Environmental problems demanding co-operation in the Eastern Nile basin
Tis Isat Fall/ Blue Nile Fall by Torleif Svensson
Source: adopted from Yacob, 2007
MSc. Thesis
Development & International Relations
JUNE 2008
Environmental problems demanding co-operation in the Eastern Nile basin
Supervisor:
Jens Muller
Student:
Yibabe Demtse
Development & International Relations
DENMARK
June 2008
Acknowledgements
Before everybody else, I praise God for each and every move I made. Everything has been
succeeded with the help of him.
It is absolutely correct to thank my parents whose prayers and thoughts have been always with
me.
I would like to express my deep whole-hearted gratitude and indebtedness to my advisor Jens
Muller, for his guidance and patience.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TITLE: Environmental problem demanding co-operation in the eastern Nile basin
Chapter one: Introduction………………………………………………………………………………………………………….1
1.1 Background of the problem ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………….4
1.2 Description of the study area …………………………………………………………………………………………………………...7
1.3 Theoretical frame work………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………9
Chapter two: Environmental degradation in highland Ethiopia…………………………………………………14
2.1 The extent of deforestation and soil erosion…………………………………………………………………………………………14
2.1.1 Deforestation ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..14
2.1.2 Soil erosion……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………...16
2.2 The state of the environment in the Ethiopian portion of the Nile basin…………………………………………….19
2.2.1 The Tekeze river basin…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….20
2.2.2 The Abbay river basin……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..20
2.2.3 The Baro-akobo river basin……………………………………………………………………………………………………………21
Chapter three: Slit accumulation and water supply problems in the downstream countries23
3.1 slit accumulation in the downstream countries: its extent……………………………………………………………………23
3.1.1 General explanation………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..23
3.1.2 Slit accumulation in the Roseirs dam in Sudan………………………………………………………………………………..25
3.1.3 Slit accumulation in the Khashim El-Girba reservoir in Sudan………………………………………………………….26
3.1.4 Slit accumulation in the Aswan high dam in Egypt………………………………………………………………………….27
3.2 water supply problems in the downstream countries………………………………………………………………………….28
Chapter four: Impacts of environmental degradation ……………………………………………………………30
4.1 Impact on Ethiopia ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………30
4.1.1 Impact on production……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………30
4.1.2 Loss of biodiversity…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………32
4.1.3 Drought intensification …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………34
4.2 Impact on the downstream countries………………………………………………………………………………………………….41
4.2.1 Impact of slit accumulation……………………………………………………………………………………………………………41
4.2.2 Impact of drought on the water supply of downstream countries …………………………………………………43
Chapter five: The need for and impediments to cooperation…………………………………………………..46
5.1 The need for co-operation…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….46
5.2 Major impediments to co-operation……………………………………………………………………………………………………47
5.2.1 Unchanged status quo……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………47
5.2.2 Mutually exclusive doctrine of the lower riparian states………………………………………………………………..49
5.2.2.2 Ethiopia’s appropriation doctrine ……………………………………………………………………………………………….56
Chapter six: Tendencies towards co-operation…………………………………………………………………………61
6.1 Current situations in the basin and the world……………………………………………………………………………………..61
6.2 The Nile basin initiative (NBI)……………………………………………………………………………………………………………….65
Chapter seven: Analysis ………………………………………………………………………………………………………….75
Bibliography……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………87
List of Acronyms
BCM-Billion Cubic Meters
EFAP-Ethiopia’s Forestry Action Program
ENSAP- Eastern Nile Subsidiary Action Program
ENTRO-Eastern Nile Technical Regional Office
ESTAC-Ethio-Sudan Technical Advisory Committee
FAO-Food and Agriculture Organization
HAD-High Aswan Dam
IMF-International Monetary Fund
ITCZ-Inter-Tropical Convergence Zone
LDCS-Less Developed Countries
MASL-Meters Above Sea Level
MM3-Million Cubic Meters
MW-Mega Watts
MWR-Ministry of Water Resources
NEL-SAP-Equatorial Nile Subsidiary Action Program
NMSA-National Meteorological Service Agency
RRC-Relief and Rehabilitation Commission
SAP-Subsidiary Action Program
SOL-Southern Oscillation Index
SST-Sea-Surface-Temperature
SVP-Shared Vision Program
WB-World Bank
WMO-World Meteorological Organization
1. CHAPTER ONE
1.1 Introduction
Nile River has been the main cause of suspicion and tensions between Ethiopia and lower basin states
(Egypt and Sudan). The old mistrust and tensions have been centred around the fear that Ethiopia might
block the safe flow of the Nile water in to Sudan and Egypt. Currently, however, nature itself is likely to
impose its own checks on the flow of the Nile (by means of increasing silt accumulation in the dams, river
and irrigation canals, and frequent droughts) due to environmental degradation in the highlands of
Ethiopia. This problem seems beyond any one country’s control, thus necessitating co-operation instead of
competition and conflict. Thus, it is these problems that initiated the study on the topic.
The Nile is the longest river in the world, in terms of its geography, flowing 6,825 km over 35 degrees
latitude from south to north. It is one of the greatest wonders of nature, with unfading legend through the
civilization of olden days, its basin embraces some three million km² encompassing the north eastern Africa
and equatorial lakes region. Included within the Nile basin are: one third of Ethiopia, a significant portion of
Sudan, almost the entire cultivated and settled lands of Egypt, the whole of Uganda, parts of Kenya,
Tanzania, Burundi, Rwanda , Congo democratic republic and Eritrea. The basin (3352710km2) is the third in
the world, following those of the Amazon and the Congo.
The Nile water system consists of several tributaries and headwater lakes. Lake Victoria in the equatorial
region and Lake Tana in the north-western Ethiopia are the most important natural reservoirs in the Nile
upstream. Of the four main tributaries, the Abay (Blue Nile) originates from the equatorial lakes region. The
Ethiopian head- water provide 86 per cent of the entire Nile water, while the remaining 14 per cent come
through the White Nile system of the equatorial lakes region.
Egypt and Sudan are net recipient of the Nile water that come from both head-water sub-systems. In view
of the on-going Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) the basin is divided into two sub-systems, namely the eastern Nile
and the equatorial Nile. The two sub-basins provide two contextual realms for strategically conceived
subsidiary scale. The equatorial Nile sub-basin comprises Burundi, DRC (Democratic Republic of Congo),
Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda, while the eastern Nile basin comprises Ethiopia and Eritrea.
Egypt and Sudan, as downstream countries relative to both the eastern and equatorial sub-basin system,
are mapped together with two sub-basins. Egypt and Sudan are therefore recipients of water from
upstream areas of the two sub-basin states.
This thesis attempts to assess environmental problems in the Nile eastern Nile basin. Particularly the study
attempts to examine environmental degradation in highland Ethiopia in general and the state of the
environment in the upper catchments of Tekeze/Atbara, Abbay(Blue Nile) and Baro-akobo river basins in
particular as well as the extent of silt accumulation and water supply problems in the downstream
countries.
The result revealed that the upper catchments of Tekeze/ Atbara, Abbay (Blue Nile) and Baro Akobo river
basins (particularly the 1st two) are nearly devoid of forest or vegetation cover. Experiencing severe soil
erosion, and thus severely degraded. Deforestation and its resultant soil erosion in these area is going on
unabated, and has resulted in loss of agricultural production, biodiversity (particularly in the source areaEthiopia), silt accumulation in the downstream countries and drought intensification in the eastern Nile
basin. Resource degradation in the sub-basin coupled with rapidly growing population has resulted in
apparent resource (water) scarcity. The results also reveal that environmental problems have become the
common challenge facing the eastern Nile basin states.
Instead of combating this common challenge, the riparian countries in the sub-basin have distanced
themselves by mutually exclusive doctrines and self –serving and hegemonistic tendencies. It is believed
that failure to address core legal and institutional issues may spoil the sprit of cooperation among the
riparian states. The objective of this thesis is to assess the extent
of environmental degradation in the highland Ethiopia and silt accumulation and water supply problem in
the downstream countries, their impacts, and assess the need for and obstacles to cooperation among the
sub-basin states. The specific objectives are to:
1. Assess the extent of environmental degradation in highland Ethiopia
2. Examine the extent of silt accumulation and water supply problem in the downstream countries
3. Explain the impact of environmental degradation and silt accumulation in the sub-basin
4. Assess the need for and major obstacle to concerted actions to solve land degradation problems in
the eastern Nile basin; and
5. Assess possibilities (for the sub–basin states) of coping with these problems.
Further the this thesis concentrate on the three countries, Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia , which are the
ultimate need of water, considered to be affected by the environmental problem and deals with the
accords involving them, or concluded on their behave, during the colonial period.
Figure 1 Showing the African portion of the Nile basin
Figure 1 Source: Yacob Arsano (2007) “Ethiopia and the Nile dilemmas of national and regional hydro
politics” P.16
1. Background to the problem
Ethiopia (the source of more than 86 percent of the Nile’s water) today is in the state of deepening
ecological crisis due to misguided and unregulated modifications of its environment. As Markos Ezra
(1997:79) noted, ‘the areas of rain-fed agriculture most under pressure from ecological degradation in the
horn of Africa lie in the northern and central highlands of Ethiopia’. The high land Ethiopia (areas of over
1500 masl), which make up about 45 percent of the total land area and support about 85 percent of human
population and two- thirds of animal population as well as produce nearly all the of the countries staple
food and cash crops, are highly degraded (vegetation cover removed, soils eroded, etc) (Tesfaye 1999:104;
Solomon, 1994: Kefialew, 1997:62).
Different writers (Solomon, 1994:4; Thomas, 1991:2) have widely reported that as recently as beginning of
the 20th century, 40 percent of the highlands was covered by forests. According to these sources, the forest
cover around the end of the 20th century was estimated to be less than 3 percent. And forest clearance is
continuing at an estimated rate of ‘about 8,000 ha per annum in the closed forests and 80,000 ha per
annum in the open forests (Markos, 1997:79). On the other hand, EFAP (1994:2) estimated that the annual
loss of the high forest/natural forest area is between 150,000 and 200,000 ha per year. On the positive
side, only 13,000 ha were afforested in the 1980s annually (Markos, 1997:70, Tesfaye, 1999:102). EFAP
(1994:2) exclaims that, if the present rate of deforestation continues, the area covered by natural forests in
the year 2010 may be reduced to scattered minor stands of heavily disturbed forests in the remote/in
inaccessible parts of the country.
Tesfaye (1999:102) reported that the destruction of forest has been spreading from the highly populated,
over cultivated and drought –afflicted northern parts (mainly Wollo and Tigray) to the relatively sparsely
populated and forested southern regions (Illubabor, Wollaga and Kafa) by means of the government
resettlement programs of the 1980s. This implies that population resettlement aggravates land
degradation.
Deforestation is one of the factors that cause increased runoff, which leads to soil erosion and ultimate to
land degradation. As Williams and Bailing (1995: 14) describe, ´the sparser the planet covers, the more
vulnerable the top soil to detachment and removed by raindrop impact, surface runoff and wind´.
In highland Ethiopia, soil degradation has not only been a continuous threat: it is now more serious than
ever before (Solomon, 1994:1). It is serious in its severity, extent and the rate at which it progress.
According to estimate by Constable (1984: xiii), over half of the high lands or 270,000 km² are already
significantly eroded and left with relatively shallow soils; and over 20,000 km² of former or present farm
lands have reached the point of no return to fertility.
Rates of soil erosion are high, though estimates of soil loss from the highland vary widely. It is generally
agreed that erosion causes cropped areas to lose on average 100 tons of soil per hectare every year
(Constable, 1984: XV), even if erosion rates stay at the 1983/84 levels, land covered by soils less than 10
centimeters deep ( and thus incapable of sustaining cropping) will increase five –fold to around 100,000km²
by the year 2010. As soil depth decreases, croplands convert to grass lands and finally to bare rock.
Land degradation affects both natural and man-made water flows and storage regimes so that the extent
and frequency of flooding increase in wet seasons and drought in dry seasons (Constable, 1984: XV).
Dassalegn (2001:42) asserted that land degradation in highland Ethiopia has resulted in: (1) damaging the
effective life of dams and reservoirs in Sudan and Egypt through siltation and sedimentation; (2) increasing
the frequency and the magnitude of drought in highland Ethiopia, both of which affect the quality and
quantity of the Nile waters. These in turn have resulted in the water supply problems in the downstream
countries.
In the past Egypt and Sudan had attempted to secure their water supply by: (1) legal means (establishing
legal regimes between themselves), (2) building high dams (storage regimes) that can store water for the
period of low flow.
Today, however, nature itself is likely to impose its own checks on the flow of the Nile due to the
combination of continued degradation with frequent droughts. Storage regimes, particularly in the Sudan
are being silted up, losing their storage capacity; and Sudan and mainly to land degradation in the source
area-Ethiopia highlands. As a result of this, it seems that the lower riparian states (Egypt and Sudan) are in
confusion with regard to what to do concerning their water security. The choice is between continuing the
old conflict-laden attitudes and trends (though political and diplomatic means) in the basin, While the
former leads to mutual harm, later will lead to mutual benefit.
As stated by Renner (1991:108), environmental degradation is a new force shaping governmental policies
and international relations, both in negative sense (tensions over resource depletion or degradation) and
positive sense (the necessity of new forms of cooperation-rules and institutions-to address common
dangers). In this sense, the eastern Nile basin could not be an exception. This is to mean that
environmental degradation in high land Ethiopia with its impacts on the water supply of the downstream
countries can bring new tensions in the region unless the sub-basin countries co-operate to solve the
problem. It means that the impact of land degradation in the sub-basin can hardly be solved by means
other than cooperation. So far there is no genuine and effective co-operation approaches to the
sustainable utilization and management of the Nile waters. But this does not mean that the impasse in the
sub-basin has completely been broken.
1.1 Description of the study
The high lands of Ethiopia include areas with altitude above 1500masl. They cover about 45 percent of
Ethiopian’s land area, accommodate about 85 percent and 75 percent of human and livestock population,
as well as generate more than 90 percent of the country’s agriculture output (Solomon, 1994: 23).
The substantial portion of this area has slopes in excess of or greater than 20 percent (kefiale, 1997:62).
Getahun Bikora(2001:33), However, has wrote that nearly 70 percent of the Ethiopian highlands have
slopes in excess of 30 percent, creating favorable conditions for accelerated soil erosion.
Climate in the highlands is moderate and annual precipitation ranges from 800 to over 2200 mm (Shibru
and Kifle, 1999:18). Of the total are, 60 percent is reported to be suitable for agricultural purpose (Shibru
and Kifle, 1999:18). It seems that because of this the area is densely populated.
This thesis focus on the north, central and southwest highlands, where most rivers (Blue Nile-Abbay,
Tekeze/Atabra, and Baro-Akobo) originate and flow towards Sudan and hence to Egypt; forming part of the
system of the Nile waters. Stated differently, the study focuses on the upper catchments of Tekeze/Atbara,
Blue Nile/Abbay and Baro Akobo river basins, which forms the Ethiopian portion of the Nile basin. Of these
river basins emphasis will be given to the upper catchments of Tekeze/Atbara and Abbay/Blue Nile because
these catchments are suffering from severe land degradation as compared to the upper catchments of the
Baro-Akobo basin.
The Tekeze/Atbara sub-basin: the Tekeze sub-basin, whose upper stream rise in northern Ethiopia,
replenishes the major Nile north of Khartoum perennially. The rivers Angarab and Guang are the main
Ethiopian tributaries of the Tekeze. At the one part the river marks the Ethio-eriterian border. The Tekeze
sub-system contributes 8.2 BCM to the total annual flow of the Nile waters. The climatic pattern and the
physical environment of the Tekeze sub-system are very alike to those of the Abbay. For this reason, the
river’s headwater area is also prone to a high degree of soil erosion and land degradation, as a result
incurring a loss of 120 million cubic meter topsoil to Ethiopia (Yacob, 2007:50)
The Abbay/Blue Nile sub-basin: the Abbay sub-basin (known as the Blue Nile outside of the Ethiopian
boundary) start off in Ethiopia’s northwestern plateau. Its numerous head-waters include Lake Tana and
the rivers Dabus, Didessa, Fincha, Guder, Muger, Jamma, Wolaka, Bashilo, Birr, Beles, Dinder and Rahad. Its
catchments area of (324,500km square) is more than twice smaller than that of the White Nile, whereas its
water contribution to the main Nile is more than four times as big as that of the White Nile.
The Abbay River contributes 52.62 billion cubic meters (Ethiopia, FDRE, 1999) to the sum annual volume of
the main Nile measured at Aswan High Dam. As there is high degree of seasonal inconsistency in the
Ethiopian plateau, the seasonal flow of the Abbay varies dramatically.
The major rainy season in the Ethiopian plateau is from June to September. The most runoff is in august
and is 60 times greater than the minimum runoff in the month of February. The physical nature of the basin
and the seasonal concentration of the water runoff have resulted in a high amount of soil erosion every
year. This advance results in land degradation in upstream Ethiopia and siltation in the downstream Sudan
and Egypt. According to one recent report, Ethiopia’s annual loss of topsoil is 405 million cubic meters from
Abbay basin. As a result the Khasim El Girba Dam on Atbara lost more than 60 percent of its storage
capacity between the year 1964 and 1997. During the same period the Roseries Dam on the Blue Nile lost
all its dead storage volume to sedimentation, and the live storage was getting depleted (Yacob, 2007:50).
The Baro-Akobo/Sobat sub-basin: emanates in western Ethiopia. Its major tributaries within Ethiopia
comprise the Alwero, Gilo and Pivor River that drain the western Ethiopia plains before they join the main
Baro-Akobo River. The Baro, Pivor and Alwero River make up a 380 km frontier line between Ethiopia and
Sudan. On the Sudanese side of the border this sub-system to the Nile is 23.24 BCM/year.
Compared to other river systems that flow due west, the Baro-Akobo has broad banks and a less irregular
flow course. It is the single navigable river across the Sudan-Ethiopia frontier. At one point there was river
transport by steamboat between Gambella in Ethiopia and Khartoum basin that Ethiopia and Sudan have
ethnic populations with common languages, shared traditions and similar production systems. These
include the Anyuae, the Nuwer, and Bumme. They straddle across the otherwise international frontier in
search of their livelihood that is dependent on riverine resources (Yacob, 2007:51).
The thesis also focuses on the Sudanese reservoirs built on the Blue Nile and Atbara rivers, and irrigation
canals using water from the same rivers. The high Aswan dam in Egypt is also another focus of this study.
Emphasis is given to the extent of slit accumulation in these storage regimes, and water supply problems in
Sudan and Egypt.
Figure 2 showing the Ethiopian portion of the Nile basin.
Figure 2 source Source: Yacob Arsano (2007) “Ethiopia and the Nile dilemmas of national and
regional hydro politics” P.84
1.2 Theoretical Framework
Environment, which comes from the French environner, meaning to encircle or surround, can be defined
as: 1) the circumstances or conditions that surround one organism or group of organisms: or 2) the complex
of social or cultural conditions that affect an individual or community (Cunningham and Saigo, 1995:3).
Obviously, human beings have always inhabited two inter-relating worlds: nature world consists of animals,
plants, soils, air, land, mountains, water, and etc. That perhaps predated human beings by billions of years.
The social world consists for itself using its own inventiveness. Although both worlds are essential to our
lives, the subject matter of this section is the natural world.
The rich diversity of life exists on our –earth, millions of plant and animals species inhabit the earth and
help sustain a habitable environment, as explained by Cunningham and Saigo (1995:3),’ this vast multitude
of life creates complex inter-related communities where towering trees and huge animals live together
with and depend upon tiny life-forms such as viruses, bacteria, and fungi.’ For the natural environment or
ecosystem to sustain itself, the natural and unintervened interaction of these communities must exist.
Birch et al (1996:5)’ succinctly stated this fact by saying that for an ecosystem to be fully functional (and
therefore self-sustaining) there must be representatives from the three metabolic groups: primary
producers (green plants), consumers (animals) and decomposers (bacteria, fungi and protozoa). The
complex interaction of these functional groups enables the natural environment to sustain itself and
support the living beings, including humans.
Human beings are inseparable linked with the natural environment. Obviously the environment is the base
of humanity‘s life because ‘from the environment come our food. Clothing and shelter’ (Thomas, 1991:1;
Neefies 2000:1). In their quest for their basic necessity (as they wholly depend up on the natural
environment). In their quest for their basic necessities (as they wholly depend up on the natural
environment), human beings have succeeded in modifying the environment and shaping nature to their
desires. In fact, the mere (and normal) relationship per se between man and nature cannot be condemned
as wrong. The relationship is said to be bad/wrong when human kind destroys nature (for instance, through
deforestation, soil erosion, gene pool extinction) or when man’s action goes beyond the nature’s carrying
capacity and endanger many of the life- support system. When nature is disturbed, life on earth will be in a
terrible state of affairs.
Deterioration or depletion of environment resources (like soil, water and forest) results in deterioration of
man’s living conditions. Deterioration or degradation of natural resource coupled with their uneven
distribution also results in resource conflict between states (Deudeney, 1992:181).
Bennett (1991:22) defined environment degradation as reduction or deterioration of environmental
resource. Resulting in the alteration of the natural support system upon which humanity lively depends; or
reduction in the longer term productivity of the environmental degradation is a plague that upsets the
traditional balance between people, their habitat and socio-economic system by which they live. Because
environmental degradation disturbs a region’s natural resource base, it promotes insecurity. It shakes the
whole edifice of man-nature relationship, and hence the socio-economic and political system of a state or
region.
Thus, it seems clear that land degradation affects water resource systems. Since water is the key to life, its
reduction or deterioration both in quantity and quality endangers the continues survival of life on the
planet earth. The management of this key element to life (water) is inextricable linked with managing water
resources. Tewolde Berhan, as below has briefly stated this fact:
Water comes as rain from the environment, goes through land, which is the major
Component of the human environment and ends up in the sea or on the land. Managing
water is thus intimately linked with managing the environment, conversely, Water is an
important component of every type of the environmental, Even of the desert, where life is
found. There is thus no such thing as managing water without managing or mismanaging
the environment, and no managing or mismanaging of the environment in which water does
not play a central role (Tewolde Berhan, 2000:239).
