NAFTA Bad - Open Evidence Project

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***NAFTA Bad***
UQ- NAFTA Low Now
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NAFTA failures kills It’s credibility
Cypher ’11 (James, economics professor at Fresno State and author of Mexico Since NAFTA: Elite Delusions and the Reality of Decline, Mexico Since
NAFTA: Elite Delusions and the Reality of Decline- page 60//NS)
Far from helping to overcome Mexico’s economic backwardness, NAFTA has permanently tied
Mexico to a low-wage export strategy. In spite of the export boom, real manufacturing wages in
2002 were 12 percent below the 1994 level, while maquiladora wages only rose by 3 percent.2 In the same period, manufacturing sector
employment growth dropped by forty-four thousand jobs while maquiladora employment
growth rose by 493,000 jobs—roughly equal to one year’s worth of migration in the first half-decade of the twenty-first century. NAFTA
increased exports and foreign investment but it failed to generate significant employment
growth because of policy-based wage repression that constrained the domestic market. Labor
productivity failed to improve and from 1994 through 2009 employment growth in the formal economy averaged 387,000 jobs per year—absorbing only 38 percent of
Mexican youth leaving school for the labor market.3 Furthermore, Mexico deindustrialized under NAFTA because
transnational firms began to import more of their inputs and suppliers, almost exclusively
relying on a combination of imported components and cheap Mexican labor to process and
assemble products for re-export. Approximately 80 percent of Mexico’s exports were for the U.S. market, with foreign-owned firms
accounting for 80 percent of total exports. Although Mexico had a $93 billion trade surplus with the U.S. in 2010, overall it suffered a trade deficit.4 It fell from the
twelfth largest exporter in 2000 to the fifteenth largest exporter in 2010, with its share of global exports dropping from 2.61 percent to 1.96 percent. 5 Cheaper
imported consumer and intermediate goods (inputs) also undermined the domestic industrial base.
Stagnation, falling wages, a growing “jobs deficit,” and surging migration from 2001 through 2008
demonstrated the failure of NAFTA’s export-led strategy.
NAFTA fails—border infrastructure insufficient
Bronk and Payan 2009—Dr.
Christopher Bronk is a Fellow in Society, Technology and Public Policy and the James
A. Baker III Institute For Public Policy at Rice University. Dr. Tony Payan is the Assistant Professor of Political
Science at the University of Texas at El Paso. [“Developing the U.S.-Mexico Border Region for a Prosperous and
Secure Relationship. Managing the U.S.-Mexico Border: Human Security and Technology.” April 1, 2009.
http://bakerinstitute.org/publications/LAI-pub-BorderSecBronkPayan-040109.pdf]//MM
The impact of the growth of cross-border economic integration on border
infrastructure has been colossal, as has been the increased inspection protocols by U.S. border
officials, as dictated by the Department of Homeland Security after September 11. Economic integration has strained the
existing infrastructure because economic activity has grown at a faster pace than investment in
infrastructure. In addition, border security measures implemented after September 11 have
been found to impede the transborder flow of goods and people . A study by El Colegio de la Frontera Norte shows
that the efficiency of cross-border infrastructure has decreased over time. Some general findings are that nearly 46 percent of all roads
and highways leading to border stations are in poor condition. Fifty-five percent of the
municipal roads by which passenger vehicles access border crossings are insufficient for the
volume of traffic. Commercial routes also face serious obstacles: 50 percent have excessive traffic, 17 percent have limited road access, and l2
Infrastructure¶
percent have long queues to pass through the port. In regard to pedestrian crossings, there are too few inspection booths at 74 percent of' all U.S.-Mexico
border crossings and too few U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) inspectors at 80 percent of all ports of' entry. Finally, 86 percent of
the border-related national transportation system needs to be improved so that export goods
can reach their destination in a timely manner. 16 the current infrastructure is simply
insufficient to handle the volume of traffic, and the result is long queues, excessive traffic, and increased vehicular pollution.
NAFTA fails—border security
Cottam 2005—Martha
L. Cottam is Professor of Political Science and Director of the Washington State University
Institute for the Study of Intercommunal conflict. [“The Management of Border Security in NAFTA: Imagery,
Nationalism and the War on Drugs”. International Criminal Justice Review, May 2005.]//MM
NAFTA is the Western Hemisphere’s version of globalization. It envisions a free trade area that
requires the relatively unrestricted movement of people, goods and services across the internal
borders, ultimately leading to increased political, social, and cultural interdependence among the three member states. While the proponents of
NAFTA emphasize positive economic outcomes for the three partners, the dependence of those outcomes on open borders inevitably brings with it the
prospect of greater opportunities for transnational criminal activities. The easy movements of legal capital, services,
goods and workers require less border control. Yet, at the same time, to prevent illegal flows of
capital, goods, and workers, the border needs to be more fortified.
And as internal economic integration
¶ Border
control is caught in a vice - control must be exercised to prevent illegal trans-border acts but
legal commercial and people traffic cannot be brought to a halt. The examination of the responses of the NAFTA
partners to this reality at their national borders is the topic of this paper. We argue that an appropriate and effective balance
between opening and fortifying the borders, enabling and preventing traffic simultaneously,
will only be achieved through coordinated and cooperative security and law enforcement
policies by governments and agencies on both sides of the C-US and M-US borders. Specifically, we ask whether
strengthens, greater emphasis on controlling the common external NAFTA borders will become a significant policy issue as well.
law enforcement cooperation at the internal borders of NAFTA will follow similar paths at the Canada-US and Mexico-US borders and will lead to the
development of a common external NAFTA border control policy. We argue that the answer is no or not likely to both questions. ¶ Canada-United States
(C-US) and Mexico-United States (M-US) border relations have long yet very different histories The C-US border is often proclaimed, by both sides, as
the longest, peaceful, undefended border in the world. In contrast, the M-US border region has experienced a
contentious and often violent history; it has been, in Schmidt’s (1997: 300) succinct summation, “an ecosystem
for violence as a consequence of being removed form direct governmental supervision and a
lack of law enforcement by the centers of power.” The creation of NAFTA incorporated two bilateral borders which have faced and will face distinctly different problems for police
cooperation, and created a political, organizational and perceptual overlay on former bilateral relations which have had a profoundly different
character (Zagaris, 1995-96, 1996).
NAFTA fails now—Underfunding and internal problems
Hufbauer and Schott ’05 – Hufbauer is Reginald Jones Senior Fellow since 1992, Marcus Wallenberg
Professor of International Finance Diplomacy at Georgetown University, deputy assistant secretary for
international trade and investment policy of the US Treasury; Schott is a senior fellow since 1983, was senior
associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and international economist at the US treasury
(Gary Clyde and Jeffrey J, “NAFTA Revisited: Achievements and Challenges,” Chapter 9: Recommendations for
North American Economic Integration, Institute for International Economics, October 2005)//ER
First, we would consolidate the three national NAFTA sections into a¶ single staff, which should
be jointly funded. The current system of na-¶ tional staffs has resulted in funding disparity with
the US section chroni-¶ cally underfunded. The joint funding model should also be used to pay¶
for panelists and other expenses relating to the operation of dispute set-¶ tlement mechanisms.
To raise the profile of NAFTA institutions, the uni-¶ fied staff should be housed in a single
NAFTA headquarters building,¶ where NAFTA disputes could be heard. Second, in chapter 4, we
recom-¶ mend that the dispute settlement provisions of NAFTA be both strength-¶ ened and
simplified. Currently NAFTA disputes are addressed in a de-¶ centralized system governed by
four chapters (in addition to the two side¶ agreements on labor and environment).
Decentralization has caused some¶ controversy over which chapter should be applied to a given
dispute. To¶ avoid this, we suggest consolidation of the processes. Rather than four¶ separate
methods for selecting panelists, a single roster should be selected¶ for six-year terms. Panelists
should have a broad background in interna-¶ tional economic law and be capable of hearing
cases under any chapter.¶ In addition to panel consolidation, the hearing processes and
evidentiary¶ standards should be fine-tuned.¶ Second, the NAFTA partners need to reexamine
both the dispute settle-¶ ment provisions and how they are used. Chapter 11-on investor-state¶
disputes-has attracted the most criticism. We note above how it should¶ be clarified and
updated. Chapters 19 and 20 also merit attention.¶
NAFTA weak in the squo—Labor and environmental policies
Hufbauer and Schott ’05 – Hufbauer is Reginald Jones Senior Fellow since 1992, Marcus Wallenberg
Professor of International Finance Diplomacy at Georgetown University, deputy assistant secretary for
international trade and investment policy of the US Treasury; Schott is a senior fellow since 1983, was senior
associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and international economist at the US treasury
(Gary Clyde and Jeffrey J, “NAFTA Revisited: Achievements and Challenges,” Chapter 9: Recommendations for
North American Economic Integration, Institute for International Economics, October 2005)//ER
The NAFTA labor and environmental side agreements were never de¶ signed to make
substantial progress in addressing labor and environ-¶ mental problems. Negotiated primarily
to provide political cover for¶ Democratic members of the US Congress to support NAFTA, the
side¶ agreements were far from ambitious and were never funded at the level¶ necessary to
effectively deal with labor and environmental problems. The¶ labor side agreement is largely
hortatory. The environmental side agree-¶ ment is somewhat stronger, but no NAFTA country,
least of all the United¶ States, wants intrusive surveillance of its domestic environmental poli-¶
cies. Instead, the side agreements have managed to spotlight selective¶ labor and environmental
abuses. Labor unions and some nongovernmen-¶ tal organizations have seized on these shortcomings as a
broad rallying¶ cry against "NAFTA failures.
NAFTA weak—no financial cooperation
Hufbauer and Schott ’05 – Hufbauer is Reginald Jones Senior Fellow since 1992, Marcus Wallenberg
Professor of International Finance Diplomacy at Georgetown University, deputy assistant secretary for
international trade and investment policy of the US Treasury; Schott is a senior fellow since 1983, was senior
associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and international economist at the US treasury
(Gary Clyde and Jeffrey J, “NAFTA Revisited: Achievements and Challenges,” Chapter 9: Recommendations for
North American Economic Integration, Institute for International Economics, October 2005)//ER
Nonetheless, closer cooperation on monetary policy among the three ¶ NAFTA countries would
be desirable. To that end, we recommend that¶ the Federal Reserve Board of Governors invite
representatives of the¶ Banco de Mexico and the Bank of Canada to participate in its key meet-¶
ings-those where interest rate decisions are made-on a nonvoting¶ basis. Reciprocal invitations
should be forthcoming from the Banco de¶ Mexico and the Bank of Canada.¶ At the same time,
the NAFTA partners could usefully coordinate their¶ approaches to the regulation of financial
services. Mexico has experienced¶ a series of bank failures, while the collapse of Enron, Arthur
Andersen,¶ Global Crossing, and WorldCom, followed by a string of Wall Street and¶ CEO
scandals, starkly revealed the seamy underside of US finance.¶ Canada has a cumbersome
capital-market regulatory regime, which is run¶ by the provinces." Mexico and the United States
are both well along on¶ their own cleanup acts, but more could be clone in a North American
con-¶ text. In Canada, the trend toward harmonized securities regulation among¶ the provinces
is long overdue. A single national system would help even¶ more."
Trade disputes within NAFTA are currently handled by ad hoc tribunals, which
undermine the agreement’s credibility
Pastor 11 – (Robert Pastor, former US national security advisor and writer on foreign affairs) “North American Idea: A Vision of a Continental
Future.” 2011 p. 196 http://site.ebrary.com/lib/umich/Doc?id=10480770&ppg=219
NAFTA established four distinct dispute-settlement
mechanisms to deal with problems related to investments, trade remedies, finance, and higher-level trade issues. Chapter 11 of NAFTA
provides assurances that a firm’s investment would not be expropriated without prompt, adequate, and effective compensation. While it was
mainly intended to reassure foreign investors in Mexico, it has been used against all three countries and in
ways that no one had contemplated. The most controversial cases involved firms protesting new environmental rules that were judged
Permanent Tribunal for Trade and Investment Disputes.
“tantamount to expropriation.” In subsequent free-trade agreements with Chile and Central America, the United States revised the wording so as to
preclude any effect on environmental or health policies. 42 The three governments should sign a memorandum of agreement that would make NAFTA
consistent on this matter with the newer agreements. Chapter 19 was intended to prevent arbitrary, protectionist use of
U.S. trade laws, and although it set a limit of 315 days for completion of panel proceedings, the average length has been nearly twice that, and
the United States has been reluctant to accept any rulings against it. The most notorious case involved soft-wood
lumber “where the United States stalled cases interminably and Canadians eventually were forced to pay $1 billion to settle legal cases they had won
before bi-national panels and in U.S. courts.” 43 That $1 billion went to lawyers’ fees and nongovernmental organizations connected to the forestry
companies and the George W. Bush administration. This has left a very bad taste in the mouths of Canadians. The current ad hoc
dispute-settlement mechanisms rely on temporary panelists that are increasingly likely to have a
conflict of interest since many of the panelists have used their past experience to bring cases to the courts. Moreover, it is not
possible to establish precedents or build any institutional memory if one uses an ad hoc
mechanism. The three North American leaders should therefore establish a Permanent Tribunal for Trade and Investment Disputes and fold the
other dispute mechanisms into it. A Permanent Tribunal should prevent the three governments from gaming
the system and eroding the region’s confidence in NAFTA. The World Trade Organization (WTO) has
established such a permanent court, and it is functioning very effectively. It’s time to apply it to
North America.
NAFTA integration risks failure now – hurts US and Mexican economic
competitiveness
Peters, 09 – Enrique Dussel, professor at the Graduate School of Economics, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (“Manufacturing Competitiveness: Toward a
Regional Development Agenda,” The Future of North American Trade Policy: Lessons from NAFTA, Pardee Center, November 2009,
http://www.ase.tufts.edu/gdae/Pubs/rp/PardeeNAFTACh2PetersManufNov09.pdf)
First, Mexico´s
manufacturing share in GDP has fallen constantly since the end of the 1980s , from levels above 23 percent to
from 1994 to
March 2009 manufacturing´s share of total formal and permanent employment fell from 33 to 26 percent.
