-denying rather than death accepting. 76 BRAIN ACTIVITY IS ACCEPTED AS DEFINITION OF EXISTENCE OF LIFE 1. SOCIETY ACCEPTS BRAIN ACTIVITY AS DEFINITION OF LIFE Jim Holt, Writer, THE NEW REPUBLIC, February 21, 1994, p. 26. Once the brain stem stops functioning, traditional heart-lung death invariably follows within a week or so, even with the most aggressive support of life-sustaining gadgetry. Thus it is not possible for someone to be both whole-brain dead and at the same time in a persistent coma. The whole-brain standard was endorsed in 1984 by the President’s Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine, and has since become statute law in more than thirty states. 2. IRREVERSIBLE COMA DEFINES DEATH Jim Holt., Writer, THE NEW REPUBLIC, February 21, 1994, p. 26. The 1968 Harvard Medical School Ad Hoc Committee to Examine the Definition of Brain Death defined it as a state entailing a total unawareness of external stimuli, no spontaneous breathing and a flat brain wave. “Our primary purpose,” said the committee’s report, “is to define irreversible coma as a new criterion of death.” 3. A PERSON CEASES TO EXIST WHEN THE BRAIN STEM DIES Jim Holt, Writer, THE NEW REPUBLIC, February 21, 1994, p. 27. It is certainly possible that, even with the cessation of higher-brain function, some rudimentary cognitive capacity remains as long as the brain stem and other systems deeper in the brain are working. And even if consciousness does turn out to reside exclusively in the cerebral cortex, some opponents of the higher-brain death standard refuse to concede that personal identity can be defined purely in terms of consciousness. One such, the British philosopher David Lamb, maintains that uncertainty over which mental processes are constitutive of personhood “can only be avoided by accepting the proposal that the point where loss of personhood is certain is when the brain as a whole, and hence the organism as a whole no longer functions.” And that moment, he adds, is “when the brain stem dies.” LIFE IS NOT THE ULTIMATE VALUE 1. LIFE IS NOT ULTIMATE VALUE Thomas A. Shannon, Professor of Religion and Social Ethics at the Worcester Polytechnic Institute, COMMONWEAL, December 1993, p. 12. For while human life is sacred and valuable, it is created and finite and to suggest it has an ultimacy because of its sacredness is to commit idolatry. Such a point has ethical significance in evaluation medical therapies and technologies. For while life is valuable, it is neither the ultimate value nor the only value relevant to the issue at hand. Nor does life’s being a basic value give it a privileged position among other values. Even though life is not a means to other ends, it is not of ultimate value. 2. WE CANNOT DETERMINE THE VALUE OF LIFE Stephen C. Hicks, Professor of Law, Suffolk University School of Law, FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW, WINTER, 1992. 824. In the sense “life” may be said to exist as such, we do not have life; life lives us. Therefore, we cannot determine or discover the value of life. We may simply recognize that we have value for it. 77 LIFE CONSISTS OF MORE THAN PHYSICAL EXISTENCE 1. PRESENCE OF SOUL SHOULD NOT MARK LIFE Stephen C. Hicks, Professor of Law, Suffolk University School of Law, FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW, WINTER, 1992.826. But it seems odd that the presence or absence of the soul should mark life. It is unexpectedly materialistic of religious thinkers to identify the soul with the fertilization of the egg because it marks the beginning of human life, rather than to identify the soul with some more spiritual quality, such as the embryo’s perception, sensation, quickening, or even reason. 2. A BODY DOES NOT DEFINE A PERSON Stephen Levine, Writer, UTNE READER. September/October 1991, p. 68. Perhaps the first recognition in the process of acknowledging, opening, and letting go that I call “conscious dying” is when we begin to see that we are not the body. We see that we have a body but it is not who we are. One fellow remarked that he could see that the was “creation constantly in the act of becoming.” He saw the perfect unfolding of each moment and that there was nothing he had to do about it, that all his doing to become something or someone just “dulled the wonder of it all.” ACTUAL BEGINNING OF A HUMAN LIFE CANNOT BE DETERMINED 1. DETERMINING THE BEGINNING OF LIFE IS ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE Stephen C. Hicks, Professor of Law, Suffolk University School of Law, FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW, WINTER, 1992, p. 812. Therefore, any right to life argument cannot be based on the premise that development is stageless. Rather it must be that conception, instead of other stages—such as implantation, responsiveness to stimuli, quickening, ability to survive outside the womb, or neocortical functioning—is the meaningful stage, because conception defines the occurrence of individual life. But not only does this meaningfulness beg the very value it set Out to assert—that there is an individual to be valued as of conception, rather than life in the abstract—but the idea that this is a simple, easy, and fundamental line to draw is quite mistaken. 2. DETERMINING THE BEGINNING OF LIFE IS ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE Stephen C. Hicks, Professor of Law, Suffolk University School of Law, FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW, WINTER, 1992, p. 812. However, we are left with the unfortunate fact that because there is no accepted scientific, religious, philosophical, or common sense stage for the beginning of personhood, the balancing of interests whether interests axe even sufficiently valid to be balanced, are subject to the whims of political power. 78 Biotechnology Good BIOTECHNOLOGY IS NECESSARY FOR THE ENVIRONMENT AND FOOD 1. TECH PROVIDES BOUNTIFUL FOOD FOR POOR COUNTRIES James Walsh, Journalist, TIME, January 11, 1999, p. 86. That race has produced some truly remarkable things. In one lab researchers are developing food plants fortified with a scrap of DNA that codes for a natural pesticide, eliminating the need to spray clouds of toxin over acres of crops. At another they're developing beans and grains with much higher levels of protein--no small thing for parts of the world where beef and other meats are scarce. At still others they're making potatoes with more starch and less water, coffee beans that grow caffeine-free right on the vine, tomatoes with more solid flesh and less pulp, and strawberries with less natural sugar. Better still, possibly, such Uber-plants, passing their clever new traits on to succeeding generations, could yield more bountiful harvests on marginal land in poor, overpopulated countries. 2. BIOTECH WILL PROVIDE A CLEANER ENVIRONMENT Edward T. Shonsey, President and CEO of Novartis Seeds, VITAL SPEECHES, March 15, 1999, p. 342. Our environment will be profoundly changed as a result of bio-engineered water utilization by crops, waste reduction in livestock and humans - and reduced groundwater contamination because of biotechnology's ability to create plants which need less fertilizer and chemicals. 3. BIOTECH INCREASES VALUE OF AGRICULTURE BY FACTOR OF FOUR Edward T. Shonsey, President and CEO of Novartis Seeds, VITAL SPEECHES, March 15, 1999, p. 342. We will create better products, that meet specific needs and will do it faster than ever before. And if we deliver products which make farming more efficient and profitable, then we will have no trouble recovering some of our investment. But where the REAL impact of biotech begins to show up is when we look beyond the farm gate. Here's how I look at it - using wheat as an example. In and of itself, the worldwide value of wheat production is roughly $100-billion dollars. BUT - when you start to look at what comes after harvest - the potential to produce specific types of wheat to meet the needs of the feed industry, the starch industry, the milling industry and the malting industry you increase the value of the crop several fold. And the value of the crop continues to escalate after it leaves the farm and, say, the feed industry sells its products to the livestock industry which, in turn, sells its products to the grocer for use in your back yard bar-b-que. And while the example I've used is wheat, you can run the same sort of numbers with any crop you can name. Hence value creation is multiplied by a factor of 4X. 4. BIOTECH WILL FEED CHILDREN, PROVIDE BETTER WORLD Edward T. Shonsey, President and CEO of Novartis Seeds, VITAL SPEECHES, March 15, 1999, p. 342. And personally a world where I can balance my corporate responsibility for strong fiscal management with my personal belief that agriculture represents one of the best ways possible to do something good for all mankind. Biotech? Bust? No way. Boom? Certainly. If ... If we continue to keep our eye on the distant, long-term goal: making this a better world in which to live. A world where no one goes hungry because the farmers in their country can't produce enough food for them to eat. A world where children grow up healthy because they receive their immunizations in their breakfast food. A world where precious natural resources are preserved because we - you and I working together - create new alternative sources of fuel and fiber. That's the ultimate destination in the evolution of biotechnology. A better world in which to live. 5. PROBLEMS WITH BIOTECHNOLOGY ARE OVERBLOWN James Walsh, Journalist, TIME, January 11, 1999, p. 86. Europe's reticence mixes some good arguments with some ill-informed rhetoric. Does a modified form of wheat grown in France by the Swiss-owned giant Novartis contain a resistance to antibiotics, posing a risk of imparting that resistance to consumers? The company insists the buzz is nonsense, yet a French citizens conference last year solemnly accepted the rumor as fact. Do genetically altered crops "outbreed" with wild relatives and other plants?, but so do hybrid farm crops produced by classical breeding since time immemorial. The prospect of unwittingly breeding "superweeds" and "superpests" is a justified concern, demanding caution. Yet studies to date suggest herbicide-resistant genes die out in the wild. 79 BIOTECHNOLOGY CAN IMPROVE HUMANS AND STOP DISEASE 1. TECH CAN LEAD TO A FUTURE WITHOUT DISEASE Gregg Easterbrook, Author, THE NEW REPUBLIC, March 1, 1999 p. 20. If researchers can convert stem cells into regular cells like blood or heart muscle and then put them back into the body, then physicians might cure Parkinson's, diabetes, leukemia, heart congestion, and many other maladies, replacing failing cells with brand-new tissue. Costly afflictive procedures such as bone-marrow transplants might become easier and cheaper with the arrival of stem-cell-based "universal donor" tissue that does not provoke the immune-rejection response. The need for donor organs for heart or liver transplants might fade, as new body parts are cultured artificially. Ultimately, mastery of the stem cell might lead to practical, affordable ways to eliminate many genetic diseases through DNA engineering, while extending the human life span. Our near descendants might live in a world in which such killers as cystic fibrosis and sickle-cell anemia are one-in-a-million conditions, while additional decades of life are the norm. 2. GENETIC RESEARCH CAN REVOLUTIONIZE MEDICINE Gregg Easterbrook, Author, THE NEW REPUBLIC, March 1, 1999 p. 20. Harold Varmus, head of the National Institutes of Health (NIH), recently declared, "This research has the potential to revolutionize the practice of medicine." Notes John Fletcher, a bioethicist at the University of Virginia, "Soon every parent whose child has diabetes or any cell-failure disease is going to be riveted to this research, because it's the answer." Ron McKay, a stem-cell researcher at the National Institute of Neurological Disorders and Stroke, says, "We are now at the center of biology itself." Simply put, the control of human stem cells may open the door to the greatest medical discovery since antibiotics. 3. BIOTECH WILL IMPROVE ALL ASPECTS OF LIFE Edward T. Shonsey, President and CEO of Novartis Seeds, VITAL SPEECHES, March 15, 1999, p. 342. And when it comes to biotechnology, I don't think you should count on there ever being an end to the evolution - at least not in the lifetimes of any of us in this room for many reasons including cost which will define the competition between such things as chemical synthesis and enzymatic engineering. What I care more about than "getting to the end of the trail," is the fact that we will never look at the world the same again because of this thing we call biotechnology. This web of enabling technologies which - I am firmly convinced - WILL change our health, our diets, our jobs and how we solve the complexities of life, itself. 4. BIOTECH WILL IMPROVE NUTRITION AND HEALTH Edward T. Shonsey, President and CEO of Novartis Seeds, VITAL SPEECHES, March 15, 1999, p. 342. For instance, the opportunities presented by biotechnology and bioinfomatics are limitless and far-reaching. They will affect every - EVERY - aspect of your, and my life. Our nutrition and health will be affected by biotech vaccines and antibody production. 5. BIOTECH WILL PROVIDE MIRACLE CURES FOR DISEASES Edward T. Shonsey, President and CEO of Novartis Seeds, VITAL SPEECHES, March 15, 1999, p. 342. In medicine, cholesterol, cancer, heart disease, HIV and genetic diseases will become the beneficiaries of our greater understanding of biotechnology. These benefits rest not only in innovation and miracle cures but also in testing, evaluation and manufacture of these cures. 6. NO REASON TO REJECT GENETIC ENGINEERING OF HUMANS Gregg Easterbrook, Author, THE NEW REPUBLIC, March 1, 1999 p. 20. Though no gene engineering has been attempted on humans, there appear to be no special technical barriers against doing so. Silver, the Princeton biologist, argues that our generation will be looked back on as "the point in history when human beings gained the power to seize control of their own evolutionary destiny." Control over evolution might turn out well or badly, but there's no reason to reject it out of hand, since evolution has left humanity disease-prone, short-lived, and fragile. Why shouldn't we try to change that? 80 Biotechnology Bad BIOTECHNOLOGY IS OUT OF CONTROL 1. PEOPLE VIEW GENETICS AS AN OUT-OF-CONTROL JUGGERNAUT James Walsh, Journalist, TIME, January 11, 1999, p. 86. Yet the Continental food fight that continues to pitch up scare headlines in Europe may herald what genetic engineering can expect to encounter as it moves more broadly into pharmaceuticals and medical procedures. It's not just a matter of consumers' smelling something very fishy in the idea of tomatoes given an antifreeze-producing gene from the winter flounder. More broadly, society--at least European society--is beginning to view genetic science as a market-impelled juggernaut out of control and wearing moral blinders. 2. COMMERCIAL BENEFITS OUTPACE RATIONAL THINKING ON GENETICS James Walsh, Journalist, TIME, January 11, 1999, p. 86. The notion of science as a Faustian enterprise is deeply embedded in the popular psyche, even in the relatively optimistic U.S. Technologies that tinker with the fundamentals of life can inspire anxieties enough; when increasingly wedded to the profits of Big Business, the exercise can begin to look downright alarming. Author Jeremy Rifkin, America's most persistent critic of bioengineering, wonders what is in store for a world in which evolution is treated as a plaything and life as an "invention." A case in point: the announcement in November by Advanced Cell Technology of Worcester, Mass., that it had hybridized human DNA with a cow egg. Says David Magnus, director of graduate studies at the University of Pennsylvania's Bioethics Center: "It's an example of an issue that requires deep, careful thought. Instead, there was a race to get it done as fast as possible, because there were commercial benefits." 3. BIOTECH RISKS CATASTROPHIC CONSEQUENCES Kirkpatrick Sale, Contributing Editor, THE NATION, March 8, 1999, p.14. Jerry Mander, a California technology activist, has taken a long hard look at the biotech industry and the "bugs" it is creating daily. He concludes, "If I were a betting man, I would take the long odds and put my money down that within the next few decades a bug will get loose, will survive, and will cause one hell of a lot of unexpected, possibly catastrophic problems." It may not come from Monsanto's laboratories, of course. This is a colossal and growing business, with thousands of universities and companies, and hundreds of thousands of employees, fiddling with life. But it may: Monsanto scientists around the world are altering genes this way and that to make cotton plants that grow with colors built in; food additives designed to manage diabetes; super-firm potatoes that are easier to fry; artificial enzymes that increase nutrients in animal feed; and new forms of sugar beets, wheat, rape, tomatoes, rice and a hundred other creations not found in nature. 4.SCIENTISTS CANNOT SELF-REGULATE James Walsh, Journalist, TIME, January 11, 1999, p. 86. While society is torn between benefits and risks, commercial scientists have done a bad job of regulating themselves, in Magnus' view. "Testing with breast-cancer genes was offered far too early," he says. "It wasn't even clear what the tests meant." He adds, "We could literally have had women getting double mastectomies because of a positive result on a genetic test, where in fact the test does not mean that they are at increased risk." 5. BIOTECH FIRMS MISLEAD THE PUBLIC James Walsh, Journalist, TIME, January 11, 1999, p. 86. At the same time, biotech firms like Novartis, America's Monsanto and Britain's Zeneca are somewhat disingenuous when they imply that nothing could go wrong with their products. Science has moved at such a dizzying pace that neither politics nor the law, let alone research into unforeseen consequences, can keep up with it. Britain's preeminent champion of organic farming, Prince Charles, weighed in on the debate in mid-1998 with a newspaper commentary arguing that transferring genes between utterly unrelated species--fish to tomatoes, for instance-"takes us into realms that belong to God, and to God alone." 81 BIOTECHNOLOGY IS AN IMMORAL RISK 1. BIOTECH CONSTITUTES A POTENTIALLY LETHAL PLAYING GOD Kirkpatrick Sale, Contributing Editor, THE NATION, March 8, 1999, p.14. And the one overriding fact that Monsanto is in the business of playing God. Even if technological intrusion into and manipulation of the environment had not left a lengthy and frightening record of unintended disasters in the past century or so, there would be no reason to have any faith that Monsanto was so wise and foresightful that it could predict with any certainty what the consequences of its genetic intrusions would be--and that they would always be benign. Thomas Midgely Jr. didn't mean to destroy the ozone layer when he introduced chlorofluorocarbons for refrigerators and spray cans half a century ago; the champions of nuclear energy didn't mean to create a deadly hazard with a life of 100,000 years that no one knows how to control. And now we are talking about life--the alteration of the basic genetic makeup of plants and animals. A mistake here might have unimaginably horrible consequences for the species of the earth, including the human. 2. GENETICS IS THE PROVINCE OF GOD AND NATURE, NOT HUMANS Kirkpatrick Sale, Contributing Editor, THE NATION, March 8, 1999, p.14. After enough such protests, Monsanto began to catch on to the idea that messing around with the genes of life, altering seeds and foods and drinks and drags, is something that just simply scares a lot of people--reasonable people. It began to understand that using the powers of technology to interfere in life, heretofore generally thought of as the province of Nature, or God, and manipulate it at the basic genetic level so as to change its character, raises deep-seated doubts and worries. 3. MANY ARE IN REVOLT OVER THE "TEST TUBE FUTURE" Kirkpatrick Sale, Contributing Editor, THE NATION, March 8, 1999, p.14. The Whole Foods Market of Austin, Texas, for example, an eighty-nine-market operation that requires suppliers to guarantee than none of the products they sell to it have gene-altered ingredients. And the Foundation on Economic Trends, in Washington, DC, whose spokesman Jeremy Rifkin has warned against "the wholesale reseeding of the Earth's biosphere with a laboratory-conceived Second Genesis" [see Rifkin, "The Biotech Century," April 13, 1998]. And a variety of consumer and environmental groups that last fall mounted a loud campaign against the Agriculture Department's attempt to allow genetically altered food to be labeled organic and eventually forced it to back down. And, according to the New York Times this past July, most of the consumers of Europe, who are "in open revolt over the prospect of a future in which nature has somehow been altered by people holding test tubes." 4. PRACTICES OF BIOTECH FIRMS ARE UNSUSTAINABLE Kirkpatrick Sale, Contributing Editor, THE NATION, March 8, 1999, p.14. Monsanto is trying very hard to reassure such people, but of course it doesn't like to address certain unpleasantries that these critics level. Such as the fact that Roundup is, after all, a poison so lethal that it kills almost all herbaceous plants and is toxic ("very low" but measurable) for humans if touched or ingested; that its active ingredient remains in the soil for three months or more; and that the long-term effect of its widespread use is unknown--a University of California study calls it the third most common cause of pesticide illness among farm workers. It seems strange to call "sustainable" the vast destruction of plants to make way for a monoculture crop like this, but the company plans to carry this anti-biodiversity scheme to nearly 300 million acres around the world when the product reaches its full "growth potential." 82 Buddhism Good BUDDHISM SOLVES SOCIETY'S PROBLEMS 1. BUDDHISM AFFIRMS PEACE AND INTERCONNECTEDNESS OF BEINGS Kenneth Kraft, Professor of Religion at Lehigh University, JOURNAL OF BUDDHIST ETHICS, Volume 2, 1995, p. 153. As traditional Buddhist understandings of nonviolence are filtered through new cultural settings and historical circumstances, fresh interpretations emerge. First, there is a renewed affirmation of the fundamental interconnectedness between individual peace and social or political peace. From this standpoint there can be no such thing as an "inner peace" that is separate from the world. Real inner peace is the fruit of deep awareness, and deep awareness includes a profound sensitivity to the suffering (lack of peace) of other beings. 2. BUDDHISM HELPS ADDRESS MYRIAD OF SOCIAL ILLS Kenneth Kraft, Professor of Religion at Lehigh University, JOURNAL OF BUDDHIST ETHICS, Volume 2, 1995, p. 154. Any "inner peace" that does not generate some kind of response to the pain of the world is therefore considered a false inner peace. Some Western Buddhists would even go one step further, contending that unless one is working "outwardly" for peace, one will not be able to experience real inner peace. Once interconnectedness is affirmed, it also follows that inner/outer peace is not separate from a cluster of related issues: justice, economic fairness, human rights, racial and gender equality, protection of the environment, and so on. Accordingly, most Western Buddhists are convinced that one can meaningfully work for peace by campaigning against the death penalty, serving in an AIDS hospice, promoting animal rights, conserving water in an intentional community, publicizing the effects of nuclear waste, or practicing a few minutes of silence before a family meal. 3. ANY STEP TOWARDS ENDING SUFFERING IS KEY TO BUDDHISM Kenneth Kraft, Professor of Religion at Lehigh University, JOURNAL OF BUDDHIST ETHICS, Volume 2, 1995, p. 166. In a similar spirit, many believe that any step toward alleviating suffering in the world has a real effect, and the cumulative outcome of such actions will eventually prove to be of utmost significance. "I know this sounds grandiose," writes Gorin, "but I do really see the work here as a drop of water in the wave of history that is rolling inexorably towards liberation." Shifting metaphors in a later passage, he adds, "Our work may take lifetimes, but with each grain of sand, we are building a new world." 4. BUDDHISM DEALS WITH ALL MANNER OF SOCIAL ISSUES Kenneth Kraft, Professor of Religion at Lehigh University, JOURNAL OF BUDDHIST ETHICS, Volume 2, 1995, p. 166. Interconnectedness -- as doctrine and as experience -- is a source of comfort and inspiration for most Buddhist activists. If all things are related to each other, then work on behalf of one worthy cause often supports work on behalf of other worthy causes. Joe Gorin kept asking himself where he could contribute most effectively; eventually he concluded that "each struggle for justice is a part of every other one, so it makes little difference where I go after my time in Guatemala is over." In practical terms, saving rainforests may not help to save whales, but saving rainforests may indeed help to protect indigenous peoples. The task for globally oriented activists is to identify the meaningful connections. 83 OBJECTIONS TO BUDDHISM ARE WRONG 1. BUDDHISM IS NOT NIHILISM Peter D. Hershock, East-West Center Asian Studies Development Program, JOURNAL OF BUDDHIST ETHICS, Volume 6, 1999, p. 152. It is a common misconception that the Buddhist practice of seeing all things as empty involves a nihilistic detachment from our circumstances. In fact, it entails carefully freeing things from the univocal assertion of their existence in keeping with our own, often quite prejudiced, importances. Practicing emptiness makes it possible for the horizonless and always reciprocal relevance of all things to freely manifest. 2. BUDDHIST NOTION OF "EMPTINESS" STRENGTHENS RELATIONSHIPS Peter D. Hershock, East-West Center Asian Studies Development Program, JOURNAL OF BUDDHIST ETHICS, Volume 6, 1999, p. 152. As an attribute, the emptiness of all things consists of their unique ways of arising only as patterns of interdependence or mutual contribution, having neither fixed and defining essences nor hard boundaries segregating them from one another. Because such 'essences' and 'boundaries' arise as functions of projected horizons for relevance, relinquishing these horizons through the practice of emptiness is to relinquish our own fixed positions, our own segregated identities and limiting perspectives. The liberation of things from the imposition of identities based on our own fixed categories is thus inseparable from our own liberation from both the arrogant illusion of autonomy and the tragic alienation of anonymity. Finally, Buddhist emptiness does not mean vacuity, but an infinite depth of meaningful interrelationship. Fully practiced, it occasions horizonless, responsive, and dramatic community -- the elision of any conceptual, perceptual, or emotional blockages we have to appreciating the uniqueness, value, and contributory depth of all things. As epitomized in the attainment of upaaya (unlimited skillin-means) by those bodhisattvas (enlightening beings) who have realized non-reliance and the art of responding without any fixed perspective, fully appreciating the emptiness of all things is associated with horizonless virtuosity in improvising meaningful resolutions to trouble. Contrary to the biases of our technological lineage and legalistic activism, this is not accomplished by controlling circumstances, but through contributory appreciation; not by means of leveraging power in order to get what is wanted, but by dedicating unlimited attention-energy to realizing dramatic partnership with all things. The bodhisattva does not heal through accumulating and wielding power, but through daanapaaramitaa or the perfection of offering. 3. BUDDHISM ISN'T OTHERWORLDLY: MORE VITAL TODAY THAN EVER Kenneth Kraft, Professor of Religion at Lehigh University, JOURNAL OF BUDDHIST ETHICS, Volume 2, 1995, p. 152. Buddhism in the late twentieth century is affected by many of the same forces influencing other religious traditions today. Increasingly, Buddhists in Asia and the West are responding to contemporary issues in ways that may seem unprecedented but are grounded in Buddhism's past. Although Buddhism is typically depicted as otherworldly, its present-day vitality can best be seen in various forms of engagement -- social, political, and environmental. 84 Buddhism Bad BUDDHISM HAS INTERNAL CONTRADICTIONS 1. TAKING BUDDHIST WRITINGS LITERALLY IS PROBLEMATIC Stephen Batchelor, author of Buddhism without Beliefs, WHAT IS ENLIGHTENMENT?, Issue 14, 1998, p. 18. It means that if you read through the Buddhist sutras, of which there are so many that it’s unlikely anybody’s read them all, you’ll find all manner of passages which appear, actually, to be at odds with many other passages. And I think it’s particularly striking how Western interpreters of Buddhism have latched on to that last passage you’ve just quoted. It’s endlessly reiterated and yet, as I said, it only occurs once in all of the canon. It’s a passage that I think is attractive precisely because it lends credence to a kind of mystical absolutist interpretation of Buddhist doctrine that is actually not so widely found elsewhere in the texts. If one reads through the Majjhima Nikaya, for example, you won’t find that sort of language very widespread. I’m not saying you can’t find passages elsewhere that use that kind of language, but even leaving aside contemporary views on Buddhism, there have been commentators as far back as two thousand years ago who shed doubt on the legitimacy of such passages and saw them as inspirational rather than literal. In other words, for many people that kind of language inspires them to reach beyond themselves. It inspires them to believe in the possibility of something quite other than the sort of experience they feel trapped and stuck in at the present. But that those inspirational injunctions of the Buddha are meant to be taken literally, I personally find problematic. 2. MYTHS ABOUT THE BUDDHA HIMSELF ABOUND Dr. Robert Morey, Research and Education Foundation, BUDDHISM UNMASKED, 1998, www.cultbusters.com/buddhism.html, accessed May 11, 1999. Buddhism is supposedly built upon the teachings and example of a Hindu guru who was called the "Buddha," i.e. Enlightened One. The problem we face is that this guru did not write down any of his teachings. Neither did any of his early disciples. A few manuscripts appear four to five hundred years after his death! But most of the manuscripts do not appear until nearly 1,000 years after his death. This gives plenty of time for legends and myths to arise which falsify the life and teachings of the guru. 3. RELIABILITY OF BUDDHIST TRUTH IS SPECIOUS Dr. Robert Morey, Research and Education Foundation, BUDDHISM UNMASKED, 1998, www.cultbusters.com/buddhism.html, accessed May 11, 1999. This problem is further complicated by the development of two contradictory literary traditions: Pali and Sanskrit. These divergent literary traditions produced hundreds of Buddhist sects which disagree with each other on many major points. Because of the lack of primary source materials for the history of Buddhism, modern scholars seriously doubt the reliability of the traditional legends about the Buddha. As a matter of fact, if he were alive today he would not recognize the religion that bears his name! Since Buddhists themselves disagree on the "facts" of the life and teachings of their guru, there is more than adequate reason to cast doubt on the entire history of the "Buddha." 4. BUDDHISM IS BEREFT WITH CONTRADICTIONS Dr. Robert Morey, Research and Education Foundation, BUDDHISM UNMASKED, 1998, www.cultbusters.com/buddhism.html, accessed May 11, 1999. There are only a few facts about this Hindu guru that are agreed upon by most scholars. He was born around 563 BC in what is now called Nepal. His name is not known for certain. The ones that history preserved are spelled differently. One variation is Siddhartha Gautama. Although this name is doubted by many scholars, we will use it for lack of a better alternative. It is universally agreed that Siddhartha did not intend to start a new religion. He was born a Hindu. He lived as a Hindu. And he died a Hindu in 483 B.C. The myths and legends which gradually built up around him over the centuries are no safe guide to what he really believed or practiced. As Buddhism evolved over the centuries, many different authors from varying cultures set forth their own ideas in the name of the Buddha. As a result, Buddhism developed inherent contradictions. When this was realized, Buddhism embraced these contradictions as a badge of honor. Thus the making of self-contradictory statements has become one of the pronounced features of Zen and other esoteric forms of Buddhism. 85 BUDDHISM HAS MANY PROBLEMS 1. SELFISHNESS IS A SERIOUS PROBLEM WITH BUDDHISM Dr. Robert Morey, Research and Education Foundation, BUDDHISM UNMASKED, 1998, www.cultbusters.com/buddhism.html, accessed May 11, 1999. Then a new idea came into his mind. His real problem was that he had DESIRES. When his desires were not met, he became dissatisfied. Thus the way to avoid frustration and the suffering it caused, is to arrive at the place where he had no desires for anything, good or evil. For example, he should have no desire to see his wife or child or to help the poor and needy. Desire qua desire must be eradicated. With these insights (sic), Siddhartha was proclaimed a "Buddha," i.e. an Enlightened One. Did this mean he went back to his family and fulfilled his moral obligation to his wife and child? No, his wife and child remained abandoned. Siddhartha's so-called "enlightenment" was intensely self-centered and inherently selfish. This is still one of the main problems of Buddhism. 2. DALAI LAMA SUPPORTS NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND VIOLENT CULTS Christopher Hitchens, columnist for Vanity Fair, “HIS MATERIAL HIGHNESS,” July 13, 1998, http://www.salon1999.com/news/1998/07/13news.html, accessed May 10, 1999 The greatest triumph that modern PR can offer is the transcendent success of having your words and actions judged by your reputation, rather than the other way about. The "spiritual leader" of Tibet has enjoyed this unassailable status for some time now, becoming a byword and synonym for saintly and ethereal values. Why this doesn't put people on their guard I'll never know. But here are some other facts about the serene leader that, dwarfed as they are by his endorsement of nuclear weapons, are still worth knowing and still generally unknown. Shoko Asahara, leader of the Supreme Truth cult in Japan and spreader of sarin nerve gas on the Tokyo subway, donated 45 million rupees, or about 170 million yen (about $1.2 million), to the Dalai Lama and was rewarded for his efforts by several high-level meetings with the divine one. 3. BUDDHISM CAN BE CRUEL AND HEARTLESS Christopher Hitchens, columnist for Vanity Fair, “HIS MATERIAL HIGHNESS,” July 13, 1998, http://www.salon1999.com/news/1998/07/13news.html, accessed May 10, 1999 I have talked to a few Dorge Shugden adherents, who seem sincere enough and who certainly seem frightened enough, but I can't go along with their insistence on the "irony" of all this. Buddhism can be as hysterical and sanguinary as any other system that relies on faith and tribe. Lon Nol's Cambodian army was Buddhist at least in name. Solomon Bandaranaike, first elected leader of independent Sri Lanka, was assassinated by a Buddhist militant. It was Buddhist-led pogroms against the Tamils that opened the long and disastrous communal war that ruins Sri Lanka to this day. The gorgeously named SLORC, the military fascism that runs Burma, does so nominally as a Buddhist junta. I have even heard it whispered that in old Tibet, that pristine and contemplative land, the lamas were the allies of feudalism and unsmilingly inflicted medieval punishments such as blinding and flogging unto death. 5. BUDDHIST BELIEFS ARE DANGEROUS NONSENSE Christopher Hitchens, columnist for Vanity Fair, “HIS MATERIAL HIGHNESS,” July 13, 1998, http://www.salon1999.com/news/1998/07/13news.html, accessed May 10, 1999 Yet the entire Western mass media is uncritically at the service of a mere mortal who, at the very least, proclaims the utter nonsense of reincarnation and who affirms the sinister if not indeed crazy belief that death is but a stage in a grand cycle of what appears to be futility and subjection. What need, then, to worry about nuclear weaponry, or sectarian frenzy, or the sale of indulgences to men of the stamp of Steven Seagal? "Harmony" will doubtless kick in. During his visit to Beijing, our sentimental Baptist hypocrite of a president turned to his dictator host, recommended that he meet with the Dalai Lama and assured him that the two of them would get on well. That might easily turn out to be the case. Both are very much creatures of the material world. 86 BUDDHISM HAS NO GROUNDING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS 1. NO REFERENCE TO RIGHTS OR DIGNITY IN FOUR NOBLE TRUTHSDamien Keown, Lecturer in Indian Religion, University of London, JOURNAL OF BUDDHIST ETHICS, VOL. 2, 1995 , p.12.It is by no means apparent, however, how human dignity is to be grounded in Buddhist doctrine. The very words "human dignity" sound as alien in a Buddhist context as talk of rights. One looks in vain to the The Four Noble Truths for any explicit reference to human dignity, and doctrines such as no-self and impermanence may even be thought to undermine it. If human dignity is the basis of human rights Buddhism would seem to be in some difficulty when it comes to providing a justification for them. 2. INADA WRONG ABOUT BUDDHIST NATURE OR HUMAN RIGHTS Damien Keown, Lecturer in Indian Religion, University of London, JOURNAL OF BUDDHIST ETHICS, VOL. 2, 1995 , p.13-4. Few would disagree with the proposition that human rights are grounded in human nature. Towards the end of the extract, however, Inada seems to move away from his initial suggestion that human nature is the "ultimate source" of human rights towards the view that the ultimate ground is the "dynamic relational nature of persons in contact with each other." In other words, it is in the interrelatedness of persons rather than in the persons themselves that the justification for human rights is to be found. This is confirmed a little later: “Consequently, the Buddhist concern is focused on the experiential process of each individual, a process technically know as relational origination (paticca-samuppaada). It is the great doctrine of Buddhism, perhaps the greatest doctrine expounded by the historical Buddha. It means that, in any life-process, the arising of an experiential event is a total, relational affair.” How is the link between dependent-origination and human rights to be forged? 3. INADA WRONG THAT BUDDHISM JUSTIFIES LEGAL RIGHTSDamien Keown, Lecturer in Indian Religion, University of London, JOURNAL OF BUDDHIST ETHICS, VOL. 2, 1995 , p.13. In simple language, the argument seems to be as follows. Human beings, like everything else, are part of the relational process described in the doctrine of dependent-origination; since no-one exists independently we should look out for one another; looking out for one another means respecting each other's rights; examples of the rights we should respect are security, liberty and life. Although I have described this as an "argument" it is little more than a series of assertions. Working backwards, it is difficult to know what sense to give the concluding sentence: "These rights are actually extensions of human qualities such as security, liberty and life." It is unclear what is meant by "human qualities" here. In what sense is security a "human quality" (perhaps a "need")? Why is life described as a "quality" of a human being? Even granted that these things are "human qualities," what does it mean to say that rights are extensions of "human qualities"? In the first extract quoted above, Inada suggests that "the Buddhist sees the concept of human rights as a legal extension of human nature." What is left unexplained, however, is how human nature (or "human qualities") become legal rights. Do all "human qualities" extend into rights or only some? If so, which and why? Finally, if "human qualities" are what give rise to rights, why invoke the doctrine of dependentorigination? 4. INADA WRONG ABOUT BUDDHIST GROUNDING OF RIGHTS Damien Keown, Lecturer in Indian Religion, University of London, JOURNAL OF BUDDHIST ETHICS, VOL. 2, 1995 , p.14-5. The derivation of human rights from the doctrine of dependent-origination is a conjuring trick. From the premise that we live in "a mutually constituted existential realm" (we all live together) it has "thereby become a fact" that there will be "mutual respect of fellow beings." In the twinkling of an eye, values have appeared from facts like a rabbit out of a hat. However, the fact that human beings live in relationship with one another is not a moral argument about “how they ought to behave”. By itself it offers no reason why a person should not routinely abuse the rights of others. Inada's suggestion that human rights can be grounded in the doctrine of dependent-origination turns out to be little more than a recommendation that people should be nice to one another on the ground that we are "all in this together." 87 BUDDHISM DOESN’T USE RIGHTS LANGUAGE, EMBRACES DUTIES 1. BUDDHIST LANGUAGE HAS NO WORD FOR “RIGHTS” Damien Keown, Lecturer in Indian Religion, University of London, JOURNAL OF BUDDHIST ETHICS, VOL. 2, 1995 , p.8. We took our cue for the discussion of rights in the West from etymology, and perhaps we can glean something further from this source. Above it was noted that the English word "right" is derived from the Latin “rectus” meaning straight. Both "right" and “rectus” themselves, however, have a more remote ancestor in the Sanskrit “rju” (straight or upright). The equivalent form in Pali is “uju” (or “ujju”) meaning "straight, direct; straightforward, honest, upright." It would therefore appear that both the objective sense ("straight") and the metaphorical moral sense ("rectitude") of the word "right" referred to earlier occur in Buddhist as well as Western languages. Despite a common Indo-European etymology, however, there is no word in Sanskrit or Pali which conveys the idea of a "right" or "rights," understood as a subjective entitlement. 2. BUDDHISM EXPRESSES OBLIGATIONS IN LANGUAGE OF DUTIES, NOT RIGHTSDamien Keown, Lecturer in Indian Religion, University of London, JOURNAL OF BUDDHIST ETHICS, VOL. 2, 1995 , p.10.We must qualify this conclusion, however, by noting that the requirements of Dharma are expressed in the form of duties rather than rights. In other words, Dharma states what is due in the form "A husband should support his wife" as opposed to "Wives have a right to be maintained by their husbands." Until rights as personal entitlements are recognized as a discrete but integral part of what is due under Dharma, the modern concept of rights cannot be said to be present. 3. BUDDHISM IS SIMILAR TO ROMAN CULTURE: RIGHTS NO, DUTIES YES Damien Keown, Lecturer in Indian Religion, University of London, JOURNAL OF BUDDHIST ETHICS, VOL. 2, 1995 , p.10. In this respect, however, Buddhism is far from unique, and a similar comment could be made about many other cultures and civilizations. Finnis points out with respect to Roman law: “[I]t is salutary to bear in mind that the modern emphasis on the powers of the right-holder, and the consequent systematic bifurcation between "right" ... and "duty", is something that sophisticated lawyers were able to do without for the whole life of classical Roman law. 4. RIGHTS ONLY IN EMBRYONIC FORM IN BUDDHISM Damien Keown, Lecturer in Indian Religion, University of London, JOURNAL OF BUDDHIST ETHICS, VOL. 2, 1995 , p.10. In sum it might be said that in classical Buddhism the notion of rights is present in embryonic form although not yet born into history. Whether anything like the Western concept of rights has, or would, appear in the course of the historical evolution of Buddhism is a question for specialists in the various Buddhist cultures to ponder. In many respects the omens for this development were never good. Buddhism originated in a caste society, and the Asian societies where it has flourished have for the most part been hierarchically structured. 88 Capitalism Good CAPITALISM HAS CREATED INDUSTRIAL PROGRESS 1. CAPITALISM LIBERATED PRODUCTION CAPACITIES Samuel McCracken, Assistant to the President of Boston University, CAPITALISM AND EQUALITY IN AMERICA, 1987, p. 26. Statistics make it abundantly clear that in the approximately two centuries since capitalism began to operate it has enriched mankind almost beyond belief by liberating and thereby vastly increasing its productive capacities. Moreover, even the most casual march through the Sears catalog shows that by the turn of the century the production of capitalism was increasingly made available to an extremely wide range of people at a decreasing price in terms of their labor: that is, that increases in productivity were and have been shared with the producer. 2. CAPITALISM HAS STIMULATED INDUSTRIAL PROGRESS Howard Zinn, Professor Emeritus, Spelman College, DECLARATIONS OF INDEPENDENCE, 1990, p. 168. It is true that the profit motive, in the history of capitalist development, has stimulated great industrial progress. Karl Marx, even while he looked forward to the disappearance of capitalism, acknowledged that it had brought the greatest increase in the productive forces of society, that it was a “progressive” stage in history. And it produced many useful, worthwhile things. 3. CAPITALISM IS NECESSARY FOR EFFICIENCY AND PRODUCTIVITY Ronald M. Glassman, NQA, DEMOCRACY AND EQUALITY THEORIES AND PROGRAMS FOR THE MODERN WORLD, 1989, p. 198. Let me make it clear that the capitalist financial segment is a crucial portion of the capitalist-industrial economy. Without it, a deadening, bureaucratic, non-entrepreneurial economic system with lowered efficiency and less productivity results. CAPITALISM HAS CREATED EQUALITY 1. AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL CAPITALISM HAS CREATED HIGH EQUALITY Peter L. Berger, Professor at Boston University, CAPITALISM AND EQUALITY IN AMERICA, 1987, p. 5. The fact remains that the working-class American enjoys access to the good things of life in a measure unparalleled in human history, anywhere or anytime, and this fact in itself has egalitarian implications. Put simply, industrial capitalism in American (and in other advanced societies of the capitalist type) has vastly raised the standard of living of virtually everyone in the society. For many, this fact in itself is tantamount to saying that American society is one of high equality and that it is the incredibly productive economy of American capitalism to which this achievement must be credited. 2. CAPITALISM HAS INCREASED OPPORTUNITIES FOR MINORITIES Milton Friedman, Economist, THE CAPITALIST READER, 1977, p. 158-9. The maintenance of the general rules of private property and of capitalism have been a major source of opportunity for Negroes and have permitted them to make greater progress than they otherwise could have made. To take a more general example, the preserves of discrimination in any society are the areas that are most monopolistic in character, whereas discrimination against groups of particular color or religion is least in those areas where there is the greatest freedom of competition. 3. CAPITALISM BRINGS ABOUT EGALITARIAN EFFECTS Peter L. Berger, Professor at Boston University, CAPITALISM AND EQUALITY IN AMERICA, 1987, p. 5-6. Capitalism as such does not make for equality in terms of the distribution of wealth and income; what makes for greater [sic] equality is progress in economic growth caused by industrialization in its more mature phases; but capitalism, far beyond any competing system, has the productive capacity for sustained economic growth of vast scope; to that [sic] extent, at any rate, capitalism brings about egalitarian effects. 89 CAPITALISM DECREASES TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY 1. COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES PREVENT TYRANNY BY THE MMORITY Michael Novak, Director of Social and Political Studies, American Enterprise Institute, LEGITIMACY, GOVERNMENTS, AND MARKETS, 1990, p. 208. Madison understood that the way you defeat a tyrannical majority and protect minority rights is to break up majorities by multiplying commercial interests. This systematic action makes it very hard to form a majority in the first place. The more commercial interests there are, the more people are in competition with one another in different ways. 2. CAPITALISM HAS RESULTED IN IMPROVEMENTS FOR THE WORKING CLASS Bertrand de Jouvenel, NQA, THE CAPITALIST READER, 1977, p. 132. And there is every reason to remember how miserable the majority of the people still were as recently as a hundred or a hundred and fifty years ago. But we must not, long after the event, allow a distortion of the facts, even if committed out of humanitarian zeal, to affect our view of what we owe to a system which for the first time in history made people feel that this misery might be avoidable. The very claims and ambitions of the working classes were and are the result of the enormous improvements of their position which capitalism brought about. 3. FREE MARKET SYSTEM IS CONDUCIVE TO EQUALIZING OPPORTUNITIES FOR ALL Delba Winthrop, Lecturer in Extension at Harvard University, CAPITALISM AND EQUALITY IN AMERICA, 1987, p. 2934. At the same time, however, assuming that investment capital can be found, the system of free enterprise provides unique opportunities for the disadvantaged to compete with the majority on its own (materialistic) terms even as the competitors do their own thing. There are now banks and advertising agencies owned by and serving women, prospering businessmen and professionals catering to minorities equitably and effectively, and health food stores and head shops run by patrons of healthful and less than healthful lives. Other economic orders may have tolerated different groups as what they were, but surely none has been more conducive to their social as well as economic equality than free enterprise. CAPITALISM IS FUNDAMENTALLY A MORAL SYSTEM 1. THE MARKET SYSTEM IS THE MORALLY PROPER SYSTEM FOR HUMANS Tibor R. Machan, Philosophy Professor at Auburn University, LEGITIMACY, GOVERNMENTS, AND MARKETS, 1990, p. 177. It [a market-based economic system] is the economic corollary of a just political system. Contrary to perceived opinion in contemporary political philosophy—as well as in much of popular culture, as represented by media opinion—the market economy is indeed the morally proper economic arrangement for human beings. As such, this is the system all persons ought to support and maintain in their community whenever a choice faces them relating to politics. 2. COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES TEACH OTHER-ORIENTED BEHAVIOR Michael Novak, Director of Social and Political Studies, American Enterprise Institute, LEGITIMACY, GOVERNMENTS, AND MARKETS, 1990, p. 207. Commercial activities make people other-centered. They involve people in the needs of others. They do not inspire projections of what one thinks [sic] others should need, but in listening closely to what others do [sic] need, as they express themselves. Amazingly, markets teach other-oriented behavior not for altruistic reasons but for quite effective ones. You can make the most beautiful Ethel in the world, but if other people do not want it, it is useless to you; it is a loss. 3. CRITICS OF CAPITALISM ON MORAL GROUNDS DO NOT UNDERSTAND CAPITALISM Ludwig von Mises, NQA, THE CAPITALIST READER, 1977, p. 154. All those rejecting capitalism on moral grounds as an unfair system are deluded by their failure to comprehend what capital is, how it comes into existence and how it is maintained, and what the benefits are which are derived from its employment in production process. 90 DISCRIMINATION IS NOT CAUSED BY CAPITALISM 1. THERE IS NO LINK BETWEEN DISCRIMINATION AND CAPITALISM Delba Winthrop, Lecturer in Extension at Harvard University, CAPITALISM AND EQUALITY IN AMERICA, 1987, p. 281. Even in the more nebulous case of leniency for white-collar crime, the softer treatment accorded these criminals is arguably not a consequence of the advantage they might have by virtue of their wealth, but rather of regard for their status, and of a sense that for some people disgrace is punishment enough. Given the incomes of clergymen as compared to businessmen, it is clear that capitalism is not responsible for our deference to particular occupations. Discrimination, be it against a race or for a profession, is distinct from and perhaps more deeply rooted than attachment to an economic order. 2. THERE CAN BE CAUSES OTHER THAN CAPITALISM FOR INEQUALITY Peter L. Berger, Professor at Boston University, CAPITALISM AND EQUALITY IN AMERICA, 1987, p. 3. Put differently, if one concludes that America either is or is not, comparatively speaking, an egalitarian society, is it capitalism that should be either praised or blamed for this fact? Clearly there is no certain way of knowing. There are many other factors to be taken into account—industrialism as such (regardless of its organization in capitalist or non-capitalist forms), political democracy, and a miscellany of geographical, demographic, social and cultural factors—such as the continental size of American society, the waves of mass immigration, the frontier tradition or the puritan heritage. 3. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT RACISM IS CAUSED BY CAPITALISM Delba Winthrop, Lecturer in Extension at Harvard University, CAPITALISM AND EQUALITY IN AMERICA, 1987, p. 281. Furthermore, it is unclear that many or even most of the acknowledged inequalities under capitalism have much to do with capitalism itself. The most dramatic progress toward equality under the law in America has occurred in the last few decades, and it has been achieved by protection of the procedural rights of the indigent. As is generally known, but less openly acknowledged, the indigent criminals or suspects in question are predominantly black and Hispanic, and much of their harsh treatment is due not to their poverty or social class, but to racial prejudice. To show that racial prejudice in the United States is a consequence of capitalism would be difficult indeed. CAPITALISM INCREASES POLITICAL FREEDOM 1. FREE MARKETS RESULT IN POLITICAL FREEDOM Milton Friedman, Economist, THE CAPITALIST READER, 1977, p. 239. Historical evidence speaks with a single voice on the relation between political freedom and a free market. I know of no example in time or place of a society that has been marked by a large measure of political freedom, and that has not also used something comparable to a free market to organize the bulk of economic activity. 2. CAPITALISM PROMOTES POLITICAL FREEDOM Milton Friedman, Economist, THE CAPITALIST READER, 1977, p. 239. Viewed as a means to the end of political freedom, economic arrangements are important because of their effect on the concentration or dispersion of power. The kind of economic organization that provides economic freedom directly, namely, competitive capitalism, also promotes political freedom because it separates economic power from political power and in this way enables the one to offset the other. 3. FREE MARKETS PRESERVE POLITICAL FREEDOM Milton Friedman, Economist, THE CAPITALIST READER, 1977, p. 439. Another example of the role of the market preserving political freedom was revealed in our experience with McCarthyism. Entirely aside from the substantive issues involved, the merits of the charges made, what protection did individuals, and in particular government employees have against irresponsible accusations and probings into matters that it went against their conscience to reveal? Their appeal to the Fifth Amendment would have been hollow mockery without an alternative to government employment. 91 CAPITALISM INCREASES WORLD PEACE 1. CAPITALISM PROVIDED LONGEST PERIOD OF PEACE IN HISTORY Ayn Rand, Author, THE CAPITALIST READER, 1977, p. 171. Let those who are actually concerned with peace observe that capitalism gave mankind the longest period of peace in history [sic]—a period during which there were no wars involving the entire civilized world—from the end of the Napoleonic wars in 1815 to the outbreak of World War I in 1914. 2. COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES ENCOURAGE PEACE NOT WAR Michael Novak, Director of Social and Political Studies, American Enterprise Institute, LEGITIMACY, GOVERNMENTS, AND MARKETS, 1990, p. 206. Markets teach people to prefer peace rather than war, which destroys everything anyone has tried to build. Commercial activities teach people to seek bargaining rather than absolutes. They undermine the martial spirit and induce a pacific temper. 3. CAPITALISM IS FUNDAMENTALLY OPPOSED TO WAR Ayn Rand, Author, THE CAPITALIST READER, 1977, p. 171. Laissez-faire capitalism is the only social system based on the recognition of individual rights and, therefore, the only system that bans force from social relationships. By the nature of its basic principles and interests, it is the only system fundamentally opposed to war. 4. ONLY DEMOCRATIC CAPITALISM WILL SAVE HUMANITY Jean-François Revel, Author, DEMOCRACY AGAINST ITSELF, 1993, p. 258. Twentieth-century history is clear on two points: only capitalism engenders economic development; only democracy can correct the worst political abuses and errors. This is why humanity faces a stark choice: democratic capitalism or extinction. 5. ECONOMIC INCENTIVES OF CAPITALISM PREVENT WAR Ayn Rand, Author, THE CAPITALIST READER, 1977, p. 171. Men who are free to produce, have no incentive to loot; they have nothing to gain from war and a great deal to lose. Ideologically, the principle of individual rights does not permit a man to seek his own livelihood at the point of a gun, inside or outside his country. Economically, wars cost money; in a free economy, where wealth is privately owned, the costs of war come out of the income of private citizens—there is no overblown public treasury to hide the fact— and a citizen cannot hope to recoup his own financial losses (such as taxes or business dislocations or property destruction) by winning the war. Thus his own economic interests are on the side of peace. CAPITALISM IS MOST EFFICIENT ECONOMIC SYSTEM 1. CAPITALISM IS THE ONLY SYSTEM THAT WORKS Jean-François Revel, Author, DEMOCRACY AGAINST ITSELF, 1993, p. 258-9. Liberal democratic capitalism is not the best system: it is the only one [that works]. The parrots who keep telling us about its imperfections are right, it is imperfect. But the only prohibitive vice for a system, is not for it to be without vices, but to be without qualities. And what we know about all the tested alternatives to liberal democratic capitalism is that they are without qualities. 92 CAPITALISM DOES NOT CREATE POLITICAL INEQUALITY 1. CAPITALISM DOES NOT CREATE POLITICAL INEQUALITY Delba Winthrop, Lecturer in Extension at Harvard University, CAPITALISM AND EQUALITY TN AMERICA, 1987, p. 285. For it seems that not so much capitalism or even economic inequality, but lack of assured wealth and leisure are the economic obstacles to political participation. There may also be cultural barriers to full and equal participation that will not be overcome by any institutional reform alone. And some people may just have a natural disinclination to political activity that will never be overcome under any free regime. Capitalism may well be accompanied by unequal political participation, but it does not follow either that capitalism causes that inequality or that abolishing capitalism will bring more equal participation. 93 Capitalism Bad CAPITALISM CREATES WASTE AND DESTRUCTION 1. CAPITALISM CREATES OVERPRODUCTION WHICH DESTROYS SOCIETY Emile Burns, NQA, AN INTRODUCTION TO MARXISM, 1966, p. 35. The features of capitalist crises were only too familiar in the years between the two wars: there is overproduction, therefore new production declines and workers are unemployed; their unemployment means further decline in the market demand, so more factories slow down production; new factories are not put up, and some are even destroyed; wheat and other products are destroyed, though the unemployed and their families suffer hunger and illness. It is a madman’s world; but at last the stocks are used up or destroyed, production begins to increase, trade develops, there is more employment—and there is steady recovery for a year or two, leading to an apparently boundless expansion of production; until suddenly once more there is over-production and crisis, and the whole process begins again. 2. CAPITALISM CREATES A “BIOLOGICAL” NEED TO CONSUME Herbert Marcuse, Social Philosopher, AN ESSAY ON LIBERATION, 1969, p. 11. The so-called consumer economy and the politics of corporate capitalism have created a second nature of man which ties him libidinally and aggressively to the commodity form. The need for possessing, consuming, handling, and constantly renewing the gadgets, devices, instruments, engines, offered to and imposed upon the people, for using these wares even at the danger of one’s own destruction, has become a “biological” need in the sense just defined. The second nature of man thus militates against any change that would disrupt and perhaps even abolish this dependence of man on a market ever more densely filled with merchandise—abolish his existence as a consumer consuming himself in buying and selling. 3. OVERPRODUCTION OF CAPITALISM IS DESTROYING SOCIETY MANIFESTO OF THE 9Th CONGRESS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST CURRENT, 2nd Quarter, 1992, p. 4. If capitalism is plunging into an insoluble economic crisis which is the basis for its convulsions today, if it condemns masses of human beings to misery and starvation while at the same time it cannot find outlets for its production and is closing factories, leaving fields fallow, and laying off workers, this is because capitalism produces, not to satisfy need, but to sell at a profit. The markets are saturated today, not because society’s needs are saturated but because it does not have the wherewithal to buy the goods that have been produced, and capitalism cannot provide this wherewithal without ceasing to exist: a capitalism that gave consumers the money to buy what it produced, in other words gave away its produce, would no longer be capitalism. And the credit which has been so much abused for years will not change anything: by generalizing debt, it has only made the contradictions more explosive. CAPITALISM IS OPPRESSIVE TO WOMEN 1. CAPITALISM CREATED OPPRESSION OF WOMEN Marilyn French, Feminist Philosopher, BEYOND POWER, 1985, p. 455-6. The oppression of women arose with the concept of private property. Mainly because women could reproduce, they like animals, were defined as property. Because capitalism is founded on the idea of private property, the oppression of women is inherent within it and necessary for its perpetuation. Sexism is functional for capitalism because it allows employers to get two workers for the price of one: the man is paid wages, his wife performs the services necessary for him to live even though he spends most of his hours at work, but she is not paid. 94 CAPITALISM IS DETRIMENTAL TO A HEALTHY ECONOMY 1. ECONOMIC DETERIORATION IS AT THE CENTER OF CAPITALISM Paul M. Sweezy, NQA, FOUR LECTURES ON MARXISM, 1981, p. 43. Marx wrote that “the real barrier of capitalist production is capital itself.” I have been arguing in effect that monopoly capital makes that barrier even bigger and more formidable. So much so that stagnation—a combination of sluggish growth, rising unemployment, and a chronically low level of utilization of productive capacity—has become the normal condition of capitalist economies. CAPITALISM RESULTS IN DISCRIMINATION 1. CAPITALISM HAS LED TO OPPRESSION Cornel West, Professor of Religion, Princeton University, PROPHESY DELIVERANCE: AN AFRO-AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY CHRISTIANITY, 1982, p. 132. The boomtown character of American industrialization—urban centers which appeared virtually overnight— set the context for the flowering of nativism, jingoism, anti-Semitism, sexism, and, above all, racism. Ironically, this ideology of Americanism became a beacon to oppressed social classes and ethnic groups around the world. 2. CAPITALISM CONTRIBUTES TO INEQUALITY IN THE UNITED STATES Peter L. Berger, Professor at Boston University, CAPITALISM AND EQUALITY IN AMERICA, 1987, p. 2. From its beginnings, America has been a symbol of equality for vast numbers of people, both admired and despised for this by both Americans and outside observers. Today, for many (again, both inside and outside its borders), America has become a precisely opposite symbol—supposedly a society with crass inequalities, oppressive and exploitative, a bastion of privilege and hierarchy. And for most of those who see America in this light, American capitalism is at the very least one of the important factors that have made for inequality. 3. CAPITALISM OPPRESSES AFRICAN AMERICANS Cornel West, Professor of Religion, Princeton University, PROPHESY DELIVERANCE: AN AFRO-AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY CHRISTIANITY, 1982, p. 105. Exploitative, profit-oriented capitalism is a way of ordering life fundamentally alien to human value in general and to black humanity in particular. Racism and capitalism have set the stage for despoliation of natural had human resources all around the world. Yet those who seriously challenge these systems are often effectively silenced. We view racism as criminality and yet we are called criminals. We view racism as a human aberration, yet we are called freaks. The roots of our crisis are in social, economic, and political power systems that prevent us from managing the reality of our everyday lives. 95 CAPITALISM CREATES VIOLENCE 1. CAPITALISM PRODUCES VIOLENCE Herbert Marcuse, Social Philosopher, AN ESSAY ON LIBERATION, 1969, p. 12-13. Self-determination, the autonomy of the individual, asserts itself in the right to race his automobile, to handle his power tools, to buy a gun, to communicate to mass audiences his opinion, no matter how ignorant, how aggressive, it may be. Organized capitalism has sublimated and turned to socially productive use frustration and primary aggressiveness on an unprecedented scale—unprecedented not in terms of the quantity of violence but rather in terms of its capacity to produce long-range contentment and satisfaction, to reproduce the “voluntary servitude”. 2. POST-MODERN CAPITALISTIC CULTURE IS HARMFUL Cornel West, Professor of Religion, Princeton University, RACE MATTERS, p. 5 Post-modem culture is more and more a market culture dominated by gangster mentalities and self-destructive wantonness. This culture engulfs all of us—yet its impact on the disadvantaged is devastating, resulting in extreme violence in everyday life. Sexual violence against women and homicidal assaults by young black men on one another are only the most obvious signs of this empty quest for pleasure, property, and power. 3. CAPITALISM DEMANDS AN IMPERIALIST FOREIGN POLICY Emile Burns, NQA, AN INTRODUCTION TO MARXISM, 1966, p. 39. In popular usage, imperialism is a policy of expansion, the conquest of less developed countries to form an Empire. In so far as the policy is seen to be more than an abstract desire to see the country’s flag floating over as much territory as possible, it is recognized that there is some economic reason for the policy of expansion. It is sometimes said, for example, that the reason is the need for markets, or for raw materials and food, or for land where an overcrowded home population could find an outlet. 96 CAPITALISM RESULTS IN A BREAKDOWN OF SOCIETY 1. EXCESSES OF U.S. CAPITALISM ARE CAUSING A MASSIVE SOCIAL BREAKDOWN Cornel West, Professor of Religion at Princeton University, THE ETHICAL DIMENSIONS OF MARXIST THOUGHT, 1991, p. xi. America is in the midst of a massive social breakdown. Never before in U.S. history has national decline and cultural decay so thoroughly shaken people’s confidence in their capacity to respond to present-day problems. America remains the premier military power in the world, yet has a waning influence on the global scene. 2. ALIENATION OCCURS AS MARKET FORCES CREATE HELPLESSNESS Paul Craig Roberts and Matthew A. Stephenson, NQA, MARX’S THEORY OF EXCHANGE, ALIENATION, AND CRISIS, 1973, p. 72. Alienation is said to occur when men are mutually independent and engage in market exchange, and when men are subject to the market—something over which they have no control—as to an alien force. The lengthy discussion of the nature of commodities and the commodity mode of production in Capital is prefigured in the 1844 Manuscripts, in which Marx says that he has “considered the act of estranging practical human activity, labor, in two of its aspects. (1) The relation of the worker to the product of labor an alien object exercising power over him.. . [sic] (2)The relation of labor to the act of production within the labor process.” 3. FREEDOM CREATED BY CAPITALISM HAS RESULTED IN POWERLESSNESS Erich Fromm, Social Philosopher ESCAPE FROM FREEDOM, 1941, p. 107-8. In one word, capitalism not only freed man from traditional bonds, but it also contributed tremendously to the increasing of positive freedom, to the growth of an active, critical, responsible self. However, while this was one effect capitalism had on the process of growing freedom, at the same time it made the individual more alone and isolated and imbued him with a feeling of insignificance and powerlessness. CAPITALISM EXPLOITS THE WORKING CLASSES 1. CAPITALISM PERPETUATES EXPLOITATION OF WORKING CLASSES Herbert Marcuse, Social Philosopher, AN ESSAY ON LIBERATION, 1969, p. 16-7. In the advanced capitalist countries, the radicalization of the working classes is counteracted by a socially engineered arrest of consciousness, and by the development and satisfaction of needs which perpetuate the servitude of the exploited. A vested interest in the existing system is thus fostered in the instinctual structure of the exploited and the rupture with the continuum of repression—a necessary precondition of liberation—does not occur. It follows that the radical change which is to transform the existing society into a free society must reach into a dimension of the human existence hardly considered in Marxian theory—the “biological” dimension in which the vital, imperative needs and satisfactions of man assert themselves. 2. CAPITALISM MAKES WORK THE BASIC FUNCTION OF HUMANS Paul Craig Roberts and Matthew A. Stephenson, NQA, MARX’S THEORY OF EXCHANGE, ALIENATION, AND CRISIS, 1973, p.2. For Marx, man’s human function is work. Man realizes himself in labor. In economies organized for production for direct use, the relations between men are convivial rather than commercial, and society has control over the allocation and employment of labor. This follows from producing use-values for direct consumption by the community rather than “commodities” which find their way into consumption indirectly by being sold in a market. 3. CAPITALISM MAKES WORKERS A COMMODITY Paul M. Sweezy, NQA, FOUR LECTURES ON MARXISM, 1981, p. 26. A commodity is something—a good or a service—produced for sale, not for use. All societies since the most primitive have been characterized by some commodity production, but only under capitalism has it become the dominant type of production; and only under capitalism has labor power, the capacity of the worker to perform useful labor, become a commodity, not exceptionally but in general. 97 Categorical Imperative Good CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE IS THE BEST MORAL GUIDELINE 1. CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE IS AN ABSOLUTE GUIDELINE Immanuel Kant, Philosopher, in AN INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS, ed. by Robert Dewey, 1977, p. 183. Finally, there is an imperative which commands a certain conduct immediately, without having as its condition any other purpose to be attained by it. This imperative is categorical It concerns not the matter of the action, or its intended result, but its form and the principle of which it is itself a result; and what is essentially good in it consists in the mental disposition let the consequence be what it may. 2. CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE IS THE BEST FRAMEWORK Immanuel Kant, Philosopher, in AN INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS, ed. by Robert Dewey, 1977, p. 183. When I conceive a hypothetical imperative, in general I do not know before-hand what it will contain until I am given the condition. But when I conceive a categorical imperative, I know at once what it contains. For as the imperative contains besides the law only necessity that the maxims shall conform to this law, while the law contains no conditions restricting it, there remains nothing but the general statement that the maxi of the action should conform to a universal law, and it is this conformity alone that the imperative properly represents as necessary. There is therefore but one categorical imperative, namely this: Act only on that maxim whereby thous canst at the same time will that it should be a universal law. 3. MORAL DECISIONS MUST BE UNIVERSAUZABLE James Moreland and Norman Geisler, Profs. of Philosophy, Biola Univ. and Liberty Univ., THE LIFE AND DEATH DEBATE, 1990, p. x. A judgment is moral only if it is universalizable; that is, if it applies equally to all relevant similar situations. The main point of this criterion is to express the conviction that moral judgments must be impartially applied to moral situations by taking into account all of the morally relevant features of the situation. If someone claimed that one act is right and a second act is wrong, but that person was unable to cite a relevant distinction between the two acts, then the judgment would seem arbitrary and without adequate foundation. This criterion points to an important aspect of morality: moral judgments are no arbitrary expressions of personal preference. They are rationally justifiable claims which, if true, are binding on all cases that fit the relevant criteria upon which the claim is based. 4. CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE DETERMINES NATURAL LAW Immanuel Kant, Philosopher, in AN INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS, ed. by Robert Dewey, 1977, p. 183-4. Since the universality of the law according the which effects are produced constitutes what is properly called nature in the most general sense (as to form) that is, the existence of things so far as it is determined by general laws - the imperative of duty may be expressed thus: Act as if the maxim of thy action were to become by thy will a universal law of nature. 5. CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE REFLECTS INDIVIDUAL MORALITY Ray Billington, Prof. of Ethics, Bristol Polytechnic, LIVING PHILOSOPHY, 1988, p. 112. Kantian ethics allows each individual to be his own moral authority, and it was this emphasis which was taken up by the existentialists two centuries later (see Chapter Seven). Man is looked upon as an autonomous creature, capable of expressing this quality through a continuous process of rational judgments. Kant thus lifts the moral decisionmaking process above that of the gratification solely of personal desire (I’m going to do this because I feel like it) or the pursuit of pleasure. His own life style, which was a living expression of his philosophy - not always the case with philosophers - may express a rigidness and rigour which are not fashionable today, but at least under some lights, present a more commendable, even desirable, image of the human species than is to be found in excessive libertarianism (in the popular sense of the word: Kant was a libertarian in the philosophical sense). 98 CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE IS RATIONAL AND CONSISTENT 1. CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE ALLOWS REASON TO ANALYZE MORALITY T.C. Williams, Prof. of Philosophy, Oxford, THE CONCEPT OF THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE, 1968, p. 10. Kant’s argument is, therefore, that to act on categorical imperative is to act in such a way that reason of itself, and not inclination, determines the action. It is action, therefore, which is done on a principle that is valid for all rational beings; and thus, on a principle that is capable of being an objective law for all rational beings. That is to say, it is action which, in Kant’s own words, is in conformity with ‘the universality of a law as such.’ Thus, immediately following the above passage, Kant goes on to formulate the principle of morality - the principle of the categorical imperative: There is therefore only a single categorical imperative and it is this: ‘Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should be a universal law.’ 2. GOOD WILL IS THE ONLY UNQUALIFIED GOOD Immanuel Kant, Philosopher, in AN INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS, ed. by Robert Dewey, 1977, p. 174. Nothing can possible be conceived in the world, or even out of it, which can be called good without qualification, except a good will. Intelligence, wit, judgment, and other talents of the mind, however they may be named, or courage, resolution, perseverance, as qualities of temperament, are undoubtedly good and desirable in many respects; but these gifts of nature may also become extremely bad and mischievous if the will which is to make use of them, and which, therefore, constitutes what is called character, is not good. It is the same with the gifts of fortune. Power, riches, honor, even health, and the general well-being and contentment with one’s condition which is called happiness, inspire pride, and often presumption, if there is not a good will to correct the influence of these on the mind, and with this also to rectify the whole principle of acting, and adapt to its end. The sight of a being who is not adorned with a single feature of a pure and good will, enjoying unbroken prosperity, can never give pleasure to an impartial rational spectator. Thus a good will appears to constitute the indispensable condition even of being worthy of happiness. 3. GOOD WILL IS INTRINSICALLY GOOD Immanuel Kant, Philosopher, in AN INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS, ed. by Robert Dewey, 1977, p. 174-5. A good will is good not because of what it performs or effects, not by its aptness for the attainment of some proposed end, but simply by virtue of the volition- that is, it is good in itself, and considered by itself is to be esteemed much higher than all that can be brought about by it in favor of any inclination, nay, even of the sum-total of all inclination. Even if it should happen that, owing to special disfavor of fortune, or the niggardly provision of a step-motherly nature, this will should wholly lack power to accomplish its purpose, if with its greatest efforts it should yet achieve nothing, and there should remain only the good will (not, to be sure, a mere wish, but the summoning of all means in our power), then, like a jewel, it would shine by its own light, as a thing which has its whole value in itself. 4. THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE ALLOWS HUMANS TO BE ENDS, NOT MEANS Eric Rakowski, Prof. of Law at Berkeley, COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW, 1993, p. 1071. That people should be treated as ends in themselves, not merely as means to an agent’s objective, is commonplace of much contemporary moral reasoning. As an abstract principal, Kant’s injunction seems unexceptionable. Not only does it appeal to deontologists, who place respect for people’s rights above the achievement of worthy goals defined without regard to people’s moral claims. Kant’s maxim could likewise be endorsed (although in fact it is rarely invoked explicitly) by consequentialist thinkers who see the principle of maximizing the world’s good as that which equally deserving individuals would fairly choose if asked to agree on moral standards. 99 Categorical Imperative Bad CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE IS AN INAPPROPRIATE FRAMEWORK 1. CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE IS INAPPLICABLE TO REAL ETHICAL PROBLEMS Onora O’Neill, Prof. of Philosophy, U. of Essex, ACTING ON PRINCIPLE, 1975, p. 59. The complex classification of duties and moral statutes of acts in chapter 4 shows that the Categorical Imperative must have great powers of discrimination if it is really to provide a method for solving all those ethical problems for which Kant thinks it is appropriate. To most recent commentators, and to many earlier ones, it has seemed quite clear that the Categorical Imperative cannot be used to solve ethical problems. Mill wrote of Kant: But when be begins to deduce from this precept any of the actual duties of morality, he fails, almost grotesquely, to show that there would be any contradiction, any logical (not to say physical) impossibility in the adoption of all rations beings of the most outrageously immoral rules of conduct 2. KANT’S FRAMEWORK IS INCOHERENT Onora O’Neill, Prof. of Philosophy at U. of Essex, A COMPANION TO ETHICS, ed. by Peter Singer, 1991, p. 180. This objection is that Kant’s basic framework is incoherent His account of human knowledge leads to a conception of human beings as parts of nature, whose desires, inclinations and actions are susceptible of ordinary causal explanation. Yet, his account of human freedom demands that we view human agents as capable of selfdetermination, and specifically of determination in accordance with the principals of duty. Kant is apparently driven to a dual view of man; we are both phenomenal (natural, causally determined) beings and noumenal (non-natural, self-determining) beings. Many of Kant’s critics have held that this dual-aspect view of human beings is ultimately incoherent 3. MORAL RULES ARE NOT UNIVERSALIZABLE G.C. Field, Prof. of Philosophy at the U. of Bristol, in AN INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS, ed. by Robert Dewey, 1977, p. 196. It is argued, for instance, that none of these so-called moral rules can really be universalized in practice. The rule, ‘Thou shalt not lie,” for instance, leads to the conclusion that if a man pursued by murderers could be saved by a timely lie, it would nonetheless be wrong for us to tell this lie, and that it would be our duty to help the murderers to commit the crime by telling them which way their victim had gone. Kant, indeed, seems ready to accept this conclusion. But almost everyone would feel that a conclusion like this violates our strongest moral feelings, and that a view which really led to this conclusion would have to be abandoned. 4. THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE IGNORES THE VALUE OF NATURE Tom Regan, Prof. at North Carolina State University, THE MONIST, April, 1992, p. 173. While Kant’s theory is not anthropocentric, its implications vis-à-vis the question of intrinsic value of the natural world coincide with those of an anthropocentric outlook. It is no doubt logically proper for Kantians to contemplate the possibility that E.T. and others of his kind are rational autonomous agents and, if so, that they exist as ends-in-themselves. But whatever may be true of extraterrestrials, the Kantian case is closed regarding trees and rocks, streams and meadows, bison and beaver. They do not exist as ends-in-themselves. 5. THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE TEST CANNOT BE APPLIED REALISTICALLY Geoffrey Thomas, Prof. of Philosophy, Birkbeck College, AN INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS, 1993, p. 76. Another line of criticism is that there is no action which the CI test can rule out. We need only invoke an arbitrary specificity in order to let any action through the test. For instance, if my maxim is to take cheap wine to a bottle party and to drink superior wine brought by others, the maxim cannot be consistently universalized. Nobody would bring along the superior wine for the bringers of cheap wine to drink. But then, the idea is, I need only redescribe my action arbitrarily in order for its maxim to pass the CI test. E.g., ‘I am a 48-year-old guest who will take cheap and drink superior wine if I know in advance that not all guests will do the same.’ Now that maxim could be consistently universalized, for the simple reason that not all guests at a bottle party are 48 years old. 100 THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE CANNOT MEDIATE MORAL DISPUTES 1. KANT CANNOT RESOLVE MORAL DILEMMAS Onora O’Neill, Prof. of Philosophy at U. of Essex, A COMPANION TO ETHICS, ed. by Peter Singer, 1991, p. 182-3. This criticism points out that Kant’s ethics identifies a set of principals which may come into conflict. The demands of fidelity and of helpfulness, for example, may clash. This criticism is true of Kant’s ethics, as for any ethic of principals. Since ‘trade-offs’ between differing obligations are not part of the theory, there is not routine procedure for dealing with conflicts. On the other hand, since the theory is only a set of side constraints on action, the central demand is to find some action that falls within all constraints. Only when no action can be found does the problem of multiple grounds of obligation arise. Kant has nothing very illuminating to say about these cases; the charge made by advocates of virtue ethics (e.g. Bernard Williams, Martha Nussbaum), that be does not say enough about the regret that may be appropriate when some moral commitment has an unavoidably to be violated or neglected, is apposite. 2. CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE CANNOT RESOLVE CLASHING DUTIES G.C. Field, Prof. of Philosophy at the U. of Bristol, in AN INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS, ed. by Robert Dewey, 1977, p. 197. The same question, really, comes from a different point of view when we find two principals of action, both apparently right, clashing with each other. We have the rule forbidding the telling of lies. And we have another rule bidding us preserve innocent human life by every means m our power. Both these would be recognized as wholly laudable principals of action. But, as we have seen, in the case of the man escaping from murderers they come into conflict If we ask how we are to decide between them, all we can say is that it depends on the circumstances of the particular case. But with that we have already abandoned Kant’s principal. We recognize that it is impossible to have any general rule, absolutely universal and admitting of no exceptions. We cannot lay down beforehand a general formula which can be applied ready-made to each particular case. We have to examine each particular case on its merits, because we can never be sure beforehand that its special circumstances are not of importance. 3. CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE CANNOT GUIDE POSITIVE ACTIONS Ray Billington, Prof. of Ethics, Bristol Polytechnic, LIVING PHILOSOPHY, 1988, p. 112. The main weakness of Kant’s theory, apart from any that may have been already discussed in passing, is that its emphasis lies primarily in telling us what we ought not, rather than what we ought, to do. As Maclntyre writes ‘Morality (as presented by the categorical imperative) sets limits to the ways in which and the means by which we conduct our lives; it does not give them direction.’ It tells us that we should not cheat at cards, crib in exams, or kick a man when he’s down; it is considerably less helpful in telling us what kind of behavior is desirable, what ends we should have in mind, what behavior we should wish to see universalized. We can hardly take Kant’s own lifestyle to guide us on this matter: apart from the obvious fact that one aspect of this, his celibacy, would bring about the extinction of the human race, this would be to deny the central truth of Kant’s teaching that, because each of us is an autonomous, rational human being, we must apply the categorical imperative to our own lives, not simply try to imitate the way another person has done this. 4. CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE DOES NOT PROVIDE POSITIVE GUIDANCE Geoffrey Thomas, Prof. of Philosophy, Birkbeck College, AN INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS, 1993, p. 88. Urmsons complaint aside, the doctrine of the Categorical Imperative is often criticized as providing merely a negative test. It rules out a line of action if the relevant maxim cannot be consistently universalize. But it provides no positive guidance. 101 Civil Disobedience Good OPPORTUNITY FOR CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE IS NECESSARY IN DEMOCRACY 1. CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE IS JUSTIFIED TO BRING ABOUT DEMOCRATIC VALUES Elliot M. Zashin, NQA, CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE AND DEMOCRACY, 1972, p. 127. But order is not indivisible, and obviously, total obedience to law is not necessary to the maintenance of sufficient order and social peace for the large majority of people to live tolerably secure lives. In a democratic society which espouses other values besides order, a monolithic sense of undeviating obedience to law would hinder the realization of these other values, such as equality and the various “freedoms to.” As Thomas Jefferson suggested, we do not really want a nation of men who unquestioningly and docilely do exactly what their governors tell them. While civil disobedience may [sic] “encourage” an unthinking disrespect for law because of the public’s lack of sophistication or self-control, it may also encourage a deeper realization of the values which law must embody in a democracy if it is to maintain a durable legitimacy in the minds of the large majority of its citizens. 2. CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE IS A MA1TER OF POLITICAL NECESSITY Steven M. Bauer and Peter 1. Eckerstrom, Professors of Law, Stanford University, STANFORD LAW REVIEW, May 1987, p. 1173. Although courts have been unreceptive to political necessity arguments [as they might apply to cases of civil disobedience], they have failed to acknowledge an important point: The necessity defense is a social policy that sanctions certain justifiable, but illegal acts. When applied to civil disobedience, it has broad implications for the persuasiveness and integrity of civil disobedience, role of the judiciary, the power of individuals in our society, and the place of protection in our democracy. 3. POSSIBILITY OF CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE MUST EXIST IN A DEMOCRACY Elliot M. Zashin, NQA, CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE AND DEMOCRACY, 1972, p. 308. To argue, as I have done, that civil disobedience is well within the corpus of liberal-democratic thought and is an extension of democratic political techniques is not necessarily to suggest that civil disobedience must be epidemic in a healthy liberal democracy; indeed, that might be a sign of political illness. But it is to suggest that civil disobedience must be endemic, latent but always a possibility. 102 CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE IS A MECHANISM TO CHANGE SOCIAL INJUSTICES 1. CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE HAS BEEN AN INSTRUMENT OF POSITIVE SOCIAL CHANGE Elliot M. Zashin, NQA, CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE AND DEMOCRACY, 1972, p. 3. Perhaps the prevalence of protection during the heyday of the civil rights movement contributed nearly as much to the emergence of more radical movements as did the war, the virtual lack of progress in alleviating black poverty, and the slow pace of change in more traditional areas of civil rights activity, e.g., school desegregation, effective use of the franchise, and opportunities in white collar jobs and the professions. Perhaps the movements in which civil disobedience was an important weapon provided the impetus for more radical movements, mobilizing people who were then further radicalized by the course of events and by their experience in protest activity. 2. CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE ALERTS THE MAJORITY TO INJUSTICES Steven M. Bauer and Peter 1. Eckerstrom, Professors of Law, Stanford University, STANFORD LAW REVIEW, May 1987, p. 1175-6. Historically, civil disobedience has been important to this country’s political development, alerting the majority to injustices and unwise policies. Beginning with the Boston Tea Party and continuing through the antislavery, abortion, women’s rights, civil rights, antiwar, and antinuclear movements, civil disobedience has been a familiar sight on the American political landscape. 3. CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE IS AN OPTION FOR DISADVANTAGED MINORITIES Elliot M. Zashin, NQA, CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE AND DEMOCRACY, 1972, p.2. Moreover, radical dissenters and reformers have generally been isolated in America because the system has provided the majority of its citizens with considerable affluence. The groups which have had the greatest need for change generally have been relatively small minorities. Civil disobedience seemed to be a resolution of the conflicting tugs of private conviction and political obligation, a solution to the problem minority protestors faced when conventional channels afforded them no relief. 103 CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE IS JUSTIFIED IN AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 1. CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE CAN BE JUSTIFIED WITH SPIRIT OF AMERICAN LAWS Hannah Arendt, Philosopher, CRISIS OF THE REPUBLIC, 1969, p. 83. However, what is basically at stake here is not whether, and to what extent, civil disobedience can be justified by the First Amendment, but, rather, with what concept [sic] of law it is compatible. I shall argue in what follows that although the phenomenon of civil disobedience is today a world-wide phenomenon and even though it has attracted the interest of jurisprudence and political science only recently in the United States, it still is primarily American in origin and substance; that no other country, and no other language, has even a word for it, and that the American republic is the only government having at least a chance to cope with it—not, perhaps, in accordance with the statutes, but in accordance with the spirit [sic] of its laws. 2. THERE IS A FRAMEWORK WITHIN DEMOCRACY TO JUSTIFY CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE Elliot M. Zashin, NQA, CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE AND DEMOCRACY, 1972, p. 72-3. There are several useful propositions to be culled from the work of these three theorists: (1) a social contract theory of the state does not preclude legitimate disobedience to political authority—that is, not all acts of disobedience are inconsistent with the idea of a government established voluntarily by a body of men to protect their liberties; (2) the consent of the individual is the source of the obligation to obey constituted political authority; (3) when governors commit acts which subvert the ends for which government was established, popular resistance is justified; and (4) popular willingness to resist can serve to keep governors responsive and less likely to infringe on the people’s liberties. These are the basic components for constructing a full-blown justification of civil disobedience within the liberal-democratic polity. 3. CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE IS AN ESTABLISHED PART OF AMERICAN POLITICS Bruce Ledewitz, Professor of Law, Duquesne University School of Law, HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW, Fall, 1990, p. 67-8. Though not understood as protected by the First Amendment, civil disobedience nevertheless has become an established part of American political life. Certainly since the 1960’s, but even before then, many groups seeking political reform have used civil disobedience either as a tactic to bring their message to the attention of the public or as an expression of non-cooperation with policies they oppose. 104 CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE DOES NOT CREATE WIDESPREAD ANARCHY 1. CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE DOES NOT LEAD TO ANARCHY Howard Zinn, Professor Emeritus, Spelman College, DECLARATIONS OF INDEPENDENCE, 1990, p. 109-10. Did the mass demonstrations of the black movement in the American South, in the early sixties, lead to anarchy? True, they disrupted the order of racial segregation. They created scenes of disorder in hundreds of towns and cities in the country. But the result of all that tumult was not general lawlessness. Rather the result was a healthy reconstitution of the social order toward greater justice and a healthy new understanding among Americans about the need for racial equality. 2. CIVIL DISOBEDIENTS DO NOT BELIEVE ANARCHY WILL RESULT IN SOCIAL REFORM Steven M. Bauer and Peter 1. Eckerstrom, Professors of Law, Stanford University, STANFORD LAW REVIEW, May 1987, p. 1190. As a social reformer with a vision of a public good who displays a respect for the influence of law on a community, the civil disobedient has a stake in the eventual enforceability of law more to his liking. The fundamental legitimacy of political society does not offend him; it motivates his. Anarchy and social chaos, he feels, offer no possibility of social reform. 3. CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE DOES NOT CREATE WIDESPREAD DISRESPECT FOR LAW Elliot M. Zashin, NQA, CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE AND DEMOCRACY, 1972, p. 127. For the most part, these objections [to civil disobedience] assume that law and order is a basic requisite for any society, particularly a complex one. Civil disobedience, so the argument goes, cannot be justified because it threatens those conditions upon which the realization of any [sic] societal values and ideals rest, even though it may be motivated by commitment to the highest ideals of society. But although public disturbances have occurred occasionally when civil disobedience has been used, there does not seem to be any clear and cogent evidence that civil disobedience has actually encouraged widespread or significant disrespect for the law. CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE IS JUSTIFIED AS A MEANS OF LAST RESORT 1. CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE IS AN ACTION OF LAST RESORT Elliot M. Zashin, NQA, CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE AND DEMOCRACY, 1972, p. 129. By limiting civil disobedience to a last resort, its practitioners attempt to minimize the disorder which civil disobedience may produce. They do not want [sic] to risk weakening the structure of order and respect for the law unless there are strong reasons for doing so. Thus, they generally are willing to postpone civil disobedience until conventional methods are exhausted. 2. CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE IS JUSTIFIED WHEN OTHER CHANNELS OF DEMOCRACY FAIL Steven M. Bauer and Peter J. Eckerstrom, Professors of Law, Stanford University, STANFORD LAW REVIEW, May 1987, p. 1184. Civil disobedience as a form of public expression possesses its greatest utility and legitimacy when orthodox channels of democratic participation have failed. Only then is it needed; only then is it morally acceptable. 3. CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE IS JUSTIFIED WHEN TRADITIONAL POLITICAL REMEDIES FAIL Elliot M. Zashin, NQA, CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE AND DEMOCRACY, 1972, p. 223. If one responds that the minority has a right to attempt to influence the majority and that conventional political methods often do not provide the minority with a real opportunity to do that, then one has essentially moved to the argument that institutional channels are not really available to certain groups of protestors. This argument seems a more solid grounding for the justification of civil disobedience and nonviolent direct action. 105 THE PURPOSE OF CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE IS TO CREATE JUSTICE 1. TEST FOR CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE IS JUSTICE, NOT LAW Howard Zinn, Professor Emeritus, Spelman College, DECLARATIONS OF INDEPENDENCE, 1990, p. 128. The principles I am suggesting for civil disobedience is not that we must tolerate all disobedience to law, but that we refuse an absolute obedience [sic] to the law. The ultimate test is not law, but justice. This troubles many people, because it gives them a heavy responsibility, to weigh social acts by their moral consequences. 2. CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE IS ROOTED IN THE BELIEF OF ACHIEVING IDEAL JUSTICE Elliot M. Zashin, NQA, CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE AND DEMOCRACY, 1972, p. 127-8. Many members of the public may not be able to recognize that civil disobedience places a higher value on the ideal justice; instead, they may see only that it shows disrespect for the law. Proponents of civil disobedience cannot ignore the very real dilemmas that pubic lack of understanding about the nature of civil disobedience creates, but the fact that the public does not immediately grasp their intent is not a conclusive argument against civil disobedience. For civil disobedience, by its very nature, is directed toward making practitioners, adversaries, and bystanders, more aware of and sensitive to transcendent ideals and present injustices. Civil disobedients try to communicate that they place a higher value on an ideal justice and that ultimately their acts may lead to greater respect for law by bringing law and justice closer together. 3. CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE IS JUSTIFIED TO REMEDY INJUSTICE Henry David Thoreau, American Moral Philosopher, WALDEN AND OTHER WRITINGS OF HENRY DAVID THOREAU, 1965, p. 664. If the injustice is part of the necessary friction of the machine of government, let it go: perchance it will wear smooth,—certainly the machine will wear out. If the injustice has a spring, or a pulley, or a rope, or a crank, exclusively for itself, then perhaps you may consider whether the remedy will not be worse than the evil; but if it is of such a nature that it requires you to be the agent of injustice to another, then, I say, break the law. Let your life be a counter friction to stop the machine. What I have to do is to see, at any rate, that I do not lend myself to the wrong which I condemn. THREAT OF VIOLENCE CREATES A CIVIL SOCIETY 1. THREAT OF VIOLENCE GUARANTEES NONVIOLENT SOCIETY Alvin Toffler, Author, POWERSHIFT, 1990, p. 15. No one doubts that violence—embodied in the mugger’s switchblade or a nuclear missile—can yield awesome results. The shadow of violence or force, embedded in the law, stands behind every act of government, and in the end every government relies on soldiers and police to enforce [sic] its will. This ever-present and necessary threat of official violence in society helps keep the system operating, making ordinary business contracts enforceable, reducing crime, providing machinery for the peaceful settlement of disputes. In this paradoxical sense, it is the veiled threat of violence that helps make daily life nonviolent. THERE IS NO ALTERNATIVE TO WARFARE IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA 1. THERE IS NO ALTERNATIVE TO WARFARE IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA Hannah Arendt, Social Philosopher, CRISES OF THE REPUBLIC, 1972, p. 107. The chief reason warfare is still with us is neither a secret death wish of the human species, nor an irrepressible instinct of aggression, nor, finally and more plausibly, the serious economic and social dangers inherent in disarmament, but the simple fact that no substitute for this final arbiter in international affairs has yet appeared on the political scene. Was not Hobbes right when he said: “Covenants without swords, are but words?” 106 Causality Good CAUSALITY IS NECESSARY TO MAKE GOOD POLICY 1. CAUSALITY IS NECESSARY TO DETERMINE GOOD POLICY Jerald Hage and Barbara Foley Meeker, Professors at the University of Maryland, SOCIAL CAUSALITY, 1988, p. 1 Why should we be concerned with the problem of causality? One answer, we suggest, is that success of social intervention policies and the consequent credibility of social science depends on our knowing what the mechanisms are by which one variable changes another variable. We cannot make changes without understanding the reasons for a change having one effect rather than another, and the conditions under which the change we want may occur. We have, therefore, practical as well as theoretical interest in the “why” of social life. 2. CAUSALITY IS KEY TO MAKING POLICIES Jerald Hage and Barbara Foley Meeker, Professors at the University of Maryland, SOCIAL CAUSALITY, 1988, p. 2 A good causal theory will produce interesting empirical research hypotheses and statistical analyses and also social intervention policies. A poor (or nonexistent) causal theory will make empirical research and statistical analysis difficult to interpret, and lead to (at best) ad hoc and accidentally effective social intervention policies. 3. CAUSALITY IS NECESSARY FOR EFFICIENT POLICIES Jerald Hage and Barbara Foley Meeker, Professors at the University of Maryland, SOCIAL CAUSALITY, 1988, p. 33 Another reason why causality is so important is the need to develop better and more effective social intervention strategies that focus on social processes. This will lead to more credibility for the social sciences as well as to more effective social policies. CAUSALITY IS NEEDED FOR EDUCATION 1. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT IS ENHANCED WHEN WE LOOK AT CAUSALITY. Jerald Hage and Barbara Foley Meeker, Professors at the University of Maryland, SOCIAL CAUSALITY, 1988, p. 33 Social causes are frequently ignored in the development of social theory. As we have seen, there is some confusion in the philosophy of science about the concept. Causes occur in time prior to their effects and represent some mechanism or process which produces a change. These occur in a complex network of causal links. Types of causal link include direct, indirect, spurious and conditional, and may also include reciprocal and feedback processes, Typically in sociology we focus on state variables such as sex, age, income, centrality, size or complexity and do not explicate the causal mechanisms which relate the independent and dependent variable. The concept of social causality provides a useful service by calling attention to this neglected aspect of theory. Both theory development and empirical research will be enriched by considering questions of causality. 2. CAUSALITY IS NECESSARY FOR SCIENTIFIC THINKING Georg Henrik von Wright, Professor at Colombia University, CAUSALITY AND DETERMINISM, 1974, p. 1. I shall be talking here about one concept of causation only--but one which I think is of sufficient importance to merit this singular attention. Its importance, as I see it, has many dimensions. First, this concept of causation is important because of the role it actually seems to play in scientific thinking and practice, particularly in the experimental and natural sciences. Secondly, it is important because of the even greater role it has played in philosophy as an ideal or model concept. It has set a model to philosophers of what a scientific “causal explanation” ideally looks like. And it has lent support to an idea according to which the entire course of the world, or of nature, is subject to a rigid determinism under inexorable causal laws. 107 CAUSALITY IS A GOOD VALUE 1. CAUSALITY IS USEFUL IN PREDICTING OUTCOMES. D.M. Armstrong and Norman Malcom, Authors, CONSCIOUSNESS AND CAUSALITY, 1984, p. 138 The word ‘disposition’ here is a philosopher’s technical term. By ‘disposition’ is meant such properties of material objects such as brittleness, solubility, and elasticity. This rubber band is elastic. If a force is suitably applied it will stretch, and will continue to stretch as long as the force is readily applied. Remove the force, however, and it will return to its original length. It is important to realize that what we have here is are casual conditions. They tell us that if the band were acted upon in certain ways, then certain effects will result. Pulling on the band is a cause. It has the effect of stretching the band. The removal of the pulling agent is a further cause, which has the effect that the band returns to its original shape. 2. CAUSALITY MUST BE DETERMINED BEFORE ANYTHING ELSE. Jerald Hage and Barbara Foley Meeker, Professors at the University of Maryland, SOCIAL CAUSALITY, 1988, p. 13 One of the few features of causality that is generally agreed upon is that a causal process goes in one direction only, and that the action of the cause comes first in time. (Recall that theology, the idea that a cause is the end state toward which an event is heading, is not acceptable scientifically.) If we know the sequence in which events occur, we must take into account in establishing what causes what; the one that occurs second can never be the cause of the one that occurred first. CAUSALITY IS DIFFICULT TO DETERMINE 1. THE EFFECT OF SOMETHING DOES NOT ALWAYS HAVE TO HAVE A CAUSE. Myles Brand, Professor at the University of Illinois, THE NATURE OF CAUSATION, 1976, p. 68 Hume’s “official” view on this subject may perhaps be summarized as follows: To be is to be perceived. No connection is ever perceived between a cause and its effect. Therefore there is none. An “object” of kind A is called the cause of one of kind B if, in our experience, objects of kind A have always been followed each of an object of kind B. But such following of one object upon a certain other is not “necessary.” 2. THERE IS NOT ALWAYS A CAUSE TO AN EFFECT. Myles Brand, Professor at the University of Illinois, THE NATURE OF CAUSATION, 1976, p. 69-70 As to the first, if a man were so situated as always to have heard two clocks striking the hours, one which always struck immediately before the other, he would according to Hume’s definition of cause have to say that the strokes of the first cause the strokes of the second; whereas in fact they do not. 3. THERE IS NO REAL WAY TO DETERMINE CAUSALITY. Myles Brand, Professor at the University of Illinois, THE NATURE OF CAUSATION, 1976, p. 72-73 Hume attempts to meet this difficulty by saying that even then we had millions of experiments “to convince us of this principle, that like objects placed in like circumstances, will always produce like effects,” and that this principle then “bestows an evidence and firmness on any opinion, to which it can be applied.” By itself, however, this principle would support equally the generalizing of any sequence observed-of one which is accidental as well as of one which turns out to be casual. 108 Communitarianism Good COMMUNITY PROVIDES THE BEST UNDERSTANDING OF HUMAN NATURE 1. SOCIETY IS THE HIGHEST GOOD IN ALL INSTANCES OF HUMAN HISTORY Peter 1. Steinberger, Political Scientist at Reed College. LOGIC AND POLITICS, 1988, pp. 190-1 Briefly, according to these premises political society is, by definition, the realm of human interaction which governs all others; it is “sovereign,” it reserves to itself, so to speak, the right to regulate the remaining varieties of human interaction and, in principle, its reach can be as extensive as practicality allows. Wherever humans live together there is likely to be some such ultimate practice, in terms of which particular forms of social life are, according to the fashion, either actively regulated or generously allowed to operate without overt interference, and where the decision actively to regulate or not is itself subject to review and revision. This practice--however formulated and instituted—is the practice of politics conceived in the broadest possible terms and, as such, is the defining characteristic of political society. It follows, then, that all of our ways of living together are, at least in theory, subject to the claims and judgments of politics. 2. MUST VIEW COMMUNITY AND INDIVIDUAL AS A CONCEPTUAL WHOLE Peter 1. Steinberger, Political Scientist at Reed College. LOGIC AND POLITICS, 1988, p. 147 Thus, the rules and patterns of society and the individuality of the individual must come to fruition together. It is only in virtue of the other that each can, in Hegel’s term, attain its “actuality.” To approach them in their discreteness is to treat them abstractly, to miss the sense in which society and individual are in fact concrete elements of a concrete whole. 3. COMMUNITY IS RESPONSIBLE FOR INDIVIDUALS’ POWER TO REASON Peter J. Steinberger, Political Scientist at Reed College. LOGIC AND POLITICS, 1988, pp. 157-8 It seems that the “essence” which unites the laws and the individual can only be reason itself. Rationality is the basis of selfhood, of human freedom and subjectivity in the full sense, and the proper basis also of society’s institutions and practices. Thus, the link between law and subject, between community and individual, is more substantial than, say, bonds of either faith or trust; for these latter typically involve choices and judgments which are somehow incapable of being proven, which defy rational demonstration and which, as a result, could well turn out to be insupportable (whereby the bond itself would shatter). 4. INDIVIDUAL IDENTITY IS ALWAYS A RESULT OF THE COMMUNITY John Rawls, Philosopher at Harvard. POLITICAL LIBERALISM, 1993, p. 269 Now everyone recognizes that the institutional form of society affects its members and determines in large part the kind of persons they want to be as well as the land of persons they are. The social structure also limits people’s ambitions and hopes in different ways; for they will with reason view themselves in part according to their position in it and take account of the means and opportunities they can realistically expect. So an economic regime, say, is not only an institutional scheme for satisfying existing desires and aspirations but a way of fashioning desires and aspirations in the future. More generally, the basic structure shapes the way the social system produces and reproduces over tune a certain form of culture shared by persons with certain conceptions of their good. 109 COMMUNITARIANISM LIBERATES THE INDIVIDUAL 1. COMMUNITY IDENTITY IS NECESSARY FOR FREEDOM John Rawls, Philosopher at Harvard. POLITICAL LIBERALISM, 1993, p. 77 It is in their public recognition and informed application of the principles of justice in their political life, and as their effective sense of justice directs, that citizens achieve full autonomy. Thus, full autonomy is realized by citizens when they act from principles of justice that specify the fair terms of cooperation they would give to themselves when fairly represented as free and equal persons. 2. FREEDOM AND OPPORTUNITY REQUIRE A SENSE OF COMMUNITY Peter J. Steinberger, Political Scientist at Reed College. LOGIC AND POLITICS, 1988, p. 147 According to Hegel, then, the individuality of the individual is related to or composed of his capacity for freedom and reason. Fully exercising this capacity is, in turn, related to and dependent upon the institution of property, hence also on the institution of punishment (since, speaking conceptually, property requires crime which requires punishment). Thus, satisfying the requirements of individuality is shown to be contingent upon the successful establishment of certain rules and patterns of a social or legal nature. 3. SOCIETY IS THE BASIS FOR INDIVIDUAL SELF-WORTH John Rawls, Philosopher at Harvard. POLITICAL LIBERALISM, 1993, p. 203 A second reason political society is a good for citizens is that it secures for them the good of justice and the social bases of their mutual self-respect Thus, in securing the equal basic rights and liberties, fair equality of opportunity, and the like, political society guarantees the essentials of persons’ public recognition as free and equal citizens. In securing these things political society secures their fundamental needs. COMMUNITARIANISM DOES NOT LEAD TO TYRANNY 1. COMMUNITY IDENTITY IS ACCESSIBLE IN NON-STATE MEANS John Rawls, Philosopher at Harvard. POLITICAL LIBERALISM, 1993, p. 146 Justice as fairness assumes, as other liberal political philosophies do also, that the values of community are not only essential but realizable, first in the various associations that carry on their life within the framework of the basic structure, and second in those associations that extend across the boundaries of political societies, such as churches and scientific societies. 2. LIMITATIONS ON COMMUNITY POWER DO NOT INVALIDATE THE PRIMACY OF IT Peter J. Steinberger, Political Scientist at Reed College. LOGIC AND POLITICS, 1988, p. 191 Thus, the relationship of political society to the rest of social life as one of regulation, either intrusive or permissive, is by definition necessary and unavoidable. Of course, it may be that some aspects of social life are difficult or even impossible to control reliably. This only asserts a practical limitation, however; it in no way denies the fact that the purpose of political society is to determine, either through active interference or benign neglect, the ways in which we live together. 3. COMMUNITARIANISM GUARANTEES THE RATIONALITY OF LAWS Peter J. Steinberger, Political Scientist at Reed College. LOGIC AND POLITICS, 1988, p. 201 Finally, political society must in some sense be sovereign. As the ultimate manifestation of right, and the final determinant of our ways of living together, political society is by definition that source of rules and patterns above which there is no other. But this means that the claims of political society need to be legitimized explicitly in such terms. That is, its authority over the countless other institutions of social life--familial, economic, cultural, and the like--must be justified on the basis of some concept of sovereignty, so that its peculiar position in society can be clarified and defended. 110 COMMUNITARIANISM PROVIDES THE BEST MODEL OF SOCIETY 1. A WELL ORDERED SOCIETY REQUIRES UNITY John Rawls, Philosopher at Harvard. POLITICAL LIBERALISM, 1993, pp. 31-2 Moreover, in a well-ordered society supported by an overlapping consensus, citizens’ (more general) political values and commitments, as part of their noninstitutional or moral identity, are roughly the same. 2. COMMUNITARIAN PARTICIPATION IS NECESSARY TO PREVENT TYRANNY John Rawls, Philosopher at Harvard. POLITICAL LIBERALISM, 1993, p. 205 The idea is that without a widespread participation in democratic politics by a vigorous and informed citizen body, and certainly with a general retreat into private life, even the most well-designed political institutions will fall into the bands of those who seek to dominate and impose their will through the state apparatus either for the sake of power and military glory, or for reasons of class and economic interest, not to mention expansionist religious fervor and nationalist fanaticism. The safety of democratic liberties requires the active participation of citizens who possess the political virtues needed to maintain a constitutional regime. 3. COMMUNITARIANISM IS NECESSARY TO PREVENT SELFISH BEHAVIOR Peter 1. Steinberger, Political Scientist at Reed College. LOGIC AND POLITICS, 1988, p. 200 It must be emphasized that civil society is not to be understood as a regression, a step back from the sublime unity of the family. Rather, in civil society the individual comes to see even more clearly than before the degree to which his freedom and individuality depend upon rational self-awareness. Specifically, he comes to see that in pursuing selfish ends, he finds himself necessarily enmeshed in a system of complete interdependence wherein the livelihood, well-being, and legal status of one man is interwoven with the livelihood, well-being and legal rights of all. 4. COMMUNITY IS NECESSARY TO REALIZE JUSTICE John Rawls, Philosopher at Harvard. POLITICAL LIBERALISM, 1993, p. 146 Of course, in the well-ordered society of justice as fairness citizens share a common aim, and one that has high priority: namely, the aim of insuring that political and social institutions are just, and of giving justice to persons generally, as what citizens need for themselves and want for one another. It is not true then, that in a liberal view citizens have no fundamental common aims. 5. COMMUNITY MUST PROVIDE FOR CITIZENS’ NEEDS IN ORDER TO BE DEMOCRATIC John Rawls, Philosopher at Harvard. POLITICAL LIBERALISM, 1993, pp. 156-7 As I have said, the most reasonable political conception of justice for a democratic regime will be, broadly speaking, liberal. This means that it protects the familiar basic rights and assigns them a special priority; it also includes measures to insure that all citizens have sufficient material means to make effective use of those basic rights. Faced with the fact of reasonable pluralism, a liberal view removes from the political agenda the most divisive issues, serious contention about which must undermine the bases of social cooperation. 111 COMMUNITARIANISM PRESERVES INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY 1. COMMUNITARIANISM ONLY WAY TO PROTECT RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY Amitai Etzioni, Professor of Government at George Washington University, Founder and Chairman of the Communitarian Network, THE SPIRIT OF COMMUNITY, 1993, p.253. Neither human existence nor individual liberty can be sustained for long outside the interdependent and overlapping communities to which all of us belong. Nor can any community long survive unless its members dedicate some of their attention, energy, and resources to shared projects. The exclusive pursuit of private interest erodes the network of social environments on which we all depend, and is destructive to our shared experiment in democratic self-government. For these reasons, we hold that the rights of individuals cannot long be preserved without a communitarian perspective. 2. PRESERVATION OF INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY REQUIRES A COMMUNITARIAN PERSPECTIVE Amitai Etzioni, Professor of Government at George Washington University, Founder and Chairman of the Communitarian Network, THE SPIRIT OF COMMUNITY, 1993, p. 253. A communitarian perspective recognizes that the preservation of individual liberty depends on the active maintenance of the institutions of civil society where citizens learn respect for others as well as self-respect; where we acquire a lively sense of our personal and civic responsibilities, along with an appreciation of our own rights and the rights of others; where we develop the skills of self-government as well as the habit of governing ourselves, and learn to serve others--not just self. 3. COMMUNITARIANISM DOES NOT USE COERCION TO ACHIEVE ITS ENDS Amitai Etzioni, Professor of Government at George Washington University, Founder and Chairman of the Communitarian Network, THE SPIRIT OF COMMUNITY, 1993, p.253-254. America's diverse communities of memory and mutual aid are rich resources of moral voices--voices that ought to be heeded in a society that increasingly threatens to become normless, self-centered, and driven by greed, special interests, and an unabashed quest for power. Moral voices achieve their effect mainly through education and persuasion, rather than through coercion. Originating in communities, and sometimes embodied in law, they exhort, admonish, and appeal to what Lincoln called the better angels of our nature. They speak to our capacity for reasoned judgment and virtuous action. It is precisely because this important moral realm, which is neither one of random individual choice nor of government control, has been much neglected that we see an urgent need for a communitarian social movement to accord these voices their essential place. 4. COMMUNITARIANISM SEEKS A BALANCE BETWEEN RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS Amitai Etzioni, Professor of Government at George Washington University, Founder and Chairman of the Communitarian Network, THE SPIRIT OF COMMUNITY, 1993, p. 254. The basic communitarian quest for balances between individuals and groups, rights and responsibilities, and among the institutions of state, market, and civil society is a constant, ongoing enterprise. Because this quest takes place within history and within varying social contexts, however, the evaluation of what is a proper moral stance will vary according to circumstances of time and place. If we were in China today, we would argue vigorously for more individual rights; in contemporary America, we emphasize individual and social responsibilities. 112 COMMUNITARIANISM AND MORALITY GO HAND IN HAND 1. COMMUNITY DEFENDS MORAL STANDARDS OF ALL ITS MEMBERS Amitai Etzioni, Professor of Government at George Washington University, Founder and Chairman of the Communitarian Network, THE SPIRIT OF COMMUNITY, 1993, p. 255. A responsive community is one whose moral standards reflect the basic human needs of all its members. To the extent that these needs compete with one another, the community's standards reflect the relative priority accorded by members to some needs over others. Although individuals differ in their needs, human nature is not totally malleable. Although individuals are deeply influenced by their communities, they have a capacity for independent judgment. The persistence of humane and democratic culture, as well as individual dissent, in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union demonstrate the limits of social indoctrination. 2. COMMUNITY DEFENDS VALUES OF MORALITY AND JUSTICE Amitai Etzioni, Professor of Government at George Washington University, Founder and Chairman of the Communitarian Network, THE SPIRIT OF COMMUNITY, 1993, p. 255-256. For a community to be truly responsive--not only to an elite group, a minority or even the majority, but to all its members and all their basic human needs--it will have to develop moral values which meet the following criteria: they must be nondiscriminatory and applied equally to all members; they must be generalizable, justified in terms that are accessible and understandable: e.g., instead of claims based upon individual or group desires, citizens would draw on a common definition of justice; and, they must incorporate the full range of legitimate needs and values rather than focusing on any one category, be it individualism, autonomy, interpersonal caring, or social justice. 4. MUST LOOK TO COMMUNITY FIRST FOR MORAL VOICES Amitai Etzioni, Professor of Government at George Washington University, Founder and Chairman of the Communitarian Network, THE SPIRIT OF COMMUNITY, 1993, p. 256. History has taught that it is a grave mistake to look to a charismatic leader to define and provide a moral voice for the polity. Nor can political institutions effectively embody moral voices unless they are sustained and criticized by an active citizenry concerned about the moral direction of the community. To rebuild America's moral foundations, to bring our regard for individuals and their rights into a better relationship with our sense of personal and collective responsibility, we must therefore begin with the institutions of civil society. 5. COMMUNITARIAN MORALS NEEDED FOR COMPLETE CONCEPT OF RIGHTS Amitai Etzioni, Professor of Government at George Washington University, Founder and Chairman of the Communitarian Network, THE SPIRIT OF COMMUNITY, 1993, p. 256. The language of rights is morally incomplete. To say that "I have a right to do X" is not to conclude that "X is the right thing for me to do." One may, for example, have a First Amendment right to address others in a morally inappropriate manner. Say one tells a Jew that "Hitler should have finished you all" or a black, "nigger go back to Africa," or worse. Rights give reasons to others not to coercively interfere with the speaker in the performance of protected acts; however, they do not in themselves give me a sufficient reason to perform these acts. There is a gap between rights and rightness that cannot be closed without a richer moral vocabulary -- one that invokes principles of decency, duty, responsibility, and the common good, among others. 6. COMMUNITARIANISM PROMOTES RECIPROCAL SOCIAL JUSTICE Amitai Etzioni, Professor of Government at George Washington University, Founder and Chairman of the Communitarian Network, THE SPIRIT OF COMMUNITY, 1993, p. 256. At the heart of the communitarian understanding of social justice is the idea of reciprocity: each member of the community owes something to all the rest, and the community owes something to each of its members. Justice requires responsible individuals in a responsive community. 113 Communitarianism Bad COMMUNITARIANISM IS A VAGUE AND MISLEADING IDEOLOGY 1. AT LEAST THREE TYPES OF COMMUNITARIANISM EXIST: THEY ARE ALL EVIL J. Budziszewski, Professor of Government University of Texas at Austin, FIRST THINGS, March 1995, p. 22. Another way to explore the difficulty with "communitarianism" is to point out that there are at least three communitarianisms, each of which poses problems of its own. The demonic variety makes the community itself the source of value; the accountable variety submits the community to values of which it is not the source, but which can be identified by all; and the narrative variety submits it to values of which it is not the source, but which cannot be identified by all. 2. COMMUNITARIAN IDEAS SHIFT Pat Lorj, Representative of the New Democratic Party in the Canadian Parliament, Chair of the Government Caucus Committee on Employment and the Economy, "Communitarianism: A Legislator's Perspective," CANADIAN PARLIAMENTARY REVIEW, February 16, 1996, p. np, Accessed 5/14/98, http://parl30.parl.gc.ca/infoparl/articles/lorje_e.htm. In the excitement of embracing a "new movement", we must not forget a basic truth embodied in E.B. White's Charlotte's Web. Parents will recognize this cautionary tale of a curious and deep friendship between Wilbur, the very innocent pig, and Charlotte, the very wise spider. One line speaks to me and my ilk: "Wilbur ran again to the top of the manure pile, full of energy and hope." My re-election to a once honourable profession makes me keenly aware of the need to mix idealism and practicality as we trumpet the New Jerusalem. We need whisker-sharp antennae to know how far, and how fast to implement our ideas. If we are too far ahead of people, we lose. If we are too far behind, we atrophy. So, like Wilbur, politicians constantly run to the top of the manure pile, full of energy and hope. Indeed, many communitarian ideas certainly fill me with energy and hope that the partisan debate can be transformed to a discourse on effective improvements. Nevertheless, I have been around the political game long enough to be wary of the shifting nature of the pile where I stand. 3. COMMUNITARIANISM SEEKS TO OBSCURE FURTHER PROBLEMS OF NATURAL LAW J. Budziszewski, Professor of Government University of Texas Austin, FIRST THINGS, March 1995, p. 22. Now so far, the worst one could say about accountable communitarianism is that it hasn't taken its premises to their logical conclusion. It needs to declare what are the external and overriding criteria, based on shared human experience, that its qualified defense of communities requires; it needs something like natural law. But here we find ourselves in an extraordinary predicament. Natural law is far from unproblematic itself, and communitarianism is often regarded as a maneuver for getting around its mysteries rather than entering into them. 4. DEMOCRATIC POLITY IS NOT REALLY A "COMMUNITY" BUT LOTS OF COMMUNITIES J. Budziszewski, Professor of Government University of Texas Austin, FIRST THINGS, March 1995, p. 22. Now the polity is not a community in the simple sense, but a community of communities; not a hearth, but a vestibule. That means that many stories contend. Two things follow. First, any "communitarianism" feasible for the polity as a whole could be reached only by strategic mutual accommodation; second, it could be reached only among those communities whose stories were sufficiently related for them to find some common ground. For instance Catholics, Orthodox, evangelical Protestants, and religious Jews might be able to reach such an accommodation. One could say in this case that they had agreed about the precepts of the natural law. The problem is that secular humanists have their own "communitarianism"- a counter-accommodation, involving different groups, with different stories, sharing a different common ground-and these two communitarianisms are utterly at odds. 114 COMMUNITARIANISM DISRESPECTS INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS 1. COMMUNITARIANISM IGNORES NECESSARY INDIVIDUALISM Tibor R. Machan, Professor of Philosophy at Auburn University, Research Fellow, Hoover Institution, RES PUBLICA, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1995, p. 3. Should we embrace a new version of collectivism, for example, communitarianism, in order to recover us from the consequences of subjectivism? I don't believe that is necessary. Individualism has not had a full hearing. There are forms of it distinct from the version the classical liberal tradition inherited. The type of individualism I have in mind focuses on individual human beings. This humanist, ethical or classical individualism recognizes that there is in nature a class of human individuals. And their human nature has a lot to teach us about social life and personal ethics. It seems there are indeed good reasons to classify hum an beings as a distinct class of entities in nature. There is, however, also good reason to regard their individuality as one of their essential, central characteristics. 2. COMMUNITARIANISM IS COLLECTIVIST AND DOESN'T RESPECT THE INDIVIDUAL Tibor R. Machan, Professor of Philosophy at Auburn University, Research Fellow, Hoover Institution, RES PUBLICA, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1995,p. 3. All of this is especially important now, in the light of the recent economic and cultural demise of the planned economic systems of Eastern Europe. That their system has collapsed does not necessarily mean that one that embraces freedom is going to be successfully sold to them. There is competition here -- Western social democrats, or democratic socialists, are only too willing to rework their system, call it communitarianism, and sell it to the victims of Stalinist socialism. Unless individualism can be shown to be a sound position, it will not be successful in capturing the minds and hearts of those who have found its opposite, collectivism, practically impossible. One can always claim, after all, that collectivism has not failed but was merely misunderstood, misplayed, and it will now have to be tried again, the right way. In short, classical individualism satisfies the concerns expressed by many antiindividualist with the amoralism of the radical individualist based liberal social order. But this view retains a principled adherence to the ultimate value of individual sovereignty based on the moral nature (that is, the requirement of self governance) of human individuals in the bulk of their lives. 3. NAZISM IS A RESULT OF COMMUNITARIANISM J. Budziszewski, Professor of Government University of Texas Austin, FIRST THINGS, March 1995, p. 22. First, demonic communitarianism, the discredited ideology of the Volk or People, epitomized by Adolf Hitler and Joseph Goebbels. It was an idolatry, which like all idolatries eventually demanded sacrifices of blood. By treating the community itself as the source of value and the criterion of truth, the Nazis opened vaults of wickedness so vast that they have hardly yet been fathomed. Yet the problem was not chiefly that the Nazis were monsters. It was that their theory of value makes monsters of all who live it to its logical conclusion, be they angry German socialists or merely clever American relativists. Christians have a special responsibility to guard against the demonic sort of communitarianism, not only because the Church was so slow to condemn it the last time it reared its head, but also because on that occasion it drew strength from a specifically Christian heresy: the heresy of Jewish blood-guilt. 4. COMMUNITARIANISM FOR THE PRIVILEGED LEADS TO CYNICISM AND INACTION Pat Lorj, Representative of the New Democratic Party in the Canadian Parliament, "Communitarianism: A Legislator's Perspective," CANADIAN PARLIAMENTARY REVIEW, February 16, 1996, p. np, Accessed 5/14/98, http://parl30.parl.gc.ca/infoparl/articles/lorje_e.htm. My only caveat to the lure of communitarianism is one expected from an unapologetic social democrat: this movement, to succeed at all, must not rely simply upon attitudinal change. Economic change is equally important. Otherwise communitarianism will be seen as mere middle-class moralizing, and pompous rhetoric from those who already have their oar for the lifeboat. Enlightened self-interest is a tacky excuse for a social movement. Governments today come in two forms - maintenance, or change. The former simply props up the status quo of the privileged. This leads to bitterness, cynicism, and disdain for the political process. 115 COMMUNITARIAN IDEAS ARE PHILOSOPHICALLY UNSOUND 1. THE COMMUNITARIAN THESIS IS A FALLACY Alisa Came, Philosopher at Georgetown. NOUS, June 1994, p. 192 It simply does not follow from the social constitution thesis that we will as individuals view society and the good of others to be intrinsically valuable, let alone as a fundamental good; to infer from the claim that the individual is socially-constituted to the claim that his good consists in participating in and sustaining the community is, again, to commit a genetic fallacy--this time to infer from a claim about the origin of an agent’s values and motivations to a claim about the nature (or content) of those motivations and values. 2. HUMAN EXPERIENCE INVALIDATES THE PRIORITY OF THE COMMUNITY Robert Kane, Psychological Philosopher. PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES, Vol. 75, 1994, pp. 47-8 These conflicts create tensions that are reflected in appropriate regions of the brain by movement further from thermodynamic equilibrium which increases the sensitivity to micro-indeterminacies at the neuron level and magnifies these indeterminacies throughout the complex macro-process which, taken as a whole, is the effort of will. The agents experience these soul-searching moments as moments of inner struggle and uncertainty about what to do that are reflected in the indeterminacy of their neural processes. One now adds that when a person does decide in such situations, and the indeterminate effort becomes determinate choice, the person makes one set of reasons or motives prevail over the others then and there by deciding. 3. COMMUNITARIAN VIEW IGNORES OUR ABILITY TO CHANGE OURSELVES Alisa Came, Philosopher at Georgetown. NOUS, June 1994, pp. 194-5 At times, communitarians talk as if we cannot reject our roles and attachments: not only don’t we choose them (we “find” ourselves with them), but there is no “me” apart from them who can reject them (for they constitute me). Moreover, if this is the communitarian view, it is not a view the communitarian can coherently hold. For in our (western, democratic) society, though we may understand ourselves in significant part in terms of our roles, attachments, and community-sanctioned ends, we do not understand ourselves as forever stuck with the roles we inhabit, the attachments we have, or the ends affirmed by our communities. We understand ourselves as capable of distancing ourselves from them, if never entirely, and never all at once, at least sufficiently to take a critical look at them, question them, try to revise them, or even on occasion abandon them altogether. 116 COMMUNITARIANISM DESTROYS FREEDOM 1. PLACING COMMUNITY PRIOR TO INDIVIDUALS FEEDS TYRANNY Alisa Came, Philosopher at Georgetown. NOUS, June 1994, pp. 201-2 But we must ask how easily justice can be rendered useless in a society like ours in which our understanding of roles is very unsettled, and there is fundamental and often violent disagreement about the good. We must ask how well the family can serve as a model for a society in which many citizens are not bound to each other through ties of fraternity and benevolence. And we must ask just which “family values” we are to revitalize. When we stand in review of our tradition, what we see is a long history in which many forms of repression, discrimination, and abuse have been exercised against racial and cultural minorities, women, religious groups, and homosexuals. 2. COMMUNITARIANISM DECREASES EVERYONE’S RIGHTS Katha Pollitt, Columnist. THE NATION, July 25, 1994, p. 118 What is communitarianism, finally, but Republicanism for Democrats--Reaganism with a human face? It’s the perfect philosophy for our emerging one-party state: Travail, Famille, Patrie, plus campaign finance reform and paid parental leave. More volunteerism, less government activism; more “arbitration,” less access to legal redress; more police, less Bill of Rights. (Indeed, its affection for the expansion of police powers--curfews, checkpoints, ‘drug free zones” and such--is one of its salient features.) Although communitarians claim they represent a third way, neither left nor tight, look what they blame for America’s ills: not corporate capitalism, poverty, bigotry and inequality but “radical individualism.” 3. TYING FREEDOM TO COMMUNITY RESULTS IN A LOSS OF DEMOCRACY John Rawls, Philosopher at Harvard. POLITICAL LIBERALISM, 1993, p. 30 We can imagine a society (history offers many examples) in which basic rights and recognized claims depend on religious affiliation and social class. Such a society has a different political conception of the person. It lacks a conception of equal citizenship, for this conception goes with that of a democratic society of free and equal citizens. 4. COMMUNITARIAN7ISM PLACES WOMEN IN SUBSERVIENCE TO PATRIARCHY Katha Pollitt, Columnist. THE NATION, July 25, 1994, p. 118 Note (communitarianism) nostalgia for traditionally differentiated sex roles, its romanticized view of marriage and striking lack of interest in that institution’s darker side (domestic violence, for instance), its absurd habit of blaming family breakdown on women’s frivolous quest for self-development 117 COMMUN1TARIANISM IS BAD FOR SOCIETY 1. COMMUNITY VIEW IS DAMAGING TO A WELL-ORDERED SOCIETY John Rawls, Philosopher at Harvard. POLITICAL LIBERALISM, 1993, pp. 42-3 While a well-ordered democratic society is not an association, it is not a community either, if we mean by a community a society governed by a shared comprehensive religious, philosophical or moral doctrine. This fact is crucial for a well-ordered society’s idea of public reason. To think of a democracy as a community (so defined) overlooks the limited scope of its public reason founded on a political conception of justice. 2. COMMUNITY DESTROYS PLURALISM AND TOLERANCE Amy Guttman, Social Philosopher. NOUS, June 1994, p. 202 The common good of the Puritans of seventeenth century Salem commanded them to hunt witches; the common good of the Moral Majority of the twentieth century commands them not to tolerate homosexuals. The communitarian critics want us to live in Salem, but not to believe in witches. 3. COMMUNITARIANISM IS ELITIST AND INEFFECTIVE Katha Pollitt, Columnist. THE NATION, July 25, 1994, p. 118 (Communitarianism is) essentially a marketing device, a way for a dozen or so politically minded academics to magnify their public presence by marching under a common barrier. Poets do this all the time (cf. the New Formalism, the New Narrative, etc.), so why not policy types? This would explain why, for all their claims to be tough-minded, bold and challenging, they take no group stand on divisive issues that people actually care about-abortion and gay rights, for example. It would explain, too, why the whole thing seems to be all chiefs and no Indians. Have you ever met a rank-and-file communitarian? 4. COMMUNITARIANISM IS A PHILOSOPHY OF BLAME Katha Pollitt, Columnist. THE NATION, July 25, 1994, p. 118 Just as communitarianism allows its followers individually to see themselves as virtuous, it encourages them collectively to see what’s wrong with contemporary America as the fault of other people. It isn’t ones own divorce that causes social breakdown; it’s everyone else’s divorces. The communitarians like to speak of balancing rights with responsibilities, which sounds good, but somehow the objects of this tradeoff tend to be others: the young (curfews, national service), the poor (checkpoints in drug-ridden communities, work requirements for welfare), women (family values--and what about that silence on abortion?). 118 Community Good COMMUNITY SHOULD BE THE PARAMOUNT VALUE 1. COMMUNITY IS THE PARAMOUNT VALUE Carl J. Friedrich, author, THE CONCEPT OF COMMUNITY IN THE HISTORY OF POLITICAL AND LEGAL PHILOSOPHY, 1959, p. 3. Community has been a central concept of political and legal philosophy since its beginning. It has often served as a frame of reference even when not explored as such. From the well-known opening sentence of Aristotle’s Politics to the French constitution of 1958, community has served to designate the human group with which politics and law are concerned and to which all the characteristic phenomena of political life, power, authority, law, and the rest must be referred. Aristotle’s cautious teleological definition of the community (koinonia) as “aiming at some good” is later elaborated somewhat to suggest that it is a group of men having some values (customs, beliefs, interests) in common. 2. COMMUNITIES PROVIDE FOR PEACE Robert 1. Roth, Professor and Dean at Fordham University, PERSON AND COMMUNITY, 1975, p. 28. Secondly, one gets the persistent impression that for Hare peace is merely an absence of war or a cessation of hostility. But surely a truce or an armistice (cf. Richard M. Nixon’s “generation of peace” promise) does not secure a perpetual peace. Suppose that there were neither rationalists nor fanatics populating the political domain and that all men adopted the moral point of view. Would there then be peace? Perchance there would, but certainly it would not be guaranteed. Accordingly, Hare’s concern centering on the externals of how to “make the peace” or “keep the peace” rather than on how to “be at peace” or “live in peace” obscures the moral fundamental pursuit of peace which aims, not simply at removing certain logical difficulties preventing a condition of tranquil public order, but at restoring a personal sense of moral concord within the perimeter of community, a community of transcendental dimension. Doubtless, given the present world situation, we would all settle for the former, but if I am not mistaken, only the latter provides a lasting peace. 3. COMMUNITY IS THE HIGHEST GOAL OF SOCIETY Claes G. Ryn, author, DEMOCRACY AND THE ETHICAL LIFE, 1978, p. 82. Social life may be viewed as promoting a wide array of activities and corresponding values. These can be classed as ethical, intellectual, aesthetic, and economic, with politics defined as cutting across these lines. By a civilized society I mean one where these pursuits have attained a high level. Since the worth of everything must ultimately be judged by its contribution to the final purpose of life, civilization first and foremost signifies ethical attainment. The intellectual, aesthetic, and economic life of a society may be said to be truly civilized to the degree that these activities serve the ethical goal. While their respective values of truth, beauty, and economy (efficiency) have their own organizing principle or intrinsic standard of perfection, they fulfill their highest role only as they advance the purpose of the ethical 4. COMMUNITY SHOULD BE THE PARAMOUNT VALUE OF MANKIND Bernard Susser, author, EXISTENCE AND UTOPIA, 1981, p. 58. That man is a social animal is surely one of great truisms of the Western intellectual tradition. One noted scholar ties together all the elements of Aristotle’s celebrated doctrine comprehensively: “He (man) needs this community not only for self-preservation, security and perfection of his physical existence but above all because only in it is a good education and control of life by law and justice possible.” In Aristotle’s own phrase, humans live socially for the sake of “noble actions and not mere companionship.” Community is the indispensable background for the human telos--it provides the ‘paraphernalia’, the order and leisure requisite for the good life. As such, society and the state are ‘natural’ phenomena, that is, they emerge from the very character of humanity. 119 COMMUNITIES ARE MORE BENEFICIAL THAN NON-COMMUNITIES 1. COMMUNITY GIVES PEOPLE A HOPE FOR THE FUTURE Robert J. Roth, Professor and Dean at Fordham University, PERSON AND COMMUNITY, 1975, p. 58. In my account, the person has been construed as one who, in self-discovery--as he dwells in a community which, in turn, dwells in him--and with the collaboration of that community, reveals the truth about who he is. Such disclosure occurs through re-collecting: a process of gathering into coherence so that he knows he has a history and senses he has a future. In effect, he rebuilds for himself a past, and owns that past. No longer does it haunt him. On the contrary, it reassures him and stimulates his quest for new discovery. The Unconscious is an in-folding of imagery deriving from both the external world and his own inferiority. Residing within him yet wholly other to him, this Unconscious is a radical negation of all he explicitly is. Yet when deciphered it reveals itself as continuous with his awareness; and by this continuity, each person builds for himself a cosmology of inner and outer worlds as themselves a unity of harmonizing rhythms. 2. COMMUNITIES INCREASE EDUCATION Robert 3. Roth, Professor and Dean at Fordham University, PERSON AND COMMUNITY, 1975, p. 97. Dewey believed also that we are born without an appreciation of the value of social awareness. Hence the child as early as possible should experience the value of social living. That is what the lived experience of cooperative activity formed such an essential and indeed exciting part of his educational theory and practice. For Dewey, education must fulfill the vital role of giving the young the experience of living in community. 3. COMMUNITY SUPERSEDES INDIVIDUAL ADVANTAGES Claes 0. Ryn, author, DEMOCRACY AND THE ETHICAL LIFE, 1978, p. 85-86. In the context of community, the common good is not merely a code word for successful compromise between clashing self-interests. It refers to the element in human interaction which transcends private advantage. Such is the nature of living together at a level of some ethical nobility supported by general cultural elevation. This type of life, although personally satisfying to the individuals comprising it, does not need to be defended by arguments of selfinterest. It is its own justification. Whatever contributes to it can be supported, not because it happens to serve the interests of this or that individual or group, but because it fulfills intrinsically valuable existence. It is the societal end for which the civilized man knows that he is intended. In community, men have been brought together at a common center of values. In Aristotelian terminology that center is happiness or true friendship, in Christian terminology, love. 4. EGO AND COMMUNITY CAN LIVE HAND AND HAND Claes G. Ryn, author, DEMOCRACY AND THE ETHICAL LIFE, 1978, p. 86. It should be added that while community is the ethical goal of society, it is not to be understood as one which can be completely attained. That would presuppose the disappearance of selfish motives from the face of the earth. To the extent that it is realized, community will have to exist with egoism. Drawing on our previous discussion on the relationship between morality and self-interest, we can say that the pursuit of private disadvantage can never become morality. To a certain extent, however, it can be bent to fit the purposes of the moral life by the ethical forces of community in the surrounding society, which subject selfishness to a degree of control. 120 Cost-Benefit Analysis Bad COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS IGNORES MORAL ISSUES IN DECISION MAKING 1. COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS IGNORES MORAL COMPLEXITY IN DECISION MAKING John Martin Gillroy, Professor of Political Science, Trinity College, POLICY SCIENCES, Vol. 25, 1992, p. 96. If the individual is assumed by the policy-maker to have the ability to think morally, one might want to expand the concept of imperatives past the full use of the hypothetical variety and describe the individual making decision independently of the influence of his desires, on the basis of intellectually-approved principles, arrived at through reflection. If one is able to reason practically, and know when desire ought to play a role in decision-making and when it ought not, then we have a more complex mental model that has a distinct ethical component. However, this dualistic mind, with both ethical and non-ethical properties, is beyond the scope of the market model and costbenefit methods, which prescribe policy only for the one-dimensional man. 2. COST-BENEFIT METHODS IN POLICY MAKING RESULTS IN MORAL POVERTY John Martin Gilroy, Professor of Political Science, Trinity College, POLICY SCIENCES, Vol. 25, 1992, p. 98. The reality of the situation is that the policy-maker faced with a complex society, and without the possibility of getting at the distinction between true and manifest preferences (without a moral standard) will make assumptions about preferences to make his job easier. If he is convinced that the market provides a ‘moral high ground’ for the justification of policy, he will adopt a cost-benefit analysis relying on the assumptions that preferences, choice and the Potential Pareto Improvement are all related. In effect, he will ignore the myriad of problems and the moral poverty of this assumption and proceed to set up a cyclical argument as a justification for the application of costbenefit evaluation. 3. COST-BENEFIT METHODS IN POLICY MAKING INHIBIT ETHICAL CHOICES John Martin Gillroy, Professor of Political Science, Trinity College, POLICY SCIENCES, 1992, p. 100. Efficiency is an economic precept, not a moral principle, and therefore is not competition for, but must be justified in terms of, moral principles like autonomy, equality or benevolence. Considering the complexity and conflict present in the environment within which political choices are made, it is necessary to justify and evaluate these decisions in a way that does not presuppose that efficiency is the primary principle. Public policy must address the ethical questions of obligation, equality, cooperation and distribution as prior to considerations of efficiency. If autonomy is important as an independent moral ground for judging the ends of public policy, then it must be defined and justified for its context outside the market, for cost-benefit methods will reduce autonomy to a rational argument for efficiency based on assumed consent and personal preference. 4. COST-BENEFIT METHODS DO NOT MAKE MORAL DISTINCTIONS IN POLICY MAKING John Martin Gillroy, Professor of Political Science, Trinity College, POLICY SCIENCES, 1992, p. 99. Cost-benefit evaluation therefore has no independent moral justification distinct from its rational claims as a formal model of economic analysis with a foundation in efficiency and the Potential Pareto Improvement and is based on the primitive concepts of consent and preference within markets. It is therefore wrong to think of autonomy as a more fundamental normative basis for cost-benefit analysis or as a moral reason to justify the movement of market assumptions into the making of public policy decisions. There is no distinction between the ‘moral high ground’ and the ‘moral low ground’ of the rational efficiency justification. 121 OST-BENEFIT CRITERIA MUST DEFEND MORALITY OF EFFICIENCY 1. COST-BENEFIT PROPONENTS MUST DEFEND THE MORALITY OF EFFICIENCY John Martin Gillroy, Professor of Political Science, Trinity College, POLICY SCIENCES, 1992, p. 83. In order for market decision and evaluation criteria to transfer into the realm of political decision-making, its justification can no longer be based solely on efficiency as an economic standard, but an argument must be made that efficiency has moral weight, as a more universal and necessary ethical standard or principle. It is the claim, therefore, of those who would recommend cost-benefit methods, for policy-making, that this moral weight exists at a more primitive level than the rational argument for efficiency. 2. COST-BENEFIT METHODS ARE BASED ON ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS ONLY John Martin Gillroy, Professor of Political Science, Trinity College, POLICY SCIENCES, 1992, p. 100. To say that costs and benefits, in welfare terms, are all that morally count in making a public decision, is to say that any ethical variable that is not directly translatable into a monetary equivalent is of consequentially less importance to the outcome. To treat individuals strictly as consumers (rather than citizens, for example) limits the evaluation system to questions of consumption, when the real moral concern might demand that the case be considered from the angle of obligation or protection. 3. COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS CRITERIA ASSUMES EFFICIENCY IS THE HIGHEST VALUE John Martin Gillroy, Professor of Political Science, Trinity College, POLICY SCIENCES, 1992, p. 83. Those who would propose that the assumptions of the competitive market are adequate to the decision process in public policy, and who recommend cost-benefit methodology as the test of a policy’s adequacy, must also assume that efficiency has a deeper moral validity than merely its ‘rational’ economic nature in order for it to hold sway outside of the pure market context. 122 Court as a Vehicle of Social Progress Responses The Supreme Court of the United States interprets the Constitution and decides if legislation is or is not valid under that interpretation. The document itself, written well over a century ago, is not static. It is the changing and evolving nature of interpretation that has led many to see the Court as a vehicle of social progress. As Franklyn S. Haiman noted of the modern Court, “Happily, until now, a solid majority of the Supreme Court has not heeded the call of the Robert Borks, Antonin Scalias, and Clarence Thomases to accept an ‘originalist’ approach to the U.S. Constitution that would freeze its provisions into an eighteenth-century mold or tether its amendments to the environment that existed at the time of their adoption.”1 This attitude, combined with landmark Supreme Court decisions, has led many to believe that the Court is the place to turn to for a vehicle of social progress. However, such a strategy for social change is only one of a vast array of options. The following brief will make arguments as to why the Court is not the bastion of social progress that many herald it to be and should not be used by social movements in attempts to advance their causes. THE COURT IS RESTRAINED BY CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS Author Matthew J. Franck explains that the Supreme Court is theoretically constrained in their decisions by what material is included in the Constitution. This, he notes, is why there is a difference between political prudence and juris prudence. He makes a case against the Supreme Court, arguing that the term “statesmanship” should not be applied to justices on the Court. He defines statesmanship in the tradition of Morton J. Frisch and Richard G. Stevens as, “one who does as much good as he can get away with,” further clarified with, “removing the greatest amount of evil while disturbing the least amount of prejudice.” 2 This limitation of the Constitution means that the Court is not in the best position to advance social progress. Franck explains, “Already it should appear that statesmanship, by this definition, seems a task far more radical (in the original sense of that word) than judges reasonably be asked to perform....If the ‘excellent statesman...can and...will, if he must,’ take radical steps to save the regime-patient, it makes the most sense for someone other than even our highest jurists to do the cutting.”3 While it is important for the balance of powers that the Court’s power be limited to interpreting and ruling on constitutional matters, this does make it less powerful as a tool of social progress. Despite arguments about the Court’s increasing power over the last century, there are few if any who would argue that the Court does not still face limitations on its actions. Most would agree with Alexander Hamilton, who said that the Court, “has no direction either of the strength or of the wealth of the society, and can take no active resolution whatever.”24 The limited role of the Court was planned by the founders of this country. Franck notes the limitations on the Court, stating, “But we have never yet heard of the judiciary taking the nation to war or concluding a peace; of a judicial attempt at resolving the dilemma of the budget deficit...In short, the most ambitious practitioners and partisans of judicial power still appear to subscribe to some limits on that power, stemming less from limited ambition than from institutional realities, and those limits seem to be marked out largely by the difference between the realm of action and the realm of judgment.”5 Given this explanation of the limited powers of the Court, it is clear that social progress would be best fulfilled by an actor or actors with less limitations. The ability to create law (as opposed to interpret law) would best suit progress and advances. Thus, the legislature or the president could enact such changes that the Court could not. The Court is left perpetually in the position of waiting for an event or law that it can interpret. It has no authority to act without a challenge being placed before it first. Such a waiting game is too costly in a world where social advances could move at a quicker pace. Therefore, given the Court’s limitations; unless a social movement can phrase their demand as an explicitly constitutional issue that is currently being denied, the Court will be of no help. Even if the demand is articulated in that way, the Court has less power than other institutions to address it. THE COURT IS NOT RESPONSIBLE TO THE PEOPLE 123 The Court was specifically established to be outside the influence of the population as a whole. Justices are not elected and serve life-terms. However, this makes the idea of accountability elusive when it comes to the Supreme Court’s decision-making. The idea of accountability is largely based on the principles established by James Madison. This is key, as, “in the main, however, the Madisonian prescription has been directed to ways and means of government controlling itself- public government.”6 With no accountability to the people, the Supreme Court’s decisions lack not only validity, but oftentimes credibility. The best decisions would reflect the will of the people, as such decisions are most likely to be enforced and carried out. However, because there is no connection between the justices and the population as a whole, the Court can make unpopular decisions that do not reflect public attitudes on the Constitution and suffer no consequences for doing so. Such decisions, however, are difficult to enforce and may set social movements back. There are several levels at which the Supreme Court is not accountable to the people. First, the justices are appointed instead of elected. If a politician made a bad decision, she/he would not be re-elected (ideally). In that sense, the person is accountable because they must earn the votes for the next election. At a second level, the justices serve life-terms. These individuals cannot be removed from the Court for all practical purposes. Such permanency can cause justices to feel free to make decisions that the population would not support simply because they can. The most effective way to enact social change would be to win over the population. Given that the Court has little ties to the population and can actually fly in the face of public opinion, social movements would be better served to find alternative agents who are more connected to the population. THE COURT IS COMPROMISED BY POLITICAL REALITIES Ideally, the Court would make its decisions based solely on the Constitution itself. However, interpreting the Constitution leads individuals to come to very different conclusions. A person who abides by the doctrine of original intent, for instance, might form one opinion on a case; whereas a person who is a strict constructionist will reach another. Both people claim to be basing their opinions on the Constitution, yet reach differing conclusions. It matters, therefore, who makes up the Court in terms of what decisions get made. This process has been tainted by politics, which is supposed to not effect the judicial branch of the government. The selection of justices for the Supreme Court involves calculated political decisions. For instance, President Clinton nominated moderate judges Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen Breyer. As one author notes, “For all the sound judicial qualities of Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, it is clear that the President's selections were determined to a considerable degree by the desire to avoid a confirmation battle with Senate Republicans and conservatives.” 7 Since the selection of justices is effected by politics, therefore, the decisions that the Court makes are tainted. Social movements can therefore not expect decisions based solely on the Constitution. They must rather anticipate decisions that reflect the political atmosphere that existed when the justices were selected. This changing nature of the Court’s decisions makes it impossible to predict how the Court will rule without considering who is on the bench at that particular time. Given this unpredictability, social movements would be better served to find an actor that is consistent and does not fall prey to the political maneuvering of confirmation. THE COURT EXPRESSES BIAS BASED ON SEX It is important to consider the Court’s history in its treatment of social movements seeking advances. While there are undoubtedly numerous cases that advance social movements, the Court retains a bias based on sex. While the Court continues to apply strict scrutiny to cases involving race, they deny that very standard to cases based on sex or gender. First, it is important to note why strict scrutiny matters. Laws are rarely upheld under the strict scrutiny standard. The standard is applied to laws involving discrimination and suspect categories. As one author explains, “Under this standard of review...a court presumes a law to be unconstitutional, and, to undermine that assumption, the government must demonstrate that its legislation is the least restrictive means available to achieve a compelling state interest.”8 This standard is used in cases involving race, and as a result, has allowed major advances in the social movement aimed at eradicating discrimination based on race. 124 However, the Court has refused to apply this standard to cases involving sex or gender. In the case of Craig v. Boren, the Court showed the double standard it would continue to use on discrimination cases. In this case, Oklahoma passed a law that forbade the purchasing of alcohol by men until they were 21. Under the law, women were still allowed to buy low alcohol-content beer at the age of 18. Curtis Craig, a twenty-year old male who wanted to purchase beer joined with Carolyn Whitener, a beer vendor; to challenge this law. The case went all the way to the Supreme Court. Craig and Whitener argued that laws discriminating based on sex should be subject to strict scrutiny the way that cases involving laws discriminating on race were. They then argued that there was no compelling state interest in establishing differing legal drinking ages for men and women. 9 The Court did not apply strict scrutiny, and still today cases involving gender or sex discrimination are not examined using the test of strict scrutiny. This clearly shows that the Court does not look at this form of discrimination as equally serious to discrimination based on race. It would therefore be difficult for those pushing for advances in sex and gender equality to use the Court as a vehicle of change. THE NEED FOR MAJORITY TEMPERS COURT DECISIONS In order for a Court’s decision to be valid, a majority of the justices must agree. While this technically requires only a five person majority, decisions that show more consensus are often important if the issue is particularly controversial. In that sense, much of the work of the Court and the individual justices comes in creating a majority and reaching that consensus. This need for a majority, however, actually tempers the Court’s decisions. It makes the decisions more tame and middle of the road so that more justices can agree to the Court’s ruling and create a majority. A perfect example comes in the area of the proposed application of strict scrutiny to cases involving gender or sex. Justice Brennan, for instance, had made clear in the years leading up to Craig v. Boren that he felt strict scrutiny was merited in these cases. His opinion in Frontiero v. Richardson (1973) indicated that sex should be considered a suspect class, thus meriting strict scrutiny. Yet, in writing the opinion for the Craig case, Brennan abandoned this standard and adopted a midlevel approach to discrimination cases involving sex. The reason? Brennan, “acted strategically. He thought an opinion advancing strict scrutiny would have been unacceptable to a majority of his colleagues and that they would have pushed for a rational basis standard.”10 Unfortunately, Brennan’s concession is not an isolated case. As Epstein and Knight note, “Justices must act strategically if they wish to see the laws reflect, as closely as possible, their preferred positions.” 11 With justices focused on reaching a majority, decisions become more cautious and less likely to raise a stir. Caution, however, tends to fall with the established authorities and the status quo. Social movements are often calling for radical changes to the current state of affairs. This radical change is hampered by the need to temper opinions to reach majority. In that sense, social movements are harmed by the Court’s moderation. The Court cannot provide social advances that are hoped for because doing so would often be too controversial and not command a majority. DUE TO CHANGING INTERPRETATIONS, THE COURT IS NOT DEPENDABLE The Court’s changing membership over time means that interpretation of the Constitution varies over time with each new membership. Take, for example, interpretations of the 14th amendment. This amendment was first used to uphold the doctrine of “separate but equal.” The Court at the time felt that, “The Constitution does not require forced social equality of the races; if the civil and political rights of the races are equal, that is sufficient. Therefore, separate railroad cars for whites and colored are within the law if the accommodations are equal. The ‘separate but equal’ doctrine held firm for nearly sixty years.” 12 Later, the Court would use the 14th amendment in the case Brown v. Board of Education to apply to the states, and limit state power to run their own school systems. That decision explicitly ruled against “separate but equal.” While some degree of evolution is to be expected from the Court, this quality does minimize the effectiveness of the body as a vehicle for social change. Movements and advocates cannot predict the interpretation that the Court will advance. With such a moving target, it is next to impossible for groups to petition the Court in a manner that utilizes precedent to the fullest degree. More stable options, such as legislatures, should be utilized. In those 125 instances, legislatures can just pass a new law instead of changing the interpretation of a phrase or amendment. Such a straight-forward approach lets social movements know what to fight for and how to advocate for change. While it is not necessary to argue that the Court should not use evolving interpretations, it is key to note that this characteristic may hamper social movements in arguing before the Court. THE COURT HAS HISTORICALLY SQUASHED SOCIAL PROGRESS It is of course possible to point to instances where the Court advanced social progress. The case of Brown v. Board of Education, for instance, which ended the “separate but equal“ doctrine, certainly advanced the movement for racial equality in the United States. However, there are many instances in which the Court has hampered or squashed such progress. These historical examples give cause for distrust of the Court if a group is seeking social progress. Initially, the Court has often upheld atrocities due to either political pressure or lack of conviction. Author Arthur Selwyn Miller notes, “Some of those actions may have been extra-legal, and surely some were extra constitutional, but nonetheless they were accomplished- and with the acquiescence, silent or express, of the judiciary. Judges either upheld exercises of extraordinary powers; or they refused to rule upon them, often calling them ‘political questions’ not suited for courts; or the matters never got to court. Use of military forces in foreign adventures and to subdue the Indian tribes, suppression of the rebellion in the Civil War, savage repression of the ‘Wobblies’ and other labor groups- all of these actions and more either got judicial approval or were ignored by the judges.” 