The quotation above signifies the fact that natural resource work as a unitary whole, in other words,
natural resources, such as water, soil and vegetation, are strongly bonded to each other. A damage to one
of these means the damage of the system. Similarly it is impossible to develop each resource in isolation (El
Monshid et al., 1997:411).
Moreover, a drainage basin is a systemic whole, which does not recognize National/political boundaries.
Stated differently, river systems are interconnected transport systems, which are often in conflict with the
compartmentalized approach of men (Newson, 1992:22). Recognizing the unitary, systemic and integrated
character of river basins is essential to take both macro and micro decisions for their management.
The unitary character of river basins necessitates unitary development and management irrespective of
political divisions. Lowi (1993) explains this fact as follows:
Geography suggests that by virtue of its physical unity, a river basin should be developed as a
single, indivisible whole, irrespectively of political divisions. This is so, because moving water.
Flowing toward an outlet (outlets), binds land areas together, and Interference with the
water and its movement at any point has repercussions elsewhere in the basin (Lowi, 1993:1).
This in turn, basically necessitates co-operation among or between competing water users. Indeed, since
river basins are considered as common property resources, they should be managed collectively. Efforts to
manage a river basin by one state in international river basins might not bear meaningful fruits; nor could
the pursuit of interests defined in purely nationalistic terms lead to socially desirable outcomes. Hence, as
Lowi( 1993) noted, 'the ideal solution to the satisfaction of competing needs and conflicting interests is
unitary basin-wide development of water resources under some system of supra-national authority or
management' (Lowi, 1993: 1).
Nevertheless, the achievement of co-operative solutions to the provisions of a common property resource
(as is the case in international river basins) remains the main challenge. States hardly relinquish control
over the resources that lie partially or wholly within their territories. Besides, states tend to exploit
resources unilaterally.
Here the question is that why states fail, or are unwilling to co-operate over the common property
resource like river basins? Alternatively, under what circumstances would states give up sovereign control
over the resources within their borders and submit to some sort of legal regime? Moreover
comprehensively, why states tend to choose non-co-operation when (under certain conditions) cooperation seems to be in their mutual interest? In this specific case, why the Nile basin states fail to create
comprehensive, basin-wide, cooperative legal and institutional framework for the utilization and
management of the Nile?
On these issues, there have been continuous debates in international relations theory between political
realists and liberal institutionalistes.
Political realists argue the political-structural condition of anarchy in international system has an impact on
the willingness of states to engage in cooperation (Lowi, 1993:3). In other words, since ensuring their
security and independence in the self-help context of international anarchy. Central to the realist and neorealist project are two assumptions. First that states are likely to be constrained from co-operation by the
anarchic nature of international society. Second that the states formal apparatus and enduring interests are
what shape and transform economic process. International co-operation, from this perspective, only arises
in so far as it supports the political interests of the state (Williams, 1996:50). Political realist discourage
state co-operation in an anarchic international institutional system.
However, liberal institutionalists say, states are becoming increasingly interdependent in economic and
welfare matters. As a result, states rightly consider each other as partner in growth and development (Lowi,
1993:4). From the perspective of liberal institutionalists, since global environment change does not respect
national borders, multilateral co-operation and the intensification of common or shared interests across
territorial units are required if it is to be successfully addressed(Williams, 1996:51). Liberal institutionalists
consider states as partner in every aspect and hence encourage co-operation between states.
These theories are applied to explain why the riparian states in the Nile basin in general and in the eastern
Nile basin in particular have so far failed to establish co-operative frameworks for the utilization and
management of this common resource – the Nile. And finally, I advocates liberal institutionallists theory
and encourage the basin states, or the sub-basin states to use it in utilizing and managing the water
resource of the Nile.
CHAPTER TWO
ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION IN HIGHLAND
ETHIOPIA: IT’S EXTENT
2.1. The Extent of Deforestation and Soil Erosion: General
Introduction
Although the process of environmental degradation encompasses a number of things, this section is mainly
devoted to the discussion of deforestation and soil erosion. This is because deforestation and its resultant
soil erosion, among other things, results in: (1) loss in national economy; (2) downstream sedimentation;
and (3) drought intensification, the latter two affecting the quantity and quality of the Nile waters and
thereby the lives of Egyptian and Sudanese peoples. It seems that this problem can only be solved through
co-operative management of the basin's watershed.
2.1.1. Deforestation
A number of available literature indicate that very little of the natural vegetation of the highlands remain
today. Basing their description on historical sources, many literatures (Leykull, 2001:74; Shibru and Kifle,
1999: 18; Tesfaye, 1999:102; Pankhurst. 2001:13; Markos. 1997:79; Berhanu, 1997:2; Solomon. 1994:4;
EFAP, 1994:21; and RRC. 1985; 14) have indicated that by the beginning of the 20th century about 40
percent of Ethiopia's land area was covered by high forests of either the coniferous or the broad leafed
type which, by the early 1990s, had reduced to less than 3 percent. This process of entire destruction of
forests was accomplished in less than a century. Presently, even this little forest resources remaining are
unprotected; they are subject to total extinction.
Kinfe warns that 'Ethiopia could have no natural forests left by 2020.' This should be accepted with no
doubt because deforestation in Ethiopia is going on at an alarming rate due to land clearance for
cultivation, fuel wood, and uncontrolled forest fires. For instance, in January 2000, forest fires raged for
over three months in southwestern forests of Bale and Borana, in which more than 300,000 hectares of
natural forestland was consumed. This area became the victim spot of fire for the second time in February
2003 ensuring the vulnerability of the remaining forests in Ethiopia. If something is not done to stop this
process. It seems that Ethiopia will soon be turned to be bare land devoid of natural forests ( Kinfe,
2004:133).
Different sources give different estimates for the rate of forest loss in Ethiopia. According to EFAP (1994:2)
and Yonas (2001:59), deforestation in Ethiopia is still continuing at an estimated rate of 150,000 to
200,000-ha.per annum. On the other hand, Berhanu (1993:7) and Solomon (1994:4) have estimated the
rate of deforestation at 100,000 hectares per year. Still other sources such as FDRE (1997: 1) have
estimated the rate of forest clearance to be between 80,000 to 200, 000 and about 250,000 hectares per
year respectively.
Despite the varying rates estimated, the above literatures unanimously assert the fact that the
disappearance of Ethiopia's forest resources is continuing at a shocking rate. Although about 13,000 ha.
were afforested annually (in the 1980s) under food-for-work programs (Tesfaye, 1999: 102), the gap
between deforestation and afforestation is extremely wide, the former being by far greater than the latter.
EFAP (1994:22) claims that Ethiopia's remaining natural high forests (about 2.4%) concentrated in the less
populated southern and western parts of the country while the central and northern parts are almost
completely deforested. The condition is very much appalling when one notices the fact that these
completely deforested northern and central highland areas of Ethiopia are the upper reaches of Atbara
(Tekeze) and Blue Nile Basins. The damage and destruction done to the vegetation in the upper catchments
of river basins definitely aggravates soil erosion and downstream sedimentation.
The phenomenon of complete deforestation is not confined to the northern and central parts of Ethiopia.
Available literatures are telling us that forest destruction has been spreading from the north to the
southwestern regions. For instance, Tesfaye (1999: 102) reported that the destruction of forests has been
spreading from the highly populated, over cultivated and drought- afflicted northern parts (mainly Wollo
and Tigray) to the relatively sparsely populated and forested southern regions (Illubabor, Wollaga and Keta)
through the government resettlement programmes of the 1980s. Thus, things are getting worse, and not
only external sources but also government sources alike are time and again warning this danger, though
effective actions to halt this danger have not yet been taken.
EFAP (1994:2) exclaims that, if the present (1994) rate of deforestation continues, the area covered by
natural forests in the year 2010 may be reduced to scattered minor stands of heavily disturbed forests in
remote /in inaccessible parts of the country. Therefore, the extent and severity of deforestation in highland
Ethiopia is very much alarming.
Deforestation is one of the factors that cause increased runoff, which leads to soil erosion and ultimately to
environmental degradation.
2.1.2. Soil Erosion
Being a dynamic living system, the soil is capable of supplying plants with all their requirements for growth,
except solar radiation and carbon dioxide. In addition, the soil provides a means of physical support and
anchoring for plants (Birch et al., 1996:8). This important resource is being eroded in highland Ethiopia.
According to RRC (1985: 12), soil erosion has reached exceedingly dangerous levels and is especially
characteristic of the highland regions of Ethiopia, where there are almost no remaining forestlands. The
Ethiopian Highland Reclamation study (EHRS) (Constable, 1984: xiii) reported that about half of the
highland area (that is, about 270,000km²) is already significantly eroded; of which nearly half (that is, about
140, OOOkm²) are seriously eroded and left with relatively shallow soils, Some 20,000km² of agricultural
lands are so seriously eroded that it is now unlikely that they will be able to sustain farming in the future.
Hans Hurni (Quoted in Kefialew, 1997:62) estimated that about 35.4 percent of the highlands have soil
depth of less than 35cm, where as 18 percent are less than 10cm deep. These shallow soils are found
mainly in the old agricultural settlement areas of central and northern highlands, which are nearly
completely deforested, and which command the upper reaches of the Blue Nile (Abbay) and Atbara
(Tekeze) basins.
What is very much alarming in highland Ethiopia is not only the existence of severe and extensive soil
erosion but also the rate at which it is going on.
Different writers gave varying estimates of soil loss from the highlands. According to Myers (1994:60), the
cultivated lands are believed to be losing at least 1 billion tons of soil per year, Humi (Quoted in Dessalegn
Rahmato, 2001:35) claimed that the rate of soil erosion in the highlands was 1.5 billion tons per year,
Constable (1984:5) estimated that nearly 2 billion tons of soil was being removed from the highlands
annually, and that in 25 years time about 18 percent of the country's farmland would go out of production,
affecting the livelihoods of some ten million peasants. On the other hand, EFAP (1994: 7) reported that the
highlands lose a total of 1.9 to 3.5 billion tons of soil annually.
These varying estimates for sure speak one thing: the high rates of soil erosion in highland Ethiopia. It is
quite obvious that at this rate of soil erosion, all the top soils from the country's farmland would almost
completely be washed away within a short period of time. According to Constable (1984: xvi), if present
(1983/84) trends continue, today's children could see over a third of the highlands become incapable of
sustaining cropping while the population triples within their lifetimes. This seems true because no proper
measures are taken to control the process of soil erosion while demographic pressure on land is increasing
from time to time.
The major causes of environmental degradation in highland Ethiopia are believed to be the growth of
human and livestock populations, poor agricultural production techniques result in low agricultural
productivity. This is coupled with inadequate rural land use policy and poverty as well as dependence on
fuel wood (EFAP, 1994:9).
According to the same source, population and livestock growth is expanding at an average rate of 3 and 1.1
percents per year respectively, while the grazing and agricultural lands are shrinking due to degradation.
The severe land-use conflicts between crop farming, animal grazing, and forestry are thus the results of the
increasing gap between the shortage of agricultural and grazing lands and the growing demand for them.
If population growth remains unchecked, 'the population density in the High Potential Cereal crop (HPC)
zone will increase from some 62 persons/km² in 1985 to over 166 Person/km² in 2015’ (EFAP, 1994:9). This
would reduce per capita land holdings to O.6 ha. if all land within this zone is suitable for cultivation,
grazing and other purposes (But this is not actually the case). According to Clarke (1986:21),' the more
people there are, the more pressure is placed on the environment through cultivation, grazing and the
collection of firewood and building materials.’
Available literature has asserted that there is virtually no unused land in the parts of the highlands. This
resulted in the further expansion of agricultural land which in turn reduces grazing areas, pushing livestock
herds further up the hill sides which finally results in the encroachment on traditional forest land. While
stating the condition in Wollo, Timberlake (1986:21) wrote that 'all the land that an ox can climb or a man
stand upon has been cultivated. Farmers even suspend themselves by ropes to sow hillsides too steep to
stand up on.' This had further been corroborated by Getahun (2001: 33) who wrote that 'the serious
shortages of productive (fertile) land in the highland areas, coupled with population pressure, have forced
cultivation of large parts of the steep and moderate slopes which are highly degraded because of soil
erosion.'
The land-thirsty highland farmer (desperate and without alternatives) will then accelerate erosion of the
hillsides, degradation of the rangelands, burning of the forests and the extinction of plant and animal
species (Hurni and Kebede, 1992: xiii). Thus national high forests and plantations are encroached upon and
cleared for cultivation or grazing by local people (EFAP, 1994:49).
The increase in population pressure is also believed to result in the progressive shortening of fallow
periods, hence giving soils less or no opportunity to replenish their humus contents. This aggravates soil
degradation. Timberlake (1986:57) succinctly stated this phenomenon by saying that 'population pressure
is so extreme in the Ethiopian highlands that shifting and rotational cultivation, which require much land
and relatively few people, has become impossible'.
Poor farming techniques characterized by a general lack of conservation practices are also the main causes
of sheet and rill erosion in the highlands (Barber, 1984:51). Poor and archaic farming techniques can be'
one cause for low agricultural productivity which in turn results in the expansion of cultivation on to
marginal and easily erodible land probably by destroying forests and wood land which fosters run-off and
finally land degradation.
The fewer forests that remain are subjected to uncontrolled wood harvesting and rapid rates of clearing to
open up new agricultural land, partly in compensation for land lost through degradation but mostly to
accommodate the rapidly increasing population (Leykun, 2001:71). It is assumed that the demand for fuel
wood increases roughly at the rate of population growth, for household energy in Ethiopia largely comes
from woody biomass fuels.
Therefore, it is not only land clearing for agriculture, which contributes to land Degradation, but also the
reliance on biomass for household energy' (Shibru and Kifle, 1999:20). According to the same source, a
1984 estimate indicates that 94.8 percent of total energy consumption in Ethiopia was made up of biomass
fuels: wood, animal dung and crop residue, where fuel wood accounts for 81.8 percent and animal dung
and crop residue make up 9.4 and 8.4 percent, respectively. 'In the rural Ethiopia traditional fuels make up
99.9 percent of energy consumption and the rural population consumes 86.7 percent of total net energy'
(EFAP, 1994: 16).
Apparently, there is a wide gap between the fuel wood demand and supply in Ethiopia, which serves as a
backing agent for speeding up the process of forest clearance. In line with this, Tesfaye (1999: 103)
reported that ‘in 1992 the fuel wood requirement of the country was estimated at about 45 million M³
while the forest resources were able to produce only 12.5 million M³. The deficient therefore amounted to
32.5 million M³. Further, EFAP (1994: 16) reported that ‘the imbalance between wood demand for firewood
and supply would widen from 34 to 84 million M³ by the year 2014'. If alternative energy sources (like rural
electrification) are not prepared soon. The households will rapidly deplete the present stock of wood
biomass accessible to them in order to satisfy their energy demand.
In addition to a continued reliance on fuel wood, the current practice of substituting animal dung and crop
residue for fuel wood, rather than using these materials as inputs to the soil, gradually undermines the
productivity of agriculture land (EFAP, 1994:17).
Loss of humus in much of the highlands will be more pronounced because of the use of crop residues for
livestock and the use of most of the dung for fuel (Barber, 1986:8). Being the areas, that are heavily
cultivated for corps and where the largest number of human and livestock population are found, the
highland areas of Ethiopia are highly degraded.
Finally EFAP (1994:50) warns that 'with unrestricted population growth, present agricultural technology, a
continued livestock growth and reliance on fuel wood, the situation will reach a crisis level.' The fact,
however, is that these days the situation has already reached the crisis level.
2.2. The State of the Environment in the Ethiopian Portion of the Nile Basin
Although the state of the environment in the Ethiopia portion of the Nile basin is not different from the
general condition of the environment in highland Ethiopia, it seems essential to treat this section
separately so as to enrich the knowledge on environmental degradation in the upper reaches of Eastern
Nile basin. Accordingly, the state of the environment along the Tekeze, Abbay and Baro-Akobo river basins
is briefly presented here.
2.2.1 The Tekeze River Basin
About 70 percent of the Tekeze/Atbara river basin lies in the highlands at an altitude of over 1500 masl.
The upper reaches of the Tekeze/Atbara River are surrounded by mountain ranges, the elevation of which
is over 2,000 masl. The area of land above 2000m elevation covers almost 40 percent of the total basin area
(MWR, 1998:3).
The Tekeze River Master Plan Project of the MWR has reported that 'most of the climax vegetation in the
basin has disappeared. Due to deforestation and soil erosion, severe degradation of soils and watersheds
exist in the basin' (MWR, 1998:31). The project study further asserted that 'a substantial area (about 80-90
percent) of the highlands of the basin has already been taken out of agricultural production' (MWR,
1998:31). The project study also went on to estimate the existence of high erosion potential in the basin
due to:
(1) Exposure of bare soils to rain on any slope: (2) the length of slopes left unprotected : (3)
the direction of ploughing (up and down the slope): (4) the breakdown of the soil
structure by repetitive ploughing: (5) cultivation on steep slopes without protective
measures:(6) the removal of all vegetative matter for grazing or fuel: (7) cultivation
across water ways and depletion of revering vegetation: and (8) annually burning of
grasslands at the end of the dry season(MWR, 1998:79).
2.2.2 The Abbay River Basin
Much of the forest resource of the Abbay/Blue Nile basin has been cleared for agriculture. Fuel wood and
charcoal production and built up areas-like village and towns (MWR, 1999: 11). The basin's forest resources
have been degraded (MWR, 1998: 16). The damage and destruction done to the basin's vegetation has
aggravated soil erosion and downstream sedimentation, thus causing losses in agricultural productivity
(MWR, 1999: 11), Conway also added that 'severe deforestation and enhanced soil erosion in the upper
Blue Nile basin are aggravating downstream reservoir infilling (Siltation).’
The Abbay River Basin Master Plan Project stated the condition of soil erosion in the basin as follows:
The north-east and east of the basin is all area generally acknowledged as severely eroded:
the low-slope areas of the Nile highland area-Gojjam, Awi, and north and west Shewa appear
to have current erosion rates, probably the highest in the basin: and the south-west of the
highlands has many low-slopes and is in the process of development for cultivation (MWR,
1998:59).
Therefore, soil erosion is a critical issue in the Abbay/Blue Nile river basin, and the potential is said to be
high due to: 'high intensity rainfall; erodible soils: steep and long slopes, especially in the highlands; poor
and intermittent vegetation cover over much of the basin: and poor land management practices' (MWR,
1998: 14), This is endorsed by Messele (2000) who pointed out that erosion hazard in the Ethiopian portion
of the Nile basin (including the Abbay basin) is high due to high slope gradients, highly erodible soils, poor
farming practices, high intensity storms and deforestation(Messele, 2000:207), thus, the environment is the
basin is severely degraded.
2.2.3. The Baro-Akobo River Basin
In contrast to many areas in Ethiopia, land degradation (in the Baro-Akobo basin) appears to be less
destructive and spectacular: gullies are rare, soils appear to be deep, and crops appear to grow reasonably
well (MWR, 1997:33). According to the project study the basin contains about 2.2 billion ha. of different
types of forests, which are estimated to constitute more than half (about 60 percent) of Ethiopia' s
remaining forests seriously degraded (MWR, 1997: 13). However, the situation of the remaining forest
resource is said to be critical, where the rate of forest re-growth is less than the loss by exploitation and
uncontrolled burning.
In the Report of the Master Plan Study, the state of forest resource in the basin has been described as
follows:
Although an often-repeated statistics tell us that 60 percent of Ethiopia’s natural evergreen
forests occur in this region: in actual fact, the forest reserves of the project area are meager
and few primary forests remain: those that do remain occur on steep land that is unsuitable
even for shifting agriculture. Those forests that remain appear to follow a sequence of
increasing degradation followed by total disappearance (MWR, 1997:1).
The decline in forest cover in the basin is attributed to the combined actions of civil unrest land conversion
to agriculture, fuel wood harvesting and burning. The refugee population of about 60,000 individuals in the
basin is also considered as another contributing factor for the decline in forest cover in the area for the
refugees inflate fuel wood harvesting fate in the basin. It is thus stressed that with the exception of forests
located on slopes greater than about 60 percent forests in the project area are in serious decline (MWR,
1997:7).
The rate of soil erosion over the basin is reported to be very critical (MWR, 1997: 14). Due to uncontrolled
ploughing, 40 percent of the present cultivated land in the basin is found on slopes of above 30 percent
with no precautions to mitigate erosion (MWR, 1997: 14). This aggravates erosion in the area. Moreover,
soil loss due to removal of vegetative cover is a ubiquitous condition in the upland zones of the basin.
Though the rate of loss varies from zone to zone (MWR, 1997).
Therefore, although the present environment of the basin is less degraded than the above two basins,
Conditions will turn to be worst in the near future if preventive and rehabilitative measures are not taken
soon.
CHAPTER THREE
SILT ACCUMULATION AND WATER SUPPLY
PROBLEMS IN THE DOWNSTREAM COUNTRIES
3.1 Silt Accumulation in the downstream countries: Its extent
3.1.1 General explanation
Human impact on river basins and catchments is an important factor causing downstream sedimentation.
Forest clearance and its resultant soil erosion has created or has been creating chronic problems for dams
and reservoirs constructed in the lower reaches of river basins. Mahmood (1987:149) noted that for the
last century or two, a great deal of the worlds` forests have been cleared for agriculture and urbanization.