Since its peak in October 2000, the sector lost 1.04 million permanent jobs through March 2009—or 25 percent. In the
recent economic crisis, manufacturing has been hit particularly hard, suffering 59 percent of the country’s total
employment losses from October 2008 to March 2009. Weakening Integration Second, the integration process within NAFTA, and
concretely between Mexico and the United States, has been weakening steadily since 2000. From a Mexican perspective, the
share of trade with the United States fell from levels above 86 percent in the 1990s to 73 percent in 2008. In
manufacturing the fall has been more substantial, with Mexico’s share of U.S. manufacturing imports dropping
from levels above 80 percent in the 1990s to 45 percent in November 2008. Similarly, as measured by the Grubel-Lloyd Index that calculates the
percent of trade that is within industries, intra-industry trade (at the four-digit level of the Harmonized Tariff System) reached its highest level in
1998 with 48 percent and fell since then to levels below 43 percent. This trend is a clear indicator of declining economic
integration between Mexico and the United States. Dependence on the U.S. Third, these tendencies have been evident in value chains that are of particular regional
levels below 19 percent in the last quarter of 2008 (and since 2001). In terms of formal permanent employment, the conditions have been harsher:
importance—yarn-textile-garments, electronics, and auto parts-automobiles. The current global crisis has taken a heavy toll on these industries. In automobiles, for example, it
is very possible that only one or two of the Big Three U.S. auto companies—GM, Chrysler and Ford—will survive the crisis. Mexico´s auto parts-automobile industry is highly
dependent on these three firms, since they account for almost 60 percent of total auto parts and automobile production. New Competitiveness Finally, it is worth remembering
that during the period 1994–2000, the implementation of NAFTA helped the auto parts-automobiles, electronics, and yarntextilegarments industries restructure. In both the
United States and Mexico, this increasing integration contributed to new competitiveness in North America to better compete with Asia. Causes and Effects A number of
factors contribute to these trends. NAFTA made the auto, electronics, and garment industries more dynamic. Yet the dynamism was largely cut off from the broader economy
because the firms in this sector tended to ignore Mexico as a source of inputs or markets, preferring to import the majority of its inputs and export the majority of its output.
Thus, much of Mexico’s domestic manufacturing sector was hollowed out. This was a result of certain preferential programs in Mexico that favored importing inputs, a
persistently overvalued exchange rate due to Mexico’s tight monetary policy, and low tariffs under NAFTA. NAFTA’s investment and intellectual property rules also made it
difficult to pursue East Asian-like policies to enhance industrial competitiveness (though it is not clear the Mexican government would have used such policies if they had the
space to do so). China’s accession to the WTO accentuated these forces. Mexico’s exchange rate became even more overvalued relative to competitors (China) in the U.S.
market. These factors, in addition to the preference toward imports in national programs and in NAFTA, made importing all more important. More importantly, those sectors
Manufacturing sectors in all three
NAFTA countries are in a deep crisis, a crisis which has been growing since the end of the 1990s. More
worrisome than the short term is probably the medium- and long-term state of the sector in terms of its
competitiveness in Mexico and in the U.S. market, particularly in comparison with China and the rest of Asia.
that experienced dynamism from 1994 to 2000 began to lose competitiveness in the U.S. market with respect to China.5
Economic disintegration is hollowing NAFTA now
Peters, 09 – Enrique Dussel, professor at the Graduate School of Economics, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (“Manufacturing Competitiveness: Toward a
Regional Development Agenda,” The Future of North American Trade Policy: Lessons from NAFTA, Pardee Center, November 2009,
http://www.ase.tufts.edu/gdae/Pubs/rp/PardeeNAFTACh2PetersManufNov09.pdf)
One of the Mexican government’s goals in signing NAFTA was to expand its manufacturing sector by stimulating exports. In the early years following implementation, Mexico
succeeded in attracting foreign investment and increasing manufacturing exports, with notable expansion in automotive, apparel, and electronics, among others. Yet this
apparent success masks fundamental weaknesses, as the
three NAFTA countries together have been losing their ability to compete
in manufacturing in the global market. This suggests the need for a more proactive and long-term regional response. Even before the recent
global financial and economic crisis1, the manufacturing sectors in the NAFTA-region were under similarly extreme
pressures. The share of manufacturing in terms of GDP and employment has been falling in the three NAFTA countries, particularly since 2000 (See Figure 1).
Contrary to the period 1994–2000, which saw increasing regional integration in a highly competitive global
market, from 2000–2009 (March) the NAFTA region together lost 6.3 million jobs in manufacturing, or 27 percent
of total employment in the sector.2 This suggests that in general, and in particular since 2000, the process of
regional integration has deteriorated; in fact, an increasing process of “disintegration” has been
taking place since then. These tendencies have only deepened since the second half of 2008 with the global crisis. In recent years,
the original NAFTA integration agenda among the NAFTA countries has given way to one focused on security topics, with
little sustained attention to socioeconomic, infrastructure, and other regional development issues.
NAFTA needs to be revised to reflect new economic changes
– member of the Trade and Environment Policy Advisory Committee on International Economic
Policy of the US Department of State, former official of the U.S. Treasury Department in international trade
and energy policy, former professor at Georgetown University, author of numerous books and articles on trade
Schott 2008
(Jeffrey J., “THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT: TIME FOR A CHANGE?” Peterson
Institute for International Economics, November 21-23 2008//SRM)
Some items were excluded from NAFTA coverage (including some farm products, energy investment in
Mexico, rules on subsidies and dumping, and migration).
Some NAFTA provisions were weakly constructed and should be recast (including the labor and
environmental side accords, and some dispute settlement procedures and definitions).
Changing conditions in the global environment in which the NAFTA operates that were not on
the radar screen of the original draftsmen (especially border security and climate change).
Simply put, despite a decade of progress, the three NAFTA partners still have a lot of work to do
together to address new economic and political challenges that threaten to impede future
benefits from regional economic integration. There are many specific areas of friction among
the three countries; some problems remain intractable such as illegal immigration and others like
trucking and sugar involve strong political constituencies. For this paper, we focus on broader topics that
merit attention and can produce concrete gains from cooperation among the NAFTA partners.
Revising NAFTA is necessary-- agreement falling short
Gallagher 09
[Kevin. Associate Professor of International Relations. Specializes in Economic Development, Trade and
investment policy , international environmental policy, and Latin America. Reforming North American Trade
Policy: Lessons From NAFTA. 02/12/09. http://www.cipamericas.org/archives/1940 // SRSL]
After 15 years there is now widespread agreement that the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) has fallen short of its stated goals. Rather than triggering a convergence
across the three nations, NAFTA has accentuated the economic and regulatory asymmetries
that had existed among the three countries. Since 2001, the region has actually seen a decline in
levels of integration in key areas such as manufacturing.2 Thus, it is no surprise that the agreement continues to
generate controversy. While proponents credit the agreement with stimulating the flow of goods, services, and investment among the North American
countries, critics in all three countries argue that this has not brought improvements in the
standards of living of most people. In the United States, the agreement is blamed for job loss,
for adding downward pressure on wages, particularly in manufacturing, and for contributing
to a large U.S. trade deficit. In Canada, critics point to job losses, the declining competitiveness
of the manufacturing sector, and the constraints NAFTA has put on Canada to deploy adequate
policies for public welfare. In Mexico, NAFTA is blamed for creating few new jobs while
decimating many existing sources of livelihood, particularly in agriculture. In all three
countries, citizen groups and government officials decry the capability granted foreign
investors to sue governments if legislation negatively affects their profits, or expected profits.
The demands for changes in NAFTA, made by the civil societies of each of these three countries,
go well beyond the May 2007 concessions that the newly elected Democratic majority in the
U.S. Congress won from the Bush administration. These concessions include reforms in labor,
environmental, and intellectual property provisions for future trade agreements, which were incorporated into the pending
agreements with Peru, Panama, and Colombia. As of this writing only the first has been approved, while serious criticisms on human rights and financial
issues continue to hold up the other two. Reformers in the U.S. Congress introduced the "Trade Reform, Accountability, Development, and Employment
Act" (TRADE Act) of 2009 in the summer of 2009. With more than100 co-sponsors from both chambers, the TRADE Act calls for a review of existing
trade pacts, including NAFTA. The act also sets forth instruments to be included in the template for future agreements.
NAFTA doesn’t solve; continental collaboration has to be enforced
Blank 6/17 (Stephen Blank, Research Professor of National Security Affairs, “North American Solutions”,
6/17/13, http://www.worldpolicy.org/blog/2013/06/17/north-american-solutions)
This year marks NAFTA’s 20th anniversary, and we can look back on impressive (if widely unknown)
achievements in building a more integrated North American economic system. But to cope with looming
continental issues, Canada, the United States, and Mexico need to work even more closely
together—simply revamping this two-decade-old agreement won’t be enough. NAFTA wasn’t the
beginning of North America’s more integrated economic system. Rather, NAFTA recognized and formalized
changes in the structure of the North American economy already underway. Today Mexico, Canada, and the
United States are deeply interconnected and interdependent, with an unprecedented degree of collaboration
among them. What is particularly important are not just increases in trade in raw materials and
finished goods among the three nations, but rather the striking growth in the cross border
movement of parts and components. We don’t just sell stuff to each other. We make stuff together. We
share integrated energy markets, use the same roads and railroads to transport jointly-made products, fly on
the same integrated airline networks, and increasingly meet the same standards of professional practice. This is
the true North American “reality.” By the 1990s, key elements of North America’s economy could be visualized
as deeply integrated continental supply chains linking production centers and distribution hubs across the
continent. No one planned these developments. The most powerful drivers of change were “bottom-up”
changes in corporate strategies and structures rather than “top-down” government plans or decisions. This
“bottom-up” approach worked well in the 1980s and 90s, when excess capacity existed in our freight
transportation system, as new technologies (like doubt stacking containers) came on line, and governments
deregulated rail and trucking industries. But that era is over and the bottom up approach no longer suffices to
tackle new issues. The problems didn’t begin with September 11th, although post 9-11 regulations have
“thickened” borders, making business more expensive and complex. The fundamental flaw in the NAFTA
structure has been the failure of the three governments to acknowledge that the trade
agreement was only one element of this North American reality, and only a first step toward
achieving a stable foundation for continental collaboration and growth. But Ottawa, Washington, and Mexico
City continue to emphasize that the three “NAFTA partners” are trading partners, nothing more. This failure
of a trilateral vision inhibits efforts to upgrade the NAFTA system. Calls to renegotiate NAFTA
after 9-11 led nowhere, and the collapse of the more serious effort to enlarge the scope of North
American regulatory and security cooperation in the Security and Prosperity Partnership in
2009 revealed that leaders were not prepared to confront wild accusations that this was a step
toward a “North American Union.” The work of the U.S.-Canada Regulatory Cooperation Council has
been more successful but still modest—bilateral rather than trilateral and focused essentially on making the
border more efficient and secure rather than on the issues coming at us. While trade restrictions and border
issues remain vital concerns, we must be prepared to face these new, pressing problems: Energy, for example,
must be viewed in continental terms. We all benefit from North America’s deeply integrated oil, gas, and
electricity systems. In this new energy-rich environment, we must determine an energy mix that optimizes
availability, cost, and sustainability for the next generations. Environmental threats cannot be discussed as
three separate national issues. We have given surprisingly little attention to building collaborative adaptation
mechanisms for dealing with climate change. We have not thought about how to improve our continental
supply chains—and, indeed, what shape these might take in the next decades. We need to focus serious
attention on learning more about how North America works and on the factors that drive or inhibit our
competitive advantage. North Americans face a tremendous infrastructure crisis. Competitiveness requires
efficient, safe, and sustainable transport (road, rail, air, and water); logistics systems; border crossings; and
energy infrastructure. We have not thought about a 21st century continental infrastructure of roads, rails, and
ports. We are all undergoing extensive demographic changes that limit economic growth and fiscal balance and
create political, economic, and social turmoil. The issue is not just Mexican immigration to the United States,
but aging in all three countries. All three countries experience high levels of internal migration as people follow
jobs; all three face growing imbalances of the supply of medical and educational resources and changing levels
of demand for these services. As we begin to focus on these issues, efforts to revitalize the movement toward
economic integration in North America should not be directed toward the negotiation of a new grand bi- or
tripartite trade deal. We cannot think of trying to build a North American version of the European Community.
What we need to launch is not a new trade negotiation but a political campaign. First, we must begin with a
vision of what North America might look like in the mid-21st century—how efficient, sustainable and secure
energy, climate change, supply chain, infrastructure, and demographic-health systems might operate in
another 30 or 40 years. Second, instead of compressing many different issues into a single
negotiation, discussions must be separated and treated individually. We should begin with a view of
three sovereign nations seeking means to confront common, often shared problems. An integrated “North
America” should be a vehicle for collaboration rather than the goal of collaboration. We do not suggest that
every problem that exists has a North American solution. But we have to stop being afraid to consider
continental ideas and approaches to some of our most pressing problems. It should be natural—not unusual—
to think of continental collaboration as a tool to deal with particular issues. Third, we must build a much
broader base of informed and active constituencies. The NAFTA approach confined discussions
about North America to a small number of beltway trade experts. But the issues we face today
are large and difficult, and we are burdened with a history of misinformation (for example, about
a massive, secret Mexico to Canada trade corridor) and deeply embedded fears (eroded sovereignty in a North
American Union). Large constituencies that support North American integration do exist. They consist of
companies that run continental production, supply, and marketing systems; cities where jobs depend upon
efficient North American transportation and logistics networks; and communities living on the borders. Many
government, business, and civil society groups are aware of their roles integrating communities across Canada,
the United States, and Mexico. Still for even the most informed, the concept of an integrated North America is
limited to more traditional pan-national tasks of getting parts on to loading docks, keeping oil and gas flowing
in pipelines, matching electrical demand and supply, considering how weather might affect water flows, and
tracking threatening invasive species. The aim should be to mobilize these disconnected groups into
coherent communities that recognize interests in continental collaboration. We must stimulate
continual conversations among these groups, build ongoing ties with research and teaching institutions, and
mobilize constituencies in energy, climate change, supply chains, infrastructure, and demographics. We need
to think about how to institutionalize these conversations and thus climb beyond the repetitive, ad-hoc
approach that has characterized discussions of North America over the past three decades. Discussions must
involve perspectives from different regions, different economic and social sectors, and from
those who oppose further integration. If efforts to build a new North American system rest
solely on the creation of a new Ottawa-Washington-Mexico City corridor, they will lack
legitimacy in many parts of the continent. The issues that we now face cannot be conducted under the
legislative and media radar. We must stop being afraid of public debate on the future of North America. If we
act like conspirators, we will surely be accused of conspiracy.