13 These examples provide instances of where the Court held social movements back. Second, in the area of expression, the Court has also hampered social movements. In the case of Gitlow v. New York, although the Court applied the 1st amendment to the states, Gitlow’s conviction was upheld because he was deemed a threat for espousing socialism. Similarly, in Abrams v. United States, a man writing socialist propaganda had his conviction upheld. The infamous Schenk v. United States, where a man was calling for people to avoid the draft, showed that anyone considered to be a “clear and present danger” could be stopped from expressing his or herself. In all of these instances, criticism of the government was effectively halted by the Court’s decisions. Their commitment to limiting expression makes it difficult for social movements to recruit members or to advance their cause. It is hard to draw attention to a problem if your discourse is not allowed. These cases and examples show that the Court in the United States has often stood for the opposite of social advances and progress. As such, it cannot be trusted as a vehicle for positive change, and must be rejected in favor of other avenues. This argument is strengthened by analysis about the Court today and in the past several decades. The examples about the Court squashing social movements have not stopped as time has continued. One author notes that the Court is moving even further away from advancing social movements. He notes, “Professor Aviam Soifer has shown that the Supreme Court's commitment is diminishing- not in so many words, of course, but by a subtle alteration in interpretive technique. Now the Justices inquire into the motive or intent of government officers, looking behind action that appears to discriminate to determine whether those responsible intended to do so.”14 It is far more difficult to prove an intent to discriminate as opposed to discriminatory results. Miller continues by explaining that the, “Justices have established themselves as a commission to read the minds of legislators and administrators- not, this time, for the ‘reasonableness’ of their actions, but, rather, for what they intended.” 15 This move by the Court has increased the difficulty of advancing social justice. “This is accomplished by placing the burden of proof upon those who contest the action to show discriminatory intent or motive. Since the mind-set of those who take such actions is seldom, if ever, written out, it is next to impossible to prove an intention to discriminate.” 16 In that sense, even the present and modern Court is establishing obstacles to social progress instead of helping it along. In light of such action, social movements must abandon the Court and seek alternative means of getting their agenda passed. THE COURT LACKS ACCESS TO IMPORTANT RESOURCES 126 As Alexander Hamilton himself noted, “The judiciary...has no influence over the sword of the purse...and can take no active resolution whatever. It may truly be said to have neither force nor will, but merely judgment; and must ultimately depend upon the aid of the executive arm even for the efficacy of its judgments.” 17 Montesquieu outlined the value of checks and balances and limited power. After his discussion of these functions of government, he said, “Of the three powers above mentioned, the judiciary is next to nothing.”18 These quotations reveal several resources that the Court lacks. Without such resources, even if the Court did reach a decision with the potential to advance social progress, they would not be able to follow through on such progress. First, the Court lacks money. Policies cannot be implemented if they are not funded. The Court could therefore make a decision requiring the federal or state governments to take an action to end discrimination. If doing so was expensive, the governments could just refuse to put up the money. The Court has no access to funding, and therefore the discrimination would continue. With no ability to fund the decisions that it makes, the Court is left at the mercy of other institutions that may or may not be able to afford or willing to afford the enforcement of the decision. Second, the Court lacks enforcement and power. This is perhaps the biggest resource that the Court lacks. Their decisions are all based on the voluntary actions of the government and the population. The Court’s decision that racial segregation in schools was unconstitutional had to be enforced by the president calling in the National Guard. There is no mandate that comes with a Supreme Court decision. The Court lacks any ability to enforce its decisions. If the president had decided, for instance, that segregation should continue, he could have not called in the Guard and the schools would have remained separated based on race. The fact that most previous decisions have been enforced is not a reason to depend on the Court, it is rather a reason to recognize the possibility that enforcement could not occur with every decision. Leaving social progress up to the will of the federal or state government’s ability and desire to enforce a Court decision is not solid enough to base a strategy for social progress upon. Access to the Court is also not free, and the resources are not provided by the Court. Lawyers must often be hired, and time invested into arguing before the Court is taken away from other activities that social movements would be engaged in. In that sense, the Court also lacks the resources to assist individuals who solicit their opinion or assistance. INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS ARE PREFERABLE The Court has thus far had limited interaction with international law and standards. Jeremy Rabkin notes, “This much is certain: international commitments have much more credibility than might have been thought possible only a few decades ago. The U.S. Supreme Court, it is true, has tended to take a rather cold and dismissive view of arguments grounded on international law.”19 The increased reliance on international standards in bodies except the Court has important implications for social progress. First, international law and standards provide alternatives to the Court as an actor. Social movements can call upon international actors and bodies to take action. This allows them to escape the problems of the Court that we have been outlining. As the world becomes smaller thanks to quicker travel and telecommunications, the world will also become more dependant upon international organizations and standards for guidance. It would therefore be wise for social movements to begin voicing their arguments and concerns in the language of international law to be best prepared for the future. Second, the Court’s attitudes toward international law and standards show its stubbornness and inability to adapt. International standards allow for the global community to rally around a cause and commit to advancing social justice. The Court’s refusal to recognize this powerful tool in moving social progress forward shows that it is not the superior actor for social groups and movements to turn to. International standards also provide a wider array of voices and opinions to assist the movement forward. The more people that are participating, the more diverse the array of opinions that will be able to compete and create the best standards. This focus on international standards also allows for not only a maximization of resources and people to participate, but also a maximization of those who will be effected by progress. The best way to help the most people is to look beyond a single country. Groups like 127 the United Nations and the European Union show that while internationalism is not perfect, it can work. Social progress would best occur through working with international standards. SUMMARY There are many reasons why the Supreme Court should not be relied upon as a means of creating social progress. Initially, the Court is restrained by Constitutional limits, limiting the issues it can address in advancing social justice. The Court is also not responsible to the people of the United States, minimizing accountability in decision making. The Court can be compromised by political realities, making its decisions less than favorable for social movements. This is further explained by the fact that the need for a majority in a Supreme Court decision tempers the verdicts. The ever-changing nature of the Court’s interpretations of the Constitution makes it anything but dependable. Social progress has been historically squashed by the Court, making it anything but a vehicle for social change and advances. The Court lacks access to important resources that could best enable social movements, including money and enforcement power. International standards not only provide an alternative to the Court, but are preferable. With so many problems found in the Court, it is clear that it is not the best way to achieve social progress and advances. ______________________________ 1 Parker, Richard A. Free Speech on Trial: Communication Perspectives on Landmark Supreme Court Decisions. Tuscaloosa: The University of Alabama Press, 2003, pg. 7. 2 Franck, Matthew J. Against the Imperial Judiciary: The Supreme Court vs. the Sovereignty of the People. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1996, pg. 21. 3 Ibid, pg. 22. 4 Ibid, pg. 23. 5 Ibid, pg. 23. 6 Miller, Arthur Selwyn. Toward Increased Judicial Activism: The Political Role of the Supreme Court. Westport: Greenwood Press, 1982, pg. 164. 7 McKeever, Robert J. Raw Judicial Power? The Supreme Court and American Society. Oxford: Manchester University Press, 1995, pg. 281. 8 Epstein, Lee and Jack Knight. The Choices Justices Make. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1998, pg. 2. 9 Ibid, pg. 3. 10 Ibid, pg. 56. 11 Ibid, pg. 57. 12 Carter, John Denton. The Warren Court and the Constitution: A Critical View of Judicial Activism. Gretna: Pelican Publishing Company, 1973, pg. 56. 13 Miller, Arthur Selwyn. Toward Increased Judicial Activism: The Political Role of the Supreme Court. Westport: Greenwood Press, 1982, pg. 164-165. 14 Ibid, pg. 91. 15 Ibid, pg. 91. 16 Ibid, pg. 91. 17 Carter, John Denton. The Warren Court and the Constitution: A Critical View of Judicial Activism. Gretna: Pelican Publishing Company, 1973, pg. 155. 18 Ibid, pg. 155. 19 Wilson, Bradford P. and Ken Masugi. The Supreme Court and American Constitutionalism. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1998, pg. 256-257. 128 THE COURT LACKS THE ABILITY TO ENFORCE ITS DECISIONS 1. COURTS REQUIRE THE SUPPORT OF OTHER POLITICAL ACTORS IN ORDER TO EFFECTIVLY MEANINGFUL SOCIAL CHANGE. Rosenburg, Gerald N., Assistant Professor of Political Science at University of Chicago, 1991. The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change. pg. 336-337. Courts will also be ineffective in producing change, given any serious resistance because of their lack of implementation powers (Constraining III). The structural constraints of the Constrained Court view, built into the American judicial system, make courts virtually powerless to produce change. They must depend on the actions of others for their decisions to be implemented. With civil rights, little changed until the federal government became involved. With women’s rights, we still lack a serious government effort, and stereotypes that constrain women’s opportunities remain powerful. Similarly, the uneven availability of access to legal abortion demonstrates the point. Where there is local hostility to change, court orders will be ignored. Community pressure, violence or threats of violence, and lack of market response all serve to curtail actions to implement court decisions. This finding, too, appears applicable across all fields. 2. THE COURTS LACK THE POWER TO ENFORCE THEIR DECISIONS THUS CAN”T ACCOMPLISH SIGNINFICANT SOCIAL REFORM Rosenburg, Gerald N., Assistant Professor of Political Science at University of Chicago, 1991. The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change. pg. 15-16. For courts, or any other institution, to effectively produce significant social reform, they must have the ability to develop appropriate policies and the power to implement them. This, in turn, requires a host of tools that courts, according to proponents of the Constrained Court view, lack. In particular, successful implementation requires enforcement powers. Court decisions, requiring people to act, are not self-executing. But as Hamilton pointed out two centuries ago in The Federalist Papers (1787-88), courts lack such powers. Indeed, it is for this reason more than any other that Hamilton emphasized the courts’ character as the least dangerous branch. Assuaging fears that the federal courts would be a political threat, Hamilton argued in Federalist 78 that the judiciary “has no influence over either the sword or the purse; no direction either of the strength or of the wealth of the society; and can take no active resolution whatever. It may truly be said to have neither FORCE nor WILL, but merely judgment; and must ultimately depend upon the aid of the executive arm even for the efficacy of its judgments” (The Federalist Papers 1961, 465). Unlike Congress and the executive branch, Hamilton argued, the federal courts were utterly dependent on the support of the other branches and elite actors. In other words, for Court orders to be carried out, political elites, electoral accountable, must support them and act to implement them. Proponents of the Constrained Court view point to historical recognition of this structural “fact” of American political life by early Chief Justices John Jay and John Marshall, both of whom were acutely aware of the Court’s limits. President Jackson recognized these limits, too, when he reputedly remarked about a decision with which he did not agree, “John Marshall has made his decision, now let him enforce it.” More recently, the unwillingness of state authorities to follow court orders, and the need to send federal troops to Little Rock, Arkansas, to carry them out, makes the same point. Without elite support (the federal government in this case), the Court’s orders would have been frustrated. While it is clear that courts can stymie change (Paul 1960), though ultimately not prevent it (Dahl 1957; Nagel 1965; Rosenburg 1985). The Constitution, in the eyes of the Constrained Court view, appears to leave the courts few tools to insure that their decisions are carried out. 129 COURT ACTIVISM BACKLASHES 1. ACTIVISM BY THE COURT DESTROYS ANY HOPE FOR BRINGING ABOUT PROGRESSIVE SOCIAL CHANGE Nowlin, Jack Wade, Assistant Professor of Law at University of Mississippi, 2001. “The Constitutional Illegitimacy of Expansive Judicial Power: A Populist Structural Interpretive Analysis.” Kentucky Law Journal . 1989. pg. 465-466. The reemergence of expansive judicial power in the post-war Roe era (in even more radical form) prompted another wave of criticism- this time, predictably, from the political right. Indeed, the Warren Court’s judicial activism helped to divide the New Deal coalition in the 1960s, driving many populists, communitarians, and social conservatives into the Republican Party. It also inspired Richard Nixon to advocate what he called “strict construction” of the Constitution. And Ronald Reagan to endorse “originalist” interpretive methods, both intended as means to curb judicial discretion and limit judicial policy-making. Finally, the Republican Party of the 1990s, following the lead of Nixon and Reagan, remained steadfastly opposed to the most expansive conceptions of judicial power and committed to the nomination of proponents of judicial restraint to the federal judiciary. Numerous neo-conservative communitarians and left-wing populist intellectuals also oppose the judicial usurpation of politics. All of these observations suggest a continuing, long-standing, and vibrant strain in the American political tradition of principled opposition to more expansive forms of judicial power. Of course, these strong counter-traditions undercut substantially any claim that sweeping judicial power has now achieved consensus-based popular support. 2. JUDICIAL MINAMILISM IS KEY Nowlin, Jack Wade, Assistant Professor of Law at University of Mississippi, 2001. “The Constitutional Illegitimacy of Expansive Judicial Power: A Populist Structural Interpretive Analysis.” Kentucky Law Journal . 1989. pg. 394-395. Contemporary debates about judicial power center around two broad rival visions of the proper role for courts in the American constitutional design. What may be termed the judicial minimalist vision envisages proper exercise of judicial review as one that is firmly grounded in traditional legal materials, that minimizes the political discretion of judges, that strives to be apolitical, that shows considerable deference to the judgment of democratic political actors, and that results in a set of fairly "thin" and consensus-based, judicially-enforceable constitutional norms. Some of the most obvious exemplars of this view of the judicial role among American judges would include Oliver Wendell Holmes, Learned Hand, Benjamin Cardozo, Felix Frankfurter, John Marshall Harlan III, and William Rehnquist. A broad definition of minimalism would also include originalist judges, such as Robert Bork and Antonin Scalia, who justify judicial originalism primarily as a means of limiting judicial discretion and preserving the contours of the constitutional design. Under this judicial minimalist vision, greater discretionary political authority is exercised by voters and their elected representatives in accordance with the constitutional norms of representation, separation of powers, bicameralism, presentment, and federalism. Less discretionary power, comparatively speaking, is exercised by unelected federal judges, given the strict limits this view places on more aggressive forms of judicial review. This conception of the constitutional design might then also be fairly called a "populist," "democratic," "republican," or "federalist" understanding. 130 THE COURTS ARE LIMITED BY THE CONSTITUTION 1. THE CONSTITUTION LIMITS WHAT COURTS CAN “DO” Nowlin, Jack Wade, Assistant Professor of Law at University of Mississippi, 2001. “The Constitutional Illegitimacy of Expansive Judicial Power: A Populist Structural Interpretive Analysis.” Kentucky Law Journal . 1989. pg. 397-398. In fact, one cannot really answer the question of what judges should "do" about the Bill of Rights and Fourteenth Amendment until one has answered a much more fundamental, structural-interpretive question: What is the proper role of courts within the American constitutional design, including the legitimate scope and constitutional limits of the judicial power? This approach to the question of the proper judicial function would ask, in essence, whether the design of the Constitution can fairly be read as granting "expansive" power to the Supreme Court or, by contrast, power of some more limited degree. Therefore, this question of the limits of judicial power, rightly understood, is a question of both constitutional structure and constitutional interpretation. It thus requires a structural interpretation of the American constitutional design, an attempt to discern constitutional meaning as it relates to the distribution of power among the institutions of government, which in turn requires careful consideration of the Constitution's various structural strategies for protecting the rights of individuals. Indeed, the question of the proper judicial role is also, as a question of constitutional interpretation, one logically antecedent to specific, second order questions such as judicial interpretation of the Bill of Rights or Fourteenth Amendment. Indeed, one simply cannot decide, at least properly so, how the Supreme Court should interpret the Bill of Rights until after one has considered the questions of the proper role of the judiciary in the American constitutional design, of what the Court is properly "to do" within the framework of government, and of the proper scope and constitutional limits of the judicial power. A court can scarcely premise an exercise of the judicial power on a particular conception of the judicial role without first determining if that conception of the judicial role is itself justified as a matter of structural constitutional interpretation. Moreover, this question is not purely or even largely a matter of prudence or political philosophy, as so often has been assumed, for the obvious reason that the Court may not exercise governmental power that exceeds the scope of the limited powers granted to it by the Constitution. Therefore, the difficulties of structural constitutional interpretation must be confronted and engaged rather than avoided or circumvented, and one's moral-political judgments about the judicial role must be placed in an interpretive context. As will be described, any plausible interpretation of the constitutional design must be firmly grounded in a "fit" analysis of traditional legal materials, and therefore a moral-political analysis must take a subordinate role to a legal-historical one. 2. WHEN THE COURT GOES OUTSIDE ITS CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS THAT DELEGITMIZES THE CONSTITUTION AND THE RIGHTS IT PROTECTS Nowlin, Jack Wade, Assistant Professor of Law at University of Mississippi, 2001. “The Constitutional Illegitimacy of Expansive Judicial Power: A Populist Structural Interpretive Analysis.” Kentucky Law Journal . 1989. pg. 467. Clearly, this radical and somewhat haphazard expansion in judicial power constitutes a veritable revolution in the American governmental practice, altering fundamentally the role of courts, the nature of our design for government, the Constitution's basic plan for the structural protections of rights, and the popular, republican, and federal character of the American constitutional design. Moreover, while there is good reason to suppose that routine use of judicial review and judicial enforcement of the Bill of Rights and Fourteenth Amendment have today achieved some sort of "populist" support, it is also obvious that the most expansive conceptions of the judicial role, including the use of aggressive, politically-driven, highly discretionary judicial "veto" power, remain very controversialrendering the charge of illegitimate judicial "usurpation of power" a regular term of political discourse. In particular, then, there is good reason to suppose that the most controversial aspects of this expansion have seriously undermined the Constitution's original strategy of protecting rights by establishing democratic institutions, diffusing political power, and encouraging civic virtue among citizens. As discussed, the exercise of such a sweeping judicial power tends to erode fundamental constitutional norms and, for these reasons, the exercise of such a power by the courts continues to be contested as an illegitimate encroachment upon the constitutional authority of legislatures. In sum, the constitutional legitimacy of expansive judicial power remains seriously in question. 131 COURTS CAN’T ACCOMPLISH SOCIAL CHANGE 1. THE COURT SYSTEM CAN’T PRODUCE SOCIAL CHANGE Rosenburg, Gerald N., Assistant Professor of Political Science at University of Chicago, 1991. The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change. pg. 93. The courts were ineffective in producing significant social reform in civil rights in the first decade after Brown for three key reasons captured in the constraints of the Constrained Court view. First, political leadership at the national, state, and local levels was arrayed against civil rights, making implementation of judicial decisions virtually impossible. Second, the culture of the South was segregationist, leaving the courts with few public supporters. In response, and after several tries at ordering change, the courts backed on and bided their time, waiting for the political and social climate to change. Third, the American court system itself was designed to lack implementation powers, to move slowly, and to be strongly tied to local concerns. The presence of these constrains made the success of litigation for significant social reform virtually impossible. The fact that little success was achieved should have surprised no one. 2. ON BALANCE, THE COURT DOES NOT AND CANNOT PRODUCE SIGNIFICANT SOCIAL REFORM Rosenburg, Gerald N., Assistant Professor of Political Science at University of Chicago, 1991. The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change. pg. 21. To sum up, the Constrained Court view holds that litigants asking courts for significant social reform are faced with powerful constraints. First, they must convince courts that the rights they are asserting are required by constitutional or statutory language. Given the limited nature of constitutional rights, the constraints of legal culture, and the general caution of the judiciary, this is no easy task. Second, courts are wary of stepping too far out of the political mainstream. Deferential to the federal government and potentially limited by congressional action, courts may be unwilling to take the heat generated by politically unpopular rulings. Third, if these two constraints are overcome and cases are decided favorably, litigants are faced with the task of implementing the decisions. Lacking powerful tools to force implementation, court decisions are often rendered useless given much opposition. Even if litigators seeking significant social reform win major victories in court, in implementation they often turn out to be worth very little. Borrowing the words of Justice Jackson from another context, the Constrained Court view holds that court litigation to produce significant social reform may amount to little more than “a teasing illusion like a munificent bequest in a pauper’s will” (Edwards v. California 1941, 186). 3. BROWN DIDN’T EFFECT CIVIL RIGHTS LEGISLATION Rosenburg, Gerald N., Assistant Professor of Political Science at University of Chicago, 1991. The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change. pg. 120-121. In Congress, there is little evidence that Brown played any appreciable role. The seemingly endless congressional debates, with some four million words uttered in the Senate alone (Whalen 1985, 193) hardly touched on the case. References to Brown can be found on only a few dozen out of many thousands of pages of Senate debate. While much of the focus of the debate was on the constitutionality of the proposed legislation, and on the Fourteenth Amendment, the concern was not with how Brown made such a bill possible. Even in the debates over the fund cutoff provisions, Brown was seldom mentioned (Berman 1966: Orfield 1969, 33-45: Whalen 1985: Graham 1990, 8282). This is particularly surprising since, as Condition IV suggests, it would have been very easy for pressured and uncertain members of Congress to shied their actions behind the constitutional mandate announced by the Court, That they did not credit the Court with affecting their decisions prevents the debates from providing evidence for the indirect-effects thesis. Thus, there does not appear to be evidence for the influence of Brown on legislative action. 132 Cultural Relativism Good CULTURAL RELATIVISM IS A VALID VALUE 1. STANDARDS AND VALUES ARE RELATIVE TO THEIR CULTURES Tracy E. Higgins, Associate Professor of Law Fordham University, HARVARD WOMEN’S LAW JOURNAL, Spring, 1996, P. 92. The debate over the universality of human rights is almost as old as the movement toward universal human rights standards in international law. Following World War II, as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was being drafted, the Executive Board of the American Anthropological Association (AAA) warned that the Declaration would be “a statement of rights conceived only in terms of the values prevalent in the countries of Western Europe and America.” The Board added that “standards and values are relative to the culture from which they derive” and thus “what is held to be a human right in one society may be regarded as anti-social by another people.” - 2. CULTURAL RELATIVISM IS OF HIGH VALUE IN THEORY AND SUBSTANCE Katherine M. Culliton, Fulbright Grantee, Washington College of Law Valedictorian, OAS Grantee Inter-American Institute for Human Rights, CASE WESTERN RESERVE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, Spring/Summer, 1994, p. 193 Cultural relativism has high value, in both theory and substance, when used as a tool to overcome imperialism and ensure that international policymakers listen to, respect, and include the decisions and values of people from lesspowerful nations. It can also be used as a tool to enlighten Western or Northern peoples to the benefits of other cultures. - 3. RELATIVISM IS SKEPTICAL ABOUT THE EXISTENCE OF UNIVERSAL NORMS Tracy E. Higgins, Associate Professor of Law Fordham University, HARVARD WOMEN’S LAW JOURNAL, Spring, 1996, p. 96. Generally speaking, however, cultural relativists are committed to one or both of the following premises: that knowledge and truth are culturally contingent, creating a barrier to cross-cultural understanding; and that all cultures are equally valid. Combined with the empirical observation of cultural diversity worldwide, these two premises lead to the conclusion that human rights norms do not transcend cultural location and cannot be readily translated across cultures. The two premises of cultural relativism deprive human hghts advocates of both a transcendent justification for human rights standards (i.e., notwithstanding disagreement, human rights exist as a product of the human condition) and a hope for consensus (by bridging the barriers of cultural difference). Cultural relativism raises the possibility that the category “human” is no longer sufficient to enable cross-cultural assessment of human practices or the actions of states. - 4. RELATIVISM SIMPLY SHIFTS THE FRAMEWORK OF MORAL EVALUATION Allan F. Hanson, Professor of Anthropology at the University of Kansas, TIKKUN, November 21, 1995, p. 63. D’Souza’s argument that relativist-inspired antiracism has impeded progress toward racial equality is not simply inflammatory and insulting to African Americans; it is intellectually untenable. It does not hold water even if one accepts his notions about relativism. In his view, a relativist would argue that evaluations of cultural institutions should be made only from within. But it does not follow that the outcome of all such internal judgments will be favorable. It is commonplace for communities, applying their own standards, to debate the morality or effectiveness of certain customs and institutions and ultimately to reject them. 133 CULTURAL RELATIVISM IS NOT AN UNDESIRABLE VALUE 1. CULTURAL RELATIVISM IS NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR RACISM Allan F. Hanson, Professor of Anthropology at the University of Kansas, TIKKUN, November 21, 1995, p. 63. D’Souza’s most preposterous argument is that relativism is responsible for contemporary racism, in both its Black and white varieties. The white racist reasons from a relativist set of assumptions, says D’Souza: Every culture is equally valuable and entitled to respect, including “white culture.” Therefore, white people have as much reason to cherish their culture as anyone else. A thing of unique value, white culture merits protection against inroads from other cultures. Immigration, integration in neighborhoods and schools, and multiculturalism should be resolutely opposed as alien threats to white cultural distinctiveness. Replace the word “white” with “Black” in the foregoing sentences, and you have D’Souza’s rendition of Black racism and the promotion of racial separation found in some versions of Afrocentrism and the teachings of the Black Muslims. The claim that these forms of racism draw their inspiration from cultural relativism is outlandish. Racism in all its forms encourages an essentialist focus, valorization of one’s own culture above all others. Nothing could be more opposed to cultural relativism, which encourages an open, expansive approach to all cultures. 2. THE FEMINIST CRITIQUE OF CULTURAL RELATIVISM EXCLUDES WOMEN Tracy E. Higgins, Associate Professor of Law Fordham University, HARVARD WOMEN’S LAW JOURNAL, Spring, 1996, p. 101. In addition to criticism from cultural relativists, this cross-cultural approach to women’s oppression has not been immune from criticism within the feminist community. Such cross-cultural analysis depends upon very broad assumptions about women’s lives and experiences and therefore raises important empirical questions regarding the extent to which women’s oppression is similarly constituted across cultures. It also raises issues about the formulation of those empirical questions themselves. An essentialist approach generally begins with the experiences of white, middle-class, educated, heterosexual women. Such an approach tends to attribute commonly shared forms of oppression to gender and specific forms of oppression to other sources such as race, class, or sexual orientation. Consequently, an essentialist approach risks becoming a least common denominator approach, allowing relatively privileged women’s experiences to define the feminist agenda. This tendency, in turn, creates division among women. In short, when feminists aspire to account for women’s oppression through claims of cross-cultural commonality, they construct the feminist subject through exclusions, narrowing her down to her essence. And, as Judith Butler has observed, “those excluded domains return to haunt the ‘integrity’ and ‘unity’ of the feminist ‘we’.” - 3. THE CRITIQUES OF CULTURAL RELATIVISM ARE MISGUIDED Micaela deLeonardo, anthropologist, THE NATION, April 8, 1996, p. 25. The attack on cultural relativism, then, is of a piece with the entire New Rightist program: the hypocritical attempt to rewrite the American morality play, to lay claim to virtue through focusing on the mote in Others, eyes while ignoring the beam in one’s own. Certainly, moral principles are important. But claiming that “cultural relativism tells us there are no ultimate moral principles” is a canard. All that most of the practitioners of my benighted discipline have ever advocated is the attempt, from the bedrock of one’s own enculturation, to empathize with the moral logics of others. 4. RELATIVISM OPENS OUR EYES TO DEEP, HIDDEN ASSUMPTIONS Tracy E. Higgins, Associate Professor of Law Fordham University, HARVARD WOMEN’S LAW JOURNAL, Spring, 1996, p. 108. Joan Williams has explained the advantage of abandoning universalist arguments as follows: A steadfast refusal to appeal in any context to objective moral certainties has, in my view, more than epistemological significance. It offers us a chance to step back and examine the structure of our form of life, to assess the hidden costs of our ideals. How the ideal of universal brotherhood is inevitably hemmed in by the arbitrary lines that people draw to define, and ultimately to limit, the scope of their moral responsibility. - 134 Cultural Relativism Bad CULTURAL RELATIVISM IS PHILOSOPHICALLY INVALID 1 DISCRIMINATION AND OPPRESSION REQUIRE A RESPONSE REGARDLESS OF CULTURE Sandra D. Lane and Robert A. Rubenstein, Center for Bioethics, THE HASTINGS CENTER REPORT, May, 1996, P. 31. Although most anthropologists at the time appeared to consent to this cultural relativism, some rejected it. Julian Steward, a leading anthropologist of this period, wrote in the American Anthropologist, “Either we tolerate everything, and keep hands off, or we fight intolerance and conquest... As human beings, we unanimously opposed the brutal treatment of Jews in Hider Germany, but what stand shall be taken on the thousands of other kinds of racial and cultural discrimination, unfair practices, and inconsiderate attitudes found throughout the world? 2. CROSS-CULTURAL VALUE DISCUSSION IS POSSIBLE AND PLAUSIBLE Loretta M. Kopelman, anthropologist, SECOND Oyou PINION, October, 1994, p. 54. We need not rank values similarly with people in another culture, or our own, to have coherent discussions about their consistency, consequences, or factual presuppositions. That is, even if some moral or ethical (I use these terms interchangeably) judgments express unique cultural norms, they may still be morally evaluated by another culture on the basis of their logical consistency and their coherence with stable and cross-culturally accepted empirical information. In addition, we seem to share some moral values, goals, and judgments such as those about the evils of unnecessary suffering and lost opportunities, the need for food and shelter, the duty to help children, and the goods of promoting public health and personal wellbeing. 3. CULTURAL DIFFERENCE DOES NOT ABSOLVE MORAL RESPONSIBILITY Michael Agar, professor of linguistic anthropology at the University of Maryland, LANGUAGE SHOCK: UNDERSTANDING THE CULTURE OF CONVERSATION, Quill Press, 1994, p.58 If differences are just to be accepted, just to be investigated as an alternative reality, does that mean, for instance, that we have to accept the behavior of a Hitler as just another possible way of doing things? Is anything anyone wants to do okay, as long as it participates in an alternate system? Of course not. Linguistic and cultural relativism are methodological assumptions. They don’t mean a person abandons all moral standards. They do mean that a person confronted with a difference investigates and understands its role in an alternative system, whatever he or she may think of it in moral terms. 4. FEMALE CIRCUMCISION PROVES CROSS-CULTURAL MORAL JUDGEMENT POSSIBLE Loretta M. Kopelman, anthropologist, SECOND OPINION, October, 1994, p. 54. First, the fact that a culture’s moral and religious views are often intertwined with beliefs that are open to rational and empirical evaluation can be a basis of cross-cultural examination and intercultural moral criticism. Defenders of female circumcision/genital mutilation do not claim that this practice is a moral or religious requirement and end the discussion; they are willing to give and defend reasons for their views. For example, advocates of female circumcision/genital mutilation claim that it benefits women’s health and well-being. Such claims are open to crosscultural examination because information is available to determine whether the practice promotes health or causes morbidity or mortality. Beliefs that the practice enhances fertility and promotes health, that women cannot have orgasms, and that allowing the baby’s head to touch the clitoris during delivery causes death to the baby are incompatible with stable medical data. Thus an opening is allowed for genuine cross-cultural discussion or criticism of the practice. 135 CULTURAL RELATIVISM IS AN UNDESIRABLE VALUE 1. CULTURAL RELATIVISM JEOPARDIZES THE BASIC RIGHTS OF WOMEN Tracy E. Higgins, Associate Professor of Law Fordham University, HARVARD WOMEN’S LAW JOURNAL, Spring, 1996, P. 91. On the one hand, feminists note that culture and religion are often cited as justifications for denying women a range of basic rights, including the right to travel, rights in marriage and divorce, the right to own property, even the right to be protected by the criminal law on an equal basis with men. Women have much to lose, therefore, in any movement away from a universal standard of human rights in favor of deference to culture. - 2. RELATIVISM MASKS GENUINE OPPRESSION Elizabeth Powers, nqa, COMMENTARY, January, 1997, p. 23. Today, of course, this relativism-in-the-service-of-a-new-absolutism has contaminated far more than the upper reaches of academia and the fringes of the Modem Language Association. All introductory college courses, be they in literature, sociology, anthropology, religion, etc., have become shot through with the insights of deconstruction, and an afternoon of watching Oprah is enough to demonstrate how they have filtered down into the general culture. The goal of this new orientation is, ostensibly, radical human freedom and equality, without ties to oppressive institutions of any kind, especially not to the patriarchy, that shibboleth of social reconstructionists. But what deconstruction has really done is to banish, as nothing more than a set of arbitrary conventions, the moral promptings that lead people to notice oppression in the first place, and along with them the ability to distinguish true oppression from false. 3. CULTURAL RELATIVISM IS CAUSING THE BREAKDOWN OF AMERICAN SOCIETY Dinesh DSouza, John M. Olin Scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, COMMENTARY, November, 1995, p. 47. But the solution to an old problem has become the source of a new one. Cultural relativism now prevents liberals from recognizing a civilizational breakdown that is national in scope but whose effects are disproportionately felt by poor blacks. This breakdown is characterized by extremely high crime rates, the normalization of illegitimacy, an excessive reliance on government provision, and a contempt for the virtues of civility, discipline, and deferred gratification. If these trends persist and metastasize, then the American Century, which really began in 1945, will prematurely come to an end. 4. RELATIVISM BREAKS DOWN IN THE FACE OF CULTURAL AMBIGUITIES Loretta M. Kopelman, anthropologist, SECOND OPINION, October, 1994, p. 54. A related problem is that there can be passionate disagreement, ambivalence, or rapid changes within a culture or group over what is approved or disapproved. According to ethical relativism, where there is significant disagreement within a culture there is no way to determine what is right or wrong. But what disagreement is significant? As we saw, some people in these cultures, often those with higher education, strongly disapprove of female circumcision/genital mutilation and work to stop it. Are they in the same culture as their friends and relatives who approve of these rituals? It seems more accurate to say that people may belong to various groups that overlap and have many variations. This description, however, makes it difficult for ethical relativism to be regarded as a helpful theory for determining what is right or wrong. To say that something is right when it has cultural approval is useless if we cannot identify the relevant culture. Moreover, even where people agree about the rightness of certain practices, such as these rituals, they can sometimes be inconsistent. For example, in reviewing reasons given within cultures where female circumcision/genital mutilation is practiced, we saw that there was some inconsistency concerning whether women needed this surgery to control their sexual appetites, to make them more beautiful, or to prevent morbidity or mortality. Ethical relativists thus have extraordinary problems offering a useful account of what counts as a culture and establishes cultural approval or disapproval. 136 Cultural Relativism Responses Cultural relativism deals with the core of what anthropologists, sociologists, and political scientists are supposed to do in their work. As Richard A. Barrett explains, “[The] task is to achieve understanding: to discover the meaning that these practices have for individual participants and to determine the part that they play within the context of the culture as a whole. This in no way implies, of course, that they endorse the customs they describe.” 1 He then offers a more specific definition of cultural relativism, explaining, “Cultural relativism is the belief that any particular set of customs, values, and moral precepts are relative to a specific cultural tradition, and that they can only be understood and evaluated within that particular milieu.” 2 He further notes that adopting a perspective of cultural relativism is an attempt to avoid ethnocentrism or the appearance of it. Those who advocate for the acceptance of cultural relativism often have noble motives. For example, as John H. Bodley explains, combating ethnocentrism is an attempt to stop the destruction of tribal people and cultures. He says “Anthropologists have been quick to stress the presumed deficiencies of tribal cultures as a justification for externally imposed change or a rejection of proposals that tribals be granted political autonomy.” 3 Culture undoubtedly plays a role in the formation of individuals’ personalities and senses of self-being. Therefore, when cultures are destroyed, parts of the individuals who made up those cultures are also lost. In the interest of preserving cultures, therefore, many advocate a viewpoint that does not make normative judgment about differing cultures, but rather only observes and describes them. That viewpoint is cultural relativism. CULTURAL RELATIVISM ALLOWS FOR PAIN AND SUFFERING The single biggest argument against cultural relativism is that it allows us to accept behavior and traditions that cause pain and suffering. Richard A. Barrett notes that, “Anthropologists frequently encounter societies in which attitudes, values, and standards of appropriate conduct differ radically from those of the anthropologist's own society.”4 It is natural at some level for an individual coming across customs and behaviors different from their own to not want to judge. To condemn these behaviors might compromise the documentation or participation in a culture. However, if we agree that there are no universal rights or wrongs, then we can be led to accept practices that cause pain and suffering. Barrett offers several examples of rituals in other cultures that cause pain. He explains that in Western Guinea, there is a tribe called the Dani. There, the custom is that every time a man dies, a finger is cut from the hand of the close female relatives of that man. This is a standard portion of the mourning rituals of the Dani, and it is normal to see a woman in old age with only one or two fingers left on each hand. Another practice that Barrett describes is when Dodoth tribesman of Uganda pry out the lower teeth of young girls because it is thought to make them more attractive. The process is painful, however. One anthropologist described the process after watching it in the following way: When the family spontaneously decided to extract the lower teeth of all the little girls in the dwelling (except the baby, whose milk teeth had already been extracted), the operation was performed in Rengen’s court. Her son Akral sat in her day house with one of his weeping little half-sisters between his knees. Her twenty-three-year-old son Akikar, mild and impassive, placed a stick as a bit in the girl’s mouth, and while Akral held the girl tightly, Akikar expertly hooked out the lower teeth with an awl. They were second teeth, deeply rooted, and as they came, cracked loudly, and the smell of blood filled the air. The little girl screamed that she was dying, and vomited red foam....her sister, begging and crying, her hands pressed over her mouth, was captured by Rengen, who firmly handed her over the heads of all the seated people to Akral, who gripped her with his knees. The weeping girl began to scream: “Akikar, help me!” Akikar dispassionately pried open her jaw and forced the bit into her mouth. He worked carefully, the extraction took a moment, but she struggled so much he nearly pierced her palate with the awl. She moaned hysterically when it was over and her teeth lay on the ground.5 These incidents certainly cause pain to the young girls who are having their teeth removed. Forcing these procedures on little girls is wrong, and they have no choice in the matter. Since a culturally relativistic viewpoint would mean we could not condemn this practice, rather only accept it as different, cultural relativism must be rejected. 137 Mistakenly, many believe that rejection of cultural relativism would mean that that world cultures could no longer be studied and observed. However, there is a difference between witnessing these events and condemning them and witnessing these events and saying they are a part of culture that should be accepted. With the increasing globalization of a human rights standard, the ability to point to forced pain and torture as wrong should also become more accepted. The examples discussed by anthropologists in Barrett’s book are not the only ways to explore the problem of cultural relativism. Many other events taking place around the world also prove the necessity of condemning human rights violations regardless of whether or not such actions are labeled as a part of a society’s culture. One modern and continuing action that merits the rejection of cultural relativism is the practice of honor killings. Honor killings are taking place in many Middle Eastern and several African countries. The practice involves a woman who is killed by a male relative or friend due to sexual indiscretion. In these societies, sex outside of marriage is considered a crime punishable by death. When a woman participates in such sexual activity, she is thought to bring shame and dishonor to her family. The way to restore the family’s honor is to kill the woman. These honor killings are abhorrent on several levels. First, the penalty of death for sex is far too extreme. Second, oftentimes no sexual misconduct has even occurred. All it takes is rumor or belief that a woman has had sex outside of marriage. With only this suggestion of impropriety, shame has been created and must be erased with a killing. Third, women are often killed even when they are the victims of rape. In these instances, when the woman did not even voluntarily participate in the sexual act, she is killed to restore her family’s name. While in most countries honor killings are not legal, governments turn a blind eye to the killings because of their role in the culture. Cultural relativism would have us believe that we can not condemn these practices or attempt to stop them because they have validity as a part of a certain culture. That attitude, however, condemns women worldwide to undeserved pain and death. Another modern example would be female genital mutilation, a practice found in several African countries. This practice was so shocking that the American government even sanctioned countries who encouraged or allowed the practice. It should first be noted that many Americans have wrongly associated female genital mutilation with female circumcision, the latter being a medical procedure that is relatively painless and clean. However, female genital mutilation involves the removal of a woman’s clitoris, and is often conducted against her will. The procedure is often done in unclean and unsafe locations, causing infection and death for those who are operated on. Similarly, the procedure, when done incorrectly, can cause greater physical damage and can cause a woman to lose all feeling in the pubic area. Again, female genital mutilation is wrong and imposes pain and suffering on an unwilling part of the population. To defend it as a cultural practice that is therefore acceptable is to allow the atrocities to continue. Once all behaviors associated with a culture are deemed legitimate, intervention and condemnation are never acceptable. Should the Holocaust be accepted as a part of German culture? Must racism and sexism be accepted and defended as American culture? Certainly, the answer is no. But with no clear cut definitions of what is or is not a cultural act, cultural relativism condemns us to never speaking out or acting out against such actions and atrocities. It is impossible to define what behaviors, beliefs, or values are intrinsic to any particular culture. In fact, it is impossible to clearly point out where one culture ends and another begins. In the interest of the global population, it is necessary to accept that some behaviors are wrong regardless of their cultural context in order to prevent pain and suffering that is not needed. The way to allow such judgment is to reject cultural relativism. 138 CULTURAL RELATIVISM CAUSES US TO SYMPATHIZE Cultural relativism is a self-confessed attempt to avoid ethnocentrism. While the avoidance of cultural superiority without foundation is certainly a noble cause, ethnocentrism carries that objective too far. Adoption of a mindset of cultural relativism can cause the observer to actually lose perspective in an attempt to identify with those being observed. That is known as subjective understanding, or the attempt to understand societies from the inside. This would be when, “anthropologists attempt to assimilate the outlook of their informants to such a degree that they can begin to perceive the world as it appears to them. Anthropologists mentally place themselves in their informants’ circumstances, comprehending their logic and value orientations, and in the light of these, assessing their behavioral choices.”6 This association with different cultures can produce a sympathy with the culture that is being observed. In that sense, the behavior of these societies can not only become accepted, but modeled. The sympathy with the culture being observed can lead to a defense of that culture’s actions and a complete inability to criticize any of the actions that are witnessed. Additionally, the close sympathy and association with a culture can destroy the anthropologist’s or political scientist’s ability to accurately describe a situation. Without value-laden terms or comparisons to other cultures, the process of describing a culture becomes not only more difficult, but also less constructive. The most vivid descriptions may necessitate value judgments and the ability to say if actions being taken are wrong or right. For instance, take the example of the Dodoth tribe that removed the teeth of the women. If a person was attempting to use cultural relativism, they would use perhaps more cautious language in an attempt to avoid value judgments. This might cause them to minimize the pain felt by the girls so that they didn’t appear to be biased against the Dodoth. Similarly, they may unwittingly attempt to construct a defense of the tribesman’s actions so that they do not appear to be putting that particular culture down. Instead, accurate descriptions of the behavior of the Dodoth can and should involve value judgments, allowing the person describing the events to use all of their skills and all of their responses to the behavior in their work. In that way, the person will not sympathize unnaturally with the people they are observing, but will instead be free to write their responses with a description of the events. Therefore, those who observe other cultures should be free to describe them as they see fit, without worrying about offense or a need to sympathize. In that way we will receive not only the most accurate information, but information that relies on all that the person experienced and observed. CULTURAL RELATIVISM IS INHERENTLY CONTRADICTORY Author Henry McDonald explains that there are two understandings of cultural relativism, and that these two understandings contradict one another. First, cultural relativism refers to the fact that cultures vary immensely in their values and ways of life. There is therefore no limit that humans can impose on the range of cultural variability. The second way in which cultural relativism is used is to mean that all cultures are equal in status. This is the point that there is no form or variety of culture that is legitimately superior to another. Thus, no culture should be viewed as superior to another. An example that McDonald gives is that in examining the economies of two cultures, one that uses a barter system and one which uses paper currency, neither would be said to be “better” than the other. He continues, noting that the workings of the system could only be judged within the particular context of that culture and its accompanying demands and conditions. If we should evaluate the culture as a whole, that would be illegitimate, as we should regard all cultures and social practices as equal in status.7 With these two understandings of cultural relativism in place, McDonald goes on to explain the contradiction. He says, “These two ways of understanding the term cultural relativism may seem consistent with one another, but in fact there is a very important sense in which they are not. For to insist that all cultural forms and practices (for example, the economic systems of different cultures) be regarded as equal in status is to assume implicitly that there exists a standpoint from which such forms and practices may be regarded as equal in status; it is to view the economic systems of the cultures as serving ultimately the same basic function or purpose- say, the distribution of wealth in the society- but in different ways.”8 139 McDonald sums up the problems with this contradiction, explaining, “When we view different cultural forms and practices as equal in status, we are really objectifying the meanings of those forms and practices- that is, we are posting such meaning not in the particular forms and practices we are confronted with, but in some ethereal element that is common to all such forms and practices.” 9 The contradiction inherent in cultural relativism makes it a philosophical position that should not be accepted. The contradiction not only undermines the usefulness of cultural relativism as a means of describing and observing culture, but minimizes the intellectual value of the position. CULTURAL RELATIVISM PREVENTS MEANINGFUL COMPARISONS A strict adoption of cultural relativism destroys the ability to make meaningful comparisons in analyzing different societies and cultures. While it is certainly valuable to learn about individual cultures and societies, even more meaning and knowledge can be accrued in comparing those cultures to others around the world and over time. This position is explained in the book The Normative Basis of Culture. There, it is asked, “But if there exists neither an empirical substratum nor a set of universal concepts from which we might try to understand foreign culturesthat is, there is neither an absolute nor a fixed basis common to all cultures- and we must instead try to grasp the norms and values of each culture on its own terms, are we not landed in the most sterile relativism? Are we not presented with a vast panorama of cultures each of which is possessed of its own separate values and logic, and none of which is necessarily related to the others?”10 Here, it is pointed out that without some form of comparison, it is next to impossible to learn from other cultures. Comparison and analysis is needed in order to gain knowledge from our worldwide observations. Rejecting cultural relativism, therefore, allows us to learn more by creating a connection between cultures. The explanation of this argument is complex, but worthwhile. First, we need to note the goal in this rejection of absolute cultural relativism, that is, “For according to the normative concept of culture I am suggesting, although there may be nothing that all cultures have in common, it is nonetheless a necessary presupposition for the study of comparative culture that they be related.”11 The reasons for this necessary relation are several. Initially, understanding is better gained and a foothold better gained in a culture that has a connection to one’s own. McDonald uses the example to illustrate the impossibility of gaining a foothold in the world of cultural relativism. He says that it is like trying to gain a foothold on a surface that was perfectly smooth and without friction. He adds, “Or, to change metaphors, our cultural eyeglasses would not allow us to see the foreign culture, and there would be no objects on the horizon to which we could conceptually anchor ourselves.” 12 He likens this to a hypothetical situation in which we would attempt to understand the “society” of a school of fish. The fish’s behavior would be described merely in human terms, and there would be no way to know if those terms were even remotely accurate. He clarifies, noting, “A culture with which we have absolutely nothing in common would not, in other words, be human in the sense in which we are accustomed to using the term. Indeed, it is because we have no means of understanding the way of life of a school of fish that we say they lack consciousness or internationality; such contentions are ways of expressing our concepts of human and animal.” 13 Therefore, McDonald concludes that we must see a connections between all cultures (a rejection of cultural relativism) in order to have meaningful scholarship and understanding. He explains, “A culture that we did term human would necessarily have something in common with our own, something we could connect or link up with.” 14 McDonald argues that specifically, the link between all human cultures is history. Regardless of whether or not history becomes the agreed upon connection, we can see that the need for such a connection exists. Viewing all cultures as connected in some way allows a better understanding of those individuals who participate in other cultures. It means that we see those individuals as similar to us in enough ways that we seek to learn more about them in comparative research. Cultural relativism, therefore, by forcing us to look at each culture individually and in its own perspective, denies this powerful tool of comparison. In that sense, it robs us of knowledge and information that should be gathered as we investigate not only other cultures, but our own as well. 140 CULTURAL RELATIVISM HAS NEGATIVE IMPLICATIONS FOR SCHOLARS The acceptance of cultural relativism as an approach to academics and scholarship can have negative effects on said fields. First, the premise behind cultural relativism, when carried to the extreme, destroys cultural studies. This is articulated clearly by Fred Inglis, who explains that behind cultural relativism is the belief that an experience can only be deemed valid or legitimate by the person in that experience. This is the belief that is behind cultural relativism; that individuals should not judge another culture’s practices or beliefs because they don’t live in the same context and therefore cannot understand the motivation or meanings of these practices and values. Inglis argues that when cultural relativism is associated with the view that experience is inaccessibly personal, “it becomes perfectly obscure. Only women can write about women, blacks about blacks, you about you.” 15 This viewpoint would devastate much political science and anthropology. Individuals would be forced to only write about and examine their own culture, destroying any ability for them to learn from the personal experiences of members of different cultures. Instead of saying that only women can understand the particular context for their culture and therefore no one else can write about it, individuals should be encouraged to attempt to understand that alternative context and viewpoint. Second, it leads to the justification of abhorrent practices. We already briefly discussed a related point in our arguments regarding the allowance of pain and suffering. However, the argument goes further when we point out the dangers this holds specifically for scholars. Inglis explains, “Functionalism concludes that societies generate practices which serve the function of system-maintenance. Faced by a mysterious or (it may be) horrible social practice, the ethnographer or historian will explain it by reason of its society-supporting function.”16 Functionalism, however, is a natural by-product of cultural relativism. If values cannot be imposed on the customs of a particular culture, another lens must be adopted in viewing them. In order to not give them value, they can merely be described as how they function in that particular society. Resorting to a discussion of how they serve the society they exist within legitimizes practices because it assigns them an integral role in a particular culture. For instance, if one explained honor killings as serving a role in a particular culture, then they can almost be justified by systemmaintenance. This is problematic because it compromises the integrity of scholastic research by unwittingly making all observation a way of entrenching the very problematic practices around the world that the researcher is there to document. It makes science and philosophy the tools of the culture being examined. Third, cultural relativism ignores the already-existing cultural interaction. One author notes, “It is pretty well impossible in the modern world to find a culture which could possibly live in a self-enclosed way; certainly, it is theoretically difficult to define what it would look like, let alone whether it would want to stay self-enclosed, given a choice.”17 If cultures are already interacting and changing one another, it seems ridiculous to suggest that cultures be considered strictly by their own context and without comparison of value with others. Finally, cultural relativism can breed nihilism. The attitude by cultural relativists that causes this problem is that all values should be rejected simply because of their ability to be shown as merely locally grounded and constantly changing. “The relativist gives this as the reason for moving to nihilism. Because the old advertising slogan for a conservative newspaper ‘Times change: values don’t’ is so evidently wrong, the conclusion is drawn that since present values will indeed have severally changed in another hundred years, there can be no good reason for giving them our allegiance now.”18 By accepting that we can never have an accurate prediction on the values that are to come, many abandon values altogether. 141 TRUE CULTURAL RELATIVISM IS IMPOSSIBLE Those who advocate cultural relativism would suggest that we abandon any attempts to judge cultures against one another or impose values on a culture. However, it is impossible to observe another culture without comparing it to one’s own. It is impossible for an observer to be truly neutral and unassuming. Instead, the lens we view the world through has been effected by our own culture and upbringing, making it impossible to not color the way we view other cultures. It would be impossible to convince me that honor killings are justified. Similarly, it might be impossible to convince a person who grew up around honor killings that they are unjust. The cultures and settings in which we were raised effect the way we see the world. It is not possible to leave all of that upbringing behind simply because one is going to observe another culture. Instead, what would likely happen is that an observer would think they were leaving their prejudices behind while they actually only sought to hide them. In such an instance, an individual would unknowingly be judging another culture by their own cultural standpoint. It is better then, to recognize such inherent biases that we cannot get rid of. By acknowledging such bias, a reader or an observer can understand the position of the person reporting the information. They can take into account their biases and prejudices, and temper their understanding based not only on what is described but the culture of the person doing the describing. If this is not understood, we will be condemned to observers who think they are neutral but are actually only reaffirming their cultural biases and dispositions with every observation they make. It is not wise to reach for an unfathomable goal in observing cultures around the world. Instead, we should admit the limitations of our investigations of the world around us and continue to try and make meaningful comparisons between our culture and other cultures. By doing so, we would not only produce the most effective observations and descriptions of other cultures, but be more intellectually honest with ourselves in creating those observations and descriptions. SUMMARY Cultural relativism as a philosophy has noble intentions, that is, to prevent ethnocentrism and cultural genocide. However, in practice there are a myriad of problems of adopting this viewpoint. Initially and most importantly, cultural relativism allows for pain and suffering by refusing to condemn any behaviors or customs. These customs are allowed to continue because cultural relativism causes us to sympathize with those committing the acts of pain or suffering. The philosophy is inherently contradictory and prevents us from making meaningful comparisons among cultures. The implications of attempting to adopt the viewpoint of cultural relativism is negative for scholars, and the actual adoption of this viewpoint is impossible. Therefore, cultural relativism should be rejected on the basis of both a lack of practical and philosophical value and utility. ______________________________ 1 Barrett, Richard A. Culture and Conduct: An Excursion in Anthropology. Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1991, pg. 6. 2 Ibid, pg. 7. 3 Bodley, John H. Victims of Progress. Mountain View: Mayfield Publishing Company, 1990, pg. 11. 4 Barrett, Richard A. Culture and Conduct: An Excursion in Anthropology. Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1991, pg. 5. 5 Ibid, pg. 6. 6 Ibid, pg. 8. 7 McDonald, Henry. The Normative Basis of Culture. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1986, pg. 131. 8 Ibid, pg. 131. 9 Ibid, pg. 132. 10 Ibid, pg. 216. 11 Ibid, pg. 217. 12 Ibid, pg. 217. 13 Ibid, pg. 217. 14 Ibid, pg. 217. 15 Inglis, Fred. Cultural Studies. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 1993, pg. 205. 16 Ibid, pg. 133. 17 Ibid, pg. 134. 18 Ibid, pg. 12. 142 CULTURAL RELATIVISM IS INHERENTLY CONTRADICTORY 1. CULTURAL RELATAVISM LOGICALLY COLLAPSES IN ON ITSELF Joseph Wagner, “The Revolt Against Reason: Mistaken Assumptions In Post-Positivist Relativism,” Critical Thinking: Focus on Social and Cultural Inquiry, ed. Wendy Oxman-Michelli and Mark Weinstein, May 2, 2000, Accessed January 22, 2001, http://hascall.colgate.edu/jwagner/DownloadFiles/Revolt.doc. NP. Relativism goes awry because of its tendency to confuse distinct categories and issues. In this case it confuses an epistemic issue with a normative one. Normatively, post-positivist relativism tells us that the universalism and objectivity of science and ethics seem insensitive to non-Western cultures or even subordinate subcultures, groups, and classes within Western societies. It reminds us that 'knowledge is power,' and that power is frightful. It commends relativism to those excluded groups and recommends that each group recapture the 'fleeting images' and 'subjective memories' that constitute its group meanings and form the basis for social and political solidarity. Each community is encouraged to articulate values implicit in such archeology (Giroux 1991). Perhaps these are commendable prescriptions, especially if we believe there is value in solidarity and in capturing meanings that make life in a community worthwhile. But by themselves these are inadequate prescriptions for liberation or emancipation from domination. 2. PRESCRIPTIONS OF RELATIVISM ARE PRACTICALLY AND LOGICALLY SELF-DEFETING Joseph Wagner, “The Revolt Against Reason: Mistaken Assumptions In Post-Positivist Relativism,” Critical Thinking: Focus on Social and Cultural Inquiry, ed. Wendy Oxman-Michelli and Mark Weinstein, May 2, 2000, Accessed January 22, 2001, http://hascall.colgate.edu/jwagner/DownloadFiles/Revolt.doc. NP. If subordinate groups find objectivity hostile, then they deny a common ground that is prior to or takes precedence over the parochial differences in beliefs and values. If they can only appeal to that which is unique in their group, if they can appeal to values that move only them, then they fail. They fail to appeal to the values of the dominant group; they fail to make any claim upon the dominant group; and thereby concede to a struggle that is simply a matter of power. Unfortunately, the dominant group, by definition has power. Thus the normative prescriptions of relativism are practically as well as logically self-defeating. Alternatively, objective principles of justice and mutual respect make moral and political claims which ought to be honored by all persons, nations, and cultures. These are universal claims, the only sorts of claims which assert obligation on those who are dominant as well as those who are subordinate. Only universal claims of justice are the kind that cannot be discharged by the rejoinder, 'those are simply your tastes and preferences, not mine,' because only universal claims are grounded on the fundamental commonality of human beings and human societies, not upon the ineradicable differences between them. Such universality resides in the common reason and common truths (empirical and moral), which make differences possible as well as shared understanding and appreciation. 143 CULTURAL RELATIVISM IS BAD FOR ACADAMEIA 1. CULTURAL RELATIVISM COLLAPSES BECAUSE IT REJECTS NON-RELATIVIST CULTURES Allan Bloom, Professor in the Committee on Social Thought at University of Chicago. The Closing of the American Mind. 1987, pg. 36-37. One should conclude from the study of non-Western cultures that not only to prefer one’s own way but to believe it best, superior to all others, is primary and even natural—exactly the opposite of what is intended by requiring students to study these cultures. What we are really doing is applying a Western prejudice—which we covertly take to indicate the superiority of our culture—and deforming the evidence of those other cultures to attest to its validity. The scientific study of other cultures is almost exclusively a Western phenomenon, and in its origin was obviously connected with the search for new and better ways, or at least for validation of the hope that our own culture really is the better way, a validation for which there is no felt need in other cultures. If we are to learn from those cultures, we must wonder whether such scientific study is a good idea. Consistency would seem to require professors of openness to respect the ethnocentrism or closedness they find everywhere else. However, in attacking ethnocentrism, what they actually do is to assert unawares the superiority of their scientific understanding and the inferiority of the other cultures which do not recognize it at the same time that they reject all such claims to superiority. 2. OBJECTIVITY INCREASES KNOWLEDGE, FOSTERING A MORE IMPARTIAL AND CLEARER ACCOUNT OF SCIENTIFIC INSTITUTIONS AND PRACTICES. Sandra Harding, Professor of Social Sciences and Comparative Education Director. Is Science Multi-Cultural? Postcolonialism, Feminisms, and Epistemologies, 1998, pg. 155. Again, the standpoint from such marginalized lives on whether and how scientific and technological changes work can lead to a more objective account than can analyses restricted to what looks reasonable from the perspective of the groups who most benefit from scientific and technological change. “The winner names the age” the historians say, acknowledging that the winners’ name for the age may not be the most accurate one from more objective standpoints. Starting from the “losers” lives can systematically expand our knowledge. This is one way of talking about how people marginalized, dominated, oppressed, or otherwise disadvantaged by a dominant culture have fewer interests in ignorance about how such a culture and its practices actually work than do those that benefit from it. Anyone who starts out thinking about science funding, or environmental destruction, or medical research from the perspective of the lives of those who bear a disproportionate share of the costs of these activities can learn to “follow the interests” of the latter to arrive at less partial and distorted accounts of science and technology institutions and practices. 144 RELETAVISM CEMENTS NEGATIVE BEHAVIOR 1. FLOATING SUBJECTIVITY REINFORCES PATTERNS OF DOMINATION Kevin Cryderman, “Jane and Louisa: The Tapestry Of Critical Paradigms,” 2000, Accessed November 7, 2001, http://65.107.211.206/post/caribbean/brodber/kcry1.html. NP. Dirlik claims that the 'happy pluralism' of postcolonialism -- such as its emphasis on flux, borderlands and liminal space -- does not so much oppose elite unified narratives of nations and cultures as it does reinforce them. Dirlik also links this trend of "fluid subject positions" (98) in postmodernism to postcolonialism and Global Capitalism: "in the age of flexible production, we all live in the borderlands. Capital, deterritorialized and decentered, establishes borderlands where it can move freely, away from the control of states and societies but in collusion with states against societies" (Dirlik 87). Moreover, the problem "presented by postcolonial discourse" is "a problem of liberating discourse that divorces itself from the material conditions of life, in this case Global Capitalism as the foundational principle of contemporary society globally" (99). 2. FOCUSING ON RELATIVISM CEMENTS OPPRESSION Aihwa Ong, Professor of Anthropology at UC Berkeley. Flexible Citizenship: The Cultural Logic of Transnationality. 1999, pg. 13. Some scholars dwell on narratives of sacrifice, which are associated with enforced labor migrations, as well as on critiques of the immorality of development. Others, who write about displacements in “borderland” areas, emphasize subjects who struggle against adversity and violation by affirming their cultural hybridity and shifting positions in society. The unified moralism attached to subaltern subjects now also clings to diasporan ones, who are invariably assumed to be members of oppressed classes and therefore constitutionally opposed to capitalism and state power. Furthermore, because of the exclusive focus on texts, narratives, and subjectivities, we are often left wondering what are the particular local-global structural articulations that materially and symbolically shape these dynamics of victimhood and ferment. 3. CULTURAL RELATIVISM DOES VIOLENCE TO THOSE WHO LIVE ON THE BORDERLANDS Linda Alcoff, Professor of Philosophy and Women’s Studies at Syracuse, “Mestizo Identity,” The Idea of Race, ed. Robert Bernasconi and Tommy Lott, 2000, pg. 152-153. Liberation is associated with the refusal to be characterized, described, or classified, and the only true strategy of resistance can be one of negation, a kind of permanent revolution on the metaphysical front. Unfortunately, nomadic subjectivity works no better than assimilationist doctrine to interpellant mixed identity: the nomad self is bounded to no community and represents an absence of identity rather than a multiply entangled and engaged identity. This is not the situation of mixed-race peoples who have deep (even if problematic) ties to specific communities; to be a free-floating unbound variable is not the same as being multiply categorized and ostracized by specific racial communities. It strikes me that the postmodern nomadic vision fits far better the multinational CEO with fax machine and cellular phone in hand who is bound to, or by, no national agenda, tax structure, cultural boundary, or geographical border. And what this suggests is that a simplistic promotion of fluidity will not suffice. 145 CULTURAL RELATAVISM PREVENTS DISCOVERY OF THE TRUTH 1. A UNIVERSAL CRITERIA PROVIDES MORE RATIONAL CRITERIA FOR JUDGING KNOWLEDGE AND RECOGNIZES THE INFLUENCE OF POLITICS Margaret Davies, Law Lecturer, and Nan Seuffert, Law Lecturer, Hastings Women’s Law Journal, Summer 2000, NP. Therefore, valuing knowledge which explicitly acknowledges location or standpoint epistemology is valuable as a strategy. We value located knowledge and the "view from below' partly because we believe that these approaches currently provide more rational criteria for judging knowledge than the spurious claims to objectivity of traditional legal knowledge. Additionally, these approaches have the elementary political and ethical values of recognition and respect for others. Such an ethic requires us - as middle-class, White feminists - to take a position of reflective ignorance in relation to others, admitting that our understanding of the world might be completely useless in another context, even while we are attempting to claim space from a mainstream discourse like law. In contrast to a universally "grounded' knowledge, therefore, knowledge valued for its strategic benefits explicitly recognizes the connection between politics and knowledge. 2. STANDPOINT EPISTEMOLOGY FACILITATES SUBSTANTIAL TRUTH CLAIMS WHILE INCORPORATING THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE OTHER Gary Chartier, Lecturer in Business Ethics, UCLA Asian Pacific American Law Journal, Spring 2001, pg. 127. The successful practice of an Asian American jurisprudence requires the recognition of truthful narratives of oppression and the condemnation of structures and behaviors that subordinate and exclude. A standpoint epistemology enables us to identify truthful narratives and unjust actions and institutions without giving up either outsider perspectives or substantial claims to truth. Employing such an epistemology means starting with the beliefs we have, and the perspectives and understandings we have acquired as the result of our (interpreted) experience. But it does not mean resting content with those beliefs, perspectives, and understandings, as if we were insulated against surprises and inoculated against truths that our background assumptions might make it difficult for us to apprehend. Thus, adopting a standpoint epistemology does not preclude openness to the Other that is the prerequisite to any serious quest for truth. 3. CULTURAL RELATIVISM HIDES THE PROCESS OF DISPOSSESSION John Beverley, Professor of Spanish and Latin American Literature and Cultural Studies at Pittsburgh, Subalternity and Representation: Arguments in Critical Theory, 1999, pg. 38-40. Moreover, in making the shift from "objectivity" to "solidarity," we cannot simply disavow representation under the pretext that we are allowing the subaltern to "speak for itself" (that is Spivak's main point in "Can the Subaltern Speak?"). And there is a way in which the (necessarily?) liberal political slant Rorty gives the idea of solidarity may also be, as the 1960s slogan has it, part of the problem rather than part of the solution, because it assumes that "conversation" is possible across power/exploitation divides that radically differentiate the participants." Solidarity based on an assumption of equality and reciprocity does not "lean that contradictions are suppressed in the name of a heuristic notion of merger or identification with the subaltern: Foucault's point about the embarrassment of "speaking for others" is pertinent here. 146 Democracy Good DEMOCRACY LEADS TO PEACE 1. DEMOCRACIES ARE LESS LIKELY TO GO TO WAR WITH EACH OTHER Morton H. Halperin, Senior Associate of the Carnegie Endowment, FOREIGN POLICY, 1993, p. 105. States that are constitutional democracies are less likely to go to war with the United States or other democracies, and are more likely to support limits on weapons trade, encourage peaceful resolution of disputes, and foster free trade. 2. DEMOCRATIC COUNTRIES DO NOT WAGE WAR ON EACH OTHER Anthony Lake, Special Assistant to President Clinton for National Security Affairs, FEDERAL NEWS SERVICES, September 21, 1993. The addition of new democracies makes us more secure because democracies tend not to wage war on each other and they tend not to support terrorism. In fact, they don’t. They are more trustworthy in diplomacy and they do a better job of respecting the environment and the human rights of their people. 3. A PEACEFUL WORLD IS MORE LIKELY IF COUNTRIES ARE DEMOCRACIES Morton H. Halperin, Senior Associate of the Carnegie Endowment, FOREIGN POLICY, 1993, p. 111. When a people have established a constitutional democracy, or, as with the Soviet Union in August 1991, are moving in that direction, the United States and much of the world community will resist internal efforts to undermine democracy. It will do so in large part because it recognizes that a peaceful world is more likely if states are constitutional democracies. 4. DEMOCRACY STOPS NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION John Van Oudenaren, RAND Corporation expert in Soviet foreign policy, NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE CHANGING WORLD, 1992. The technical barriers to nuclear proliferation in the third world have continued to diminish in importance as the list of potential suppliers of components has expanded, as third world countries have improved their own technical base, and as private companies and individuals have flouted international safeguards. Future barriers to proliferation thus are likely to be increasingly less technical and progressively more political (i.e., based on national perceptions of the incentives and disincentives to acquire nuclear weapons), with the character of these perceptions heavily influenced by the makeup of national regimes (democratic vs. authoritarian and pro- vs. anti-Western). 5. DEMOCRACY INCREASES WORLD PEACE Morton H. Halperin, Senior Associate of the Carnegie Endowment, FOREIGN POLICY, 1993, p. 111. Peace, security, and the establishment of a true world order require that all states, including the United States, work toward that goal by seeking to preserve democracy where it is being established. We are now at a historic crossroads; the opportunity to take a giant step toward universal constitutional democracy is here and should be seized. 6. DEMOCRACY BLOCKS THE DISASTERS OF FORCED SOCIETAL REFORMS Jean-François Revel, Author, DEMOCRACY AGAINST ITSELF, 1993, p. 258. There have been natural cataclysms in history, epidemics, droughts, earthquakes, and cyclones, and they have killed millions, destroyed cities and crops, annihilated artistic and intellectual treasures, devastated the infrastructures of nations. Yet these plagues are nothing compared to those that have been caused by human action. The most destructive catastrophes are man-made, and above all statesman-made. They come from his appetite for conquest and domination, from the dead-end political systems he thinks up, his uncountable religious or ideological fanaticisms, and, especially, his obsessive need to reform societies instead of letting them change at their own pace. Democracy blocks or at least slows down, this disastrous—and wicked— human propensity. 7. DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENTS ARE MORE PEACEFUL Morton H. Halperin, Senior Associate of the Carnegie Endowment, FOREIGN POLICY, 1993, p. 111. 147 The United States should take the lead in promoting the trend toward democracy. Democratic governments are more peaceful and less given to provoking war or inciting violence. 148 DEMOCRACY IS THE BEST FORM OF GOVERNMENT 1. DEMOCRACY IS SUPERIOR TO SOCIALISM WORLDWIDE Jean-François Revel, Author, DEMOCRACY AGAINST ITSELF, 1993, p.6 At any rate, whereas only ten years earlier it had been almost impossible to argue, even in the West, that Socialism was definitely and irretrievably finished, its failure now proclaimed to the whole world that the liberal democratic model was superior. Nineteen ninety-one saw even the collapse of Sweden’s social democratic model, which for a long time was thought to have retained the advantages and jettisoned the liabilities of both systems. Bankrupt, rejected by the voters, Sweden’s social democracy made way for a wave of privatizations—as did Zambia once it rid itself of Kaunda. From all sides were heard lyrical praises of democracy—which is very well—but more than this: confident proclamations that the “democratic revolution” would triumph everywhere in all countries and overcome all difficulties. 2. REALITY PROVES DEMOCRACY AND CAPITALISM ARE SUPERIOR TO COMMUNISM Jean-François Revel, Author, DEMOCRACY AGAINST ITSELF, 1993, p. 8 Communism had not fallen back yet, but it was stopped in its tracks. The Third World no longer viewed communism as a model of rapid development, particularly since it was, at last, evident to all that it was itself a form of underdevelopment. Of all the blows dealt Marxist theory by reality, democracy’s social and economic efficiency is probably the most potent. 3. DEMOCRACY IS THE ONLY FORM OF EFFICIENT GOVERNMENT Jean-François Revel, Author, DEMOCRACY AGAINST ITSELF, 1993, p. 40. Democracy does not mean the absence of government. On the contrary, it is the only form of government that is efficient, for it is the only form of government that can both serve civil society and make use of the creative resources of civil society. 149 THE WORLD IS BECOMING MORE DEMOCRATIC 1. THE WORLD IS MOVING TOWARD DEMOCRACY Jean-François Revel, Author, DEMOCRACY AGAINST ITSELF, 1993, p. 6. Gorbachev himself, transformed into the benevolent mentor of the world’s oldest democracies, proclaimed at the U.N. on 7 December 1988: “The whole world is becoming democratic,” On every continent conferences met to sing praises to the new goddess, whose inexistence it was forbidden to deny: not only democracy, but universal democracy, the complete democratization of the world. 2. DEMOCRACY NOT TOTALITARIANISM IS THE “WAVE OF THE FUTURE” Charles R. Wilson, NQA, THE AMERICAN IDEA, 1942, p.9. Analysts can easily collect “evidence” which seems to demonstrate that totalitarianism is the “wave of the future”. But unless man has changed in his essential nature and the principle of historical continuity is a myth, such a judgment is more nearly a wave of intellectual bilge water. Far from being the wave of the future, totalitarianism is the contaminating seepage of the past. The true wave of the future is the revision and readjustment of democratic processes so as to preclude the possibility of a plunge into the murky waters of medievalist by rabble-rousing paranoiacs who use the maladjustments of democracy as a springboard. Fortunately, democracy, like the Constitution of the United States, is general enough in its implications to permit adjustments of various kinds without destruction of its essential fabric. 3. DICTATORSHIPS CAN TRANSFORM INTO DEMOCRACIES Vladimir Bukovsky, Former Soviet Dissident and President of Resistance International, TOTALITARIANISM AT THE CROSSROADS, 1990, p. 10. Indeed, while we do not know of a single example of a totalitarian state transforming itself into a democracy (except as a result of a foreign occupation), there have been quite a number of dictatorships even in the last ten to fifteen years which have done so. Furthermore, in most cases, the process of transformation was remarkably smooth, quick, and painless, often triggered simply by the death of a dictator (Spain, Portugal), or by a coup (Paraguay), by a failure to suppress the opposition (the Philippines), by international pressure (Chile, South Korea), or even by a dictatorship itself which did not want to maintain its rule any longer (Turkey, Argentina). RIGHT TO VOTE INHERENT IN DEMOCRACY SECURES ALL OTHER RIGHTS 1. RIGHT TO VOTE PRESERVES ALL OTHER RIGHTS Lani Guinier, Law Professor at the University of Pennsylvania, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY, 1994, p. 35. First, the fundamental nature of the right to vote stems from its role in preserving all other rights. Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is undermined. The franchise gives status to the individual voter but derives its vitality from its exercise by a “politically cohesive” group of citizens who elect representatives to promote consideration of group interests in public policy. 150 DEMOCRACY IS INTEGRALLY LINKED TO HUMAN RIGHTS 1. DEMOCRACY IS INTEGRALLY LINKED TO HUMAN RIGHTS A. Belden Fields and Wolf-Dieter Nan, Professors of Political Science, University of Illinois and University of Berlin, HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY, 1992, p. 12. The two ideas, democracy and human rights, are necessarily connected; democracy cannot exist without human rights, and there can be no human rights without democracy. Democracy is the form; human rights are the norm or consent. Furthermore, human rights and their necessary procedural rules cannot be put into practice by a segmental approach—the society as a whole has to be structured according to the requirements of this norm and form relationship. 2. DEMOCRACY IMPROVES PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS Sakah Mahmud, University of Denver Professor, HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY, 1993, p. 498. The current democratization process in Africa is a positive trend because once democratization begins, as it has in most of Africa, it would be difficult to stop the trend. The process might be delayed in the short run, but it could not be completely reversed. It is in this regard that one can expect better prospects for human rights protection in Africa. 3. ONLY DEMOCRACY INCORPORATES VALUES OF HUMAN RIGHTS A. Belden Fields and Wolf-Dieter Nan, Professors of Political Science, University of Illinois and University of Berlin, HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY, 1992, p.9. Four values have been proposed as the key norm for an adequate conception of human rights: freedom, social recognition, equality, and integrity. Only one political form thus far discovered—democracy— incorporates all those norms. Human rights norms and political forms are not really distinct, separate entities; one cannot talk seriously about the one without talking about the other. If democracy is characterized by the right and ability to participate in governance on an equal footing with all participants, that is a human right as well as a definition of democracy. ONLY DEMOCRACY SAFEGUARDS FREEDOM 1. ONLY DEMOCRACY ENCOURAGES FREEDOM Eugene T. Adams, NQA, THE AMERICAN IDEA, 1942, P. 262. In the long march of civilization men have bound themselves together, or have been bound together, under various forms of government. Some of these have reduced the individual to a state of slavery. Some have tolerated freedom of the individual within limits. Democracy alone has encouraged the individual to establish and safeguard his own freedom. 2. U.S. DEMOCRACY BALANCES FREEDOM WITH AUTHORITY Albert H. Garetson, NQA, THE AMERICAN IDEA, 1942, p. 62-3. We can see clearly that there must be many changes in our democratic way of doing things. But our past record is a comfort to us. We have known how to meet great problems. Our democracy has always found the balance between freedom and authority that has met the needs of each period of crisis in our history. It has known how to defend itself from social chaos and to protect its great heritage of American freedom. 3. AMERICAN DEMOCRACY MEANS INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM Thomas H. Robinson, NQA, THE AMERICAN IDEA, 1942, P. 65. To us, democracy means freedom—individual freedom. It means freedom for each one of us to take part in making policies that concern us. It means taking part in a way that counts. 151 DEMOCRACY ALLOWS FOR CHANGE AND REFORM 1. DEMOCRACY ALLOWS FOR REFORM Herbert Marcuse, Social Philosopher, AN ESSAY ON LIBERATION, 1969, p. 66. The fact that the democratic process provides for the redress of grievances and for legal and lawful change does not alter the illegality inherent in an opposition to an institutionalized democracy which halts the process of change at the stage where it would destroy the existing system. By virtue of this built-in stabilizer or “governor,” capitalist mass-democracy is perhaps to a higher degree self-perpetuating than any other form of government or society; and the more so the more it rests, not on tenor and scarcity, but on efficiency and wealth, and on the majority will of the underlying and administered population. DEMOCRACY IS MORE THAN THE CONCEPT OF MAJORITY RULE 1. DEMOCRACY IS MORE THAN MAJORITY RULE Frank Bealey, NQA, DEMOCRACY IN THE CONTEMPORARY STATE, 1988, p.4. Democracy is often wrongly defined as ‘majority rule,’ but though it may involve the majority getting their way, there is clearly much more to democracy than majoritarianism. Majorities may, and sometimes do, act in a completely undemocratic manner. Democracy might be extinguished by a majority voting for the abolition of public contestation and inclusiveness at a general election or national referendum. The Weimar Republic ended in this way. 2. LIBERTY NOT MAJORITY RULE IS CENTRAL TO U.S. CONSTITUTION James A. Dorn, Editor of Cato Journal, LEGITIMACY, GOVERNMENTS, AND MARKETS, 1990, p. 73. This fundamental right to noninterference or liberty stands at the center of the Framers’ “Constitution of liberty,” as Hayek (1960) put it, and is derived from the natural rights doctrine, which was widely accepted at the time of the framing. The basic principles inherent in the natural rights doctrine were stated in the Declaration of Independence and were used to justify the American Revolution. . . .[sic] The Constitution stands on these higher law principles, and is best viewed as a charter for limited government and individual freedom, not primarily as a blueprint for majority rule. 3. MAJORITY RULE IS NOT THE SAME AS AMERICAN DEMOCRACY Stephen L. Carter, Law Professor, Yale University, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY, 1994, p. xvi. Majority rule, loosely put, is the proposition that 51 percent of the people should be able to get whatever they want. Some consider this the same as democracy, but it is not; at least, it is not the same as American democracy. There is not a single place in the United States (and, I would bet, in the world) in which 51 percent of the people are in fact entitled to whatever they want. Instead, majorities face often considerable obstacles in transforming their preferences into policy. The most obvious obstacles are the state and federal constitutions, which limit what majorities can do and are not easy for those same majorities to change. 4. RIGHTS OF INDIVIDUALS SUPERSEDE MAJORITY RULE James A. Dorn, Editor of Cato Journal, LEGITIMACY, GOVERNMENTS, AND MARKETS, 1990, p. 71. In a rights-based approach to constitutional legitimacy, majoritarianism plays a secondary role to individual rights. Majority preferences, in other words, do not rule in all political matters, only those that do not violate higher law principles or what Sir Edward Coke referred to as “common right and reason.” Thus, in the Framer’s constitutional vision, the equal rights of individuals to life, liberty, and property were not to be the subject of majority vote. 5. DEMOCRACY IS NOT GOVERNMENT BY THE MAJORITY Anthony Arblaster, NQA, DEMOCRACY, 1987, p. 73. There are therefore sound reasons for rejecting any crude equation of democracy with the unqualified principle of majority rule. ‘The people’ cannot be equated with only a majority of them, nor can ‘government by the people’ by equated with government by the majority, let alone the representatives of the majority. Minorities are also part of the people, and, as far as possible, their interests, views and convictions must be taken into account in the processes of policy-making and decision-taking. 152 Democracy Bad DEMOCRACY IS AN OPPRESSIVE FORM OF GOVERNMENT 1. VIEWS OF THE MAJORITY OVERSHADOW THOSE OF THE MINORITY Lani Guinier, Law Professor at the University of Pennsylvania, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY, 1994, p. 37. However, virtual representation theory is not appropriate if the interests of a racial minority are not necessarily fungible with those of the “actual” representatives or of their white constituents. For example, blacks, as a poor and historically oppressed group, are in greater need of government sponsored programs and solicitudes, which whites often resent and vigorously oppose. Even a mildly sympathetic white official will not dependably consider black interests if that individual must also accommodate the more dominant views of white constituents. 2. MAJORITY RULE DOES NOT ENSURE MINORITY CONFIDENCE IN THE SYSTEM Lani Guinier, Law Professor at the University of Pennsylvania, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY, 1994, p. 79. Yet, just as it would be illegitimate for an advantaged minority to exercise majority power, it is illegitimate for an advantaged majority to exercise disproportionate power. From the excluded minority’s perspective, such a system exaggerates its difficulty in winning any power and is unlikely to be stable, accountable, or reciprocal. In sum, to the extent majority rule is associated with winner-take-all voting procedures, it does not ensure minority confidence in the system’s fairness. 3. ACCESS TO POLITICAL SYSTEM DOES NOT GUARANTEE POLITICAL FAIRNESS Lani Guinier, Law Professor at the University of Pennsylvania, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY, 1994, p. 34. For a group that has been excluded [from the political process] as long as blacks, aggressive advocacy is essential to ensure that black interests are taken seriously. Technical, formal access to the political process may not be enough to guarantee even good faith representation. This is a particular problem where black voters are less likely to engage in the “extended political process” of post-election day accountability with white representatives. DEMOCRACY DENIES JUSTICE TO ETHNIC AND RACIAL MINORITIES 1. DEMOCRACY DENIES JUSTICE TO ETHNIC MINORITIES Amy Gutman, Scholar and Author, PHILOSOPHY & PUBLIC AFFAIRS, Summer 1993, p. 180. Like other political procedures, democracy is imperfect where many matters of justice are at stake, and widely recognized as such. In situations of racial, ethnic, and religious conflict within democratic societies, majoritarian procedures may deny minorities personal security, basic liberty and decent living standards. No procedures can justify the denial of these goods and others basic to human dignity. 2. RACIAL HIERARCHY WILL DESTROY DEMOCRATIC ORDER Cornel West, AFRICAN AMERICAN SCHOLAR, RACE MATTERS, 1993, p.4. Today, eighty-six percent of white suburban Americans live in neighborhoods that are less than 1 percent black, meaning that the prospects for the country depend largely on how its cities fare in the hands of a suburban electorate. There is no escape from our interracial interdependence, yet enforced racial hierarchy dooms us as a nation to collective paranoia and hysteria—the unmaking of any democratic order. 3. RACIAL ATMOSPHERE DETERS MINORITY CANDIDATES Lani Guinier, Law Professor at the University of Pennsylvania, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY, 1994, p. 33. The election of more black representatives proves a second important opportunity for substantive rather than rhetorical outreach. At present the electoral process is permeated by a subtle, yet pervasive, racial atmosphere that deters black candidates from running, that dismissed prematurely [sic] Jesse Jackson’s presidential aspirations (on the basis of his race) and that permits jurisdictions not to recognize members of a sizable minority as part of the governing coalition. Indeed, a recent survey indicated that the higher the office in question, the less whites are inclined to vote for a qualified black candidate. 153 REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY IS INHERENTLY FLAWED 1. REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT IS INHERENTLY FLAWED Howard Zinn, Professor Emeritus, Spelman College, DECLARATIONS OF INDEPENDENCE, 1990, p. 255. Rousseau provokes us to think critically about the whole idea of representation. It is an idea that we grew up to accept without question because it was an advance over monarchy and is today much preferable to dictatorship. But it has serious problems. No representative can adequately represent another’s needs; the representative tends to become a member of a special elite; he has privileges that weaken his sense of concern over his constituents’ grievances. 2. REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT IS ALWAYS APPROXIMATE AND IMPERFECT Anthony Arblaster, NQA, DEMOCRACY, 1987, p. 85. Even if the practice of representation was more thoroughly democratic than it is, and every precaution was taken to guard against what Walt Whitman memorably termed ‘the never-ending audacity of elected persons’, there are still problems from a democratic point of view, inherent in the very principle of representation. Given the uniqueness of each individual, and given the gradations and shadings of opinion found even among those who are in broad agreement on a particular issue, representation, even of one person by another, let along of a group by a single person. must always be approximate and imperfect. 3. REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENTS DO NOT PROTECT MINORITY RIGHTS Howard Zinn, Professor Emeritus, Spelman College, DECLARATIONS OF INDEPENDENCE, 1990, p. 253-4. Representative government does not solve the problem of race. It does not solve the problem of class. The very principle [sic] of representation is flawed, as Jean Jacques Rousseau, living in prerevolutionary France in the mideighteenth century, pointed out. His book The Social Contract was a confusing, contradictory, difficult search for a more direct democracy, in which a majority could not vote a minority into slavery or poverty. 4. SYSTEM OF REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY DILUTES DIRECT DEMOCRACY Stephen L. Carter, Law Professor, Yale University, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY, 1994, p. xvi. Just as important to understanding the interaction between democracy and majority rule is the fact that the great majority of the people never has the opportunity to vote directly on the great majority of the issues. The divisive issues—abortion, school prayer, taxes—are never on the ballot. Instead, we all vote for representatives who will then cast votes in our name. Not only does this system dilute direct democracy— sometimes the system openly frustrates it. 5. REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY HAS BEEN AN OBSTACLE TO HUMAN RIGHTS Howard Zinn, Professor Emeritus, Spelman College, DECLARATIONS OF INDEPENDENCE, 1990, p. 186. The black movement, like the labor movement, the women’s movement, and the antiwar movement, has taught us a simple truth: The official channels, the formal procedures of representative government have been sometimes useful, but never sufficient, and have often been obstacles, to the achievement of crucial human rights. What has worked in history has been direct action [sic] by people engaged together, sacrificing, risking together, in a worthwhile cause. 6. CONCEPT OF GROUP REPRESENTATION IN GOVERNMENT IS IMPERFECT Lani Guinier, Law Professor at the University of Pennsylvania, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY, 1994, p. 127. The concept of representation necessarily applies to groups; groups of voters elect representatives individuals do not. Representation is more than that the individual relationship between constituent and elected representative. Because representation is primarily about political influence, not political service, bottom-up representation becomes the essential link to a genuine voice in the process of self-government. Districting is a form of group-interest representation, albeit an imperfectly realized one. 154 DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENTS ARE INHERENTLY FLAWED 1. DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENTS ARE HYPOCRITICAL Howard H. Harriott, Department of Philosophy, University of South Carolina, JOURNAL OF PEACE RESEARCH, 1993, p. 219-220. Put plainly, the paradox is as follows: the ideals of democracy argue for values such as honesty, trust, and open government. The ideals of efficient and effective foreign policy in an anarchic international arena call for lying to friends and foes and a willingness to use force and deception. 2. MONEY NOT VOTES DOMINATES U.S. POLITICAL PROCESS Howard Zinn, Professor Emeritus, Spelman College, DECLARATIONS OF INDEPENDENCE, 1990, p. 254-5. [Campaign] Money buys advertising, prime time on television, a public image. The candidates then have a certain obligation to those with money who supported them. They must look [sic] good to the people who voted for them, but be [sic] good to those who financed them. Voting is mostly certainly overrated as a guarantee of democracy. 3. DEMOCRACY IS NO GUARANTEE AGAINST TOTALITARIANISM Marilyn French, Feminist Author, BEYOND POWER, 1985, p. 356. Those of us who live in democratic states may feel complacent at our good fortune. But there is little to protect any industrial society against sliding into totalitarianism. Even nonindustrial nations can become totalitarian, if they contain an elite with strong faith in control and in possession of weapons, transport, and communications systems devised by modern technology. 4. CONGRESS MEMBERS DO NOT “REPRESENT’ THE VOTERS ON MAJOR ISSUES Howard Zinn, Professor Emeritus, Spelman College, DECLARATIONS OF INDEPENDENCE, 1990, p. 256. We should also note that voting for members of Congress is meaningless for the most important issues of life and death. That is not just because it is impossible to tell at election time how your representative will vote in a future foreign policy crisis. It is also because Congress is a feeble, often nonexistent factor in decisions on war and peace, usually following helplessly along with whatever the president decides. That fact makes a shambles of “representative” government. 155 Democracy Responses Webster’s dictionary defines democracy as, “government by the people.”1 While many governments and systems claim to be democracies, this type of government comes in many forms. A direct democracy is one where each individuals vote counts equally and the vote is directly responsible for the ultimate decision. Representative democracies, in contrast, have individuals use their votes to vest power in a representative who then helps make the ultimate decisions. Regardless, democracy as a system and value has long been heralded as a positive development. Author Ian Budge describes the appeal of democracy in the following way, “Democracy justifies itself as empowering citizens, making government their own rather than an external or imposed authority. So it is hard to defend restrictions on democratic citizens’ power to decide what governments should do and how they should operate.” 2 While Budge may be correct that defending restrictions on democracy is hard, the next few pages will provide arguments that counter democracy and point out the problems in a democratic system of decision making. THE PROBLEM OF MAJORITY RULE A democracy is rarely defended as requiring a unanimous decision by the population to move forward. Such decisions and unanimity would be impossible in the modern world, and so democracy is defended as a majority rule system. As Robert Dahl notes, “In this stronger sense, majority rule means that majority support ought to be not only necessary but sufficient for enacting laws. Requiring majority rule in this strong sense, however, runs into several perplexing problems for which no entirely satisfactory solutions have yet been found.”3 Several justifications are made regarding the use of majority rule. These include that majority rule maximizes self-determination, that it is a necessary consequence of reasonable requirement, that it is more likely to produce correct decisions, and that it maximizes utility. Dahl, however, makes a formidable attack on these justifications. First, assuming that in some decisions there are more than two options, a clear majority will not always exist. In these instances, a minority or plurality of voters will make the ultimate decision. A technical majority of the population will not get the alternative that they voted for. Attempting to resolve this problem led to the coining of the term cyclic voting. Cyclic voting also shows that, “control over the agenda can be used to manipulate the outcome.”4 Dahl also outlines problems concerning boundaries, both between matters decided collectively and matters not so decided; and the boundaries of the collective unit itself. He poses a question to one who would defend majority rule, saying, “Considering the boundary for collective decisions in the light of your first justification, might it not sometimes be possible to maximize self-determination by allowing individuals or groups to decide certain matters autonomously rather than submitting them to a collective decision?” 5 Dahl further argues that in a system that demands representative democracy, “conditions in the real world generally weaken the translation of majority preferences into law and administration.”6 Perhaps Dahl’s most compelling argument is that when the majority seeks to maximize utility, they maximize their own utility and happiness.7 Minority groups can potentially be devastated and destroyed in a majority rule system. Take, for example, a population that was 60% white and 40% African-American. If the entirety of the white population voted to take away the property of African-Americans; majority rule would dictate that it happen. In that sense, majority rule and democracy guarantees only what is good for the group or sub-population that has the largest numbers. Majority rule is a way to justify oppression of minority groups while still technically allowing their voice to be “heard” by continuing to allow them to vote. This type of system condemns any group that does not make up the majority of a population to having decisions made for them by groups who may or may not have their best interests in mind. THE TERM “DEMOCRACY” IS OPEN TO ABUSE In his book The Problem of Democracy, Herbert Lars Gustaf Tingsten argues that, “the implications of ‘democracy’ can be clarified only by noting the difficulties, ambiguities, and tendencies toward conflict and contradiction latent in popular usage of this term.”8 For example, in 1814, Napoleon I declared that he alone represented the French nation and population. Plebiscites had been conducted that sanctioned his rule, and Napoleon believed that he represented the will of the French 156 people in a realistic sense as well. He declared, “My policy is to govern in the manner in which the majority wishes to be governed. This, I believe, is the right way to recognize the sovereignty of the people.” 9 Modern dictators as well have argued that their ability to acquire the right to govern through an election means that they do govern in accord with the will of the people. In the spring of 1919, in a conversation between General Ludendorff, a leader of the nationalist reaction to the Weimar Republic, and Max Weber, a sociologist, this issue was debated. Ludendorff argued that the country was enjoying democracy at the time. Weber, when asked what he meant by a democracy, said, “In a democracy the people choose a leader in whom they have confidence. Subsequently, the leader says, ‘Be quiet and do as I say.’ The people and political parties can no longer interfere with what he does. Then the people may sit in judgment; if the leader has acted wrongly he is sent to the gallows!” 10 While some will argue that this system does allow for a leader to represent the will of the people, it is important to consider if such will can truly be known in that setting. As Tingsten notes, “In reality, there is no way of exacting accountability in any reasonable sense where such a state of affairs prevails.”11 When a leader must only be elected once, the accountability to the people stops at that single vote. Therefore, using the name democracy, individuals can create dictatorships. DEMOCRACY DESTROYS EXPERT DECISION MAKING James Madison eloquently and vigorously defended a representational form of government, speaking of the ills that a direct democracy would bring. Madison was concerned with factions, or smaller groups of an entire population. Madison notes, however, that factions can be the majority of a population as well. He argues that thwarting the will of factions is a desirable function of a government. This is because factions are mostly selfish and therefore opposed to the best interest of the group as a whole. Madison does concede that factions cannot be eliminated except by force. He therefore argues that a society that is free must learn to live with factions while simultaneously moderating them. This can be done by putting power in the hands of representatives instead of in the hands of the public as a whole. These representatives, according to Madison, are more likely to be, “aware of the long-term interests of the population than the population itself.” 12 The advantage to this absence of direct democracy is that citizens still get to vote on who represents them, making those individuals accountable and securing control. It also allows individuals to feel connected to the political system through this more limited form of voting. The representatives, “in turn come between the people and their wishes with their own critical political judgment, thus insulating public policy from their passions.”13 In that sense, those individuals who have the most expertise and information are left to make decisions. No one would argue that the process of governing is simple or easy. The decisions that are to be made are often complex, and have heavy consequences. In such instances, it is impractical to believe that the masses of uneducated and untrained individuals will make preferable decision to those who have been prepared for these situations. Therefore, having individuals who are educated and trained to make decisions rule is superior. A democracy prevents that situation by allowing the entire public to be the decision-making body, and should be rejected because of this problem. DEMOCRACY PRODUCES INSTABILITY Leaving the decision making in the hands of the masses also leads to instability. Madison explains that when factions make decisions, they are hasty and unwise. Similarly, the conflict among factions causes the goals of these groups to shift and be inconsistent. Thus, a primary argument made against democracy is based on the concept of balance. As Budge notes, “The system most likely to produce good decisions is one where popular participation is balanced by expert judgment....leave it to be carried out by the professionals.” 14 This argument is also advanced regarding the ever-changing will of the people. Friedrich Hayek, best known as a critic of socialism, is used as a source of criticism of democracy as well. “He suggests that majority decisions should not be trusted too readily since they tell us only what people want at a given moment, and not what it is in their interest to want if they were better informed. Majorities can be persuaded and minority opinion can become a majority one.” 15 This instability is worsened by the need for a majority to move forward. This argument is furthered when we explore the fact that in order for decisions to get made in a majority rule system, groups must spend time recruiting 157 others to their cause. As Hayek explains, “Under the existing system...every small interest group can enforce its demands, not by persuading a majority that the demands are just or equitable, but by threatening to withhold that support which the nucleus of agreed individuals will need to become a majority.” 16 Therefore, in order to provide a stable system, democracy must be rejected. DEMOCRACY IN THE MODERN WORLD IS INFEASIBLE To value any sort of political system implies that it can be put into practice. If it cannot be, there is no point in discussing that system as it would be futile. There are several points that need to be made in order to prove that direct democracy is infeasible in the modern world and therefore should be rejected. The first reason why democracy in the modern world is infeasible is that there are economic conditions required for democracy. These required economic conditions do not exist everywhere, meaning that there are areas of the world where democracy cannot exist. To claim democracy is best and then concede that it cannot exist everywhere would be to condemn parts of the world to a less-than best system. In order to avoid that scenario, we must reject democracy due to these economic conditions. Author Carl Cohen says in reference to the physical needs of communities, “The fulfillment of these material needs, and the economic system that insures it, so far as these are required for the operation of a democracy, I call its economic conditions.”17 Cohen argues that some level of economic well-being is a condition of democracy. He notes, “No community can long expect to be self-governing unless the members of that community enjoy a minimum level of material wellbeing.”18 Democracy as a system is utterly dependant upon the ability of citizens to participate in the decision making role. This means that these citizens must be physically healthy. If there are frequent medical problems or chronic malnutrition, individuals are unable to participate politically. Individuals cannot concentrate on making astute political choices if they are busy worrying about getting enough food or avoiding disease. When the focus and attention is placed on survival of self and family, a democracy cannot flourish. Economic well-being, as explained by Cohen, is always relatively well or relatively poorly satisfied. This happens on two levels, that of individual circumstance and that of the level of community circumstance. He explains, “Democracy may be feasible, if imperfect, where a small fraction of the community are impoverished; as that fraction grows, democracy in that community is less likely to suceed.”19 There are many countries around our modern world that do not have a population that lives outside of poverty. These countries would be unable to enact democracy, therefore, and a new type of governmental structure that can be effective must be sought after. Cohen sums this point up, adding, “In general, extreme poverty defeats democracy, rendering participation uninformed and superficial, even if widespread. It is the affluent who can afford to be public-spirited citizens.”20 Cohen himself realizes the implications of his argument when he discusses the material prospects of democracy succeeding. He explains, “Long-range success for democracies in political communities will require the attainment of a standard of living for the masses of the world far higher than that they presently enjoy, and it will require a considerable reduction of the gross economic inequalities that presently divide men. That such material objectives can be achieved, or that they will be achieved before economic pressures explode the present world fabric entirely, appear now to be matters of serious doubt.”21 With no real signs of this global poverty diminishing or the rich-poor gap shrinking, democracy is unrealistic and unattainable. Another reason why democracy is infeasible is that political communities have grown too large for direct democracies. Thomas Jefferson wrote in 1800, “Our country is too large to have all its affairs directed by a single government. Public servants at such a distance and from under the eye of their constituents, must, from the circumstance of distance, be unable to administer and overlook all the details necessary for the good government of the citizens, and the same circumstance, by rendering detection impossible to their constituents, will invite the public agents to corruption, plunder and waste.”22 Jefferson’s words bring up the problems with attempting to have direct democracy in a growing political community. The United States is certainly larger now (both in territory and population) than it was in 1800, when Jefferson said that it was too large to have a direct democracy. Jefferson says first that if the public servants are far away from their constituents, they will not be able to do good works for those citizens. They will have only a broad picture instead of knowing people on an individual level to attempt, and cannot do what is best for them. Additionally, with 158 so little public oversight given the great distance, the politicians are free to do what they want. Jefferson indicates that this will lead them to “corruption, plunder, and waste.” In that case, politicians are not serving the people. Yet they are so far removed from the citizenry that there is nothing the citizenry can do about these problems. John Rawls would also share Jefferson’s concerns about the feasibility of a democracy in a modern world where political communities have grown so large. He, “believes that a constitutional democratic state should be grounded in the fundamental intuitive idea of a society as a fair system of cooperation between free and equal persons who are fully cooperating members of that society over a complete life.”23 It would be impossible to expect cooperation in modern America over such a large distance. Individuals in California cannot possibly have a detailed understanding of life in South Carolina or Vermont. They are therefore not in a position to make decisions that will directly effect those individuals who live across the country. The only way to have a system that is fair and values cooperation is to have a governmental structure that makes decisions that are truly for the good of the entire population, involving a level of understanding that cannot be reached with direct democracy. Perhaps there is a place and time for discussing utopian philosophy. Yet democracy does not claim to be utopian, but rather practical. Given its infeasibility, therefore, it should be rejected. Time instead should be spent pursuing other goals and other political systems that might be more capable of being implemented and used around the world, regardless of financial situation or size. DEMOCRACY IS CORRUPT IN ITS ASSOCIATIONS Democracy seems to bring along with it the capitalist system. As Benjamin R. Barber argues, “To listen to politicians and policymakers on both sides of what was once called the Iron Curtain, democracy is but a synonym for the marketplace. This is perhaps the most dangerous, because the most compelling and widely held, myth of our time.” He continues, “Historically, it is not capitalism which produced democracy, but democracy which produced capitalism.”24 This would not be problematic except that capitalism is having negative effects worldwide. Barber explains, “It is no longer clear that postmodern capitalism serves real needs at all. In the ancient capitalist economy, products were manufactured and sold for profit to meet the demand of consumers who made their needs known through the market. In the new postmodern capitalist economy, needs are manufactured to meet the supply of producers who make their products marketable through promotion, spin, packaging, and advertising.”25 The problems that come along with this modern capitalism can be devastating. Environmental damage and pollution are considered necessary and acceptable in the quest to produce more and cheaper products. Meanwhile, land, water, and air become unsafe and lives are shortened and ended due to the environmental degradation. Similarly, labor standards have also been reduced. Individuals are working longer hours for less money in the effort to make the most profit for a company and the upper management. Often injuries and poverty result from poor working conditions and low wages. In many areas of the world, child labor is accepted and used widely. This spread of capitalism can also destroy cultures. As American products spread around the world, they often replace indigenous forms of entertainment and enjoyment. While this can sometimes be positive, the decimation of these cultures does not work to the benefit of populations outside of the United States. Barber is not alone in making the connection between democracy and capitalism. Carl Cohen notes the frequently made argument that, “economic democracy is the condition of any genuine democracy,” meaning that capitalism and a free market economy are necessary for democracy.26 Carter and Stokes write, “Parliamentary multi-party democracy is now widely accepted as the dominant expression of the democratic ideal in most parts of the world. This historical transformation has occurred alongside the ostensible ascendancy of capitalism over state socialism and the declining influence of Marxist ideas.”27 Another way that democracy is corrupting is that it causes individuals to be used as means to an end. Individuals must push others to decisions in order to reach a majority, when they are ultimately only looking out for their own good. This, according to Kant, is a violation of, “a moral conception of the person” as a, “free and equal rational being, recognized as an autonomous member of the kingdom of ends.” He argues, “Moral persons are autonomous 159 and free to choose, and are thus ends in themselves. The categorical imperative provides a rule of respect for human freedom, that is, respect for the right of all persons to determine their own ends, which is clearly expressed in the formulation known as the principle of humanity.”28 Because it requires a majority to get anything passed, a democracy encourages its citizens to view others simply as a vote. The idea becomes to gather a large enough number of supporters, instead of focusing on the good of the political community. Given the connection of democracy to capitalism and the problems capitalism causes, it is understandable why democracies fail. Democracy also brings along a desire to use others for gain, denying them their humanity. With these negative associations, democracy should be rejected. DEMOCRACY IS BASED ON CITIZENSHIP A democracy, at its base, is founded on the concept of citizenship. That is, members of a certain group (usually a country or city) get together to make decisions through a vote. Only citizens, however, get that right to vote. Therefore, a democracy dictates that membership requirements be outlined and enforced for the citizens to make decisions. While in theory this may not sound problematic, in practice it certainly is. The history of the United States provides great examples as to what happens when citizenship requirements are in place. First, only white men who owned property were allowed to vote. Over centuries, the limits of property ownership, race, and sex were eliminated. However, one must still be a citizen to vote in the United States. That means you must have lived in the country for a certain period of time, have legal residence, and have passed a citizenship test. Citizenship requirements such as banning women or African-Americans from voting are obviously problematic. However, the voting restrictions based on citizenship that exist now are problematic as well, though probably not as recognized. Citizenship requirements set up standards for legitimacy, indicating that if you are not a legal citizen, you are not entitled to make decisions about the country you live in. Often the process of gaining citizenship can be flawed or downright corrupt, and therefore innocent people are denied participation in the process of making decisions. The distinction also creates a hierarchy, whereby those who are citizens are considered more important and worthy than those who are not. This increased worth is enforced by bestowing on those individuals the right to vote. Such citizenship requirements also produce worse decisions. First, many groups who are effected by governmental policies are not represented in the decision-making process. Illegal immigrants, for instance, or those awaiting their citizenship legally, do not get to vote. Yet, legislation and policies effect their lives specifically. If a policy is to be created regarding the process of attaining citizenship, immigrants should get to voice their opinions. Similarly, health care and education policies effect these individuals as well as the rest of the public, yet they are denied an ability to vote. Additionally, the validity of votes and decisions is lessened when the entirety of the population is not allowed to participate. Democracy bases its appeal on decisions made by and for the people. However, when large portions of “the people” are left out of the entire process, the decisions are made for them. Thus, like a totalitarian government, policies are imposed as opposed to chosen by the population. This not only takes away the rationale that is offered for democracy, but undermines the legitimacy of the decisions reached by democratic governments. Finally, this citizenship process creates more in-groups and out-groups. It allows a hierarchy to be entrenched and breeds resentment. Eventually, those who are denied a voice may choose to take action in the only venue left open to them: revolution. Denied a way to protest in a vote or through the decision-making process, individuals would turn to violence and resistance in an attempt to have their voices recognized and legitimized. In such instances, stability would be destroyed and the entirety of the political system would be in jeopardy. It would be far superior to create an inclusive, equalizing society instead of allowing a political system which creates citizenship and according hierarchies. SUMMARY 160 While the argument for democracy is often persuasive, both democracy in theory and in practice has many weaknesses. The majority rule that democracies produce denies the voices and opinions of the minorities. A democracy can also easily be abused and used as justification for a more authoritarian government. A democracy puts decision-making in the hands of uneducated masses instead of power in the hands of experts who can make the best decisions for the population. Practically speaking, democracy is infeasible in its direct form in the modern world. The close association with capitalism and dehumanization merits a rejection of democracy. Finally, the necessity of citizenship in establishing democracies makes them undesirable. Thus, at multiple levels, a democratic system of government is not most beneficial. ______________________________ 1 Webster’s II New Riverside Pocket Dictionary. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1991, pg. 74. 2 Budge, Ian. budge://the.new.challenge.of.direct.democracy/. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996, pg. 1. 3 Dahl, Robert A. Democracy and its Critics. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989, pg. 135. 4 Ibid, pg. 146. 5 Ibid, pg. 147. 6 Ibid, pg. 149. 7 Ibid, pg. 151. 8 Tingsten, Herbert Lars Gustaf. The Problem of Democracy. New York: The Bedminster Press, 1965, pg. 83. 9 Ibid, pg. 83. 10 Ibid, pg. 84. 11 Ibid, pg. 86. 12 Budge, Ian. budge://the.new.challenge.of.direct.democracy/. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996, pg. 74. 13 Ibid, pg. 74. 14 Ibid, pg. 60. 15 Carter, April and Geoffrey Stokes. Liberal Democracy and its Critics. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998, pg. 25. 16 Ibid, pg. 25. 17 Cohen, Carl. Democracy. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1971, pg. 109. 18 Ibid, pg. 109. 19 Ibid, pg. 110. 20 Ibid, pg. 100. 21 Ibid, pg. 277. 22 Padover, Saul K. Thomas Jefferson on Democracy. New York: Mentor Books, 1939, pg. 30. 23 Hayden, Patrick. John Rawls: Towards a Just World Order. Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2002, pg. 75. 24 Hirst, Paul and Sunil Khilnani. Reinventing Democracy. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1996, pg. 152. 25 Ibid, pg. 153. 26 Cohen, Carl. Democracy. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1971, pg. 109. 27 Carter, April and Geoffrey Stokes. Liberal Democracy and its Critics. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998, pg. 1. 28 Hayden, Patrick. John Rawls: Towards a Just World Order. Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2002, pg. 142. 161 THE PROBLEM OF MAJORITY RULE 1. DEMOCRACY SUBORDINATES MARGINALIZED POLITICAL OPINIONS. Slavoj Zizek. Senior Researcher at the Institute for Social Studies, Ljubljana, Slovenia. 2003. “Too Much Democracy?” www.lacan.com. Updated April 14, 2004. NP. "Democracy" is not merely the "power of, by, and for the people," it is not enough just to claim that, in democracy, the will and the interests (the two in no way automatically coincide) of the large majority determine the state decisions. Democracy - in the way this term is used today - concerns, above all, formal legalism: its minimal definition is the unconditional adherence to a certain set of formal rules which guarantee that antagonisms are fully absorbed into the agonistic game. "Democracy" means that, whatever electoral manipulation took place, every political agent will unconditionally respect the results. In this sense, the US presidential elections of 2000 were effectively "democratic": in spite of obvious electoral manipulations, and of the patent meaninglessness of the fact that a couple hundred of Florida voices will decide who will be the president, the Democratic candidate accepted his defeat. In the weeks of uncertainty after the elections, Bill Clinton made an appropriate acerbic comment: "The American people have spoken; we just don't know what they said." This comment should be taken more seriously than it was meant: even now, we don't know it - and, maybe, because there was no substantial "message" behind the result at all. This is the sense in which one should render problematic democracy: why should the Left always and unconditionally respect the formal democratic "rules of the game?” Why should it not, in some circumstances, at least, put in question the legitimacy of the outcome of a formal democratic procedure? 2. DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY ENTRENCHES THE SUBORDINATION OF DISEMPOWERED GROUPS Lynn Sanders, Political Science Professor. Political Theory. June 1997, pg. 349. If we assume that deliberation cannot proceed without the realization of mutual respect, and deliberation appears to be proceeding, we may even mistakenly decide that conditions of mutual respect have been achieved by deliberators. In this way, taking deliberation as a signal of democratic practice paradoxically works undemocratically, discrediting on seemingly democratic grounds the views of those who are less likely to present their arguments in ways that we recognize as characteristically deliberative. In our political culture, these citizens are likely to be those who are already underrepresented in formal political institutions and who are systematically materially disadvantaged, namely women; racial minorities, especially Blacks; and poorer people. 162 DEMOCRACY DESTROYS EXPERT DECISION MAKING 1. DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY HINDERS COLLECTIVE POLITICAL ACTION James Gardner, Professor of Law. Tennessee Law Review Association, Winter 1996, pg. 447. Second, citizens of a deliberative democracy are likely to be uncooperative and obstructionistic. Many of the personal benefits of democracy flow, as we have seen, from the sense of self-mastery that citizens gain when they have an opportunity to participate meaningfully in the governmental processes that affect their lives. Because deliberative democracy is so heavily weighted toward protecting minorities, and because it so strongly emphasizes consensus, just about the only way for citizens to feel like they are actually influencing the process of collective decision making is to exercise a veto. Moreover, since deliberative democracy indirectly teaches minorities the legitimacy of maintaining the integrity of group or individual identity against outside pressures for change, people who believe that they are in the minority are especially likely to dig in their heels, further obstructing the possibility of collective political action. 2. DEMOCRACY SHIFTS DECISIONS FROM INDIVIDUALS TO CAPITALIST INSTITUTIONS Slavoj Zizek. Senior Researcher at the Institute for Social Studies, Ljubljana, Slovenia. “Too Much Democracy?” www.lacan.com 2003. Accessed April 14, 2004. NP. As for the US themselves, Zakaria's diagnosis is that "America is increasingly embracing a simple-minded populism that values popularity and openness as the key measures of legitimacy. /.../ The result is a deep imbalance in the American system, more democracy but less liberty." The remedy is thus to counteract this excessive "democratization of democracy" (or "deMOREcracy") by delegating more power to impartial experts insulated from the democratic fray, like the independent central banks. Such a diagnosis cannot but provoke an ironic laughter: today, in the alleged "overdemocratization," the US and the UK started a war on Iraq against the will of the majority of their own populations, not to mention the international community. And are we not all the time witnessing the imposition of key decisions concerning global economy (trade agreements, etc.) by "impartial" bodies exempted from democratic control? Is the idea that, in our post-ideological era, economy should be de-politicized and run by experts, today not a commonplace shared by all participants? Even more fundamentally, is it not ridiculous to complain about "overdemocratization" in a time when the key economic and geopolitic decisions are as a rule not an issue in elections: for at least three decades, what Zakaria demands is already a fact. What we are effectively witnessing today is a split into ideological life-style issues where fierce debates rage and choices are solicited (abortion, gay marriages, etc.), and the basic economic policy which is presented as a depoliticized domain of expert decisions - the proliferation of "overdemocracy" with the "excesses" or affirmative action, the "culture of complaint," and the demands for financial and other restitutions of victims, is ultimately the front whose back side is the silent weaving of the economic logic. 163 THE TERM DEMOCRACY IS OPEN TO ABUSE 1. DEMOCRACY IS USED TO MANIPULATE AND CONTROL Slavoj Zizek. Senior Researcher at the Institute for Social Studies, Ljubljana, Slovenia. “Too Much Democracy?” www.lacan.com 2003. Accessed April 14, 2004. NP. In The Future of Freedom, Fareed Zakaria, Bush's favored columnist, locates the threat to freedom in "overdoing democracy," i.e., in the rise of "illiberal democracy at home and abroad" (the books subtitle). He draws the lesson that democracy can only "catch on" in economically developed countries: if the developing countries are "prematurely democratized," the result is a populism which ends in economic catastrophe and political despotism no wonder that today's economically most successful Third World countries (Taiwan, South Korea, Chile) embraced full democracy only after a period of authoritarian rule. The immediate lessons for Iraq is clear and unambiguous: yes, the US should bring democracy to Iraq, but not impose it immediately - there should first be a period of five or so years in which a benevolently-authoritarian US dominated regime would create proper conditions for the effective functioning of democracy... We know now what bringing democracy means: it means that the US and its "willing partners" impose themselves as the ultimate judges who decide if a country is ripe for democracy. 2. DEMOCRACY CAN BE USED TO DECREASE FREEDOM Slavoj Zizek. Senior Researcher at the Institute for Social Studies, Ljubljana, Slovenia. “Too Much Democracy?” www.lacan.com 2003. Accessed April 14, 2004. NP. Interestingly enough, there is at least one case in which formal democrats themselves (or, at least, a substantial part of them) would tolerate the suspension of democracy: what if the formally free elections are won by an antidemocratic party whose platform promises the abolition of formal democracy? (This did happen, among other places, in Algeria a couple of years ago, and the situation is similar in today's Pakistan.) In such a case, many a democrat would concede that the people was not yet "mature" enough to be allowed democracy, and that some kind of enlightened despotism whose aim will be to educate the majority into proper democrats is preferable. 164 DEMOCRACY IN THE MODERN WORLD IS INFEASABLE 1. DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY FOSTERS TYRANNY AND IS INEFFECTIVE James Gardner, Professor of Law. Tennessee Law Review Association. Winter 1996, pg. 447. The deficiencies of deliberative democracy are even better illustrated by examining the kind of citizens it is likely to constitute. Deliberative democracy theorists seem to think that these citizens will be generous, open-minded and self- sacrificing. For the reasons set out in the previous section, I think it far more likely that deliberative democracy would constitute citizens who are ineffectual, tyrannical, obstructionist, and in general poorly suited for the kind of life demanded of citizens in a large, modern republic. First, citizens of a deliberative democracy are likely to live in a constant state of frustration because they are unable to live up to deliberative democracy's unrelenting demands of openness, good faith, and authenticity in dialogue. Every debate cut off in heated argument or terminated short of agreement is a failure, and deliberative democracy implies that the failure is one of character because it likely results from laziness and insufficient openness. 2. DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY IS UNTENABLE: CITIZENS WILL BE UNWILLING TO INVEST THE RESOURCES NECESSARY FOR DELIBERATION Christopher Schroeder, Professor of Law and Public Policy Studies, Law and Contemporary Problems. Summer 2002, pg. 118. In the case of individuals choosing between deliberative and private pursuits, while there is good evidence that citizens will invest some resources in participating in public affairs, that evidence comes nowhere near suggesting they will invest resources of the magnitude deliberative theory demands. The behavior necessary to satisfy the demands of deliberation stands quite outside anything that can be achieved, just as deliberative theorists concede. While conceding this reality, though, they ignore its implications. It is worth a moment to reflect on both the reality and the implications. 165 The Denial Of Death What do the war rituals of indigenous peoples, the proliferation of gyms in major cities, nanotechnology and professional wrestling have in common? Some psychologists say that they represent a universal human urge to conquer death. By performing intricate ceremonies, building up our bodies, and advancing technological "fixes," some argue, we contribute to a culture that fundamentally denies the undeniable - our mortality. Okay, I made up the professional wrestling part. Though I think it is an excellent example of the theories of Ernest Becker, the Pulitzer Prize winning author, Becker died in 1974 - the year I was born, and before anyone could smell what the Rock was cookin'. THE DENIAL OF DEATH was the book that earned Becker the most hallowed of writing prizes, but it wasn't his only exploration into what drives human motivation. He was interested in human evil, and how it comes about. For those of you who don't want to read the rest of essay, here's the upshot: Becker, a noted cultural anthropologist, believed that all people want to deny their own death - to completely repress the notion that one day they will stop breathing and cease to exist. They do so in all cultures through a remarkably similar set of rituals, Becker notes. To some extent, this is psychologically necessary. We couldn't function if we were thinking, for every minute of every day, how we were going to die. But on another level, this way of looking at things creates many negative psychological consequences. For example, if certain cultures perform death-conquering rituals, it gives them the feeling of superiority over other cultures. Becker uses this argument, which I'll get into in greater detail below, to link the fear of death with the rise of religious fundamentalist movements worldwide and social conflict generally. Becker is not the only psychologist to declare the fear of death as the essence of many human mental problems. Viktor E. Frankl was another - and though their theories are very different, they share common elements and themes. Briefly, they are: that all human beings hope their lives have meaning, and that trying to create meaning occupies our minds even at times when we don't realize it; that our efforts to deny the reality of our own death are ultimately fruitless, and just give rise to insecurity, pain and ultimately, evil. I've always thought that psychological arguments got short shrift in debate. It wasn't until the rise of the policy debate critique that we even heard psychological principles used in rounds on a regular basis. However you feel about the "fiat is imaginary" argument, it at least got people to think about the impact what goes in rounds has on our minds. The arguments I'm about to discuss don't deal with psychology in the same way: that is, they don't make claims related to in-round impacts per se. They can, of course, be used in philosophical critiques, which I do advise. But they do get at some questions which are pretty fundamental in the lives of every human: we are all going to die - so what is the proper way to live life before we do, and how do we prepare for dealing with the inevitable? VIKTOR FRANKL: ANOTHER PROMINENT TAKE ON DEATH-DENIAL If you were to ask anyone who would be best to talk about what it's like to live every day in the shadow of death, most people would answer quickly: a Holocaust survivor. Who better to relate the near-death experience than someone who survived the defining horror of the twentieth century? Well, possibly someone who was a professional psychotherapist before being sent to the camps. Viktor E. Frankl, a brilliant post-Freudian psychotherapist, was rounded up with other Jews and taken to the Nazi concentration camps. There, he lost family. Under the oppressive conditions, it would have been easy to lose one's mind. But Frankl began writing secretly, keeping his manuscript from the guards. For him, with the loss of his family and the world around him crumbling, meaning could be found in his work. 166 That's what Frankl ultimately decided was the most important thing for humans: a meaning for their lives. For him, it was helping others through psychotherapy. Who knows what it is for you? Probably just you yourself - but what's important, according to Frankl, is that you know what it is. The principle he cites is this: "he who has a why to live can bear almost any how." That's the thesis he advances during his classic MAN'S SEARCH FOR MEANING. Coming from someone who survived a Nazi death camp during World War II, the claim becomes all the more plausible. WHAT WE CAN CONTROL AND WHAT WE CAN'T Frankl used the insights he gathered in the death camps to found an entirely new school of psychological research, which he called logotherapy. Sometimes, his thought is called "existential psychology," and it also seems to borrow some insights from Zen Buddhism. I think this bit of Frankl's thought will give you some sense of why the reference to existentialism is valid: he says that life can throw just about anything at you, but the only thing you can determine is how you respond to it. In particular - and another argument where its source lends it massive credibility - Frankl says that suffering can be a great teacher. People who have suffered great losses possess a deep understanding of the world that others who skate through life simply never will. His is not to say that suffering is good necessarily - but we all will experience hardship in this life, albeit in varying degrees. The task, then, is to accept the inevitable, and choose to respond to it in the best and most profitable way we can. Similarly, Frankl says, every person dies. But not every person possesses a life that can be truly said to have meaning. That's up to us, and I'll discuss later what its debate applications are. THE HERO SYSTEM AND OUR DESIRE FOR IMMORTALITY I should point out that the notion of humans desiring immortality is not new. When a woman asked Socrates "What is love?" he is said to have replied, "A desire for immortality." Ernest Becker expanded on that statement, devoting a series of books to the topic. He examines religion and ritual in ancient and modern societies, and found that most of the rituals were designed - literally or metaphorically - to conquer death. The Egyptians had well-documented elaborate practices designed to ensure they made it to the afterlife. Modern religion mirrors these practices, to a lesser extent. But even atheistic societies and cultures had this same characteristic: sometimes the rituals were games or tests, sometimes body manipulation - tattooing, piercing, and the like. It's different for every nation or tribe, and even natural. THE DENIAL OF DEATH goes into great detail about what causes this psychological process. There's one problem, though. If my culture has one ritual (or God) and your culture has another ritual (or God), we have two competing immortality systems. Some enlightened cultures realized that the truth of one system didn't discount the truth of another - but as we all know, the world isn't made up solely of enlightened cultures. That's what gives rise to religious fundamentalism, or even simple tension between two individual people. If you have an immortality system that is different from mine, one must be false. If mine is false, I have no immortality system. If I have no immortality system, my life has no meaning and I fall victim to the spectre of death. Therefore, I must conquer your immortality system. That means converting you, or killing you and all those who look, act and believe like you. This, Becker argues, is the essential motivation behind the Crusades as well as the Nazi Holocaust. His work culminates in ESCAPE FROM EVIL, where Becker argues that "man's natural and inevitable urge to deny mortality and achieve a heroic self-image are the root causes of human evil." Naturally, these ritual systems we speak of evolve. Though we are still a religious society, most of the ritual and mysticism has been drained out of everyday life. Even though Becker died in the 1970s, he recognized that there was a new universal power ideology money - on the horizon. This serves to point out that there are many ways to structure an immortality system. In the beginning, we saw mostly physical tests of strength - war rituals, etc. We see this today in high school sports, especially football. But that has evolved over the centuries, and different cultures often evolved multiple hero systems. Sometimes people 167 were valued for their physical prowess, sometime for their mental skills or eloquence, depending on what circles they ran in. I am quoting the following at length for two reasons: the first is it sums up nicely Becker's reasoning about the process of death denial. The second is I think it will help debaters recognize why so many people take debate so seriously. "And so Rank could say, 'Every conflict for the truth is in the last analysis just the same old struggle for ... immortality.' If anyone doubts this, let him try to explain in any other way the life-and-death viciousness of ideological disputes. Each person nourishes his immortality in the ideology of self-perpetuation to which he gives his allegiance; this gives the only abiding significance it can have. No wonder men go into a rage over fine points of belief: if your adversary wins the argument about truth, you die. Your immortality system has been shown to be fallible, your life becomes fallible." (Ernest Becker, ESCAPE FROM EVIL, p. 64) High school football is a hero system that symbolically promises immortality, and so is high school and college debate. Are there any social conflicts between the jocks at your school and the debaters? This is just a small manifestation of the kind of social conflicts Becker is identifying. Whenever an athlete beats up another kid, or whenever a couple of debaters make fun of how stupid the football players are, they are each exerting their respective hero systems. I hope by now it is apparent that I am not crazy when I suggest that professional wrestling fits right into this mold. You have your good guy (babyface) and your bad guy (heel), and they fight. One of them wins, and the result teaches us lessons. Wrestling is actually very similar to the morality plays prevalent in medieval England and Puritan America - the only things different are the lessons. The immortality system's basic framework has been in place for millennia. But recent developments have given us new manifestations of death-denial, which could have profound implications for society and for debate. WHAT ARE THE MANIFESTATIONS OF THE DENIAL OF DEATH? In the new era, manifestations of the denial of death are many and varied. We already mentioned the various examples of competing hero systems at work in the world. But there are some recent developments in the art of pushing mortality to the background. Most of them center around modern technology, and how its innovations promise a world without death. Some relatively benign examples include America's fitness obsession, where everyone belongs to a gym, and nutrition science. But there are other, spookier ways that people (mostly scientists) are attempting to push death away with a sharp stick. Take cryogenics, also known as cryonics, for example. If you get sick, they're looking for a way to freeze you until they can cure you. Well, actually, probably not you - probably someone very, very rich. But you get the idea. Or take the super technologists, like K. Erik Drexler and Frank Tipler. Drexler is famous as the father of nanotechnology, while Tipler is less famous, but gained a small measure of renown for THE PHYSICS OF IMMORTALITY. Drexler is arguing that nanomachines - tiny machines that can self-replicate - will ultimately being able to recreate genetic material from dead organisms, thus raising the possibility of reviving endangered species. Tipler's book is perhaps the ultimate example of death denial, though. He makes the serious case that one day, people will be able to download their consciousness - their brain, their personality, everything that makes them onto silicon-based brains, effectively preserving peoples' minds for all eternity. Now, no one wants to die - but doesn't this represent an irrational hope at best, a push toward monstrosity at worst? Haven't these people ever read Mary Shelley's FRANKENSTEIN, as we were all forced to do in high school, and again in college? 168 The point of Becker's intellectual successors in responding to this sort of thing hinges on the fact that we are biological entities with consciousness. To remove one from the other probably removes the essence of humanity. If we have to do that, it probably isn't worth immortality. HOW TO WORK AGAINST THE PROBLEM Both Frankl and Becker, despite their differing views of the fear of death, agree than an acceptance of our ultimate mortality is a necessary precondition to working against the unhealthy fear of death. Frankl takes a very Zen viewpoint - that human understanding of the issues involved is the crucial point. And if we simply realize what it is we're after - meaning - then we will be able to pursue it in a successful and psychologically healthy manner. Becker extends it a step farther, saying that people must learn to almost embrace death. He delineates between a "positive faith" and belief in the afterlife, and a nasty, exclusionist mentality that pervades the denial of death. Sad to say, Becker's last suggestion on the subject - understandable given his concerns about the rising money orthodoxy in the world - was Marxism, which he wrote "has already had an enormous influence for human survival," giving it credit for "(stopping) Hitler in Russia," and eliminating "the gratuitous and age-old miseries of the most numerous people on Earth." Needless to say, it's not likely that's going to come around again. DEBATE MANIFESTATIONS OF THE DENIAL OF DEATH The fear of death argument can be used well as a critique, or as a value objection in Lincoln Douglas Debate. While Becker's and Frankl's arguments are distinct, is possible to use them in the same critique: probably a criticism of using technological fixes to prolong life. Additionally, the Frankl argument can be used to illuminate the value of suffering. A close relative of the "crisis is good because it spawns an ethic" argument, the suffering argument can point out that avoiding every negative situation is probably not the way to go. From most sources, this might come off as a repugnant position - but coming from a Holocaust survivor, it holds a lot of sway. Either way, I strongly suggest that you read THE DENIAL OF DEATH, ESCAPE FOR EVIL and MAN'S SEARCH FOR MEANING. Besides providing an opportunity for creative argument, the books get to the bottom of that most mysterious place: the human mind. 169 BIBLIOGRAPHY Ernest Becker, THE BIRTH AND DEATH OF MEANING: A PERSPECTIVE IN PSYCHIATRY AND ANTHROPOLOGY, New York: The Free Press, 1962. Ernest Becker, THE REVOLUTION IN PSYCHIATRY: THE NEW UNDERSTANDING OF MAN, New York: The Free Press, 1964. Ernest Becker, BEYOND ALIENATION: A PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION FOR THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRACY, New York: George Brazillier, 1967. Ernest Becker, STRUCTURE OF EVIL: AN ESSAY ON THE UNIFICATION OF THE SCIENCE OF MAN, New York: George Brazillier, 1968. Ernest Becker, LOST SCIENCE OF MAN, New York: George Brazillier, 1971. Ernest Becker, THE BIRTH AND DEATH OF MEANING: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVE ON THE PROBLEM OF MAN, New York: The Free Press, 1971. Ernest Becker, THE DENIAL OF DEATH, New York: The Free Press, 1973. Ernest Becker, ESCAPE FROM EVIL, New York: The Free Press, 1975. Ron Evans, THE CREATIVE MYTH AND THE COSMIC HERO: TEXT AND CONTEXT IN ERNEST BECKER'S THE DENIAL OF DEATH, New York: Peter Lang, 1992. Viktor Frankl, MAN'S SEARCH FOR MEANING, New York: Washington Square Press, 1984. R. May, EXISTENTIAL PSYCHOLOGY: SECOND EDITION, New York: Random House, 1984. Michael Alan Kagan, EDUCATING HEROES: THE IMPLICATIONS OF ERNEST BECKER'S DEPTH PSYCHOLOGY OF EDUCATION FOR PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION, Durango, CO: Hollowbrook Publishing, 1994. Sam Keen, "A Conversation with Ernest Becker". PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, April 1974, p. 71-80. Sally A. Kenel, Mortal Gods: ERNEST BECKER AND FUNDAMENTAL THEOLOGY, Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1984. Jaron Lanier, "Death: the Skeleton Key of Consciousness Studies?" JOURNAL OF CONSCIOUSNESS STUDIES, Vol. 4, No. 2, 1997, p. 181. Stephen W. Martin, DECOMPOSING MODERNITY: ERNEST BECKER'S IMAGES OF HUMANITY AT THE END OF AN AGE, Lanham MD: University Press of America, 1997. 170 DENIAL OF DEATH HAS SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES 1. THE CONSEQUENCES OF DENIAL OF DEATH ARE DISASTROUS Glenn Hughes, University of Washington Professor, ERNEST BECKER FOUNDATION NEWSLETTER, January 1998, p. 2. This psychological denial of death, Becker claims, is one of the most basic drives in individual behavior, and is reflected throughout human culture. Indeed, one of the main functions of culture, according to Becker, is to help us successfully avoid awareness of our mortality. That suppression of awareness plays a crucial role in keeping people functioning - if we were constantly aware of our fragility, of the nothingness we are a split second away from at all times, we'd go nuts. And how does culture perform this crucial function? By making us feel certain that we, or realities we are part of, are permanent, invulnerable, eternal. And in Becker's view, some of the personal and social consequences of this are disastrous. 2. DENIAL OF DEATH IS THE ROOT OF BIAS AND HATE Glenn Hughes, University of Washington Professor, ERNEST BECKER FOUNDATION NEWSLETTER, January 1998, p. 2. First, at the personal level, by ignoring our mortality and vulnerability we build up an unreal sense of self, and we act out of a false sense of who and what we are. Second, as members of society, we tend to identify with one or another "immortality system" (as Becker calls it). That is, we identify with a religious group, or a political group, or engage in some kind of cultural activity, or adopt a certain culturally sanctioned viewpoint, that we invest with ultimate meaning, and to which we ascribe absolute and permanent truth. This inflates us with a sense of invulnerable righteousness. And then, we have to protect ourselves against the exposure of our absolute truth being just one more mortality-denying system among others, which we can only do by insisting that all other absolute truths are false. So we attack and degrade - preferably kill - the adherents of different mortality-denying-absolute-truth systems. So the Protestants kill the Catholics; the Muslims vilify the Christians and vice versa; upholders of the American way of life denounce Communists; the Communist Khmer Rouge slaughters all the intellectuals in Cambodia; the Spanish Inquisition tortures heretics; and all good students of the Enlightenment demonize religion as the source of all evil. The list could go on and on. 3. POLITICAL AND SOCIAL CONFLICTS WILL BE DETERMINED BY DEATH DENIAL Jaron Lanier, Department of Computer Science, Columbia University, JOURNAL OF CONSCIOUSNESS STUDIES, Vol. 4, No. 2, 1997, p. 181. Is it a coincidence that religious fundamentalism is experiencing a resurgence at just the time that science is starting to touch some of the most intimate aspects of human identity? Today's social conflicts are more likely to be about technologies that challenge our definition of death, such as abortion, than about the distribution of wealth. Although the consciousness community is obscure in the larger scheme of world events, I believe we are on the front lines of a fundamental conflict. The political and social future will be largely determined by the provisional outcomes of conflicts over what are essentially popularized variants of the hard problem. 171 INDIVIDUALS MUST ACCEPT MORTALITY TO CONQUER FEAR OF DEATH 1. ACCEPTANCE OF DEATH IS ONLY WAY TO SOLVE DENIAL OF DEATH Glenn Hughes, University of Washington Professor, ERNEST BECKER FOUNDATION NEWSLETTER, January 1998, p. 2. Above all, Becker says, adopting a phrase from Luther, you must be able to "...taste death with the lips of your living body [so] that you can know emotionally that you are a creature who will die." Then quoting William James (who is himself quoting the mystic Jacob Boehme), Becker further describes this "tasting" of death as a "passage into nothing, [a passage in which] a critical point must usually be passed, a corner turned within one." Thus in this process of self-realization, Becker writes, the self is "brought down to nothing." For what purpose? So that the process of what Becker calls "self-transcendence" may begin. 2. GOOD FAITH CAN COUNTERACT NEGATIVE IMMORTALITY SYSTEMS Glenn Hughes, University of Washington Professor, ERNEST BECKER FOUNDATION NEWSLETTER, January 1998, p. 2. And he describes the process of self-transcendence this way: "Man breaks through the bounds of merely cultural heroism; he destroys the character lie that had him perform as a hero in the everyday social scheme of things; and by doing so he opens himself up to infinity, to the possibility of cosmic heroism ... He links his secret inner self, his authentic talent, his deepest feelings of uniqueness ... to the very ground of creation. Out of the ruins of the broken cultural self there remains the mystery of the private, invisible, inner self which yearned for ultimate significance. ...This invisible mystery at the heart of [the] creature now attains cosmic significance by affirming its connection with the invisible mystery at the heart of creation. "This," he concludes, "is the meaning of faith." Faith is the belief that despite one's "insignificance, weakness, death, one's existence has meaning in some ultimate sense because it exists within an eternal and infinite scheme of things brought about and maintained to some kind of design by some creative force." This, then, is what we might call good faith, not a flight into some immortality system. 3. DENIAL OF DEATH IS NOT INEVITABLE Glenn Hughes, University of Washington Professor, ERNEST BECKER FOUNDATION NEWSLETTER, January 1998, p. 2. But then again: is this true for every person with a passionate commitment to a meaning that endures? Are there Buddhists or Christians, for example, whose convictions and commitments do not constitute an evasion of mortality-who on the contrary face up to and embrace their mortality? In The Denial of Death, Becker tells us that there certainly are such people. In the fifth chapter, titled "The Psychoanalyst Kierkegaard," Becker applauds Kierkegaard's portrayal of the person who does not lie about the human condition, who breaks away from the cultural network of lies that ward off the awareness of mortality, and who faces the precariousness and fragility of existence - with inevitable anxiety. Becker praises these people for their courageous "destruction of...emotional character armor." Such a courageous and frightening passage to honesty is symbolized in the literary figure of King Lear: through the terror of being stripped of all his illusions of invulnerability, he comes finally to a profound if tragic reconciliation with reality. As for actual cultural representatives, he mentions Zen Buddhists, but "in fact," he writes, it is a process undergone by "self-realized men in any epoch." Becker affirms, then, that it is possible to face up to the human situation. The denial of death is not inevitable. 172 SCIENCE CAN SOLVE IMPACTS OF DEATH AND FEAR OF DEATH 1. WE CAN SOLVE THE IMPACTS OF DEATH THROUGH SCIENCE Frank Tipler, Professor of Physics at Tulane University, THE PHYSICS OF IMMORTALITY: MODERN COSMOLOGY, GOD, AND THE RESURRECTION OF THE DEAD, 1995, p. 269. This exponentially increasing wealth allows life in the far future the power to resurrect us all and, furthermore, allows the Omega Point to share wealth in such a way that our share is an ever decreasing percentage of the whole, yet nevertheless our share also diverges to plus infinity. Any cosmology with progress to infinity will necessarily end in God. Further, the hope of eternal worldly progress and the hope of individual survival beyond the grave turn out to be the same. Far from being polar opposites, these two hopes require each other: one cannot have one without the other. The Omega Point is truly the God of Hope: "O death, where is thy death? O grave, where is thy victory?" (I Corinthians 15:55) 2. HUMANS FIND MORE MEANING WITH OMEGA POINT EXPLANATION Frank Tipler, Professor of Physics at Tulane University, THE PHYSICS OF IMMORTALITY: MODERN COSMOLOGY, GOD, AND THE RESURRECTION OF THE DEAD, 1995, p. 82. Human beings have learned how to find happiness even in the most appalling circumstances. But they would be happier knowing that one day there would be better conditions, that the universe was not in point of fact absurd, but rather full of meaning. Sisyphus would be happier knowing his toil served some purpose, and that one day he would be free to climb still higher mountains, climb all the way to God himself. 3. PEOPLE WILL FIND MORE MEANING FOR THEIR LIVES WITH OMEGA THEORY Frank Tipler, Professor of Physics at Tulane University, THE PHYSICS OF IMMORTALITY: MODERN COSMOLOGY, GOD, AND THE RESURRECTION OF THE DEAD, 1995, p. 82. People can find meaning in their lives even believing that they, their children and all their descendants will eventually die, never to rise again. But they would find more meaning in their lives if they believed what the Omega Point Theory claims to be the case, namely that one day they and their children will rise from the dead, never to die again. They would find more meaning in their lives if they believed that the Eternal Return is not true. And it is fact not true, as I shall show below. 4. SCIENCE CAN STOP THE FEAR OF DEATH, JUST AS RELIGION ONCE DID Frank Tipler, Professor of Physics at Tulane University, THE PHYSICS OF IMMORTALITY: MODERN COSMOLOGY, GOD, AND THE RESURRECTION OF THE DEAD, 1995, p. 338. The Omega Point Theory allows the key concepts of the Judeo-Christian-Islamic tradition now to be modern physics concepts: theology is nothing but physical cosmology based on the assumption that life as a whole is immortal. A consequence of this assumption is the resurrection of everyone who has ever lived to eternal life. Physics has now absorbed theology; the divorce between science and religion, between reason and emotion, is over. I began this book with an assertion on the pointlessness of the universe by Steven Weinberg. He repeats this in his latest book, DREAMS OF A FINAL THEORY, and goes on to say " ... I do not think for a minute that science will ever provide the consolations that have been offered by religion in facing death." I disagree. Science can now offer precisely the consolations in facing death that religion once offered. 173 SCIENCE SHOWS ETERNAL LIFE IS POSSIBLE 1. LIFE MEANS INFORMATION PROCESSING, AS IN A COMPUTER PROGRAM Frank Tipler, Professor of Physics at Tulane University, THE PHYSICS OF IMMORTALITY: MODERN COSMOLOGY, GOD, AND THE RESURRECTION OF THE DEAD, 1995, p. 124. In order to investigate whether life can continue to exist forever, I shall need to define "life" in physics language. I claim that a "living being" is any entity which codes information coded being preserved by natural selection. Thus "life" is a form of information processing, and the human mind - and the human soul - is a very complex computer program. 