This increases the on-site erodibility of soil, loosening it, destroying its protective layer. The general
consensus is that, trees are effective at preventing soil erosion, though topography, soil nature and other
factors also play their own roles. When trees are cut down, heavy rains wash topsoil into the rivers. While
the river flows swiftly, the particles of the soil are held in suspension but when flow encounters a dam,
then it is halted and the particles of silt fall to the bottom (Europe world, 7 December, 2001). Therefore,
the transported soil, as a result of soil erosion from deforestation, is the main source of sediment delivered
to the reservoirs. According to Crispen (7 December, 2001), soil erosion deprives the area of nutrition and
deteriorates the quality of the land; it also silts up dams and dykes. Elevates the riverbed and hence the
water level, which aggravates flood devastation. The same writer further elaborated the situation as
follows:
When a catchment area of a river is heavily forested, the elaborate root system of the trees
acts as a vast sponge, which soaks up rainfall, releasing it only very slowly to the river below.
Once a catchment area has been deforested, the runoff is vastly increased. Thus... when
forested the watershed of one selected river only releases between 1 and 3 percent of the
total rainfall: by contrast, once the area was deforested, between 97 and 99 percent was
released (Crispen, 7 December. 2001).
Obviously, all the sediments carried by water runoff may not enter into rivers and hence may not reach
dams and reservoirs. Some of the sediments may be deposited in the lower lying plain lands (if any) before
they reach streams and rivers. The land topography is thus one that can mitigate or aggravate sediment
transportation. Similarly, the deposit of sediments may not always have negative effects. Since sediments
often have a high nutrient content, sedimentation can be beneficial in increasing land productivity. For
instance, much land in Egypt might never have been cultivated had it not been for sediment deposits
coming from the Ethiopian highlands (EHRS/FAO, 1986:225). Hutchison (1991:96) also enunciated that
sedimentation has an advantage of depositing downstream new layers of soil that recover some of the lost
fertility from years of intensive farming.
When sediment enters into rivers and then to dam reservoirs, it has serious negative consequences. The
consequences can be in terms of water supplies and hydroelectric power production (Barber, 1984:23).
Silted water brings greater wear and tear to hydroelectric turbines (EHRS/FAO, 1986:23). According to
Satyanarayana and Srivastava (1987: 151), 'the process of sedimentation leads to a reduction in the
expected benefits such as irrigation, hydropower, navigation, flood control, fishing and recreation. It also
progressively impairs the drainage system downstream, reduces the carrying capacity of the irrigation
canals and increases the probability of floods.'
Since the world's dams and reservoirs are filling up with silt, they are losing their Capacity to hold water
(Europe world, 7 December 2001). The same source further indicated that, 'on average, 1 percent of the
water storing capacity (equivalent to some 70km³ of storage capacity) of the globe's reservoirs is now being
lost annually through silting.' In his 1984 research findings on the effects of sedimentation conducted in
200 major dams built from 1940 onward, Myers (1994) had calculated economic impacts of siltation as
below:
Merely a 1 percent reduction in capacity will mean a loss of some 148,000 gig watt hours of
electricity by the year 2000. To produce an equivalent amount of electricity by thermal means
would require 3.7 million tons of oil: and at US$ 80 per ton, or US $12 per barrel. Thus
Sedimentation would constitute a direct cost of US 3 billion dollar in electricity output
forgone in the single year 2000 (Myers, 1994:61).
Moreover, in some parts of the world (particularly in tropical areas, where rivers are rich in silt) the rate of
sedimentation is even faster, up to 2 percent (Myers, 1994:61; Europe world, 7 December 2001). Thus,
siltation is becoming the cancer of dams, because it largely determines the life span of a project.
3.1.2. Silt Accumulation in Roseires Dam in Sudan
It has been said that, the original temperate and mountain forests in the Ethiopian highlands have been
disappeared after centuries of improper and intensive cultivation. Particularly, the northern and central
highlands (the upper reaches' of the Blue Nile and Atbara basins), as it has already been stated, suffer from
severe soil erosion.
As noted by Hutchison (1991: 19), the process of soil erosion not only affects downstream sedimentation
but also can change the seasonal hydrological profiles to exacerbate flooding. Stated differently, soil
erosion affects water and drainage regimes through reducing rainfall infiltration and increasing run off. This
in turn results in flooding and sedimentation, which can cause damage in downstream areas (EHRS/FAO,
1986:220).
The reservoirs of Sudan and Egypt are the victims of soil erosion in highland Ethiopia, as the Ethiopian rivers
flowing into these countries carry high sediments due to severe soil erosion associated with rugged
topography of the highlands. In line with this, Humi (1986: 1) expressed his observation, saying, 'Rills,
gullies and brown rivers full of sediment show that a lot of soil is carried away and lost for agricultural
production'.
The fact of sediment concentration in the Ethiopian rivers has also been confirmed by EFAP (1994:5), which
reported that sedimentation and siltation have seriously affected water resources in Ethiopia; this will lead
to reduced life of storage dams and may change the conditions for transport and hydropower production.
Hurni and EI-Swaify (1996) further remarked that:
The Atbarah and Blue Nile rivers are the primary conveyors carrying nearly 53 percent of
seasonal waters, with an average of 11 BCM/year for the Atbara, and 49BCM/year for the
Blue Nile. We estimate that these two tributaries contribute over 90 percent of the Nile's
sediment, although their catchment area is only 332,000km², or about 16 percent of the Nile
basin (EI-Swaify and Humi, 1996: 7).
With particular reference to a reservoir on Blue Nile River, Hutchison (1991:94) wrote that increased topsoil
erosion in highland Ethiopia has resulted in increased siltation, as a result of which the useful life span of
the Blue Nile Roseires dam in Sudan has probably been halved. The same author further expressed his fear
of damage by sedimentation directed against strategic water control and hydropower structures of Sennar,
Roseires and Aswan Dams; together with irrigation areas they serve (Hutchison, 1991:94).
Roseires dam is located at the Blue Nile/Abbay and provides water for irrigation schemes and hydropower
generation for Sudan. The sediment quantities carried by the Blue Nile are monitored by a key station at EI
Deim near the Ethiopian borders, 100kms upstream from the Roseires dam. ’The quantities of suspended
sediment carried by the Blue Nile at EL Deim are estimated to be 140 million tons during the flood period
(July-October)’ (EI-Monshid, 1997:397).
The sediment grain size ranges from sand (grain size diameter > 0.063mm) to silt and clay (grain size
diameter < 0.04mm): and the average percentages are 45 percent sand, 15 percent silt and 40 percent clay
(El Monshid, 1997:397; Ahmed, 2000: 186). Conway (2000: 133), on the other hand gave percentages of
sediment size type for Roseires reservoir of 22 percent sand, 38 percent silt, and 40 percent clay.
These researchers also found that concentrations are increasing and that Roseires has lost 40 percent of its
designed capacity (which was 3 million cubic meters); and the dead storage volume is almost completely
filled with sediment (EI Monshid, 1997:398). Ahmed (2000: 186) also noted that the capacity of Roseires
dam had been reduced from 3 million cubic meters (Mm³) to less than 2.2Mm³ due to sediment deposition
in the dam. Thus, the extent of silt accumulation in the Roseires dam is alarming.
3.1.3 Silt Accumulation in Khashm EI-Girba reservoir in Sudan
Another Sudanese reservoir seriously affected by sedimentation is Khashm EI-Girba, located at the
Atbara/Tekeze River, 150km downstream from Ethiopia-Sudan border. It is estimated that ‘the Atbara river
used to carry 3 kilogrammes of dissolved and eroded material per million cubic meters of water' (Ati,
1992:30). 'As a result of siltation (and evaporation) the reservoir storage capacity gradually started to drop
from the original 1.3Mm³ in 1964 to 0.80 Mm³ in 1972 to 0.64 Mm³ in 1990' (Ati, 1992:29). Based on the
reports of the Sudanese Ministry of Irrigation, the same author explained that the amount of sediments in
the Khashm EI-Girba reservoir has risen from nil in I964 to 0.46 X 109M³ in 1972/73, thus reducing its
storage capacity by about 35 percent in only 8 years (Ati, 1992: 30). While Conway (2000: I33) estimated
that Khashm EI-Girba built on the Atbara has lost 42 percent of its capacity in only 12 years, EI Monshid
(1997:396) remarked that the same reservoir has lost 60 percent of its capacity in 30 years. These research
works signify the continuous reduction in the storage capacity of Khashm EI-Girba reservoir. It seems clear
that if unchecked, the reservoir will completely lose its capacity due to increasing average siltation rate
resulted from severe soil erosion in highland Ethiopia.
Irrigation schemes in Sudan are also being affected by sedimentation. It has been said that sediment
deposition in irrigation canals creates problems both in services and clean out costs and is considered to be
the most serious problem facing the Gezira and other irrigation schemes using water from the Blue Nile and
Atbara rivers (EI Monshid, 1997:398: Conway, 2000: 133). Rasmussen (1992: 91) also noted that in some
places of Sudan, sand dunes up to 40m high reach the villages and the agricultural land. For the
communities living along the Nile of northern Sudan, the severances and amounts of Sand present a new
problem, hence necessitating the invention of new strategies.
3.1.4 Silt Accumulation in the Aswan High Dam in Egypt
Available literature everywhere witnesses the fact that soil erosion in highland Ethiopia is resulting in dam
siltation not only in Sudan but also in Egypt. Salih (1992: 15) noted that '….increased water runoff
contributed to dam siltation and in some cases affected hydropower production, as in the case of Sudan
and Egypt.' Evans (1990: 13) remarked that in the pre-High Aswan Dam period, the Nile Delta actively grew
with the high sediment load carried by the Blue Nile from soil erosion over the Ethiopian Plateau, which
now have been entrapped behind the dam, resulting in serious economic and environmental problems in
Egypt.
The HAD, with a large storage capacity of 164 BCM and a total of 645 Mega Watts installed capacity of
hydropower, can accommodate any flood coming from upstream countries such as Ethiopia. The dam can
also accommodate suspended sediments of varying types and sizes, though much of sediments are halted
by reservoirs in Sudan before reaching the HAD. Nevertheless, the HAD is not free from sedimentation.
Conways reported that 'the total sediment accumulation in the HAD reservoir reached at 594 million cubic
meters between 1987 and 1992, an average of almost 120 million cubic meters per year' (Conway,
2000:132). Waterbury, on the other hand, explained that 'each year the Nile Water has carried about 100110 million tons of silt (15 percent), clay (40 percent) sand (45 percent) either to Egypt's fields or to the
Mediterranean Sea. Now nearly all that sediment is being entrapped by the HAD reservoir, where the
"dead storage" capacity available for this purpose is 30BCM' (Waterbury, 1979: 126). This is more or less
consistent with the description of Abu-zeid, who says ' prior to the construction of the Aswan High Dam,
the Nile discharged between 60 and 180 million tons of silt annually into the Mediterranean. Since 1964,
this amount of sediment has been held in the reservoir' (Abu-zeid, 6 March 2003). According to Waterbury
(1979: 126) 'dead storage would be used up after 500 years on the assumption that the average silt load is
60 Mm³ (or 110 million tons) annually.' But, on the basis of average annual silt load estimated by Conway,
that is, 120Mm³, the dead storage would be used up after 250 years unless actions would be taken. Thus,
Presently occurring siltation, or sedimentation deposition follows patterns that had not been
initially anticipated: fortunately, the most significant depositions since construction in the
mid 1960s are occurring several hundred kilometers away from, rather than immediately
behind, the structure, it is, of course a matter of time before this phenomena shifts towards
the structure (Said cited in EI-Swaify and Humi, 1996: 12).
In order to prove the inevitable accumulation of sediments in the HAD, two things can be considered:
firstly, a great deal of soils carried away from agricultural areas of Ethiopian highlands and entering into the
Blue Nile/Abbay and Atbara/Tekeze rivers; secondly, the shortage of silt in the once-fertile Nile Delta due to
the holding back of silt laden floods behind the HAD. These can be taken as proofs for the accumulation of
sediments in or behind the HAD.
It has widely been acclaimed that because of the entrapping of silts behind or by the HAD. The Egyptian
lands below the dam are becoming poorer and poorer. In other Words, silt in these lands has become a
scarce resource (Waterbury, 1979:131). Stated differently, water released from the HAD reservoir is siltfree because silts have been entrapped by the dam (Abu-zeid, 6 March 2003). Rosensweig (25 may, 1999)
explained that with the HAD in Egypt growing time can be increased but yields decreases because soils
became poorer due to the holding back of floods from the once fertile Nile delta. Thus, definitely, the
accumulated silts is not only shortening the life span of the dam but also denying Egyptian farmers of
naturally fertilized soils (Tesfaye, 2001:31).
3.2. Water Supply Problems in the downstream countries
Water supply can be affected by quality and quantity problems. In terms of levels of salinity and pollution
from agri-chemicals, and domestic and industrial uses, the water in the Nile basin is mostly of high quality
(Shapland, 1997: 68). One possible reason for this is that upstream countries have not so far utilized the
Nile's water. In fact water quality problems are significant in Egypt, where upstream uses within Egypt
cause deterioration in water quality which is felt when that water is re-used downstream (Shapland,
1997:68). When upstream countries begin utilizing the water resources of the Nile its quality will be
affected. Since there is soil degradation in highland Ethiopia, the country will use chemical fertilizers, and
this will affect the quality of the Nile waters as they are transported down in the form of sedimentation.
This in turn will result in the water supply problems in Sudan and Egypt.
Water quantity problems can result from siltation and drought. Large quantities of silt deposited in
reservoirs reduce the volume of water, which they can store. For instance, the Roseires dam has
heightened by 10 meters to increase its storage capacity due mainly to the effects of siltation (Shapland,
1997:68). But this technique cannot bring lasting solution to the siltation problems of storage regimes as
the rates of sedimentation are increasing from time to time. Reduction in the storage capacity of reservoirs
means reduction in the volume (quantity) of water that can be used for different purposes. Hence bringing
water supply problems.
Drought in Ethiopia has direct impacts on the hydrology of the Nile system. This is because changes in the
main Nile discharges primarily occur due to changes in the Blue Nile/Abbay discharges and thus fluctuations
in the rainfall over the source area-the Ethiopian highlands (Conway, 1997:267). Further, according to
Schove (1918:38), there is high correlation between the Nile levels and summer rainfall in Ethiopia, the
Sahel and the Indian Ocean countries generally.
In ancient Egypt, periods of famine caused by failure of the summer rains in Ethiopia (and probably the
Sahel) are recorded with low Nile levels (Schove, 1978:38). Since about 86 percent of the Nile waters are
discharged from the rainfall over the Ethiopian highlands, rainfall deficiency (drought) over this area means
low Nile levels. Low Nile levels in turn means an increase in dry spell or socio-economic crisis in the lower
riparian, Nile water-dependent countries, particularly Egypt. For instance, as Schove (1978:40) noted,
'prolonged periods of very low levels A.D. 53/63, 151/170 and 254/265 may haw been partly responsible
for economic crisis in the Roman world.'
In order to prove the correlation between the Nile levels and summer rainfall in Ethiopia, Schove took
series of drought periods in Ethiopia and compared these periods against weak Nile floods reported in
Egypt, and finally, he reached a conclusion that these periods (periods of drought in Ethiopia and periods of
weak Nile floods in Egypt) are in excellent agreement (Schove, 1978). This evidence indicates the fact that
runoff in the Nile basin is highly sensitive to fluctuations in rainfall over the Ethiopian highlands.
CHAPTER FOUR
IMPACTS OF ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION
4.1. Impacts on Ethiopia
4.1.1. Impacts on Production
Land degradation caused by deforestation, soil erosion and the loss of soil fertility, up sets the agricultural
production functions for farmers and leads, other things being equal, to reduced crop yields. It has been
estimated that ‘soil erosion reduces crop yields between 1 and 2 percent per year, while biological
degradation due to the decline in organic matter causes a further loss of 1 per cent’ (EFAP, 1994:14).
Land degradation affects agricultural production in two major ways: first erosion results in loss of soil
depth, which in turn results in the decrease of the capacity of soils to hold water for plant growth; and,
second, the use of animal dung and crop residues for fuel wood purposes disturbs the soil nutrient cycle
and reduces plant production. Besides, soil erosion, by accelerating surface runoff, imposes losses on
agricultural production. EFAP has summarized the quantitative and monetary impacts of land degradation
in Ethiopia as follows:
In1990 reduced soil depth, caused by erosion, resulted ill a loss in grain production estimated
at between 57,000 and 128,000 tons depending on whether the loss of soil depth has
amounted to 3.5 mm or 8 mm. This loss also reflects the impact of 1,000 to 2,500km of
cropland going out of cultivation because the soil depth fell below a minimum critical level.
The foregone production in the livestock sector resulting from soil erosion was estimated to
be between 35,000 and 78, 000 tropical livestock units (TLU). Together these losses represent
financial losses of Birr 18 million (at 3.5 mm soil loss) or Birr 40 million (at 8 mm soil loss),
equivalent to 0.5 percent and 1.1 Percent, respectively of the 1990 agricultural GDP (EFAP,
1994:18).
On the other hand, the Ethiopia's Environmental Policy document, prepared by the FDRE (1997), estimated
the annual loss in grain production and livestock due to soil erosion as below:
In 1990 accelerated soil erosion caused a progressive annual loss in grain production
estimated at about 40,000 tons, which unless arrested, will reach about 170,000 tons by
2010. Livestock play a number of vital roles in the rural and national economy, but according
to one estimate some 2 million hectares of pastureland would have been destroyed by soil
erosion between 1985 and 1995. Land degradation is estimated to have resulted in a loss of
livestock Production in 1990, equivalent to 1. 1million TLU, and unless arrested, will rise to 2.0
million TLU or to 10 percent of the current national cattle herd by 2010 (FDRE, 1997: 1).
Using the figure of 1 billion tons of soil lost per year in highland Ethiopia. Myers calculated that erosion
accounts for a loss of crop output of at least 1 million tons of grain, which is equivalent to two-thirds of all
the relief food shipped to Ethiopia in 1985 (Myers, 1994:61).
In addition to agricultural production losses as a result of soil erosion, the burning of dung and crop
residues caused physical production losses estimated by EFAP to be four (at 3.5 mm soil loss) to eight times
(at 8 mm soil loss) greater than the production lost on account of soil erosion. In financial terms these
losses amounted to '4 and 7 percent of the 1990 agricultural GDP', respectively (EFAP, 1994:49).
The logic behind physical production losses described above is that increasing use of animal dung for
household energy prevents its use as manure or soil conditioner: at the same time the use of plant residues
for the same purpose prevents their use as livestock feed. This in turn leads to breaches in the process of
soil nutrient regeneration, especially nitrogen and phosphorous, leading in turn to declining soil fertility and
so to declining crop yields.
When one considers the combined impact of production losses from soil erosion and the burning of dung
and crop residues. It is very alarming. Stated differently, production losses in Ethiopia due to physical and
biological soil degradation is large, and constitutes a formidable challenge to the society whose livelihood
depends on agricultural products. In line with this, Stahl (1994: 48) stated that ' today, land degradation is
threatening the very basis of East African peasant societies. Degradation has proceeded furthest in Ethiopia
where the northern highlands have become chronically dependent on food aid.’
The total cereal production lost in 1990 was estimated to be equal to about one fifth of an average year's
harvest of 5 million tons of grain. This would have been sufficient to feed 4.4 million people, which
(calculated on the basis of an annual cereal requirement of 220 kgs. per person) to the average farmer, the
financial cost of losses in agricultural production (both crop and livestock) in 1990 prices represented about
12 percent of his income (EFAP, 1994). In general, the financial costs of losses in grain and livestock
production in the period from 1985-1990 would have meant an average yearly decline of between 0.33 and
0.41 percent of the agricultural GDP in 1985 (EFAP, I994:49).
The impacts of physical and biological soil degradation on the agricultural GDP of Ethiopia are likely to
increase. This is because: firstly, deforestation together with its resultant soil erosion and the burning of
animal dung and crop residues are continuing at more alarming rate than ever before: and secondly, there
is no effective measure taken, at either regional or national level, to arrest the process. Thus, land
degradation in Ethiopia remains a serious danger, threatening the continuous survival of the society.
4.1.2. Loss of biodiversity
The Environmental Policy document of Ethiopia asserted that 'renewable natural resources (land, water,
forests and trees as well as other forms of biodiversity) in highland Ethiopia, which meet the basic need for
food, water, clothing and shelter have now deteriorated to a low level of productivity' (FDRE, 1997: 1).
The existence of a diversified topography and climatic zones enabled Ethiopia to accommodate a diverse
range of climax vegetation types (Afro-Alpine, sub-Afro-alpine, forest & woodland savannah), each with its
specific assemblage of animals, birds, insects etc, which famed Ethiopia for its biodiversity. Nevertheless, it
seems that a dramatic reduction in forest cover has posed a serious threat to this biodiversity.
Ethiopia is said to have one of the highest levels of endemism in Africa. 'Out of 5,770 species found in
Ethiopia, 10 percent or about 577 species are said to be endemic. The highlands are also one of the six
cradles of primary plant domestication' (EFAP, 1994:215). For instance, 'of the 16 major crops domesticated
in the country, three (Coffee, Okra, and Castor Beans) are uniquely domesticated in Ethiopia. The country is
also an important centre of genetic diversity for forage species' (EFAP, 1994:21). Moreover, 'some 103
species of mammals and 832 species of birds have so far been identified, of which seven species of
mammals and 25 species of birds are endemic to Ethiopia' (Dept. of Geography, 2001:57).
Ethiopia's richness in biodiversity and hence the fame she has been accorded, however, seems to be
declining, because ecosystems for flora and fauna and, for genetic resources as well as being threatened
due to reduced forest cover and associated impact on land degradation. Deforestation and its associated
impact on land degradation has two-folded effects: loss of plant species, and loss of primary habitats for
animal species and their ultimate extinction/ disappearance.
Orians (1997:20) noted that there is a good deal of evidence that human activity is leading to the extinction
of plants and animals on a broad scale. The possible extinction of plant and animal species in Ethiopia is a
critical threat because it is hardly reversible. Since forest cover in Ethiopia has dramatically been reduced
from 40 percent to 2.4 percent within less than a century; and since the remaining forest resource areas
are being encroached by the local people in every part of the country, ecosystems for plants and animals
are seriously endangered.