NAFTA’s lack of immigration policy makes implementation impossible – there are differences
in provisions for Canadian and Mexican immigrants
McGehee 2 (Melinda, JD from Dedman School of Law, “Using Immigration as a Protectionist Mechanism
While Promoting Free Trade, “Using Immigration as a Protectionist Mechanism While Promoting Free Trade,”
8 Law & Bus. Rev. Am. 667, Fall, Lexis)
Thus, unfortunately, the negotiators' "careful tactics" of ignoring the issue have created more of a
divide between immigration in the United States and NAFTA.¶ n12 Id. at 366.¶ ¶ n13 Alan C. Nelson,
NAFTA: Immigration Issues Must Be Addressed, 27 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 987, 987 (1994).¶ When looking at the
overall effect of U.S. immigration in NAFTA, one can see that it is quite limited. "NAFTA does not address
permanent immigration. All entries under its provisions are determined to be temporary, and
business persons entering under NAFTA are presumed to return to their home countries." n14
In looking at the opposite side of the spectrum, NAFTA does not address illegal immigration either.
n15 It is interesting to note that although NAFTA never addressed these issues, the controversy of illegal
immigration was a point of issue for the supporters and detractors of NAFTA. n16 "NAFTA supporters argued
that the trade agreement would reduce the illegal immigration in the long run by stimulating the Mexican
economy and thereby creating jobs, increasing wages and raising the standard of living for Mexicans." n17 The
argument appears somewhat logical except [*670] for the fact that immigration and complexities were not a
focus in drafting NAFTA. Post-drafting, however, it turns out to be an objective of NAFTA.¶ n14 Schoonover,
supra note 3, at 4.¶ n15 Id.¶ n16 Id.¶ n17 Id.¶ ¶ II. Annex to Chapter 16--Immigration Provisions¶ The majority of
the volume of information within chapter 16 is found in annex 1603 on "Temporary Entry for Business
Persons." n18 Annex 1603 is composed of four parts: section A on business visitors, section B on traders and
investors, section C on intra-company transferees, and section D on professionals. n19¶ n18 Gal-Or, supra note
6, at 380.¶ n19, at annex 1603.¶ "Section A ... requires the UNITED STATES, Canada and Mexico to grant
temporary entry to a business person from another NAFTA party who is otherwise qualified and who seeks to
engage in an occupation or profession within one of the seven categories of business activities listed in
Appendix 1603.1." n20 The categories consist of the following: research and design; growth, manufacture and
production; marketing; sales; distribution; after-sales service; and general service. n21 This list is nonexclusive.
Thus, a business visitor may be allowed to enter for the purpose of a business not listed in appendix 1603.1 "as
long as the activity is consistent with existing immigration measures applicable to temporary entry to that
country." n22¶ n20 Schoonover, supra note 3, at 5.¶ n21 Id.¶ n22 Id.¶ Although section A appears to be rather
self-explanatory, there are hidden differences within regarding treatment to Canadians and
Mexicans. "Prior to the NAFTA, Canadian citizens were not required to obtain a visa for entry
into the United States, not even to present a passport at the border." n23 Even today with the
implementation under NAFTA, the procedures allowing Canadians to enter the United States are
still relatively relaxed. n24 This is due to the fact that the provisions for Canadians under
NAFTA are quite similar to the ones under the U.S.-Canadian Free Trade Agreement (CFTA)
regarding the movement of people. n25 In fact, "Canadians will be treated no less favorably under
NAFTA than they have been treated under the FTA." n26¶ n23 Gal-Or, supra note 6, at 381.¶ n24 Id.¶ ¶ n25
United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement, Jan. 2, 1988, U.S.-Can., 27 I.L.M. 281 (1988); Ellen G. Yost,
NAFTA--Temporary Entry Provisions--Immigration Dimensions, 22 CAN-U.S. L.J. 211, 215 (1996).¶ n26 Id.¶
Alternatively, for as far as Mexicans entering the United States, the same procedures of requiring a valid
passport or visa are still strongly enforced. n27 In addition, when a professional enters the
United States under NAFTA he must show that he is a citizen of either Canada or Mexico. n28
"Mexican citizens are persons who have Mexican nationality, [*671] have reached the age of 18,
and have an honest means of livelihood." n29 Interestingly enough, "no definition of what
constitutes a Canadian citizen appears in NAFTA." n30 Thus, the drafters made more than
obvious the difference in treatment of Canadians over Mexicans. "Although the NAFTA includes
Mexico in the preferential trading relationship established by the FTA, Chapter 16 does not
offer Mexican citizens as easy entry to the United States as it offers Canadians." n31 One possible
explanation for this inconsistency is that the U.S. negotiators were concerned about the accession clause in
NAFTA, "and that any advantages given Mexicans would be available without further negotiations to citizens of
countries acceding to the NAFTA in the future." n32 Another explanation scholars have mentioned is that the
1990 enactment of the amended Immigration and Nationality Act that changed U.S. immigration law makes
some entries much more difficult. n33 Thus, with the implementation of the new law there was no choice for
the drafters but to follow these new measures of U.S. immigration law.¶ n27 Gal-Or, supra note 6, at 381.¶ ¶ n28
David B. Etherington & Donna Lea Hawley, Hiring Professionals under NAFTA, IMMIGR. BRIEFINGS Feb.
1997, at 1.¶ n29 Id. at 3.¶ n30 Id.¶ ¶ n31 IMMIGRATION PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE UNDER THE NORTH
AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 2 (Janet H. Cheetham et al. eds., American Immigration Lawyers
Association 1995).¶ n32 Id.¶ n33 Id.¶ These differences in treatment between Mexicans and Canadians under
NAFTA regarding immigration are found in various sections under annex 1603, but they do not appear to be
consistent with the goals of NAFTA according to the provisions concerning national treatment. n34 Article 301
states the following:¶ 1. Each Party shall accord national treatment to the goods of another party ...¶ 2. The
provisions of paragraph 1 regarding national treatment shall mean, with respect to a state or province,
treatment no less favorable than the most favorable treatment accorded by such state or province to any like,
directly competitive or substitutable goods, as the case may be, of the Party of which it forms a part. n35 ¶ n34
NAFTA, supra note 1, at art. 301.¶ n35 Id.¶ Thus, if the parties are to accord national treatment to the goods of
another, then how can this be plausible if they are not according national treatment from an immigration
perspective? Goods are often transported by particularly skilled people, so if the countries do not
have reciprocal requirements involving the movement of people, then clearly, national
treatment is not being followed. By implication, one would think this standard of treatment
also applies to services since they can be seen as the goods of a country. Therefore, the provisions of
chapter 16 appear to be the exception to this standard.¶ Section B, Traders and Investors, provisions in NAFTA
differ from the reference in the CFTA between Canada and the United States. The provisions in NAFTA
"broaden this reference to entries to establish, develop, administer, or provide advice or key technical services
to the operation of an investment to which the business person or the business person's enterprise has
committed, or is in the process of committing, a substantial [*672] amount of capital." n36 A visa requirement
is allowed under this section and "it is the only category which treats Canadians and Mexicans alike." n37¶ n36
Schoonover, supra note 14, at 1.¶ n37 Gal-Or, supra note 6, at 381.¶ Section C, Intra-Company Transferees, deals
with individuals who are transferred within the same enterprise or its affiliate from one Party to another. n38 A
Party may require that such business person shall have been employed continuously by the enterprise for one
year within the three-year period immediately preceeding the date of the application for admission." n39 The
United States maintains this requirement, but Canada and Mexico have chosen to drop it, n40 which focuses
on the national treatment concept mentioned previously. In addition, there is an optional visa requirement, but
both Canadian and Mexican employers must file a petition. However, "the Canadians are spared one step
in the processing procedure compared to the steps required from a Mexican applicant." n41
Canadians are allowed to present their petition at a Class A port of entry with their own intra-company
transferee application. n42 "This one-step processing greatly expedites the procedure for the petitioning
employer." n43 In contrast, a Mexican national must process his employer's petition "through one of the four
INS regional service centers [where it] typically takes three to four weeks." n44 Thus, the theme in moving
people by not abiding by national treatment continues in section C.
¶ n38 Id.¶ n39, supra note 1, at art. 1.¶ n40 Gal-Or, supra note 6, at 373.¶ n41 Id.¶ ¶ n42 Gerald A. Wunsch, Why
NAFTA's Immigration Provisions Discriminate Against Mexican Nationals, 5 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV.
127, 133 (1994).¶ n43 Id.¶ n44 Id.¶ Section D consists of professionals known as the TN ("Trade NAFTA")
category. n45 The appendix contains a list of sixty-three professions with minimum educational credentials
and "only persons coming to work 'in' one of these enumerated professions may be accommodated under the
TN category." n46 Section D states that no Party to NAFTA may require prior approval procedures, petitions,
labor certification tests, or other procedures, or impose or maintain any numerical restriction relating to the
temporary entry of Section D professionals under NAFTA. n47 "However, Section D [as with other Sections]
preserves the right of a Party to impose a visa requirement on professionals of another Party," ... in addition,
"unlike the other sections of Annex 1603 ... Section D allows a Party to establish an annual numerical limit with
regard to professionals of another NAFTA Party." n48¶ n45 Schoonover, supra note 3, at 4.¶ n46 Vasquez-Azpiri,
supra note 2, at 809.¶ n47 Wunsch, supra note 42, at 134.¶ n48 Id.¶ One can easily note the obvious
contradictions just within this section. Canadians can apply for this status when entering the country
"without any prior petition or visa approval" just as they could under the CFTA. n49 Mexicans,
on the other hand, have [*673] to meet the same requirements as other professionals under the
H - 1B status, such as obtaining a labor certification from the DOL and following routine INS
procedures. n50 Canadians entering under TN status can work for a U.S. employer or entity or a foreign
employer that provides "prearranged services to a U.S. entity." n51 However for Mexicans entering under TN
status, they may enter for work with a U.S. employer. n52 In addition, "NAFTA establishes an annual
numerical cap on Mexican TN admissions ... [such that] only 5,500 Mexican TN's will be admitted each
year for a ten-year period, although the number may be increased by agreement of the U.S. and Mexican
governments." n53 These contradictions are stated within an order to "allow" this disparate
treatment between Canadians and Mexicans. "The TN application process for Mexican
professionals is far more complex and costly than for Canadian professionals, creating a
chilling effect that has held down the number of TN petitions filed by Mexican citizens." n54¶ n49
Schoonover, supra note 3, at 4.¶ n50 Id.¶ n51 Etherington, supra note 28.¶ n52 Id.¶ n53 1 Immigr. Law & Bus. §
2.76 (2001).¶ n54 Etherington, supra note 28.¶ Scholars comment that this difference in treatment of Canadians
and Mexicans throughout annex 1603 is a result of the tightening needed on Mexican immigration to the
United States. n55 For example,¶ the premise underlying NAFTA's annual approval limit of 5,500 petitions for
Mexican TN nationals is that this quota is needed to prevent a flood of cheap labor from entering the United
States to compete with degreed professionals ... NAFTA's contrary premise is that labor conditions in Canada
are so favorable compared to the United States that we need not concern ourselves about the entry of a horde of
degreed professionals from the North. n56¶ n55 See Schoonover, supra note 3, at 4.¶ n56 Wunsch, supra note
42, at 141.¶ Both of these premises appear to be false. During the first six months of NAFTA zero
applications for Mexican nationals for TN status were approved, and when looking at the
acceleration rate of Canadians under the CFTA, "there is every reason to expect that they will
continue an accelerating exodus to the United States under NAFTA." n57 But even if these premises
are not exactly accurate, a need to tighten Mexican immigration remains a likely influence.
However, this difference does not follow the national treatment standard as expressed so clearly in NAFTA.¶
n57 Id.¶ Besides the differences in treatment within each category, the TN category encounters various
problems of its own in NAFTA. The TN category's purpose was to facilitate cross-border movement of
people between the NAFTA countries; however, the "TN category is not functioning as effectively as it
could or should." n58 "The unqualified boon to cross-border labor mobility between the U.S. and Canada
promised at the inception of the NAFTA has never materialized, and what we have today is a needlessly
complicated admission system that is fraught with pitfalls, and often arbitrarily implemented,
and continues to produce an unacceptably high number of denials of application by [*674]
admissible professionals." n59 One of the difficulties lies in that the INS has trouble recognizing software
engineers as "engineers" under the TN category. n60 The INS believes that the degree or license held by the
applicant for admission must be identical to the field "or even relevant to the profession in which admission is
sought." n61 INS officials seem to insist on matching up degree to profession almost exactly, which in turn
inhibits the movement of people and trade under NAFTA. n62 For example, one can see the problems that
arise for a computer software engineer holding a degree in computer science when previous versions of the
Occupational Outlook Handbook correlated degrees in computer or electrical engineering for computer
engineers and degrees in computer science for computer scientists. n63 There have been positive changes
made correcting this confusion concerning software engineers with computer science degrees, n64 but recently
"a trend among INS offices at the Canadian border to deny TN applications for software engineers with
computer engineering degrees has emerged." n65 The reason for these denials appears to be an opinion of
multiple INS officers that, "in accordance with the prescriptions of the Occupational Outlook Handbook,
persons with computer engineering degrees are more appropriately classified under NAFTA as Hardware
Engineers or Computer Systems Analysts than as Software Engineers." n66 As one can see, there are various
problems between the rigid immigration rules and the push to allow free movement of people
for labor-mobility.¶ n58 Vasquez-Azpiri, supra note 2, at 818.¶ n59 Id.¶ n60 Id. at 810.¶ n61 Id. at 811.¶ n62 Id.
at 811-12.¶ n63 Id. at 812.¶ n64 Id.¶ n65 Id.¶ n66 Id.¶ Clearly, these tensions between U.S. immigration and
NAFTA are not welcomed by the other NAFTA countries. An author in THE ECONOMIST in 2000
noted the following:¶ The contradictions in America's immigration laws are becoming increasingly
awkward to live with. Canada is getting cross with a partner who insists on ever freer trade but
keeps on erecting barriers at its frontier. Some people ask whether a trade block need
necessarily involve the free movement of labor as well as that of capital and goods. n67¶ n67 Id. at
818-19.¶ Regarding the TN entry problem, some believe the fault lies with the INS officers "who lack
adequate training, and whose principal motivation, arguably in violation of Article 1602 of
NAFTA, is not to promote the free flow of services, but misunderstanding or ignoring NAFTA's
basic function of providing temporary labor mobility rather than facilitating immigration to
protect the U.S. work force." n68¶ n68 Id. at 820.¶ Finally, what is another country to do in reaction to such
"trade barriers?" Unfortunately, there is not a specific dispute resolution provision within Chapter 16
of NAFTA. n69 "When faced with a Party's refusal to grant temporary entry, another Party may not [*675]
invoke the NAFTA's overall dispute settlement provisions unless it can demonstrate that the denial arises out
of a pattern of repeated practices and that the business person has exhausted available administrative
remedies." n70 Therefore, it is not easy to resolve these tensions and contradictions within the
rules of NAFTA.¶ n69 Ellen Ginsberg Yost, Immigration Provisions of the North American Free Trade
Agreement, 515 PLI/LIT 9, 39 (1994).¶ n70 Id. at 39-40.¶ When these tensions of national treatment and
contradictory actions taking place at the border rise to the surface, many people brush them aside and reiterate
that NAFTA "did not seek to harmonize their immigration regimes or to create a common labor market or
passport union" n71 such as the European Union did. This argument is an easy way to dismiss the
inconsistencies and problems with immigration under NAFTA. Although NAFTA does not have the same goals
as a common labor market, the goals it states within the agreement must be clear and recognized in practice.