2. PHYSICS CAN PROVE THAT ETERNAL LIFE CAN HAPPEN Frank Tipler, Professor of Physics at Tulane University, THE PHYSICS OF IMMORTALITY: MODERN COSMOLOGY, GOD, AND THE RESURRECTION OF THE DEAD, 1995, p. 135. Let us now consider whether the laws of physics will permit life/information processing to continue forever. John von Neumann and others have shown that information processing (more precisely, the irreversible storage of information) is constrained by the First and Second Laws of Thermodynamics. Thus the storage of a bit information requires the expenditure of a definite minimum of information of available energy, this amount being proportional to the temperature. This means it is possible to process and store an infinite amount of energy between now and the final state of the universe only if the time integral of P/T is infinite, where P is the power used in the computation, and T is the temperature. Thus the laws of thermodynamics will permit an infinite amount of information processing in the future, provided there is sufficient available energy at all future times. 3. SCIENTIFIC REDUCTIONISM ALLOWS US TO INTEGRATE RELIGION AND SCIENCE Frank Tipler, Professor of Physics at Tulane University, THE PHYSICS OF IMMORTALITY: MODERN COSMOLOGY, GOD, AND THE RESURRECTION OF THE DEAD, 1995, p. xiv. Our arrogance stems from the reductionist perception that ours is the ultimate science, and from our undoubted achievements over the past few centuries. What we promise, we generally deliver. Whatever one thinks of social significance of the nuclear bomb, there is no doubt that it works. Solar eclipses occur exactly when we predict they will. As one who has spent his entire life as a physicist or as a physicist manque, I not surprisingly share this arrogance. In my previous publications on religion and physics, I have attempted to conceal this arrogance (not very successfully). In this book, however, I have not bothered, mainly because such concealment in the past has prevented me from presenting the strongest case for reductionism. And reductionism is true. Furthermore, accepting reductionism allows one to integrate fully religion and science. 174 Deontology Versus Utilitarianism: New Ways Around Old Debates Whenever questions of public policy arise, it seems inevitable that the same old deontology versus utilitarianism debate will rear its ugly head. A moral conflict comes up in which the question is, can you take a questionably moral action in order to ensure a greater good? The deontology side exclaims “never treat anyone as a means to an ends!” The utilitarian replies, “the greatest good for the greatest number!” Debates rarely seems to go beyond these competing refrains. But how is a judge to decide between these two slogans? Both are well grounded in philosophical traditions. How can debaters take it to the next level and find ways to successfully defend their moral framework? This essay will explore the conventional ways the deontology versus utilitarianism debate has been carried out and offer argumentative suggestions for avoiding the usual unproductive standstills, pitfalls, and traps. The most prominent founders of the deontology versus utilitarianism debate are Jeremy Bentham and Immanuel Kant, although others came before them and many have followed in their footsteps. In the 18th century, both Bentham and Kant claimed to have knowledge of the ultimate laws of morality. Bentham explains the “Principle of Utility” in his Principles of Morals and Legislation and Kant explains the “Categorical Imperative” in his Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals. Both principles attempt to define moral action. Bentham states the meaning of his principle: By the principle of utility is meant that principle which approves or disapproves of every action whatsoever, according to the tendency which it appears to have to augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose interest is in question: or, what is the same thing in other words, to promote or to oppose that happiness. I say of every action whatsoever; and therefore not, only of every action of a private individual, but of every measure of government. According to this utilitarian principle, it is justified to kill people, for example, if one aims to maximize happiness. It would be justified to bomb a city today if it would prevent the war from escalating into worse destruction. In contrast to this approach, Kant provides the categorical imperative. Kant explains his moral law when he states: “Act only according to the maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law.” To apply this rule, you can ask yourself, what would the world be like if everyone acted like this? The categorical imperative is much like the Christian rule, do unto others as you would have others do unto you. If one follows the categorical imperative, one would never tell a lie. If lying became a universal law and everyone lied all the time, the world would be awful. Kant argues that it is not justified to use immoral means to accomplish a moral end, because, “whoever wills the end also wills . . . the sole means thereto which are in his power.” It is never justified to kill another person because that is treating her as a means to an end, a not a human with inherent worth and dignity. Looking only at the base formulations of these principles, it is not clear if they are in competition or mutually exclusive. It would be possible for people to will that their actions be legislated universally, and for their actions to maximize happiness. However, the categorical imperative and the principle of utility can not coexist as supreme moral laws. In many hypothetical cases, a utilitarian would take the opposite action of the deontologist. Bentham would argue that the categorical imperative is not the supreme principle of morality because utility is the only principle which objectively and clearly defines “right” and “wrong” and because accounts for true human nature. Kant would criticize the principle of utility for its emphasis on the end of “happiness” and lack of concern for the means used to attain that end. Bentham claims that the principle of utility is the only one which defines “right” and “wrong” with clarity. He contends that an action is right when it increases happiness, wrong when it decreases happiness. This is Bentham’s base claim that serves as a warrant for the rest of his arguments for utility. Bentham explains: “Is it susceptible of any direct proof? it should seem not: for that which is used to prove every thing else, cannot itself be proved: a chain of proofs must have their commencement somewhere. To give such proof is as impossible as it is needless.” He feels his moral system is superior because “when thus interpreted, the words ought, and right and wrong, and others of that stamp, have a meaning: when otherwise, they have none.” According to Bentham, at the core of all moral systems, there is the goal of bringing about “right” actions, and preventing “wrong” ones. Bentham can conceive of no other definition for these terms than that which increases or decreases happiness. 175 Kant’s system of morality flatly refutes Bentham’s focus on happiness with the argument that a “good will” is a superior standard for morality. Kant explains: [That] the same [qualities become harmful] holds with gifts of fortune; power, riches, honor, even health, and that complete a well-being and contentment with one’s condition which is called happiness make for pride and often hereby even arrogance, unless there is a good will to correct their influence on the mind and herewith also to rectify the whole principle of action and make it universally conformable to its end. Just because you’re happy doesn’t mean you act in a way that is moral and good. Kant defines morally correct actions as those which come from a “good will”: “There is no possibility of thinking of anything at all in the world, or even out of it, which can be regarded as good without qualification, except a good will.” The “good will” is “good not because of what it effects or accomplishes, nor because of its fitness to attain some proposed end; it is good only thorough its willing, i.e., it is good in itself.” People with good wills would act according to the categorical imperative. They would not act so that their actions could have some good effect, like happiness, but rather their actions would be of moral value themselves. According to Kant, this is the only way to be deserving of happiness: “The sight of a being who is not graced by any touch of a pure and good will but who yet enjoys an uninterrupted prosperity can never delight a rational and impartial spectator. Thus a good will seems to constitute the indispensable condition of being even worthy of happiness.” A “good will” is the only way for humans to retain both autonomy and morality. Through the categorical imperative, humans legislate universal law using reason and according to their own autonomous wills. This allows people to feel that they have “greater intrinsic worth” and freedom. Many hypothetical situations are offered to explore the applicability of deontology and utilitarianism. Utilitarians offer the scenario of a person hiding Jews in her basement during World War II. If Nazi police came to the door and asked, “Are you hiding Jews in your basement?” The deontologist would have no choice but to reply “yes,” even if it meant she and her Jewish friends would be killed. Deontologists offer the scenario of a terrorist who threatens to bomb a city, killing millions, unless you torture your mother to death. It would not be justified to cave in to this sort of terrorist threat because it would degrade your own human dignity as well as your mothers, even though it would attain the greater good of saving the city. Plus, the terrorist’s potential actions can never be known for certain, while killing your mother is a certain evil. It is never justified to give into this sort of terrorist means/ends calculus. Depending on the hypothetical, a person may find herself a deontologist or a utilitarian. This points to a problem with absolute, rule-bound systems of morality. These moral frameworks seem to provide easy formulas for determining the correct action. However, easy formulas may simply be ways of putting off hard choices that require not only rational, but emotional and intuitive responses. Neither system of morality seems wholly adequate to address the moral dilemmas of our time. In light of this understanding, how can we make arguments to justify choices in particular debates that appeal to deontology or utilitarianism? Perhaps it is better to appeal to these moral frameworks on a case by case basis, and not attempt to justify any framework absolutely. JUSTIFYING DEONTOLOGICAL DECISIONS Professor of philosophy Thomas Nagel says, “Many people feel, without being able to say much more about it, that something has gone serious wrong when certain measures are admitted into consideration in the first place.” Some actions are simply too immoral to even be considered. One way to justify a deontological decision is to assume that a utilitarian framework is the best one to work through. This seems at first to be a strange argument. However, many philosophers claim that even if we should abide by utilitarian reasoning most of the time, utilitarian frameworks need to be checked by concern for ultimate values, such as human dignity and freedom. We can assume that our public actions should maximize good for the greatest number of people, so long as human dignity and freedom are not sacrificed in pursuit of those aims. Human dignity must serve as a “side constraint” on utilitarianism. Nagel explains that absolute protection of human dignity “operates as a limitation on utilitarian reasoning, not as a substitute for it.” How might this work in a debate? For example, in a debate over the morality of economic sanctions, one side could argue that even if we accept utilitarianism, economic sanctions are not justified because they starve the people of a foreign country who are not responsible for the actions of their leaders. The act of starving an innocent population so degrades human dignity and freedom that it cannot be justified, even if the end result is to prevent wars. It would also be possible to refute economic sanctions on utilitarian grounds by arguing that they are rarely effective. However, Nagel points out that it is important to affirm 176 the basic dignity of human beings: “Once the door is opened to calculations of utility and national interest, the usual speculations about the future of freedom, peace, and economic prosperity can be brought to bear to ease the consciences of those responsible for a certain number of charred babies.” This is why it is important to undermine the utilitarian logic that would permit the killing of innocents in the first place. Why is an absolute regard for human dignity and freedom so important? Charles Fried, a professor of law at Harvard Law School, argues that “What we may not do to each other, the things which are wrong, are precisely those forms of personal interaction which deny to our victim the status of a freely choosing, rationally valuing, specially efficacious person, the special status of moral personality.” To do bodily harm to another person or otherwise treat him or her in a way that is degrading is to treat a person as an object or an item. Kant described this as treating another person as a means to an ends. Fried argues that there is a distinction between accepting the risk that others may be harmed and doing direct harm to others. While one can accept risks for the greater good without degrading the status of other people, to directly kill or mistreat another person is unjustified. Other people are owed infinite respect. Fried argues that the value of respect for other people is absolute and different from all other values. Respect for the freedom and choice of other rational actors is a pre-requisite for the very activities of moral judgment and determination of values. Jack Donnely argues that when utilitarians fail to pay attention to the side constraint of human dignity, they disregard the unique meanings of individual lives. By saying that everyone counts equally in utilitarian calculations, the result is “no-one counting as a person.” People should count in the ways they are different from one another. Every person has a unique potential. Every person is owed infinite respect, not "respect = 1." If we make decisions by adding up the number of people we can help and subtracting the number of people we hurt, with each person counting as only one, we erase that unique potential. This may make all people equal in a numerical sense, but it ends up erasing the specificity and particular situations of individuals. The meanings of particular judgements are erased and glossed over and morality becomes math. This is a way of setting aside hard questions that require looking at particulars: how much are some people helped and others hurt? How can we treat everyone in accordance with the respect they are owed as a human being? Donnelly argues that there are certain attributes, potentialities, and holdings that are essential to the maintenance of a life worthy of a human being. These are given the special protection of natural rights; any ‘utility’ that might be served by their infringement or violation would be indefensible, literally inhuman—except in genuinely extraordinary circumstances, the possibility of which cannot be denied, but the probability of which should not be overestimated. Not only does it degrade the person who is sacrificed in the name of utilitarian calculation, it also degrades the humanity of the policymakers or moralists who take the action. Alan Gewirth, a professor of philosophy at the University of Chicago, argues for “the principle of intervening action.” His claim is that if we act in accordance with respect for human dignity, we are not necessarily responsible for other people’s destructive reactions. He offers the example of Martin Luther King, Jr. As a peaceful civil rights demonstrator, King. was not responsible for the violent protests and riots that followed his demonstrations. King should not have been held responsible for these consequences because those who started the riots were responsible. To say that King should not have demonstrated for human rights because of the potential consequences is to hold him hostage to the violent threats of others. This sort of reasoning licenses blackmail. Deontology can be argued to better assure the values utilitarianism seeks to protect. If respect for human dignity is guaranteed in all public policy and social decisions, the greater good would be better protected. Deontologists can argue that the only basis for a just society is one that recognizes the intrinsic worth of the individual. Catastrophic consequences of the sort that would justify killing innocents or grossly abridging freedom are highly unlikely. Also, because consequences can never be known for certain, they are unlikely to justify the certain harm that comes from taking direct action to abridge human dignity. Daniel Callahan, in his book The Tyranny of Survival, describes how human dignity has been abridged in the name of the saving more lives. He offers historical examples of groups that fought for human dignity at the expense of many lives, including Americans in the American Revolution and Israelis. He argues, “The lesson which many Jews believed they learned from the holocaust is that the most ineffective way to guarantee survival is to be passively willing to settle for survival. Unless one wants more than survival, and is willing to die for it, even survival will be taken away.” Focusing only on the survival of the greatest number of people without concern for what other values might be cast aside is self-defeating. 177 Survival itself will be jeopardized. Callahan offers the example of nuclear weapons. Originally developed for selfdefense, they now threaten to wipe out the planet. JUSTIFYING UTILITARIAN DECISIONS Just as you can argue there are side constraints on utilitarian reasoning, you can argue that there are side constraints on deontological reasoning. When the consequences of failing to take an action that may involve immoral means are horrendously catastrophic, it may become morally necessary. Even if we work through a deontological framework, sometimes utilitarian methods must be considered. For example, if killing one evil person would prevent a war that could kill millions, it might be justified, even though it uses the evil person as a means to an ends. The war that kills millions will undoubtedly kill us and the person we were trying to save initially. Charles Fried writes, “Even within such boundaries we can imagine extreme cases where killing an innocent person may save a whole nation. In such cases it seems fanatical to maintain the absoluteness of the judgment, to do right even if the heavens will in fact fall.” Even Fried, who tends to agree with absolutist deontological arguments, thinks that catastrophic cases require different sorts of judgments. How might this play out in a debate? One common debate is over the environment. It can be argued that the consequences of not doing anything to stop the environmental crisis are so high (species loss, global warming, resource depletion) that it is justified to curtail industrial pollution, even if that means people lose jobs. Those people are used as the means to ends of protecting the environment, but it is justified in order to prevent tragic harm. But what about the abuse to the inherent dignity of all people that occurs when they are used as means to ends? Utilitarian philosophers argue that utilitarianism best assures human dignity by counting every person’s life as equal. Utilitarianism is more democratic than deontology because it takes account of the needs of the majority of people and considers each person to have an equal claim. Ronald Dworkin, a professor of Law and Philosophy at NYU and Oxford, offers the following hypothetical to explain how utilitarianism is egalitarian: “If the community has only enough medicine to treat some of those who are sick, the argument seems to recommend that those who are sickest be treated first . . . One sick man is not to be preferred to another because he is worthier of official concern.” While it may be poetic to speak of the infinite worth of each individual, it does not help philosophers and politicians to make hard decisions in day to day struggles. This is not callous disregard for the value of the individual, it is the recognition that certain sacrifices must be made. A potent argument to justify utilitarianism is to point to the way deontological frameworks inevitably collapse into utilitarian reasoning. Richard Epstein, a professor of law at the University of Chicago, writes that we all end up “utilitarian[s] of some stripe”: A defense of the older regime of individual liberties and properties cannot rest on a simple assertion that people have rights and that other individuals are not allowed to do actions that violate those rights. One has to show why any given configuration of rights is superior to its rival conceptions, an undertaking that typically requires an appeal to consequences, less for particular cases, and more for some overall assessment of how alternative legal regimes play out in the long run. Because rights will always come into conflict (my right to freedom of expression can conflict with your right to be free from me calling you on the phone every 5 minutes to harass you) we must appeal to the consequences of different ways to balance rights. The act of balancing is utilitarian. It need not seek to maximize happiness, in Bentham’s sense. Rather, the utilitarian can seek to maximize respect for all persons, or freedom, or other values. What about the distinction between means and ends? Is there are a relevant moral distinction between direct actions and the consequences of those actions? James Rachels, a professor of philosophy at the University of Alabama, offers the following thought experiment questioning these distinctions. Imagine Mr. Jones acting in the following ways, “Jones moved his finger, Jones pulled the trigger, Jones fired the gun, Jones shot Smith, Jones killed Smith, Jones started a riot, and so on.” Which of these actions are means, and which are ends? Rachels writes, “the description of an action can be expanded or contracted so that what was a consequence of the action under the old description becomes a part of the action itself under the new description, or vice versa.” What is a direct cause and what is a consequence depends on mere semantics. Some consequences are so easy to predict that they might as well be direct causes. If the means/ends distinction has broken down, utilitarianism can be appealed to as a way to make hard choices. In cases where truly difficult choices are presented, utilitarianism seems the more intuitive response that absolute 178 deontological rules. Kai Nielsen, a professor of philosophy at the University of Calgary, discusses the hypothetical of the man in the cave. His scenario involves a group of people who are trapped in a cave with the tide quickly rising. Soon they will drown. There is only one way out through a hole, but a man is stuck there. They have dynamite, and they face the choice of blowing the man out of the hole, which will surely kill him, or allowing everyone to drown. For the purpose of this hypothetical, imagine that no other alternatives are feasible. Nielsen argues that the best decision is to use the dynamite. He explains, “This indeed overrides the principle that the innocent should never be deliberately killed, but it does not reveal a callousness toward life, for the people involved are caught in a desperate situation in which, if such extreme action is not taken, many lives will be lost and far greater misery obtain.” Killing the man trapped in the opening to the cave is not disregarding his human dignity. It is action undertaken as a last resort and with “great reluctance” that will most likely “haunt” the others for the rest of their lives. Nielsen says there is no morally relevant distinction here that makes it worse to “do” the evil of blasting the man than to “allow” the evil everyone drowning. This is a case where we must choose the lesser evil. Deontologists attempt to keep their hands clean with moral purity using the excuse that they didn’t directly cause any evil, but when they have the power to prevent evil, they are evading responsibility not to do it. Arguments like Gewirth’s principle of the intervening actor can have negative consequences. For example, if we only considered the principle of the intervening actor, we would feel no moral obligation to save a drowning child. Saul Alinksy, an activist, professor, and social organizer, applies Nielsen’s arguments to the domain of political decisionmaking. Alinksy argues, “To say that corrupt means corrupt the ends is to believe in the immaculate conception of ends and principles. The real arena is corrupt and bloody.” Politics requires hard choices, not hard principles. In real struggles for social and political change, absolutism must be abandoned and compromises must be made in order to achieve greater good for society as a whole. The means/ends distinction often becomes an excuse for staying out of political action whatsoever. Why fight the Nazis if you are not responsible for their actions? AN UNRESOLVEABLE DEBATE Which side provides a better moral framework: deontology or utilitarianism? Both sides probably offer valuable moral insights that should be considered in debates over public policy issues where the balancing of rights and interests are at stake. Respect for the inherent dignity of human beings is essential to prevent us from becoming no more than figures to be tabulated. The risk of callous over-emphasis on utilitarianism is that the very values that make life worth living: freedom, dignity, and autonomy, can be sacrificed in the pursuit of the “greatest good for the greatest number.” But utilitarians are probably right to emphasize that the distinction between means and ends is rarely clean or clear cut. Often times politicians must make hard choices that don’t accord with deontological principles. Neither side is completely correct. Neither deontology nor utilitarianism provide universal answers to every moral dilemma. The principles associated with these moral frameworks should be taken as guides, not hard and fast rules. Hard and fast rules can never fit every particular case. Morality is not mathematics: it requires a degree of intuition and emotion. It is up to those who make political decisions to use the conceptual tools provided by moral philosophy in order to come to more informed judgements. Debaters who argue for one framework or another would be well advised to modify their positions and recognize that their arguments are not absolute. Instead of hurling competing slogans back and forth, debaters should think through the ways their arguments might subsume or make irrelevant the arguments of the other side. In debates over moral frameworks, it is a good idea to examine what values are at stake and how combinations of frameworks or principles can best serve those values. By justifying a deontological decision through a utilitarian framework or vice versa, a debater can co-opt much of her opponent’s strategic ground. 179 BIBLIOGRAPHY Aiken, William and Hugh LaFollette, WORLD HUNGER AND MORAL OBLIGATION, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1996. Alinsky, Saul D., RULES FOR RADICALS, New York: Vintage Books, 1989. Bentham, Jeremy, DEONTOLOGY, New York: Oxford University Press, 1983. Callahan, Daniel, THE TYRANNY OF SURVIVAL, New York: Macmillan, 1973. Diehm, Christian, “Facing nature: Levinas beyond the human,” PHILOSOPHY TODAY, Spring 2000, Vol 44, p. 51(9). Donnelly, Jack, THE CONCEPT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985. Dworkin, Ronald M., A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985. Dworkin, Ronald M., TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977. Freeman, Samuel, “Utilitarianism, deontology, and the priority of right,” PHILOSOPHY & PUBLIC AFFAIRS, Fall 1994, Vol. 23, No. 4. p. 313(37). Gewirth, Alan, THE COMMUNITY OF RIGHTS, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996. Gewirth, Alan, HUMAN RIGHTS, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982. Haber, Joram Graf, ABSOLUTISM AND ITS CONSEQUENTIALIST CRITICS, Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1993. Hatch, Elvin, CULTURE AND MORALITY, New York: Columbia University Press, 1983. Kant, Immanuel, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, Trans. Mary Gregor, Cambridge, U.K.; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998. Mill, John Stuart, COLLECTED WORKS, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1963. Rosenthal, David M. and Fadlou Shehadi, APPLIED ETHICS AND ETHICAL THEORY, Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1988. Shaw, William H., CONTEMPORARY ETHICS, Malden, Mass.: Blackwell Publishers, 1999. 180 RESPECT FOR HUMAN DIGNITY MUST CHECK UTILITARIANISM 1. ABSOLUTE RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS MUST LIMIT UTILITARIAN REASONING. Thomas Nagel, Professor of Philosophy, New York University, ABSOLUTISM AND ITS CONSEQUENTIALIST CRITICS, 1993, p. 221-222. Many people feel, without being able to say much more about it, that something has gone seriously wrong when certain measures are admitted into consideration in the first place. The fundamental mistake is made there, rather than at the point where the overall benefit of some monstrous measure is judged to outweigh its disadvantages, and it is adopted. An account of absolutism might help us to understand this. If it is not allowable to do certain things, such as killing unarmed prisoners or civilians, then no argument about what will happen if one does not do them can show that doing them would be all right. Absolutism does not, of course, require one to ignore the consequences of one's acts. It operates as a limitation on utilitarian reasoning, not as a substitute for it. An absolutist can be expected to try to maximize good and minimize evil, so long as this does not require him to transgress an absolute prohibition like that against murder. But when such a conflict occurs, the prohibition takes complete precedence over any consideration of consequences. Some of the results of this view are clear enough. It requires us to forgo certain potentially useful military measures, such as the slaughter of hostages and prisoners or indiscriminate attempts to reduce the enemy civilian population by starvation, epidemic infectious diseases like anthrax and bubonic plague, or mass incineration. It means that we cannot deliberate on whether such measures are justified by the fact that they will avert still greater evils, for as intentional measures they cannot be justified in terms of any consequences whatever. Someone unfamiliar with the events of this century might imagine that utilitarian arguments, or arguments of national interest, would suffice to deter measures of this sort. But it has become evident that such considerations are insufficient to prevent the adoption and employment of enormous antipopulation weapons once their use is considered a serious moral possibility. The same is true of the piecemeal wiping out of rural civilian populations in airborne antiguerrilla warfare. Once the door is opened to calculations of utility and national interest, the usual speculations about the future of freedom, peace, and economic prosperity can be brought to bear to ease the consciences of those responsible for a certain number of charred babies. For this reason alone it is important to decide what is wrong with the frame of mind which allows such arguments to begin. 2. RESPECT FOR PERSONS CANNOT BE COMPROMISED Charles Fried, Professor of Law at Harvard Law School, ABSOLUTISM AND ITS CONSEQUENTIALIST CRITICS, 1993, p. 92. What we may not do to each other, the things which are wrong, are precisely those forms of personal interaction which deny to our victim the status of a freely choosing, rationally valuing, specially efficacious person, the special status of moral personality. To lie or to do intentional, grievous harm to the body of another represents a denial of the personal status of that other, a denial not necessarily implicit in allowing that harm to come about as a mere concomitant of our actions. If we use harming another as the means to our end, then we assert that another person may indeed be our means, while if we merely accept the risk that others will be harmed as we pursue our ends, and do not make that harm a part of our projects, then it is still possible to assert that those others are not reduced to the status of means in our system . . . . When we accomplish our purposes through lies, it is not so much that among the consequences of our action must be counted the fact that another person entertains a false belief-after all, that may be trivial enough-but rather that we have asserted that the mind, the rationality of another, is available to us as the track on which the train of our purposes may run. Thus, what constitutes doing wrong to another may also be regarded as a denial of the respect owed another's moral personality. And it is a principal hypothesis of mine that the absolute quality of categorical norms (what one might call their logic), the concepts of action and intention necessary to the application of those norms (the psychology of the system), and the substantive moral basis of the norms, the respect for persons, all fit together in a system. Though I have identified respect for persons as a value, the connection between that respect and the concept of right and wrong shows that this value is wholly different from all other values. All other values gather their moral force as they determine choice. By contrast, the value of personhood, far from being chosen, is the presupposition and substrate of the very concept of choice. And that is why the norms surrounding respect for person may not be compromised, why these norms are absolute in respect to the various ends we choose to pursue. 181 UTILITARIAN WEIGHING OF CONSEQUENCES IS A FLAWED MORAL CALCULUS 1. UTILITARIAN COUNTING MEANS NO ONE COUNTS Jack Donnelly, College of the Holy Cross, THE CONCEPT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, 1985, p. 55. Basic moral and political rights are not just weighting factors in utilitarian calculations that deal with an undifferentiated `happiness'. Rather, they are demands and constraints of a different order, grounded in an essentially substantive judgement of the conditions necessary for human development and flourishing. They also provide means - rights - for realising human potentials. The neutrality of utilitarianism, its efforts to assure that everyone counts `equally', results in no-one counting as a person; as Robert E. Goodin puts it, people drop out of utilitarian calculations, which are instead about disembodied preferences. In Aristotelian terms, utilitarianism errs in basing its judgements on `numerical' rather than `proportional' equality. 2. CATASTROPHIC CONSEQUENCES ARE TOO UNLIKELY TO JUSTIFY VIOLATING DIGNITY Jack Donnelly, College of the Holy Cross, THE CONCEPT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, 1985, p. 58 But suppose that the sacrifice of one innocent person would save not ten but a thousand, or a hundred thousand, or a million people. All things considered, trading one innocent life for a million, even if the victim resists most forcefully, would seem to be not merely justifiable but demanded. Exactly how do we balance rights (in the sense of `having a right'), wrongs (in the sense of `what is right') and interests? Do the numbers count? If so, why, and in what way? If not, why not? Ultimately the defender of human rights is forced back to human nature, the source of natural or human rights. For a natural rights theorist there are certain attributes, potentialities and holdings that are essential to the maintenance of a life worthy of a human being. These are given the special protection of natural rights; any `utility' that might be served by their infringement or violation would be indefensible, literally inhuman - except in genuinely extraordinary circumstances, the possibility of which cannot be denied, but the probability of which should not be overestimated. Extraordinary circumstances do force us to admit that, at some point, however rare, the force of utilitarian considerations builds up until quantity is transformed into quality. The human rights theorist, however, insists on the extreme rarity of such cases. Furthermore, exotic cases should not be permitted to obscure the fundamental difference in emphasis (and in the resulting judgements in virtually all cases) between utility and (human) rights. Nor should they be allowed to obscure the fact that on balance the flaws in rights-based theories and practices seem less severe, and without a doubt less numerous, than those of utility-based political strategies. 3. YOU AREN’T RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ACTIONS OF INTERVENING OTHERS Alan Gewirth, Professor of Philosophy at University of Chicago, HUMAN RIGHTS: ESSAYS ON JUSTIFICATION AND APPLICATION, 1982, p. 230. An example of this principle may help to show its connection with the absolutist thesis. Martin Luther King Jr. was repeatedly told that because he led demonstrations in support of civil rights, he was morally responsible for the disorders, riots, and deaths that ensued and that were shaking the American Republic to its foundations." By the principle of the intervening action, however, it was King's opponents who were responsible because their intervention operated as the sufficient conditions of the riots and injuries. King might also have replied that the Republic would not be worth saving if the price that had to be paid was the violation of the civil rights of black Americans. As for the rights of the other Americans to peace and order, reply would be that these rights cannot justifiably be secured at the price of the rights of blacks. It follows from the principle of the intervening action that it is not the son but rather the terrorists who are morally as well as causally responsible for the many deaths that do or may ensue on his refusal to torture his mother to death. The important point is not that he lets these persons die rat than kills them, or that he does not harm them but only fails to help the or that he intends their deaths only obliquely but not directly. The point is rather that it is only through the intervening lethal actions of the terror that his refusal eventuates in the many deaths. Since the moral responsibility is not the son's, it does not affect his moral duty not to torture his mother to death, so that her correlative right remains absolute. 182 UTILITARIANISM BEST ASSURES RESPECT FOR HUMAN DIGNITY 1. IT IS GREATER INHUMANITY TO ALLOW HARM TO A LARGER NUMBER Kai Nielsen, Professor of Philosophy, University of Calgary, ABSOLUTISM AND ITS CONSEQUENTIALIST CRITICS, 1993, p. 170-172. Consequentialism of the kind I have been arguing for provides so persuasive "a theoretical basis for common morality that when it contradicts some moral intuition, it is natural to suspect that intuition, not theory, is corrupt."" Given the comprehensiveness, plausibility, and overall rationality of consequentialism, it is not unreasonable to override even a deeply felt moral conviction if it does not square with such a theory, though, if it made no sense or overrode the bulk of or even a great many of our considered moral convictions, that would be another matter indeed. Anticonsequentialists often point to the inhumanity of people who will sanction such killing of the innocent, but cannot the compliment be returned by speaking of the even greater inhumanity, conjoined with evasiveness, of those who will allow even more death and far greater misery and then excuse themselves on the ground that they did not intend the death and misery but merely forbore to prevent it? In such a context, such reasoning and such forbearing to prevent seems to me to constitute a moral evasion. I say it is evasive because rather than steeling himself to do what in normal circumstances would be a horrible and vile act but in this circumstance is a harsh moral necessity, he allows, when he has the power to prevent it, a situation which is still many times worse. He tries to keep his `moral purity' and avoid `dirty hands' at the price of utter moral failure and what Kierkegaard called `double-mindedness.' It is understandable that people should act in this morally evasive way but this does not make it right. 2. UTILITARIANISM IS ESSENTIAL TO EGALITARIANISM Ronald Dworkin, Professor of Law and Philosophy, NYU, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, 1977, p. 234. The utilitarian argument, that a policy is justified if it satisfies more preferences overall, seems at first sight to be an egalitarian argument. It seems to observe strict impartiality. If the community has only enough medicine to treat some of those who are sick, the argument seems to recommend that those who are sickest be treated first. If the community can afford a swimming pool or a new theater, but not both, and more people want the pool, then it recommends that the community build the pool, unless those who want the theater can show that their preferences are so much more intense that they have more weight in spite of the numbers. One sick man is not to be preferred to another because he is worthier of official concern; the tastes of the theater audience are not to be preferred because they are more admirable. In Bentham's phrase, each man is to count as one and no man is to count as more than one. These simple examples suggest that the utilitarian argument not only respects, but embodies, the right of each citizen to be treated as the equal of any other. The chance that each individual's preferences have to succeed, in the competition for social policy, will depend upon how important his preference is to him, and how many others share it, compared to the intensity and number of competing preferences. His chance will not be affected by the esteem or contempt of either officials or fellow citizens, and he will therefore not be subservient or beholden to them. 3. CATASTROPHIC CONSEQUENCES REQUIRE SUSPENSION OF DEONTOLOGY Charles Fried, Professor of Law at Harvard Law School, ABSOLUTISM AND ITS CONSEQUENTIALIST CRITICS, 1993, p. 76. Even within such boundaries we can imagine extreme cases where killing an innocent person may save a whole nation. In such cases it seems fanatical to maintain the absoluteness of the judgment, to do right even if the heavens will in fact fall. And so the catastrophic may cause the absoluteness of right and wrong to yield, but even then it would be a non sequitur to argue (as consequentialists are fond of doing) that this proves that judgments of right and wrong are always a matter of degree, depending on the relative goods to be attained and harms to be avoided. I believe, on the contrary, that the concept of the catastrophic is a distinct concept just because it identifies the extreme situations in which the usual categories of judgment (including the category of right and wrong) no longer apply. At the other end of the spectrum, there is the concept of the trivial, the de minimis where the absolute categories do not yet apply. And the trivial also does not prove that right and wrong are really only a matter of degree. It is because of these complexities and because the term absolute is really only suggestive of a more complex structure, that I also refer to the norms of right and wrong not as absolute but as categorical. 183 THE MEANS/ENDS DISTINCTION OF DEONTOLOGY IS FLAWED 1. THERE IS NO MORAL DISTINCTION BETWEEN ACTIONS AND CONSEQUENCES. James Rachels, Professor of Philosophy, University of Alabama, ABSOLUTISM AND ITS CONSEQUENTIALIST CRITICS, 1993, p. 212-213. The question here is whether the distinction between actions and consequences can bear the burden required of it. Just why is `lying' the name of an action while `saving a life' is not? Certainly, if we describe the action as lying, then under that description it is a consequence of the action, rather than a part of the action itself, that a life is saved. But we could always describe the act to begin with as an act of saving life. Then we could say that the fishermen's choice is between truth-telling and life-saving, both of which are actions and both of which cannot be done; and then this case would be a conflict-case of the sort which Geach says cannot arise. In order to avoid this, and say that this is not a genuine conflict-case, the Geachean absolutist must maintain that `saving a life', contrary to appearances, cannot be the name of an action. In maintaining this, the absolutist would be going against one of the most universally accepted tenets of modern action-theory, viz., that an action can be given many different descriptions, none of which captures the `essence' of the action any more than the others. For example, a single action might be described in any of the following ways: Jones moved his finger, Jones pulled the trigger, Jones fired the gun, Jones shot Smith, Jones killed Smith, Jones started a riot, and so on. This list illustrates what Joel Feinberg felicitously calls the 'accordian effect': the description of an action can be expanded or contracted so that what was a consequence of the action under the old description becomes a part of the action itself under the new description, or vice versa. Thus, Smith's being shot is a consequence of what Jones did under the second description listed, but not under the fourth. Clearly, the absolutist cannot accept such a view of act-descriptions, because it would vitiate the whole point of `not doing evil that good may come'-the `good to come' could simply be written into the description of the action, making it a good sort of action rather than an evil one, and thus reversing the original judgment. 2. APPEAL TO CONSEQUENCES IS INEVITABLE. Richard A. Epstein, James Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor of Law, University of Chicago, BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW, February-April, 1996, p. 2-3. Similarly, on questions of method, I believe that the deontological approach is wrong insofar as it claims that its normative conclusions can be denied only on pain of self-contradiction. Today many writers believe that the protection of individual autonomy is not a primary goal of legal rules, but that, to the contrary, any "natural" distribution of talents is determined largely by luck and hence morally arbitrary. Given this perspective, it follows that legal rules should introduce certain measures of sharing across individuals, if not by forced labor, then by systems of taxation and regulation that redistribute the fruits of individual labor. One can argue against these views, but hardly on the ground that they are self-contradictory, or even that they are morally suspect in their effort to raise the level of the least fortunate closer to the level enjoyed by those who have a greater share of natural abilities and endowments. A defense of the older regime of individual liberties and properties cannot rest on a simple assertion that people have rights and that other individuals are not allowed to do actions that violate those rights. One has to show why any given configuration of rights is superior to its rival conceptions, an undertaking that typically requires an appeal to consequences, less for particular cases, and more for some overall assessment of how alternative legal regimes play out in the long run. In a word, one has to become a utilitarian of some stripe to justify rules in terms of the consequences they bring about. 184 Direct Democracy Good PEOPLE WANT DIRECT DEMOCRACY MORE THAN REPRESENTATIVE 1. PEOPLE ARE CHANGING THEIR DEFINITION OF DEMOCRACY Brian Needham, Associate Editor, THE ECONOMIST, September 11, 1993, p. 17. The difference between today's politics and the politics of the coming century is likely to be a change in what people mean by "democracy": to be precise, a radical change in the process by which the democratic idea is put into practice. The collapse of communism, everybody agrees, removes the ideological framework that has shaped the politics of the 20th century. One of the two great rival bodies of ideas has been defeated, and the other will be transformed by the consequences of its victory. This does not mean that the world is now wholly non-ideological; there will be other ideas in the name of which politicians will call upon people to follow them into the good fight. But the end of communism, and of the special sort of confrontation it produced, both reinforces the need for a change in the way democracy works and, at the same time, gets rid of a large obstacle in the path to that change. 2. VALUE OF DIRECT DEMOCRACY NOW POPULAR EVERYWHERE Brian Needham, Associate Editor, THE ECONOMIST, September 11, 1993, p. 17. In crude terms, this overdue change is a shift from "representative democracy" to "direct democracy". The basis of modern democracy is the proposition that every adult person's judgment about the conduct of public affairs is entitled to be given equal weight with every other person's. However different they are from each other -financially, intellectually, in their preference between Schubert and Sting-- all men and women have an equal right to say how they wish to be governed. The concept sprang originally from the Protestant Reformation, which declared that everybody was equal in his dealings with God. The political offspring of that religious declaration is now accepted everywhere in the world, at least in principle, except among diehard Leninists and conservative Muslims. 3. PEOPLE ARE BETTER EQUIPPED FOR DIRECT DEMOCRACY Brian Needham, Associate Editor, THE ECONOMIST, September 11, 1993, p. 17. People are better equipped for direct democracy than they used to be. The altered character of post-cold-war politics increases the need for direct democracy. And then comes the third reason for believing that change is on the way. The waning of ideology weakens the chief source of opposition to the new sort of democracy. 4. STEP TO DIRECT DEMOCRACY CAN'T BE RESISTEDBrian Needham, Associate Editor, THE ECONOMIST, September 11, 1993, p. 17. Now, in post- cold- war politics, much of this is disappearing. There are no longer heroic banners to be borne aloft in the name of ideology. In the wealthier parts of the world, at any rate, class divisions are steadily losing their meaning. In the prosaic new politics, many of the issues that have to be decided are matter- of- fact ones, requiring little excitement. In these conditions fewer people will feel the need to belong to parties, and people will more easily shift from one party, to another. This will make the parties weaker. And that will make it harder for them to oppose radical innovations- - such as the bold step forward to direct democracy. 5. REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY IS MORE UNSATISFACTORY THAN EVER Brian Needham, Associate Editor, THE ECONOMIST, September 11, 1993, p. 17. There are three reasons for thinking that this is going to change. One is the growing inadequacy of representative democracy. It has long been pointed out that to hold an election every few years is not only a highly imprecise way of expressing the voter's wishes (because on these rare election days he has to consider a large number of issues, and his chosen "representative" will in fact not represent him on several of them) but is also notably loose-wristed (because the voter has little control over his representative between elections). Now the end of the battle between communism and pluralism will make representative democracy look more unsatisfactory than ever. 185 DIRECT DEMOCRACY IS PREFERABLE TO REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY 1. REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY IS INADEQUATE COMPARED TO DIRECT Brian Needham, Associate Editor, THE ECONOMIST, September 11, 1993, p. 17. In the new agenda of politics, where so much depends upon decisions of detail, the power of the lobbyist can produce striking results. It will at times be, literally, corrupting. But even when it is not as bad as that it will make representative democracy seem increasingly inadequate. The voter, already irritated at having so little control over his representatives between elections, will be even angrier when he discovers how much influence the specialinterest propagandists are now able to wield over those representatives. An interloper, it will seem, has inserted himself into the democratic process. The result is not hard to guess. The voter is liable to conclude that direct democracy, in which decisions are taken by the whole people, is better than representative democracy, because the many are harder to diddle--or to bribe--than the few. 2. REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY SHOULD GO THE WAY OF COMMUNISM Brian Needham, Associate Editor, THE ECONOMIST, September 11, 1993, p. 17. The democracies must therefore apply to themselves the argument they used to direct against the communists. As people get richer and better educated, a democrat would admonishingly tell a communist, they will no longer be willing to let a handful of men in the Politburo take all the decisions that govern a country's life. The same must now be said, with adjustment for scale, about the workings of democracy. As the old differences of wealth, education and social condition blur, it will be increasingly hard to go on persuading people that most of them are fit only to put a tick on a ballot paper every few years, and that the handful of men and women they thereby send to parliament must be left to take all the other decisions. 3. REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY IS NOT REAL DEMOCRACY Brian Needham, Associate Editor, THE ECONOMIST, September 11, 1993, p. 17. In most places where it is practised, however, democracy is in a condition of arrested development. Every adult person exercises his or her political right every few years, in elections by which the voters send their representatives to an elected assembly; but in the intervals between elections - which can mean for anything up to about seven years - it is these representatives who take all the decisions. This is not what ancient Athenians meant by democracy. 4. REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT IS GOVERNMENT FOR THE CHOSEN FEW Brian Needham, Associate Editor, THE ECONOMIST, September 11, 1993, p. 17. Some countries do it differently. The most clear-cut example is Switzerland's system of direct democracy. In Switzerland it is possible to insist, by collecting a modest number of signatures, that any law proposed by the government must be submitted to a vote of the whole people. Even better, you can also insist (by getting more signatures) that a brand-new idea for a law must be put to the people even if government and parliament are against the idea. Australia and some of the western parts of the United States also now use referendums in a fairly regular way. There have even started to be referendums in Europe outside Switzerland--the politicians in Italy, France, Denmark and Ireland have all consulted their people within the past year or so--though only on subjects of the government's choice, and when the government thinks it dare not deny the people the final word. But elsewhere democracy is still stuck at a half-way house, as it were, in which the final word is delegated to the chosen few. 5. DEMOCRACY MUST BE MODIFIED TO BE AS DIRECT AS POSSIBLE R. Buckminster Fuller, Research Professor at UC-Santa Barbara, NO MORE SECONDHAND GOD, 1963, p.16. Democracy has potential within it the satisfaction of every individual's need. But Democracy must be structurally modernized, must be mechanically implemented, to give it a one-individual-to-another speed and spontaneity of reaction commensurate with the speed and scope of broadcast news...Devise a mechanical means for nation-wide voting daily and secretly by each adult citizen of Uncle Sam's family: Then -- I assure you-- will Democracy "be saved," indeed exist, for the first time in history. 186 Direct Democracy Bad REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY IS BEST 1. REPRESENTATIVE SYSTEM HAS DISTINCT ADVANTAGESDavid Held, Professor of Politics and Sociology at the Open University, MODELS OF DEMOCRACY, 1996, p. 108. A representative system, along with freedom of speech, the press and assembly, has distinct advantages: it provides the mechanism whereby central powers can be watched and controlled; it establishes a forum (parliament) to act as a watchdog of liberty and centre of reason and debate; and it harnesses, through electoral competition, leadership qualities with intellect for the maximum benefit of all. Mill argued that there was no desireable alternative to representative democracy, although he was aware of its costs. 2. REPRESENTATIVE SYSTEM EQUALS STABLE, EFFECTIVE DEMOCRACY David Held, Professor of Politics and Sociology at the Open University, MODELS OF DEMOCRACY, 1996,p. 119. The theory of representative liberal democracy fundamentally shifted the terms of reference of democratic thought: the practical limits that a sizeable citizenry imposes on democracy, which had been the focus of so much critical (anti-democratic) attention, were practically eliminated. Representative democracy could now be celebrated as both accountable and feasible government, potentially stable over great territories and time spans. 3. REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY INEXORABLY MOVES FORWARD Robert C. Byrd, Representative from West Virginia, CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, June 2, 1986, p.H1265. As we begin this new experiment in opening our debates to massive scrutiny through the eye of the camera, we can only guess at the impact this medium will have upon our proceedings in the future. But we do know that, just as public opinion is in advance of the law, it is only through an informed public opinion that our nation's laws will see best its prosperity enhanced, its treasures properly husbaned, and its future destiny be most favored. As the advance of communications is irresistible, so is the progress of representative democracy inevitable. And today, the two are one as the Senate takes this new and sure step forward -- a step that is as irreversible as it is inexorable. 4. QUALIFIED, INTELLIGENT SHOULD RULE David Held, Professor of Politics and Sociology at the Open University, MODELS OF DEMOCRACY, 1996, p. 108. Mill ultimately, however, trusted extraordinarily little in the judgment of the electorate and elected. While arguing that universal suffrage was essential, he was at pains to recommend a complex system of plural voting so that the masses, the working classes, 'the democracy' would not have the opportunity to subject the political order to what he labelled simply as 'ignorance'. Given that individuals are capable of different kinds of things and only a few have developed their full capacities, would it not be appropriate if some citizens have more sway over government than others? 5. REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY IS THE SOLUTION TO ALL PROBLEMS David Held, Professor of Politics and Sociology at the Open University, MODELS OF DEMOCRACY, 1996, p. 119. As one of the great advocates of the 'representative system' put it, 'by ingrafting representation upon democracy' a system of government is created that is capable of embracing 'all the various interests and every extent of territory and population.' Representative democracy could even be heralded, as James Mill wrote, as 'the grand discovery of modern times' in which 'the solution of all difficulties, both speculative and practical, would be found.' 187 DIRECT DEMOCRACY HAS SERIOUS FLAWS 1. DIRECT DEMOCRACY IS ANTITHETICAL TO TRUE REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENTPeter Schrag, author, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, March 1998, p. 20. California was a national leader in spending on social services and education prior to the passage of Proposition 13 in 1978. Such government by initiative undermines legislative power. Direct democracy is antithetical to the ideal of representative government espoused by the founding fathers. 2. RICH LOBBYISTS CAN INFLUENCE DIRECT DEMOCRACY THE ECONOMIST, May 30, 1998, p. 26. To be put to the vote, a proposed new law this year needs the valid signatures of 433,269 voters; a proposed change to the constitution needs 693,230. Collecting that many signatures usually requires professional help. Most professional signature-collectors charge about 50 cents a go; that can add up to $250,000 or so for a law-making initiative, and $400,000 for a proposed constitutional change. And then comes the propaganda bill, for advertisements and leaflets and the rest of it. Plainly, this gives rich lobbyists their chance to influence the result. 3. SOME DIRECT DEMOCRACY INITIATIVES FAIL THE ECONOMIST, May 30, 1998, p. 26. Some initiatives stir up a passionate response, such as the one proposing to legalise marijuana for medical purposes (passed in 1996), and the one which sought to deny public services to illegal immigrants (Proposition 187, passed in 1994 and tied up in the courts ever since). The "three strikes" initiative, which brought in life imprisonment for those convicted of three felonies, tapped into people's alarm about crime. Direct democracy can come a cropper. Many initiatives, like 187, are passed only to fall foul of the law afterwards. 4. DIRECT DEMOCRACY HAS FLAWS THE ECONOMIST, May 30, 1998, p. 26. In 1994 a "citizens' commission" was set up to examine complaints against direct democracy. The system is used too much, say some; it is too complicated, and it can become a tool of special interests. In the event, the commission made only modest recommendations. It thought there should be public hearings on initiative proposals, and the state legislature should have some say. 188 Duty to Future Generations Good WE HAVE AN ETHICAL DUTY TO FUTURE GENERATIONS 1. THE RIGHTS OF FUTURE GENERATIONS MUST BE GUARANTEED Federico Mayor, UNESCO, UNESCO COURIER, March, 1996, P. 36. The political, economic or financial interests that favour particular solutions must never be allowed to overshadow the interests of future generations. In cases where the foreseeable consequences of investment will extend far beyond the present, it is worth considering whether an impact study should not be made of the consequences of the various options on offer over a fifty-year period, the span of two generations. In fact there is little doubt that several of the rights of future generations are affected: the right to life and to the conservation of the human genome, the right to development and to individual and collective fulfillment, and the right to an ecologically balanced environment. These are indeed human rights, that is, universal and universally recognized values which are a legitimate cause of concern for the international community as a whole. This is a far cry from rights regarded merely as legally protected vested interests. 2. WE HOLD THE EARTH IN TRUST FOR OUR PROGENY Edith Brown Weiss, Professor Georgetown University School of Law and Board of Editors, THE AMERICAN JOURNAL INTERNATIONAL LAW, January, 1990, pp. 199-200. The purpose of human society must be to realize and protect the welfare and well-being of every generation. This requires sustaining the life-support systems of the planet, the ecological processes and the environmental conditions necessary for a healthy and decent human environment. In this partnership, no generation knows beforehand when it will be the living generation, how many members it will have, or even how many generations there will ultimately be. It is useful, then, to take the perspective of a generation that is placed somewhere along the spectrum of time, but does not know in advance where it will be located. Such a generation would want to inherit the earth in at least as good condition as it has been in for any previous generation and to have as good access to it as previous generations. This requires each generation to pass the planet on in no worse condition than it received it in and to provide equitable access to its resources and benefits. Each generation is thus both a trustee for the planet with obligations to care for it and a beneficiary with rights to use it. - 3. WE I-IAVE AN ETHICAL STAKE IN FUTURE GENERATIONS Joseph R. Des Jardins, Philosophy Professor at the College of Saint Benedict and St. John’s University, ENVIRONMENTAL EThICS: AN INTRODUCTION TO ENVIRONMENTAL PHILOSOPHY, 1997, p. 83. Reasonably strong empirical evidence suggests that people are often motivated to act out of a concern for the interests of people in the future. On the political level, decisions to protect wilderness areas, establish national and state parks, forests, and shorelines, to build museums and libraries, fund research and development in medicine, industry and national defense make sense only if we recognize that the beneficiaries of these decisions will be generations as yet unborn. On a private level, decisions to endow charitable and educational foundations, and to fund artistic, cultural, and social organizations also seem obviously motivated, at least in part, by a concern to provide people of the future with a decent and human world. On a personal level, a decision as simple as planting an oak tree, one of countless varieties of plants that mature over long periods of time, suggests that individuals are motivated by a concern for the distant future. 4. WE HAVE AN ETHICAL IMPERATIVE TO RESPECT FUTURE GENERATIONS Federico Mayor, UNESCO, UNESCO COURIER, March, 1996, p. 36. For the first time in the history of humanity, awareness of the global impact of our actions starting with the effects our population numbers have on the environment compels us to do all we can to avoid causing irreparable environmental damage and preventing future generations from exercising all or some of their rights. Because of this risk we must act before it is too late and correct trends which might otherwise lead to incalculable problems. We must observe, anticipate, and prevent. Prevention is not just an option. It is an unavoidable obligation, an ethical imperative. We must act in good time. We must look ahead and try to see the shape of our common destiny. We must never lapse into fatalism. I - - 189 FUTURE GENERATIONS HAVE MORAL STANDING 1. INTERNATIONAL LAW DOCUMENTS OUR DUTY TO FUTURE GENERATIONS Edith Brown Weiss, Professor Georgetown University School of Law and Board of Editors, THE AMERICAN JOURNAL INTERNATIONAL LAW, January, - 1990, pp. 200-201. The theory of intergenerational equity finds deep roots in international law. The Preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights begins, “Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world.” The reference to all members of the human family has a temporal dimension, which brings all generations within its scope. The reference to equal and inalienable rights affirms the basic equality of these generations in the human family. The United Nations Charter, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man, the Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, the Declaration on the Rights of the Child and many other human rights documents protect the dignity of all people and the equality of their rights... These instruments reveal a fundamental belief in the dignity of all members of human society and in an equality of rights that extends in time as well as space. 2. THE HUMAN RACE IS UNITED ACROSS TIME Federico Mayor, UNESCO, UNESCO COURIER, March, 1996, p. 36. The fact remains that the rights of future generations belong to a new type in comparison with the rights enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948. First of all because, by definition, those entitled to them do not yet exist although since Roman times the law has admitted cases in which the rights of persons yet unborn are acknowledged. We must now extend that possibility, without, however, ending up with a precise legal status for the unborn child or embryo, issues which are now under discussion in many countries. In reality, these new-style rights are only rights because today~s generations have obligations whose counterparts are the rights of future generations. In other words there is a dialectical relationship between rights and duties which should make us aware of the inherent unity of the human race, in space and over time. - 3. ~THEY WILL NEVER KNOW” IS AN INADEQUATE EVASION OF OUR DUTY Joseph R. Des Jardins, Philosophy Professor at the College of Saint Benedict and St. John’s University, ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS: AN INTRODUCTION TO ENVIRONMENTAL PHILOSOPHY, 1997, p. 85. The objection is correct in holding that, if people of the future do not know of these things, they cannot desire (or miss) them. But the motivation to preserve for the future does not rest on the content of their. desires; it rests with our judgement that a life lived with the possibility of knowing and desiring these things is fuller and more meaningful than one lived without them. We can make a parallel argument by using the example of distinguished works of art. If we failed to preserve all Renaissance paintings, for example, and all records of this art were lost to future generations, surely they could not be said to miss them. If future generations knew nothing of these paintings, they could not feel their loss. But their lives would nonetheless be impoverished by this loss. And it is our concern for this, our caring that they not live an impoverished life, that motivates us to preserve great artwork for the future. Thus, it does seem meaningful to care about future people. 190 Duty to Future Generations Bad ATTEMPTING TO BENEFIT FUTURE GENERATIONS DESTROYS THEM 1. AITEMPTING TO HELP FUTURE GENERATIONS ACTUALLY DESTROYS THEM Anthony D’Amato, Board of Editors, THE AMERICAN JOURNAL INTERNATIONAL LAW, Januaxy, 1990, p. 191. Let us picture the people who will be living 100 years from now: they will be specific, identifiable persons. We can claim that we currently owe an environment-preserving obligation to those particular as-yet-unborn persons. Parfit’s paradox arises when we seek to discharge that postulated obligation. Suppose that we undertake a specific environmental act of conservation. For example, we help to pass a law requiring catalytic converters on all automobiles in our state. We will thus have succeeded in intervening in the environment making the environment slightly different from the way it would have been but for our action. Our intervention will reduce the amount of air pollution that otherwise would have taken place, and increase the utilization of energy and resources in the manufacture of catalytic converters. Yet this slight difference resulting from our intervention in the environment will affect the ecosphere in the years subsequent to our intervention. In particular, it will affect the conditions under which human procreation takes place. The particular sperm and egg cells from which any human being develops is a highly precarious fact; the slightest difference in the conditions of conception will probably result in fertilization of the egg by a different sperm. Hence, when the environment is disrupted even a slight amount, a different future person will probably be conceived.... Parfits conclusion is that every single person alive 100 years from now will be an entirely different individual from the person he or she would have been had we not intervened in the environment. This fact creates a paradox in our attempt to discharge our moral obligation to future generations. How can we owe a duty to future persons if the very act of discharging that duty wipes out the very individuals to whom we allegedly owed that duty? Our attempted environmental altruism will prevent the birth of the precise beneficiaries of our altruism. -- 2. PARFIT’S PARADOX IS SCIENTIFICALLY VALID Anthony D’Amato, Board of Editors, THE AMERICAN JOURNAL INTERNATIONAL LAW, Januaiy, 1990, p. 192. People encountering Parflts thesis for the first time are properly skeptical that a minor intervention in the environment can actually result in entirely different individuals in 100 years from those who would have existed then had there been no such intervention. But the result is scientifically accurate, stemming from the discovery in recent years of chaos theory. In the 1 950s, Edward Lorenz, a meteorologist at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, discovered that a very slight shift in the initial data about weather conditions fed into a computer will result in drastic differences in simulated weather conditions after a number of iterations. The differences, or perturbations, grow exponentially, doubling every 4 days. Lorenz called this the “butterfly effect.” An environmental intervention as slight as a butterfly flapping its wings near a weather station will change long-term weather predictions.... Thus, applying chaos theory in support of Parfit’s thesis makes clear that any action we take will affect the environment in such a way as to change the conditions of all acts of human procreation several decades hence. Even minor acts in the present can substantially affect which particular sperm cells succeed in fertilizing human ova 60 years from now. 191 FUTURE GENERATIONS LACK INDEPENDENT MORAL STANDING 1. GENERIC FUTURE GENERATIONS ARE NOT WORTHY OF MORAL DUTY Anthony D’Amato, Board of Editors, THE AMERICAN JOURNAL INTERNATIONAL LAW, January, 1990, p. 194. The point is that the winner of the lottery would not be equally content to have any other person win the lottery; similarly, you and I would not be content if a different person had been born instead of us. We may have been lucky to have been born at all, but we are not ready to relinquish that luck simply on the ground that large numbers and vanishingly small probabilities are involved. The fact that somebody will be born does not mean that the person lucky enough to be born is indifferent about who it is. Future generations cannot be indifferent about whether it is they or other persons who will enjoy the fruits of the earth. If we feel we owe an obligation to them, we, too, cannot be indifferent about the question. We cannot discharge our obligation to them if in the process of doing so we deprive them of life. 2. MORAL OBLIGATION IS AN INAPPROPRIATE APPROACH TO FUTURE GENERATIONS Daniel A. Farber, Associate Dean for Faculty and Henry J. Fletcher Professor of Law at the University of Minnesota and Paul A. Henimersbaugh, Law Clerk to Judge Paul Magnuson, United States District Court for the District of Minnesota, VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW, March, 1993, p. 294-295. This benchmark enables us to invoke some widely shared intuitions. First, whether the language of ‘moral obligation” is appropriate when considering unborn descendants is not clear. If your great-grandparents squandered the family fortune, you may feel that they acted reprehensibly, but you would have difficulty charging them with violating a personal obligation toward you or with violating a “right” that you possessed. 3. GENERATIONAL JUSTIFICATIONS CARRY NO MORAL VALIDITY Anthony D’Amato, Board of Editors, THE AMERICAN JOURNAL INTERNATIONAL LAW, January, 1990, p. 193. But my argument is that although eveiy policy decision of government and business surely affects the composition of future generations, we are nevertheless entitled to examine each and every one of those policy d~ecisions from a moral point of view. If some are immoral, we reject them for that reason alone. But some policy decisions are asserted to be morally required solely because they will benefit future generations. It is just these policy decisions that are subject to the Parfit rejoinder: If you undertake a policy decision only to benefit future generations, and that is its only “moral’ justification, it is not morally justifiable at all because it destroys the very persons you claim to protect. 4. HARSH SACRIFICES FOR FUTURE GENERATIONS ARE UNREASONABLE Daniel A. Farber, Associate Dean for Faculty and Henry J. Fletcher Professor of Law at the University of Minnesota and Paul A. Hemrnersbaugh, Law Clerk to Judge Paul Magnuson, United States District Court for the District of Minnesota, VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW, March, 1993, p. 295-296. As a practical matter, we probably cannot project benefits with even minimal confidence over long periods such as over a century. Even if we could predict some benefits with a degree of accuracy over such long periods, today’s generation likely would refuse to make severe sacrifices simply to create marginal improvements in the welfare of distant future generations. 5. FUTURE GENERATIONS ARE PROTECTED BY MARKET FORCES James V. DeLong, Senior Consultant with Sanders International and Competitive Enterprise Institute Adjunct Scholar, PROPERTY MAJTERS: HOW PROPERTY RIGHTS ARE UNDER ASSAULT AND WHY YOU SHOULD CARE, 1997, p. 38. In political discussion, it is often pointed out that future generations do not vote in present elections, which often tempts cunent politicians to ignore their interests. The point is well taken. But future generations do have powerful representatives in the present: the owner who calculates that they will make it worth his while, or worth the while of his progeny, if he preserves resources for their use. The much-maligned speculator actually compensates for a serious flaw in the workings of the political system. — 192 Ecocentrism Good ECOCENTRISM IS A DESIRABLE PERSPECTIVE 1. ECOCENTRISM COMPASSIONATELY VALUES NATURAL WORTH Chris Guthrie, nqa, STANFORD ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL, 1993, P. 213. Eckersley’s ecocentric approach is best understood by way of comparison to anthropocentrism. Whereas anthropocentrism values human beings exclusively, or at least preeminently, the ecocentric approach posits that “there is no valid basis to the belief that humans are the pinnacle of evolution and the sole locus of value and meaning in the world.” Rather, an ecocentric approach values both humans and nonhumans for their own sake. While anthropocentrism adopts an atomistic view of the world, ecocentrism views the world in holistic terms, valuing “populations, species, ecosystems, and the ecosphere as well as individual organisms.” And in contrast to anthropocentrism, ecocentrism places special emphasis on “caution” and “empathy.” This means “a greater sense of compassion for the fate of other life-forms (both human and nonhuman) and a keener appreciation of the fact that many of our activities are likely to have a range of unforeseen consequences for ourselves and other life-forms.” 2. ECOCENTRISM TRANSCENDS THE UMITS OF LIBERAL ENVIRONMENTALISM Paul Wapner, assistant professor at the School of International Service at American University, TIKKUN, May, 1996, p. 21. Inviting humans to be part of a biotic community enlarges the meaning of environmental protection, and this in itself can inspire greater political effort. Although certainly important, the liberal approach to the environment evokes little passion and rarely elicits long-term commitment, probably because it turns humankind’s relationship to nature into a technocratic problem a matter of maintaining a steady flow of inputs and absorbable outputs. While such a view presents a challenging puzzle, it displays a narrowness of vision that has little to attract most of us. Indeed, liberal environmental protection is probably best left to those who specialize in maximizing efficiency, engineering the sustainabiity of throughputs, and mastering technological innovation the technocrats, bureaucrats, and systems analysts of the world. - - 3. ECOCENTRISM DOES NOT IMPLY ENVIRONMENTAL FASCISM Ronald E. Purser, Assistant Professor of Organization Development at Loyola University of Chicago, et al, ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT REVIEW, October, 1995, p. 1053. On the other side of the debate, critics of the ecocentric paradigm have distorted the policy implications of this view, claiming that it would lead to a type of “environmental fascism” and a coercive submission of the parts to a larger, impersonal whole. Additionally, Draconian measures would be deployed, where the EPA would become a massive bureaucratic federal environmental auditing agency with powers equal to that of the IRS. These fears and criticisms are unfounded: The ecocentric paradigm does not entail downgrading the dignity of humans or undermining the viability of economic organizations. 4. ECOCENTRISM CONNECTS FOSTERS HUMAN CONNECTION WITH NATURE Paul Wapner, assistant professor at the School of International Service at American University, TIKKUN, May, 1996, p. 21. Connection is about being in the world in a different way. It sees our lives as webs of relations constituted by mutual support, respect, and care. Connection places us in the world and allows us to experience and concomitantly reinvigorate the networks of interdependence of which we are a part. By way of analogy, one could say that if minding the house involves vacuuming rugs, watering plants, and taking out the trash, cultivating a home entails acting in ways that create the kind of warmth of intimacy that results from extending our care to each other. Ecologically, connection involves seeing the earth as an intricate weave of air, water, land, and species, and appreciating how we are braided into its very fabric. This involves understanding not only that we depend upon a well-fanctiorang natural world to support us, but also that we are literally of the earth and intertwined with its life. 193 ECOCENTRISM IS A VALID PERSPECTIVE 1. ECOCENTRISM IS A MORALLY JUSTIFIED POSITION Ronald E. Purser, Assistant Professor of Organization Development at Loyola University of Chicago, et al, ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT REVIEW, October, 1995, p. 1053. There are morally significant reasons for preserving undisturbed ecosystems besides their usefulness as a “control group for assessing ecosystem health. Ecosystems support and sustain the life of various species and biological organisms. In one sense, ecosystems are valuable for the life-support function they afford. Ecosystems exist at a level that supersedes the level of individual biological organisms. It is a category mistake to use criteria for ascribing value that is appropriate at the level of species to ecosystems. For example, an animal species may have sentience, but an ecosystem does not. An animal may have the capacity for subjective experience, but an ecosystem as a whole does not. Therefore, it is a categorical mistake to assume that ecosystems are not valuable simply because they do not exhibit the criteria of sentience or subjectivity. As Rolston pointed out, We do not look for a valuer, but rather for the ability to form value. We look for a matrix, for interconnections between centers of value (individual plants and animals, dynamic lines of speciation), for creative stimulus and open-ended potential. We look for a system able to produce and support value, and ask whether that ability is a value in itself, and also a value for those it produces and supports. According to Rolston, ecosystems have the ability to produce value; that is, they produce and support life, regardless of whether humans are on the scene to ascribe and project value judgments. Ecosystems therefore have systemic value.. 2. ECOCENTRISM CONTRIBUTES TO DEMOCRATIC, EQUITABLE GOVERNMENT Chris Gutbrie, nqa, STANFORD ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL, 1993, p.213. Accordingly, Eckersley concludes her book by identif~ring the characteristics of a truly ecocentric polity: First, an ecocentric polity will have a democratic legislature, which will be part of a larger, multi-layered, decisionmaking body. This legislature will be less powerful than a modem nation-state and more responsive to local, regional, and international decision-making bodies. Second, the ecocentric polity will be characterized by a more equitable distribution of political power, economic power, and wealth among local communities. Third, the ecocentric polity will retain a market economy, but the legislature will regulate it closely. And finally, the ecocentric polity will be characterized by an ecocentric spirit or culture. 3. ECOCENTRISM IS NOT MISANTHROPIC Ronald E. Purser, Assistant Professor of Organization Development at Loyola University of Chicago, et al, ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT REVIEW, October, 1995, p. 1053. However, the ecocentric perspective is not misanthropic. Rather, this perspective amounts to a fundamental ethical shift, with a concomitant recognition of constraints placed on individual systems (human beings, organizations) by virtue of the fact that such systems are members of a land community. As “plain members” and “citizens” of the land community (rather than being “conquerors,” above and apart from the environment), individual systems can no longer maintain an egocentric view of themselves. 4. ECOCENTRISM DOES NOT DEVALUE HUMANITY Bryan Norton, Professor School of Public Policy, Georgia Institute of Technology, DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY FORUM, Fall, 1996, p. 62. Critics of the land ethic, especially Tom Regan, have argued that if we manage to protect ecosystems because they have inherent value, we will sometimes override the ngbts of individual members (human and nonhuman) of ecological communities for the good of the larger whole. Regan even compared this approach to the way that Adolph Hitler and the Nazis overrode the rights of individuals in their misguided attempt to protect the German state as the embodiment of a master race. However, if Leopold and the land ethic are interpreted within a multiscalar system, there is no conflict between individual rights and the protection of ecosystems. Human individuals actually exist within ecosystems. Damage to ecosystems is usually the cumulative damage of whole cultures and civilizations it is a responsibility at the community level of a multi-scaled, open system, not at the level of individual decisions. Correction of these communal threats need not override the interests of individuals. Individuals, in a properly functioning system, will act in ways that contribute to, rather than destroy, the values that emerge on the larger, ecosystem scale. - - 194 Ecocentrism Bad ECOCENTRISM IS FUNDAMENTALLY FLAWED 1. ECOCENTRISM IS A FUNDAMENTALLY BANKRUPT PHILOSOPHY Thomas N. Gladwin, Director of the Global Environment Program at the Leonard N. Stern School of Business at New York University, et. al., ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT REVIEW, October, 1995, p. 874. In summary, ecocentrism diminishes human distinctiveness, ignores fundamental relationships bearing upon human security and therefore ecological integrity, and rests on philosophical grounds that cannot cu~ently be accepted as practical guides to human conduct. Despite its perhaps attractive ideology and admirable intent, ecocentrism, like technocentrism, is beset by internal contradictions and fails to truly integrate culture and nature. 