Surprising enough, even the so-called National Parks have become the victims of wild fires and forest
clearance for agricultural expansion and for settlement purposes by the local population. Ever since the
period of transition from the Dergue to EPRDF (Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front), almost
all National parks in the Country have been encroached by the local people, resulting in evacuation or loss
of animal species and loss/disappearance of plant species from the area. Here, suffices it to mention the
case of Gambella National Park, which is reported to be in danger of extinction. On the basis of the
information from the Head of the Gambella National Park, Girma Mengesha, Kinfe (2004:54) reported that
the 'National park spanning 5,061 km² was facing the threat of destruction by frequent fires started by the
local people and deforestation mainly by refugees from the Sudan. As a result of this, it is said that buffalo,
elephant, roan antelope and other varieties of the 41 animal species in the park were migrating to the
Mago park in Southern Ethiopia, and to the Sudan and Kenya in mass; and failure to offer appropriate
solution will definitely result in further depletion of their number.
From this, one can imagine similar losses in biodiversity in Ethiopia, though precise estimates of the
number of species lost due to deforestation and associated land degradation are not possible due to
absence of species inventory in the country. The general consensus, however, is that there exists loss in
biodiversity in the country so far as there is ecological crisis.
EFAP (1994:8) exclaims that 'a loss in biodiversity ultimately implies economic losses to Ethiopia and the
world.' Indeed, the impact of losses in biodiversity is beyond economic losses. It further results in the
disturbances of natural systems on which human society depends.
Obviously, we need plants for photosynthesis, building materials, and energy. We need water and arable
soils for our survival. These and other ecosystem services are vital to our life. These services can be
obtained in an unspoiled environment. Therefore: for our lives to survive, forests, grassland, soils, &
biodiversity must be protected.
In Ethiopia, however, protecting these natural resources has become a strong national challenge requiring
not only the enactment of appropriate policy and allocation of sufficient budget, but also public awareness
and mobilization.
4.1.3. Drought Intensification
Drought defined
Being a complex phenomenon, drought lacks a universal definition. Its definition varies in accordance with
different perspectives and disciplines. However, water deficiency is central to all definitions. The following
are some of the definitions.
Drought is defined as an 'extended water deficit' (Castelli, 1996:53). World Meteorological Organization
(WMO, 1975:3) defined drought as 'the condition where there is "lack of sufficient water to meet
requirements," the requirements' being dependent upon the distribution of plant, animal and human
populations, their life-style and their use of the land.' Loginov (N.D: 7) on the other hand, defined drought
as 'a sufficiently prolonged period of evaporation excess over rainfall, resulting in soil moisture deficiency
and thus affecting growth of vegetation and then crop yields and pasture vegetations.' In all these
definitions reference to water demand or requirement is made to be central.
Possible Causes of Drought in Ethiopia
Meteorological factors responsible for drought in Ethiopia include, the weakening and dislocation of the
ITCZ, anomaly in the Sea Surface Temperature (SST), EINino events and Southern Oscillation (ENSO),
variation in pressure systems and others (Meskir, 2000: 11), equally important factor responsible for
causing or/and-aggravating drought in Ethiopia, on which this paper dwells much, is increase in surface
Albedo. But before dealing with what increase in Albedo mean, and how it causes or/and aggravates
drought in Ethiopia, it seems mandatory to give a brief account for each of the aforementioned possible
drought causing factors in the country.
The weakening and dislocation of the ITCZ
Studies indicated that during the drought years, the ITCZ the major rain giving mechanism of Ethiopia, are
found to be weak and shifted southwards (Hutchison, 1991: 16). However, the findings of Nicholson
(Quoted in Misiker, 2000: 11) for sub-Saharan Africa contradicted with this assertion and claimed that a
weakened intensity of the rainy season is independent of the ITCZ position and during most drought years
of Ethiopia, the location of the ITCZ seemed to be normal.
Anomaly in the Sea Surface Temperature (SST)
In his research findings, Castelli (1996:56) noted that 'the anomalous warming of the SST over the southern
Atlantic and /or Indian Oceans as Possible cause for drought in Ethiopian highlands.' The possible reason
given for this event, according to Meskir (2000: 11), is that 'the warming of the SST in the two Oceans
(major moisture Sources for Ethiopia) resulted in low-pressure formation in the area and decreases the
moist air advection towards Ethiopia. This is supported by Loginov (N.d: 13) who related the 1984 drought
in Africa with the warming of the SST in the south atlantic ocean. This anomaly in the SST is mainly linked
with the EINino events.
EINino and Southern Oscillation (ENSO)
The modern outlook on certain aspects of the African drought particularly inter annual rainfall variability is
related to and strongly influenced by large-scale atmospheric-ocean fluctuations occurring around the
world (Loginov, N.d: 13). ENSO (abbreviation taken from EINino and Southern Oscillation) cause drought
and flooding at different places (Meskir 2000: 13). The correlation coefficient study of NMSA indicated a
significant correlation between southern oscillation Index (SOI) and seasonal and annual rainfalls of
Ethiopia (NMSA, 1996:36). According to the same source, maximum positive correlation of 0.5 was found
between the SOl of November and annual rainfall in Ethiopia. Loginov (N.d: 13) on the other hand,
indicated the coincidence between the 1972-73 and 1982-83 droughts of Africa and ENSO events, having
first stated a 0.4 correlation between mean sea level pressure at Darwin and equatorial Africa, which
indicate a possible link between SOl and African rainfall.
Variation in Pressure System.
Lamb (1997: 28) explained the subtropical pressure system and indicated that 'the pressure system is
weakened and displaced somewhat towards the equator and brought a tendency of reduced rainfall.'
Schove (1977:41) also found the link between the high pressure in Azores-Scandinavian regions and
drought in the Sahel.
Increase in Albedo
Various studies have indicated that the destruction of vegetation cover due to over grazing and forest
clearance for agriculture changes the colour of the surface of the earth and hence it’s Albedo, which in turn
intensifies the atmospheric processes that produce drought.
Existing literatures asserted that improper human interference could prolong and intensify the dry spells
natural to the climate. According to Timberlake (1986) this could happen in three possible ways:
First over cultivation and deforestation all strip soil of vegetation, bare soil and rock reflect
more solar radiation back into the atmosphere than do grasses, shrubs and trees. ‘Increased
reflectivity (albedo) keeps the atmosphere warmer, disperses cloud and reduces rain. At least,
there is less rain in the several large computer models of the late 1970s and early 1980s
which show that a sharp rise in the albedo over the figure of the Sahara should reduce rain.
Second, computer models suggest that a general lowering of soil moisture could itself
suppress rainfall. Much of the rain in tropical moist forest come outside, as humans change
the landscape so that it holds less water, they may produce a drier local climate …this is
almost certainly the case when rainforest is cleared over large areas.
The third and most controversial possible feedback mechanism involves dust; stripping
vegetation from the soil allows the wind to throw more dust into the air. This dust reduce the
amount of the earth’s surface, which would have the same rain-reducing effect as bouncing
more solar radiation back off the earth’ surface
(Timberlake, 1986:29-30).
The literature of Hutchison (1991), which is mainly devoted to the environmental crisis in the horn of Africa,
strengthened the above position as follows:
Damage to the land brought on by economic and political factors such as over grazing,
warfare, overly intensive farming or deforestation, can affect climate cycles, Scientists, for
example, are recording more frequent dust storms in the Sahal… Increased dust in the
atmosphere is believed by some climatologists to interfere with the production of rain by
conventional systems. Similarly, vanishing ground cover increases the earth's albedo- the
proportion of sunlight that the earth's surface reflects back into space, bare earth, lighter in
colour, reflects more sunlight. The soil no longer retains as much heat and gradually cools
down. Since rain is caused by warm moist air rising. Rainfall is diminishing. Because of its
impact on convection patterns, wind current and rainfall regimes, the albedo effect is a basic
factor in controlling climate (Hustchison, 1991:97).
The same author (Hutchison) further asserted that local climate has a tendency to change as vegetation
cover decreases, and windblown soil entering the atmosphere interferes with the ecosystems.
According to Williams (1995:12) changes in albedo, surface roughness, soil moisture and particulate load in
the atmosphere perturb the background surface-atmospheric energy and moisture exchanges. Brubake
(cited in Castelli, 1996:64) further corroborated this idea using observation-based vapour transport
climatology to estimate that on an annual basis up to 30% of the precipitation over large land areas is
derived from local evaporation.
If forests are cleared resulting in increased runoff and higher potential evapotranspiration rates, soil
moisture will be decreased thus creating local moisture stress, or even precipitation deficiency. In other
words, it is possible to speak, with a justifiable confidence that, land-atmosphere interaction, the limited
extent of land as compared to sea has a strong influence on the change of climate fluctuations at all scales.
Once again it is possible to state the fact that deforestation and soil erosion not only degrades land but also
affects climatic cycles, causing or/and aggravating dry anomaly.
Having understood the role of land-atmosphere interaction in the modulation of climate fluctuations. Many
Ethiopian researchers are blaming mismanagement of land and its resources as a cause for recurrent
droughts in Ethiopia. According to these writers, land degradation has made Ethiopia vulnerable to drought
and famine.
Admussu (1996), for instance, has stated the following:
Degradation of the agricultural resource base, particularly through intensified land use of the
ecologically fragile mountain slopes by a rapidly growing population together with over
grazing, deforestation and soil erosion, has been partly responsible for the increasing
vulnerability of the rural population to drought and famine (Admaassu, 1996:81).
He added that though drought can be assumed as a natural disaster man can make a significant
contribution to it. Thus, indeed, we are making our contribution not to mitigate but to aggravate the
vulnerability of the country to drought.
Tesfaye (1999: 101) also noted that frequent droughts and associated food deficits in Ethiopia are partly
the results of long-term environmental degradation, particularly rapid deforestation and soil erosion.
Further, according to Getahun (2001:33), it is well known fact that soil degradation results in such things as
decreased food production, droughts, ecological imbalance (desertification) and consequent degradation of
the quality of life. According to Getahun's generalization, the rainfall problem in Ethiopia is not expected to
improve as long as environmental degradation continues unabated. Dessalegn (2001) adds:
In the past, drought and famine were considered natural calamities and an act of God, but
from the late 1970s, government sources began to attribute such disaster not just to periodic
environmental shocks but to what was called “uncontrolled human activity:" such activity,
which was thought to have been going on for centuries, was said to be responsible for the
loss of valuable natural resources on a large scale (Dessalegn, 2001:12).
Yeraswork (2000: xxii) also adds that 'after the 1973/74 drought in Ethiopia, the assertion that drought and
famine are the results of environmental degradation became part of the official stance.'
Still another researcher, Kefialew (1997), explained the role of environmental degradation causing or land
aggravating drought in the following manner:
The removal of vegetation cover increases surface runoff and surface reflectivity, reduces
energy receipt at the surface and accelerates evaporation from the soil: alters the local
atmospheric moisture balance and eventually leads to weatherchanges which manifests
themselves in the form of drought (Kefialew, 1997:60).
Darkoh (1994:20) noted that 'when human misuse of land weakened the natural system, drought and
desiccation often lead to desertification." It has been stated that the process of desertification is already
well advanced in many northern areas of Ethiopia since the damage to the environment has been going on
for such a long time (Clarke, 1986:21).
Currently, there is also another assumption that average temperature in the globe is increasing due to the
so-called greenhouse effect. The assumption goes on to say that the greenhouse effect would also increase
the fluctuation of the climate, which could bring droughts to Africa. In line with this, Timberlake's (1986)
explanation is worthy of notice. Thus;
Due to the burning of coal and oil by the industrialized world, carbon dioxide in the
atmosphere increases every year by almost 0.5 percent, and sometime next century, this is
expected to raise tropical temperatures by 2-3 degree c… the blanket of atmospheric carbon
dioxide reduces the heat that the plant radiates out into space, without reducing the heat
received from the sun (Timberlake, 1986:30).
According to the same author, the greenhouse effect would increase both average temperature and the
variability of the climate; and this growing variability could be bringing Africa more droughts (Timberlake,
1986:30).
Destruction of forests certainly contributes to global warming both by releasing the carbon content into the
atmosphere and by reducing the value of trees as carbon sinks.
Since global warming has the effect of increasing average temperature and the variability of the climate
(which could bring drought), deforestation, it can be inferred, is playing its part in causing drought. As
Anderson (1992:52) noted, 'one of the potentially most insidious effects of reduced vegetative cover is its
contribution to global warming, which could cause drought through increasing climate variability’s. '
It is certainly persuasive to speak here that vegetation prevents, or at least mitigates climate variability’s
(both local and global) by maintaining soil moisture and reducing global warming. If climate anomaly is
mitigated, drought occurrence, other things being equal, will be reduced.
Therefore, environmental degradation in highland Ethiopia is partly responsible for recurrent droughts in
the country. The widespread misuse of the land is increasing country's vulnerability to drought. The
continuing deforestation of the remaining forest stock and the high rate of soil erosion in the highlands will
probably turn the country into barren land, if preventive and rehabilitative measures are not taken.
As it is widely known, Ethiopia is one of the most drought-stricken countries in the world. Its name is
inextricably linked with drought and famine. The country has been experiencing periodic droughts since
time immemorial. And the frequency and magnitude of drought is increasing from time to time, not
decreasing.
Investigations proved that since the mid-20th century, Ethiopia has been experiencing one drought per
year (Meskir, 2000:8). Thus, the average drought occurrence frequency in Ethiopia has changed from nearly
a decade before the 20th century to only a year after mid of it. In the past, Ethiopian people used to face a
drought in every 7 or 10 years only. Today, however, this people are facing a drought in every year or two,
because climate conditioners (forests) are cleared and soils became drier. Similarly, 'during the 1990s, the
drought- affected population was on the average, 11.6% while that of the 1970s and 1980s averaged to
about 9.5%. This shows that the magnitude of drought is also higher in the 1990s than it was in the 1970s
and 1980s' (Tesfaye, 1999: 101).
Ethiopia has been hit by frequent droughts since long ago, and it will continue to be hit unless there is
fundamental mobilization of policy-makers and people alike against it. We should properly manage our
land and its resources, Timberlake (1986:31) noted that 'for recurrent drought in Africa, the most useful
and obvious step towards lessening the impact of adverse weather is to control land use: protect land from
livestock, plant forest and shrub stands, and reduce over cultivation,' Indeed, this is the best and possible
alternative at our disposal that we can apply to mitigate drought. This is what Tewolde Berhan expressed in
his interview held with the "Marawa" Bulletin columnist. He asserted that 'drought in Ethiopia can be
mitigated only through revegetation and soil conservation' (kinfe, 2004:6).
4.2 Impacts on the Downstream Countries
4.2.1. Impacts of Silt Accumulation
As it has already mentioned, when the sediment enters into rivers and thence to dam reservoirs, it has
serious negative consequences. The consequences can be in terms of water supplies and hydroelectric
power production (Barber, 1984:23). Silted water brings greater wear and tear to hydroelectric turbines
(EHRS/FAO, 1986:23). According to Satyanarayana and Srivastava (1987: 151), 'the process of
sedimentation leads to a reduction in the expected benefits such as irrigation, hydropower, navigation,
flood control, fishing and recreation. It also progressively impairs the drainage system downstream,
reduces the carrying capacity of the irrigation canals and increases the probability of floods.'
For instance, the reduction in the storage capacity of the Roseires dam in Sudan has resulted, among other
things, in severe restriction of power output. The decrease in Roseires dam storage capacity has created a
number of difficulties, which Ahmed (2000) summarized as follows:
Crossing ferries during the low flow years face difficulties in finding enough navigation depth
to operate: water quality is deteriorating also during the low flow years: the most important
impact is that the stored water may not be adequate to supplement the schemes with their
required irrigation water: the amount of sediment normally pass through the reservoir during
the flood season cause heavy sediment deposition in the canals network of all the irrigation
schemes …also during the flood periods the reservoir is operated at its minimum water level,
hence causing operation problems of the turbines and this leads to reduction in the
hydropower generation problems of the turbines and this leads to reduction in the
hydropower generation at time when it is badly needed (Ahmed, 2000: 187).
Siltation also affects water supply in Sudan, For instance, 'the high silt content of the Blue Nile/Abbay water
has necessitated the installation of special filters in the Khartoum Water-supply system' (Shapland,
1997:69).
Irrigation schemes in Sudan are also being affected by sedimentation. It has been said that sediment
deposition in irrigation canals creates problems both in services and clean out costs and is considered to be
the most serious problem facing the Gezira and other irrigation schemes using water from the Blue Nile and
Atbara rivers (El Monshid , 1997:398: Conway, 2000: 133). The problem is that the deposition of sediments
in irrigation canals results in decreased canal capacities, difficulties in water deliveries, lost production,
increased cut out areas and rising water levels in canals, all of which make water control and distribution
difficult (El Monshid, 1997:398). Siltation of rivers also causes bank erosion with subsequent effects on the
surrounding environment. For instance, due to the sedimentation of the Atbara River, the river bed in 1988
overflowed its normal channel and penetrated protective embankments made round the city of Gedaref to
flood the treatment plant well field, collector pipeline, booster pumps, and the entire system was
inundated. This resulted in damaging two generators, two pumps, and the pre-sedimentation basins used
for primary settlement prior to water treatment, had totally disappeared (Ahmed, 2000: 187). According to
the same author, the main Nile's approximate annual rate of erosion varies from 5 to 20 meters, and the
areas lost vary from few hectares to several hundreds of hectares. Thus Silt accumulation is creating
multidimensional problems in Sudan.
In spite of special management provisions to avoid sedimentation (such as flushing and dredging), it has
been said, reservoirs in Sudan have lost all of their dead storages, and hence irrigation canals and power
stations have been facing water shortages. It has been said that "annual removal of this sediment
consumes over 50 percent of the operation and management budget in Sudan'’ (Ahmed et al., 2000: 186:
Conway, 2000: 133). This economic crisis is a formidable challenge for Sudan, requiring co-operation and
concerted action, particularly, with the upper basin state- Ethiopia from where the sediments originate and
are transported down due to soil erosion caused by deforestation. Insult is added to injury when Sudan
loses 800 million USD per annum for flood mitigation (Mussa, 2003:24).
Silt accumulation in the Aswan High Dam has also resulted in serious economic problems in Egypt.
Generally, the condition of sediment trapping by the HAD and its downstream impacts are summarized by
Ahmed (2000) as follows:
Siltation in Lake Nasser results in corresponding erosion and land loss in the Mediterranean
coastal area: degradation of agricultural soil fertility downstream of the dam: negative
effects on fishers in the Nile system and costal lakes, as the migration of certain types of fish
were dependent on the arrival of turbid flood water, which is now impounded upstream of
the high Aswan dam. This problem can be exemplified by the fact that since the mineral rich
slits that nourished certain fish species have been deposited behind the Aswan dam, sardines,
which breed at the estuaries of the Nile, almost disappeared (Ahmed, 26 April 2000).
Therefore, the available literature indicates that siltation is one of the problems, which Egypt is facing.
Although technologies are available to dispose of sediments, costs are high. The progressive silt up then
requires the diverting of resources from other projects for rehabilitation (Hutchison, 1991:96). The problem
for Egypt is then not only the allocation of huge budgets for the removal of sediments but also the
impossibility of completely cleaning the reservoir (and irrigation canals) from sedimentation, Thus, it is
entirely possible to say that 'unless ingenious solutions are developed, we will lose the struggle to enhance
available water resources' (Mohamood, 1987: 149).
Yet, Egypt is in need of more and more water and soil nutrients for her newly reclaimed dry lands to feed
her rapidly growing population. However, these needs cannot be satisfied unless appropriate solutions are
employed to enhance available water resource and prevent dams from siltation. This mismatch between
demand and supply is a formidable challenge for Egypt. One ideal solution for this challenge seems proper
management of the environment in the upper reaches of the Nile basin, particularly the eastern Nile basin,
managing the environment of the river basin by nature necessitates co-operation between or among
riparian states.
4.2.2. Impacts of Drought on the Water supply of downstream
Countries
Drought affects the hydrology of the local area. When rainfall decreases, surface runoff water becomes
sparse, and ground water is not recharged (Bake, 1989: 144). In other words, the surface water that is
usually available during the wet season will be reduced. seasonal rivers might not carry runoff at all,
streams and wells might dry up, and the recharge of local aquifers may be dramatically reduced. This can
cause water stress in irrigated agriculture, disruption in hydropower generation, shortage in water supply
for domestic and industrial uses and the like. In fact, the severity of the impact depends on the magnitude
of the drought. The severe the drought, the greater the impact will be, and the impact are grave upon the
living beings that inhabit arid and semi-arid lands like Egypt.
Definitely, low-level floods of the Nile River have serious negative economic repercussions in the lower
riparian states, particularly in Egypt. Concerning this fact, Shapland (1997:63) states:
Even the enormous storage capacity of the lake cannot afford the country (Egypt) total
protections against an exceptionally long run of low floods such as occurred during the
1980s. By 1988 the level of the lake (Nasser) had fallen to the point where there was
insufficient water available to meet all the demands for it. The area of land under rice had to
be cut back: less than two-third of the Electricity generating capacity at the Dam could be
used: and the level the river could not be kept high enough to permit the unrestricted
operation of large tourist boats. Another low flood would have caused serious difficulties for
Egypt: the lake would have fallen to the point where no electricity at all could have been
generated at the high dam, and more severe cutbacks in irrigation would have necessary
(Shapland, 1997: 63).
Egypt was faced with an annual deficit of nearly 12 BCM of water in 1998 with no alternative sources to
bridge the gap (Warburg, 2000:233); Erlich (2002:2) strengthened this position by saying that:
After several years of drought in Ethiopia, the water level in Lake Nasser ... was reduced to an
alarming level. The volume of the reservoir had fallen from the normal level of 165-175 meters
above sea level to 153 meters by early July 1988. Had the rains in Ethiopia continued to fail for
another two month, the water would have dropped 147 meters, halting the massive
production of hydroelectric power from the Aswan Dam (Erlich, 2002: 2).