Even if the actual immigration procedures were never meant to be harmonized, one would
think that the basic goals among the NAFTA countries should be harmonized.¶ Canada is more
interested in, and hence committed to, using immigration as a strategy to invite human capital and attract
talent. Unlike the UNITED STATES, where size and prosperity foster a sense of economic selfsufficiency, Canada realizes that, in an increasingly competitive global economy, it is
impossible to have free trade without the companion movement of people. n72¶ n71
IMMIGRATION PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE UNDER THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE
AGREEMENT, supra note 31, at 3.¶ ¶ n72 Asher Frankel & Gary Endelman, Go North Young Man, Go North:
Working Temporarily in Canada from an American Perspective, 77 No. 3 INTERPRETER RELEASES 73, 87
(2000).¶ The United States does not appear to need this influx of people as much as Canada, but they are both
part of a free trade agreement and thus need to find a way where the restrictions on the movement of people do
not become a barrier to trade. For example, "while accepting employment-based immigration, the UNITED
STATES does not seek to encourage it or endow it with the integrity that is its only enduring justification ...
[but] Canada needs, even invites, temporary employment from abroad to a far greater extent
than the UNITED STATES" n73 NAFTA is a free trade agreement and differences are allowed.
But differences that inhibit trade should be addressed. United States Immigration discussions
were not a focus during the negotiations of NAFTA and, although they are a material part of
NAFTA's everyday existence, they still do not seem to be a focus.
Reforming the TN visa is critical – it’s the only way to ensure an effective free trade regime
McGehee 2 (Melinda, JD from Dedman School of Law, “Using Immigration as a Protectionist Mechanism
While Promoting Free Trade, “Using Immigration as a Protectionist Mechanism While Promoting Free Trade,”
8 Law & Bus. Rev. Am. 667, Fall, Lexis)
So where is the solution? It appears from the various agreements trying to extend the borders in the EU, in the
hopes of economic and social integration, that the Member States have found many more problems than
expected. Thus, from using their experience, open and free borders within the NAFTA countries are
not a reasonable solution to address the underlying differences between those countries.
Rather, NAFTA itself is a reasonable solution.¶ The Treaties of the EU have established an open system
allowing for the free movement of people, while NAFTA has been much more restrictive in its
approach, but much more effective for the purposes of free trade including the movement of
people. NAFTA and its conservative approach is a useful tool in "addressing" immigration (even
if implicitly), as long as it is used correctly. As stated previously, many believe that NAFTA has been used
to stop, or at least reduce, the flood of illegal Mexican immigrants into the United States. Therefore, such
motives would explain the discrepancies that exist within NAFTA between Canada and Mexico.
But NAFTA needs to start being used as a more persuasive tool. NAFTA is already such a strong and
powerful instrument within other areas of trade that in chapter 16 it needs to carry this attitude
as well. For example, article 1601 of chapter 16 notes the importance of ensuring border security
and protecting the domestic labor force--along with promoting free trade. n129 Therefore, instead
of furthering this contradiction throughout the rest of the chapter and annexes, NAFTA should
be consistent and fair in order to justify it.¶ n129, supra note 1, at chap. 16, art. 1601.¶ Annex 1603
addresses the four categories of people who are qualified to move between the borders under NAFTA. As
mentioned previously, there are constant contradictions between the treatment of Canadians and
Mexicans. Now that the issue of [*683] immigration has become even more prevalent and NAFTA has already
been passed, representatives from the NAFTA countries should meet to resolve these
discrepancies. The answer need not be in the form of the EU's provisions, but it should be clear and uniform.
These ambiguities and inconsistencies not only hurt the strength and effectiveness of chapter
16, but also further the social divide between Mexicans and Americans, n130 which in turn only
contributes to the problems such as illegal immigration that NAFTA is trying to reduce. ¶ n130
Johnson, supra note 117, at 126.¶ In detail, NAFTA should reevaluate the provisions located in annex 1603 in a
fair and uniform manner. As long as restrictions are consistent, free trade can be effective and
uninhibited by immigration obstacles. Since Mexico is presumably a part of this preferential trading
relationship under NAFTA, the process for Mexicans to enter the United States under NAFTA needs
to be more parallel with the process Canadians endure. As long as the restrictions are upheld and the
guidelines for each qualified section within annex 1603 are met, then the inherent goal of chapter 16 to protect
the sovereign would remain intact and free trade would actually be furthered under the National Treatment
standard used throughout NAFTA. "Congress recognized the difficulty of trying to stem the flow of
illegal migration through unilateral action and concluded that close consultation and
cooperation with Mexico and Canada were essential." n131 Such close consultation and cooperation
are needed in NAFTA.¶ n131 Yost, supra note 25, at 222.¶ Therefore, NAFTA is in need of many modifications in
order to be used effectively for the movement of people. Additional visa requirements for Mexicans
under sections A and D should be amended similar to those in place for the Canadians. If the
Mexican national meets the requirements to enter under the particular category, why is there an additional
obstacle? At this level, the person is a Mexican professional, not one that can be generally equated with the
stereotypical illegal immigration problem. And the numerical cap within the TN category also involves Mexican
professionals. If the Canadian professionals and the Mexican professionals are judged by the
same standards, then why should there be a cap on one and not on the other? The additional
processing requirement for Mexicans under section C also seems excessive. At this point the Mexican and the
Canadian alike both have their petition signed by their employer to be transferred within the company. The
Canadian is able to process the petition right there at the border while the Mexican has to wait weeks while it is
processed in a regional INS Center. Additional procedures such as this one do not seem to have any purpose,
but for delaying the Mexican national. When such restrictions are in effect, then free trade is
inhibited. These are examples of when protective restrictions are used incorrectly.¶ Continuing
with section D, clearly, in order for the TN category to work effectively, INS inspectors at border crossings need
to be informed of the latest group of professionals considered to be a part of the category. The problems
Canadians have been facing with their degrees not exactly matching with their qualified jobs should not be
occurring. Computer software engineers not being admitted because their profession is questionable as an
engineer is ridiculous. Once again, this is an example of a restriction, imposed for the purpose of granting entry
to a limited category, which is not being used correctly and thus inhibits trade.¶ ¶ [*684] V. Conclusion¶
Therefore, what this paper proposes is an enhanced NAFTA. It does not appear that the EU knows the
best way to handle the movement of people. The Treaties of the EU have granted almost absolute
freedom of the movement of people, which looks ideal, but causes many problems that have
been discussed within. Some amount of control needs to be maintained, but the ultimate question
is how much and how evenly spread should the control be among the various parties. "In an era when states
are ever more eager to cooperate with each other to achieve economic integration by lowering
trade barriers and relaxing controls over cross-border economic exchange, some are
intensifying their efforts to police cross-border flows of persons." n132 Such efforts to guard or
police borders do not have to inhibit trade as long as the methods are used correctly with the
purpose of protecting borders and allowing professionals to cross the various borders in order
to further the goal of free trade under NAFTA.
Small Farms Module
1NC
NAFTA has killed Mexican Small farms—we’re on the brink
Malkin 9 (Elizabeth Malkin March 23, 2009 “Nafta’s promise unfulfilled” Staff writer for the New York Times
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/24/business/worldbusiness/24peso.html?pagewanted=all)- RT
Mexico’s former president, Carlos Salinas, used to promise that free trade and foreign investment would jump-start this country’s development,
empowering a richer and more prosperous Mexico “to export goods, not people.”¶ Fifteen years after the North American Free Trade Agreement took
effect, only the first part of that promise has been realized.¶ Mexico’s exports have exploded under Nafta, quintupling to $292 billion last year, but
Mexico is still exporting people too, almost half a million each year, seeking opportunities in the United States that they do not have at home.¶ Secretary
of State Hillary Rodham Clinton will arrive in Mexico on Wednesday and President Obama will visit next month. Both are expected to emphasize the
successes of American-Mexican economic cooperation, but it will be hard to ignore how much in Mexico has not
changed under Nafta.¶ Economists here say much of the blame lies with Mexican leaders, unable
or unwilling to take on oligarchs and unions controlling key sectors of the economy like energy
and telecommunications. But they say some blame goes to the unintended consequences of
Nafta.¶ In some cases, Nafta produced results that were exactly the opposite of what was
promised.¶ For instance, domestic industries were dismantled as multinationals imported parts
from their own suppliers.¶ Local farmers were priced out of the market by food imported tarifffree. Many Mexican farmers simply abandoned their land and headed north.¶ Although onequarter of Mexicans live in the countryside, they account for 44 percent of the migrants to the
United States. The contradictions of Nafta are apparent in Guadalajara and the rich farmland
around it.¶ On the road from the airport to the city, Mexico’s second-largest, a well-worn sign welcomes visitors to Mexico’s Silicon Valley. After
Nafta went into effect, the comparison seemed ambitious but not out of reach.¶ Global giants spent billions of dollars turning Guadalajara into a
manufacturing hub for the information technology industry. The industry boomed, spurred by cheap labor and the sense that Nafta guaranteed investorfriendly policies. Today the city is ringed with low-slung factories that churn out everything from BlackBerrys to digital tape storage libraries for Sun
Microsystems.¶ But investors came because the city was already a center of technology. I.B.M, Hewlett-Packard and others had come in the 1960s and
1970s when Mexico’s market was closed.¶ After Nafta, the new factories imported parts from their global suppliers, wiping out local companies that had
sold printed circuit boards or assembled computers under tariff protection, said Kevin P. Gallagher, a Boston University professor who has written about
the Guadalajara information technology industry.¶ Things grew worse when the tech bubble burst, the American economy cooled and the companies
moved to China, where they could pay even lower wages. Once China entered the World Trade Organization, Mexico lost much of the edge in exporting
to the United States that Nafta had given it. Employment in Guadalajara’s I.T. factories dropped 37 percent in 2001 and continued to slide for two years.¶
“The agreement could have brought investment with more value here,” including research, testing and design, said Jesús Palomino, the general manager
at Intel’s design center in Guadalajara. “But we did not know how to define or negotiate or take advantage of it.”¶ Mr. Palomino argues that attracting
multinational manufacturers was too limited a focus. He oversees about 300 young engineers who test future Intel products and carry out research and
development. The sophisticated Intel design center is an exception to the city’s assembly plants. Those factories mostly hire low-wage labor.¶ “A new
phenomenon has grown up under Nafta — high-productivity poverty,” said Harley Shaiken,
chairman of the Center for Latin American Studies at the University of California, Berkeley. ¶
Low wages means low purchasing power. “It is not a successful strategy for globalization,” Mr.
Shaiken said.¶ Even Nafta’s greatest success — exports — has become a liability, as Mexico feels
the full brunt of declining consumption in the United States. The auto industry, for example, which has flourished
under Nafta, has ground to a virtual standstill. Over all, Mexican auto exports fell more than 50 percent in the first two months of this year compared
with 2008, and production dropped almost 45 percent.¶ The central bank forecasts that as many as 340,000 people could lose their jobs this year, and
some investment banks predict the economy could contract as much as 5 percent.¶ That weakness has driven down the peso, which has lost about a
quarter of its value in the last six months. Foreign direct investment fell last year to $18.6 billion from $27.2
billion in 2007.¶ Still, economists here say much of the responsibility for the lack of development in the last decade and a half lies largely with
Mexican leaders and their unwillingness or inability to enact real reforms. “We have an economy that has atrophied because of the lack of reform,” said
Gerardo Esquivel, an economist at the Colegio de México.¶ Other developing countries benefited from globalization, particularly in Asia. But in Mexico,
economic growth has averaged about 3 percent a year since Nafta took effect, far below what is needed to create jobs for the million young people who
enter the work force each year and the millions more who barely scrape by.¶ As presidential candidates, both President Obama and Mrs. Clinton
promised to renegotiate Nafta. But when Mr. Obama arrives next month, he will find Mexico’s leaders reluctant to revisit the agreement. He will
also find them seething over his signing of a spending bill that scrapped a pilot program
allowing Mexican long-haul trucks to transport cargo throughout the United States. In
retaliation, Mexico has imposed punitive tariffs on $2.4 billion worth of American goods.¶ Nafta
guaranteed Mexico, Canada and the United States access to one another’s highways for cargo
transport by 2000.¶ Perhaps the Mexicans least prepared for globalization were Mexico’s small
farmers.¶ “It isn’t possible for a peasant to make a living from the countryside,” said Francisco
Vargas, president of an association that groups together 2,500 farmers from Etzatlán, about 90
minutes west of Guadalajara.¶ The farmers hold other jobs to subsidize their farming. Mr.
Vargas is a teacher. Another of the group’s leaders is a retired accountant; a third has a sideline
renting out construction equipment. Some farmers continue thanks to money sent by relatives
working in the United States.¶ Farmers in the region have survived Nafta by raising corn yields
through converting to modern farming techniques. They also lobby for government aid and
band together to fight private oligopolies that sell seed and buy corn.¶ But their landholdings
remain small, sometimes not more than about 10 acres, and they are at the mercy of rising
costs and fluctuating prices. Seed is up about 20 percent because of the peso’s devaluation,
while corn is off the high of last year as global demand drops.¶ The farmers say that they have
raised their yields to double Mexico’s average of three metric tons per hectare, or more . (The
average for the United States is more than nine tons per hectare.) Late last year, their high yields caught the attention of the federal government in
Mexico City, which has promised new financing for the Etzatlán farmers and other commercial corn farmers. ¶ “It’s a race against time,” said Antonio
Hernández, an agronomist who advises the farmers for a coalition of farming associations in Jalisco state. “We have to demonstrate this before people
abandon the land.Ӧ I.T. industry leaders and the local government in Guadalajara are trying to do the same thing: convince Mexicans that there is
opportunity at home.¶ The group representing the industry in Mexico, known by its Spanish initials as Canieti, now promotes Guadalajara’s ability to
produce customized products for customers in the United States, specialized corporate software and portions of software for operating systems. Canieti
officials also promote the advantage for “pizza products,” like new cellphones that must be delivered on time.¶ The government and Canieti have put up
$4 million to buy equipment and train 150 young people in computer animation, in a bid to attract joint ventures for co-productions and video games.¶
But Mr. Palomino, the general manager at the Intel design center, argues that the industry should also promote small local companies and encourage
them to establish joint ventures in the United States. Those changes would nourish a culture of entrepreneurship that he believes has yet to emerge.¶
Professor Gallagher at Boston University argues that free trade on its own does not bring development. “Nafta was a great
opportunity, but you had to build on it,” he said.