2. ECOCENTRISM UNACCEPTABLY DENIGRATES THE SIGNIFICANCE OF HUMANITY Thomas N. Gladwin, Director of the Global Environment Program at the Leonard N. Stern School of Business at New York University, et. al., ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT REVIEW, October, 1995, p. 874. Appraising ecocenirism versus sustainabiity. In reacting to technocentrism, ecocentrists offer a worldview that is more holistic, integrative, and less arrogantly anthropocentric. Ecocentrism, however, also fails our litmus tests of sustainable development. Inclusiveness. Ecocentrism emphasizes harmony in nature and downplays its harshness. The full range of human ecological needs in such roles as predator, prey, competitor, and symbiont is often downplayed. As a species in a biotic community, some mix of human subduing and caring is essential; as Nash stated, “some degree of domination of nature by humans is necessary to prevent the domination of humans by nature”. Ecocentrism subordinates humans to the biosphere. Although true in the physical and ecological spheres, it is an ontological fallacy to claim that the human intellect is subservient to the biosphere. Ecocentrism dispenses with human distinctiveness and, thus, with human centrality in a hierarchically evolving universe. It ultimately removes the wisdom from Homo sapiens. Ecocentrism overcomes the gross reductionism of technocentrism, but it covertly propagates a subtle reductionism by instrumentalizing everything in its holistic web of life ideology. Ecocentrism fails to embrace the capacity of human intellect and, thus, the whole of reality. 3. ECOCENTRISM FAILS TO PROPERLY UNDERSTAND HUMAN SOCIETY Bob Pepperman Taylor, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Vermont, OUR LIMITS TRANSGRESSED: ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICAL THOUGHT IN AMERICA, 1992, p. 131 Although “community” is discussed a great deal in these works, the term is very loosely employed and remains largely unexamined as a normative concept. It may be appealing, and even true in some sense, to speak, as Taylor does, of “Earth’s Community of Life” or, as Callicott does, of the earth as “one humming community,” but it is not useful as a full definition of our relationship with other living things. It simply cannot describe, for example, the extension of the moral and affective mutuality that is usually thought to be included in the notion of human community. 4. ECOCENTRISM CARICATURES THE IMPLICATIONS OF ANTHROPOCENTRISM Scott Campbell, assistant professor of urban planning and policy development at Rutgers University, JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN PLANNING ASSOCIATION, June 22, 1996, p. 296. An anthropocentric view, if distorted, can lead to an arrogant optimism about civilization’s ability to reprogram nature through technologies ranging from huge hydroelectric and nuclear plants down to genetic engineering. A rigid belief in the anthropocentric labor theory of value, Marxist or otherwise, can produce a modern-day Narcissus as a social-constructionist who sees nature as merely reflecting the beauty of the human aesthetic and the value of human labor. In this light, a tree is devoid of value until it either becomes part of a scenic area or is transformed into lumber. On the other hand, even as radical, ecocentric environmentalists claim to see “true nature” beyond the city limits, they are blind to how their own world view and their definition of nature itself are shaped by their socialization. The choice between an anthropocentric or an ecocentric world view is a false one. We are all unavoidably anthropocentric; the question is which anthropomorphic values and priorities we will apply to the natural and the social world around us. 195 ECOCENTRISM IS EXCESSIVELY NAIVE 1. ECOCENTRISM IGNORES OPPRESSION OF HUMAN BEINGS Thomas N. Gladwin, Director of the Global Environment Program at the Leonard N. Stern School of Business at New York University, et al., ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT REVIEW, October, 1995, p. 874. Connectivity. A renowned proponent of deep ecology recently expressed the opinion that pursuit of ecological sustamability would be acceptable, regardless of the state of affairs in the domains of peace and justice. This view falls considerably short of our argument that ecological sustainability is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for sustainable development. Ecological sustainability is simply unachievable under conditions of social or economic unsustainability. Ecocentrism offers little guidance concerning the horrors of expanding poverty, human-rights abuse and massive displacement that currently beset much of the developing world. It fails to adequately address issues of unemployment, income inequality, and other social pathologies that grip the industrial world. Ecocentrism does not ensure sustainable livelihoods. Equity. Ecocentrism privileges the biosphere, levels distinctions within it, and by emphasizing the whole, depreciates the importance of the suffering of individual parts (human or nonhuman). Even though most ecocentrists have offered biospheric egalitarianism as a supplement or complement, and not a substitute, for human-to-human morality, more extreme ecocentrism evokes accusations of antihumanist cosmology, misanthropy, or even fascism. Although we will not attempt to settle this debate here, it is important to note that an ethic that gives nonhomocentric guidance is still impeded by uncertainties as to the constraints and ground rules by which a moral theory must abide. In the absence of principles for adjudicating conflicts of interest between human and nonhuman nature, ecocentrism offers little policy guidance beyond that of taking all legitimate human and nonhuman interests into account in decision making. Ecocentrism may completely paralyze pragmatic action of any sort. 2.ECOCENTRISM IS NOT PLAUSIBLE HUMANS MUST INTERVENE Thomas N. Gladwin, Director of the Global Environment Program at the Leonard N. Stern School of Business at New York University, et. al., ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT REVIEW, October, 1995, p. 874. Prudence. Ecocentrism eulogizes a primal state when matter, life, and mind were undifferentiated and whole. It is a vision of return to a pristine communion with nature in a new Golden Age. The reality today, however, is that humans already may have brought about “the end of nature” as a force independent of humanity. Human alteration of natural cycles and land use/land cover is already so vast that “any clear dichotomy between pristine ecosystems and human-altered areas that may have existed in the past has vanished”. There is no longer a primal relationship to which to return. Projections suggest that the human population will double in the next century. According to ecocentrism, a substantial decrease of the human population from current levels is required. How this can be achieved in the absence of profound social reengineering is difficult to imagine. — 3. ECOCENTRISM IS WITHOUT CONSENSUS OR SOLID FOUNDATION Ronald E. Purser, Assistant Professor of Organization Development at Loyola University of Chicago, et al, ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT REVIEW, October, 1995, p. 1053. Competing ecological paradigms add to the confusion already existing in organizational studies coupled with the erosion of a secure sense of the future and clear notion of progress. We believe that there is no single paradigm or theory that can promise to offer unfailing solutions or clear guidance to organizations for resolving current and future ecological dilemmas. Further, we could argue that the Arcadian-ecocentric paradigm is a nostalgic dream, which, although perhaps philosophically tenable and aesthetically attractive, is simply “unrealistic” in the context of socioeconomic realities. There seems to be little consensus as to what constitutes “ecosystem sustainabiity” or “beauty,’ “integrity,” “health,” and so forth. 196 Ecofeminism Good ECOFEMINISM IS A DESIRABLE OUTLOOK 1. ECOFEMINISM IS ESSENTIAL TO ANY REAL POSITIVE SOCIAL CHANGE Judith Plant, Ecofeminist Author, CIRCLES OF STRENGTH, 1993, p. xii. This is why community-building must be a feminist project, and particularly an ecofeminist one. An understanding of how and why women have been subjugated by patriarchy is absolutely fundamental to any rebuilding of human society, or we will delude ourselves and our revolutions will bring us right back to the same behavior with which we started. 2. ECOFEMINISM IS NECESSARY TO BUILD STRONG COMMUNITIES Judith Plant, Ecofeminist Author, CIRCLES OF STRENGTH, 1993, p. xii. An ecofeminist perspective enhances feminism's basic message by adding that all life is seen by the patriarchy to be on this Earth for the use and convenience of the elite. More than just equality is at stake. This culture made sick power cannot value anything that is not competitive and self-interested because such values as cooperation, sharing, and even love are at odds with the patriarchal determination to turn everything into property. 3. ECOFEMINISM IS A TOOL FOR CHALLENGING ALL UNJUST POWER RELATIONSHIPS Starhawk, Peace Activist, Psychologist, Therapist and Writer, TURTLE TALK: VOICES FOR A SUSTAINABLE FUTURE, 1992, p. 35. I think part of what has burned so many women out is that we have to keep fighting for the same issues over and over again. We win victories over abortion and then suddenly they're going away and we have to struggle again for them. But I think there is, and always has been within feminism a very radical critique of society. One wing of feminism has said "Let us gain power within the system and equalize our power." Another wing has asked, "What's the point of having equal power in a system which is destroying the Earth?" What we need to do is use feminism as a tool for challenging all the relationships of power in society. 4. ECOFEMINISM EMPOWERS RURAL WOMEN IN THE THIRD WORLD Christine J. Cuomo, Activist and Author, “Unraveling the Problems in Ecofeminism” GREEN POWER, April 1996,p. np, Accessed 5/10/98, http://user.hk.linkage.net/~greenpow/essays/ecof1.htm. In her book, Staying Alive, Vandana Shiva illustrates the instrumentality of a "feminine principle" ecofeminism in empowering rural Indian women and enabling them to sustain their livelihood by interrupting deforestation. One cannot ignore the successes of ecofeminist activism in communities that have suffered severely under Westerninitiated maldevelopment. It is important that Western scholars recognize the practical relevance of ecofeminist activism even when it relies on essentialist notions and is not based on rigorous analyses. Ecofeminist criticism should take seriously the material significance of such theory for women throughout the world by asking why certain theories are able to inspire social change and changes in the way women and others interact with their environments. 5. WESTERN PATRIARCHY IS ROBBING THE WORLD OF ITS SOUL Gloria Orenstein, Professor of Comparative Literature University of Southern California, “The Shamanic Dimensions Of An Ecofeminist Narrative,” December 1997, p. np., Eve Online, Accessed 5/10/98, http://www.envirolink.org/envlib/orgs/eve/writings/shamanic.html. While we cannot personally address, interview, or study with a mentor from Minoan Crete or Catal Huyuk, we can begin to listen to the teachings and the voices of those spiritual teachers from a wide diversity of indigenous traditions living today all over the planet. In warning us of the ecological disasters and the genocidal rape of their land and their people, these voices are also telling us that at the very heart and soul of their cultures is their connectedness, not only to the Earth, but to the spirit or soul of the earth and to the spirit of the Creator of the Universe. The death of the soul (or spirit) accompanies largely atheist and agnostic scientific cultures. Our western Enlightenment monoculture is a shocking example of the death of the soul. As we have de-souled the earth through our science and technology, we are also de-souling humanity; we are alienating ourselves from the spirits of all of non-human nature in the cosmos. 197 ECOFEMINISM IS NECESSARY FOR SURVIVAL 1. ECOFEMINISM CREATES PROFOUND RESPECT FOR ALL LIFE Gloria Orenstein, Professor of Comparative Literature University of Southern California, “The Shamanic Dimensions Of An Ecofeminist Narrative,” December 1997, p. np., Eve Online, Accessed 5/10/98, http://www.envirolink.org/envlib/orgs/eve/writings/shamanic.html. In this paper I affirm that the shamanic dimension to Ecofeminism considers the definition of life, itself, to be larger than the biological, genetic description, and that the spiritual dimension of the "seed" (as discussed by Vandana Shiva) is an expanded but inherent aspect of the fundamental constituents of life, itself. Radical feminists and ecofeminists in the international Finnrage network have critiqued the new reproductive technologies thanks to the pioneering work of Renate Klein, Jan Raymond, Gena Correa, and Robyn Rowland, among many, and have noted the multiple ways in which the cycle of reproduction centered in the female is being dismembered, how women are being turned into egg producers, egg donors, uteri, and so-called "surrogate mothers"; how the mother is being fragmented, and, indeed, how reproduction is being separated from sexuality, in general. 2. ECOFEMINIST SPIRITUALITY SAFEGUARDS THE PLANET Gloria Orenstein, Professor of Comparative Literature University of Southern California, “The Shamanic Dimensions Of An Ecofeminist Narrative,” December 1997, p. np., Eve Online, Accessed 5/10/98, http://www.envirolink.org/envlib/orgs/eve/writings/shamanic.html. As most native peoples will tell us, the reason for validating the information gleaned from prophets and visionaries is rather to enable and empower us to give adequate thanksgiving to those spirits for their beneficial interventions in our lives, for it is via our spiritual communication with the spirits that safeguards the balance and harmony of the planet. Within the Ecofeminist movement, largely through the work of scholars such as Marija Gimbutas we have begun to recover the shamanic dimension of ecofeminist spirituality within our contemporary reclamations of the ancient Goddess Religion that predated patriarchy for millennia. 3. ECOFEMINISM CREATES AN ETHIC OF CARE, COMPASSION AND RESPECT FOR NATURE Christine J. Cuomo, Activist and Author, “Unraveling the Problems in Ecofeminism” GREEN POWER, April 1996,p. np, Accessed 5/10/98, http://user.hk.linkage.net/~greenpow/essays/ecof1.htm. Warren states that ecofeminist ethics makes a central place for values of care, and elements of the care ethic are evident in much ecofeminist literature. In the introduction to Healing the Wounds editor Judith Plant writes: "Our pain for the death of the forest is simply, and most fundamentally, compassion for the senseless destruction of life. This compassion that we feel is the essence of a new paradigm which ecofeminism describes in detail. Feeling the life of the "other"--literally experiencing its existence--is becoming the new starting point for human decisionmaking." 198 Ecofeminism Bad ECOFEMINISM IS SEXIST 1. ECOFEMINISM ISN'T REVOLUTIONARY, IT'S REACTIONARY AND SEXIST Janet Biehl, Institute for Social Ecology, Left Green Network, RETHINKING ECOFEMINIST POLITICS, 1991, p. 15. Despite ecofeminism's "revolutionary" potential, some feminists (who are not ecofeminists) have criticized ecofeminism and its closely associated cultural feminism for their reactionary implications. Ecofeminist images of women, these critics correctly warn, retain the patriarchal stereotypes of what men expect women to be. These stereotypes freeze women as merely caring and nurturing beings, instead of expanding the full range of women's human potentialities and abilities. To focus overwhelmingly on women's "caring nature as the source of ecologically necessary "values" easily leads to the notion that women are to remain intuitive and discourages them from expanding their human horizons and capacities. 2. ECOFEMINISTS EMBRACE GENDER STEREOTYPES Janet Biehl, Institute for Social Ecology, Left Green Network, RETHINKING ECOFEMINIST POLITICS, 1991, p. 12. In fact, psycho-biological ecofeminists believe that women, owing to their biological makeup, have an innately more "caring" and "nurturing" way of being than men, a view that roots their parenting attributes in a uniquely genetic makeup. Unlike other feminists, who tried to demolish stereotypes as insufferably constraining to women's development as human beings, such ecofeminists enthusiastically begin to embrace some of these same psychobiological stereotypes. 3. ECOFEMINIST METAPHORS ARE STEREOTYPICAL AND DEMEANING TO WOMEN Janet Biehl, Institute for Social Ecology, Left Green Network, RETHINKING ECOFEMINIST POLITICS, 1991, p. 25. The attempt by ecofeminists to formulate a new ontological ground for an ecological ethics on metaphors may be a failure from a rational viewpoint, but it may be a flaming success in another, ugly way--namely, by reinforcing gender stereotypes. If metaphors of nature cannot form the basis of an ecological ethics, metaphors of women as "nature," alas are all too likely to provide the basis for sexist notions of women. Sexist characterizations like "intuitive," "Irrational," "hysterical," and "unpredictable" have been slapped on women for centuries. At the very least, this should warn women about the reckless use of metaphors in trying to formulate an environmental ethics. 4. ECOFEMINISM DOESN'T PROMOTE EMPATHY FOR OTHER OPPRESSED PEOPLE Christine J. Cuomo, Activist and Author, “Unraveling the Problems in Ecofeminism” GREEN POWER, April 1996,p. np, Accessed 5/10/98, http://user.hk.linkage.net/~greenpow/essays/ecof1.htm. Some proponents of a care ethic recommend empathy and ego denial as the point of departure for ecofeminists. Judith Plant claims that "feeling the life of the other" should be the starting point for ecofeminist decision making.'" In her essay "Invoking the Grove," Deena Metzger writes of the importance of giving up the ego as a necessary prerequisite to living out a compassionate commitment to the equality of all things." Nevertheless, given our socialization and our present material conditions, like many other oppressed people, we must begin to feel ourselves, identify our own feelings and what is in our own best interest. This experience should be our point of departure for any ethical decision making and theory building. Identifying one's own feelings and interests may be a necessary prerequisite to empathizing with another. If so, then ego denial is contrary to the kind of empathy that allows one to appreciate the oppression of another living being. 199 ECOFEMINISM UNDERMINES FREEDOM 1. ECOFEMINISM EXCLUDES IMPORTANT VALUES LIKE FREEDOM AND REASON Janet Biehl, Institute for Social Ecology, Left Green Network, RETHINKING ECOFEMINIST POLITICS, 1991, p. 26. If women are to gain an understanding of their relationship with nonhuman nature that is liberatory, it certainly cannot be done by advancing a myth of the eternal feminine. Important as caring and nurturing are, humanity, it is to be hoped, has greater potentialities than caring and nurturing alone. What of such goals as consciousness, reason, and above all freedom? 2. ECOFEMINISM SUPPORTS THE STATUS QUO, NOT ECOLOGY AND FREEDOM Janet Biehl, Institute for Social Ecology, Left Green Network, RETHINKING ECOFEMINIST POLITICS, 1991, p. 156-7. Here all thinking women stand at a crossroads. Will they mystify the domestic virtue of the oikos, emphasize their particularity, defame the most generous traditions of democracy as "male" or "patriarchal," and ultimately degrade whatever progress humanity as a whole has attained in the course of its development? Or will they pursue a more generous approach by joining with others--men no less than women--in a common project of liberation and ecological restoration? This common project can never be formulated merely in terms of domestic values, of atavistic mystical retreats to the "tribalistic" virtues of the Neolithic village, or of direct or indirect denigrations of reason, science and technology as "male" or "patriarchal." In the ecology movement, thinking women must, if only to realize their human potentialities, either join with thinking men in developing new a politics, rationality and science--not to speak of those qualities that make us humane as well as human--or they are likely to follow the ecofeminist path toward a narrow parochialism, primitivism and irrationalism that will ultimately mystify and support the status quo rather than transcend it by achieving a free ecological society. 3. ECOFEMINISM IS ANTI-DEMOCRATIC AND AUTHORITARIAN Janet Biehl, Institute for Social Ecology, Left Green Network, RETHINKING ECOFEMINIST POLITICS, 1991, p. 137. By contrast, many ecofeminists prefer consensus decision-making to that of majority-minority democracy. Ideally, consensus process seeks group unanimity. In the ideal consensus process, no decision is made by a group without unanimity. After a period of debate on an issue, according to consensus theorist Caroline Estes, "there starts to emerge a common answer to the question that moves the group to a decision." This is a prayer at best rather than a description, for sometimes a "common answer" does not start to emerge at all. Ideal consensus and consensus seeking processes are nonetheless premised on the notion that such a common answer must always emerge if a decision is to be made, not unlike the emphasis many ecofeminists place on the "oneness" of "all" in a cosmological sense. Says Estes, "it is fairly easy to arrive at a unity place where people can get behind and move forward together. Indeed, for Estes, consensus is a matter of urgency: "This integration is going to be essential for our survival." By affirming that this "integration" is going to be "essential for our survival," Estes creates a quasi-authoritarian imperative. We are left with the impression that there must be "unity"--or else! 4. ECOFEMINIST CARING IS NOT ALWAYS MORALLY GOOD Christine J. Cuomo, Activist and Author, “Unraveling the Problems in Ecofeminism” GREEN POWER, April 1996,p. np, Accessed 5/10/98, http://user.hk.linkage.net/~greenpow/essays/ecof1.htm. To talk of caring and compassion in the abstract, without naming the object of the caring and the context in which the caring occurs, is ethically uninformative. In constructing an environmental ethic, feminists must ask if caring for other particular beings or objects is a good activity to engage in when one is trying to free oneself from a subordinate social position. "Caring" cannot be evaluated unless the object and purpose of care are made clear. In fact, female caring and compassion for oppressors are cornerstones of patriarchal systems. Women have forgiven oppressors, stayed with abusive husbands and partners, and sacrificed their own desires because of their great ability to care for others. Claudia Card has argued that in the context of oppression the care ethic actually causes moral damage in some women and that, therefore, caring is not always a healthy and ethical choice for a moral agent. 200 Ecofeminism Responses Ecofeminism is a philosophy that is extraordinarily complex and difficult to define. As Noel Sturgeon notes, “The ecofeminist movement I examine, and in some ways construct throughout this book, is a fractured, contested, discontinuous entity that constitutes itself as a social movement with a particular place in a tradition of U.S. radical social movments.”1 One of the founders of ecofeminism in the United States, Ynestra King, called it, “the third wave of the women's movement,” indicating it was, “this most recent manifestation of feminist activity [that] was large and vital enough to parallel the first-wave nineteenth-century women’s movement and second-wave women’s liberation movement of the 1960s and 1970s.”2 Clearly ecofeminism is having an impact on those examining it. For the purposes of this essay, we must attempt to reach some sort of definition of ecofeminism. Noel Sturgeon says, “Most simply put, ecofeminism is a movement that makes connections between environmentalisms and feminisms; more precisely, it articulates the theory that the ideologies that authorize injustices based on gender, race, and class are related to the ideologies that sanction the exploitation and degradation of the environment.” 3 Perhaps the first ecofeminist “manifesto” was the Unity Statement from the Women’s Pentagon Action in 1981. In it, “the women demand an end to male violence in all its forms (warfare, poverty, educational deprivation and distortion, battering, rape, pornography, reproductive control, heterosexism, racism, nuclear power), an end to oppression, and end to warfare. In the last six paragraphs, the Unity Statement explicitly names women and ecology as forces opposed to militarism and corporatism.”4 These goals of the movement have been expanded upon, clarified, and debated since the movement’s inception. In this essay, we will focus on ecofeminism as the philosophy that points out the similarities in the abuses of women and the environment. When employed in any type of debate round it would be best to ask for sufficient clarification of what it meant by “ecofeminism” to determine which of the arguments discussed below will be most applicable and most effective. ECOFEMINISM HURTS ECOLOGY BY PORTRAYING NATURE AS AN ENEMY Though the goal of ecofeminism is partly the ethical treatment of the environment and protection of the natural world, it actually harms ecology in an important way. Author Stacy Alaimo discusses this problem by looking at the history of feminism and movements toward birth control. She explains that in the fight for reproductive freedom, nature and the natural world became volatile sites in the writings of women. She notes, “Thus, ‘nature,’ dense with contested meanings, becomes a discursive nexus for feminist attempts to establish agency, self-determination, and reproductive control.”5 However, she continues by noting that, “feminist rearticulations of nature draw on predominant categories and are no less contradictory.”6 Many feminist writers have portrayed nature as harmful. Rebecca Inman and Mary Pitts, for example, portrayed nature as being anti-essentialist and a realm of freedom. However, in other works it becomes essentialist with a vengeance as it reduces the characters in their writing to breeding bodies. Alaimo notes, “Despite some ecofeminists’ affirmations of a ‘closeness’ between woman and nature, during the period when women battled for reproductive freedom, nature was frequently portrayed as feminism’s foe- especially when such ‘closeness’ erupted into natural disasters.”7 This argument is helped by specific examples. When literature portrays nature as the cause and problem relating to women being seen only as child-bearers, it is difficult to consider that literature also a push for preserving the environment. Childbirth and being seen as a breeding body is harmful, and associating that harm with nature makes nature the enemy. Reproduction is even defined as a “natural disaster.” In Edith Summer Kelley’s Weeds, the protagonist does not feel a bond with nature since it consumed her in, “a quicksand of endless reproduction.” 8 Nature is also seen as seducing the protagonist to then only betray her with the horrors of bearing a child. Nature was seen not as an outside territory, but one that was collapsing in on and even colonizing women’s bodies. In Fielding Burke’s Call Home the Heart, “nature offers the young female protagonists an escape from domestic drudgery. But when girls become women, the nature that exists as a liberatory field outside of the domestic manifests itself within their bodies, and, paradoxically, renders them the very nucleus of the domestic realm as child bearers.” 9 201 These images clearly portray nature as the villain that women face in claiming reproductive rights. While the ecofeminist movement may not explicitly blame nature as much anymore, this association can still be damaging. Ecofeminism places a high priority on the rights of women and their ability to control their bodies. In that sense, the philosophy contradicts itself by championing women and nature, and then showing that nature may be harming women. Stuart Hall notes that, “some associations, though not given for all time, are difficult to break because the ideological terrain of this particular social formation has been so powerfully structured in that way by its previous history.”10 So long as nature is seen as holding women back, a movement that focuses on moving women forward will not be able to fully strive to protect nature. The identification of nature as the cause and also part of the problem confuses the philosophy and can lead to a natural tendency against nature as the cause of women’s servitude to child-bearing. Additionally, this identification of nature as the problem leads to other negative consequences for the ecofeminist movement. If nature is viewed as the enemy then time and attention must be put into describing that enemy and attempting to stop the actions that the enemy is taking. In this case, nature would be focused on in terms of how it could be stopped. This diverts time, energy and resources from the real problems that ecofeminism is supposed to be confronting: the abuse and discrimination facing women and the earth in our world today. By focusing on nature as the problem there is no allowance for a movement to protect and preserve nature. Similarly, women will continue to suffer because the attention is being paid to the adversarial description of nature instead of the unifying way that nature and women are in the same situation. ECOFEMINISM BRINGS ALONG ANTIFEMINISM It should come as no surprise that as the feminist movement has grown and made advances, resistance to this movement have also grown. There is a strong anti-feminist sentiment around the world that attempts to combat feminist movements at every level. Therefore, associating the protection of the environment with feminism invites this anti-feminist movement to challenge any progress. This argument should not in any way be construed to mean that if resistance exists a movement or goal should be abandoned. Instead, it is an evaluation of the most effective way to advance the environmental goals of ecofeminism. To truly understand the resistance that comes with feminism’s association with environmental goals, we must explore the state of antifeminism today. The first form of evidence of antifeminism is the treatment of women around the world. The United Nations Population Fund wrote in 2000 about women of the world, “This half does most of the world’s work, yet earns a fraction of its income. This same half is often the target of violence, is deprived of education and health care and denied a role in civic life. This half is comprised of women and girls. The discrimination they endure, solely as a consequence of their gender, is universal. It occurs in virtually every country in the home and workplace at worship and play in classrooms and courtrooms.”11 The antifeminism that we see in the world around us today is not an accident, but has rather developed purposely and with much care over the course of history. In her book The War Against Women, author Marilyn French explains the historical progression of abuse of women. She notes of our present state: “In the same vein, men-as-a-caste- elite and working-class men- continue to seek ways to defeat feminism, by rescinding or gnawing away at its victories, confining women to lower employment levels, or founding movements aimed at returning them to fully subordinate status....Men are adapting new technologies to old purposes, for example, using amniocentesis to detect a fetus’s sex to abort girls or new fertility techniques to create children they claim as their own. These actions amount to a global war against women.” 12 This evidence is all over the world. French notes, “This war is aimed at reasserting or tightening men’s control over female bodies, especially sexual and reproductive capacities, and women’s labor.” 13 The second form of evidence of antifeminism is the opposition that is levied more directly at the movement. Rhonda Hammer notes, “Indeed, this backlash has plagued the feminist movement since its inception, but as of late it has taken on a particularly dangerous guise, within the seductively poisonous ideological form of an antifeminist ‘feminism’...This agenda is being advanced by a growing assortment of collaborators, who are misrepresenting themselves- largely through the efforts of the mainstream media- as feminists or feminist proponents.”14 The media also hampers feminism and promotes antifeminism. Susan Douglas wrote, “This was what the debates about feminism got reduced to in the mass media: a catfight...So it’s worth reminding ourselves that the catfight was first 202 revived not in prime time but through a more respectable venue, the news media.”15 The media used other women to put down feminism and insult its ideology. The media seems to have been stacked against the feminist movement from the beginning. But it’s important to note that the media would not have been so antifeminist had not their message found a welcoming audience. The public embraced this antifeminist attitude, and such media roles continue today. Hammer notes, “Susan Douglas’s analysis of the media’s role in misrepresenting and diminishing the underlying philosophy and goals of the feminist movement of the 1970’s is not just a tactical relic of the past.”16 Perhaps the best example of the pervasive nature of antifeminism being used subtly is in the 1998 Time Magazine cover and article entitled, “Is Feminism Dead?” The article claimed to pictorially show the history of the feminist movement. It included pictures of Susan B. Anthony, Gloria Steinem and Ally McBeal. Hammer explains, “The Time cover story presents a completely invented reality of the so-called contemporary feminist terrain that is devoid of any references to the real multidimensional state of current feminist theory or practice.” 17 The article suggests that the need for feminism has passed, ignoring the realities of the discrimination women face still. This antifeminist sentiment, now accurately documented, must be discussed in terms of its effect on the ecofeminist movement. There are probably a substantial amount of antifeminists who are not against saving or protecting the environment. These people may be possible resources for the environmental movement, providing political capital, funding and labor. However, associating the ecological goals with feminism in any form will turn these people off from the movement. This means not only that the move towards environmentally sound policies suffers, but additionally, that the ecofeminist movement in particular suffers. In that sense, the best way to pursue goals of protecting and preserving the environment is not to invite those who oppose feminism unnecessarily to criticize or prevent progress. ECOFEMINISM DOMESTICATES THE EARTH Ecofeminism is based on the notion that there are parallels to be drawn between the way the earth is taken advantage of and abused and the way that women are taken advantage of and abused. In that sense, there is a correlation and an association between the earth and women. This entrenches and advocates the view of the earth (and nature) as female. However, the portrayal of the earth as female is actually damaging because it domesticates the earth and makes it a tool for the protection and care of humankind. Stacy Alaimo discusses this very problem that has actually been noted by many scholars studying the rhetoric of environmental advocacy groups. Alaimo uses the example of a bumper sticker that reads, “Love Your Mother,” in calling for the preservation of the planet. Catherine Roach analyzes this image, saying that “it is problematic because of our tendency to relate to our mothers as ambivalent love-objects, expected to care for all our needs, and that for this reason, instead of achieving the desired result of encouraging us toward environmental soundness, this slogan has almost the opposite effect of helping to maintain exploitative patterns toward the earth and mother.”18 The image of “mother earth” and earth as a woman is a huge problem. Carolyn Merchant warns that we should not be reinstating, “nature as the mother of humankind.” 19 Patrick D. Murphy noted in “Sex-Typing the Planet” that, “sex-typing a gender-free entity reinscribes a cultural dualism and an anthropomorphism that alienates earth by trying to render it in our image.” 20 This quotation from Murphy merits a closer examination. First, the anthropocentrism only further entrenches the notion that humanity is separate from earth. This allows us to not view ourselves as dependent and justifies actions which harm the earth. In addition, he explains that we actually try to make earth in our own image by assigning the human concept of gender to the earth. This again places the earth below humans and makes it a lower priority than human life. The way that earth is portrayed as Mother Earth is damaging. In a television special for a recent Earth Day, Mother Earth was played by Better Midler, as “a whiny, dismissible character. Poor Mother Earth is sick, victimized by humanity. This perfectly selfless mother doesn’t really mind that she herself is dying but worries abut the people who need her.”21 This portrayal of Mother Earth as the victim not only makes the environment look weak, but places women in the role of victim as well. It should also be noted that the connotations of “motherhood” do not carry into nature. Nature is not required to care for humanity, and oftentimes nature’s actions are destructive 203 toward humanity. To suggest that nature is responsible to humanity sets individuals up to feel betrayed when nature doesn’t “behave” the way they expect, justifying control of and harm to the environment. Therefore, while the association of women and the earth is supposed to point out the harms and problems that both face; in actuality this association only causes more damage. To domesticate the earth as a woman and a mother only harms the movement to protect the earth as a being. It also unnecessarily invites problems over the gendering of the earth. A stronger, more gender-neutral image of the earth is needed if the movement to end abuse of the earth and women is to be successful. Such an image would be unifying instead of divisive and pessimistic. ECOFEMINISM SUFFERS IN THE SHADOW OF THE GREEN MOVEMENT Greta Gaard notes: “[The] description of ecofeminism can be seen as one example of a larger phenomenon within the Green movement throughout its history: the perspective that ecofeminism is a subsidiary of the Green movement rather than a distinct movement of its own.” Gaard even explains how this is much like the co-optation of women by men in general, adding Janet Biehl’s words that, “Women know from long experience that when they are asked to become ‘one’ with a man, as in marriage, that ‘one’ is usually the man. Ecofeminists should be equally suspicious of this ‘ecological’ oneness.”22 Unless ecofeminism can separate itself from the Green movement and other branches of the environmental movement, it risks losing its impact and its ability to be seen as unique. There is nothing wrong with environmental groups joining forces in order to have a greater effect for their cause. However this is not the case with ecofeminism and the Green movement. Ecofeminism has been claimed as part of the Green movement by those outside of ecofeminism. As such, the general public probably does not understand what sets ecofeminism apart. The coopting of movements is also dangerous in that it allows the possibility of misrepresentation. If the Green movement or another branch of the environmental movement begins to speak on behalf of ecofeminism due to the shadow they have cast, the likelihood that the message is accurately transmitted is low. Ecofeminists are best prepared to discuss their philosophy and position. Allowing them to be taken over by the Green movement or another larger movement increases the possibility that the ecofeminist message is not heard appropriately. A reason why ecofeminism is finding it so difficult to escape this shadow of the Green movement is that ecofeminism is a purposely fragmented and diverse movement. At that level, it becomes hard to point to what is and is not ecofeminism; and that makes it difficult to recruit or sustain a movement. In discussing the origins of ecofeminism, Greta Gaard reveals how little of the philosophy of modern ecofeminism was included at the beginning of the movement in the Unity Statement. She says, “The introductory emphasis on militarism as the root cause of the problem shows this first manifestation of ecofeminism as origination from the peace movement. There is no direct mention of women’s spirituality, for example, or of the need for animal liberation; the military’s destruction of nature is framed primarily in terms of its impact on humans rather than on the environment itself. And the connections between corporations and the military- connections that would move to the center of ecofeminist analysis as it developed a broad scope historically and internationally- are left to the end of the statement.”23 The way that the movement has developed and changed has certainly allowed for flexibility, but it has also added difficulty to the task of defining what ecofeminism is. At that level, the movement is easily taken over by the Green movement, and the goals that are particular to the ecofeminist movement are not discussed. The purpose of ecofeminism cannot be achieved if it is constantly viewed as a subset of the Green movement. However, the misunderstandings about ecofeminism and its complicated and changing nature mean that it is doomed to remain in the shadow. ECOFEMINISM ENFORCES A FALSE BINARY OF SEX Ecofeminism assumes that there exists categories of humans that are “men” and “women.” This binary does not exist in reality, but is a social construction. The belief that there exist “men” and “women” denies the existence and eliminates the space for other genders and sexes. This would include transgender individuals, individuals with ambiguous genitalia or those who do not affiliate with either being male or female. In that sense, ecofeminism 204 denies self-definition and autonomy by forcing individuals into only two categories of sex when in reality many more exist. This mentality should be criticized at multiple levels. First, this mindset enforces the belief that individuals who fall outside of a binary of sex are different and do not have a sex. This justifies negative treatment of those individuals as outsiders and as different. Violence and discrimination result when this sort of classification system is used. A person who does not fit into the only two legitimate categories constructed by ecofeminism may feel like they are no longer a person since they have no place to belong. Although this is only one venue for their involvement, the mentality that they are not included in the categories as human can carry scars throughout attempts to join or assist other movements. It is also, at a basic level, psychologically damaging. Second, this hurts the ecofeminist cause. The movement is supposedly committed to making connections between violence happening to humanity and violence happening to the earth. Individuals who fall outside of the binary of gender are often the victims of violence, yet this is not targeted or discussed by ecofeminism. Instead, only those who are willing or able to self-identify as “women” are included in the type of violence that the earth also experiences. In addition to de-legitimizing the experiences of those who are not “men” or “women,” this mindset excludes people from the ecofeminist movement. A sex binary is a reason that some individuals will feel uncomfortable participating or getting involved in the movement. Ecofeminism is based on a belief that there is suffering going on currently. Yet defining sex and “women” as one half of that category only allows suffering to continue at multiple levels. This definition excludes and enforces dangerous attitudes that already exist, placing some people as more important in a hierarchy of the discrimination and abuse that takes place in the world around us. MARXIST FEMINISM While there are many different forms of feminism, all of which are complex and possibly unable to be defined, Marxist feminism offers a unique challenge to ecofeminism by identifying a different cause for the discrimination happening to both women and the earth. The tradition that developed out of Marxist feminism identifies the cause of the world’s problems as the focus on capital and production. Women are abused, therefore, because they are viewed as capital that can be used as the means to an ends for another person. Women become dispensable in this view, as does most of humanity in an attempt to profit. The reasons for the exploitation of the earth are the same. In the interest of ensuring capital, the earth is destroyed. Mining is done quickly and in non-environmentally sensitive ways. The ground is destroyed by explosions in an attempt to mine minerals and production materials. Forests and trees are cut down to produce wood to build or create energy for a company and their machines. Chemicals and waste are leaked into the ocean, ground, and air because it is cheap and the easiest way to boost profit. Militarism is in the interest of protecting a country, which really means protecting the economic interests of that country. Therefore, the devastation from nuclear waste and wars can also be attributed to the search for capital. Empires that took thousands of lives were justified in the need for capital and raw materials to produce goods. Slavery was defended as an efficient economic system and slaves were viewed as capital. Marxist feminism therefore, explains that the root cause of our problems is the quest for capital, economic gain, and production. Ecofeminism denies this possibility by claiming that there is some unique bond between the women of the world and the earth that makes them targets for exploitation and discrimination. This would deny a focus on capital and allow many forms of exploitation of the earth to continue. A focus on the drive for economic fulfillment and the willingness to sacrifice humanity to get that fulfillment must be examined as the root cause of the problems in the world around us. These two versions of feminism seem impossible to reconcile given the ways in which they define the cause of exploitation in radically different ways. SUMMARY 205 Though ecofeminism consists of a diverse and varying range of philosophical viewpoints, its unifying characteristic is the connection drawn between harm to women and harm to the environment. However, there are numerous problems with this position. First, ecofeminism hurts ecology by portraying nature as the enemy. Additionally, ecofeminism brings along antifeminism, which adds obstacles to the process of protecting the environment. Ecofeminism actually harms the earth by domesticating it, thus performatively contradicting its own goals. The shadow of the Green movement has proven too difficult for ecofeminism to escape and it is suffering accordingly. Ecofeminism enforces a false binary of sex that is dependant upon exclusion. Ecofeminism’s exclusion of Marxist feminism harms the movement as a whole. _________________________________ 1 Sturgeon, Noel. Ecofeminist Natures: Race, Gender, Feminist Theory and Political Action. New York: Routledge, 1997, pg. 3. 2 Ibid, pg. 23. 3 Ibid, pg. 23. 4 Gaard, Greta. Ecological Politics: Ecofeminists and the Greens. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1998, pg. 19. 5 Alaimo, Stacy. Undomesticated Ground: Recasting Nature as Feminist Space. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000, pg. 109. 6 Ibid, pg. 109. 7 Ibid, pg. 109. 8 Ibid, pg. 109. 9 Ibid, pg. 109. 10 Ibid, pg. 109. 11 Hammer, Rhonda. Antifeminism and Family Terrorism: A Critical Feminist Perspective. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2002, pg. ix. 12 French, Marilyn. The War Against Women. New York: Ballantine Books, 1992, pg. 13. 13 Ibid, pg. 13. 14 Hammer, Rhonda. Antifeminism and Family Terrorism: A Critical Feminist Perspective. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2002, pg. 5. 15 Ibid, pg. 13. 16 Ibid, pg. 13. 17 Ibid, pg. 17. 18 Alaimo, Stacy. Undomesticated Ground: Recasting Nature as Feminist Space. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000, pg. 172-173. 19 Ibid, pg. 173. 20 Ibid, pg. 173. 21 Ibid, pg. 173. 22 Gaard, Greta. Ecological Politics: Ecofeminists and the Greens. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1998, pg. 148-149. 23 Ibid, pg. 19. 206 ECOFEMINISM DOMESTICATES THE EARTH 1. ECOFEMINISM OBSCURES THE RELATIONSHIP OF WOMYN AND NATURE Janet Biehl, Social Ecologist, Rethinking Ecofeminist Politics, Boston: South End Press, 1991, pg.19. Ironically, the shift to social constructionism has somewhat diminished the original ecofeminist passion to reclaim "nature" in an organic sense - certainly when it comes to women's biology. Yet in dissolving "women and nature" into metaphors or subjective attributes, social-constructionist ecofeminists obscure both non-human nature and women's relationship to it. They leave undefined the way women, as human beings, gradually evolved out of nonhuman nature, while remaining part of nature as a whole. One wonders how many ecofeminists can claim to "speak for" a "nature" that they perceive as illusory or only through metaphors. 2. ECOFEMINIST NOTIONS OF BIOLOGICAL REPRODUCTION ARE CONFLATED WITH THE LIFE-GIVING AND LIFESUSTAINING EXISTANCE OF MOTHER EARTH. Stearney, Lynn M. Assistant Professor of Communication, University of New Hampshire. “Feminism, Eco-Feminism, and the Maternal archetype: Motherhood as a feminine universal.” Communication Quarterly, Spring 1994. NP. Within ecofeminist rhetoric, the existence of the Earth Mother and her life-giving and life-sustaining nature, is conflated with human motherhood and the biological process of reproduction. Some theorists, for example, speculate that women often experience their oneness and identification with nature through such experiences as reclaimed menstruation, pregnancy, natural childbirth, and motherhood (e.g. Razak, 1990; Salleh, 1984; Starhawk, 1989). Such experiences give women a particular authority in environmental activism, as they share the experience of birth with the earth as a fundamentally feminine parent. 3. UNGENDERED METHODS ARE KEY FOR PROTECTING THE EARTH Stearney, Lynn M. Assistant Professor of Communication, University of New Hampshire. “Feminism, Eco-Feminism, and the Maternal archetype: Motherhood as a feminine universal.” Communication Quarterly, Spring 1994. NP. In this essay, I argue that we must continue to search for a powerful but ungendered image that can function to motivate and unify the environmental movement. He mother archetype, however powerful, cannot function in this way without reinforcing the contemporary patriarchal ideal of motherhood as natural, limitless, and exploitable. My analysis proceeds in four stages. First, I will offer a discussion of motherhood as an archetype that specifically ties it to female identity and female nature. Second, I will contrast the archetypal description of motherhood with feminism’s critique of motherhood as an institution that emerged in the 1970’s. Third, I will examine the use of the maternal archetype in ecofeminist rhetoric and its dependence on an essentialist view of women as mothers. Finally, I will discuss the implications of the ecofeminist appropriation of the maternal archetype for women, and for the environmental movement. Ultimately, I argue, the maternal archetype is harmful to feminism, because in advancing the construct of “motherhood” as a feminine universal, it denies women access to other identities. The conflating of “motherhood” with the environmental movement obscures the responsibility of men, women, and children to ensure the survival of the Earth. A continued search seems warranted for a powerful but gender neutral image that motivates all of the Earth’s inhabitants to practice environmental responsibility. 207 ECOFEMINISM OPPRESSES WOMYN 1. OBSCURING THE LINK BETWEEN WOMYN AND THE EONVIRONMENT HURTS WOMYN Karen Green, Professor of Philosophy, Monash University, “Environmental Ethics”, Summer 1994, pg. 127. It was at least partly in direct response to this reasoning that Wollstonecraft asserted that it is the faculty of reason which distinguishes human beings from the brutes and that the perfection of both men and women consists in the triumph of reason and virtue. Viewed in this way, the second historical argument rests on a one-sided characterization of the Christian tradition and masks the fact that, historically, feminists have had good reason to be suspicious of the valorization of nature, since it is so closely associated with the valorization of women's natural role and with a justification of their exclusion from the rights of self-determination. 2. APPEALS TO NATURE USED TO JUSTIFY SUBORDINATION OF WOMYN Karen Green, Professor of Philosophy, Monash University, “Environmental Ethics”, Summer 1994, pg. 126-127. The problem of the education of the virtuous citizen, therefore, becomes the problem of discovering a method of allowing the true God-given nature of man to unfold. This is a method that has to be discovered by reason, but it is a reason subordinated to the dictates of nature, which, Rousseau believes, can be discerned in bare outline beneath the actual character of people who have suffered from centuries of cultural corruption. When applied to women, this reasoning transforms itself into a classic justification for their subordination to their husbands within the private sphere of the household. Since it is in women's nature to bear children, and since, in bearing children, a woman is at a disadvantage and requires support, nature and reason dictate that her character and education should mould her to fulfill the role of loving mother and devoted wife. Thus, in this strand of Western philosophical thought, far from there being a connection between the subordination of nature and the subordination of women, it is the valorization of nature. which extends to the valorization of natural women, that is used to justify the subordination of women to their husbands and to decry the corrupting influence of those disordered women who neglect their natural maternal duties in favor of participation in the world of politics and the arts. 3. ECOFEMINISM DENIES WOMYN FREEDOM Luc Ferry, Professor of Philosophy, the Sorbonne, The New Ecological Order. 1995, pg.125-126. Here we can measure the distance from existentialist feminism: it is by affirming her difference from "males," by insisting instead on her specific proximity to nature, that the woman, like the proletariat in days past, incarnates the redemptive portion of humanity. The danger inherent in such a position is obvious. Simone de Beauvoir had already foreseen it and Elisabeth Badinter has analyzed it: an insistence on the "naturality" of women threatens to revive the most time-worn clichés about "feminine intuition," the vocation of motherhood and the irrationality of what could well, under such conditions, pass for the "second sex." To assert that women are more "natural" than men is to deny their freedom, thus their full and whole place within humanity. 208 ECOFEMINISM CREATES NEGATIVE GENDER BINARIES 1. ECOFEMINISM ESSENTIALIZES WOMYN Karen Warren, Professor of Philosophy, Macalister, Ecological Feminism, 1994, pg. 3. In her piece, "Is Ecofeminism Feminist?," Victoria Davion offers the distinction between "ecofeminist" and "ecofeminine" positions and argues that many of the currently available positions - nearly all ones, it turns out, offered by nonphilosophers - are properly called "ecofeminine" rather than "ecofeminist." Davion rejects such positions on a number of grounds, including their essentializing tendencies to speak of one woman's voice, a woman's way of knowing, "women's knowledge" or "women's perspective," or to glorify female sex and genderidentified traits, "the feminine" or "the female" or "the feminine principle." Through conceptual clarification, Davion argues that a "truly feminist perspective cannot embrace either the feminine or the masculine uncritically, as a truly feminist perspective requires a critique of gender roles, and this critique must include masculinity and femininity" (p. 14). Those that fail to do this are understood as ecofeminine philosophies, not ecofeminist ones. 2. ECOFEMINISM UNDERMINES FEMINISM BY EMBRACING FEMININE ROLES Victoria Davion, Professor of Philosophy, University of Georgia, Ecological Feminism, Karen Warren, ed., 1994, pg. 16. If feminists fail to assert that at least some of the roles assigned to women under patriarchy are damaging, we fail to assert the very premise that makes feminism, the overthrowing of patriarchy, important. For, if sexist oppression is not damaging to women, women have no reason to resist it. If it does cause damage, we should expect to see this damage in traditionally assigned feminine roles. Thus, ecofeminist solutions which assert that feminine roles can provide an answer to the ecological crisis, without first examining how these roles presently are, or historically have been, damaging to those who play them, undermine the very conceptual significance and underpinnings of feminism that ecofeminist philosophers such as Warren and Plumwood assert. 3. ECOFEMINISM CREATES GENDER BINARIES Stearney, Lynn M. Assistant Professor of Communication, University of New Hampshire. “Feminism, Eco-Feminism, and the Maternal archetype: Motherhood as a feminine universal.” Communication Quarterly, Spring 1994. NP. Second, however, the ecofeminist appropriation of the maternal archetype obscures the social nature of mothering as a practice that feminists revealed in both their theory and in their autobiographical reflections. Ecofeminists who emphasize the notion of women’s “difference” and their greater capacity for caring, nurturing, and self0sacrifice have tended to link “relatedness” and female identity to motherhood per se. Tacitly, these renderings imply that women’s capacity for empathic relatedness to the earth is circumscribed in motherhood, and, as such is universal and biologically determined. Unfortunately, this trajectory has the effect of reinforcing-and indeed, entrenching- the traditional gender dichotomy that positions women as essentially “related” to others and men as autonomous individuals. Women’s capacity for “relatedness,” however, has evolved in a particular social, cultural, and historical context. Although the capacity for nurturing, empathy, and care have become associated with stereotypically feminine characteristics, there are multiple reasons for this association. Ecofeminists promote and essentialist view of gender differences by privileging women’s relationship to nature and their responsibility for environmental protection in this way. 209 THE MATERNAL ARCHTYPE USED IN ECOFEMINISM IS BAD FOR THE ENVIRONMENT AND WOMYN 1. ECOFEMINISM NATURALIZES WOMENS’ ROLES. Stearney, Lynn M. Assistant Professor of Communication, University of New Hampshire. “Feminism, Eco-Feminism, and the Maternal archetype: Motherhood as a feminine universal.” Communication Quarterly, Spring 1994. NP. The maternal theme in ecofeminist rhetoric emphasizes and illustrates women in their “natural” roles as mothers: furthermore, this mothering role is constructed to highlight the psychological characteristics that accompany the maternal archetype as a universal feminine ideal. The intent of using the maternal archetype is to unify and motivate a “caring” environmental activism. However, the dependence on the maternal archetype in ecofeminist rhetoric may have the inadvertent result of reducing and simplifying complex political, economic, social, and technical environmental issues to the cultivation of a appropriate maternal and feminine ethic while simultaneously reducing female identity to the facts of women’s reproductive capacity. 2. THE MATERNAL ARCHTYPE USED IN ECOFEMINISM NATURALIZES WOMENS’ ROLES Stearney, Lynn M. Assistant Professor of Communication, University of New Hampshire. “Feminism, Eco-Feminism, and the Maternal archetype: Motherhood as a feminine universal.” Communication Quarterly, Spring 1994. NP. First, the deployment of the maternal archetype in ecofeminism leaves motherhood itself undertheorized and overdetermined as a “natural” role for women and a “natural” ability of those of us born with wombs. Such a perspective obscures the social construction of motherhood and dilutes women’s diverse experiences of mothering. While giving childbirth is a biological event, the sentiments that surround birth as well as those that surround mothering are socially constructed. Furthermore, this privilege of motherhood as a form of power and as an alliance with nature overlooks the fact of men’s essential role in human reproduction. The celebration of motherhood as the source of women’s attunement to nature and as a feminiace unversal also overemphasizes the place of motherhood in women’s lives, and splits off women who are not mothers into a theoretical cul-de-sac. This construction of motherhood additionally promotes an identification of women as exclusively and essentially mothers, therby diminishing other identities or other roles for women in the environmental movement, or in the world at large.. 3. THE MATERNAL ARCHETPE CAN HAVE ADVERSE CONSEQUENCES ON THE EARTH AS WELL AS FOR FEMINISM. Stearney, Lynn M. Assistant Professor of Communication, University of New Hampshire. “Feminism, Eco-Feminism, and the Maternal archetype: Motherhood as a feminine universal.” Communication Quarterly, Spring 1994. NP. Fourth, the over-emphasis in ecofeminism on the metaphorical and symbolic dimensions of mothering may ultimately have adverse consequences for the earth, as well as for feminism. As Gray (1982, pp. 102-105) points out, Mothers in patriarchal culture provide all of our sustenance, rid us of our waste products, satisfy all of our wants and needs, and function as an exploitable, limitless, self sacrificing object. A similarly exploitative approach to the environment will undoubtedly have disastrous results. Additionally, ecofeminist rhetoric which draws on the maternal archetype may inadvertently reduce the number of potential environmental activists through its gendered imagery. Although Ruddick (1989) and others have argues that “maternal thinking” is not restricted to women alone, our unconscious association is of mother as a feminine ideal. By dichotomizing and defining human characteristics by gender, ecofeminism creates a gendered, “two-world” view of environmental activism, positioning women as environmental “ mothers” but making no mention of environmental “fathers,” of even of environmental “parents.” 210 Economic Competitiveness Good ECONOMIC COMPETITIVENESS IS A GOOD VALUE 1. COMPETITIVENESS CONSIDERS THE WHOLE ECONOMY Stephen Cohen, Professor and Co-director of Berkeley Economic roundtable, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, July/August 1994, p.193. The clean simplicity and apparent analytic power of the simple, one-number approach, though it fits snugly with the models and methods of traditional American economics, has given rise to efforts to define a different organizing concept--competitiveness--in order to open a broader, more open-minded and modest approach. The competitiveness approach poses a sensible question: How are we doing as an economy? No single number sums it all up, especially given the follow-up: how are we doing compared to the other guys? And why? Competitiveness is a reconsideration of a broad set of indicators, none of which tells the whole story but that together provide a highly legitimate focus. 2. COMPETITIVENESS TAKES THE ECONOMY TO A HIGHER LEVEL Daniel Burton, US Council on Competitiveness, WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, Autumn 1994, p. 17. By the early 1990s, the White House and Congress had joined the US private sector in regularly referring to competitiveness as a driving rationale for their policies. Its impact on the US private sector cannot be overestimated. International competition has forced US firms to conceive of their business in entirely new ways. It has led them to reassess their products, their customers, their markets and their rivals. It has prompted them to search out new management ideals around the world and to implement them at home. It has driven them to hone their skills against the most demanding customers worldwide. And it is the major force behind efforts to streamline production, improve quality, accelerate cycle-time, and rethink the innovation process. 3. COMPETITIVENESS STRENGTHENS PRODUCTIVITY AND GROWTH Daniel Burton, US Council on Competitiveness, WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, Autumn 1994, p. 17. Concerns about US competitiveness are also behind legislation designed to improve US education and training programs such as the Goals 2000: Educate America Act and the School-to-Work Opportunities Act. Goals 2000 explicitly state that by the year 2000, "US students will be first in the world in science and mathematics achievement." The School-to-Work Opportunities Act takes much of its inspiration from the German apprenticeship programs designed to make sure that students are ready for the demans of the workplace when they graduate from school. Will these initiatives succeed? It is too early to tell, but there is no doubt that competitiveness has played a constructive role in focusing the United States on critical domestic eduction and training problems -- problems that if addressed would strengthen US productivity performance and economic growth. 4. COMPETITIVENESS LEADS TO NEW TECHNOLOGY AND GROWTH IN MANY AREAS Daniel Burton, US Council on Competitiveness, WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, Autumn 1994, p. 17. Competitiveness has also had a significant impact on US R&D policy. Here it has prompted a series of programs to enhance US industry's ability to develop and commercialize new technology. Some of these programs, such as the information superhighway the Clinton administration is promoting, fall into the category of strengthening the nation's technology infrastructure. Others focus on providing incentives for industry to develop critical technologies with broad application, such as the Advanced Technology Program at the National Institute of Standards and Technoplogy, launched under President George Bush, and the more recent Technology Reinvestment Program at the Advanced Research Projects Agency in the Department of Defense. 211 CRITICS OF COMPETITIVENESS ARE WRONG 1. PAUL KRUGMAN'S CONCLUSIONS ARE WRONG: COMPETITIVENESS HELPS Daniel Burton, US Council on Competitiveness, WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, Autumn 1994, p. 17. Krugman, however, pushes his argument too far. Although he raises some interesting points, his conclusion -- that competitiveness is a "dangerous obsession" -- is not warranted. On the contrary, competitiveness is a valuable concept that can, and has, led to constructive public policy. 2. KRUGMAN'S PRODUCTIVITY FOCUS IS WORSE THAN A COMPETITIVENESS FOCUS Stephen Cohen, professor and co-director of the Berkeley Economic Roundtable, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, July/August 1994, p.196. Krugman warns us that an obsession with competitiveness is dangerous and advises cathecting it onto productivity. A near-exclusive focus on productivity, however, has some particular dangers and problems. Competitivenesss puts productivity at the center of its concerns but not as an explanation. Instead competitiveness points out that overall productivity rates, which are very complex syntheses, are the things to explain, and that economics does not know how to do that. 3. 10 YEARS EMPIRICALLY DISPROVE KRUGMAN'S VIEWS Daniel Burton, US Council on Competitiveness, WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, Autumn 1994, p. 17. In some ways, Krugman's argument is largely semantic. He likes the word "productivity" but not the word "competitiveness." His major complaint is that competitiveness focuses on relatively unimportant issues, like trade balances, and in doing so detracts from the greatest determinant of national economic performance, namely growth in domestic productivity. He believes that this focus is the result of faulty analysis by economists who should know better and leads to bad public policy. Yet, although international trade has received a lot of attention in the competitiveness debate, so have investment, technology and human resources, which together constitute the building blocks of productivity. As for the charge that competitiveness leads to distorted public policy, and in particular protectionism, the record of the last decade does not support his claim. 4. KRUGMAN OMITS THE STATISTICS THAT PROVE HIM WRONG Stephen Cohen, professor and co-director of the Berkeley Economic Roundtable, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, July-August 1994, p.195-6. Krugman criticizes those who write about competitiveness for their tendency to "engage in what may perhaps most tactfully be described as 'careless arithmetic'." Yet Krugman's own arithmetic is, to say the least, careless. He provides a table that purports to demonstrate arithmetically that value-added production correlates not with technology but with capital intensity. But relating capital intensity to value added by sector contains a concealed correlation because the same table also ranks sectors by degree of monopoly power. And nothing generates more value added than monopoly. Furthermore, Krugman omits at least one sector: pharmaceuticals. 212 Economic Competitiveness Bad ECONOMIC COMPETITIVENESS IS A BAD VALUE 1. SEEKING COMPETITIVENESS LEADS TO POOR ECONOMIC POLICY Paul Krugman, Professor of economics at MIT, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, March/April 1994, p. 41. Thinking and speaking in terms of competitiveness poses three real dangers. First, it could result in the wasteful spending of government money supposedly to enhance US competitiveness. Second, it could lead to protectionism and trade wars. Finally, and most important, it could result in bad public policy on a spectrum of issues. 2. COMPETITIVENESS COULD SPAWN WORLD TRADE WAR Paul Krugman, Professor of economics at MIT, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, March/April 1994, p. 41-2. A much more serious risk is that the obsession with competitiveness will lead to trade conflict, perhaps even to a world trade war. Most of those who have preached the doctrine of competitiveness have not been old-fashioned protectionists. They want their countries to win the global trade game, not drop out. But what if, despite its best efforts, a country does not seem to be winning, or lacks the confidence that it can? Then the competitive diagnosis inevitably suggests to close the borders is better than to risk having foreigners take away high-wage jobs and highvalue sectors. 3. SEEKING COMPETITIVENESS IS NOT BENEFICIAL, BUT DANGEROUS Paul Krugman, Professor of economics at MIT, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, March/April 1994, p. 44. Unfortunately, those economists who have hoped to appropriate the rhetoric of competitiveness for good economic policies have instead had their own credibility appropriated on behalf of bad ideas. And somebody has to point out when the emperor's intellectual wardrobe isn't all he thinks it is. So let's start telling the truth: competitiveness is a meaningless word when applied to national economies. And the obsession with competitiveness is both wrong and dangerous. 4. A GOVERNMENT COMMITTED TO COMPETIVENESS CAN'T MAKE GOOD POLICY Paul Krugman, Professor of economics at MIT, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, March/April 1994, p. 43-4. To make a harsh but not entirely unjustified analogy, a government wedded to the ideology of competitiveness is as unlikely to make good economic policy as a government committed to creationism is to make good science policy, even in areas that have no relationship to the theory of evolution. 213 COMPETITIVENESS ADVOCATES ARE WRONG 1. COMPETITIVENESS ADVOCATES ARE IGNORANT OF BASIC FACTS Paul Krugman, Professor of economics at MIT, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, July/August 1994, p. 199-200. Everyone makes mistakes, although it is surprising when men who are supposed to be experts on international competition do not have even a rough idea of the size of the US trade deficit or know how to look up a standard industrial statistic. The interesting point, however, is that the mistakes made by Thurow, Prestowitz and other competitiveness advocates are not random errors; they are always biased in the same direction. That is, the advocates always err in a direction that makes international competition seem more important than it really is. 2. DOZENS OF EXAMPLES PROVE COMPETIVENESS AUTHORS SKEW THE DATA Paul Krugman, Professor of economics at MIT, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, March/April 1994, p. 38-9. In his own presentation at the Copenhagen summit, British Prime Minister John Major showed a chart indicating that European unit labor costs have risen more rapidly than those in the United States and Japan. Thus he argued that European workers have been pricing themselves out of world markets. But a few weeks later Sam Brittan of the Financial Times pointed out a strange thing about Major's calculations: the labor costs were not adjusted for exchange rates. In international competition, of course, what matters for a US firm are the costs of its overseas rivals measured in dollars, not marks or yen. So international comparison of labor costs, like the tables the Bank of England routinely publishes, always convert them into a common currency. The numbers presented by Major, however, did not make this standard adjustment. And it was a good thing for his presentation that they didn't. As Brittan pointed out, European labor costs have not risen in relative terms when the exchange rate adjustment is made. If anything, this lapse is even odder than those of Thurow or Magaziner and Recih. How could John Major, with the sophisticated statistical resources of the UK Treatury behind him, present an analysis that failed to make the most standard of adjustments? These examples of strangely careless arithmetic, chosen from among dozens of similar cases, by people who surely had both the cleverness and the resources to get it right, cry out for an explanation. The best working hypothesis is that in each case the author or speaker wanted to believe in the competitiveness hypothesis so much that he felt no urge to question it; if data were used at all, it was only to lend credibility to a predetermined belief, not to test it. 3. PRO-COMPETITVENESS ARGUMENTS ARE WRONG: THEY USE NO DATA Paul Krugman, Professor of economics at MIT, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, March/April 1994, p. 35. One of the remarkable, startling features of the vast literature on competitiveness is the repeated tendency of highly intelligent authors to engage in what may perhaps most tactfully be described as "careless arithmetic." Assertions are made that sound like quantifiable pronouncements about measurable magnitudes, but the writers do not actually present any data on these magnitudes and this fail to notice that the actual numbers contradict their assertions. 4. RESPONSES TO KRUGMAN'S ARTICLE JUST PROVE HIS POINT Paul Krugman, Professor of economics at MIT, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, July/August 1994, p. 203. My original article in FOREIGN AFFAIRS argued that a doctrine that views world trade as a competitive struggle has become widely accepted, that this view is wrong but that there is nonetheless an intense desire to believe in that doctrine. That article enraged many, especially when it asserted that the desire to believe in competitive struggle repeatedly leads highly intelligent authors into surprising lapses in their handling of concepts and data. I could not, however, have asked for a better demonstration of my point than the responses published in this issue. 214 Economic Growth Good ECONOMIC GROWTH IS A DESIRABLE VALUE 1. POVERTY CAUSES A HOST OF GLOBAL CRISES James E. Beard, University of Oregon School of Law, JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND LITIGATION, 1996, pp. 208-209. The second key principle of sustamability is that of just distribution. This principle addresses a two-part problem: first, the fact that poverty is extremely harmful, causing hardship, death, and disease for eighty percent of the worlds population; and second, the pressures on the global environment and social fabric caused by poverty. As Gro Harlem Brundtland, chairperson of the World Commission on Environment and Development, has stated: “Poverty is not only an evil in itself, but sustainable development requires meeting the basic needs of all and extending to all the opportunity to fulfill their aspirations for a better life. A world in which poverty is endemic will always be prone to ecological and other catastrophes.” William Ruckelshaus, a member of the World Commission on Environment and Development, is more blunt in his assessment. The maintenance of a livable global environment depends on the sustainable development of the entire human fumily. If 80 percent of the members of our species are poor, we can not hope to live in a world at peace; if the poor nations attempt to improve their lot by the methods we rich have pioneered, the result will eventually be world ecological damage. 2. ECONOMIC GROWTH IS NOT THE ENEMY OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY David I. Stern, Research Fellow with the Centre for Resource and Environmental Studies Australian National University, JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC ISSUES, March, 1997, p. 145. The concept of sustainable development first appeared in the World Conservation Strategy put forward by the International Union for the Conservation of Nature in 1980. The most important aspect of this formulation was the argument that not only the affluent, developed countries were capable of degrading the environment. Poverty, especially when combined with population growth, was seen as a potential cause of environmental degradation, but degradation would also undermine development and lead to the perpetuation of poverty. This marked a break with mainstream environmentalist thought, which viewed economic growth as the enemy of environmental quality. - 3. GROWTH IS A NECESSITY ANI) BENEFITS THE ENVIRONMENT Michael 0. Zey, sociologist and futurist, THE FUTURIST, March 13, 1997, p. 9. This brings me to one of my major points about the necessity of growth. A recurring criticism of growth be it industrial, economic, or technological centers around its negative consequences. A good example of this is the tendency of economic and industrial growth to generate pollution. However, I contend that growth invariably provides solutions to any problems it introduces. The following examples will illustrate my point. Although economic growth can initially lead to such problems as pollution and waste, studies show that, after a country achieves a certain level of prosperity, the pendulum begins to swing back toward cleaner air and water. In fact, once a nation’s per capita income rises to about $4,000 (in 1993 dollars), it produces less of some pollutants per capita. The reason for this is quite simple: Such a nation can now afford technologies such as catalytic converters and sewage systems that treat and eliminate a variety of wastes. According to Norio Yamamoto, research director of the Mitsubishi Research Institute, “We consider any kind of environmental damage to result from mismanagement of the economy.” He claims that the pollution problems of poorer regions such as eastern Europe can be tmced largely to their economic woes. Hence he concludes that, in order to ensure environmental safety, “we need a sound economy on a global basis.” - - 215 ECONOMIC GROWTH IS NOT HARMFUL TO THE ENVIRONMENT 1. GROWTH ENHANCES WILLINGNESS TO PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT Christopher D. Stone, Roy P. Crocker Professor of Law, University of Southern California, CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW, 1994, p. 981. The tensions between environment and development get more unruly when we enter a third level. Suppose that the project threatens a wildlife refuge that is the traditional homeland of an indigenous people, but the project is economically sound. Now, in these cases it seems fair to say that the antagonistic positions are likely to be described and advocated in different vocabularies. The pro-development position (the reasons favoring mining the National Park) is spelled out in terms of economic value and discount rates. The arguments on the other side (favoring leaving the park undisturbed) are likely to be expressed in the looser language of other, competing values, such as respect for nature and the honoring of national commitments. But conflicting values do not make differences irreconcilable. Governments routinely resolve tensions between “efficiency” and “fairness” (or equity) that are no less perplexing than those between the environment and development at their most aloof. In fact, the parallel is instructive. As Brian Barry has pointed out, just as preferences across a basket of ordinary commodities grapes and potatoes can be represented by indifference curves expressing marginal preferences as a function of endowments, so can efficiency and fairness. The less wealth we have, the more likely we are to sacrifice advances in fairness for advances in wealth; and conversely, the better we are fed and clothed, the more apt we are to sacrifice advances in wealth for advances in equity values. Consistent patterns of indifference can meet standards of rationality, even if equity and efficiency cannot be reduced to the same metric indeed, even if neither can be satisfactorily reduced to its own metric. The same appears to hold for trade-offs between wealth and facets of the environment not captured in markets, such as the existence value of dolphins. As wealth grows (as countries become more developed) so too do populations, in general and by degrees, become readier to trade marginal wealth for marginal environmental amenities. -- -- -- 2. GROWTH IS ESSENTIAL TO ENVIRONMENTAL CLEANUP Ronald Bailey, economist, THE FUTURIST, March 13, 1997, p. 17. In other words, economic growth leads to less pollution, not more. The cleanest countries on the planet are the richest countries on the planet. I submit this proposition: Anything that retards economic growth also retards ultimate environmental cleanup. When people rise above mere subsistence, they start demanding environmental amenities like clean air and water. As people get wealthier, they start cleaning up their societies. 3. ECONOMIC GROWTH IS A PRECONDITION OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION James E. Beard, University of Oregon School of Law, JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND LITIGATION, 1996, p. 211. The World Commission on Environment and Development concluded that there is a direct link between economics and the environment. William Ruckelshaus, a member of the Commission, provided one of the clearest statements of the principle: The doctrine of sustainability holds that the spread of a reasonable level of prosperity and security to the less developed nations is essential to protecting ecological balance and hence essential to the continued prosperity of the wealthy nations. It follows that environmental protection and economic development are complementary rather than antagonistic processes. The Commission based its conclusion on the just distribution principle the fair distribution of resources and an adequate standard of living for all people is a necessary element of preventing ecological catastrophe. ... - 4. GROWTH SHOULD NOT BE RESTRICTED TO SAVE THE ENVIRONMENT LONDON BUSINESS SCHOOL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK, February 1, 1997, p. 18. The main lesson that Grossman and Krueger draw from their studies ‘is that efforts to contain growth may be counter-productive, even from a narrow environmental perspective.” Given the controversy that has surrounded this literature, this seems a rather a weak conclusion. Very few people have argued that the environment would be best protected by halting growth. Indeed, growth is about as blunt an instrument as one could imagine for the purpose of protecting the environment; a country could always do at least as well protecting its environment directly (by regulating emissions, protecting habitat, and so forth). 216 Economic Growth Bad GROWTH IS AN UNDESIRABLE VALUE 1. THE RISK POSED BY GROWTH IS IMMENSE Robert Morris Colim, Associate Professor of Law at the University of Oregon School of Law and Robert William Collin, Visiting Associate Professor of Planning at the University of Oregon Department of Planning and Public Policy Management, JOURNAL OF ENYRIONMENTAL LAW AND LITIGATION, 1994, pp. 402-403. The stakes of delay or a wrong decision are extremely high, including the threat to survival of both human, animal, and plant species on earth. These problems are global in scale, long-term in impact, and they relate to industrialization and development-oriented policy decisions. Thus, contemporary society perceives environmental problems as more complex and related to social sciences than previously understood. “Each day, the world community engages in ever greater conflict over the environment. In the United States, we struggle with a complex environmental paradigm where job creation, energy development and growth control clash with critical concerns of biodiversity, wilderness protection and open space preservation.” 