According to Erlich (2002: 2) experts were predicting a horrible catastrophe, that is, they forecasted
another dry year in Ethiopia, when the eternal river would virtually begin drying up, with chaotic
consequences.
Thus drought in Ethiopia, which has been intensified by environmental degradation over the Blue Nile and
Atbara basins, resulted in increased dry spell in Egypt. This may be continued unless controlling
mechanisms are designed jointly. Evans (1990:27) warns that ‘due to the possible intensification of the
drought, it is imperative that water conservation measures are implemented to conserve reservoirs, and
water management techniques improved to alleviate the more damaging effects of reduced Nile
discharges'. The impact of drought in Sudan is also severe. On the issue, El-Zain (2000) has wrote the
following:
Overall, sorghum’s yield per acre decreased by 32.9 percent and the total area under
sorghum cultivation decreases by10.6 percent during the drought of 1984-85, the fall of yield
per acre can be attributed mainly to the decrease in output. The effect of the drought was
more pronounced on millet: a 3.3 per cent increase in the area under cultivation, crop Output
fell by 49. 7 percent, resulting in a 51. 3 per cent decline in yield per Acre compared with
1983-8-1. Wheat's area under cultivation decreased by 67 per cent during 198-1-85 when
compared with the previous year, probably because of the poor rainy season in Ethiopia,
which affected the level of the Nile and the amount of water available for irrigation (El-Zain
2000: 354).
According to the author, the 1980s drought had resulted in the failure of crops and loss of livestock lives as
well as in the collapse of subsistence economies, which in turn had tolld the lives of 250,000 people and
caused population displacement in Sudan.
Therefore, environmental problems both in upstream and downstream countries have become challenging.
Though the degree might vary, currently, both the upstream and downstream countries are facing the
challenges of environmental degradation. Since river basins are interconnected transport systems.
Environmental problem in the sub basin can only be mitigated through joint efforts and co-operation
CHAPTER FIVE
THE NEED FOR AND IMPEDIMENTS TO CO-OPERATION.
5.1. The Need for Co-operation
Environmental degradation in highland Ethiopia has brought about serious problems both in the lower and
upper Eastern Nile basin countries. Since river basins act as a systemic whole, the problems in certain parts
of the basin, particularly in the upper part affects the whole basin. It is by this logic that severe
deforestation and soil erosion in highland Ethiopia have affected not only Ethiopia, but also Sudan and
Egypt.
Soil erosion in highland Ethiopia washes topsoil away from agricultural lands in Ethiopia, causing loss in
production (crop yield). At the same time, this soil erosion results in silting up of dams in Sudan and Egypt,
which means loss in reservoirs' storage capacity and hence insufficient water for agricultural activities,
hydropower, and domestic consumption purposes. Thus this constitutes economic loss in the lower basin
states, too; and thus the challenge for all. Similarly, Environmental degradation is intensifying drought in
Ethiopia. Hydrological drought in highland Ethiopia means deficiency of water both in Ethiopia and lower
Eastern Nile basin states. The impacts of water shortage are clear: crop failure, cut in agricultural areas and
cultivation in general; power shortage and hence reduction of industrial activities, change in patterns of
human settlements and many other interrelated effects. This is the challenge not only for Ethiopia but also
for Sudan and Egypt. Mengistu (1995: 15) observed that environmental degradation has made abnormal
floods and unexpected droughts to increase in Ethiopia, which have caused loses in agriculture, dams and
water reservoirs in Sudan and Egypt, thus damaging the human settlements there. Undeniably, thus,
environmental degradation in highland Ethiopia has brought about serious problems to all the Eastern Nile
basin states.
Moreover, an extended period of dry season low flow means high evaporation and see-page and enhance
water wastage in the lower riparian countries; water wastage increases the gap between demand and
supply factors. Water demanding factors (population increase, urbanization, & the need for ensuring food
security) are rapidly growing in both upper and lower riparian states. On the other hand, water supply is
deteriorating due to recurrent droughts and sedimentation, which can intensify by environmental
degradation in highland Ethiopia. The problem is, therefore, equally challenging the population inhabiting
the Eastern Nile basin. Common problem needs common solution.
The source country, Ethiopia, by her cannot afford to mitigate environmental degradation. The country's
poor economy and scarce skilled manpower are not sufficient to rehabilitate the environment of the Nile
basin. Egypt and Sudan should share the burdens of environmental management so as to maintain and
enhance
Water resource of the Nile, If Egypt and Sudan want to live in a healthy environment and satisfy their water
needs, they must actively participate in environmental rehabilitation programmers’. Stated differently,
Ethiopia must be supported not only to restore the basin' s environment but also to utilize her water
resources on environmentally sustainable basis. Seeking common solutions for common problems, in fact,
by and large needs co-operation among the parties.
However, the environment (legal, Political, Ideological, diplomatic) is not conducive for reaching at cooperative solutions for these common problems. Stated differently, there are impediments to co-operation
among the sub-basin states. This situation has made the utilization and management of the Nile waters
difficult.
5.2. Major Impediments to Co-operation
5.2.1. Unchanged Status quo
The current status quo in the Nile basin is unfair in that water suppliers, particularly Ethiopia utilize almost
none whereas the lower riparian states (Sudan and Egypt) which add little or nothing to the Nile's water
consume the entire water of the Nile river. The two lower riparian states have ignored the legitimate rights
of the upper riparian states to share in the Nile waters. This status quo, which favored only the rights of the
lower basin states has served as the major roadblock to co-operative approaches for the utilization and
management of this shared resource. Girma Amare (2000: 573) has rightly put this, Thus,
The major impediment on the road towards effective co-operation on the Nile has been the
position of some lower riparian states that are bent on appropriating the entire flow of the
river to the detriment of other rightful States. There seems to be an entrenched desire not to
accept the legitimate rights of other riparian states to share in its bountiful resources (Girma,
2000:573).
As history witnesses, the reasons given for such unfair status quo could be attributed to British colonialism
which had great interest in controlling the Nile for its cotton plantation aimed at supplying its industries in
Europe (Girma, 2000:573). As Zewede (2000:520) noted ' ... to show her (Britain's) appreciation to Egypt,
she bestowed Egypt with "Natural and historical rights" in the Waters of the Nile and thereby created
future misunderstandings among the riparian states as to Whether or not "Natural and historical rights" as
bestowed by Britain on Egypt constitutes legal rights under international law.'
The colonial treaties and the condominium over Sudan mainly favored Egypt's interests in the basin,
because for strategic and economic reasons Egypt had become the most important Nile basin riparian state
for the British colonizers (Elhance, 1999: 68). Consequently, political stability in Egypt acquired paramount
importance for its British administrators (Elhance, 1999: 68). Obviously, political stability in Egypt could be
attained by satisfying Egypt's growing water needs, without much concern to the interests of other basin
states.
After independence, Egypt pursued more or less similar goals in securing the now of the river to meet its
own interests (Girma, 2000:573). Stated differently, the mentality of colonial-era has been inherited by the
rulers of independent Egypt. This has generated the resentments in the newly independent nations.
With the aim of bringing the Nile flow within its own territorial jurisdiction and appropriating a lion's share.
Egypt concluded the 1959 Nile Waters Agreement with Sudan. Under the terms of the 1959 Agreement,
which is called the "Treaty for the Full utilization of the Nile,"' Egypt and Sudan divided the entire annual
flow between them, with 66% going to Egypt, 22% to Sudan, and the remaining 12% allocated to surface
evaporation and seepage at the HAD reservoir (Waterbury and Whittington, 1998:2).
No other riparian states were (and are) party to this accord, and there was no any share in the annual flow
set aside for them (Waterbury and Whittington, 1998:2).
Hence, ‘the 1959 Agreement defined a status quo set in absolute quantities: it constructed a classic Zerosum situation: ceteris paribus, any gain in water to an upstream riparian must be a loss to Egypt and the
Sudan' (Waterbury, 1996:8).
Nevertheless, all colonial and postcolonial era treaties and accords as well as Egypt’s right to dictate all
aspects of hydropolitics in the basin have been duly rejected by all the upper riparian states ( Girma, 2000:
573), However, Egypt and Sudan continued to act as if the Nile originates in Sudan and ends in Egypt. They
have refused to respond to the demands by co-basin states for the equitable utilization of their shared
resources (Girma, 2000:573). Particularly, Egypt is unwilling to discuss future water development plans with
all upstream states unless its water allocation of 55.58 BCM specified in the 1959 Nile waters Agreement is
not negotiable (Whittington and McCleliand, 1992: 153). Waterbury (1996: 19) also remarked that ‘thus,
one principle and one negotiating tactic were firmly anchored in Egyptian practice: sharing can only involve
enhanced flow over and above the share laid down in the 1959 Agreement.'
'This uncompromising attitude has always marred relations between the upper and lower riparian countries
of the Nile' (Girma, 2000:573).
Thus, the current status quo in the Nile basin is static for it fails to flexibly adjust itself in the light of a
number of developments in the Nile river states (like population growth, Environmental degradation and
policy changes in upstream states) (Hillawi, 1998).
Hence, the existing status quo in the basin serves as the major roadblock to co-operation, which is required
for solving impacts of environmental degradation in the sub-basin.
5.2.2 Mutually exclusive Doctrines
5.2.2.1. Water appropriation doctrine of the Lower Riparian States
It appears to be clear that the legal validity of the principle of "acquired rights" has invariably been insisted
upon by the lower riparian states. In other words, the principle of "acquired rights" has been the pillar up
on which the lower Nile basin states' hydro political position stands. Egypt claims that it has drawn upon
the Nile to sustain its agriculture since time immemorial. As a result of this, it has a historic acquired right,
or to priority of appropriation of the river's water that all other riparian’s must honor (Waterbury,
1987:96), Hence, while conducting hydro politics with the co-basin states, Egypt has mostly stressed the
triple doctrines of primary need, prior use, and acquired rights (Elhance, 1999:69). According to Erlich
(2002: 6): ‘the moral dimension behind Egypt's "historic rights" is two fold: first, Egypt has no other option
to survive: second, Ethiopia (and also other upstream states) has lived without the Nile so far and
presumably can do so in the future.’
Thus Egypt wants at least to secure its "acquired right” (that is, 55.5 BCM) of the Nile water (Dinar and
Senai, 1998:14). In other words, Egypt would like Ethiopia to recognize the legal validity of the 1959 Nile
waters Agreement prior to starting any new discussions, but Ethiopia is not willing to do this (Whittington,
1992: 153).
Therefore, the insistent position of Egypt on maintaining the existing unfair but pro-Cairo status quo and
the doctrine of "acquired and historical rights" has served as a roadblock to new negotiations for the
equitable utilizations of the Nile waters. As it is already mentioned in the paper, Egypt has time and again
expressed her position that she will be willing to discuss future development plans with upstream states
only when the legitimacy of the 1959 Nile waters agreement is recognized or the status quo is maintained.
On the other hand, upstream states, including Ethiopia rejected the status quo based on colonial and
postcolonial treaties and agreements, and demanded equitable utilization of the Nile waters, never
explicitly challenged Egypt's position.
Instead of responding to the demands of upstream states, Egypt (in order to substantiate her monopolistic
position over the Nile) went on to lay "facts on the ground" ranging from the construction of HAD, with
huge financial cost, to desert reclamation projects. These seem Egypt’s major strategies for maintaining its
"acquired rights" (55.5 BCM) if pressure for the revision of the status quo increases from the upstream
countries.
With the construction of the HAD, it can be argue d, ‘Egypt has sunk costs in harnessing the Nile within its
national territory which give it a kind of property right to the resource' (Waterbury and Whittington,
1998:3). According to Waterbury (I979: 118) 'preliminary cost estimates of the HAD project in 1964, were
put at 416 million pounds. As a result of the construction of the dam,
Basin irrigation was converted into perennial irrigation with a total area of 983,000 feddans:
arable area increased from 5.8 million feddans to 7.4 million feddans: crops are increased
from 9.8 million feddans in 1952 to about 14 million feddans in 1993 where 80 percent of
agriculture lands are cultivated at the rate of two crops a year and the remaining 20 percent
at three crops a year …. (Mansour, 2001:1).
These are all "facts on the ground" which Egypt would use as bargaining bases against anti status quo
moves in the basin.
Further, Egypt has pursued its mega national project of developing or reclaiming southern and north
western deserts by using the so-called Toshka and EI-Salam (Peace) Canals, The principal objective, as many
would agree, of these projects is strengthening Egypt's bargaining power by creating "facts on the ground."
The southern valley (Toshka) project, with the alleged, aim of creating a new delta in parallel with the old
Nile Delta. ‘Will add 540,000 feddans, establish about 75 new Industrial estates, 44 urban communities, and
7 areas for safari tourism, providing about 1.5 million new Job opportunities' (Mansour, 2001:16: Moustafa,
2000: 200: and An-Nagger, 2001: 39) of the Canal's 168 kilometers, nearly 60 percent had already been dug
by the year 2000 (Erlich, 2002: 214).
For the realization of the Toshka project plan, the biggest pumping station of its kind world-wide is being
constructed on the left bank of Lake Nasser, 8kms to the north of Toshka (Mansour, 2001: 17). The water
will eventually be put into a 70km long main canal called Sheikh Zayed canal which is designed to feed four
branches that provide irrigation water for a total area of about 540,000 feddans under phase one of the
project (Mansour, 2001: 17), The water disposal design capacity of the pumping station is estimated about
25 Mm³ per day to be raised, whenever necessary, to 37 Mm³ per day (Tesfaye, 2001:52; Mansour, 2001:
17). Under this project, Egypt plans to pump 5-10 BCM of water per year from the HAD reservoir, and put it
in the Zayed canal that will transport it to a series of new land reclamation projects in the south western
desert (Waterbury and Whittington,1998: 11).
The joint costs of the canal, and the pumping stations as well as ancillary projects in the New Valley have
been estimated to be between U.S 90 and 150 million dollar at the 1997 exchange rate (Waterbury and
Whittington, 1998: 11). It has been said that the cost is being covered by domestic private sectors, and
foreign Private investors such as Saudi Arabian prince Al-Waleed Bin Talal Bin Abdel Aziz AI-Saud, who
intended to reclaim over 162,000 hectares in the new valley, that is, in the Nubian Desert west or Lake
Nasser (Waterbury and Whittington, 1998: 11).
Another ambitious desert reclamation project launched by Egypt was the E I-Salam (Peace) canal, so named
because the project was designed to reclaim the Sinai desert given back to Egypt from Israeli occupations.
This project is related to the North Sinai Agricultural Development project (NSADP) (Bleier, 28 October,
2002). The digging for the EI-Salaam canal had begun at an estimated cost of $ 1.4 to 1.5 billion. The canal
is intended to carry 12.5 Mm³ a day of fresh water from the Nile, and is planned to leave the Nile 20km
south of the Damietta tributaries on the Nile Delta, passes beneath the Suez canal by means of
underground channels and then move east wards for about 242 km to the north Sinai town of EI-Arish,
which is located only 40 km from the border town of the Gaza strip at Rafah (Kinfe, 1997: 15).
After completion, the project is expected to irrigate from 400,000 to 600,000 acres in the north Sinai
desert, resettle 2.2 Million Egyptians, set up 37 new urban communities and establish five model villages
fully equipped with all services and utilities (Africa Confidential, 1998:3). According to the same source, the
project requires 4 BCM of water per year.
According to Africa Confidential (1998:3), Egypt needs to increase its annual quota of Nile water from 55.5
BCM to 71 BCM in order to supply all of its new schemes, here Egypt needs 15. 5 BCM of additional water.
The basic question, however, is where does Egypt get this much additional water. According to Waterbury
and Whittington (1988:11), Egypt contends that it will find the water supplies needed for the new desert
reclamation schemes by using such methods as efficient utilization of irrigation water, water conservation,
and abstraction of ground water, using reclaimed water, and water shifting from more water intensive
crops to less water intensive crops. Nevertheless, these authors questioned the rationality and practicality
of Egypt’s water saving strategies on a number of grounds.
Firstly, the ground water in the old valley cannot be considered as a different source of water for it is the
water of the Nile recharged by the water of the Nile River.
Secondly, the task of water saving is an expensive business which needs not only huge capital investment
but also modifications in the institutional settings for the management of farm - level irrigation
Thirdly, assuming that upper Nile basin states would use none of the Nile water in the future: and assuming
that some of Egypt's water saving strategies become applicable. Egypt will hardly satisfy the
aforementioned additional water demand to complete her new schemes.
Indeed, so far, Egypt has been able to utilize about 8 BCM of water above its annual quota specified under
the 1959 Nile Waters agreement, benefiting between 2 and 3 BCM from the unutilized Sudanese quota on
'loan basis', another 2 BCM from underground aquifers, and about 4 BCM of recycled drainage water
(Tesfaye, 2001:57).
The question again is what if Sudan utilizes its full quota as it is intending to expand its agricultural lands
due to population pressure and recurrent droughts. Then Egypt will be left with only 6 BCM, which is far
from satisfying additional water demand needed to complete her new projects.
It is on this basis that Elhance (1999:61) remarked that ' ... it ought to be clear to all concerned that the
implementation of the plans is contingent upon the availability of large amount of fresh water which Egypt
currently does not have, nor is it likely to have any time in the foreseeable future.'
Beside, the mystery of water source for the operation of the new desert reclamation Projects, the projects
had been fiercely opposed by the upper riparian countries.
This Egyptian strategy signifies the country's unabated interest to exclusively use the Nile water resources
that belong to ten riparian countries. Hence, 'it may be presumed that Egypt's water strategy unequivocally
symbolizes a relentless aspiration for dominance in the entire Nile basin' (Yacob, 2002:8). Tesfaye (2001:
51) also noted that to make matters worse for the upper riparian states and to perpetuate the zero-sum
game in the basin, the Egyptians are now undertaking ambitious and controversial out-of-basin desert
reclamation programs that are in contradistinction with the tenets of international water laws. This
condition freezes the existing status quo, and blocks the possibilities for co-operation.
Furthermore, in order to prolong their dominance over the entire Nile basin, or to make their so-called
"acquired" and "natural" rights remain unchallenged. Egyptians also argue that their country is desert with
literally no rainfall which deters them practicing rain fed agriculture as compared to Ethiopia and other
upstream state on the white Nile, who, receive enough rainfall to exercise rain-fed agriculture.
However, the hard fact, as noted by Waterbury and Whittington (1998:3) is that even though the upper
basin states have relatively abundant rainfall. It is erratic, seasonally concentrated, and not often in the
regions where the soils are best for agriculture. In the past , using the river water for irrigation was an
option for the upper basin states, but today it become a necessity , matter of survival due to recurrent
drought compounded by rapidly growing population. This is particularly true for Ethiopia whose highland
areas, especially the upper catchments’ of Abbay ( Blue Nile) and Tekeze (Atbara) river basins are hit by the
frequent drought resulted partly from environmental degradation, hence , Ethiopia had no harnessing
water resource found within her boundaries to irrigate drought stricken lands.
This writer is of the opinion that Egypt and Sudan should show willingness to revise the status quo, and
abandon the so called ‘’acquired right and historical right’’ so as to create conducive environment for
cooperation which is required for combating the impact of environmental degradation.
It can be said that since Egypt has established regional hegemony, it has, it has power for immediate
success or delay of new water allocation negotiation. Egypt dominance over the Nile is functional of
influence of colonial agreements, the shifting, yet timely alliance and support from the global superpowers,
and the power of Egypt relatively to the instability of the upstream states’ (Bleire, 28 October, 2002).
As Waterbury (1996:18) put it ‘Egypt made defense of the 1959 status quo its paramount objective, and has
pursued it ever since with relentless consistency…and …it has patiently cultivated the international arena
and the donor community for acquiescence to, if not support for, its priorities’. Particularly, Egypt success
in exploiting western support strengthened her hydropolitical position in two ways. Firstly, Egypt access to
US aid and to the western financial institutions (IMF AND WB) enabled her to defend her interests by
whatever means she could. Secondly, western tacit diplomatic support concerning the Nile heightened
Egypt’s boast in the basin and encouraged her to rely on her age-old tactics of military threats against the
would-be unilateral water utilization moves by upstream states, particularly Ethiopia.
Military boasts on the part of Egypt added noting best to the lasting for the Nile issue except aggravating
tension and mistrust along the co-basin states. Completion and conflict benefits none of the states sharing
Transboundary Rivers. Utilization and management of international rivers requires co-operation and
mutual understanding among co-basin states.
Military threats cannot restrain up-stream states, including Sudan itself, from the harnessing the water
resources of the Nile whenever necessary. Indeed, Egypt’s leverage against Ethiopia in the western financial
institutions is obviously great. Yet, Egypt cannot totally block Ethiopia’s chance to develop her water
resources.
Therefore, the best and lasting solution for the utilization and management of the common water
resources of the Nile is rapprochement, which can build mutual trust and erode suspicion and fear of one
another. ‘Common resource needs co-operation rather than competition, the collective sharing of the
resource rather than the individual attempting to maximize yields’ (Berkes, 1989: VII). Thus, unless there is
co-operation among the eastern Nile basin states, it is hardly possible to manage the environment of the
Nile basin and enhance water availability in the region.