Small farms are key to food security—Latin America is key
Altieri 8 (Miguel Altierei Professor of Agro ecology at the Department¶ of Environmental Science, Policy and Management at the University of¶
California, Berkeley since 1981. He is a member of the Steering¶ Committee of the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization¶ (FAO)’s Globally
Important Agricultural Heritage Systems (GIAHS)¶ programmer, whose goal is to dynamically conserve the world’s remaining¶ traditional farming
systems. He is also President of the Latin American¶ Scientific Society of Agro ecology (SOCLA) and Coordinator of the¶ International Agro ecology
Program of the Center for the Study of the¶ Americas in Berkeley. He periodically lectures at universities in the USA,¶ Latin America and Europe, and
provides technical expertise to¶ international organizations as well as farmers’ organizations and nongovernmental organizations throughout the world.
He is the author of 12¶ books, including Agro ecology: The Science of Sustainable Agriculture¶ and Biodiversity and Pest Management in Agro
ecosystems, as well as¶ more than 250 scientific journal articles “Small Farms as a Planetary Ecological¶ Asset: Five Key Reasons Why We Should¶
Support the Revitalisation of Small¶ Farms in the Global South” http://agroeco.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/11/smallfarmes-ecolasset.pdf)- RT
While 91% of the planet’s 1.5 billion hectares of agricultural¶ land are increasingly being devoted to agroexport crops, biofuels¶ and transgenic soybean to
feed cars and cattle, millions of small¶ farmers in the developing world produce the majority of staple ¶
crops needed to feed the planet’s rural and urban populations.¶ Of the 960 million hectares of
land under cultivation (arable¶ and permanent crops) in Africa, Asia and Latin America, 10-¶
15% is managed by traditional farmers. In Latin America, about¶ 17 million peasant production
units occupying close to 60.5¶ million hectares, or 34.5% of the total cultivated land with
average farm sizes of about 1.8 hectares, produce 51% of the¶ maize, 77% of the beans, and 61%
of the potatoes for domestic consumption. In Brazil alone, there are about 4.8 million family farmers (about 85% of the total
number of farmers) that¶ occupy 30% of the total agricultural land of the country. Such¶ family farms control about 33% of the
area sown to maize, 61%¶ of that under beans, and 64% of that planted to cassava, thus¶
producing 84% of the total cassava and 67% of all beans (Altieri¶ 1999) Africa has approximately 33 million small farms,
representing¶ 80% of all farms in the region. Despite the fact that Africa now¶ imports huge amounts of cereals, the majority of African farmers (many of
them women) who are smallholders with farms¶ below 2 hectares, produce a significant amount of basic food¶ crops with virtually no or little use of
fertilisers and improved¶ seed (Benneh 1996). In Asia, the majority of more than 200¶ million rice farmers, each cultivate around 2 hectares of rice¶
making up the bulk of the rice produced by Asian small farmers. Farms of less than 2 hectares constituted 78% of the
total¶ number of farms in India but contributed nonetheless to 41%¶ of the national grain
production (Greenland 1997).¶ Small increases in yields on these small farms that produce¶ most of
the world’s staple crops will have far more impact on¶ food availability at the local and regional
levels, than the doubtful¶ increases predicted for distant and corporate-controlled large¶
monocultures managed with such high-tech solutions as genetically modified seeds.
Food insecurity causes war
Brown 11 (Lester R. Brown 2011 Writer for the Earth Policy Institute “World on the Edge: How to prevent Environmental and Economic Collapse”
http://www.earth-policy.org/images/uploads/book_files/wotebook.pdf)- RT
For the Mayans, it was deforestation and soil erosion. As more and more land was cleared for
farming to support the expanding empire, soil erosion undermined the productivity of their
tropical soils. A team of scientists from the National Aeronautics and Space Administration has noted that the extensive land clearing by the
Mayans likely also altered the regional climate, reducing rainfall. In effect, the scientists suggest, it was the convergence of several environmental trends,
some reinforcing others, that led to the food shortages that brought down the Mayan civilization. 26 Although we live in a highly
urbanized, technologically advanced society, we are as dependent on the earth’s natural
support systems as the Sumerians and Mayans were. If we continue with business as usual,
civilizational collapse is no longer a matter of whether but when. We now have an economy that
is destroying its natural support systems, one that has put us on a decline and collapse path. We
are dangerously close to the edge. Peter Goldmark, former Rockefeller Foundation president, puts it well: “The death of our
civilization is no longer a theory or an academic possibility; it is the road we’re on.” 2 Judging
by the archeological records of earlier civilizations, more often than not food shortages appear
to have precipitated their decline and collapse. Given the advances of modern agriculture, I had
long rejected the idea that food could be the weak link in our twenty-first century civilization.
Today I think not only that it could be the weak link but that it is the weak link.
I/L NAFTA killed Small Farms
Hurts family farms
Public Citizen 13 (Public Citizen, nonprofit advocacy group with offices in Washington and Austin, “NAFTA’s
Broken Promises 1994-2013: Outcomes of the North American Free Trade Agreement,” 2013,
http://www.citizen.org/documents/NAFTAs-Broken-Promises.pdf, AL)
NAFTA fails to deliver on promises to farmers. U.S. agriculture was supposed to be the sector with the
most to gain from NAFTA.53 However, family farmers have seen rising trade deficits and declining
profitability in many of the years following NAFTA. The average annual trade deficit in
agricultural goods with Canada and Mexico in the five years before NAFTA nearly tripled (a 174 percent
increase) in the five years after the deal took effect. The average annual agricultural deficit under NAFTA’s
first nineteen years was $800 million, more than twice the pre-NAFTA level.54 High imports
and lackluster exports under NAFTA have particularly wracked family farmers in some sectors.
For example, while total U.S. vegetable imports from Canada and Mexico have more than tripled (a
237 percent increase) under NAFTA, U.S. vegetable exports to NAFTA partners have remained
comparably flat (a 67 percent increase). The U.S. vegetable deficit with Canada and Mexico has soared to
$3.6 billion, more than eight times the pre-NAFTA level.55 Since NAFTA took effect, about 170,000
small family farms have gone under – a 21 percent decrease in the total number.56
Specifically pork and beef industries
Public Citizen 13 (Public Citizen, nonprofit advocacy group with offices in Washington and Austin, “NAFTA’s
Broken Promises 1994-2013: Outcomes of the North American Free Trade Agreement,” 2013,
http://www.citizen.org/documents/NAFTAs-Broken-Promises.pdf, AL)
Pork and beef suffer under NAFTA. Proponents of NAFTA claimed that pork and beef would do
particularly well under NAFTA.57 However, U.S. exports of beef and pork to Mexico in the first three
years of NAFTA were 13 percent and 20 percent lower, respectively, than beef and pork exports in the
three years before NAFTA.58 The 50 percent devaluation of the Mexican peso against the U.S.
dollar after NAFTA went into effect staunched the flow of these goods into Mexico.59 Although
policymakers should have learned the lesson and inserted provisions against currency manipulation in
subsequent trade agreements (NAFTA did not have any), the Korea FTA passed in 2011 also did not discipline
currency manipulation, even though Korea is one of only three nations to have ever have been officially
certified by the U.S. Treasury Department as a currency manipulator.60 In the first nine months of the Korea
FTA, U.S. beef exports to Korea declined by 11 percent in comparison to the same months in 2011, while U.S.
pork exports to Korea fell by 17 percent – a combined loss of $96 million in U.S. exports.61
NAFTA has killed most of the small farms—cheap imports
Johnson 11 (Tim Johnson February 1, 2011 Writer for McClatchy Newspapers “Free Trade: As US corn flows south, Mexicans stop farming”
http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2011/02/01/107871/free-trade-us-corn-flows-south.html#.Uc3S9vlHOiN)- RT
SAN JERONIMO SOLOLA, Mexico — Look around the rain-fed corn farms in Oaxaca
state, and in vast areas
of Mexico, and one sees few young men, just elderly people and single mothers.¶ "The men have
gone to the United States," explained Abel Santiago Duran, a 56-year-old municipal agent, as he
surveyed this empty village in Oaxaca state.¶ The countryside wasn't supposed to hollow out in
this way when the North American Free Trade Agreement linked Mexico, Canada and the U.S.
in 1994. Mexico, hoping its factories would absorb displaced farmers, said it would "export goods, not people."¶ But in hindsight, the
agricultural elements of the pact were brutal on Mexico's corn farmers. A flood of U.S. corn
imports, combined with subsidies that favor agribusiness, are blamed for the loss of 2 million
farm jobs in Mexico. The trade pact worsened illegal migration, some experts say, particularly
in areas where small farmers barely eke out a living.¶ That is the case in the rolling hills of western Oaxaca state, ancestral
lands of indigenous Mixtecs who till small plots of corn, beans and squash between stands of
jacarandas, junipers and eucalyptus. Eagles soar in the brilliant blue skies. Clumps of prickly pear and
organ cactus attest to the sporadic nature of rainfall.¶ When a visitor arrives, the gray-haired men on the veranda of the village hall talk about the exodus
of young men.¶ "When they hit 18 and finish secondary school, they leave for the United States or
other states of Mexico," Duran said.¶ His cousin, Jesus Duran, said young men see little future as corn farmers and observe with
dismay how the government aims subsidies at medium and big farms, leaving only a trickle for small family farms. ¶ "If
you go to the offices
over there and ask for help," Duran said, nodding to the local agriculture agency, "they say
there isn't any to give."¶ Mexican negotiators who signed the NAFTA agreement hoped that
small corn farmers thrown out of work by rising imports of cheap U.S. corn would be absorbed
into jobs in the fruit and vegetable export industry or in manufacturing.¶ "That turned out to be incorrect. The
numbers of people displaced from family farming were much, much higher than the number of new wage jobs," said Jonathan Fox, an expert on rural
Mexico at the University of California at Santa Cruz.¶ Then U.S. corn imports crested like a rain-swollen river, increasing from 7 percent of Mexican
consumption to around 34 percent, mostly for animal feed and for industrial uses as cornstarch.¶ "It's been roughly a tripling,
quadrupling, quintupling of U.S. corn exports to Mexico, depending on the year," said Timothy
A. Wise, the director of research and policy at the Global Development and Environment
Institute at Tufts University in Medford, Mass. "Is that a river? Yeah, that's a lot of corn."¶ Fox and
Wise are among the collaborators on a study, "Subsidizing Inequality: Mexican corn policy since NAFTA," released last autumn. ¶
Representatives of small farmers say Mexico's policymakers tossed the dice that trade-spurred
growth would take care of rural disruptions — and lost.¶ "The great failure of this supposition is
that there wasn't economic growth that would absorb these people," said Victor Suarez, the
executive director of the National Association of Rural Producers, which represents 60,000
small farmers. "The result has left rural areas increasingly populated by the elderly and women."¶ Faced with deepening
poverty, rural migrants have tried to escape regions of Mexico that never used to be sources of
emigration.¶ "In Chiapas, there was hardly any migration before NAFTA," Suarez said,
referring to Mexico's southernmost state. "Farm laborers were even brought in from
Guatemala. Now, more than 50,000 rural people from Chiapas go each year to the United
States."¶ Corn imports from the U.S. are only one component of what scholars say is a complex picture. In fact, Mexican corn
production has risen since the trade pact, driven by domestic agribusiness and supported by
subsidies biased to favor large producers that by one estimate surpassed $20 billion in the past
two decades.¶ The Mexican government also has cash-transfer subsidies, known as ProCampo,
for small farmers who are considered the free-trade pact's losers. But they reach only a portion
of small corn growers, a quarter of whom are indigenous.¶ Some rural farmers no longer have
enough corn to sell, sinking into subsistence living for themselves and their families.¶ "Of my
generation," said 33-year-old Baldemar Mendoza, a Zapotec small corn farmer in the Sierra Juarez area of Oaxaca, "many people want nothing to do with
farming because it doesn't pay. With all the changes in the weather, there is no certainty that your harvest will be good." ¶ Unless the central
government tweaks subsidies to make more small family farms economically viable, the result
may be sustained migrant flows, experts said.¶ "The government didn't so much pull the plug on
corn. The government pulled the plug on family farmers who grow corn because the big guys
who grew corn got massive subsidies and protection from imports," Fox said.¶ Under the free-trade umbrella,
several Mexican agro-industrial companies have become muscular global conglomerates.¶
"Before NAFTA, Grupo Bimbo was a big company. Now it is the largest industrial user of wheat
in the world," Suarez said, referring to the world's No. 1 bread maker. "Maseca was a big company. Now it is a global company with a strong
position in cornmeal worldwide."¶ Their powerful position in the market has kept prices high for consumers,
while in the countryside, the social fabric frays as families disperse to find jobs.¶ The impact, Fox said,
"unravels rural communities, separates families and makes it difficult for young people to see a future in their communities of origin."¶ Josefa Soriano,
74, doesn't need an explanation of what's happening. She sees it with her own eyes. As a rural exodus unfolds, families keep fewer of the animals such as
goats, cattle and burros that provided manure for fields. Such livestock must have caretakers.¶ "You have no choice but to buy fertilizer now," she said. "If
you don't fertilize, nothing grows, not even fodder."¶ As she ambled through the settlement, Soriano offered a running commentary on those who have
migrated.¶ "The village is almost without people," Soriano said. "Many houses are empty. The fathers and the sons have
gone."¶ She turned to a visitor and said, "If the young people always leave, what do you think
will happen to us?"