2. GROWTH TRAPS PEOPLE IN A SPIRALING RAT RACE Bill Dietrich, staff, THE SEATTLE TIMES, November 24,1992, p. Cl. More recently, economist Moses Abramovitz pondered the popular backlash against progress in the 1960s and 1970s after a period from 1948 to 1973 that saw personal American incomes rise 80 percent. Why hadn’t happiness and satisfaction similarly increased? He blealdy proposed five reasons. He said humans measure their gains in relation to others; if everyone’s income rises, no one feels richer. He said the perception of poverty never declines because nations historically set their poverty rate at one half whatever the median income is. He said people need ever-increasing stimulus to be satisfied, and that the act of achieving success is psychologically more satisfying than success itself. He said people tend to accumulate more goods at the cost of less leisure time, and thus can’t enjoy them. And he said progress has produced more social regimentation and compulsion, not less. 3. INDUSTRIAL GROWTH EXPLOITS AND DEGRADES THE ENVIRONMENT Robert Moms Cohn, Associate Professor of Law at the University of Oregon School of Law and Robert William Collin, Visiting Associate Professor of Planning at the University of Oregon Department of Planning and Public Policy Management, JOURNAL OF ENYRIONMENTAL LAW AND LITIGATION, 1994, p. 409. By contrast, the values of industrialization increases the complexity of the nature of environmental problems that we encounter. We may see how those values contributed to and complicated current environmental problems by considering the political and philosophical ideologies that governed American politics and social decisions during the age of industrial development. These values include the exploitation of natural resources in pursuit of profit with profit deemed an adequate proxy for social good. An economy based on industrialization values becomes an economy operating in opposition to nature. For example, consider how these values also ignore the creation of waste and its subsequent effects on the ecosystem. 217 GROWTH IS AN INVALID VALUE 1. GROWTH EMBODIES AN ENVIRONMENTALLY DEVASTATING CONSUMERISM Robert Morris Cohn, Associate Professor of Law at the University of Oregon School of Law and Robert William Collin, Visiting Associate Professor of Planning at the University of Oregon Department of Planning and Public Policy Management, JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND LITIGATION, 1994, P. 410. In addition, consumerism drives the economies of most industrialized nations, including the United States. This consumerism has been promoted as necessary to drive an economy based on planned obsolescence and maximum exploitation of natural resources, a cycle that promises continued depletion and waste of finite natural resources, trampling nature’s resilience underfoot. Others have further identified the relentlessly linear logic of the pastCartesian world and its exclusion of systemic thinking as part of an underlying failure of contemporary values. Whatever the source, the policies and personal practices founded upon industrial values have led to a rapid diminution of natural resources, geometric increases of pollution problems, and near-gridlock in the ability of contemporary policy makers to address these policy driven postindustrial environmental problems. With rapidly rising human populations and more pressure to consume resources for economic development, the overall damage to the planet’s ecosystems could have devastating consequences.. 2. GROWTH DOES NOT EQUAL GENUINE PROGRESS Dennis Pirages, economist, THE FUTURIST, March 13, 1997, p. 17. Economists continue to use a totally outmoded calculating method called Gross National Product. It measures nothing but throughput. GNP tells us nothing about the quality of life in a country. Crime can make a strong contribution to GNP, because we have to control it and replace the goods it destroys. Hurricanes can be a smashing contribution to GNP, because we have to rebuild. An alternative measure of progress, called the Genuine Progress Indicator, portrays a much different world, even for the United States. While per capita GNP in the United States rose steadily from 1975 to 1990, this Genuine Progress Indicator peaked in 1970 and has declined since that time. Briefly put, the GPI looks at things like prison construction and the costs of crime and the other liabilities in society, which are signs of decay, and subtracts those from Gross National Product. This makes sense to me; they indicate that in the United States the GPI has gone down since 1970. 3. GROWTH MUST BE LIMITED TO AVOID ECOLOGICAL DISASTER LONDON BUSINESS SCHOOL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK, February 1, 1997, p. 18. To avoid Doomsday, the Club of Rome report concluded, growth would have to be constrained. This conclusion remains a feature of the literature today, though the modern version of the argument adds the twist that the most important environmental damage may not be pollution but a loss of ecological resilience, that ecological harm may ultimately undermine growth prospects, and that a loss in resilience can be sudden and irreversible. Evidence of the inverted-U certainly wrecks the assumption that growth inevitably worsens pollution, but it does nothing to dispel the concern that the increasing scale of economic activity may threaten the functioning of ecosystems. 218 Economic Justice Good ECONOMIC JUSTICE BASED ON FAIRNESS AND OTHER POPULAR VALUES 1. ECONOMIC JUSTICE SEEKS TO REGULATE THE ECONOMY BASED ON ETHICS C. B. Macpherson, Oxford University, THE RISE AND FALL OF ECONOMIC JUSTICE, 1985, p. 2. One obvious requirement of the concept of economic justice is that it be about economic relations, that is, relations into which people enter, in any society, in their capacities as producers or owners or exchangers of valuable goods and services. And if economic justice is to be treated as a distinct brand of justice, economic relations must be seen as having become something very distinct from social and political relations in general, that is, as something no longer automatically given by, or engulfed in, a prevailing social or political order. A second requirement, no less evident I think, is that a concept of economic justice always asserts a claim to regulate economic relations in the light of some ethical principle. Economic justice, like justice in general, is nothing if not a value-laden concept. 2. ECONOMIC JUSTICE ESTABLISHES A MORE MORALLY VIRTUOUS SOCIETY Gerald M. Mara, Associate Dean for Research in the Graduate School of Political Science at Georgetown University, THE DEEPER MEANING OF ECONOMIC LIFE, 1986, p. 174. The morally virtuous person's attitude toward material accumulation will reflect the decidedly partial or subordinate character of economic goods. The proper attitude toward material things in neither greed nor asceticism, but a certain kind of moderation as regards one's own needs and a certain kind of magnanimity and generosity toward others. Thus, governmental policies to alleviate misery are not understood simply as social engineering, but also as part of a city's overall efforts to assist in the development of a more morally virtuous character. 3. PREEMINENT CONCERN FOR THE POOR IS ESSENTIAL TO ETHICS Gerald M. Mara, Associate Dean for Research in the Graduate School of Political Science at Georgetown University, THE DEEPER MEANING OF ECONOMIC LIFE, 1986, p. 174-175. Within a challenging view of human perfection along the order of that articulated by Aristotle, a concern for the poor might well be, in this day and age, an essential component. Such an attachment to human excellence can perhaps explain and deepen Ronald Dworkin's conviction that the citizens o a truly just society should categorically reject any urge to purchase a materially stable future by ignoring the current needs of the poor as an insult to human integrity. 4. ECONOMIC JUSTICE IS BASED ON FAIRNESS, FREEDOM AND EQUALITY Peter D. McLelland, Cornell University, THE AMERICAN SEARCH FOR ECONOMIC JUSTICE, 1990 p. 295. At the core of American beliefs about the justice of their economic system is the premise that the race is reasonably fair, with fairness viewed as largely a matter of assuring the freedom and equality of the participants both at the starting line and on the course. The meaning of both terms (freedom and equality) can change as our understanding of human nature changes, and with these alterations can come new priorities and policies in the name of either freedom or equality. Admittedly many improvements in the fairness of the race--both those accomplished in the past and those yet to be addressed at present--require no overhaul of intellectual framework but simply facing up to the practical implications of old priorities. The reining in of the unfair use of undue power, the attack on discriminatory practices in the marketplace--these can be undertaken and have been undertaken because of a recognized inconsistency between certain economic behavior and longstanding notions of freedom and equality ad those notions pertain to desirable conditions for fairness in an economic race. 219 LACK OF ECONOMIC JUSTICE EXISTS IN MODERN SOCIETY 1. ANYWHERE YOU LOOK ON THE ECONOMIC LADDER, RICH ARE GETTING RICHER Mark Zepezauer, Author, and Arthur Naiman, Editor, TAKE THE RICH OFF WELFARE, 1996, p. 11. Wherever you look on the economic ladder, the rich are getting richer. The wealth of the top 20 per cent has increased while the wealth of the bottom 80 per cent has decreased. Within that top 20 per cent, the top 5 per cent have gotten richer than the bottom 15 per cent. Within the top 5 per cent, the top 1 per cent have gotten richer than the bottom 4 per cent. Within that top 1 per cent, the top 1/4 per cent have gotten richer than the bottom 3/4 per cent. And so it goes, right up to the 400 wealthiest Americans. In the eight years from 1980 to 1987, their average net worth tripled. 2. FAIRNESS AND A LEVEL PLAYING DO NOT EXIST IN ECONOMICS Noam Chomsky, Professor of Linguistics at MIT, POWERS AND PROSPECTS, 1996, p. 129. Along with democracy, markets are under attack. Even putting aside massive state intervention, increasing economic concentration and market control offers endless devices to undermine and evade market discipline, a long story that there is no time to go into here; to mention only one aspect, some 40 per cent of 'world trade' is intrafirm, 50 per cent for the US and Japan. This is not 'trade' in any meaningful sense; rather, operations internal to corporations, centrally managed by a highly visible hand, with all sorts of mechanisms for undermining markets in the interest of profit and power. In reality, the quasi-mercantilist system of transnational corporate capitalism is rife with the kind of 'conspiracies' of the masters against which Adam Smith famously warned, not to speak of the traditional reliance on state power and public subsidy. A 1992 OECD study concludes that 'Oligopolistic competition and strategic interaction among firms and governments rather than the invisible hand of market forces condition today's competitive advantage and international division of labor in high-technology industries,' as in agriculture, pharmaceuticals, services and major areas of economic activity generally. The vast majority of the world's population, who are subjected to market discipline and regaled with odes to its wonders, are not supposed to hear such words; and rarely do. 3. INCREASING INEQUALITY HURTS CHILDREN & MOST VULNERABLE WORST Noam Chomsky, Professor of Linguistics at MIT, WORLD ORDERS OLD AND NEW, 1996, p. 141. The US record was particularly bad for more vulnerable sectors: The elderly, children and single-mother families (most of them in the paid labor force, the United States ranking third-highest in that category, contrary to floods of right-wing propaganda). The 1993 UNICEF study THE PROGRESS OF NATIONS found that American and British children are considerably worse off than in 1970. Among industrialized countries, the proportion of American children below the poverty line is now twice that of the next worst performer, Britain, and about four times that of most others, with a 21 per cent increase from 1970, mainly the result of cutbacks in government services, UNICEF director James Grant comments. 4. MAJORITY OF PEOPLE UNDERREPRESENTED: 80% THINK NO ECONOMIC JUSTICE EXISTS Noam Chomsky, Professor of Linguistics at MIT, POWERS AND PROSPECTS, 1996, p. 113. In the United States, 'the interests of the bottom three' are not represented, political commentator Thomas Edsall of the Washington Post pointed out a decade ago, referring to the Reagan elections. There are many consequences apart from the highly skewed voting pattern. One is that half the population thinks that both parties should be disbanded. over 80 per cent regard the economic system as 'inherently unfair' and the government 'run for the benefit of the few and the special interests, not for the people' (up from a steady 50 per cent for a similarly worded question in the pre-Reagan years)--though what people might mean by 'special interests' is another question. 220 Economic Justice Bad ECONOMIC JUSTICE IS UNDESIRABLE: WEALTH INEQUALITY IS NOT A PROBLEM 1. IDEALIST NOTIONS OF WEALTH DISTRIBUTION ARE IMPRACTICAL George Polanyi, Research Officer with the Institute of Economic Affairs, and John B. Wood, Deputy Director of the Institute of Economic Affairs, AGAINST EQUALITY: READINGS ON ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL POLICY, 1983, p. 255. So how much is too much? One definition of the 'ideal' distribution is Professor Atkinson's statement that the case for more equality rests on social justice and on the 'basic principle that the distribution of wealth should be equal unless departures from equality can be justified according to what are considered relevant criteria.' The 'ideal that everyone should have equal incomes and equal property, unless a departure from this 'norm' can be specially justified, may be logical but is unhelpful in practice. As Professor Atkinson himself says: 'This statement as it stands is not particularly strong, since its force turns on the definitions of 'relevant' criteria.' 2. THESIS OF EGALITARIAN ARGUMENT IS UNPROVEN AND MISLEADING George Polanyi, Research Officer with the Institute of Economic Affairs, and John B. Wood, Deputy Director of the Institute of Economic Affairs, AGAINST EQUALITY: READINGS ON ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL POLICY, 1983, p. 259. The main conclusion thus seems to remain that the egalitarian thesis, in terms of a general condemnation of differences in wealth and incomes, is unproven and misleading. The advocacy of 'equality' and exploitation of what are unavoidable (and arguably undesirable) differences by the emphasis on virtually meaningless statistics such as 'the top 10 per cent own 70 per cent' arouses expectations which cannot be fulfilled, and which cannot be fulfilled, and which few advocates of more equality would themselves support. 3. STATISTICAL EVIDENCE IS WEAK FOR THE EGALITARIAN THESIS George Polanyi, Research Officer with the Institute of Economic Affairs, and John B. Wood, Deputy Director of the Institute of Economic Affairs, AGAINST EQUALITY: READINGS ON ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL POLICY, 1983, p. 259-60. Above all, it would seem that the statistics on which popular discussion rests are too weak for the purpose to which they are put. The Inland Revenue warns against attempting to use estate duty information to give a picture of the concentration of wealth. The warning is ignored; and very selective use is made of clearly defective data. To believe that 10 per cent of the adult population owns 70 per cent of the wealth it is necessary, it would seem, to believe such insupportable propositions as: (1) 24 million adults own nothing at all; (2) in the years 1965-1970 the number of wealth-owners fell by 1 1/2 million (from 18.6 million to 17.1 million); (3) anyone whose wealth exceeded 5600 pounds in 1970 is in the top 10 per cent, and anyone with more than 28,000 pounds is in the top 1 per cent; (4) the value of the contents and motor-car of the average British household is only 200 pounds. In short, the available statistical information was not intended, and cannot be used, to give an accurate picture of the spread of wealth in contemporary society. 4. STATISTICS USED BY EGALITARIANS ARE MISLEADING AND MEANINGLESS Peter Bauer, Professor of Economics at the London School of Economics and Business Science, Fellow at Caius College, Cambridge, AGAINST EQUALITY: READINGS ON ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL POLICY, 1983, p. 377. The uncritical reliance on statistics in egalitarian discourse and policies provides a major illustration. There is, for instance, the familiar practice of expressing the income or wealth of a very small population of a country as a percentage of the income or wealth of the whole population. The misleading, even meaningless, nature of this practice should be evident. Thus children have no incomes, or very low incomes; people normally cannot make any appreciable savings until middle age; and many married women have no cash incomes or very low cash incomes. Income differences need to be expressed on a basis which separates the different age groups, and also men from women. In technical language, the differences need to be expressed on an age or sex-standardized basis. 221 NO NEED FOR EFFORTS TO ESTABLISH ECONOMIC JUSTICE 1. EVERYONE IS BETTER OFF BECAUSE OF INCOME INEQUALITY Nathan Keyfitz, Professor of Demography and Sociology at Harvard University, AGAINST EQUALITY: READINGS ON ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL POLICY, 1983, p. 315. Income variation is an important enough matter to be considered by many sciences, each from its own viewpoint. In free market economics, everyone has the incentive to make his contribution as great as possible; his effort is added to a joint process; under competition, he can appropriate to himself only the marginal contribution that he makes. Each of us is better off just because some of our neighbors are more productive than we are. If we accept the perspective of the free market, we reflect, when we see our neighbours' imposing houses, that their affluence comes from their higher productivity, and moreover that their productivity overflows and adds something to our income as well. 2. AMERICANS DO NOT WANT ECONOMIC JUSTICE Nathan Keyfitz, Professor of Demography and Sociology at Harvard University, AGAINST EQUALITY: READINGS ON ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL POLICY, 1983, p. 323-4. To decide which is the means and which is the goal is not as easy as social scientists used to think. From one viewpoint, the preference for equality becomes a preference for a society whose members are less differentiated by style of life. With more equal incomes, we would live more or less nearly in the same way. Status differences would be less visible. There would be less incentive to produce on the part of individuals if they got little higher income for producing; on the other hand, with the lessened social competition a lower average income would suffice. Jencks is right when he says that American do not at present want change in this direction. 3. ONLY A SMALL MINORITY OF PEOPLE ARE FOR ECONOMIC JUSTICE Richard A. Posner, Professor of Law at the University of Chicago, AGAINST EQUALITY: READINGS ON ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL POLICY, 1983, p. 353-4. Because 'society's' preference for massive redistribution rests ultimately on the views expressed by the small minority of educated and well-to-do people who dominate the Left in this country, it is important for Thurow to reassure the reader that there is no contradiction between wanting to maximize one's personal wealth (the usual personal-private reference) and wanting to have society changed in a way that will significantly reduce that wealth. The difference between a 'personal-private' and an 'individual-societal' preference is clear enough in principle. But I, at least, would have difficulty identifying the authentic preference of someone whose personal-private and individual-societal preferences were not merely distinct, but opposite and mutually exclusive. 4. EFFORTS AT REDISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH WOULD BE COSTLY Richard A. Posner, Professor of Law at the University of Chicago, AGAINST EQUALITY: READINGS ON ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL POLICY, 1983, p. 357. If income and wealth were correctly measured--as an economist would measure them--we could evaluate Thurow's premise that there is serious economic inequality among people who work. He has failed to establish this premise. And he considers only one type of cost associated with altering the distribution of income and wealth: the reduced incentive to work associated with heavy income taxes. He wholly ignores the costs of the redistributive measures that he proposes--the extension of the minimum wage, the expansion of public employment, and the tax on wealth. All of these are costly measures. 222 Efficiency Good EFFICIENCY IS A GOOD VALUE 1. EFFICIENCY IS THE PRIMARY VALUE David Scbweickart, Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Loyola University of Chicago, CAPITALISM OR WORKER CONTROL?: AN ETHICAL AND ECONOMIC APPRAISAL, 1980, p. 58. In a sense, the efficiency question is the first question for all societies. Unless a society is reasonably efficient in marshaling its resources, it cannot expect a blossoming of innovative growth. And of course liberty is a hollow concept to a starving population. As Brecht would have it, “Grub first, and then morality.” Economists are inclined to treat economic efficiency as an ethically neutral concept, but of course it is not. Economic efficiency is as much a value as liberty or equality. 2. THE LAW SHOULD BE GROUNDED IN EFFICIENCY MAXIMIZATION Charles H. Koch, Jr., Dudley W. Woodbridge Professor of Law, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William and Mary, WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW, Winter, 1990, p.43 1. Although some doubt exists that the law in general evolves this way, law directly related to efficiency values surely must. Because economic liberties focus so intently on efficiency, one would expect the law regarding these liberties to be particularly sensitive to efficiency values. At the least, one would expect the law to evolve towards, not away from, efficient solutions. I believe this “natural” process has brought constitutional law regarding economic liberties to its current point of operating at an efficient level of economic liberties. 3. EFFICIENCY IS AN EXTREMELY IMPORTANT VALUE Bailey Kuklin, Professor, Brooklyn Law School, BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW, Fall, 1992, p. 835. Even for those who acknowledge the normativity of their discipline, “[what] many economists do not understand is that efficiency is one value among many and is not a meta-value that comprehends all others.” For example, Demsetz, stopping short of the claim of meta-value, asserts efficiency is “an extremely important” ethical notion. “It is difficult even to describe unambiguously any other criterion for determining what is ethical.” 4. ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF EFFICIENCY ARE UNIVERSALLY ACCEPTED David Scbweickart, Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Loyola University of Chicago, CAPITALISM OR WORKER CONTROL?: AN ETHICAL AND ECONOMIC APPRAISAL, 1980, p.60 I have already argued that economic efficiency both in its ordinary and technical sense is not a value-neutral concept; it presupposes certain value-commitments. We need not pursue this analysis further, because there is nothing objectionable about these commitments, not so long as they are understood in the weak sense just described. We can all (surely) accept material well-being as good, leisure as good; we can agree that a society should not squander scarce resources, nor require people to perform unnecessary labor. It cannot be too controversial that in general the economic output of the productive apparatus of society should reflect the desires of its citizens. 223 EFFICIENCY HAS IMPORTANT BENEFITS 1. EFFICIENCY BENEFITS EVERYONE Charles H. Koch, Jr., Dudley W. Woodbridge Professor of Law, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William and Mary, WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW, Winter, 1990, p.431 In short, Epstein advocates the social value of the economist’s sense of efficiency. Efficiency makes the pie bigger and we all potentially benefit President Kennedy offered a more folksy expression of the same principle: A rising tide raises all boats. Even Marx recognized that capitalist efficiency increases wealth throughout the various classes. Thus a commitment to this sense of efficiency is a commitment to improving the position of all economic groups. 2. EFFICIENCY IS NECESSARY TO OVERCOME SCARCITY Heinz Kohler, Amherst College, WELFARE AND PLANNING: AN ANALYSIS OF CAPITALISM VERSUS SOCIALISM, 1979, p. 5 In a situation of scarcity, the material welfare of people is more restricted than people would like it to be. Because there are insufficient resources to produce enough goods, some desires for goods must remain unsatisfied. This chapter and the following three explore various ways in which people can challenge the existence of scarcity. The first of these approaches, taken up in this chapter, involves making sure that the degree of scarcity prevailing in any one year is not, as a result of less-than-full or inefficient utilization of resources, any more severe than necessary. Have another look at Figure 1.1 THE SCARCITY PROBLEM, and focus on the right band circle. It illustrates the quantity of goods that a people of a society are able to produce in a year, if they use their resources fully and efficiently. Yet they may in fact produce a smaller quantity of goods, if they do not utilize some of their resources at all or if they make inefficient use of the resources they do employ. Obviously, people who wish to conquer scarcity must, first of all, see to it that existing resources are employed fully and efficiently so that the actual production equals the potential production of goods shown by the right-band circle in Figure 1.1. 3. EFFICIENCY BOLSTERS MANY OTHER VALUES David Schweickart, Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Loyola University of Chicago, CAPITALISM OR WORKER CONTROL?: AN ETHICAL AND ECONOMIC APPRAISAL, 1980, p.58 Thus embedded in a commitment to economic efficiency are numerous value judgments: that material ‘goods” are indeed good, that scarce resources ought not be wasted and implicit in this, that the future ought not be sacrificed to the present, that leisure is a good, and that it is better to labor less than more. Each of these values would have to be qualified to be non-problematic - e.g., not all material goods are good, some labor is intrinsically satisfying, etc. Nor would any of them likely be regarded as absolute, no more than the economic efficiency itself. Nonetheless, a commitment to economic efficiency is a commitment to certain values; it is by no means ethically neutral. 4. INEFFICIENCY SHOULD BE ELIMINATED IN ALL SITUATIONS Heinz Kohler, Amherst College, WELFARE AND PLANNING: AN ANALYSIS OF CAPITALISM VERSUS SOCIALISM, 1979, pp. 6-7. Just as human desires for goods can be unnecessarily frustrated by the less-than-full utilization of available resources, so they can be unnecessarily frustrated by their incorrect utilization. Such incorrect or “economically inefficient” utilization is said to be occurring whenever employed resources can be reallocated in such a way that some people become better off (in their own judgment) without other people becoming worse off (in their own judgment). Clearly, such a reallocation of employed resources would lead to an unambiguous increase in the material welfare of people. If one were interested in promoting that welfare as much as possible, one should advocate appropriate reallocations of resources in situations of economic inefficiency. And one should seek to achieve a state of economic efficiency in which it was impossible to reallocate employed resources in such a way as to make some people better off without making other people worse off because every last instance of economic inefficiency has been eliminated. 224 Efficiency Bad EFFICIENCY IS A HARMFUL VALUE 1. EFFICIENCY IS A MEANINGLESS CONCEPT Gary Lawson, Associate Professor, Northwestern University School of Law, DUKE LAW JOURNAL, October, 1992, pp. 97-98. The suspicion arises that a conception of social efficiency that is simultaneously coherent, robust, and economic is simply not to be found. To the best of my knowledge, no one has provided one, and the arguments in this Article at least suggest that no one ever will. It makes sense to talk about efficiency in the context of a given individual’s plans and preferences, but the term does not translate well when one tries to apply it to groups of individuals. Perhaps the time has come for economists and law and economics scholars simply to stop talking about social efficiency altogether. 2. EFFICIENCY IS MERELY A TOOL FOR SOCIAL CONTROL Joan M. Greenbaum, Economist, IN THE NAME OF EFFICIENCY, 1979, p. 162. But the social-control aspects of efficiency do take their toll on the accumulation process within capitalism. I have seen a remarkable number of situations in which management controls conflict with worker productivity - situations in which workers cannot produce more because either their knowledge or motivation or both have been taken away. Restricting the movements of programmers and operators, for example, may give the illusion of increasing productivity, but it mainly serves to tighten control over their actions. To both programmers and operators, mobility means the opportunity to talk with others, a chance to “blow off steam,” and often a chance to learn about what goes on in the total data- processing picture. Everyone on the shop floor knows that operators are usually better operators if they get the chance to see and understand how their actions mesh with the rest of the structure. Similarly, programmers who are involved in more diversified tasks, and who have the freedom to talk with other workers, are considered “well rounded” and therefore better workers. But management policy trades this form of worker productivity for their own version, which stamps greater control. 3. EFFICIENCY PRODUCES ALIENATION AMONG INDIVIDUALS Joan M. Greenbaum, Economist, IN THE NAME OF EFFICIENCY, 1979, p. 163. What is done in the name of efficiency for capitalism can be crippling for the functioning of the individual. Work that subdivides thought and actions can, as Marx put it, “attack the individual at the very roots of his life.” These mechanisms of efficiency are not at all natural; they are a method of social control. We know from shop floor discussions in data processing as well as in other fields that the present organization of work is decidedly inefficient in human terms. Workers complain of boredom, lack of interest, and the loss of self-esteem. They argue that if they were allowed to do the job the way they think it should be done, they would feel better about themselves and about the results of their labor. 4. EFFICIENCY NEGLECTS MANY KEY VALUES Evsey D. Domar, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND SERFDOM, 1989, p. 135. Obviously, the social welfare functions of each country, as seen by its government, or by its “ruling circles,” to use a Russian phrase, is not composed of economic variables alone. Since these noneconomic objectives - and even some economic ones, like income distribution - never become sufficiently explicit to be assigned proper weights, we usually find ourselves in an uncomfortable position between two extremes; one the one hand, justifying much foolishness by reference to non-economic objectives, and on the other, denouncing any departure from narrow economic goals as inefficient In other words, we do not know where the influence of noneconomic factors ends and true inefficiency begins. It seems that governments or ruling circles of all countries enjoy their own political systems well enough to be willing to pay high economic prices for maintaining them. 225 EFFICIENCY IS A BAD STANDARD FOR JUDGMENT 1. EFFICIENCY IS NOT AN ABSOLUTE STANDARD FROM WHICH TO JUDGE Antonio Jorge, Economist and author, COMPETITION, COOPERATION, EFFICIENCY, AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATION: INTRODUCTION TO A POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1978, p. 55-56. This is not to deny the obvious fact that some cultures have been more dedicated than others to the pursuit of economic values and more determined to mold themselves in accordance with the supposed, abstract requirements of economic efficiency. But we cannot judge by their success the value of other cultural alternatives. This is especially so because the remarkable proficiency of some cultures is mainly attributable to the role played by the increase of scientific knowledge and its technical application to production through both human and nonhuman inputs. The rationalization of production organizations and their contribution to efficiency, on the other hand, cannot be evaluated in terms of any existent, or even theoretically formulated absolute standard. It would be manifestly absurd to counter this by affirming that Western culture has patterned all of its culture and its institutions in an optimal response to the single goal of economic efficiency. If we admit this to be the case, then it must be confessed that we are just ignorant of what possible mixes of technology and human attitudes, behavior, and institutions would, in abstract and independently of particular cultural settings, absolutely maximize economic efficiency. 2. N7EO-CLASSICAL EFFICIENCY IS A FALSE OBJECTIVE William Lazomck, Harvard Economics Department, BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND THE MYTH OF THE MARKET ECONOMY, 1991, pp. 64-65. For neoclassical economists, the most efficient economy is one that achieves the optimal allocation of scarce resources among competing ends, where efficiency and optimality are assessed in terms of the aggregated maximization of the utility of the individuals who participate in the economy. In defining the economic problem as the allocation of scarce resources, neoclassical economics ignores the analysis of how individuals, firms, and economies create more value with the same amount of human and physical resources, and thereby overcome scarcity. In short, neoclassical economics has a theory of value allocation, but it lacks a theory of value creation. 3. EFFICIENCY RESTS ON FLAWED ASSUMPTIONS Richard L. Barnes, The Leonard B. Melvin, Jr. Distinguished Lecturer in Law and Professor of Law at the University of Mississippi School of Law, KANSAS LAW REVIEW, Fall, 1993, pp. 69-70. Utilitarianism has been roundly proven to be anything but neutral and uncontroversial in philosophical discourse, or it can make a claim of neutrality on libertarian or consent grounds. With empirical study, we might find the type of consent suggested by Professors Kripke, White and Scott. Creditors and debtors choose-and all other participants choose-secured transactions, and by this choice pronounce secured transactions legitimate. The consent theory rests on its own mass of unstable assumptions. How do we determine consent? If someone is nearly powerless, how can she be said to consent to an exchange? Who gets to decide the validity of consent? All of these questions are traditional philosophical inquiries. It may be possible to answer them. No claim exists here that they are without sound responses, only that the efficiency debate offers no answers. Efficiency’s claim of correctness rests on the false assumption of value gain, which if it existed, would be unobjectionable to everyone. Without those gains, efficiency is just another struggling theory looking for neutral justification. 4. EFFICIENCY IS A CULTURALLY BOUND CONCEPT Antonio Jorge, Economist and author, COMPETITION, COOPERATION, EFFICIENCY, AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATION: INTRODUCTION TO A POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1978, p. 14. Finally, what may be called the prescriptive strand in this work consists in an effort to demonstrate that such concepts as maximal economic efficiency and productivity are culture bound. Economic optimization in the abstract is, to say the least, not a very useful concept. In any case, even to the extent that intertemporal and interspatial comparisons could be established, it can be demonstrated that there is no single institutional, organizational, or motivational path to attain optimization. The essence of productivity and efficiency can be incorporated into differing social arrangements. 226 Environment Good THE ENVIRONMENT IS MOST IMPORTANT 1. ENVIRONMENTAL CRISES ARE REAL AND OUR GREATEST CONCERN Stephen Boyan and William Ophuls, Prof. Political Science at U. of Maryland and Phd in Political Science from Yale, POLITICS OF SCARCITY REVISITED, 1992, p. np. Again, in the summer of 1988, with drought baking the soil from east to west, with 100 [degree] heat in cities across the country, and with coastal beaches befouled by garbage, raw sewage, and medical wastes, Americans again bad a sense of foreboding about what we’re doing to our planet. No one, for example, seriously asserts any longer that ecological concern is a mere fad, which after a brief pirouette in the media limelight will cede its place to the newest crisis. Nor are there many who still maintain that those concerned with environmental issues are perpetrating a political hoax designed to siphon money and public support from minority interests. Whatever the excesses of some who have espoused the cause of environmentalism, the crisis is real, and it challenges our institutions and values in a most profound way -more profoundly even than some of the most ardent environmentalists are willing to admit. 2. HUMAN LOSSES DO NOT DEJUSTIFY PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT Gus DiZerega, Foundation for Research on Economics and the Environment, ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS, Spring, 1995, p. 36. Creating strong and vibrant human communities in no way removes us from the ecological community, and its prudential and ethical implications with regard to our actions. For example, the claim that environmental protection will cost jobs is not itself a valid argument against protecting endangered species or ecosystems. Rather, it constitutes an argument that the relevant human communities ameliorate the unequal suffering occasioned from limiting activities such as whaling and old-growth logging - activities from which nearly all of us have benefited in the short run. 3. WE NEED A MORAL TRANSFORMATION THAT RESPECTS ECOLOGICAL VALUES John Bellamy Foster, Professor of Sociology at the University of Oregon, MONTHLY REVIEW, February, 1995, p. 1. Faced with the frightening reality of global ecological crisis, many are now calling for a moral revolution that would incorporate ecological values into our culture. This demand for a new ecological morality is, I believe, the essence of Green thinking. The kind of moral transformation envisaged is best captured by Aldo Leopold’s land ethic, which said, We abuse land because we regard it as a commodity belonging to us. When we begin to see land as a community to which we belong, we may begin to use it with love and respect. 4. WE MUST CHANGE OUR ETHICS TO RESPECT THE ENVIRONMENT OVER INDIVIDUALS Jeremy Rifkin and Carol Grunewald Rifkin, Authors and Environmental Activists, VOTING GREEN, 1992, p. 15. Preserving the biosphere against the forces of military and commercial exploitation will require a new way of thinking and acting in the world. We will need to transcend the narrow bounds that divide us into constituencies, classes, genders, races, and nationalities, and begin thinking and acting as a species. Addressing the new spate of global threats and challenges will require collective action by the human race, entered into jointly in every neighborhood of the biosphere. The almost exclusive attention on individual rights, which has so dominated the political thinking of the modern era, will have to be buttressed by a new emphasis on collective responsibilities if we are to have any chance of addressing the issues of biosphere security that threaten the very survival of the planet and human civilization. 227 NATURE MUST BE VALUED 1. HUMANS DEPEND ON NATURE AND MUST RESPECT THE EARTH Anthony Westin, Prof. of Philosophy at SUNY- Stonybrook, TOWARD BETFER PROBLEMS, 1992, p. 104-5. “Environmental ethics,” then, urges upon us a minimum a much more mindful and longer-term attention to the way we interact with and depend upon nature. It urges attention to everything from the medicinal and nutritional uses of rain forest plants to the psychic need for open spaces and various kinds of ecological dependence of which we are not even aware. The implications are radical. We need to think of the earth in a different way: not as an infinite sink, and not as a collection of resources fortuitously provided for our use, but as a complex system with its own integrity and dynamics, far more intricate than we understand or perhaps can understand, but still the system within we live and on which we necessarily and utterly depend. 2. ITS IMPERATIVE TO RESPECT OUR ECOLOGICAL HERITAGE Gus DiZerega, Foundation for Research on Economics and the Environment, ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS, Spring, 1995, p. 30. At a minimum, we need to respect those processes that have given us birth. They embody far more knowledge than humanity has acquired, for they have successfully maintained and enriched life for over three billion years. We cannot create a living cell; nevertheless, these processes have given birth to the marvelous and beautiful diversity of earthly life. As animal rights philosophers have rightly pointed out, other creatures are sentient and capable of experiencing well-being or pain. We do not have to be egalitarians to acknowledge the impressive similarities between ourselves and other beings. The common heritage that we share with all life can either raise the standing of nonhuman in our eyes or lower that of fellow humans. 3. HUMANS UNIQUE CAPACITY FOR ETHICS DEMANDS WE RESPECT NATURE Gus DiZerega, Foundation for Research on Economics and the Environment, ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS, Spring, 1995, p. 32. To be sure, there are differences between humans and the rest of the natural world. However, they are much less different than the average human supremacist imagines. Aldo Leopold remarked that while we can mourn the passing of the passenger pigeon, which none of us has seen, had human beings rather than passenger pigeons passed from the scene, no passenger pigeon would have mourned us. Both those denying and arguing for human uniqueness would do well to ponder Leopold’s remark that “For one species to mourn the death of another is a new thing under the sun.” Perhaps the strongest evidence of human uniqueness is this capacity - which requires an ecocentric ethic in order to be realized! 4. ALL SPECIES DESERVE TO BE VALUED Gus DiZerega, Foundation for Research on Economics and the Environment, ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS, Spring, 1995, p. 24-25. Generalizing on Hume’s observation, the greater our sense of self as a being extending over time, the greater our capacity to sympathize with beings other than ourselves. The greater our sense of individuality, the deeper our capacity to realize our connections with all life. We, and all other beings, are fellow travelers on the voyage of life. Once we acknowledge that we all live under the same rules, we can better appreciate that other beings are no more purely tools that we ourselves. 5. ALL LIFE HAS INTRINSIC VALUE William French, Prof. of Theology at Loyola University, ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS, Spring, 1995, p. 42. Devall and Sessions summarize deep ecology’s ‘basic intuition’ as rooted in its holistic view: “All organisms and entities in the ecosphere, as parts of the interrelated whole, are equal in intrinsic worth.” They continue: “There are no boundaries and everything is interrelated. But insofar as we perceive things as individual organisms or entities, the insight draws us to respect all human and nonhuman individuals in their own right as parts of the whole without feeling the need to set up hierarchies of species with humans at the top. 228 Environment Bad PRO-ENVIRONMENT VIEWS LACK STRONG SUPPORT 1. PRO-ECOLOGY EVIDENCE IS PROPAGANDA GENERATED TO FUND SPECIAL INTERESTS Ronald Bailey, 1993 Warren Brookes Fellow in Environmental Journalism at the Competitive Enterprise Institute in Washington, THE FUTURIST, January, 1995, p. 14. Given the dismal record of the environmental doomsayers, why do so many people think the world is coming to an end? I think it’s pretty clear. People are afraid because so many interest groups have a stake in making them afraid. “Global emergencies” and “worldwide crises” keep hundreds of millions of dollars in donations flowing into the coffers of environmental organizations. As environmental writer Bill McKibben admitted in The End of Nature, “The ecological movement has always had its greatest success in convincing people that we are threatened by some looming problem.” That success is now measured at the cash register for many leading environmental groups. For example, in 1990, the 10 largest environmental organizations raised $400 million from donors. That pays for a lot of trips to international environmental conferences, furnishes some nice headquarters, and buys a lot of influence on Capitol Hill. Crises also advance the careers of certain politicians and bureaucrats, attract funds to scientists’ laboratories, and sell newspapers and TV air time. The approach of inevitable doom is now the conventional wisdom of the late twentieth century. 2. MEDIA DISTORTS REAL NEEDS OF THE ENVIRONMENT Ben Bolch and Harold Lyons, Profs. of Economics and Chemistry at Rhodes College, APOCALYPSE NOT, 1993, p. 10. We believe that in our two years of research for this book, a growing segment of the scientific community has come to agree with our assessment that the earth is in no great danger of being poisoned. Nevertheless, this side of the environmental story is not being told, because there is no money to be made in telling. Hysteria sells newspapers, enrolls members in environmental protection groups, allows beaurocrats to increase their power, and creates markets for corrective measures in a way that the Wall Street Journal calls a zero-sum game; money is taken from organizations like electric utilities and shunted toward organizations that claim to improve the environment. 3. ENVIRONMENTALIST SCIENCE IS WORSE THAN SHODDY Ben Bolch and Harold Lyons, Profs. of Economics and Chemistry at Rhodes College, APOCALYPSE NOT, 1993, p. 10. Subsequent chapters will point out several areas where the environmentalist’s case has been based on science that is sometimes hardly worthy of being called shoddy. People who would sell those causes seem to have discovered the public-relations expert and the attorney are more powerful (at least in the short run) that the scientist In the long run, however, this mode of operation is sure to cause trouble. 4. MEDIA BASED SCIENCE OVERSTATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS Ronald Barly, Media Analyst, ECOSCAM, 1993, pp. 20-1. Science by press release has been used to publicize lesser ‘crises’ such as the carefully choreographed Alar scare in which the Natural Resources Defense Council used a public relations firm to promote the bogus story’ of poisoned apples to CBS’s “60 Minutes.” In each case, the public was alarmed and new enduring environmental myths were added to the accumulating conventional wisdom of doom, but later scientific analysis severely weakened the original catastrophic claims. The problem of science by press release has become so bad that the National Academy of Sciences issued a report in 1992 calling on scientists to stop the “questionable research practices” of misrepresenting speculations as fact, and releasing research results, especially to the popular press, that have not been evaluated by fellow scientists and judged valid. 5. ENVIRONMENTAL DOOMSDAY THEORY IS SCIENTIFICALLY FLAWED Julian Simon, Prof. of Economics, Univ. of Maryland, SCARCITY OR ABUNDANCE, 1994, p. xv. The topics I deal with there are a small set of the conventional “green” beliefs that are massively contradicted by the scientific evidence. If these data make you question the common wisdom about how our society is doing in these particular cases, perhaps you will also review your thinking about the entire set of related issues, and recognize that across the board our human situation is getting better rather than getting worse. Perhaps you will also consider that if the issues discussed - which is in the recent past were considered insuperable problems - turned out to be non-problems after we had time to gather the facts about them, it is not unlikely that the same fate will occur to the more recently 229 publicized “green” issues - the ozone layer, the greenhouse effect, acid rain, and their kin - which we have not yet had time to understand thoroughly. 230 ENVIRONMENTAL ETHIC IS UNWARRANTED 1. ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICAL SYSTEM IS UNWARRANTED Ronald Bailey, 1993 Warren Brookes Fellow in Environmental Journalism at the Competitive Enterprise Institute in Washington, THE FUTURIST, January, 1995, p. 14. To counteract the seduction of the apocalypse, scientists, policy makers, intellectuals, and businessmen must work to restore people’s faith in themselves and in the fact of human progress. History clearly shows that our energy and creativity will surmount whatever difficulties we encounter. Life and progress will always be a struggle and humanity will never lack for new challenges, but as the last 50 years of solid achievement show, there is nothing out there that we cannot handle. So what’s the moral of the story? Please don’t listen to the doomsters’ urgent siren calls to drastically re-organize society and radically transform the world’s economy to counter imaginary ecological apocalypses. The relevant motto is not “He who hesitates is lost,” but rather, “Look before you leap.” 2. HUMANITY CAN HAVE NO SUBSTANTIAL EFFECT ON THE ENVIRONMENT Gregg Easterbrook, Columnist, NEWSWEEK, July 24, 1989, p. 26. In the aftermath of events like the Exxon Valdez oil spill every reference to the environment is prefaced with the adjective “fragile.” Nothing could be further from the truth. The environment is damned near indestructible. It has survived ice ages, bombardments of cosmic radiation, fluctuations of the sun, reversals of the seasons caused by shifts in the planetary axis, collisions of comets and meteors bearing far more force than man’s doomsday arsenals and the lightless “nuclear winters” that followed these impacts. Though mischievous, human assaults are pinpricks compared with forces of the magnitude nature is accustomed to resisting. 3. ENVIRONMENTAL DOOMSDAY THEORIES ARE WRONG Ronald Baily, Media Analyst, ECOSCAM, 1993, pp. 23. Half a century’s woeful experience indicates, however, that crying wolf never erodes the popularity of the frightful predictions. “One clearly wrong prophesy, or even a whole string of them, rarely discredits the prophet in the eyes of those who believe in prophecy,” notes Daniel Cohen in Waiting for Apocalypse. And this is especially true of contemporary environmental predictions of doom. Nevertheless, the conventional wisdom of doom is simply wrong. Humanity is not running short of food or minerals, and in fact life for most human beings has dramatically improved over the past half-century. 4. THE ENVIRONMENTAL SITUATION IS DRAMATICALLY IMPROVING Ben Bolch and Harold Lyons, Profs. of Economics and Chemistry at Rhodes College, APOCALYPSE NOT, 1993, p. 10. No doubt this book errs on the side of presenting the case for restraining people whose stock in trade is environmental hysteria. Our basic thesis is that the world is not about to come to an end and that by nearly every measure, the people who reside in the market-oriented economies of the West enjoy a cleaner and safer environment than ever experienced in modem history. Since the 1850’s, the average life expectancy in the United States has nearly doubled, from around 40 years to around 80 years. The improvement has been so sweeping and dramatic that if we completely eliminated all mortality (every single death) before the age of 50, our life expectancy would only increase by 3.5 years. We view that fact as the most dramatic proof imaginable that the environment has not deteriorated as far as human beings are concerned. 231 Equality Good EQUALITY IS NECESSARY FOR DEMOCRACY 1. DEMOCRACY CANNOT EXIST WITHOUT EQUAL PARTICIPATION OF ALL CITIZENS Delba Winthrop, Lecturer in Extension at Harvard University, CAPITALISM AND EQUALITY IN AMERICA, 1987, p. 284. Although “participatory democracy” has not always been vociferously demanded, there can be no responsible government without political participation, and no democracy without equal participation. In recent years the demand for political equality has been vociferous. 2. EQUALITY WILL RESULT IN A TRULY DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY Anthony Arblaster, NQA, DEMOCRACY, 1987, p. 81. Tocqueville’s Democracy in America is, as has been noted, essentially a study of American society, and one commentator has even suggested that it might better have been called Equality in America. If we wish to revive that tradition, or if we are interested in creating a fully democratic society, then there can be no doubt that a more than narrowly political or formal equality must be one of our goals. 3. EQUALITY IS NECESSARY FOR LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT James A. Dorn, Editor of Cato Journal, LEGITIMACY, GOVERNMENTS, AND MARKETS, 1990, p. 71. The notion of equality is central to any discussion of the legitimacy of markets and governments. Legitimacy implies justification and justification requires a method of determining what is right or just. Moreover, in the choice of justificatory criteria, reference is inevitably made to fairness, which itself is intimately bound up with the notion of equality. Thus, the notions of equality and legitimacy are inseparable, and the various meanings of equality must be fleshed out if one is to gain a handle on the legitimacy of markets and governments. 232 GOVERNMENT MUST ENSURE EQUALITY FOR ALL CITIZENS 1. GOVERNMENT HAS RESPONSIBILITY TO REDUCE INEQUALITY AND POVERTY John E. Jacob, Former President of the National Urban League, CIVIL LIBERTIES, 1988, p. 179-80. Those who believe that government can and should devise policies that reduce inequality and poverty can point to some considerable past successes. Those who believe that government cannot and should not implement such policies must defend the results of current policies that have dramatically increased inequality and poverty. Their only recourse is to say that market forces unimpeded by government interference, will create wealth and jobs. That view has only a tenuous relationship to reality. It ignores the persistence of discrimination and its effects. It embodies a fantasy of the blacks and whites lining up at the starting line as equals, when black people run the race of life carrying heavy historical and present burdens on their shoulders. 2. SOCIETY HAS A RESPONSIBILITY TO ENSURE EQUALITY Howard Zinn, Professor Emeritus, Spelman College, DECLARATIONS OF INDEPENDENCE, 1990, p. 150. We know that Jefferson and the Founding Fathers, almost all of whom were very wealthy, did not really mean for that [right to] equality to be established, certainly not between slave and master, not between rich and poor. And when, eleven years after they adopted the Declaration, they wrote a constitution, it was designed to keep the distribution of wealth pretty much as it existed at the time—which was very unequal. But that is no reason for anyone to surrender those rights, any more than the ignoring of the racial equality demanded by the Fourteenth Amendment was reasons for discarding that goal. To say that people have an equal right to life, liberty, the pursuit of happiness, means that if, in fact, there is inequality in those things, society has a responsibility to correct the situation and to ensure that equality. 3. SOCIAL POLICIES ARE NECESSARY TO CREATE EQUALITY John E. Jacob, Former President of the National Urban League, CIVIL LIBERTIES, 1988, p. 180. Everything we know about race and poverty in America suggests that unless the poor are given some extra help—in the form of social policies that enlarge their opportunities—they will not compete on equal terms with the affluent. The results of the current economic recovery bear that out. We are in the longest sustained economic recovery in memory, and the results are barely perceptible in poverty communities... [sic]. ALL PEOPLE ARE EQUAL 1. ALL PEOPLE ARE EQUAL IN HUMANITY Mortimer J. Adler, Chairman of the Board of Editors of the Encyclopedia Britannica, SIX GREAT IDEAS, 1981, p. 165. The equalities to which we are entitled, by virtue of being human, are circumstantial, not personal. They are equalities of condition—of status, treatment, and opportunity. How does our humanity justify our right to these equalities? The answer is that, by being human, we are all equal—equal as persons, equal in our humanity. 2. PEOPLE ARE EQUAL IN PRINCIPLE Erich Fromm, Social Philosopher, ESCAPE FROM FREEDOM, 1941, p. 264. The uniqueness of the self in no way contradicts the principle of equality. The thesis that men are born equal implies that they all share the same functional human qualities, that they share the basic fate of human beings, that they all have the same inalienable claim on freedom and happiness. It furthermore means that their relationship in one of solidarity, not one of domination-submission. 3. ALL PEOPLE ARE EQUAL IN DIGNITY Mortimer J. Adler, Chairman of the Board of Editors of the Encyclopedia Britannica, SIX GREAT IDEAS, 1981, p. 165. One individual cannot be more or less human than another, more or less of a person. The dignity we attribute to being a person rather than a thing is not subject to degrees in difference. The equality of all human beings is the equality of their dignity as persons. 233 FAIRNESS IS AN ESSENTIAL PART OF EQUALITY 1. EQUALITY INCORPORATES FAIRNESS AND PROPRIETY Richard John Neuhaus, Director of the Center on Religion and Society at the Rockford Institute, CAPITALISM AND EQUALITY IN AMERICA, 1987, p. 222. Equality engages the notion both of fairness and of propriety. Fairness, in the sense of fair play, is sometime measurable, stated in enprincipled form, and subject to public contestation. Such explicit questions about equality are encountered in the political and legal arenas where, fortunately, most of us do not live our every day lives. 2. EQUALITY AS FAIRNESS DEMONSTRATES RESPECT FOR INDIVIDUALS Richard John Neuhaus, Director of the Center on Religion and Society at the Rockford Institute, CAPITALISM AND EQUALITY IN AMERICA, 1987, p. 222. The idea of equality as propriety is soft, intuitive, and largely unconscious until egregiously violated. In the forms both of fairness and of propriety, equality’s hard core is the claim to individual respect. “Attention must be paid.” Except for some of those whose job it is to theorize about equality, the question of personal dignity is the chief point at which the idea of equality engages the explicit and intense interest of Americans. 3. EQUALITY IS A MORAL CONCEPT OF FAIRNESS Richard John Neuhaus, Director of the Center on Religion and Society at the Rockford Institute, CAPITALISM AND EQUALITY IN AMERICA, 1987, p. 199 Equality as a moral concept exists in tension with, and aimed to temper, the unequal distribution social goods. Equality as a social program aims at making morality dispensable. Because Americans, with few exceptions, choose fair play over fair shares, equality remains a moral concept, which is both the weakness and the strength of the idea of equality in everyday life. 234 AFRICAN-AMERICANS EXPERIENCE DISCRIMINATION 1. DISCRIMINATION OF AFRICAN-AMERICANS IS PERVASIVE Marilyn French, Feminist Philosopher, BEYOND POWER, 1985, 473. Equality continues to be the goal of many women’s and black groups, however, because of the unbridgeable gap between white and black, male and female, every gain made in the name of the latter groups is rescinded the next day and must be earned again and again. The resistance to receiving women and blacks as equals of white males is so profound, so undying, and so implanted in the culture, that the example of one woman or black doing a good just is not enough to ease the lot of the next; and assimilative acts performed under political (or moral, or social) pressure are often undone as soon as the pressure is removed. It is impossible to rely on the endurance of improvements in hiring practices, promotion, or pay, in assimilated dwelling, education, or work (for blacks), in ownership of rights over one’s body and reproduction, assimilated work, or political representation (for women). 2. DESPITE GAINS, MINORITIES STILL EXPERIENCE DISCRIMINATION Christine E. Sleeter, Professor at the University of Wisconsin-Parkside, JOURNAL OF EDUCATION, Vol. 171, 1989, p. 61-2. To White America, the absence of mass protest, the presence of a small number of Black, Hispanic, and Asian women and men as well as White women in new positions (e.g., administrative jobs), passage of civil rights laws all suggest that inequalities of the past have been remedied. This is quite false, of course; the presence of poverty and discrimination among historically disenfranchised groups is well documented. However, mainstream White America today is well versed in the right’s rearticulation of a racial ideology, and is fairly ignorant of or indifferent to limitations to gains made by racial minority groups and women during the past 25 years. WOMEN ARE DISCRIMINATED AGAINST 1. WOMEN ARE SYSTEMATICALLY UNDERPAID IN THE U.S. Marilyn French, Feminist Philosopher, BEYOND POWER, 1985, p. 465. A presidential report published in 1981 claims that women are “systematically underpaid,” that “women’s work” pays about four thousand dollars a year less than men’s work, and that occupational segregation is more pronounced by sex than by race: 70 percent of men and 54 percent of women are concentrated in jobs done only by those of their own sex. 2. WOMEN HAVE NOT ACHIEVED EQUALITY Susan Faludi, Feminist Author, BACKLASH, 1991, p. xiv-xv. The word may be that women have been “liberated’ , but women themselves seem to feel otherwise. Repeatedly in national surveys, majorities of women say they are still far from equality. Nearly 70 percent of women polled by the New York Times in 1989 said the movement for women’s tights had only just begun. Most women in the 1990 Virginia Slims opinion poll agreed with the statement that conditions for their sex in American society had improved “a little, not a lot.” In poll after poll in the decade, overwhelming majorities of women said they needed equal pay and equal job opportunities, they needed an Equal Rights Amendment, they needed the rights to an abortion without government interference, they needed a federal law guaranteeing maternity leave, they needed decent child care services. 3. TWO-THIRDS OF ALL POOR PEOPLE ARE WOMEN Marilyn French, Feminist Philosopher, BEYOND POWER, 1985, p. 464. The poor of America are women: the poor of the world are women. In 1980, in America, the median adjusted income for men was $12,530; for women it was $4,920. In 1980 the poverty level was $8,414 for a nonfarm family of four, and nearly thirty million Americans live beneath it. Seventy percent of these are white, 30 percent black—and we may note that only 12 percent of the population is black—two-thirds of them women and children. If we limit these figures to adults, two out of very three poor adults are female. If present trends continue, by the year 2000 the poor of American will be entirely women. 235 Equality Responses Typically, equality is considered to be a "reforming" idea, whereby all peoples are granted equal rights by what is usually a higher power, such as a government or group of ruling elites. Since the 17th century, the very idea of equality has been a central feature to forming new governments, especially democracies, and has proven pivotal in both the practice and theory of politics. While it is difficult to gain a uniform consensus on the true meaning of equality, it is generally recognized as the, "elimination of formal legal barriers of exclusion based on certain immutable characteristics such as race and gender." 1 This definition of equality is also referred to as the "antidiscrimination principle," which is upheld in most contemporary societies that claim some type of equality amongst their people. In the United States, our ideas of equality are central to our civic life. Our nation’s two most enshrined documents are the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution, both of which use equality as their basic foundations. While documents such as the Constitution claim equality for all, only very few Americans would agree that everyone is treated fairly and equally. In fact, the 1990's brought about a new agenda of issues involving equality which continue to drive political discourse today. Claims of unequal treatment under the law continue to be expressed in the public sphere as well as in the courts. In general, "America is far from having reached a consensus over the meaning of equality and whether we have in fact achieved it."2 While equality is generally regarded as a positive value term, in many ways the very concept of equality is not only impossible to achieve, but can also have very broad and devastating consequences. This essay will discuss the ramifications that true equality is likely to have, and demonstrate many of the challenges that equality poses for contemporary societies. THE RAMIFICATIONS OF ECONOMIC EQUALITY Michael Walzer notes that equality is the promotion of a "leveled and conformist society." 3 Unfortunately, given the degree to which contemporary societies place value on diversity, autonomy and individualism; it is unlikely that we are willing to sacrifice these things for true economic equality. The notion of economic equality means that you must eliminate all inequities in wealth, material possessions and income. This is a concept so difficult to believe that it is hard to fathom that equality could ever be implemented so literally. Even Karl Marx noted that economic equality was likely to have negative ramifications: "A single worker needs less to live on than a married worker with a dependent wife and child, (so) that giving each of these an equal income will not produce and equal effect." 4 Herein lies the first major repercussion of economic equality, which recognizes that equalizing, "social resources fails to deal with any natural inequalities we may start out with."5 In many cases, equalizing all of the resources in a society fails to recognize the different values that people attach to resources, for example, "the fact that some people may care more about time for contemplation or leisure than about the goods that they are able to enjoy."6 Additionally, economic equality (whereby everyone is given equal income) will lead to certain members of a society being given a salary which is simply inadequate due to pre-existing circumstances. Anne Phillips notes: "Some people may need more than others in order to achieve a similar level of well being. The obvious and much repeated example being the person who is born with a physical disability and needs additional equipment, like a wheelchair, to reach the standards of mobility that others have taken for granted." 7 While this example is not particularly devastating, there are a host of different circumstances that make true economic equality nearly impossible and more importantly, even devastating to those who start out with pre-existing circumstances which merit more pay. Since such differences in pay would constitute inequality, equality must be rejected. Economic equality becomes even more problematic when you look at the effects that uniform wages and salaries would likely have on the marketplace and employment prospects. A great example given by Phillips is that of nurses and doctors: "We might believe, for example, that it is inequitable to pay doctors more than nurses and that any well-regulated society would value each of these equally. But we might still think that, failing the lure of a future high salary, no one would be daft enough to embark on the extra years of study necessary to qualify as a doctor." 8 This has been an age-old problem involved with the idea of economic equality in the marketplace. In a truly equal society where everyone has equal wealth and income, the race for the bottom is inevitable; as only very few people 236 are willing to pursue professional careers in medicine, law, and business when the financial payoff is non-existent. A society without doctors and academics will inherently be one that is plagued by poor health, lower life expectancies, higher infant mortality rates, and a decreased quality of life due to a lack of innovation. Societies that have strived towards economic equality have seen the devastating results first hand. To this day, nations like Russia that attempted this type of egalitarianism continue to be plagued by the residual effects of socialist rule. Quite simply, the free market and the idea of rational choosers making decisions based upon economic concerns now regulate our world. Globalization has had the effect of infiltrating even the most closed societies. Nations like China that once prided themselves upon governmental control of business and economic equality are being forced to open their markets and allow for individuals to start small businesses in order to create wealth. "We might believe it is inequitable for those lucky enough to make a success of their business to end up with a fine mansion and several cars while those who fail through no fault of their own end up in bankruptcy proceedings ... but if the mansion and cars turn out to be the only inducement that will encourage people to set up new enterprises, we may still think that [inequality] is a price worth paying." 9 In our system of free markets, it is unlikely that we are willing to forsake the creation of new ideas, innovations and business simply for the elusive goal of true economic equality. It is likely that an attempt to create equality in a nation like the United States would be economically devastating. The results of innovation benefit everyone, not just those who directly profit financially. Advances in medicine, technology, service, and health have partially resulted from economic motivations. These advances have expanded life expectancy and made the time individuals are alive more comfortable and enjoyable. These benefits are worth sacrificing equality for. Finally, we must look at the economic basis for every world economy, which is currency. Each nation relies on a form of currency, be it actual currency or goods. These units of currency always represent the same thing, regardless of whether you are living in a socialist, totalitarian, or free market economy. The currency, "expresses a relation among the batches of goods on a market, the equivalence class any of whose members would fetch that price on the market: for each such item, not enough people will pay more for it to make it possible for the seller to charge more profitability, whereas enough will pay that much for it to make that price profitable." 10 But Jan Narveson brings up an interesting query: What would happen if you were to equalize dollar-income? In a free market economy, demand curves help to determine what is going to be produced and how much of it will come to the market for how much. With equal income however, these demand curves become distorted. The only way to get around this problem would be to pay people in kind, instead of with actual money. 11 Of course, based upon the differing needs of individuals discussed earlier, this alternative is certainly an unlikely one. True economic equality would completely destroy existing demand curves, and likely lead to serious economic ramifications, whereby entire industries find that their markets have disappeared, and with them, their profits have also disappeared. While a lack of profits and markets may not sound important, the human impacts of such occurrences would be devastating. Unemployment would soar, and with this would come an inability to pay for the basic needs of a family or individual. Hunger, poverty, and poor health would follow. In addition, crime would increase as individuals looked for ways to earn any sort of income. EQUALITY FAILS TO ACCOUNT FOR HISTORICAL INEQUITIES On face, equality usually sounds like a fair and decent idea. Politicians use the word like it is going out of style, largely in part because people respond to the word in a positive way. One might think that the idea of equality would be even better received within those communities that have been historically marginalized - either by the government or by society. But in many cases, equality ignores the oppression and institutional discrimination suffered by minorities at the hands of government and society for the vast majority of our nation’s history. The most common example which adequately demonstrates that inequality is necessary to overcome past wrongs is Affirmative Action. Mary Segers defines Affirmative Action as, "the measures and programs which are sensitive to and take cognizance of factors of race, sex, or national origins in admissions, hiring, and promotion decisions." 12 And while Affirmative Action is not necessarily the same as quotas, having a truly effective Affirmative Action program must almost by its very nature have some type of quota system to ensure adequate efforts at integration. Few would argue with the fact that society ought to acquiesce passively in light of continued racial and sexual 237 discrimination, but many question whether or not the government should make special policies and programs on behalf of these groups in order to offset the effects of past wrongs and discrimination. While Affirmative Action is one of the most contentious political issues in the United States, it is also the best example of how equality is not necessarily the best way of achieving a truly equal society. Because Affirmative Action by its definition encourages employers, admissions officers and governmental hiring programs to favor some groups of people over others, it is a system of policy which inherently promotes inequality. For the purposes of this essay, the arguments for this particular type of inequality will fall into three categories: first, the appeals to the very principle of compensatory justice, second, the appeals to utility principles, and finally, the arguments highlighting the need to take often over-reaching steps to create what will one day be a truly equal society. "Compensatory or retrospective justifications of preferential treatment focus on the historical past and argue that affirmative action is necessary to compensate women and minorities for past injustices and/or for present disadvantages stemming from past injustices." 13 For example, throughout the vast majority of our nation’s history African Americans were forbidden by law from learning to read or seeking any type of formal or informal education. And while a select few were able to gain literacy, the vast majority were not able to read even up until the beginning of the 20th century. Even today, literacy rates amongst African Americans are significantly lower than amongst their Caucasian counterparts. This disparity comes in large part because of the institutional barriers that prevented their ancestors from gaining literacy and schooling. Even in the 1950's, African Americans were sent to inferior schools with poor resources and less qualified teachers. Many barriers continue to face African Americans even today. It is in this spirit that many Affirmative Action programs are based. If you support true equality, then you would be forced to treat these historically oppressed groups in the same manner that you treat their counterparts which have not been subjected to these discriminatory institutional barriers. The same story exists for women, who up until the early 20th century were not allowed to vote. Expecting women to gain an equal stature in the workplace and in government after spending most of our nation’s history as a subordinate group of people is absurd. Second, utility dictates that inequality is merited. “Utilitarian justifications of affirmative action stress the benefits to individuals and to society as a whole of having members of previously disadvantaged groups in business and the professions…Also stressed is the educational value of having women and minority students in professional schools to present their viewpoints and otherwise act as a leavening force in the training of future professionals for a pluralistic society.” 14 The entirety of society benefits when inclusiveness is valued over equality. Finally, this unequal treatment is necessary to be truly equal in the long-term. President Lyndon Johnson in a 1965 commencement speech at Howard University spoke about the genuine need for affirmative action: Freedom is not enough. You do not wipe out scars of centuries by saying, “now you’re free to go where you want and do as you desire.” You do not take a person who for years has been hobbled by chains and liberate him, bring him up to the starting line of a race, and then say “You’re free to compete” and justly believe you have been completely fair. Thus it is not enough to open the gates to opportunity. All of our citizens must have the ability to walk through those gates; and this is the next and most profound stage of the battle for civil rights….Imagine a hundred-yard dash in which one of the two runners has his legs shackled together. He ahs progressed ten yards, while the unshackled runner has gone fifty yards. At that point the judges decide that the race is unfair. How do they rectify the situation? Do they merely remove the shackles and allow the race to proceed? Then they could say that “equal opportunity” now prevailed. But one of the runners would still be forty yards ahead of the other. 15 In that sense, unequal treatment in the form of affirmative action is justified, since it rectified historical inequities. If equality was mandated, the inequities would be allowed to stand and continue, harming not only those who are treated as less than others, but also society as a whole. EQUALITY LEADS TO CONFORMITY True and literal equality may be impossible to achieve. However, even putting aside this pragmatic objection, there are reasons to reject equality. The slide towards conformity is one such reason. “Michael Walzer sees the pursuit of literal equality as promoting ‘a leveled and conformist society.’ Given the importance contemporary societies attach 238 to autonomy and diversity, we may be unwilling to sacrifice these qualities even if we accept the independent value of…equality.” 16 The only way to truly have people at an equal level involves them accepting a level of conformity, where everyone becomes similar if not the same. This is problematic and worse than inequality for several reasons. First, a multitude of opinions and perspectives are necessary to come up with the best ideas and policies. A variety of ideas check against one another, and the clash of ideas produces synthesis and superior ideas. When individuals engage in debates, they reach new conclusions that they would not have come to on their own. These debates extend beyond a personal level, however, to also be beneficial in the policy-making paradigm. When alternatives are discussed and compared, there is the best chance of picking the superior option. This will benefit the most people and allow the most progress for a society. Second, conformity allows for the abuse of power. If everyone is the same, there is no one questioning the way that events are happening. This allows for those in power to convince the masses that they are acting in their best interest. If everyone is the same and believes this, then no one checks back the power of the government. Third, conformity destroys individuality. Individuality is key because it allows you to define who you are. Without uniqueness and differences, a person cannot realize their potential. This would lead to depression and stall any forward movement and innovation for a society. Finally, conformity is boring. If everyone was the same, it would not be interesting to interact with others because they would have nothing different to offer than what you have. In that sense, conformity would destroy social institutions like the family, church, school, friendship, and workplace. These implications that come from conformity are far worse than the implications of not having equality. The process of truly making everyone equal would rob them of their individuality and stop the forward progress society has enjoyed because of innovation and differences. EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY IS IMPOSSIBLE Author John Wilson discusses the problems of trying to create equality of opportunity. He notes, “There is a sense in which all players in a game have an equal opportunity of winning: that is, the rules do not favor one more than another. But unless the game is a game of pure chance, we might also say that in fact some players have a better chance or more opportunities to win than others, if they have superior skills or talents. So we are not sure whether to say they all really have an equal opportunity or not.” 17 In that sense, Wilson articulates that not only is equality of opportunity impossible to create; but it is also impossible to determine if it exists. He continues, “Thus if, when we say ‘Every American boy has the same opportunity to be President,’ we mean simply that there are no rules which disqualify him a priori (because he is poor, or ugly, or the devotee of some minority religion), then this may be cold comfort: for in practice anyone who wants to run for the Presidency may need not only natural talents, like political ability and intelligence, but also perhaps accidental qualifications like wealth or social standing.” 18 This example points out that even when we claim that equality of opportunity exists, it is usually a mirage. Yet it would be impossible to create a world wherein every American child had a truly equal opportunity to become President. Wilson’s work illustrates two things. The first is the slippery slope of attempting to create an equality of opportunity. There is no way to create a scenario wherein every individual has equal odds at becoming any certain position. The second is that such equality would not be definable, as there is no way to tell when those odds have been reached. Thus striving for equality is an impossible task that only frustrates and destroys instead of moving towards a progressive attitude. Author Matt Cavanagh also discusses the impossibility of equal opportunity by examining what it would mean to create equal opportunity for a job. He says, “If it just means that everyone should have the opportunity to apply for any job, and should be judged on their merits, then it is a universalist principle, not a principle of distributive justice. To be a genuinely egalitarian position, it has to appeal to equality as a principle of distributive justice. (It also has to appeal to equality as a distinct principle. This is why the view that everyone should start in the same position doesn’t count as genuinely egalitarian, even though it does involve equality as a distributive principle.)” 19 Cavanagh does an excellent job articulating the impossibility of finding a way to define and measure equality of opportunity and the justifications for such equality. 239 There is also a large amount of confusion regarding a right versus a chance or an opportunity. Wilson adds, “We have to suppose this in order to make sense of the notion of an equal opportunity, or of an equal chance. I may have the right to do things which I have not the power to do (stupid people have the right to go to a university), or be entitled to them, for these words refer simply to the rules of the game. But if I have not the power, then strictly speaking I don’t have the opportunity or the chance.” 