A light in the tunnel was seen in July 1993, when Egypt and Ethiopia signed a framework for general cooperation that included relating to the Nile. The framework agreement specified that neither Ethiopia nor
Egypt would do anything with the Nile that would cause appreciable harm to the other (Shapland,
1977:81). Further, the two countries agreed to consult and co-operate in mutually advantageous projects
like the projects that would enhance the volume of flow and reduce the loss of Nile water through
comprehensive and integrated development schemes (Shapland, 1997:81). The two countries recognized
comprehensive and integrated development schemes as means for enhancing the volume of flow and
reducing the loss of Nile water. These conceding to the geographical laws concerning international rivers
Nevertheless, in that agreement, no mention was made to the principle of ‘equity’- Ethiopia’s long –held
principle. What was mentioned in the agreement was avoidance of ‘’appreciable harm’’- Egypt’s or sown
stream states principle. The Egyptian would certainly argue that any reduction of flow in the Nile caused by
work in Ethiopia would constitute such harm (Shapland, 19997:81). Thus, the agreement conceded more to
Egypt than Ethiopia. Hence, so far, the issue of new water sharing or revising the status quo remained a red
line that can never be crossed. As it is already mentioned in the paper, the existing status quo serves as the
major impediment to co-operation that is needed for mitigating the impacts of environmental degradation
in the sub-basin.
Sudan has also already entered into a new era of friendship with Ethiopia. On December 23, 1991 Ministers
of the two countries revitalized bilateral relations and 'signed Peace and Friendship Declaration in
Khartoum that included statements relating to the Nile that were apparently made without Sudan's having
consulted Egypt in advance' (Shapland, 1997:81).
In this Declaration, the two countries agreed on the equitable entitlement to the uses of the Nile waters
without causing appreciable harm to one another (Whittington, 1994:16). The two parties also agreed to
establish a joint technical committee that would have the duty of holding consultations, exchanging data
and exploring areas of co-operation (Shapland, 1997:81).
According to Yibeltal (2003), Desk officer of Sudan in the Ethiopia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), The
Ethio-Sudanese Technical water Advisory Committee (ESTAC) is currently facilitating exchange of hydraulic
information between the two countries, which will have constructive roles in developing common water
resources of the Nile. Since it appeals to the principle of equitable sharing, "the agreement that Sudan
signed with Ethiopia appears to concede more to Ethiopia's position (Shapland, 1997:82). This apparently
implies that Sudan has shown willingness to co-operate with Ethiopia for it is the country affected more by
siltation and flooding than Egypt.
From the perspective of a river basin planning it is said, Sudan has a strong interest in developing a cooperative relationship with Ethiopia. Thus, the construction of dams on the Ethiopian portion of the Nile
Should be one of Sudan's top priorities in the water sector (Whittington and McClelland, 1992: 153). It is
believed that the regulation of the Blue Nile in Ethiopia would he particularly benefit for Sudan because it
would reduce, if not eliminate, many of the problems currently affecting Reservoirs in Sudan.
The model results of studies conducted by Guariso and Whittington (1998: 113) Show that when there is
water regulation upstream, Roseires reservoir can be filled later, and would essentially function as a
barrage to raise water and as a hydroelectric generation facility. Thus, Roseires reservoir can receive timely
and relatively silt free waters, and this reduces siltation whose annual removal is currently consuming over
50% of the operation and management budget in Sudan.
According to Wahid Belay (2003), Neighboring and Nile riparian countries Acting Director in the MOFA,
Ethiopia, there is a general change of approach on the part of both Sudan and Egypt from the old attitude
of competition and conflict toward cooperation with Ethiopia. The basic reasons for this new co-operative
approach, according to him are two: (1) Ethiopia's firm determination to unilaterally move to utilize the
water resources located in its territory, like for instance, the move for the construction of hydroelectric
power project on the Tekeze river without prior notification to them; and (2) Siltation and other problems
inside Sudan and Egypt. Wahid, however, remarked that this change in approach does not mean complete
change in the hydropolitical positions of Sudan and Egypt and thence the existing status quo.
5.2.2.2. Ethiopia's appropriation Doctrine
In the Eastern Nile basin Ethiopia is the upstream state and hence holds a unique physical geography. Her
western rivers consisting, the Tekeze/Atbara, Abbay/Blue Nile and Baro-Akobo together contribute 86
percent of the Nile waters as measured at Aswan. The lives and civilizations of the people inhabiting the
lower reaches of the Nile basin have flourished because of the waters and alluvial soils which have been
perennially flowing down from Ethiopia's western highlands. As Moorhead (1972:2) precisely put it' had the
Nile failed to flow even for one Season, then all Egypt would have been perished'. Because of its unique
physical geography and the upstream riparian position. Ethiopia could have played a decisive and
significant role in the basin's hydropolitics had she not been, among other things, economically weak and
politically unstable.
Interesting it is, however, that Ethiopia's unique riparian position has since long been recognized by the
Ethiopian rulers, who often pretended to block the flow into Egypt of the Nile in case Egypt stood against
Ethiopia's spiritual values and interests. For instance "the Ethiopian Emperors from Lalibella (13 the
century) to Zara yacob (1434- I468) threatened to divert the course of the Nile and turn Egypt into a desert
whenever Egypt's Moslem rulers were believed to have persecuted the Coptic minorities in Egypt’’
(Yacob,1996:39).
Although the warnings of the then Ethiopian Emperors to divert the natural course of the Nile seemed to
be simple bluffing (for the emperors had neither the means nor the capacity to do so), the warnings imply
two important things; (1) the sense of ownership to the river and the awareness, on the part of Ethiopian
Emperors, of Ethiopia's significant riparian position in the Eastern Nile basin; (2) the intention of the then
Ethiopian Emperors to use the water resources originating in and flowing through their own territories
whenever and for whatever purposes they wish. It is quite understandable that those Ethiopian Emperors
who boldly pretended to divert the natural course of the Nile would have not been refrained from utilizing
the river's water had they been interested in doing so. What they did then was that they simply announced
the right of Ethiopia to do whatever it wishes with its own water resources whenever the need arises. It can
be said that the wordings of the then Ethiopian Emperors can be related to the principle of the "Harmon
Doctrine," 'whereby countries presumably have absolute territorial sovereignty with a given state having
full rights over the area of the river basin within its borders' (Hillawi, 1998: 15).
Except defending their country's absolute territorial sovereignty over the water resource within its borders,
the medieval Ethiopian rulers, like the Modern ones, did not make use of these resources due to various
reasons including financial incapacity. The country's defensive position on the issue of the Nile, however,
can never constitute a tacit renunciation on the part of it of its own 'natural right' to use at least part of the
waters originating in its own territory (Hillawi, 1998: 17).
As historical references do, indeed witness, Ethiopia has since time immemorial made it clear that the
utilization of the Nile waters represents her 'natural' or 'territorial' rights. In other words, Ethiopia, though
reactive, has never given up her 'natural' or 'territorial' right to use water resources originating in and
following through her own national territories. Daniel Kendie (200 1:4) noted that, although the whole
exercise of the colonial agreement was directed mainly to the protection and promotion Egypt's interests
without any reciprocity, Ethiopia had not renounced its own quantitatively unspecified but existing natural
right to the Nile waters in its territory.
Further, Yacob Arsano (2007:108) remarked that the upstream countries including Ethiopia
intend to utilize the water resources of the Nile as long as these are within their territorial jurisdiction. The
same author exclaimed that the upstream countries hold to "riparian" doctrine as opposed to "historical
and natural rights" strongly held by the downstream nations. "The fundamental principle of the riparian
doctrine is that the owner of land bordering a water body acquires certain rights to use the water’'
(Getches, 1997: 15).
Therefore as a matter of fact modern Ethiopia had already, that is, on 6 February 1956, asserted and
reserved its natural and territorial right to utilize the waters of the Blue Nile/Abbay without recognizing any
limitations on its freedom of action (Daniel, 200 1:4). Once again the Ethiopian government made clear the
position and rights of Ethiopia by means of an aid memoire of September 23, 1957 addressed to the
diplomatic missions in Cairo, which in part reads as:
... Just as in the case of all other material resources on its territory. Ethiopia has the right and
obligation to exploit the water resources of the Empire and indeed has the responsibility of
providing the tallest and most Scientific measures for the development and utilization of the
same, for the benefit of the present and future generations of its citizens, in pace with and in
anticipation of the growth in population and its expanding needs, The imperial Ethiopian
government must, therefore, reassert and reserve now and for the future, the right to take
all such measures in respect of its water resources and particular, as regards that portion of
the same which is of the greatest importance to its welfare, namely, those waters provide if
so nearly the volume of the Nile, whatever may be the measures of utilization of such waters
sought by recipient states along the course of that river (Quoted in Whiteman, 1964: 10111012).
Meanwhile, The imperial Ethiopian government had even moved further to the extent of launching a major
study on the water resources of the Blue Nile for irrigation and hydroelectric power by using American
experts, which was begun upon the signing of the August 1957 contract between the U.S Bureau of
Reclamation of the Department of the Interior and the Ethiopian Ministry of Public works and
communication (Collins, 2000:258). Then, after five years of intensive study the Bureau of Reclamation
proposed the construction of four major dams on the Blue Nile (With a combined storage of 51 BCM equal
to the mean annual now of the Blue Nile), twenty nine irrigation with hydropower projects on its
tributaries, with a hydro electric capacity three times that of the HAD (Daniel, 2001: 5; Shapend, 1997:78).
If all the projects were realized, irrigated land in Ethiopia would be equal to 17 percent of the current land
under irrigation in Egypt and would require 6 BCM of Nile Water and hence, would reduce the total annual
flow of the Nile into Sudan by 8.5 percent (Daniel, 2001:5 ; Shapland, 1997:78).
Though not realized due to financial problems, the actions clearly witnessed the determination of Ethiopia
to unilaterally move for the utilization of the water resources located within her own territorial jurisdiction.
The imperial Ethiopian government, time and again, asserted Ethiopia's "absolute Sovereignty" over the
utilization of her own resources located within her national boundaries. In fact, the Emperor (Emperor
Haile Selassie l) never boasted or pretended to divert the natural course of the river as the Ethiopian
Medieval rulers did. He had been modest in His approach for He mentioned that ' ... Ethiopia may be
prepared to share this tremendous God given wealth of hers with friendly nations neighboring up on her,
for the life and welfare of their people ...'(Ethiopia Observer cited in Yacob, 2002:7)
Contrary to this, there was and is no modest and considerate thinking and approach on the part of the
downstream states that excluded the country that adds a lion's share to the now of the Nile from all
negotiations and agreements.
Though verbal, Ethiopia's assertion to use her water resources still continued. For Instance, at the UN water
conference held in Mar Del Plata, Argentina, in 1977. Ethiopia declared its rights to, unilaterally, develops
the water of International River within its territorial Jurisdiction, there was no agreement on the use of
these rivers (Collins, 1994: 123).
Furthermore, in protest to 'Egypt's announcement of its intention to irrigate land in Sinai with Nile Waters,
Ethiopia sent a memorandum to the meetings of the organization of African unity (OAU) held in Lagos,
Nigeria, in June 1980, whereby Ethiopia accused Egypt of misusing the waters of the Blue Nile and
infringing the rights of other riparian states since Sinai lay outside the Nile basin (Collins, 1994: 125).
In summary, Ethiopia’s current water appropriation doctrine is based on the "equitable and reasonable'’
utilization of international watercourse. The basic question that should be answered here is why has
Ethiopia been not able to convert verbal assertions into 'facts on the ground"? In other words, instead of
simply opposing the activities of the downstream states. Why did Ethiopia not enter the scene of
scrambling for the Nile Waters?
Out of about 122 BCM of surface water, Ethiopia has so far developed only 4.3%, of which 0.6% is in the
Abbay (Blue Nile) valley with the Fincha agro-industrial enterprises (Yacob, 2007:109). To date, Ethiopia has
been able to install 453MW, which is only 2% of the estimated total potential; and only 13% of the
population has access to electricity (Ibid). The country is frequently hit by drought and famine. This is the
paradox of water abundance and scarcity in Ethiopia.
The failure by Ethiopia to make use of its water resources is due to many factors, the most important
among which have been financial shortages, lack of skilled man power, lack of prior political attention and
hence absence of appropriate water utilization policy. Today, however, it seems that Ethiopia has decided
to utilize the Nile waters because of its population growth compounded by environmental degradation; and
the relative peace currently prevailed in Ethiopia also enabled the country to divert its attention and efforts
towards national development. Accordingly, in the water sector, 'Master plan studies have been completed
and the final reports published for Abbay Blue Nile, Tekeze/atbara, Baro Akobo, Gibe-Omo and Mereb
basins' (Yacob, 2007:94).
As a matter of fact, following the 1999 Ethiopian Water Resources Management Policy, Ethiopia has
adopted water sector strategy. Water resources development Fund and water sector development
programme for the year 2002-2016 (Yacob, 2007:88). This is great stride forward not only in tackling
development problems but also in creating 'facts on the ground' that considerably enables Ethiopia to
strengthen its bargaining position against the prevailing status quo in the Nile basin. Strong bargaining
power on the part of Ethiopia would hasten the move toward co-operation, which is strongly required for
combating the consequences of environmental degradation in the sub-basin.
CHAPTER SIX
TENDENCIES TOWARDS CO-OPERATION
6.1. Current Situation in the Basin and in the world
We have already seen that environmental condition? in the sub-basin are creating multifaceted problems.
Dramatic deforestation and associated soil erosion in highland Ethiopia is intensifying drought, and
sedimentation of river waters, streams and reservoirs; and unexpected heavy floods have also become
common. Drought and river sedimentation are, among other things, endangering water supply and food
production both in the upper and lower Nile basin states. In this respect Mengistu Wube(1994:520) warns
that 'if present environmental degradation continues, it can lead to severe land degradation, drought,
unexpected heavy floods, and low agricultural productivity, which all lead to mass migration, severe
famine, and human and animal mortality both in the upper and lower Nile riparian countries.' Whittington
et al. (1994: 11) also observed that environmental degradation in highland Ethiopia, which is proceeding at
an alarming rate, is making agriculture unlikely to be able to sustain its present out put and support the
projected huge population increases.
Parallel to rampant environmental degradation in the sub- basin is rapidly increasing population growth.
According to studies conducted by Senai (1995:7) and shapland (1997:83) the average annual population
growth rate for the Eastern Nile basin states ranges from 2.4% (for Egypt) to 2.9% (for Sudan and Ethiopia).
Based on this rate, by the year 2025, the populations of these three principal Nile basin countries are
estimated to be 93.5, 60.6 and 122 million respectively (Shapland, 1997:83).
Environmental degradation associated with demographic pressure alters water demand patterns among
river basin states. Population growth affects the demand for water in many ways. Additional population
means additional water need for human consumption, for livestock, and for industrial and commercial
activities. Again population growth increases the demand for food, and therefore the demand for irrigation
schemes (Whittington and McClelland, 1992: 144). As a matter of fact, eastern Nile basin states are
currently in need of more water to feed their ever-growing population. As it has already been mentioned
elsewhere in the paper. Egypt is currently advancing rather ambitious desert reclamation schemes in the
south (Toshka) and North of the country. Thus, in order to satisfy Egypt's needs or the increased food
supply, Egypt's current land master plan demands reclaiming 0.58 million ha in the near to medium term
future. Hence additional water supplies will be needed to proceed with the overall desert reclamation
programme (Whittington, 1994: 11).
Recurrent drought compounded with demographic pressure has resulted in the collapse of subsistence
economy and mass displacement of population in Ethiopia. The only way for Ethiopia to increase food
supplies is developing irrigation schemes in the western watersheds of the country by using the Nile water
(Whittington, 1994: 11). This is forcing Ethiopia to enter the scene of scrambling for the Nile waters which
until now was exclusively used by the two downstream states.
Sudan similarly has schemes for expanded irrigation. As one observer noted,
In response to the 1990s development (Food insecurity and environmental degradation), the
Sudanese government has designed a complete national strategy for upgrading water resources
including the Atbara River, the Blue Nile, and the main Nile. The strategy includes expanding the
capacity of the Roseires Dam from 3 to 7.7 BCM as well as building two dams (Elsatit and EI-Remila)
on the Atbara river to add to the Hammadab and Kajhar dams (EI-Zain, 2000: 365)
The combined effect of all this will be water shortage. This is because 'the depletion or degradation of
resources shrinks the resource pie, and population growth forces the pie to be divided into Smaller Slices'
(EI-Zain, 2000:352). The basic problem facing the three sub-basin countries is thus lack of enough Nile
water available to complete all the irrigation schemes on the drawing boards of these countries
(Whittington, I994: 12). As a result of this, Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia are entering a period of increasing
water scarcity, which makes conflicts over available water resources likely unless a basin wide planning
process is established (Whittington and McClelland, 1992: 154). The same authors added that the period of
water abundance is coming to an end. Water demands are growing due to population and economic
growth, whereas available water supplies appear to be decreasing (Whittington and McClelland, 1992:
144). These are the conditions currently prevailing in the sub-basin. So, what would be the solution?
Waterbury (1997:280) stressed that 'if there are rising and competing demands for the water, it is
imperative that its use and allocation be planned in a basin-wide, integrated manner.' Therefore, it is only
co-operation among the riparian countries that can promote the welfare of people throughout the Nile
basin (Whittington and McClelland, 1991:145). Stated differently, environmental threat can possibly be
alleviated if the upper and lower Nile riparian countries are united (Mengistu, 1994:520).
Thus, today, most international observers as well as the riparian countries themselves have generally
understood the solution to this problem to be a comprehensive agreement on how the average flow of the
Nile should be allocated among the concerned parties (Whittington, 1994: 12). However, this
understanding has not yet been converted into practice.
Internal situations in the sub-basin require that, in order to plan, utilize, develop and manage the common
property resource of the Nile waters in an ecologically friendly manner, there should be co-operation
among the co-basin states. Stakeholders should approach to the common water resource in accordance
with the geographical rules, which necessitate co-operation among them.
In addition to the above internal situations, there are also external actors that are positively contributing to
co-operation in the basin, or in the sub-basin. As an external factor, the end of the cold war provided an
opportunity to the basin states to sit together and discuss their common problems and issues. 'During the
cold war period the political regimes in the sub-basin were-willy-nilly engulfed as the ideological and/or
political strategic proxies of either the "Western" or "Eastern" camp, often on the opposing sides of one or
another power bloc' (Yacob, 1002: 1). Similarly, El Zain (2000:348) observed that the old environment was a
context of tension and mistrust maintained by the dynamics and divide of the cold war where Ethiopia and
Egypt had never been in the same camp. This was the old formula of the Nile basin politics.
Thus the end of the cold war at the beginning of the 1990s brought Egypt and Ethiopia to the same
"western" bloc. The end of the cold war made the sub-basin countries to accept the development
prescription of the international financial institutions (Yacob, 2001:1) and hence served as one positive
factor in mitigating the old mistrust and tension in the sub-basin.
Obviously, to date, there is no comprehensive (all-inclusive) agreement that deals with the utilization and
management of the Nile waters. In fact, there had been several legal instruments that Britain entered with
upstream actors in the colonial era; and currently, there is the 1959 Nile waters Agreement signed between
independent Sudan and Egypt. As it is already said the colonial and post-colonial agreements and treaties
on the Nile secured the interests of one riparian state (Egypt) or to some extent Sudan to the total
exclusion of other riparian states.
Due to absence of all-inclusive legal and institutional framework for the utilization and management of the
Nile waters, fear and suspicion of one another and the intention to maximize one's benefit has been the
reigning ideology of the Nile riparian states. It has become convincing that this kind of old formula could
not serve the current concrete situation in the basin. Sated differently, currently, resources degradation or
depletion on one hand, and increasing demand for the same on the other hand, required the establishment
of appropriate and all-inclusive legal and institutional framework for the utilization and management of the
water resources of the Nile river. It seems true that the internal and external conditions are pushing the
sub-basin states to co-operate on the utilization and management of the shared resource of the Nile,
though the states are not sufficiently responding to the pushes.
Since a river basin is 'a unitary whole' its utilization, development and management should be carried out in
a co-ordinated and integrated manner. Co-ordinated and integrated utilization and management requires
co-operation and participation on the part of the riparian states. Co operation and participation in turn
needs some form of institution with its own legal and technical jurisdiction. In the environmentally fragile
Nile river basin, institutionalized co-operation is the only way to sustain the lives of people inhabiting it.
Erlich et al. (2000) noted that 'the Nile, being a single hydro political unit, calls for unified action, where cooperation and a shared concept of common all-Nile discourse is not only vital but also perhaps the only
road to survival.'
With the objective of facilitating basin-wide co-operation and establishing institutional framework, various
attempts have been made in the Nile basin since 1960s. The Hydrometeorolgical Survey of the Equatorial
Lakes (the Hydromet), the UNDUGU and the Technical Co-operation Commission for the Promotion and
Development of the Nile (TECCONILE) were some of the attempted institutional frameworks in the basin.
Nevertheless, none of them were all-inclusive and comprehensive in terms of both their agenda and
membership; thus, failed to achieve the required objectives in the basin.
Among the aforementioned attempts for the establishment of institutional frameworks in the Nile basin.
TECCONILE is said to be relatively advanced type of Nile-based organization in terms of embracing
fundamental issues like the equitable entitlement to the Nile waters, as its long-term agenda. Another
important thing is that TECCONILE also initiated series of 'Nile 2002' conferences, which created a
multidisciplinary forum for exchanging views by academics and professionals on the issues of transnational
rivers in general and the Nile water resources, in particular. However, 'due to lack of sufficient funding, it
ceded its unfinished jobs, particularly pending projects, to the successor organization, that is, the Nile Basin
Initiative (NBI)'(Tesfaye, 200 I: 107).
6.2. The Nile Basin Initiative (NBI)
It was in Dar Es-Salam, Tanzania, in February 1999 that the NBI emerged as a successor to the TECCONLE.
Except Eritrea, all the Nile riparian States are members to the NBI (Yacob, 2007:132). The important
breakthrough with the NBI is that it included the issue of water entitlement as its agenda, which was set
out as a long-term plan in the case of TECCONILE.