NAFTA has killed off many small farms—very few have been given aid to keep them
afloat
Jordan 02 (Pav Jordan December 28, 2002 “Mexican Farmers See Death Sentence in NAFTA” Writer for Reuters and a Journalist
http://www.commondreams.org/headlines02/1228-07.htm)- RT
YECAPIXTLA, Mexico - Cirilo Yanez has been farming sorghum in the sleepy Mexican town of Yecapixtla his whole life, but he
expects to be
forced out of the business after a new phase of the North American Free Trade Agreement
comes into effect on Jan. 1.¶ "As long as I've been alive, I have been in sorghum, as were my
parents and as are my children," said the weathered Yanez, 62, who farms seven acres of the
grain in central Morelos state and sells it as livestock feed.¶ On the first day of 2003, protective tariffs on
imports of sorghum and most other farm goods will disappear under NAFTA and cheaper U.S.
imports are expected to flood into Mexico and dominate market share.¶ Yanez says that even now, with
protective tariffs on imports, he and other Mexican producers cannot compete with cheaper U.S.-produced
sorghum, which is used in snack and baked products, to produce ethanol and as animal feed.¶
Mexican farmers, many of whom till small plots with donkeys and follow ancient traditions
such as sowing seeds barefoot, cannot compete with U.S. machinery or infrastructure and,
ultimately, in price.¶ In January, import tariffs on apples, wheat, sorghum, rice, soy and many
other farm products will drop to zero, from between 1 percent and 2 percent now, in the second phase of trade
liberalization between NAFTA members Canada, Mexico and the United States.¶ Chicken and pork imports will see tariffs lowered more drastically, from
as high as 49 percent in the case of poultry.¶ Four other products, including powdered milk, corn and beans will get five more years of protection before
tariffs go to zero in 2008.¶ DEATH SENTENCE?¶ Producers see a death sentence in the agricultural chapters of NAFTA, signed a decade ago and
implemented since 1994, and blame the Mexican government for not preparing them for free trade.¶ "The governments of the recent past and of the
present have refused to assume the commitment of rural development; they have refused to assume the responsibility of promoting agricultural
activities, as it has been much more comfortable for them to be simple spectators," legislators said in a recent document sent to Mexican President
Vicente Fox as part of a petition for more protection of the agriculture sector.¶ "The countryside is being abandoned," said Sergio Ramirez, a sorghum
farmer from Yecapixtla, a tiny farming pueblo some 50 miles south of Mexico City. He said he believes he will soon be yet another casualty of NAFTA.¶
Ramirez said more and more sorghum farmers have abandoned their lands in the area since Mexico entered NAFTA because they could not compete
with their U.S. counterparts, blessed with economies of scale most Mexican farmers can only dream about. ¶ The average farm size per Mexican farmer is
between five and seven acres, whereas U.S. and Canadian farmers' properties are normally over 250 acres each.¶ Critics say that, other than some
fantastic success stories in fruits and vegetables, the Mexican farm sector is unable to compete virtually across the board.¶ "The Mexican
countryside is becoming deserted. Many have gone already," Yanez said. He said disillusioned
farmers usually make their way into Mexico City where they do bit jobs, or cross illegally into
the United States to find work.¶ The government says it will not attempt to renegotiate NAFTA,
but it has announced subsidies to protect some farmers.¶ In November the government
announced about $3 billion in agricultural subsidies meant to lower costs and guarantee
minimum prices for Mexican farmers in some products amid heightened competition from U.S.
farm goods.¶ The subsidies were part of a record 102.6 billion pesos ($10.09 billion) in farm aid
for 2003 to support electricity and diesel fuel costs and to offer competitive financing to the
struggling agricultural sector.¶ That compares to some $190 billion in U.S. farm subsidies over
the next 10 years.¶ The measures have been criticized by many who say the aid is not enough
and who speculate it will likely get siphoned off in bureaucratic expenses and by sticky-fingered
officials.¶ Some farmers say the aid will never get to the small campesino producers and that it is
destined in fact for the large farmers who did manage to boost production efficiency during
NAFTA's nascent years.¶ Mexican farmers are suffering what the rest of the developing world has been screaming about, their inability to
compete with U.S. and European farm subsidies.¶ MEXICO ILL PREPARED¶ Tariffs have been lowered gradually since 1994, when the treaty went into
effect for Mexico, and many question why Mexican farmers are not prepared, and why they are making such a fuss, if they had eight years to prepare for
the 2003 opening.¶ Still others say not much will change on Jan. 1.¶ A top U.S. agriculture official said in late November
that Mexico could have readied itself more for tariff-free borders.¶ "We're a little perplexed that
the campesino groups would come in and say, 'Oh my God, we're going to be destroyed. Come
2003, January 1, the flood gates open,"' a U.S. government official told Reuters.¶ "And our point
is, well, no, nothing's really changed."¶ The official, who asked not to be identified, said the only
area of real concern at the start of next year was in poultry, which would be unable to handle a
zero-tariff imports after protection of 49 percent this year and more than 90 percent last year. ¶
"And we're working with the government of Mexico on poultry just so we can try to reduce the sharp impact," he said. "They did feel that they were
unprepared to compete. In fact they can't."¶ The U.S. Embassy in Mexico City was a target in recent weeks for
protests from farmers demanding the Jan. 1 border opening be postponed, or that NAFTA be
renegotiated.¶ Other protests saw the lower house of Congress blockaded by farmers from
around the country who rode into the city on horseback, leading cows behind them, to demand
more government protection from U.S. competitors in the new year.
NAFTA killed off many small farms —only very few exist
Salinas 8 (12/10/2008 CLAUDIA MELÉNDEZ SALINAS In charge of the Herald Salinas Bureau “NAFTA, Farm Bill, lack of other economic
opportunities force subsistence producers to find work elsewhere” http://www.montereyherald.com/ci_7616170)-RT
Francisco Cruz gave up his farm more than a decade ago.¶ Then 20, Cruz had been earning a
living as a sharecropper in Oaxaca, giving half his harvest to the landowner. It was a
subsistence living that he supplemented by working in construction.¶ But when his wife Azucena announced she
was pregnant, he realized his fledgling family could not survive on his meager earnings from the cornfield. Cruz emigrated to Monterey
County, a year after passage of the North American Free Trade Agreement.¶ His story is not
unique. In the last 13 years, 2 million peasants left Mexico's countryside in search of better
opportunities in larger employment centers in Mexico or in the United States, according to
Mexico's Statistics Institute. The undocumented population in the U.S. is now estimated at 12
million.¶ Some experts believe the immigration dilemma could be better understood — and
perhaps resolved — if more attention was paid to the economic circumstances that bring people
here.¶ According to analysts, millions of farmers like Cruz are the casualties of a tide of multinational circumstance: NAFTA, the U.S. Farm Bill and a
dearth of effective economic initiatives in Mexico.¶ The combination, which allows for the consolidation of markets, has made it easier for large
corporations and farm operations to expand their reach but almost impossible for small producers to survive. These subsistence farmers
in turn have abandoned their land in search of better opportunities.¶ Critics point to NAFTA as
the biggest example. The "free trade" agreement was promoted as a win-win for both Mexico
and the United States, expected to spark an economic renaissance in Mexico and slow the
migration of job-hungry Mexicans to the U.S.¶ Instead, according to the critics, NAFTA actually
launched a new wave of immigration among undercapitalized farmers in Mexico's agrarian
countryside who found it impossible to compete with subsidized U.S. products.¶ "What
essentially happened was, as peasant farmers found it harder to make a living, ... more family members
were sent off the farm to make money to support the family," said Timothy Wise, deputy director of the Global Development and Environmental Institute
at Tufts University. "More of those family members headed for the United States because Mexico was
not creating jobs at the rate NAFTA promised."¶ In the balance of farm trade, the majority of
Mexican farmers were at a distinct disadvantage, unable to compete with the modern might of
U.S. agriculture.¶ "In our country we still find farmers who use oxen to pull carts to farm," said
Congresswoman Susana Monreal Avila, who represents one of the largest agricultural states in Mexico.¶ "This is what they use because they don't have
the access to other tools and that places (them) at a disadvantage."¶ Speaking to a group of U.S. activists and students touring Mexico with Food First, a
Berkeley-based advocacy group that promotes policies to eradicate hunger, Monreal Avila said
she's heading a group lobbying to renegotiate the agricultural provisions of NAFTA, which she
blames for the deterioration of Mexico's agrarian industry.¶ Former Mexican President Vicente Fox defends NAFTA
as a program that has brought progress to the country and increased agricultural trade with the United States.¶ "We are now exporting more than ever,"
Fox told The Herald during a recent visit to Monterey County. "Maybe those who didn't modernize couldn't compete."¶ Fewer in
agriculture|¶ Before NAFTA, agriculture in Mexico accounted for 25 percent of the country's
work force. Today, agriculture accounts for 19 percent of employment in the country, according
to the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development, an international group.¶ It's
not the first time Mexico has fallen prey to the vagaries of trade policies that have affected its
farmers.¶ During the 1980s, United States farmers gained access to new markets under the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs and used their
technological superiority to gain the upper hand in those markets.¶ "The costs of sustaining its own national food system and the availability of
subsidized grains from the U.S. ultimately resulted in Mexico becoming even more dependent on grain imports from the United States," according to
Ann Aurelia Lopez, a research associate with the Center for Agroecology and Sustainable Food Systems at the University of California-Santa Cruz.¶ But
U.S. policies are not solely to blame for the destruction of Mexican small farms, some analysts say. The Mexican government has
allowed the deterioration of the peasant economy to take place, and it has been slow to react
with economic development policies of its own.¶ "People are leaving for the U.S. because Mexico
is not creating jobs at the rate NAFTA promised," said Wise. "There's not enough jobs for the people entering the work force
and exiting agriculture. That's the real push factor. If there were ... jobs in other parts of Mexico, that's where these migrants would go."¶ NAFTA in place
since 1994|¶ Even though NAFTA has been in place since 1994, its impact on Mexico may not be
complete. Its remaining trade barriers — put in place to soften the blow to Mexican farmers —
are scheduled to be lifted in January. Some fear those changes, coupled with the Farm Bill that
continues to subsidize U.S. growers, will spark another wave of immigration from Mexico.¶ "The
consequences will be worse," said Victor Quintana, researcher with Universidad Autonoma de
Ciudad Juarez. "We have tariffs on corn but they're going to be eliminated, so there will be a lot more importation of corn. (Local
farmers) can't compete with those prices. They can't compete."¶ The Farm Bill — a massive
legislative package designed to rule everything in U.S. agriculture from subsidies to rural credit
to nutrition programs — expired in September. The new bill is currently being debated in
Congress.¶ While controversial on several fronts, small farming advocates believe continued
corn-subsidy policies in the bill could put Mexican farmers at a disadvantage — again.¶ They say the
subsidies help large agricultural operations in the U.S. sell their commodities abroad at reduced prices. Similar subsidies in previous farm bills have
indirectly contributed to the demise of small Mexican farmers, said Alexandra Spieldoch, director of the Trade and Global Governance Program at the
Institute for Agriculture and Trade Police in Minnesota.¶ "It's definitely related," said Spieldoch. "Looking at the Farm Bill's overall agenda is to increase
exports and expand trade, while Mexico made clear reforms to dismantle domestic supports."¶ Faced with few or no options, many of those farmers have
abandoned their land and moved to the United States.¶ "There's a growing awareness in general that the Farm Bill is much more than a farm bill,"
Spieldoch continued. "People in the U.S. tend to not know a whole lot about trade policy and its impact elsewhere." ¶ Debate centers on
corn|¶ In particular, the debate centers around corn, which is Mexico's primary food staple. The
average Mexican consumes about 280 pounds of corn a year, the second-highest per capita
consumption in the world. It is Mexico's primary crop, covering about 60 percent of the
country's cultivated area and employing more than 3 million campesinos, according to Mexican
researcher Alejandro Nadal.¶ Corn is the largest grain crop grown in the United States. According to
the U.S. Department of Agriculture, corn is grown on 80 million acres and about 20 percent of the
production is exported to other countries.¶ Mexico is its second-largest buyer, and the flood of
U.S. corn has pushed down local prices. Nadal estimates that the price of Mexican corn dropped 33 percent during a five-year
period ending in 2003, while the cost of supplies in the country increased 169 percent.¶ Farm Bill subsidies to corn producers in the United States,
coupled with the opening of trade between countries after the North American Free Trade Agreement created a double whammy for corn growers in
Mexico, according to critics.¶ But Jack King, manager of national affairs and research for the California Farm Bureau, said that the exodus of Mexicans to
the United States should not be blamed on the Farm Bill.¶ "I think Mexico may have some limitations on the crops they can grow, their amount of
resources and water," he said. "My guess is that people from Mexico would try to enter the United States for job opportunities even with (a) change of our
farm support programs. I can't necessarily draw a straight line between cause and effect there."¶ The Senate is scheduled to continue its debate on the
Farm Bill in the coming weeks, but few believe the legislation will be approved by the end of the year.
NAFTA disproportionally affects small-scale Mexican farmers—large scale bias, cheap
American imports, lack of credit
Tetrault 2010—Darcy Victor Tetrault is is professor and researcher at the University of Guadalajara, Mexico.
[“European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies”, No. 88 (April 2010), JSTOR]//MM
Reforms and trends in the agriculture sector during the neoliberal era¶ The Mexican government began
applying structural adjustments to the rural sector in the mid-1980s, in the context of the debt crisis. However
it was not until Carlos Salinas' presidential term (1988-1994) that the bulk of the reforms were carried out.
Subsequent administrations have consolidated these reforms and introduced anti-poverty programmes aimed
at rural households living in extreme poverty.¶ When the debt crisis hit in 1982, the Mexican government
immediately adopted austerity measures that spelled the demise of rural development programmes that had
been operating since the 1970s, including PIDER, COPLAMAR and SAM.4 Then, beginning in the mid-1980s,
quotas and tariffs on agricultural imports were gradually reduced, culminating in the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which set a 15-year timetable for phasing out remaining protectionist policies.