20 It would not be possible to create a world where everyone has equal abilities and therefore equal chances, equal power, and equal access. To encourage equal opportunity, therefore, is to punish those who have more abilities to accomplish what others cannot. Wilson offers another example, saying, “The door of the cell may be unlocked and the warder absent, but I do not have the opportunity or chance to escape if I am crippled or paralyzed. We could say that I had the chance if at that particular time I was asleep, but in this case I still have the power to escape- it is just that I could not use the power at that moment. In one sense of ‘could’ it is false to say ‘I had the opportunity, but I couldn’t take it’; we usually mean that, no doubt for excellent reasons, I chose not to take it.” 21 These examples are great methods of showing that inequality is preferable, as one can not possibly reach equality of opportunity without holding individuals back to the lowest possible standard. FINANCIAL EQUALITY IS UNJUST The true definition of equality means that everyone contributes and receives the same amount. If this standard is applied to finances, however, the results are unjust and problematic. Take, for example, taxes. To require everyone to pay the same amount of taxes is unjust given the large variety in the amount of money individuals make. This would be problematic whether the set amount for taxes was placed at a high or low level. If the tax level was placed relatively high, those with high incomes would not have a problem paying the tax. Those with lower incomes, however, would be extremely burdened. They would have to spend a majority of their income paying taxes, and even that amount might not suffice. This would be especially devastating because it is those who have little income who most need to hold on to their money to pay for basic necessities like housing, food, and medical care. Similarly, if the tax level was set at a relatively low amount, this would also produce problems. The lower income bracket could afford taxes, but for those with higher incomes, the amount they would be paying would seem miniscule in comparison to their incomes. This would lower the amount of tax revenue that the government would receive, and drastically lower the amount that could be spent on social programs. This, again, would harm the low income parts of the population, who depend on governmental services to assist them with food, unemployment, welfare, and health care costs. Tax money is used to pay for these services, and if that revenue was lowered the government could no longer provide those opportunities to individuals whose income did not facilitate those opportunities on their own. This illustrates that what is equal and what is fair is not always the same. Redistribution of wealth and resources seems fair, as it helps the most people in a society. However, redistributing resources is not equal and would be denied in a quest for true and perfect equality. EQUALITY FACILITATES THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY If everyone’s voices were to truly be measured equally, a majority vote would be taken on every issue and the majority’s plan would be enacted. This is problematic because it allows the majority to abuse and walk all over the minority in the pursuit of what benefits them. All that would be needed is a large enough portion of the population to unite in order to ruin the lives of a smaller portion of the population. White Americans could justify the negative treatment of racial minorities because the equal counting of votes would give them more power than any smaller group that attempted to challenge that dominance. This is especially problematic because it is often these smaller groups who are underrepresented and need attention drawn to their issues. They are also the most likely to be overlooked anyway, and a system of the majority would allow them to be completely ignored. An example of how this equality is denied in American politics is the electoral college. Electors from some states represent less people than other electors. In that sense, the votes of individuals from some smaller states count as more than the votes of individuals from larger states. This inequality is necessary, however, to make sure that politicians do not just focus on large urban centers of population. It is important that issues effecting multiple and smaller parts of the population get discussed. For example, while a small minority of 240 American are farmers, farm policy deserves much attention in the political realm. If such policies are ignored, all Americans could suffer due to food shortages or other problems, including a rising cost of food. If politicians had only to focus on the large and urban areas to succeed, issues like farm policy would be discussed less frequently. Therefore, though it is unequal, the electoral college serves the needs of the American public and should be maintained. SUMMARY While equality is a term that most people greet with happiness and acceptance, in reality, it has many problems. The economic implications of equality are devastating. In addition, equality does not take into consideration historical inequities. Equality also leads to conformity, which destroys variety and hinders society. Equality of opportunity is literally impossible and so should not be strived for. Financial equality is unjust, specifically in the realm of taxes. Equality facilitates the tyranny of the majority. Equality in theory sounds beneficial. But in addition to being impossible to achieve, equality would also have detrimental effects on individuals and society as a whole. It must therefore be rejected. ______________________________ 1 Douglas, Davison and Devins, Neal. Redefining Equality. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998, pg. 4. 2 Ibid, pg. 3. 3 Walzer, Michael. Spheres of Justice. New York: Basic Books, 1983, pg. xii. 4 Phillips, Anne. Which Equalities Matter? Malden, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers, 1999, pg. 52. 5 Ibid, pg. 52. 6 Ibid, pg. 52. 7 Ibid, pg. 53. 8 Ibid, pg. 44. 9 Ibid, pg. 44. 10 Narveson, Jan. Liberty and Equality. Oxford, England: Basil Blackwell Publisher, 1985, pg. 34. 11 Ibid, pg. 34. 12 Ibid, pg. 76. 13 Ibid, pg. 75. 14 Foster, James C. and Mary C. Segers. Elusive Equality: Liberalism, Affirmative Action, and Social Change in America. Port Washington: National University Publications, 1983, pg. 78. 15 Ibid, pg. 77-78. 16 Phillips, Anne. Which Equalities Matter? Malden, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers, 1999, pg. 45. 17 Wilson, John. Equality. New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World Inc., 1966, pg. 59. 18 Ibid, pg. 59. 19 Cavanagh, Matt. Against Equality of Opportunity. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002, pg. 121. 20 Wilson, John. Equality. New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World Inc., 1966, pg. 60. 21 Ibid, pg. 60. 241 EQUALITY THROUGH TAXATION IS UNJUST 1. ECONOMIC EQUALITY IN THE FORM OF TAXATION IS UNJUST Cavanaugh, Maureen, Assistant Professor at Washington and Lee University School of Law. "Democracy, Equality, and Taxes" Winter, 2003, Alabama Law Review, 54 Ala. L. Rev. 415. pp. 419-422. The Founders invoked debate about taxes to make concrete the very question of government legitimacy. The current tax debate necessarily implicates the nature of government. Yet it often appears to focus more narrowly on specific issues (such as tax rates) that obscure the larger question: [*420] the proper allocation of our collective tax burden. n10 Complexity, related to the nature and number of issues involved, seems to inhibit debate, as well. n11 Even where discussion of our political system occurs, it is too often cursory and full of unexamined assumptions. Because our tax debate raises many important issues of distributive justice, economic efficiency, and actual tax incidence, the absence of clearly stated premises, especially regarding the nature of our political system, is problematic precisely because it obscures fundamental principles. n12 Although the promise of "equal" taxation often exceeds the reality of assurances of "equal treatment," the appeal of these messages surely suggests the importance of equality as a principle basic to American conceptions of government. n13 Popular attention and attraction to a flat tax as the appropriate mechanism for the funding of public goods in a democracy, because of its dedication to equality, is evident in the political rhetoric. n14 It is frequently assumed that "the flat tax will restore fairness to the tax law by treating everyone the same." n15 [*421] Equality and fairness are thus linked by the rhetoric of "flat taxes." However, it is not clear, in reality, whether "equality" and "fairness" are synonymous, or in fact antithetical, given that individual resources vary dramatically. If equality and fairness were coextensive in taxation, one would expect a correlation between political systems favoring equality and equality of tax burdens. Historically, as this Article will show, the opposite has been the case. Moreover, everyone may desire equity in tax treatment, but agreement on what constitutes "fair" treatment depends upon starting assumptions. Assessment of "fair" or "appropriate" tax burdens requires discussion of theories of justice coupled with empirical analysis of the actual effects of those burdens. However, when issues of equality of taxpayer treatment are raised, the discussion often flounders. n16 For any discussion of distributive justice, a common understanding of the political and legal system is necessary at the onset. It is only possible to define the terms "equality" and "fairness" within the political context and, only then, is it possible to make progress in satisfactorily answering how this relates to questions of fairness in taxation. In other words, if equality and, therefore, fairness simply required treating everyone identically, few should oppose a poll (head) tax. However, such a tax is inconsistent with most conceptions of fairness, equality, and democracy, even dissociated from its use in outright efforts of discrimination. Its problematic historical associations in America, including its use to disenfranchise African-Americans, might prompt additional hesitation. n17 Therefore, few actually argue that every taxpayer should pay a flat head tax that is exactly the same regardless of individual economic circumstances. n18 [*422] As a result, most often, a proportionate tax is proposed as more consistent with democracy--where a flat rate is paid on whatever base is chosen. n19 Indeed, opponents of progressive income taxation assert, and often its proponents even concede, that equality presupposes proportionate taxation. This conclusion is far from clear; further examination of the nature of our democratic constitution is necessary, so that we can define "equality" in taxation consistently with that political structure. n20 Whether political "equality" requires equality in taxation will be clearer upon historical examination. First, a review of objections to progressive taxation, especially those based on our political system, is necessary. 242 PROGRESSIVE IS FAIR, EQUAL IS NOT 1. PROGRESSIVE TAXATION ALLOWS DEMOCRACY TO OCCUR Cavanaugh, Maureen, Assistant Professor at Washington and Lee University School of Law. "Democracy, Equality, and Taxes" Winter, 2003, Alabama Law Review, 54 Ala. L. Rev. 415. pp. 422-424. .Progressive taxation, the system by which those taxpayers earning more income are subject to a greater tax burden through increasing graduated rates, has characterized the income tax since its beginning in 1913. n21 Despite progressivity's long history and generally settled constitutional status, it has been subject to much debate--generally full of rhetoric, but often lacking careful examination of why it is incompatible with our political system. Walter Blum and Henry Kalven in their seminal 1952 article marshal a long list of arguments against progressive taxation, arguments many presume also support proportional taxation. n22 Ultimately, they conclude that the case for progressivity is "stubborn but uneasy." n23 Their examination of both the negative and positive cases for progressive taxation reveals some significant [*423] but little examined, and often contradictory, assumptions about our democratic political system. Regardless of other justifications, Blum and Kalven object to progressivity because of its conflict with democratic ideals. n24 Detailed assessment or definition of these democratic ideals is lacking. Defining democracy simply as "majority rule," Blum and Kalven note that a majority can easily vote a "distinctive burden," including higher tax rates, for the minority. n25 Because a progressive tax system necessarily imposes a high rate on a minority, Blum and Kalven conclude that it is "a politically irresponsible formula." n26 Because progressivity raises equity issues between taxpayers, it poses difficulties for majority rule. n27 Blum and Kalven further assume that democracy requires that the minority be protected from the majority; a priori, some decisions, including taxation, cannot be entrusted to any majority. n28 Since they are unable to cite any evidence of the majority imposing an undue tax burden on the minority, they concede that it is possible to overstate these political objections to progressivity. They, nevertheless, suggest that tax legislation could be so burdensome to the wealthier minority as to constitute a "taking of property without compensation." n29 Blum and Kalven reveal the bases for their political objections when they discuss progressivity as a means of wealth redistribution. n30 Democracy, defined as majority rule, necessarily rests political sovereignty with the majority (who are the poor). If democracy must also protect the minority (who are the rich), the possibility of majority decisions effecting wealth redistribution poses the actual problem--the conflict inherent in majority rule and minority protection. Yet their analysis also reflects a concern with the paradox that wealth inequality may inherently conflict with democracy. n31 Attributing progressivity's success to its proponents' failure to equate it openly with wealth redistribution, they themselves explain progressivity's [*424] appeal by the fact that it addresses a need to redress income inequality, where it exists at a level inconsistent with "economic democracy." n32 2. ECONOMIC FAIRNESS AS OPPOSED TO EQUALITY IS CONSTITUTIONALLY BASED Cavanaugh, Maureen, Assistant Professor at Washington and Lee University School of Law. "Democracy, Equality, and Taxes" Winter, 2003, Alabama Law Review, 54 Ala. L. Rev. 415. pp. 424-426. Richard Epstein bases his entire analysis on a radically different understanding of our political system, i.e., that the Constitution is the embodiment of Lockean political theory. n36 Epstein concludes from his reading of Locke (his theories of consent and private property) that the organization of the state does not result in the surrender of all rights, including natural property [*425] rights, to the sovereign. n37 For Epstein, applying Locke's theories to actual government presents the question of how to substitute for the doctrine of consent "an explicit and rigorous theory of forced exchanges between the sovereign and the individual that can account both for the monopoly of force and for the preservation of liberty and property." n38 Conceding that government requires some level of taxation to support its function (maintaining order), Epstein agrees with Locke's cursory statement about taxation, that each should contribute proportionally to those taxes that are legitimate exercises of the state's police power and sovereignty. n39 Because Epstein analogizes the individual's relationship with the state in quasi-contractual terms, all exchanges require equivalence. n40 Taxation is then only permissible where there is a "pareto-superior pattern of forced exchanges." n41 243 AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IS GOOD 1. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IS NECESSARY TO ACHIEVE DIVERSITY Bloch, Susan. Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. "Looking Ahead: The Future Of Affirmative Action." The American University Law Review, August, 2003. 52 Am. U.L. Rev. 1507. pp. 1510-1515. Face the simple fact that there are groups in every community which are daily paying the cost of the history of American injustice. The argument against affirmative action is ... an argument in favor of leaving that cost to lie where it falls. Our fundamental sense of fairness, particularly as it is embodied in the guarantee of equal protection under the law, requires us to make an effort to see that those costs are shared equitably while we continue to work for the eradication of the consequences of discrimination. Otherwise, we must admit to ourselves that so long as the lingering effects of inequality are with us, the burden will be borne by those who are least able to pay. n22 Significantly, the Justice who now sits in Marshall's Supreme Court seat, Clarence Thomas, could not disagree more. While not addressing Marshall's question of how far our society has come in its [*1511] quest for colorblindness, Thomas believes that all racial classifications, no matter how generous their motivation, are unconstitutional. In his separate concurrence in Adarand, Thomas argued that there is a "moral and constitutional equivalence between laws designed to subjugate a race and those that distribute benefits on the basis of race in order to foster some notion of equality. Government cannot make us equal; it can only recognize, respect, and protect us as equal before the law." n23 In Thomas' view, the government cannot make distinctions on the basis of race, no matter how benign the motivation. He believes that affirmative action programs embody and foster a paternalism that is at war with the principle of equality and that can be "just as poisonous and pernicious as any other form of discrimination." n24 Thomas concluded his separate Adarand concurrence with vehemence: "Government-sponsored racial discrimination based on benign prejudice is just as noxious as discrimination inspired by malicious prejudice. In each instance, it is racial discrimination, plain and simple." n25 This was the scene when the affirmative action cases from the University of Michigan arrived, presenting the Court with its first opportunity to address the constitutionality of affirmative action programs in higher education since Bakke, as well as the first opportunity to apply the strict scrutiny test mandated by Adarand. There were in fact two different University of Michigan programs under attack: Grutter v. Bollinger challenged the law school's admissions program, n26 and Gratz v. Bollinger challenged the undergraduate school's admissions program. n27 The University [*1512] defended both programs by arguing that they were designed to achieve a diverse student body comprised of students from a wide [*1513] variety of social, ethnic, and racial backgrounds. n28 The opponents argued that this was not a compelling interest. n29 The Court, in an opinion by Justice O'Connor, made the very significant decision that the University's desire to achieve diversity in its student body was in fact a compelling governmental interest, relying heavily on the reasoning of Justice Powell's lone opinion in Bakke. n30 The Court then went on to find, in a five-tofour decision, that the law school's nuanced, holistic consideration of race was sufficiently narrowly tailored to be constitutional. n31 The Court noted that "narrow tailoring does not require exhaustion of every conceivable raceneutral alternative. Nor does it require a university to choose between maintaining a reputation for excellence and fulfilling a commitment to provide educational opportunities to members of all racial groups." n32 The Court rejected the Bush Administration's argument that the law school's desire to achieve a "critical mass" of minority students was "a disguised quota." n33 Thus, [*1514] the Court concluded that the law school program is constitutional. n34 Voting with Justice O'Connor were Justices Ginsburg, Souter, Breyer, and Stevens. n35 Dissenting were Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Thomas, Kennedy, and Scalia. n36 However, in the undergraduate case, the Court decided six to three, in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, that the undergraduate system was not sufficiently narrowly tailored. n37 The Court objected to the point system, which, on a scale of between one to 150 points, gave twenty points to an applicant if he or she was a member of an underrepresented race - specifically African American, Hispanic, or Native American - and automatically admitted anyone with 100 or more points. n38 The problem with the point system, in the view of the six in the majority, was that it was not narrowly tailored - it was too formulaic and failed to make the individualized assessments the law school made. n39 The six in the majority were Chief Justice [*1515] Rehnquist, Justices Kennedy, Scalia, Thomas, O'Connor, and Breyer. n40 Dissenting were Justices Ginsburg, Souter, and Stevens. n41 In light of this result, the University has revised its undergraduate program to make it a more individualized assessment - not an easy task given that it receives more than 25,000 applications for 5,000 spots. n42 244 EQUALITY PREVENTS REIGHTING HISTORICAL WRONGS 1. EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY IS IMPOSSIBLE BECAUSE OF HISTORICAL INJUSTICES AND MUST BE CORRECTED WHICH VIOLATES EQUALITY Hall, David. Professor of Law at Northeastern University School of Law. "Healing the Wounds Of Slavery: Can Present Legal Remedies Cure Past Wrongs?" Boston College Third World Law Journal, Winter, 2004. 24 B.C. Third World L.J. 1. pg. 7-9. The long delay has allowed opponents to characterize the appeal for reparations as a laughing matter or an extreme political position, as opposed to a serious social dilemma and an appropriate legal remedy. The delay even makes liberal and progressive lawyers and legal scholars have doubts about the appropriateness of this approach. n19 Though some accept the fact that racism is still with us, and that slavery was a horrible experience and a stain on America's historical landscape, they still are able to distance themselves from those wrongs because the injustice seems so long ago, and, some believe, so much has already been done to correct the problem. The problem is that so much of what has been done has had very little to do with the underlying wrong and the conditions it created. Most of the laws that were passed in the 1960s and 1970s were aimed at preventing discrimination and segregation from continuing and providing individual relief when it did happen. n20 But very little, if anything, has been done to correct the original harm or to compensate people of African descent for the original injury. This society has clothed itself in a blanket of equality and social justice rhetoric, yet when one peels away the layers one finds underneath a system of inequality that has created distinct and different societies within the midst of one nation. n21 So many of the problems that vast numbers of African Americans face today are a direct outgrowth of this [*8] history of slavery, segregation, and discrimination. Unless one wants to hold fast to a theory of racial inferiority, n22 there is no other explanation for why infant mortality rates and incarceration levels are all higher for African Americans, and the life expectancy rate is lower. n23 Whatever negative social indicator you choose, African Americans find themselves at the bottom of the list. This is not an accident. Though some have escaped these invisible chains, many have been left behind and are trapped in cycles of crime, poverty, and disillusionment. This is not just a problem for Black people; this is a challenge for the entire nation. In a society where the economic power and well-being of a group determines so much of its social, physical, and educational well-being, there must be economic solutions and remedies. This will never happen through an individualized civil rights approach to justice. We can not level these playing fields with marginal remedies that do not go to the heart of the problem. Certainly money alone will not cure these social injuries, but without a major infusion of economic resources into the social wounds that this society created through laws and customs, we will not only remain a separate nation, but we will never fulfill the true calling of this nation. Many African-American children are attending public educational institutions that are in need of enormous resources and new ideas about learning and achievement. n24 [*9] Progress will not occur through the normal incremental budgeting process at the local or state level. Any viable reparations claims must address these educational, economic, and social issues through whatever judgment is rendered or legislation enacted. Therefore, funds and resources must be targeted toward African Americans who have failed to succeed economically. The most compelling claim for reparations, centuries after the initial violation occurred, is made by those who are still locked out of this country's dream despite years of legislative initiatives. Reparation is for children in urban areas who will not be able to leap over poverty, crime, and hopelessness in a single bound. It is for families who, despite their efforts, have been unable to break the chain of generational poverty and limited dreams. 245 Extreme Utilitarianism Good ACT/EXTREME UTILITARIANISM IS THE MOST RATIONAL MORAL SYSTEM 1. ACT UTILITY MAKES CONSEQUENCES MATTER MOST--MORAL RULES JUST GUIDELINES J. J. C. Smart, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Adelaide, PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY, Volume 6, 1956, p. 344. If by 'actions' we mean particular individual actions we get the sort of doctrine held by Bentham, Sidgwick and Moore. According to this doctrine, we test individual actions by their consequences, and general rules, like 'keep promises,' are mere rules of thumb which we use only to avoid the necessity of estimating the probable consequences of our actions at every step. The rightness or wrongness of keeping a promise on a particular occasion depends only on the goodness or badness of the consequences of keeping that promise on that particular occasion. Of course part of the consequences of breaking the promise, and a part to which the extreme utilitarian will normally ascribe decisive importance, will be the weakening of faith in the institution of promising. However, if the goodness of the consequences of breaking the rule is in toto greater than the goodness of the consequences of keeping it, then we must break the rule, irrespective of whether the goodness of the consequences of everybody's obeying the rule is or is not greater than the consequences of everybody's breaking it. To put it shortly, rules do not matter, save per accidens as rules of thumb and as de facto social institutions with which the utilitarian has to reckon when estimating social consequences. I shall call this doctrine 'extreme utilitarianism.' 2. ACT UTILITY APPEALS TO BEST HUMAN FEELINGS: RATIONALITY AND BENEVOLENCE J. J. C. Smart, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Adelaide, PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY, Volume 6, 1956, p. 353. Moral rules, on the extreme utilitarian view, are rules of thumb only, but they are not bad rules of thumb. But if we do come to the conclusion that we should break the rule and if we have weighed in the balance our own fallibility and liability to personal bias, what good reason remains for keeping the rule? I can understand 'it is optimific ' as a reason for action, but why should 'it is a member of a class of actions which are usually optimific' or 'it is a member of a class of actions which as a class are more optimific than any alternative general class' be a good reason? You might as well say a person ought to be picked to play for Australia just because all his brothers have been, or that the Australian team should be composed entirely of the Harvey family because this would be better than composing it entirely of any other family. The extreme utilitarian does not appeal to artificial feelings, but only to our feelings of benevolence, and what better feelings can there be to appeal to? 5. SPREADING ACT UTILITY HELPS SOLVE DANGERS TO HUMANITY J. J. C. Smart, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Adelaide, PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY, Volume 6, 1956, p. 348. Sidgwick seems to think it quite probable that an extreme utilitarian should not propagate his doctrine too widely. However, the great danger to humanity comes nowadays on the plane of public morality--not private morality. There is a greater danger to humanity from the hydrogen bomb than from an increase in the divorce rate, regrettable though that might be, and there seems no doubt that extreme utilitarianism makes for good sense in international relations. When France walked out of the United Nations because she did not wish Morocco discussed, she said that she was within her rights because Morocco and Algiers are part of her metropolitan territory and have nothing to do with the UN. The was clearly a legalistic if not superstitious argument. We should not be concerned with the so-called 'rights' of France or any other country but whether the cause of humanity would best be served by discussing Morocco in [the] UN. (I am not saying that the answer to this is 'yes.' There are good grounds for supposing that more harm than good would come by such a discussion). I myself have no hesitation in saying that on extreme utilitarian principles we ought to propagate extreme utilitarianism as widely as possible. 246 ACT/EXTREME UTILITY SUPERIOR TO RULE/RESTRICTED UTILITARIANISM 1. RULES ARE NOT RATIONAL REASONS FOR BEHAVIOR J. J. C. Smart, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Adelaide, PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY, Volume 6, 1956, p. 352. I now pass on to a type of case which may be thought to be the trump card of restricted utilitarianism. Consider the rule of the road. It may be said that since all that matters is that everyone should do the same it is indifferent which rule we have, 'go on the left hand side' or 'go on the right hand side'. Hence the only reason for going on the left hand side in British countries is that this is the rule. Here the rule does seem to be a reason, in itself, for acting in a certain way. I wish to argue against this. The rule in itself is not a reason for our actions. We would be perfectly justified in going on the right hand side if (a) we knew that the rule was to go on the left hand side, and (b) we were in a country peopled by superanarchists who always on principle did the opposite of what they were told. This shows us that the rule does not give us a reason for acting so much as an indication of the probable actions of others, which helps us to find out what would be our own most rational course of action. If we are in a country not peopled by anarchists, but non-anarchist extreme Utilitarians, we expect, other things being equal, that they will keep rules laid down for them. Knowledge of this rule enables us to predict their behavior and to harmonize our own actions with theirs. The rule 'keep to the left hand side', then, is not a logical reason for action but an anthropological datum for planning actions. 2. ACT UTILITY IS A MORE RATIONAL MORALITY THAN RULE UTILITY J. J. C. Smart, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Adelaide, PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY, Volume 6, 1956, p. 353. The restricted utilitarian might say that he is talking about morality, not of such things as the rules of the road. I am not sure how far this objection, if valid, would affect my argument, but in any case I would reply that as a philosopher I conceive of ethics as the study of how it would be most rational to act. If my opponent wishes to restrict the word 'morality' to a narrower use he can have the word. The fundamental question is the question of rational action in general. Similarly, if the restricted utilitarian were to appeal to ordinary usage and say 'it might be most rational to leave Hitler to drown but it would surely not be wrong to rescue him', I should again let him have the words 'right' and 'wrong' and should stick to 'rational' and irrational'. 3. RULE UTILITY IS NOT A RATIONAL WAY TO THINK MORALLY J. J. C. Smart, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Adelaide, PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY, Volume 6, 1956, p. 348. The restricted utilitarian regards moral rules as more than rules of thumb for short-circuiting calculations of consequences. Generally, he argues, consequences are not relevant at all when we are deciding what to do in a particular case. In general, they are relevant only to deciding what rules are good reasons for acting in a certain way in particular cases. This doctrine is possibly a good account of how the modern unreflective twentieth century Englishman often thinks about morality, but surely it is a monstrous account of how it is the most rational way to think about morality. 247 Extreme Utilitarianism Bad ACT UTILITARIANISM IS AN INSUFFICIENT MORAL SYSTEM 1. ACT UTILITARIANISM STOPS HUMAN COOPERATION AND AGREEMENTS Donald Regan, Professor of Law and Philosophy at the University of Michigan, UTILITARIANISM AND COOPERATION, 1980, p. 32. This is a problem in the real world, and not merely in our example. AU [act utilitarianism] is almost certainly indeterminate in most of the standard cases involving interaction effects from grass-walking to voting, and it can hardly be suggested that the act-utilitarian solution to all these problems is for everyone concerned to get together and make an agreement. Not only is there often no opportunity to make an agreement, but in some cases where there is the possibility of making an agreement, it will not be worth the trouble to make one. If the potential gains from co-ordination are not great, it is quite possible that on balance AU [ACT UTILTARIANISM] would forbid one to go to the trouble of creating an explicit agreement about how to behave, even where the opportunity for making such an agreement was at hand. 2. ACT UTILITY LEADS TO UNTRUE CONCLUSIONS ABOUT MORALITY Kurt Baier, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Pittsburgh, THE MORAL POINT OF VIEW: A RATIONAL BASIS OF ETHICS, 1958, p. 203-4. Deontologists and utilitarians alike make the mistake of thinking that it is one, or the only one, of our moral duties to "do the optimistic act". We do not have a duty to do good to others or to ourselves, or to others and/or to ourselves in a judicious mixture such that it produces the greatest possible amount of good in the world. We are morally required to do good only to those who are in actual need of our assistance. The view that we always ought to do the optimistic act, or whenever we have no more stringent duty to perform, would have the absurd result that we are doing wrong whenever we are relaxing, since on those occasions there will always be opportunities to produce greater good than we can by relaxing. For the relief of suffering is always a greater good than mere enjoyment. Yet it is quite plain that the worker who, after a tiring day, puts on his slippers and listens to the wireless is not doing anything he ought not to, is not neglecting any of his duties, even though it might be perfectly true that there are things he might do which produce more good in the world, even for himself, than merely relaxing by the fireside. 3. ONE CANNOT BE MORAL AND TREAT MORAL RULES AS MERE RULES OF THUMB Kurt Baier, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Pittsburgh, THE MORAL POINT OF VIEW: A RATIONAL BASIS OF ETHICS, 1958, p. 206-7. The formal condition is this: a man cannot be said to have adopted the moral point of view unless he is prepared to treat the moral rules as principles rather than mere rules of thumb, that is, to do things on principle rather than merely to act purposively, merely to aim at a certain end. And, furthermore, he must act on rules which are meant for everybody, and not merely for himself or some favored group. The material condition is this: the rules must be for the good of everyone alike. 4. IF ACT UTILITY EVER SUCCEEDS, IT DEPENDS ON HAPPY ACCIDENTS FOR SUCCESS Donald Regan, Professor of Law and Philosophy at the University of Michigan, UTILITARIANISM AND COOPERATION, 1980, p. 30-1. The defender of AU [act utilitarianism] may ask why the need for this assumption is supposed to trouble him. After all, if we look around we will see that agreements are generally kept. What can be the harm in making an empirical assumption that is patently true? To answer this question, we must remember the nature of our project. We are not primarily interested in whether AU gives the right directions in actual cases involving agreements. We are interested in whether AU is an adequate consequentialist theory. If agreements are useful, as the defender of AU concedes, then an adequate consequentialist theory ought not only to permit the existence of a practice of agreementkeeping, it ought to ensure it. It ought not to depend for its success on a pattern of behaviour which it must regard in effect as a happy accident. 248 RULE/RESTRICTED UTILITARIANISM BEST TO ENSURE MORALITY 1. ACTIONS MUST BE TESTED BY MORAL RULES, AND RULES BY CONSEQUENCES J. J. C. Smart, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Adelaide, PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY, Volume 6, 1956, p. 344-5. A more modest form of utilitarianism has recently become fashionable. The doctrine is to be found in Toulmin's book THE PLACE OF REASON IN ETHICS, in Nowell-Smith's ETHICS (though I think Nowell-Smith has qualms), in John Austin's LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE, and even in J. S. Mill, if Urmson's interpretation of him is correct. Part of its charm is that it appears to resolve the dispute in moral philosophy between institutionalists and utilitarians in a way which is very neat. the above philosophers hold, or seem to hold, that moral rules are more than rules of thumb. In general the rightness of an action is not to be tested by evaluating its consequences but only by considering whether or not it falls under a certain rule. Whether the rule is to be considered an acceptable moral rule, is, however, to be decided by considering the consequences of adopting the rule. Broadly, then, actions are to be tested by rules and rules by consequences. The only cases in which we must test an individual action directly by its consequences are (a) when the action comes under two different rules, one of which enjoins it and one of which forbids it, and (b) when there is no rule whatsoever which governs the given case. I shall call this doctrine "restricted utilitarianism." 2. RULES ADVANCE THE COMMON GOOD Kurt Baier, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Pittsburgh, THE MORAL POINT OF VIEW: A RATIONAL BASIS OF ETHICS, 1958, p. 201. There is one obvious way in which a rule[s] may be for the good of everyone alike, namely, if it furthers the common good. When I am promoted and my salary is raised, this is to my advantage. It will also be to the advantage of my wife and my family and possibly of a few other people--it will not be to the advantage of my colleague who hoped for promotion but now is excluded. It may even be to his detriment if his reputation suffers as a result. If the coal miners obtain an increase in their wages, then this is to the advantage of the coal miners. It is for their common good. But it may not be to the advantage of everyone else. On the other hand, if production is raised and with it everyone's living standard, that is literally to everyone's advantage. The rule 'Work harder,' if it has these consequences, is literally for the common good of all. 3. IF RULES MEET THE COMMON GOOD CRITERION, EVERYONE SHOULD ABIDE BY THEM Kurt Baier, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Pittsburgh, THE MORAL POINT OF VIEW: A RATIONAL BASIS OF ETHICS, 1958, p. 201-2. Very few rules, if any, will be for the common good of everyone. But a rule may be in the interest of everyone alike, even though the results of the observation of the rule are not for the common good in the sense explained. Rules such as 'Thou shalt not kill,' 'Thou shalt not be cruel,' 'Thou shalt not lie,' are obviously, in some sense, for the good of everyone alike. What is this sense? It becomes clear if we look at these rules from the moral point of view, that is, an independent, impartial, objective, dispassionate, disinterested observer. Taking such a God's-eye point of view, we can see that it is in the interest of everyone alike that everyone should abide by the rule 'Thou shalt not kill.' From the moral point of view, it is clear that it is in the interest of everyone alike if everyone alike should be allowed to pursue his own interest provided this does not adversely affect someone else's interests. Killing someone in the pursuit of my interests would interfere with his. 249 FAUX TEXT, FAUX COMMITMENT: ARGUING AGAINST THE SOCIAL CONTRACT INTRODUCTION Question: What do Newt Gingritch and Che Guevarra have in common? Answer: They both espouse a kind of social contract theory. Newt, of course, authored the infamous (and largely unfulfilled) “Contract with America,” capitalizing on the belief that an agreement between the government and the governed is binding and desirable. Che, in “Socialism and Man in Cuba,” explains that the people have been given a certain set of guarantees by the leaders; if the “masses” make their will known, the leaders must reflect that will, just as each citizen reflects the will by going to work every morning. Beyond that, little can be said of social contract theory that has not been said before. In this section we will concentrate more on how to answer it. TYPES OF CONTRACTS Depending on whether you are Locke, Hobbes, or Rousseau, the world that inspires your social contract might differ greatly: “The Hobbesian, the Lockean, and the Rousseauist concepts of political rule and of the law represent three main traditions in modem legal and political reasoning. The first such tradition, the law as a sovereign command, is closely associated with the asocial, self-preserving, strategic actors who fight amongst themselves for scarce resources and must be protected from each other by the authoritative will of the sovereign. In the second tradition, the law as a reasonable mediator between competing utility-maximizers, the law forms the noncompetitive basis for their competition. In other words, the law delineates the realm in which they must cooperate in order to be unburdened from the pressure to communicate and to cooperate in other-areas. Finally, the third tradition is the law as the expression of a collective identity from which the individuals derive their legal status in the political community, or, in other words, a concept of law where the formation of a political-legal community by lawmaking is the most distinguished realization of individual freedom” (Ulrich K. Preu, Professor, ZERP Universitatsallee, Bremen, Germany, Cardozo Law Review, March, 1996, p. 1179). HOBBES: LAW AS SOVEREIGN COMMAND Thomas Hobbes’ world, as everyone knows by now, is a frightening one, where humanity has been doomed to choose between the anarchistic brutality of the state of nature and the quite ordered brutality of an all-powerful government. In this world, the social contract is an absolute necessity, a prerequisite for any kind of civilization, period. To be sure, the “state of nature” is a bleak view of human and environmental nature in general. Where does Hobbes get the data to confirm that, left to our own devices, we will do whatever we have to do to advance our personal advantage? He sounds like Nietzsche. But Nietzsche didn’t have an answer either to the question: “Why are we like this? In what instances?” In fact, Hobbes was greatly displeased by the uprisings of his time. At its best, a Hobbesian philosophy can indeed justify authoritarianism, and dejustify any kind of civil disobedience. This is because Hobbes has two cards up his sleeve: Not only does he have the standard contractarian compulsion to follow the law because one had supposedly consented to it, but he also offers a scary alternative, a world with no laws at all, where humans are worse than coyotes. 250 This ever-present threat not only made Hobbesian contractarianism emotively appealing, but also revealed individualist implications to answer the concerns of civil libertarians: “In Hobbes’s concept, political power consisted of a Sovereign’s capacity to keep peace, i.e., to maintain an order in which the individual’s right to self-preservation is safeguarded. Under such a system the law is the will and the command of the sovereign. This is the most radical notion of political power and of the law, since it derives all political and legal obligations from the individual’s right to self-preservation, i.e., from the individual’s radically subjective worldview.”(Preu, 1179). LOCKE: LAW AS REASONABLE MEDIATOR In contrast to Hobbes, Locke was the optimist of the group. John Locke is seen today as a founder of democratic, elitist, market-driven government. The light view of life which produces such ideologies has to do with a fundamental cornerstone of the “Liberal” imagination: That humans are fundamentally rational and that their decisions are sound, when subject to the rigors of criticism and tempered by the rule of law. This abandonment of ruthlessness, rationally chosen, is the essence of human reason and spirit: “To Locke, the law is an institutional device that connects the different perspectives of individuals by harmonizing the natural rights that they equally enjoy. The law is an embryonic form of a common understanding in that it effectuates a negative coordination among the individuals. To do that, it presupposes the idea that self-preservation and interest maximization can only be achieved if there is a sphere where individuals can trust each other, i.e., where they do not act sirategically, and where the concern for the natural rights of others constitutes a kind of new moral consociation” (Preu, 1179). Locke, then, saw the social contract as the result of free individuals seeing that their individual rights would be better protected through a tacit agreement that those rights ought to be protected against any excessive force, including the government. “But Locke’s individuals are able to engage in social relations, to trust each other, and to feel mutual sympathy. They are able to engage in social life even in the state of nature. As a consequence, Locke’s concepts of government and law reflect both the individualistic and the social dimensions of the individual’s state of nature. The competence and authority of the government are clearly reduced to the protection of the individual’s rights that precede any kind of political rule; consequently, the law can never touch upon this sphere of the individual’s natural rights. But, in contrast to Hobbes, the law is not reduced to the role of an institutional representation of every individuals quasi monadic right to self-preservation” (Preu, 1179-80). Locke was also unique in explicitly approving of revolution as a means of tearing down a comipted contract and constructing a new one. Though such an allowance would have frightened, say, Thomas Hobbes, Locke was probably unconcerned about revolutions because they would be made by the same rational people who constructed the original contract. ROUSSEAU: LAW AS COLLECTIVE IDENTITY Rousseau’s view of humanity, if not as violent as Hobbes, was much more depressing. According to JeanJacques Rousseau, at one time we were like the creatures of which John Locke speaks: rational, cooperative, innocent and trusting, creative and free. But then, someone discovered private property, and everything was ruined. With a motive (wealth, the collection of surplus property, money, resources) to behave like Hobbes’ ruthless people, most of us now do so. Enter the compensatory social contract. Rousseau allowed himself enough optimism to concede that, in a competitive world, we might somehow find consensus through a contract. “in a further twist, Rousseau developed the truly revolutionary idea that it is not the moral quality of natural rights that ultimately justifies and defines the limits of the government and the laws, but, conversely, that it is the 251 individual’s participation in the formation of the general will through which individuals impose on themselves the rules under which they are willing to live. This general will constitutes the moral quality of the individuals as members of a political community and, moreover, determines the character of their rights. In Rousseau’s Social Contract, the individuals do not exchange their natural freedom for the security of civil society; rather, they substitute civil freedom for natural freedom” (Preu, 1180). Thus, although natural freedom once existed, now that it no longer exists, civil freedom is all we have. What Rousseau sees as especially important is the general will, the result of a consensus which may be difficult to reach but is absolutely necessary to compensate for the injustices some social groups, classes, commit against others. The result is civil freedom: “Neither the sovereign power nor the law is understood as restraints or limits to the enjoyment of the natural rights of individuals; instead, they are understood as conditions that enable the individuals to acquire freedom in the first place.In other words, it is the engagement of the individuals in the formation of a common will and of a common world view that enables them to develop themselves into moral persons and to acquire true individual freedom” (Preu, 1180). ANSWERS TO THE SOCIAL CONTRACT Critical legal scholar Vine Deloria, Jr., Professor of Political Science at The University of Arizona, sees the original social contract as an ideology designed to make us believe that the things we want are ours to take. He explains, in a lengthy and well-crafted narrative, that the things we want differ greatly; that there are many possible social contracts besides the European ones we now deem essential: “Let us return to the aboriginal Garden of Eden, an ordinary meadow perhaps, and parade a number of persons through it, observing how they appropriate natureand what use they make of it. The first character is an Indian who sees the animals and plants exemplifying the cycle of life. He notes that the land is fruitful and can provide sustenance forever if it is not disturbed. So he makes his home there, careful not to disrupt nature’s balance. He has appropriated the meadow and made it his property. A farmer looks at the same meadow and sees dozens of little family farms, a church and small town with a square and stately courthouse. He marks off part of the land and begins building his farm, fencing in that portion of the meadow which he can best use and encouraging his fellows to do likewise. In no time there is a small, rural, Norman Rockwellian American village where once there was only a fruitful natural meadow. He has also created property. A land developer discovers the meadow. He sees a large city with tall buildings, good transportation facilities, and cultural and business centers with a plush financial district. When he begins to fulfill this vision, surveying blocks and encouraging large industries to settle there, he has made his appropriation. Caspar Weinberger and his Pentagon cronies drive by the meadow. They are impressed by its isolation. No one knows that the meadow exists, making it a perfect spot for an MX missile complex. They return to Congress, obtain funds to purchase the meadow, and build a massive intercontinental missile base. They have also, unfortunately, appropriated nature and created property. The meadow, or nature, cannot itself change. Each person sees the meadow in unique ways because they are different individuals with radically different views of the world. They consequently create different kinds of property which have value in different social contexts. But each value can be used as the basis of a social contract. All uses have value only within a particular social context. No particular use is better than any other because each use hasan essential relationship to a human society and is acceptable to that society. Locke, Montesquieu, Hobbes, and our constitutional fathers failed to credit human genius for the role it plays in the creation of property. The real property of the social contract is the genius of human personality, the creative realm of possibilities existing in the minds of individuals, not the product of their labors.” (GEORGIA LAW REVIEW, Summer, 1986, p. 951) 252 The social contract is one of those “meat and potatoes” philosophies which seem to make perfect sense for the first five minutes you think about it. Most judges in debate rounds don’t want to think for more than five minutes, so the social contract offers a clear-cut, decent sounding way to amve at whatever value consensus the advocate wants. Hobbes is invoked when civil liberties need to be curtailed in response to terrorism. Rawis’ original position, a “personalized” social contract, simply allows the debater to ask the judge(s) to pick the kind of society they want to live in, and then proceed to make the advocate’s society sound better. At this point, those answering the social contract have a number of choices which may depend on the perceived predispositions of the critics. These approaches all answer the social contract effectively, and for divergent reasons: 1. The political approaches, or radical approaches, consist of those positions which question the attitudes and assumptions of the authors and advocates of the social contract: Feminists, for one, argue that the social contract can only govern public actions, which makes little difference for women who experience most of their oppression in the private realm. If, as one author has argued, we need a “sexual contract” (see bibliography), then this would refute the solvency of any public contract-oriented system. It also seems to defeat the underlying assumption that it is possible (even in a world of male domination) to arrive at freedom and liberty through consensus. Marxists, for another, argue that the social contract is a myth. Of course, contractarians would readily admit this, but the kind of myth Marxists have in mind is an ideological ploy to make capitalist property relations seem the result of evelyone’s consensus, a completely ridiculous notion. Anarchists give the most compelling case against the social contract: We never made it, we never came together. Those that did come together only brought their oppressive property relations together and messed up the world, a fact which Rousseau himself admits in his Second Discourse, and for which his social contract can be seen as a resigned solution to an already corrupted world. Anarchists might favor small-scale contracts for small communities, and would certainly want continuing participation in society. But, as many authors argue, America is no longer a nation of participation and consensus. These arguments are all great to advocate in front of college debaters and coaches, philosophy professors and armchair radicals, and the rare genuine activist showing up on a Saturday to make sixty bucks for the revolution. But many of us know that value debate critics are in many cases not radical at all. But what makes these arguments interesting is that they can be advocated without “sounding” radical at all; that is, their premises can serve as powerful analytical criticisms, which we shall now explore. 2. The analytical, decidedly non-political, “win the argument in front of any judge” approach consists of making the best possible observations about those things which the social contract cannot justify or solve, about certain incoherencies and leaps in reasoning made by contractarians. Of course, all arguments are in some way “political,” especially when debating about political philosophy, and it will be admitted that many of these arguments are, analytically speaking, individualisms; each takes particular care to note that, from the perspective of the single individual, some aspect of contract theory is uncompelling, fails to prove itself to its subjects. But this ideological taint is justified. After all, it is the social contract advocates themselves who want, from the subjects of a state, complete compliance with laws; not just compliance in action, but even compliance in spirit: We signed a contract. We must abide by it. THERE WAS NO CONSENT 253 In fact, the very first “analytical” argument against social contract theory is that we didn’t sign a social contract. None of us did. It never happened. Again, this is admitted to by the contractarians, but they still reason from that myth to the assumption that by virtue of our membership, we abide by that invisible charter. Here a reductio ad absurdum is especially helpful in demonstrating the social contract’s incoherence. 1. Assume that consent is necessary for legitimate government (the basis of the social contract). 2. If this is true, then consent is always necessary for legitimate government. It makes no sense to say that consent is only important at the initial formation of the government; its continued existence requires at least periodic justification. 3. This means that we must vote on whether this form of government, along with all its laws and procedures, is legitimate. We probably ought to do this periodically, say, every four years. 4. Now assume that at some point a majority votes that they no longer wish to give their consent to this form of government and its vast expanse of law. 5. Therefore, the consent principle would allow us to decide not to consent, making probable the very state of nature the socinl contract was designed to answer. Since this consent can, so clearly, not be proven coherently, contractarians have other tricks. They might argue, for example, as did Socrates, that one’s residence within a community makes one subject to its laws. Or, they might point out that the benefits we willingly receive from the government are signs of our tacit acceptance. Both arguments are answered below. RESIDENCE DOES NOT IMPLY CONSENT If residence did imply consent, then Blacks would have consented to slavery, since they clearly resided in the communities in which they were slaves! Beyond that, the lack of a positive reason why residence implies consent seems to undermine the contractarian appeal to loyalty to one’s “homeland.” The controversy surrounding many Blacks’ refusal to serve in Vietnam is an excellent example of this objection. 1. Part of one’s consent to be governed includes the consent to be conscripted to military service, in order to defend the society that is the basis of the contract. 2. However, American Blacks called to serve in Vietnam would not, even in the schema of the social contract, have had a say in the development of a system which brought their ancestors here to serve against their will. 3. Thus, that part of the social contract cannot be universal. Although some kind of exemption clause might take care of such a problem, Vine Deloria’s argument, detailed below, on the impossibility of minority rights under a social contract, suggests that the exemptions might weigh the contract down considerably. REAPING BENEFITS DOES NOT IMPLY CONSENT This is more a logical than an ethical argument. It simply says that voluntarily reaping benefits does not, by itself, imply that one has agreed to adhere to a society’s rules. Society might provide a great deal of benefits to people, and those motives may range from purely charitable to politically expedient or even cynical, but none of this by itself justifies consent to law. For such consent to occur, it would be necessaiy for each benefit to be conditional upon such consent. In a way, this happens today. Students in college swear they won’t use drugs while receiving financial aid. Welfare recipients 254 might lose their aid if they are found guilty of a felony offense. But in each of these cases, it seems that something besides the reaping of the benefits determines the need to obey the law. The social contract might be a vague, added moral compulsion for such submission, but it cannot be the primary reason for it. THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF MINORITY RIGHTS “Whenever American racial minorities have raised a voice of protest against the conditions under which they have been forced to live, they have been admonished to work within the system rather than seek its abolition. Purveyors of this good counsel point to the many institutional checks and balances that have been devised to protect the rights of the minority: the division of sovereignty between the national government and the states, the tripartite anangement of the federal government itself which inhibits any one of the three branches from dominating the affairs of government, and the provisions for frequent popular elections and limited terms of office; all of which are further modified by our American propensity to seek a social consensus by offering disputing parties a reasonable compromise on any major issue. These provisions, minorities have been told, are sufficient to prevent the miscarriage of justice in almost every instance. These institutional and procedural devices, however, are designed as much to protect a lethargic majority against zealous minorities as they are to afford minorities a shield against the oppressions of the majority. Moreover, the minority that is protected is a political minority a fictional entity consisting of people who temporarily share a political opinion on a specific issue. No individual is a permanent member of a political minority except by his own choosing; and even this minority is not always protected in instances of national hysteria. We should not confuse a political minority with other non-political minorities in our society. Non-political minorities are permanent minorities which have always been outside the social contract and the protection of the Constitution: the racial and ethnic groups, the isolated cultural enclaves that diverge radically from the majority culture, small religious communities, and the largest group of all, women.” (Vine Deloria, Jr., GEORGIA LAW REVIEW, Summer, 1986, p. 917). -- To put the matter logically: 1. A “binding” social contract assumes that a consensus exists between individuals as to the legitimacy of the social order. 2. There exists no concrete consensus among various groups within society about the legitimacy of the present social order. 3. Therefore, the social contract is not binding. This is especially true in the cases of certain minorities who have been thoroughly and violently assimilated into society. The idea that Black Americans have shaped the ideals and laws of American society from the very beginning of their participation is patently absurd, and even now it is impossible to say what that particular group may have done differently in the original inception of social order. The idea that Native Americans are even part of white society is violent by its very nature. Politics aside, Deloria points out that minorities don’t even have a say in their own political status, which would surely suggest that they had not and could not consent: Individuals have no choice concerning membership us racial, ethnic and gender groups; their physical characteristics alone permanently classify them as part of the group. Individuals in religious and cultural groups, on the other hand, derive most of their values and certainly their personal identities from distinctive beliefs and practices. Surrendering this unique understanding of life is akin to spiritual and psychological obliteration because no power on earth, particularly a secular government, is considered equal in importance to the central core of beliefs that distinguishes these people from the rest of society. Non-political minorities have no significant constitutional protection, nor have they ever. Insofar as they enjoy constitutional rights and protections, their status is the result of an intense and continuing struggle for equal treatment in the courts and legislatures of the land. Their task has been to force open the definitions that describe the American social contract and extend its applicability beyond the narrow scope originally envisioned by the constitutional fathers. Thus Chief Justice Roger Taney might well have been describing 255 all of the non-political minorities when, in discussing the status of Blacks in Dred Scott v. Sandford, he noted: ‘[Tihey are not included, and were not intended to be included, under the word “citizens” in the Constitution, and can therefore claim none of the rights and privileges which that instrument provides for and secures to citizens of the United States. On the contrary, they were at that time considered as a subordinate and inferior class of beings, who had been subjugated by the dominant race, and, whether emancipated or not, yet remained subject to their authority, and had no rights or privileges but such as those who held the power and the Government might choose to grant them”’ (Deloria, 917). The problem is that any society which purports to be formed through consensus is in fact composed of what Rawls refers to in Political Liberalism as “overlapping consensus,” the perspectives of many different and, in some cases, unique and oppressed, groups. Unless the social contract can account for how there appears to be a consensus which doesn’t reflect minority opinion, it seems doomed in today’s nationalistic age. Groups which have been marginalized from public discussion and value discourse have little interest in a theory which says a group of people got together long ago and agreed that this would be best. Ultimately, the tension between identity as minority and identity as citizen is irreconcilable from a contractanan persective: “When the cases dealing with non-political minorities are compared, a common theme emerges. A minority may find its progress blocked because it is compared with another minority not recognized as having civil rights or legal status. The fact that women could be citizens without political rights, for example, made it easy for the Supreme Court to deny Dred Scott his freedom by observing that American society already had citizens with no legal standing who could exercise no rights. The exclusion of Blacks from schools becomes an excuse to prohibit other races from enjoying a public education. Try as they might, minorities cannot get a clear definition of “person’ or citizen’ from the courts. The result is that two different definitions of person emerge” (Deloria, 940). CONCLUSION Good idea, impossible to execute. This phrase has been thrown at many “utopian” philosophies. It may also apply to the social contract. In fact, the social contract may itself be infinitely more utopian than, say, Marxism. At least Marxism attempts to explain the economy, to justify why one set of laws is bad and the other desirable. Social contractarians invent the ultimate lie, admit that it’s a lie, and spend most of their time trying to show why it’s a good lie nonetheless. 256 BIBLIOGRAPHY Barker, Ernest. SOCIAL CONTRACT: ESSAYS BY LOCKE, HUME AND ROUSSEAU (New York: Oxford University Press, 1962). Lessnoff, Michael H. SOCIAL CONTRACT (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillan, 1986). SOCIAL CONTRACT THEORY (New York: New York University Press, 1990). THE SOCIAL CONTRACT FROM HOBBES TO RAWLS (London; New York: Routledge, 1994). Skyrms, Brian. EVOLUTION OF THE SOCIAL CONTRACT (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996). Hampton, Jean. HOBBES AND THE SOCIAL CONTRACT TRADITION (New York : Cambridge University Press, 1986). Solomon, Robert C. A PASSION FOR JUSTICE: EMOTIONS AND THE ORIGINS OF THE SOCIAL CONTRACT(Reading, Mass. : Addison-Wesley, 1990). Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. DISCOURSE ON POLITICAL ECONOMY AND THE SOCIAL CONTRACT/translated with introduction and notes by Christopher Betts (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 1994). ________________ POLITICAL WRiTINGS (New York, Wiley, 1962). Buchanan, James M. THE ECONOMICS AND THE ETHICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER (Ann Arbor University of Michigan Press, 1991). Pinkard, Teny P. DEMOCRATIC LIBERALISM AND SOCIAL UNION (Philadelphia : Temple University Press, 1987). Loewy, Erich H. FREEDOM AND COMMUNITY: THE ETHICS OF INTERDEPENDENCE (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993). Binmore, K. G. GAME THEORY AND THE SOCIAL CONTRACT (Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press, 1994). Dodge, Guy Howard. JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU: AUTHORITARIAN LIBERTARIAN? (Lexington, Mass.: Heath, 1971). Kraus, Jody S. THE LIMITS OF HOBBESIAN CONTRACTARIANISM (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993). Davey, Joseph Dillon. THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT: AMERICA’S JOURNEY FROM WELFARE STATE TO POLICE STATE (Westport, Conn. : Praeger, 1995). Brennan, H. Geoffrey. THE REASON OF RULES: CONSITUTIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985). 257 SOCIAL CONTRACT THEORY IS GENERALLY FLAWED 1. THE SOCIAL CONTRACT IS LOGICALLY CIRCULAR Edward A. Harris, Legal Scholar, COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW, April, 1992, P. 657. This requirement, that the individual understand the moral implications of his acts of voluntary consent, even while he is in the state of nature, has led to the stock objection that the social contract is ultimately circular in nature: If agreements cannot be made in the “natural” state of man before society has been organized by a social contract, it is impossible for a social contract to be made; if the idea of moral obligation depends on the conventions of law, men in the “natural” state will have no conception of obliging themselves by a contract. 2. IF ThE SOCIAL CONTRACT WERE TRUE, IT WOULD NOT BE MORAL Edward A. Harris, Legal Scholar, COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW, April, 1992, p. 670. Even if there were an original social contract, whereby individuals gave express consent to the creation of sovereign authority, such express consent would have no bearing on the contemporary issues of the legitimacy of political authority and the existence of political obligations of persons who were not parties to the original compact. But those cases of express consent that do occur today, for example in the naturalization process and taking an oath of office, are so limited that an express social contract between the general citizenry and the state appears to be a practical impossibility. 3. THE SOCIAL CONTRACT CANNOT SOLVE CONFLICTING INTERESTS Michel Rosenfeld, Professor of Law, Cardozo School of Law, CARDOZO LAW REVIEW, March, 1996 p. 801. Absent atomistic market competition, and upon rejection of the Smithian conception of the relationship between the pursuit of private self-interest and promotion of the public interest, contract alone cannot serve to bridge the gap between private and public interest. Accordingly, contract loses its ability to produce pure procedural (distributive) justice. 258 SOCIAL CONTRACT THEORY HURTS MINORITY RIGHTS 1. ALL SOCIAL CONTRACTS ARE CULTURALLY BIASED IN SOME WAY Michel Rosenfeld, Professor of Law, Cardozo School of Law, CARDOZO LAW REVIEW, March, 1996 p. 791-2. Justice beyond law cannot achieve complete impartiality toward all strangers in the relevant class of legal subjects. Therefore, it must, at least in part, rely on a vision of the good that has intracommunal roots, thereby favoring members of the relevant intracommunal group over the remaining legal subjects. Thus, even the most basic and fundamental human rights embodied in numerous international covenants have been criticized as being somewhat parochial or culturally biased. 2. SOCIAL CONTRACTS ARE AN EXCUSE TO BLOCK MINORITY PROGRESS Vine Deloria, Jr., Professor of Political Science, The University of Arizona, GEORGIA LAW REVIEW, Summer, 1986, p. 942. Minorities that have been unable to secure amendments to clarify their rights have remained on the periphery of the social contract both in their persons and in their property, achieving a measure of status only when the public perspective has unintentionally included them. It is important to note, however, that women and Blacks were the only groups regarded as property originally, so the amendments that assist them are basically expanding the narrow view of the world held by our constitutional fathers. But the logic of social contract still does not allow a natural progression outward to embrace excluded groups. Women are now seeking another constitutional amendment to protect and stabilize the progress they have made in the past century. Again they are being told that existing constitutional law is sufficiently broad to take care of all foreseeable circumstances. 3. THE SOCIAL CONTRACT WAS DESIGNED TO BE EXCLUSIVE Vine Deloria, Jr., Professor of Political Science, The University of Arizona, GEORGIA LAW REVIEW, Summer, 1986, p. 919. I suggest that a hidden conceptual barrier exists that inhibits not only the permanent minorities but members of the majority as well. That barrier is the inadequate development of the philosophical framework that provided the foundation for our American social contract. In the form in which the men who framed the Constitution received it, the philosophy of social contract was oriented wholly toward a certain restricted class of individuals and could neither include any divergent groups nor provide any significant guidance or protection for the mass of people. Its primary virtue was to encourage a clever, established elite to benefit at the expense of others and perpetuate itself. 259 SOCIAL CONTRACT THEORY FAILS WOMEN 1. SOCIAL CONTRACTS FAIL TO ADEQUATELY DEFEND WOMEN~S RIGHTS Linda R. Hirshman, Director, Women’s Legal Studies Institute, Chicago-Kent College of Law, COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW, October 1994, p. 1875. Feminism is not satisfied with that answer. The short version of the exercise of rethinking the social-contract scenario from the distaff side reveals that the view from the bottom of the original position is quite different. It reveals not the happy Lockean picture of the state of nature that Rawis embraces but the darker, Hobbesian place where, as an even earlier writer than Hobbes or Rawis expressed it, “The strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept.” In that world, a place of fear, not of rights, it is not the state alone that is to be feared it is private oppression. And it is not the separation of the players into their individual selves that the weak need it is an opportunity for stable collective action against singularly stronger players. - - 2. CONTRACTS DO NOT ADDRESS THE PRIVATE OPPRESSION OF WOMEN Linda R. Hirshman, Director, Women’s Legal Studies Institute, Chicago-Kent College of Law, COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW, October 1994, p. 1875. In a world of public justice and private anarchy, women fear child sexual abuse, rape, and mugging far more than false convictions by the state of child sexual abuse, rape, and muggings. Women fear the liberty of abortion clinic mobs more than the collective action of regulating health care; they fear private sex discrimination from their bosses more than market failures caused by the enactment of the Civil Rights Act. Women seeking fair equality of opportunity fear the glass ceiling more than they fear the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission, and the tiny number of women academics in the Ivy League, most of whom are untenured, fear their male colleagues’ collective tenure votes more than they value their freedom from false charges of violating the sexual harassment laws. 3. THE SOCIAL CONTRACT CROWDS OUT ALTERNATE NOTIONS OF THE GOOD Michel Rosenfeld, Professor of Law, Cardozo School of Law, CARDOZO LAW REVIEW, March, 1996 p. 801. Upon r0flection, however, the analogy seems to hold to the extent that once the “invisible hand” premise is dropped, all the different conceptions of the good are not likely to fare equally well when subjected to the social contract device. Thus, for instance, communitarian and feminist conceptions of the good are much less compatible with the ideology of contract than are individualistic and atomistic conceptions. 260 SOCIAL CONTRACT THEORY RESULTS IN INEQUALITY 1. SOCIAL CONTRACT THEORY MAKES DISSENT IMPOSSIBLE Edward A. Han-is, Legal Scholar, COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW, April, 1992, p. 678. Unable to deal with the autonomous individual who knowingly and voluntarily acts in any other way than to consent to the authority of the state, social contract theoiy redefines the terms of the principle of consent and the paradigm of contract in such a way that the very possibility for actual dissent is denied. In this way, the dilemma of choosing between individual autonomy and civil authority is resolved, but it is resolved at a cost that renders the entire project untenable. 2. SOCIAL CONTRACTS FAVOR THE PRIVILEGED PROPERTY OWNERS Vine Deloria, Jr., Professor of Political Science, The University of Arizona, GEORGIA LAW REVIEW, Summer, 1986, p. 930. The property that people have in themselves can only operate responsibly within the social contract if property and person are understood simply as the two essential perspectives of the primordial political/social world which bear the same intrinsic relationship to each other as do matter and energy in modem physical science. Without property, a person has no standing; without a person, property has no meaning. If property and person are understood as inseparable functions of each other, when one appears the other must also be present to close the logical universe in which the two ideas make sense. Social contract theory therefore does not depend upon a single definitive concept that has principles of action that illuminate and inform people of the purpose and functions of their political institutions. It never decides whether person or property is the dominant consideration for any human social organization. American constitutional law reflects this confusion and, since we obviously enjoy immense material blessings, we assume that our social contract has the proper philosophical configurations, and few people probe further into the underlying philosophical thicket. 3. SOCIAL CONTRACTS CANNOT SOLVE OPPRESSION Vine Deloria, Jr., Professor of Political Science, The University of Arizona, GEORGIA LAW REVIEW, Summer, 1986, p. 931. The problems of non-political minorities take on added significance when theyare placed within the philosophical framework of the social contract. Although racism, sexism, and ethnocentricity are dominant attitudes which seek to oppress and exclude minorities, they cannot be manifested directly in law and are not nearly as inclusive and effective as is the lack of property which makes the individual person completely defenseless and vulnerable. Indeed, the original American situation is considerably more serious. At the time of the adoption of the Constitution minorities, women and Blacks, were regarded as someone elses property. Women and Blacks had to overcome this idea before they could begin to speak of rights of equality of treatment. In the subsequent course of American history, one minority was stripped of its property and the other minorities who attempted to gain standing within the social contract were prohibited from acquiring property or deprived of their claim to property by federal and state action. 4. SOCIAL CONTRACTS CANNOT RESOLVE RACIAL AND GENDER IMBALANCES Vine Debra, Jr., Professor of Political Science, The University of Arizona, Georgia Law Review, Summer, 1986, p. 922. Self-evident truths are generally limited to the era in history in which they are accepted with minimal critical examination. So the fact that non-political minorities are not included in the concept of “man’ as defined by our organic state documents is not really debatable. But we are not concerned with the changing opinions of the social/political world as any of our generations may experience it, rather with the internal logical consistency of the philosophical system that is thought to justify the social contract form of government, the manner in which the words relate to each other. 261 CONSENT PRINCIPLE OF THE SOCIAL CONTRACT IS FLAWED 1. THE SOCIAL CONTRACr VIOLATES INDIVIDUAL CONSENT Edward A. Harris, Legal Scholar, COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW, April, 1992, p. 658. The principle of consent requires that an individual make an active sign to indicate that she agrees to give up her natural right and liberty, and agrees to be subject to the authority of the state. A sufficient sign of consent must satisfy a variety of volitional, cognitive, and formal criteria. The sign must be freely and willfully made by a rational and informed individual who intends to consent; it must be of the appropriate form to be explicitly recognized as a sign of consent or from which consent may be inferred; and it must be made under appropriately public circumstances and at an appropriate nine. 2. THE SOCIAL CONTRACT CANNOT ACHIEVE EXPRESS CONSENT Edward A. Harris, Legal Scholar, COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW, April, 1992, p. 657. The sign of consent that is identified as being necessary and sufficient to enter into a contractual agreement with the state directly determines the scope of the account of political obligation that social contract theory provides. The problem posed by express consent is that the account of political obligation is severely limited to include only those few persons who actually perform such signs of consent; for example, those who take an oath of citizenship or an oath of office. As a general account of de jure authority and political obligation, the notion of express consent is entirely inadequate. 3. THE SOCIAL CONTRACT IS EITHER ELITIST OR FAILS TO PROVE CONSENT Edward A. Harris, Legal Scholar, COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW, April, 1992, p.659 The social contract theorist, then, is faced with two alternatives: Either she accepts the conclusion that political obligation is limited to those few persons performing acts of express consent, and she is forced to conclude that the power exercised by the state is primarily de facto, or she attempts to identify an act of consent that the vast majority, if not all, of the citizens of the state performs that accounts for the de jure authority of that state and the general political obligation its citizens have to obey that authority. CITIZENSHIP CANNOT BE THE BASIS OF OBEDIENCE TO THE STATE 1. SOCIAL CONTRACT OPPRESSES THOSE WHO CAN’T LEAVE Edward A. Hams, Legal Scholar, COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW, April, 1992, p.661. We may as well assert, that a man, by remainng in a vessel, freely consents to the dominion of the master; though he was carried on board while asleep, and must leap into the occean, and perish, the moment he leaves her.” Hume’s objection points to the fundaniental fallacy of holding that continued residence entails a voluntary choice to remain in that stare. Hume’s analysis is particularly compelling in the case of African-Americans residing in the Southern states during the 1940s and 1950s. The argument of tacit consent from residence would assert that, by their act of continued residence in the South, those African-Americans tacitly consented to the political authority of their states and thereby incurred political obligations to obey the Jim Crow laws their states had enacted. 2. TACIT CONSENT IS A MYTH Edward A. Harris, Legal Scholar, COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW, April, 1992, p. 662. The justifiability of continued residence as a form of tacit consent is seriously undermined by considerations of its alternatives and the criteria of consent. If the alternatives to residing in even a democratic state, which the individual can freely leave, are extremely limited, or impose unreasonable sacrifices upon that individual, then it cannot be said that her continued residence is either voluntary, or a tacit expression of her consent to the authority exercised over her. 262 RECEIPT OF BENEFITS IS NOT AN ADEQUATE BASIS FOR OBEDIENCE 1. RECEIPT OF BENEFITS DOES NOT JUSTIFY THE SOCIAL CONTRACT Edward A. Harris, Legal Scholar, COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW, April, 1992, P. 665. As is the case with residence, to the extent that the benefits a person receives are unwanted or involuntarily imposed upon her, the mere receipt of benefits does not constitute a genuine form of consent and is not sufficient to give rise to either the de jure authority of the state or political obligation. 2. ACCEPTING STATE BENEFITS IS NOT CONSENT Edward A. Harris, Legal Scholar, COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW, April, 1992, p. 657. This difficulty can also be stated in terms of authority: the individual recognizes and accepts the de jure authority of the state to create and enforce laws governing the interstate highway system, while considering the remaining power of the state to be purely de facto, and even illegitimate, in nature. The crucial argument that the social contract theorist must provide here is one establishing the link between voluntarily accepting specific benefits, and thereby creating de jure authority, and the political obligation to obey all laws. 3. ACCEPTANCE OF BENEFITS FAILS THE CONSENT TEST Edward A. Harris, Legal Scholar, COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW, April, 1992, p. 669. That is, the cognitive and volitional criteria of consent must be satisfied by the individual whose tacit consent is being inferred from her acts. The individual must understand the principle of consent and voluntarily perform actions from which one can infer that she tacitly consents to an agreement to which she is a party. The notion of a “general context of consent” is intended to capture this latter idea that not only the individual but also the external observer can evaluate and assess the individual’s public acts and draw inferences from them regarding the nature and scope of her consent. Pace Hobbes, it is not the case that such a context of consent exists in the public sphere to the extent that it gives rise to a tacit social contract. 263 SPECIFIC ANSWERS TO HOBBES 1. HOBBESIAN CONTRACTS ARE ARBITRARY AND FAIL TO RESOLVE CONFLICTS Michel Rosenfeld, Professor of Law, Cardozo School of Law, CARDOZO LAW REVIEW, March, 1996 p. 800. Hobbesian contractarianism satisfies the requirements of primary proceduralism yet remains morally arbitrary; Rawisian contractarianism incorporates the standpoint of Kantian morality, but proves ultimately to belong to the realm of derivative proceduralism. In Hobbesian coniractarianism, the contractual device both shapes and legitimates the contract of association, which marks the passage from the state of nature to civil society. The contractual device, moreover, performs a critical intersubjective task both by mediating between the conflicting wills of individual contractors and yielding a common will, which differs from every individual will involved, yet is nothing but the product of a voluntary compromise among all the contractors. 2. HOBBESIAN CONTRACT DOES NOT CONSIDER THE RIGHTS OF EVERY INDIVIDUAL Michel Rosenfeld, Professor of Law, Cardozo School of Law, CARDOZO LAW REVIEW, March, 1996 p. 801. Finally, in the context of atomistic competition, each contractor presumably has an equal opportunity to influence the shaping of the common will through joint and mutual cont