The policy guideline of the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) has five objectives:
These include' (a) developing the water resources of the Nile Basin in a sustainable and equitable
way to ensure prosperity, security and peace for all its peoples: (b) ensuring efficient water
management and the optimal use of the basin's resources: (c) ensuring co-operation and joint
action between the riparian countries, seeking win-win gains: (d) targeting poverty eradication and
prompting economic eradication: and (e) ensuring that the programme results in a move from
planning to action' (Nile-Com, 2002)
The objectives of the NBI summarized above are pervasive and promising. The initiative embraces issues of
equitable utilization and efficient management of water resource towards poverty eradication and
insurance of prosperity, security and peace for all the peoples of the Nile basin. To see these promising
objectives in the area, which has been stricken by poverty, civil wars, political instability, ecological crisis,
mutual exclusion, fear and suspicion, is by itself a step forward to bright future.
'The NBI is guided by a shared vision to achieve sustainable socio-economic development through the
equitable utilization of and benefit from the common Nile basin water resources' (Foulds, 2002:9). Thus,
unlike the previous initiatives, the NBI is a vision shared by all the basin states. According to El lain
(2000:368) the NBI means that the awareness about the current environmental problems that affected all
riparian states is finally on its way towards institutionalizations.
The NBI is thus believed to facilitate the realization of the principle of equitable distribution of the Nile's
water as stipulated in the so-called 03 project initiated, and financed by the UNDP. Project 0-3 is composed
of three experts from each riparian country with the duty of drawing up the general principles governing
relations between the Nile basin countries on the utilization of the same (Girma Amare, 2000). It was in
1995 that, project 03 was created by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to serve as a
forum to maintain and monitor the legal and political dialogue surrounding Nile use (Foulds, 2002:9).
Then the project, with its mission of developing a co-operative framework for the management of the Nile
waters, was transferred to the NBI in 1999 and currently embodied in the Initiatives shared vision program
(SVP) as one of its five broad themes (Nile-Com, 2002). According to Girma Hailu from UNDP, without 03
the NBI would never have been realized (Quoted in Foulds, 2002:9). Thus, it is the project 03 that brought
all the riparian states together unlike the previous Nile-based co-operative attempts.
That is why project 03 is said to be the central pillar or the raisondetre of the NBI. Even the supporting
pillars of this 'roof or 'temple' (project 03) such as (1) confidence building and stakeholders involvement
(pillar C). (2) social-economic, environment and sectoral analysis (pillarD), (3) development and investment
planning (pillar E), and (4) applied training (pillar F) by themselves involve a necessary learning process in
which different levels will contribute (EI lain, 2000).
Thus, these four pillars which support the main pillar (D3) seems to play a role in erasing the old fears,
mistrusts and suspicion; in identifying socio-economic and environmental problems (so as to set priorities);
in producing the necessary skill, particularly for those basin states with few or no trained manpower in the
hydraulic area; and in general, in clearing the ways for the eventualization of project D3. Thus, ‘SVP’s
mission is the creation of a co-odination mechanism and an enabling environment to realize the shared
vision through action on the ground (Foulds, 2002:10).
The shared vision programme of the NBI is thus beneficial to all the riparian states. It is really a promising
vision ever seen in the Nile basin. The vision can represent a diplomatic victory on the part of the upstream
states. Particularly Ethiopia for the equitable utilization of the Nile waters is the principle which has since
long been advocated by it.
The basin-wide shared vision programme has its counterparts, Subsidiary Action Programme(SAP) which
will involve actual development projects, in collaboration with two or more countries at the sub- basin
level, allowing for a move from planning (SVP) to action(SAP)(Fould, 2002:11). The principle of subsidiary is
considered an important approach to co-operative action within a basin-wide framework. It is also
designed to take decisions at the lowest appropriate level to facilitate the development of real action on
the ground (El Zain, 200:368).
SAP currently embraces two sub regional groundings: the equatorial lake subsidiary action
programme(NEL-SAP) embracing the equatorial co-basin states of Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania,
Uganda and the DRC; and the eastern Nile subsidiary action programme (ENSAP) comprising of Egypt,
Sudan and Ethiopia(Tesfaye, 2001: 112).
ENSAP aims at bringing co-operation among Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia. The three ENSAP members states
have already forwarded a total of fifty-sex hydraulic projects including hydropower, irrigation, water and
soil conservation that await funding (Tesfaye,2001:114). The same author stated that out of fifty-sex
projects, about forty-sex (80 percent) (13 for hydropower generation, 8 for irrigation, and 25 for the
watershed management) are proposed by Ethiopia as against ten percent proposed jointly by Sudan and
Egypt. It has been said that the three ENSAP members states have proposed joint projects which include
the eastern Nile simulation project, power pooling between Ethiopia and Watershed Management in the
Baro-Akobo basin (Mekonnen Lulseged, 2003).
Seen on paper, the programme and visions of the NBI are promising. Obviously, everyone benefits from the
initiatives programme, if it will have a-success story. Foulds (2002:7) noted that 'the success of the NBI
would provide security and sustainable water supply for downstream states and development
opportunities for the upstream states like Ethiopia.’
watershed management in the source area can reduce drought occurrence, unexpected heavy floods and
downstream siltation as well as enhance water availability. This benefits not only Ethiopia but also Sudan
and Egypt. Watershed Management in the source area can be realized if and only if all the beneficiaries cooperate and share burden with each other. Thus since co-operation benefits all, they (Ethiopia, Sudan and
Egypt) must work hard for the realization of the visions and programs of the NBI. Particularly, Sudan and
Egypt must give their full consent to the realization of project 03, for failure to agree on this core issue will
not bring lasting co-operation in the sub basin.
For instance, Ethiopia has made cautious moves in order not to sacrifice her principal objective of attaining
equitable water entitlement in return for this project-by-project approach. In the National Water Resources
Management Policy, it is stipulated that,
In order to develop transboundary waters, Ethiopia fosters meaningful and mutually fair Regional
co-operation and agreements on the joint and efficient use of transboundary water with Riparian
countries based on equitable and reasonable use principle (FDRE, 1999:13).
Thus, Ethiopia's involvement and active participation in the NBI and its project-by project approach does
not constitute Ethiopia's ceding of her demand for equitable and reasonable utilization of the Nile's water.
Even Ethiopia has already set out its own domestic means of financing its hydraulic projects in case this
project-by- project approach fails. Hence, Ethiopia has not decided to obtain benefits from the projects
designed under ENSAP at the expense of her long-held principle of equitable water entitlement. Yet, this
does not imply that Ethiopia has not made commitments to the eventualization of the visions and programs
of the NBI. Ethiopia's commitment to the success of basin-wide co-operation can easily be pin pointed in
her Water Resources Management Policy document, transboundary waters section; it is presented as
follows:
… Promote the establishment of all integrated framework for Joint utilization and equitable cooperation and agreements on tratrsboundary waters: ascertain and promote Ethiopia’s entitlement
and use of transboundary water based on those accepted international norms and conventions
endorsed by Ethiopia; foster meaningful and on a joint and efficient use of transboundary water
with the riparian countries based on equitable and reasonable use principles …(FDRE,1999:13).
The point then is that, Ethiopia is working at its best level for the realization of all the projects initiated
under the NBI and/or ENSAP without sacrificing its major objective of attaining equitable water
entitlement.
Concerning the commitments of Sudan and Egypt, available literatures express doubts. For instance, Egypt
is reported to have begun to implement development projects under the auspices of its new national water
plan (Foulds, 2002: 12). According to the same author, the basis of the new plan focuses on three pillars:(1)
working with the upstream states on both the Blue and the White Niles to develop new water resources,
(2) protecting water quality, and (3) severely rationalizing the usage of Egypt's share of the Nile,
In the previous chapter of this study, it is mentioned that Egypt has launched a huge desert reclamation
project aimed at creating new valley in the South (Toshka) parallel to the old Nile Valley.
One may thus argue that Egypt Will stick to its own mega national project, and will co-operate with
upstream states only on the issue of water enhancement, but not on the issue of new water allocation that
necessitates the dismantling of the status quo. One may even go on saying that Egypt may be following a
two-tier policy in the basin: creating 'facts on the ground' at home, and pretending as active and committed
participant in the NBI.
Why does Egypt pretend as committed participant in the NBI? It may be just to please her western friends
and international donors, which are now facilitating the realization of the NBI. Or just to be a beneficiary of
international aid and investment, which the NBI is hoping to obtain. These and similar others are the
possible hypotheses whose real solutions need sufficient time.
However, the Egyptian writer, Mustafa (2000: 201) Asserts that " unless urgent and effective land
conservation and watershed management measures are taken, food insecurity will continue to be a critical
local, national and regional problem in the Nile basin" It is clear fact that watershed management in the
source area underscores cooperation between or among the co-basin states.
Indeed, the Egyptians themselves know that watershed management cannot be implemented unless and
otherwise they agree and co-operate with the source country, It is also clear that, as to Ethiopia, lasting cooperation with the lower basin states underscores new water sharing in the sub-basin, But new water
sharing seems to be a taboo among the Egyptians.
These are all incompatibilities rotating round the Nile issue, which are delaying co-operation required for
mitigating impacts of environmental degradation in the sub-basin.
By the same token, Sudan's commitment to the success of the NBI is also questioned, It is reported that
Sudan has designed the strategy of expanding the capacity of the Roseires Dam from 3 to 7.7 BCM as well
as building two dams (EI Satit and EI Remila) on the Atbara to add to the Hammadab and Kajbar dams (EI
Zain, 2000:366). Africa confidential (June 12, 1998) had also reported that Sudan 'wants to construct dams
at Meroe (to generate 1.000 Mega Watts of Power) and at Kajbar near the third Cataract (to generate 300
Mega watts).'
Nevertheless, a number of available literatures, which this writer came across and used in the previous
section, asserted Sudan's dire need for co-operation with Ethiopia due mainly to problems associated with
environmental degradation. Further, it has been stated that the status quo that excludes Ethiopia is for
Egypt, not for the Sudan. These assertions contradict the ones given in the paragraph above.
However, Sudan, so far, has not shown any practical moves towards co-operation with Ethiopia on the
issue of the Nile. Thus, this writer is of the opinion that the Sudanese may be using the NBI as the smoke
screen to win diplomatic and financial support from the international community. In line with this Kidane
Assefa (2003) remarked that although Sudan, by virtue of its centeral location, and geography, benefits
most from cooperation, its position is very unpredictable.
In fact, some say that one need not expect over-night and dramatic change of countries' long held positions
on the use of the-Nile waters. To bring complete change in the hydro political positions of riparian
countries, it needs continuous dialogue and confidence building activities. Indeed, what we should not
forget is the fact that many of the riparian states were and are engaged in actual or psychological warfare
against each other. Thus, old fears, suspicion and mistrust are not yet completely washed away. Hence,
some of the countries in the basin may be in a dilemma between national assertiveness and regional cooperation.
In one way or another, it has been said that there is heightened upstream-downstream conflict of interests
within the NBl itself. For instance, it has been reported that there appeared some sort of disagreement
between upstream and downstream stances on the draft co-operative framework prepared by an
independent study team and submitted to the Panel of Experts (POE) for discussion and revision. Tesfaye
(200 1) stated that:
The POE did - - - discuss each and every provision of the draft Document and produced a revised
version that has marred with Reservation made by one party or the other. This indicates among
other things, the ascendancy of conflict of interest and locked in positions that had been reigning in
relations among Nile basin states…the Slicking points revolved around two basic issues, namely,
equitable and reasonable utilization of the waters of the Nile' vis-a vis’ no significant harm to
downstream users (Tesfaye, 2001:111).
Equitable and reasonable utilization is the currently reigning principle for the allocation and sharing of
international river basins. The 1997 Convention on the Law of the Non navigational Uses of International
water Courses underscored the principle of 'equitable and reasonable' utilization of Transboundary Rivers
first stipulated by the International Law Association (lLA) in its formulation of Helsinki Rules in 1966.
Although not legally binding, the convention on the law of the non- navigational use of international water
courses has contained promising but rather general principles for the utilization of shared waters.
Article 5 of the Convention reads as follows:
5(1) watercourse states shall in their respective territories utilize an international watercourse in an
equitable and reasonable manner, In particular, an international water course shall be used and
developed by water course states with a view to attaining optimal and sustainable utilization
thereof and benefits there from, taking into account the interests of the water course states
concerned, consistent with adequate protection of the water course. 5 (2) watercourse states shall
participate in the use and development of and protection of an international watercourse in an
equitable and reasonable manner. Such participation includes both the right to utilize the water
course and the duty to co-operate in the convention (convention on the law of non-navi. Uses of int.
watercourse, 1997: Art 5).
As it is stated above, article 5 contains- the key principle of international law in the area of water utilization
that each basin state in an international river basin has the right to equitable and reasonable use of waters
of that river basin. The logic of equitable use 'argues that all those with access to a resource have some
right to a share in the resources' (Waterbury, 1997:28).
The equitable use principle supports the position of Ethiopia or the interests of upstream states in general
against the ‘acquired' or 'historical rights' of the downstream states. In other words, the equitable use
principle protects those who have yet to harness the resource within their own territories.
Under this principle future claims to water use are taken as legitimate. Put another way, potential use
becomes as important as established use (Waterbury, 1997:281). That is why Sudan and Egypt practically
refused to accept this principle because if the principle of ‘equitable and reasonable’ uses of the Nile
waters was accepted. Ethiopia would have taken a considerable amount of the Nile's water, which is likely
to reduce its now into them.
Equitable use does not necessarily mean equal use. The share of an international drainage basin can be
carried out on the: basis or the criteria set out under Article 6 0f the convention on the Law of the Nonnavigational uses of International Watercourses.
Article 6 stipulates:
1. Utilization of an international water course in an equitable and reasonable manner within the meaning of
article 5 requires taking into account all relevant factors and circumstances, including:
(a) Geographic, hydrographical, hydrological, climatic, ecological and other factors of a natural character;
(b) The social and economic needs of the water course states concerned:
(c) The population dependent on the water course in each water course states:
(d) The effects of the use or uses of the water courses in one water course state on other water course
states;
(c) Existing and potential uses of the water course;
(f) Conservation, protection, development and economy of use of the water resources of the water course
and the costs of measures taken to that effect;
(g) The availability of alternatives, of comparable value, to a particular planned or existing use.
The factors set out under art. 6 above are vague and ambiguous. There is no numerical value attached to
these factors to weigh or rank one factor against the other. This will give a loophole to subjectivism. Which
factor takes precedence over which is not clearly known.
Moreover, the factors apparently seem favoring the down riparian states. For instance, it can be seen that
points (d) and (e) implicitly fold considerations of appreciable harm into those of equitable use (Waterbury,
1997:282). Thus, down -stream countries of the Nile would stress these points against upstream demands
for equitable utilization of the Nile. Similarly, Points (c) and (g) can also serve the position of Egypt for she
can argue that her population is totally dependent on the Nile and Ethiopia has alternative source (rainfall)
to practice agricultural activities. In fact, Ethiopia is a country that contributes a lion's share to waters of
the Nile.
This can be the point of argument for Ethiopia, albeit the contribution to the watercourse is not clearly
mentioned by the Convention as one factor for the implementation of the principle of equitable use.
Additionally, Ethiopia can also emphasize the potential use of the river Nile for the social and economic
needs or her population Indeed, this may be reacted by Egypt and Sudan on the grounds that the social
and economic needs of the river is greater in their country than it is in Ethiopia.
In any case, the ambiguity, Subjectivity and apparent bias towards downstream states may necessitate
caution on the part of Ethiopian negotiators.
Similarly, article 7 of the 1997 Convention stipulates:
1. Watercourse states shall, in utilizing an international watercourse in their territories, take all appropriate
measures to prevent the causing of significant harm to other watercourse states.
2. Where significant harm nevertheless is caused to another water course state, the states whose use
causes such harm shall, in the absence of agreement to such use. Rake appropriate measures, having due
regard for the provisions of articles .5 and 6. in consultation with the affected state, to eliminate or mitigate
such harm and, where appropriate, to discuss the question of compensation.
This principle, to a considerable extent, contradicts the principle of 'equitable utilization'; and is closely
associated with the Egyptian principle of "acquired rights". The 'no harm' principle tends to protect the
interests of Egypt and hence certainly freezes the existing status quo in the Nile basin. With regard to the
logic behind the principle of 'appreciable harm' Waterbury (1997) has succinctly stated as follows:
Those riparian’s that first put the water in a basin to use thereby establish a senior claim to it, which
is tantamount to a property right. If another riparian puts forward rival claim to the water, the
property right is put in jeopardy. Moreover, if the senior user has invested heavily in jeopardy, to
harness the resource, and if the user's economy has become reliant upon the established patterns of
explanation of the water, rival claims might cause appreciable harm to those with acquired right
(Walerhury, 1997:281).
Such a scheme (a "no harm' principle), thus, implies acceptance of a first-come-first serve system, with the
users presumably having 'acquired rights' once having 'been first' to utilize the water resources in question
(Hillawi, 1998: 15). This system is definitely against the natural right of upstream states such as Ethiopia in
our case. Thus, the challenge facing the Nile riparian countries is to' ... find a balance between the
upstream countries' support for the principle of 'equitable use' and Egypt's and Sudan's support for the
principle of 'no appreciable harm' (Waterbury and Whittington, 1998:27).
0bviously, Ethiopia has now determined to irrigate her western watersheds by using the Nile waters as her
natural and territorial rights allow. Agricultural Development led-Industrialization (ADLI) has been set out as
Ethiopia's national policy priority. Developing irrigation schemes is set up as the main strategy for ensuring
food-security and attaining food self-sufficiency for her ever-increasing population, as stipulated in the
National Water Resources Management Policy.
The area of irrigated agriculture cultivated so far is insignificant compared to the irrigable potential.
Sufficient food has to be produced to meet the requirement of the lost growing population and
ensure food security or eventualities at household level.
Furthermore, small, medium and large-scale irrigation schemes will have to be developed in order
to enhance reliable agricultural development in Ethiopia to cater for externally marketable surplus
that would earn the country foreign exchange and at the same time provide raw material in
provide for industries (FDRE, 1999:26).
If the principle of 'equitable and reasonable' utilization of the shared water resource is not implemented in
the Nile basin, Ethiopia may be forced to take unilateral actions. This in turn will pave the way for the
mushrooming of the seemingly latent fears, suspicion and tension among the riparian states.
The call is hence for the down riparian states (Egypt and Sudan) to cease their monopolistic control over
the river and to show sincerity and willingness to share the waters of the Nile with the right full users.
Therefore, a balance should be maintained between the principles of 'equitable and reasonable' utilization
and avoidance of 'appreciable or significant harm'. As a matter of fact, the 1997 Convention under article 7(
1) stated that 'watercourse states shall in utilizing an international watercourse in their territories, take all
appropriate measures to prevent the causing of significant harm to other water course states'. From this
statement it is clear to understand the fact that;
First, a state should utilize an international watercourse in its territory; and while utilizing should take all
appropriate measures to prevent the causing of significant harm to other users. From this, it is possible to
argue that first Ethiopia should be allowed to utilize international river basin found in her territory, then
Ethiopia will be obliged to take, all the appropriate measures not to cause appreciable harm to the water
uses of Sudan and Egypt. From this argument, two things can be inferred. Firstly, it seems that the principle
of 'equitable and reasonable' utilization is the guiding principle whose application is complemented by the
'no harm' principle.
In other words, equitable utilization has precedence over the ‘no-harm' principle (Mussa, 2003). Thus, the
guiding principle should not be ruled out on the grounds of the complementary one. Rather a balance
should be worked out through accommodation and compromise on the parts of all the parties (Waterbury
and Whittington, 1998:27).
Secondly, the 'equitable and reasonable' utilization by one state may not necessarily cause significant harm
to another state using the same watercourse.
The point, then, is that 'riparian' rights to use the water should be respected: all the parties should
accommodate and compromise their interests to reach at the legal solution for: Sustainable use and
management of the Nile's waters; mitigating environmental degradation; enhancing availability of existing
volume of the Nile's water; and avoiding water scarcity and possible conflicts in the basin.
Thus, unless the basin countries avoid divisive issues concerning core legal and institutional questions, cooperation in other minor issues will be temporary and short lived that will not break the stalemate in the
basin in general and the sub-basin in particular. According to Kidane Assefa (2003) and Tesfaye (2003),
project D-3 that is concerned with the core legal and institutional issues has been stacked somewhere and
its future is unknown.
Thus the impasse has not yet been broken. But failure to reach at compromising solutions would generate
more mistrust and suspicion among the basin states, frustration on the part of the facilitators, and a fullfledged unilateralism, which would be a recipe for a conflict over the utilization of the Nile water (Foulds,
2002:7).
CHAPTER SEVEN
ANALYSIS
Being agricultural community, the peoples inhabiting Eastern Nile basin are inseparably Iinked with the
natural environment. In the countries of the sub-basin, agriculture is the primary economic activity, which
employs more than 90 percent of the labor force and accounts for more than 50 percent of the Gross
Domestic Product (GDP). Even in Egypt, Where there is advancement in industrialization and increased
urbanization,
agriculture still accounts for 50 percent of the total population, 47 percent of the
employment, about 30 percent of the Gross National product (GNP), and 80 percent of export earnings
(Kinfe, 2004:12).
Agriculture in Egypt (totally) and Sudan (Partially) has been carried out by means of irrigation. In Ethiopia,
too, irrigation agriculture is becoming a matter of necessity due to recurrent droughts and erratic and
seasonally concentrated nature of the rainfall. Agriculture is obviously water intensive activity.
What is more, the three sub-basin countries (Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia) have the plan to expand their
agricultural activities in order to ensure food security for their rapidly growing population. The sub-basin's
population is growing at an average rate of nearly 3 percent every year. Under this estimated rate, the joint
population of the three sub- basin states will climb to 276.1 million by the year 2025. The peoples of the
sub-basin are in severe food insecurity.
This means that the sub-basin states have not attained the stage of food self-sufficiency. In other words,
they are now net importers of agricultural commodities; Egypt, for example, 'currently (in 1999) imports
more than one-half of its basic food requirements' (Elhance, 1999:60). Similarly, the decline in productivity
plus the high rate of population growth (3.1 %) forced Ethiopia to import 285.000 tons of grain per year
between 1980 and 1984. This figure has grown still higher during the 1990s (Shibru and Kifle, I999:20).