During the same period, dozens of state-owned enterprises linked to the rural sector were dismantled and
privatized, including the National Company for Popular Subsistence (CONASUPO), which was in charge of
buying, storing and marketing basic grains.¶ Until 1988, Mexican farmers were provided with guaranteed
producer prices for twelve crops (maize, beans, wheat, rice, sorghum, safflower, soybean, cotton, sesame,
coconuts, sunflower and barley). During Salinas’ presidential term, all of these were eliminated, with the
exception of maize and beans. As a result, producer prices dropped throughout the 1990s, as cheap grains
flooded in from the United States at levels well above the quotas set by NAFTA. At the same time, farmers were
faced with rising input costs.¶ Until the 1990s, agricultural inputs were highly subsidized in Mexico. Publicly
owned companies such as Mexican Fertilizers (FERTIMEX) and the National Seeds Producer (PRONASE)
provided inputs for the national market, making the country virtually self-sufficient in seed and fertilizer
production. Since then, how- ever, these state-owned companies have been dismantled or privatized and a
handful of large and powerful trans-national corporations (TNCs) have gained control of the national market
(for example: Cargill, Archer Daniels, Bayer, Bunge and Dreyfus). Consequently, input costs have increasing
dramatically, first in the early 1990s, then again over the past three years.¶ Between 2005 and mid-2008,
international prices for basic grains hiked up steeply, leading some analysts to suggest that this would create
more favourable market conditions for Mexican farmers. However, what we have seen is that these higher
prices have only been weakly transmitted to small-scale producers. As with agricultural inputs, Mexico's
domestic grain market has become dominated by a handful of international and (in this case) national
corporations, including Cargill, Archer Daniels, Minsa and Maseca. Under oligopolistic conditions, these
corporations have been able to squeeze small-scale farmers on both ends (with higher in- put costs and lower
producer prices) and capture the lion’s share of higher food prices. In this way, in 2008, Cargill's profits
increased by 81 per cent, Archer Daniels Midland's by 86 per cent and Bunge's by a stunning 1,452 per cent
(Guzman 2008).¶ Lack of credit is another problem. Under Salinas, subsidized agricultural credit was almost
completely eliminated, as well as government-backed crop insurance. The National Bank for Rural Credit
(BANRURAL) was downsized and reoriented towards medium-sized commercial farmers. Large-scale farmers
were expected to obtain credit from private banks, while small amounts of subsidized credit were made
available to poor farmers through anti-poverty programmes such as Credit on Word (Credito a Ia Palabra) and
Regional Solidarity Funds (Fondos Regionales de Solidaridad). The net result of all of this was a dramatic
increase in the real cost of credit, accompanied by a severe contraction in its availability. This situation was
exacerbated by the 1995 economic crisis and it has not improved significantly since then. In 2001, BANRURAL
was privatized. Today, only 15 per cent of Mexico's farmers have access to seasonal credit and 5 per cent to
credit for long-term productive investments and these tend to be the medium and large scale producers.¶ The
last element of the neoliberal strategy was to make changes to Article 27 of the Constitution and to the Agrarian
Law in order to put an official end to land re- distribution and in order to pave the way towards the
privatization of the ejido. As part of this reform, the Programme for Certification of Ejidal Rights and Titling of
Urban Parcels (PROCEDE) was created in 1993 as a mechanism for strengthening land-tenure security and
facilitating the renting and selling of ejida/land. At first there was widespread resistance, not to the programme
per se, but rather as an expression of a broader resistance to the neoliberal reforms in their entirety.¶ Entry
into PROCEDE was supposed to be voluntary. However, during Ernesto¶ Zedillo's presidential term (19942000), government officials began exerting pressure on non-complying ejidos and indigenous communities,
inter alia, by threatening to exclude them from exiguous subsidy programmes, most importantly the
Programme for Direct Support for Agriculture (PROCAMPO). These heavy-handed tactics provoked internal
conflicts in many agrarian communities, and to a large extent they worked: by late 2003, almost 80 per cent of
Mexico's thirty-one thousand ejidos and indigenous communities had accepted PROCEDE. Resistance has
continued, though, especially in the south, where Mexico's indigenous population is concentrated. In Chiapas
and Oaxaca, for example, only 28 and 21 per cent of agrarian communities respectively have accepted the
programme (De Ita 2003).¶ Although some critics warned that the changes made to Article 27 of the
Constitution would lead to significantly higher land concentration, so far this has not been the case, at least not
in terms of land sales. On the other hand, a dramatic in- crease in land rentals has led to a de facto
concentration of some of the best irrigated land, especially in the north-western states of Sinaloa and Sonora,
where up to 80 per cent of ejidalland is rented by large-scale farmers and agribusiness that produce mainly
maize and beans (De Ita 2003). In Jalisco, too, there is widespread renting of ejidalland, in this case, by agave
producing companies that offer leases of up to eight years, often applying large quantities of agrochemicals to
the land in order to get the most out of it during their contract. Farmers who rent their land benefit by securing
a low-risk income without having to invest their own time or money. This allows them to search for jobs
outside of farming, often implying migration to the United States.¶ In order to help cushion some of the
adverse effects of these structural reforms, the Mexican government created a number of agricultural subsidy
programmes and focalized anti-poverty programmes. The three most important are the Programme for Direct
Support for Agriculture (PROCAMPO), Acquisition of Productive Assets (previously known as Alianza parae/
Campo), and Opportunities.¶ PROCAMPO was created in 1993 in order to help farmers adjust to neoliberal
reforms. Originally it was supposed to be terminated in the year 2008, but it is still running and it is unlikely
that it will be cancelled any time in the near future, given the Mexican government's current legitimacy crisis
and taking into consideration the worldwide food crisis. PROCAMPO provides cash payments of approximately
100 dollars for every hectare of land cultivated, made directly to land owners. The programme benefits
approximately 3.3 million Mexican farmers, including about 2 million subsistence producers that had not
received any kind of subsidy before the neoliberal reforms. On the other hand, the programme is extremely
regressive: farmers with more than I0 hectares - which represent only 8 per cent of the beneficiaries - receive
45 per cent of the money channeled through the programme; whereas farmers with less than 2 hectares - which
represent almost 50 per cent of the beneficiaries- only receive 13 per cent (Rosenzweig 2005).¶ For its part,
Acquisition of Productive Assets (APA) is a multifaceted programme created in 1996 under the name Alliance
for the Countryside, with the following goals in mind: to improve the standard of living in rural areas, to increase agricultural production, to create jobs , to reduce poverty, and to stimulate exports. As its original name
suggests, this programme seeks to forge partnerships between different actors, namely, the federal
government, state governments, farmers and the private sector. The main thrust of the programme is to help
farmers acquire capital goods such as tractors, irrigation systems, high-yield seeds, and so on. However, as with
PROCAMPO, it is highly regressive: farmers with more than 20 hectares of land receive 57 per cent of the
funds, while those with less than I0 hectares receive only 2I per cent (FAO 2000). From a different angle,
Armando Bartra observes that '70 per cent of the resources go to the richest 20 per cent of the beneficiaries,
while the poorest 40 per cent only receive 10 per cent' (2008, 2). Moreover, its budget is very small, especially
in the context of its purported objectives, representing only 0.107 per cent of Mexico's GDP in the year 2008.¶
Originally called the National Programme for Education, Health and Food (PROGRESA), Mexico's main antipoverty programme initiated in I997 was directed in its early years exclusively to extremely poor households in
marginalized rural communities. Later, during Vicente Fox's presidency (2000-2006), it was renamed
'Oportunidades' and extended to urban areas. Opportunities provides direct cash transfers to families living in
extreme poverty, with a number of strings attached. Basically, the female head of the household- who is the
person who directly receives the payments - has to attend a number of workshops, take children under fiveyears of age to the local health clinic for monthly checkups, and make sure that her older children attend school
regularly.¶ The 2008 budget for Opportunities is $3.8 billion, representing 0.43 per cent of the Mexico's GDP.
The programme benefits approximately 5 million families, which translates into an average of about 760
dollars annually per family. This is a significant amount of money for families living in extreme poverty.
However, to keep things in perspective, it should be noted that, in recent years, the average annual budget for
Opportunities has only been equal to about 12 per cent of the annual interest payments that the Mexican
government makes to the Savings Protection Banking Fund (FOBAPROA), the notorious public bailout
programme for private banks after the 1994-95 crisis. •¶ It is beyond the scope of this paper to explore the
debates around Opportunities. The programme has been highly touted by the World Bank and it has served as
a model for other developing countries. At the same time, it has been criticized by independent academics,
inter alia, for being paternalistic and for not addressing the structural causes of poverty (see for example,
Valencia et al. 2000, Ornelas- Delgado 2006).¶ Taking a step back, now, and looking at the neoliberal reforms
in their entirety, we can see what their net implications have been for the agricultural sector. Our first
observation is that public investment in Mexico's rural sector dropped in global terms by over 60 per cent
between 1982 and 2008 (Chavez 2008). Second, between 1980 and 2006, agricultural production fell by 6.9
per cent in per capita terms (Gonzalez and Macias 2007). Third, although Mexico's food exports more than
doubled since NAFTA came into effect (from 3,995 to 9,431 million dollars between 1994 and 2003), food
imports increased at an even greater rate (from 4,766 to 12,866 million in the same time period), resulting in
an expanding agricultural trade deficit equal to 3,435 million in the year 2004 alone (Quintana 2007), and
reaching over 5 billion dollars in 2007. In this way, Mexico's food dependency and vulnerability has increased
substantially , not just because of this growing deficit, but also because Mexico tends to export non-strategic
items (such as beer, tequila, fruits, vegetables and live beef), while importing strategic items such as basic
grains (most importantly, maize, soya, rice and wheat).
NAFTA subsidies crush Mexican small farms
Paley 3/12 (Dawn Paley, Masters in Journalism from the University of British Columbia and BA in arts and
women’s studies and first nations studies from Simon Fraser University, “Corn on the Border: NAFTA and
Food in Mexico,” 13 March 2013, http://upsidedownworld.org/main/mexico-archives-79/4183-corn-on-theborder-nafta-and-food-in-mexico, AL)
Agricultural subsidies in Mexico chalk in much lower than they do in Canada, which according to a 2005
estimate provided $3.7 billion to farmers, and the US, which paid out $19.1 billion in the same year. Mexican
farmers, the majority of whom farm plots smaller than five hectares, receive between $78 and $102 per hectare
per harvest cycle in government support, according to Herrera. “The peasants are often so poor that what they
receive from [PROCAMPO, the federal assistance program for farmers], they use to satisfy their basic
consumption needs,” he said.¶ A 2011 study showed that for small farmers in Mexico to produce a kilogram of
corn it cost $3.72, compared to $1.67 per kilo in commercial farms. Both groups sell their product at a loss and
rely on state support and other income to survive. “I have a hectare that’s maybe a quarter planted, and it gives
me a ton (of corn per harvest),” said Pedro Viafuerte, who has land in Mexico State, but who works as a
custodian in Mexico City in order to earn an income. “We use it for our personal consumption… and to fatten
our livestock, because it doesn’t fetch the price it should.”¶ Because it is so difficult to turn a profit growing
traditional foods, according to a report published by the Agriculture, Society and Development journal last
year, most Mexican peasants no longer grow corn and beans as a means of economic survival. Instead, “most of
the production that peasants obtain from their land plots (maize, beans, kidney beans, etc.) is for selfconsumption … the greater part of monetary income is obtained from other activities linked to the land (fruit,
flower or vegetable production) or of another type (commerce, paid work in factories or construction in Mexico
or the USA).”
NAFTA killed Mexican small farms
Paley 3/12 (Dawn Paley, Masters in Journalism from the University of British Columbia and BA in arts and
women’s studies and first nations studies from Simon Fraser University, “Corn on the Border: NAFTA and
Food in Mexico,” 13 March 2013, http://upsidedownworld.org/main/mexico-archives-79/4183-corn-on-theborder-nafta-and-food-in-mexico, AL)
“NAFTA marked a breaking point … NAFTA privileged commercial agriculture, and small farmers were
basically abandoned,” José Herrera Vizcarra, an advisor with the Cardenista Peasant Union in Mexico City, told
Watershed Sentinel.¶ NAFTA was preceded by legislative changes allowing for the privatization of collectivelyowned land. It also resulted in radical cuts to subsidies and loans for farmers and other supports in seeds,
technical assistance, marketing and pricing that the state once provided. The last protections for agricultural
products under NAFTA, which were applied to corn and beans, were dropped in 2008. On January 31st of that
year, over 200,000 people marched in Mexico City against NAFTA’s final blow to Mexican farmers.
Renegotiating NAFTA is a key tenet of those pushing to regain food sovereignty in Mexico.¶ “NAFTA created a
disloyal competition, because the United States and Canada continued to subsidize agricultural producers, and
we pulled the subsidies,” said Herrera, who has worked in Mexico’s agricultural sector for over 30 years. “It
became impossible for small and medium producers to compete with producers from Canada and United
States.”
NAFTA hurts small farmers and increases agricultural trade deficits
Public Citizen ’13 (“Let them Eat Imports: Food Imports to United States Soar under WTONAFTA Model, Threatening American Farmers and Safety,” Public Citizen, May 2013,
http://www.citizen.org/food-under-nafta-wto)//ER
Family Farmers Hit Hardest¶ Smaller-scale U.S. family farms have been hardest hit by the
import influx caused by deals like NAFTA and the WTO. About 170,000 small U.S. family farms
have gone under since NAFTA and the WTO took effect, a 21 percent decrease in the total
number.7 After the WTO required elimination of various U.S. price support and supply
management policies, small farmers were also hard-pressed to survive the increasing year-toyear volatility in prices paid for commodities, making investment and planning more difficult
than before the WTO.¶ Food and Agricultural Trade Becomes Chaotic under NAFTA/WTO,
Yielding Historic Deficits¶ The United States has experienced wide swings in food and
agricultural trade under the WTO. In 2005, the United States became a net food importer for
the first time since the U.S. Department of Agriculture started reporting data in 1967.8 Trade
deficits have become the norm, meanwhile, for U.S. agriculture under NAFTA, as indicated in the
adjacent graph. The average annual U.S. trade deficit in agricultural goods with Canada and
Mexico in the five years before NAFTA nearly tripled (a 174 percent increase) in the five years
after the deal took effect. Since then, high imports and lackluster exports have continued to
wrack U.S. family farmers with deficit surges. The average annual U.S. agricultural deficit with
Canada and Mexico under NAFTA’s first 19 years surpassed $800 million, more than twice the
pre-NAFTA level.9
NAFTA kills small farms in Mexico and Canada – hurts the environment, economy, and
leads to breakdown of authority
Hightower ‘1 – American syndicated columnist, progressive political activist, and author who
served from 1983 to 1991 as the elected commissioner of the Texas Department of Agriculture
(Jim, “8. NAFTA Destroys Farming Communities in U.S. and Abroad,” Project Censored, The
Hightower London, September 2001, http://www.projectcensored.org/8-nafta-destroys-farmingcommunities-in-us-and-abroad/)//ER
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) are responsible for the impoverishment of and loss of many small farms in Mexico and
Haiti. NAFTA is also causing the economic destruction of rural farming communities in the
United States and Canada. The resulting loss of rural employment has created a landslide of
socio-economic and environmental consequences that are worsening with the continued
dismantling and deregulation of trade barriers.¶ When NAFTA came before Congress in 1993,
US farmers were told that the agreement would open the borders of Mexico and Canada,
enabling them to sell their superior products and achieve previously unknown prosperity.