Nevertheless, for Ethiopia, ensuring food security through food imports is an unimaginable task because of
lack of finance and capital. Nor can Ethiopia hope to meet its large food deficits through rain-fed
production done (Kinfe, 2004:40). For ensuring food self-sufficiency, Clearly, Ethiopia's main strategic asset
is water.
Thus, Ethiopia has already reached the stage where it has no choice other than to utilize the Nile waters for
irrigation, hydropower generation, and other needs. For instance, Ethiopia has already planned to irrigate
275,000 hectares of new land within the coming 15 Years, which bring the total area under irrigation to
472,000hectares within the coming 15 years (Knife, 2004: 44). And generally Ethiopia demands about 54.4
BCM of fresh water.
Egypt has also planned to reclaim her desert lands to open new agricultural and settlement areas for her
rapidly growing population; and, as it has been already mentioned, needs additional 15.5BCM of fresh
water, thus raising her water quota to 71 BCM. Likewise, Sudan has also plans to expand her agricultural
lands and power generation, and 'needs more than 31 BCM of fresh water' (Zewde cited in Mengistu,
1995:20). The water demands of the three countries put together amounts to 156.4 BCM.
Conversely, the estimated available average annual flow of the Nile is 84 BCM as measured at Aswan.
Hence the demand is by far greater than the supply. One may wonder when he hears the news that even
this estimated figure (84 BCM) is persistently declining since mid-1950s and 1960s due to frequent
droughts intensified by environmental degradation in the sub-basin. In fact, the most optimists suggest an
increase of 22 percent by the year 2025 (Shapland, 1997:90). However, even if these predictions of water
increase will come true, it may not satisfy the needs of riparian countries given rapidly growing population,
ongoing environmental degradation, and inefficient water management in the sub-basin.
Rapidly growing population in the face of resource degradation or depletion means nothing but further
resource depletion and hence resource scarcity. This is because resource depletion results in the shrinking
of the pie, and population growth further divides the pie into smaller slices, and hence scarcity. Obviously,
rapid population growth pushes economic and natural resource limits. Hence, with the growth of
population, more and more water is needed to supply farms, factories and households, which results in the
nature's water bodies to become overtaxed (Postel, 1995: 403).
It is possible to say that fresh water in the sub-basin is under two-fold stress: threats from the impacts of
environmental degradation (mainly drought and sedimentation), and increasing demands for agriculture,
industry and domestic consumption. It seems true that nature and human beings are competing for the
scramble of the Nile waters not for conservation but for further depletion. Truly speaking, it is man's failure
to follow nature's law in utilizing natural resources like water that is making nature refuse to give its fruits
to man.
The most ridiculous thing in the sub-basin is the fact that the sub-basin states have been acting in violation
of not only the law of nature but also each other's rights in utilizing the water resources, instead of acting in
unison to combat deforestation. Soil erosion and drought in the sub-basin, Egypt and Sudan have been
working hard for the maximization of their own national quota by ignoring or violating Ethiopia's natural
right to utilize the Nile's water. While crying aloud about the so-called water rights and wrongs, and looking
inimical at each other, the basin states have neither fully recognized the impacts of environmental
degradation nor respected natural laws in utilizing and managing transboundary river-the Nile. It is in this
circumstance that the Nile is saying, "unless you treat me according to the law of nature, would not support
your life’’.
According to the law of nature, natural resources work as a unitary whole. In other words all resources but
especially water, soil and vegetation, are strongly bounded to each other. A damage to one of these means
the damage of the system. Moreover, a drainage basin is a systemic whole, which does not recognize
political boundaries and compartmentalized approach of men. It is here that Myers (1994:65) said, nature
works as a unitary whole, within a seamless web of ecological interactions, and does not recognize the
artificially imposed divisions of humans. Ecologically, the Nile is one, but the users being many, have been
attempting to modify it against ecological rules. The Nile is part of one great ecological system, which
should be treated like wise. Failure to recognize and respect this objective reality would mean failure to
solve problems of environmental degradation and, hence resource depletion, which in turn endangers our
survival.
Running for the maximization of one’s own self-interest in the case of trans-national river basins is contrary
to ecological rules, and may not bear satisfactory fruits. Egypt can definitely maximize it’s, let us say,
military power without co-operating with the upper Nile Basin states. But it can never permanently
maximize its water supply without the inclusion of upper Nile basin states, particularly Ethiopia. It is here
that the state-centric biases of political realist's explanations do not operate.
Realists argue that the political- structural condition of anarchy in the international system has an impact
on the willingness of states to engage in co-operation (Low, 1993:3). In other words, since ensuring their
security is their chief objective, states are pre-occupied with maximizing their power and capabilities, which
are the ultimate bases for state security and independence in the self-help context of international
anarchy. Central to the realist and neo-realist project are two assumptions.
First that states are likely to be constrained from co-operation by the anarchic nature of international
society.
Second that the states formal apparatus and enduring interests are what shape and transform economic
process. International co-operation, from this perspective, only arises in so far as it supports the political
interests of the state (Williams, 1996:50).
Nevertheless, realism's fixation with sovereignty and state power cannot serve as an alternative approach
to hydro politics in the Eastern Nile basin in particular and international water courses in general.
In an attempt to maximize their national water quota, Egypt and Sudan have built gigantic storage regimes.
But today, reservoirs in Sudan are losing their storage capacity due to accumulation of Silts, although the
country uses different sediment removal methods. Thus, Sudan could not permanently maximize its water
supply in ecologically hostile, state-centric manner. Sudan's co-operation with the country at the lower end
of the basin could not bring ecological health to Sudan.
By the same token, the HAD could not protect Egypt from long run of low floods-such as occurred during
the 1980s. Further Egypt's farmlands are suffering from lack of alluvial soil due to accumulation of silts
behind the dam. Thus Egypt today is in shortage of both fertile land and water. This again witnesses the
failure of a country (Egypt) to maximize water supply on a nationalistic basis, more precisely, without the
inclusion of the source country- Ethiopia. Frankly speaking, Egypt's co-operation with Sudan (non- source
country) could not bring expected benefits to Egypt.
Both the silting up of dams and drought occurrences have been intensified by environmental degradation
over the Ethiopian highlands. This is the supranational impact of environmental degradation. Since river
basins constitute one and unitary ecological system, damage to the natural environment at upper basin has
effects at the lower basin outside the country in which it occurs. Thus, impacts of environmental
degradation are border crossing, which require basin-wide /sub-basin-wide co-operation.
Therefore, if Egypt and Sudan want to permanently secure and enhance available water Supply, live in a
healthy environment, and in general, want to bring peace and prosperity to their people, they should come
to terms with Ethiopia-an important ecological unit in the sub-basin. They must acknowledge Ethiopia's
right to utilize the water resource of the Nile, and should co-operate with her in rehabilitating and
managing the basin's watershed.
Even people in Sudan and Egypt must worry about the effects of environmental degradation in highland
Ethiopia for their own self-interested reasons. Undeniably, common vulnerability to environmental
degradation has created interdependence among the peoples of the three sub-basin states. Whether
believed or not, the peoples of these three sub-basin states are united by the Nile system and should act
accordingly. This unifying factor is by far greater than divisive elements existing among the peoples
inhabiting and using the Nile basin. Any stereotypical and divisive elements (ideology, religion, language,
and mutual mistrust) should be put aside for the sake of the Nile, on which the survival of the basin's
peoples depends. Since Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia Share the Nile's ecosystem, they should quickly come to
terms with each other to avoid environmental catastrophes. The three countries should consider each
other as partners in development. As Liberal institutionalists say, states are becoming increasingly
interdependent in economic and welfare matters. As a result, states rightly consider each other as partners
in growth and development (Lowi, 1993:4). From the perspective of liberal institutionalists, since global
environmental change does not respect national borders, multilateral co-operation and the intensification
of common or shared interests across territorial units are required if it is to be successfully addressed
(Williams, 1996:51).
Thus, unilateral actions and attempts to strengthen national institutions could not protect states from the
impacts of border-transcending environmental degradation. The concept of absolute sovereignty does not
work in the case of transnational rivers; nor could it ensure national water security. Water supply security
depends on the good management of watersheds, which in turn underscores cooperation between or
among co-basin states. Without effective legal and institutional cooperation water may be utilized through
depletion, and each country may be left to the mercy of the actions of others in the sub-basin.
Once again, the ideal solution for the sustainable use: and management as well as for the satisfaction of
competing needs and conflicting interests is unitary basin-wide planning and development of water
resources, under some system of independent legal and institutional authority or regime: 'Effective regime
does not supersede or overshadow states but instead create networks over, around and within states that
generate the means and incentives for effective co-operation' (Vogler, 1996:9) International river and its
cross- border imperatives necessitate co-operation and mutual inclusion for the common good.
Thus, the sub-basin states are advised to change their old hostile attitudes to each other and are expected
to 'move from political relations that essentialise the borders of states to ecological ones that essentialise
the river's watershed' (Elzain, 2000:368). Particularly Egypt and Sudan should show willingness, sincerity
and commitment to change their old formula of excluding Ethiopia and maximizing their own national
agenda. This is not for the exclusive advantage of Ethiopia, but just for mutual advantage: watershed
management and regulation of the Blue Nile at its upper catchments will protect Sudan and Egypt from
siltation, unexpected floods and water shortage; and similarly, this will enable Ethiopia to irrigate its
western watersheds and generate more hydroelectric power for domestic consumption and export.
Although the sub-basin states have joined the NBI with the spirit of equitable and sustainable utilization
and management of the Nile waters. The impasse has not yet been broken. Divisive elements are still
persisting, blocking the road to co-operation.
On the other hand, Ethiopia and Sudan are currently working in many areas of mutual Concern, including
transportation, trade and port facilities. 'Trade exchange between the two countries has been gaining
momentum after the opening of the Metema-Gadarif road. Ethiopia has been importing petroleum and
various goods from Sudan while Sudan also begins to import bean, coffee and other commodities from
Ethiopia' (Kinfe, 2004:53). According to the same source, trade exchange between the two countries has
reached 40 million U.S. dollars over the last two months alone. This may erase the old suspicion and
distrust and may create interdependence and friendship between the two countries.
'Roads and railroads, carrying vitally traded goods among riparian states (fuel, fertilizers, grain, etc)
promote mutual dependency' (Waterbury, 1987:103). Accordingly to the same author, navigable stretches
of rivers and lakes (if any) offer similar possibilities, and ports provide still more (Waterbury, 1987:103).
This is what is being between Sudan and Ethiopia, albeit at its infantry stage.
If the two countries strength their economic mutual benefits and establish mutual dependency; and if this
functional co-operation spills over into the sub basin’s hydropolitics, Sudan will have two options: either to
influence and persuade Egypt to accept upstream states’ principle of equitable and reasonable utilization
through the existing NBI, or to unilaterally break links with Egypt in favor of cooperation with Ethiopia: in
fact this latter choice is at the risk of military threats from Egypt.
Similarly, Egypt will have two possibilities: either to accept upstream demand for the equitable utilization,
and co-operation with them, or to avert Ethio-sudanse co-operation by means of military intervention. But
Egypt military intervention in Sudan will (1) bring domestic and regional instability;(2) strengthen southern
Sudan peoples liberation army(SPLA), perhaps to secede from the north and establish its own autonomous
states.
If southern Sudan is separated from the north and controlled or administered by group with no Arab
orientation, Egypt might still face serious challenge to its water security. It can be judged that Egypt never
dares to accept an independent southern Sudan administered by group with no Arab sentiment because of
the Nile waters.
Thus, military intervention on the part of Egypt is detrimental not only to Egypt but also to the sub-basin as
a whole, because it will bring regional instability and will lead to further degradation or depletion of the
sub-basin’s natural resources and socio-economic crisis in general. Hence, the Egyptians should practice a
friendly, appeasing, and fruitful dialogue instead of sticking to the old formula of threats, military
intervention, and ethnic religious subversion.
Let us think the other way round , and say Sudan will not break hydropolitical links with Egypt in favors of
co-operation with Ethiopia: and say that Sudan and Egypt will insist on maintaining the prevailing status
quo, as a matter of necessity, Ethiopia will unilaterally move to irrigate her watersheds by using the Nile
waters. Then, reservoirs and irrigation canals in Sudan and Egypt will continue to be silted up and
unexpected drought-flood cycle will continue, thus endangering water supply and the survival of people in
the sub-basin.
Under this circumstances, water supply in Sudan and Egypt will be threatened both by the impacts of
environmental degradation and Ethiopia's unilateral exercise of its right to utilize the Nile's water. Then, to
secure their water supply, Sudan and Egypt might use military force against Ethiopia directly or through
proxies. But direct military attack against Ethiopia seems impractical because
Sudan is involved to the point of exhaustion with a civil war and could not for the foreseeable future
muster a force to defend its hydraulic interests. And while Egypt has considerable military
strength.... it has not the capacity to embark on campaigns in remote parts of the Nile basin
especially as the returns from such a military investment would be far outweighed by the sheer
economic cost, not to speak of the immeasurable political costs of such a venture (Allan, 1994:
308).
Moreover, Egypt's military capability could not fit to Ethiopia's landscape, as this was proved in 'the Yemen
in the 1960s, where-military operations in rough mountain terrain were not suited to Egypt's military
capabilities' (Waterbury, 1996:14).
Even if direct or indirect involvement in military confrontation takes place, it brings only regional instability
but not permanent solution to the Nile question. Moreover, Sudan and Egypt cannot solve problems of
environmental degradation by military force nor can they mitigate the problems with out watershed
management, which requires cooperation with Ethiopia. This is obvious for every mindful person.
This is the challenge, which the sub-basin states are currently facing with. The dilemma is whether Sudan
and Egypt continue their old trend of competition and conflict with Ethiopia in the face of rapidly mounting
environmental degradation, or change that trend, and co-operate with Ethiopia to mitigate environmental
problems. Obviously, mutual survival lies in effective co-operation, not in competition and conflict. Even
the Egyptians themselves realise the fact that without ecological conservation in the whole Basin,
reforestation of the Ethiopian highlands, and other co-operative enterprises aimed securing more waters,
the HAD will not save their country forever (Erlieh, 2002:218). This understanding must be converted to
practical implementation, up to and including new water sharing.
Therefore, since mutual benefit is rooted in co-operation through legal and institutional Framework, the
sub-basin states should work for the realization of co-operative Framework currently on going under the
NBI. Egypt should stop the trend of 'self-first' principle because if this principle is also adopted by other
riparian sates. Egypt will be affected more than any other basin state for it is completely dependent on the
water of a single river that is shared by nine other states. In the case of full-fledged unilateralism, Egypt will
be the victim of a zero-sum game. In other words, since Egypt is at the end of the line she would be
vulnerable to the actions of the upstream states (Bennett, 1991:96).
Hence, Egypt should totally abandon conflict-Iaden statements and work for confidence building and winwin solutions. The sub-basin states in particular should avoid the old trend of competition and conflict and
embark on a new trend of friendship, mutual trust and belongingness, They should be committed and
sincere in searching appropriate legal and institutional solutions for the Nile issue: for its equitable and
sustainable utilization, management, and for alternative means of enhancing available water supply. True
cooperation requires compromise and accommodation, and flexibility on the part of the parties involved.
CHAPTER EIGHT
Conclusion
Currently, the environment of highland Ethiopia is severely degraded. Within less than a century the forest
cover of highland Ethiopia was reduced from 40 percent to less than 3 percent. The upper catchments of
the Abbay/Blue Nile, Tekeze/ Atbara and Baro-Akobo rivers are severly deforested, through the former two
catchments are more deforested than the later one, and forest clearance is continuing at an estimated rate
varying from 8,000 to 20,000 hectares per annum. Thus, even the remaining forest cover of about 2.4
percent is said to be at great risk, hence putting our survival as a nation at danger.
Deforestation is one of the factors that cause increased run off, which leads to soil erosion and ultimately
to environmental degradation, In highland Ethiopia, soil erosion has not only been a continuous threat; it is
now more serious than ever before, it is serious in its severity, extent and the rate at which it progresses.
The rate of soil erosion in highland Ethiopia is estimated to be between 1 billion and 3.5 billion tons per
year. The catchments of Ethiopia's rivers in the western watershed are also experiencing severe soil
erosion, Thus, land degradation is a challenging problem in the country's western watersheds in particular,
and highland areas in general. Due to deforestation and its resultant soil erosion, Ethiopia has been and is
experiencing severe droughts, economic losses and losses in biodiversity.
Land degradation affects both natural and man-made water flows and storage regimes so that the extent
and frequency of flooding increase in wet seasons and drought in dry seasons, As a result of land
degradation in highland Ethiopia (the source of 86 percent of the Nile waters), the reservoirs in Sudan and
Egypt are losing their storage capacities, Silting up of dams creates water shortage in the storage regimes
and thus results in Socio-economic crisis of the countries whose life is based on the waters stored in the
storage regimes, This is true for Sudan and Egypt. Similarly, due to environmental degradation in highland
Ethiopia unexpected drought- flood catastrophes have been endangering the lives of people inhabiting the
lower basin of the sub-basin.
Since, the impacts of environmental degradation are border transcending; they affect the whole of the subbasin countries, albeit the degree might vary.
In other words, Ethiopia Sudan, and Egypt have, at varying degrees, been affected by the impacts of
environmental degradation in highland Ethiopia. Thus the challenge of environmental degradation is not
only for Ethiopia but also for Sudan and Egypt too.
On top of environmental degradation and its impacts, there is rapidly growing population in the sub-basin.
It is said that population growth further depletes the resource. The states of the sub-basin need to feed
their rapidly growing population. The three sub-basin states have thus intentions to expand their irrigation
agriculture. Their plan demanded more water than what is currently available. Hence it seems that there is
discrepancy between demand and supply. Obviously, demand is greater than supply What is more, even
available supply is on the trend of declining due to continuous drought in the basin.
The sub-basin states did not show committed attempts to solve the impacts of land degradation. Many
factors, including mutually exclusive doctrines and unfair status quo have distanced the sub-basin states
from seeking co-operative solutions for the problem. Even the sub-basin states have been engaged in
military conflicts either directly or through proxies. One sub-basin state, Egypt, maintained hegemony over
the basin by using its good access to the western money and diplomacy as well as by using its domestic
political and economic stability relative to other sub basin states. However, it is understood that, this will
not be permanent solution for the problems of the sub-basin, though there is (so far) no practical move on
the part of the sub-basin states (particularly Sudan and Egypt) towards genuine co-operation.
Even the recently emerged co-operative forum, the NBI, has not yet shown practical progress towards the
needed end. There is still disagreement on the legal and institutional co-operative framework (project D-3)
between upstream Ethiopia and downstream Sudan and Egypt. The core issue, that is, co-operative legal
and institutional framework has been stacked somewhere. This may soon result in the withdrawal of some
states like Ethiopia from the initiative, and thus may freeze the stalemate, blocking the way to cooperation
required for sustainable utilization and management of the Nile waters.
Since a drainage basin works as a systemic whole, it does not recognize political boundaries: it should be
managed jointly. Joint management and utilization of water resources like that of the Nile, need cooperation among the co-basin states. Accordingly, Sudan, Egypt and Ethiopia should sincerely co-operate to
properly manage and utilize the water resources of the sub-basin. The stability of upstream fresh water
flows depends upon maintaining the integrity of watersheds. This calls for conservation of mountain forests
as they are particularly important to maintaining a steady supply of fresh water to downstream areas.
Realist's view of state-centric approach to maximize one's own interest does not fit the case of river basins
as is seen in the Nile basin. In fact, Sudan and Egypt have beyond state-centrism tried to co-operate
between themselves and maximize their national water quota but failed. This is because the water does not
originate in Sudan and end in Egypt, or vice versa.
They missed the water source country-Ethiopia. Hence, if Sudan and Egypt want to permanently secure
their water supply, live in a healthy environment and bring peace and prosperity to their people, they
should co-operate with the water source country. The three countries have the common cause (the Nile),
which is the base of life, particularly for the lower basin states.
Thus, they have to consider each other as partners for development in the sub-basin. Since they are
partners in the Nile system, they should co-operate for its management and utilization. This fits the theory
of liberal institutionalism, which advises states to co-operate for the common good in this interdependent
world.
For genuine co-operation, what is needed is reconciling mutually exclusive doctrines. Equitable and
reasonable utilization should be accepted and practiced as the guiding principle. "Equitable and reasonable
utilization" should take precedence over the "no harm" principle. This could be achieved through
compromise and accommodation of interests, particularly on the part of the lower sub-basin states. In any
case Ethiopia should be given her riparian right. This would change the existing unfair status quo and
promote co-operation in the sub basin.
If the sub-basin states are really willing to compromise and accommodate each other's interests, and are
committed to true co-operation, they can tackle the apparent condition of water scarcity by using different
mechanisms. There are some available mechanisms, which are suggested by experts on the Nile. For
instance (Shapland, 1997) and (Waterbury, 1996) have suggested the mechanisms for water enhancing in
the sub basin which include, storage of Blue Nile water in Ethiopia and the concomitant operation of lake
Nasser at a lower level: the reduction of losses in the Sudd via the excavation of the Jonglei canal: using
ground water: importing "virtual water": using water saving technologies such as drip irrigation: shifting
from more to less water intensive crops: reutilizing drainage water; water pricing: and other conservation
measures.
The sub basin states should strive to apply workable mechanisms in the basin so as to come to negotiated
solutions for the prevailing problems in the region. The old trends of Power politics could not bring real and
lasting solution for the problems of land degradation in the sub-basin. Rather what is required is genuine
co-operation among the sub-basin states.
The sub-basin states are advised to identify and implement water storage systems for water supply, energy
production, flood control, and irrigation. Special attention should be given to those activities that increase
access by upstream communities to water and its benefits (clean drinking water, water for sanitation,
irrigation water, hydroelectricity, and revenues from water use by downstream consumers).
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