Corporations who operate throughout the Americas, such as Tyson and Cargill, have since used
the farming surplus to drive down costs, pitting farmers against each other and prohibiting
countries from taking protective actions. These same corporations have entered into massive
farming ventures outside the U.S. and use NAFTA to import cheaper agricultural products back
into this country, further undermining the small farmers in the U.S. Since the enactment of
NAFTA, 80% of foodstuffs coming into the U.S. are products that displace crops raised here at
home. NAFTA has allowed multinational mega-corporations to increase production in Mexico,
where they can profit from much cheaper labor, as well as freely use chemicals and pesticides
banned in the U.S.¶ In both Mexico and Haiti, NAFTA policies have caused an exodus from rural
areas forcing people to live in urban slums and accept low paid sweatshop labor. Farmers in
Mexico, unable to compete with the large-scale importation and chemical-intensive mass
production of U.S. agricultural corporations, are swimming in a corn surplus that has swelled
approximately 450% since NAFTA’s implementation. Haiti’s deregulation of trade with the U.S.
has destroyed the island’s rice industry in a similar manner. Urban slums, engorged with rural
economic refugees, are contributing to the breakdown of cultural traditions and public
authority, making the growing masses increasingly ungovernable.¶ The Mexican government
clashes violently with any organized protest of NAFTA. Dissent in Chiapas and in Central
Mexico has lead to the reported arrests, injuries, and deaths of dozens of activists. Community
leaders like Minister Lucius Walker, executive of the Interreligious Foundation for Community
Organization, state that, “The biggest challenge facing all of us in this new millennium is to
build a citizens’ movement to counter the corporate captivity of the Americas.”¶ The1993 NAFTA
agreement desolated small farming communities in the U.S. and in Mexico and Haiti. With the
scheduled 2009 lift on tariffs and import restrictions, as well as Bush’s proposed Free Trade
Area of the Americas (FTAA) adding 31 more countries to the NAFTA agreement, many
additional farming communities are in danger.
NAFTA hurts Mexican Small farms
Wise ’10 – Global Development and Environment Institute, Tufts University (Timothy A, “The impacts of U.S.
agricultural policies on Mexican producers,” 2010, Wilson Center,
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Subsidizing_Inequality_Ch_8_Wise.pdf)//ER
How have U.S. agricultural policies affected Mexican producers in an economic environment of liberalized
trade? We analyzed eight heavily supported commodities – corn, soybeans, wheat, cotton, rice,
beef, pork, and poultry – that compete with Mexican production ¶ and that have seen increases
in U.S. exports to Mexico of between 159% and 707% since ¶ the early 1990s. Together they
represent 52% of the value of U.S. agricultural exports to ¶ Mexico. We examined the extent to which those
products were exported to Mexico at prices below production costs between 1997 and 2005. We look at those
years because the ¶ period begins after NAFTA’s liberalization was largely implemented and after
the 1996 U.S. ¶ Farm Bill, which caused significant changes to U.S. production and prices by
bringing a ¶ great deal of land back into agricultural production. The period under study ends before ¶
the recent run-up in commodity prices. ¶ Our goal was to estimate the costs to Mexican producers of domestic
farm prices driven ¶ down by below-cost imports from the United States. We estimate the costs at $12.8
billion ¶ from 1997-2005 for the eight products (in constant 2000 US dollars), 10% of the value of ¶ all
Mexican agricultural exports to the United States. Corn producers were by far the most ¶ heavily
affected, with $6.6 billion in losses, an average of $38 per metric ton, or $99 per ¶ hectare. This is more
than the average per-hectare payment to small-scale producers under the Procampo subsidy program.
NAFTA puts corn farmers out of work and increases illegal immigration to the US
Engsinger ’11 – Reporter at The Delaware Gazette (Dustin, “Illegal Immigration and NAFTA,”
Economy in Crisis: America’s Economic Report – Daily, 2/5/11,
http://economyincrisis.org/content/illegal-immigration-and-nafta)//ER
One of the largely overlooked aspects of the North American Free Trade Agreement is the fact
that the failed trade pact has been the catalyst for the massive increase in illegal immigration
over the past two decades or so.¶ An influx of highly subsidized corn flooding the Mexican
market has displaced millions of rural farmers, according to McClatchy Newspapers. Prior to
the implementation of NAFTA, Mexican officials claimed that factory jobs would fill the void
left by disappearing work on family farms.¶ Mexican officials had promised that NAFTA would
result in the “export of goods, not people.” That, however, has turned out to be far from reality.¶
Since NAFTA was signed into law, illegal immigrants in the U.S. has increased to 12 million
today from 3.9 million in 1993, accounting for an overall increase of over 300 percent.
According to the Pew Hispanic Center, 57 percent of those entering the country illegally are
from Mexico.¶ “The numbers of people displaced from family farming were much, much higher
than the number of new wage jobs,” Jonathan Fox, an expert on rural Mexico at the University
of California at Santa Cruz, told McClatchy Newspapers.¶ Those displaced workers are largely
the result of U.S. corn exports to Mexico. Heavily subsidized American Agribusiness not only
put hundreds of thousands of American family farms out of business, but also dumped billions
of dollars worth of American agricultural products into the Mexican market, putting millions of
peasant farmers out of business.¶ Between 1994 and 2001, the flood of cheap, subsidized
American corn caused the price of the crop to fall 70 percent in Mexico. The drop in prices
caused millions of farm jobs to disappear, with the numbers falling from 8.1 million in 1993 to
6.8 million in 2002.¶ Those out-of-work farmers make up the bulk of the illegal immigrants
entering the U.S. each year. Unable to compete with their highly subsidized American
competitors – $10 billion in 2000 alone – rural Mexican farmers have increasingly sought
employment in the U.S.¶ Corn producing jobs – the nation’s largest cash crop – fell by over one
million in the first decade of NAFTA. Additionally, another 142,000 job cultivating flowers and
fruit have disappeared.¶ In rural areas, the percentage of the population working in the
agricultural sector fell from 44 percent in the early 1990s to just 28 percent at the beginning of
the decade.¶ Even those that did not earn livings on farms were likely to be affected by NAFTA.
Since the trade pact was implemented, 30,000 small and medium-sized businesses have
permanently closed their doors.¶ “It’s been roughly a tripling, quadrupling, quintupling of U.S.
corn exports to Mexico, depending on the year,” Timothy A. Wise, the director of research and
policy at the Global Development and Environment Institute at Tufts University in Medford,
Mass, told McClatchy Newspapers. “Is that a river? Yeah, that’s a lot of corn.”¶ The end result
has been a flood of illegal immigration into the U.S. With jobs drying up in Mexico, millions
have illegally crossed the border seeking work. If it were not for NAFTA, illegal immigration
would not be such a problem.¶ “The great failure of this supposition is that there wasn’t
economic growth that would absorb these people,” Victor Suarez, the executive director of the
National Association of Rural Producers, told McClatchy. “The result has left rural areas
increasingly populated by the elderly and women.”¶ “In Chiapas, there was hardly any
migration before NAFTA,” Suarez said, referring to Mexico’s southernmost state. “Farm
laborers were even brought in from Guatemala. Now, more than 50,000 rural people from
Chiapas go each year to the United States.”
NAFTA kills Mexican corn industry and rural workers – leads to immigration and
poverty
Whitehead ’13 – holds degrees in education and linguistics (Catherine E, “Mexican Corn: Traditional
Farming Practices, NAFTA, Variety,” Suite: Politics and Society, 3/25/13, http://suite101.com/article/mexicancorn--traditional-farming-practices-nafta-variety-a310725)//ER
Subsidies and NAFTA¶ Farm subsidies in the U.S. help U.S. corn to undersell Mexican. According to
Oxfam's Duncan Green, U.S. corn subsidies have allowed U.S. corn to be sold in Mexico at 19%
below production cost, which Green says has cost Mexican farmers about $99.00 U.S. per acre.¶
Meanwhile, in its own effort to profit from NAFTA, Mexico's government has focused some of its subsidies on
its biggest agribusinesses, making these, including Grupo Bimbo (Mexico's biggest baker goods company) and
Grupo Maseca (Mexico's biggest tortilleria), some of the biggest businesses in the world. The result has not
always been more jobs either, but again, an equally important issue may be variety.¶ Mexico's Increasing Corn
Imports¶ Beginning in 1994 with NAFTA and a desire for less regulation, corn, primarily yellow corn (used in
corn starch, corn syrup,and animal feed), has been increasingly imported by Mexico, according to the USDA's
Steven Zahniser (2006), while fruit and vegetable products from Mexico have been increasingly imported by
the U.S. However since 2001, the sweeter white corn that forms the backbone of many Mexicans' diets has also
been imported, Zahniser says. According to Jonathan Fox of the University of California (Santa Cruz; cited by
McClatchy's Tim Johnson), since NAFTA, corn imports which made up "7 percent of Mexican
consumption" have increased "to around 34 percent," though it's still mostly yellow corn used
in animal feed and industry that's being imported.¶ Subsidies of Mexico's Agribusinesses¶ Zahniser
nevertheless believes that Mexican corn production has remained mostly steady since NAFTA, because of the
Mexican government's own agricultural and consumer subsidies of corn and tortillas. But not as many
farmers are growing corn.¶ According to Tracy Wilkinson of the Los Angeles Times (2010), "Procampo"
was created in Mexico when NAFTA took effect, with a goal of enabling Mexico's poorest farmers to compete
with U.S. farmers. Wilkinson however cites research that suggests that, "as much as 80% of the money
went to just 20% of the registered farmers."¶ Wilkinson's sources include the newspaper El Universal,
which obtained information "through the Mexican equivalent of the Freedom of Information Act," according to
Wilson. Wilson says that subsidies went to, among others, "three siblings of billionaire drug lord
Joaquin 'El Chapo' Guzman," who heads the Sinaloa cartel; and to the brother of a former Guzman
partner, supposedly to grow corn and other crops. Most of Mexico's organized criminals maintain legitimate
agricultural business interest side-by-side their criminal operations, Wilkinson explains. The subsidies are paid
on a per "hectare" basis, and only in 2009, says Wilkinson, were any caps placed on how much any one
individual or business could receive.¶ NAFTA and Population Displacement, Immigration¶ Currently according
to the Wilson Center, which cites population statistics from the Consejo Nacional de Población (CONAPO; cited
in OECD, Agricultural and Fisheries Policies in Mexico), the number of people living in Mexico's rural areas
has actually increased slightly, to 24% although that number is projected to decline to 21% by 2030. But, the
Wilson Center says, the small farmers in rural areas are asset-poor and increasingly
marginalized.¶ According to McClatchy's Tim Johnson (2011), ". . . when the North American Free Trade
Agreement linked Mexico, Canada and the U.S. in 1994, . . . Mexico . . . said it would 'export goods, not
people.'" But, says Johnson, perhaps two million Mexican farm jobs have been lost since, to U.S.
corn imports and to Mexican subsidies which may favor agribusiness.¶ Johnson argues that areas
where the poorest farmers live have had the highest rates of migration due to NAFTA and to Mexican subsidy
policies. Johnson cites as an example, ". . . the rolling hills of western Oaxaca state, ancestral lands of
indigenous Mixtecs who till small plots of corn, beans and squash." In any case, the number of small corn
farmers is declining, with many of farmers from the Mexico's south now numbering among
agricultural workers coming from Mexico into the United States.¶ Exodus and Increased Fertilizer
Use in Mexico¶ Besides planting less corn (and perhaps thus fewer varieties) in Mexico, small farmers since
NAFTA have relied more on fertilizers. Johnson explains that, with their caretakers leaving, the
number of livestock, "goats, cattle and burros," which previously provided manure for fields, have
declined too. "You have no choice but to buy fertilizer now," he quoted elderly Josefa Soriano: "If you don't
fertilize, nothing grows, not even fodder."¶ Increased Planting of Illicit Crops?¶ Another result of NAFTA
and Mexico's "Procampo" subsidies, according to Wilkinson's Los Angeles Times report, may be
increasing growth of marijuana and other illegitimate crops.¶ NAFTA Pluses and Minuses for Mexico¶
The "plus" for Mexico is that corn and tortilla prices, which tend to rise with increasing demand for ethanol
(and may be rising ten times as fast as Mexico's minimum wage) may be kept down by imports, says the
USDA's Zahniser. The down side of NAFTA includes a possible decline in the genetic diversity of
Mexican corn, as small farmers abandon farming. And, while the adoption of higher-tech production
methods by Mexican corn farmers may someday enable them to gain a larger share of the market, this may not
by itself solve the problem of declining genetic diversity.¶ Increasing Poverty¶ Mexican corn farmers face
increasing poverty. A Woodrow Wilson Center report cites a World Bank (2008) World Development
Report, which argues that Mexico's farmers need to investigate higher tech methods. (Smaller farmers, the
Wilson Center report notes, have limited access to credit however.)
NAFTA causes a decline in the corn industry – that hurts land and agriculture
Cortez ’10 (Jared, “NAFTA and the Decline of internal Corn,” Geneseo Research, 12/10/10,
https://wiki.geneseo.edu/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=67112378)//ER
Since the implementation of NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement), the Mexican corn
industry has changed dramatically. Many concerns have been raised over the worry of Mexican
corn farmers and migration due to the heavy export of U.S corn to Mexico. Since its signing in
1994,NAFTA has loosened trade restrictions on the corn industry, however the Mexican government still
holds tight to the policies on agriculture before the implementation of NAFTA. This includes
heavy support for Mexican grown corn products such as tortillas, flours and animal feed.
However, with the rise of NAFTA, the U.S has heavily subsidised the corn industry, often selling
exports at lower the price of production or prices lower than those in Mexico.¶ This has put the
country's food self-sufficiency in jeopardy. Many local corn farmers have not been able to keep
up with the heavy demands, thus resulting in migrations. There have also been studies which link
the rise of U.S corn imports to the heavy demand for yellow corn and animal feed (De Janvry,
Sadoulet, Gordillo 1995) . Mexicans primarily use yellow corn for animal consumption, while home grown
white corn is used for human feasts. This is linked to Mexico being a key player in the export of hog and cattle
meats, thus needing feed for these animals. The demand for feed keeps the cost low, but endangers the
Mexican farm industry. However, Zahnsier and Coyle (14 2004) point out that corn prices in Mexico have
been adjusted for international prices, thus steadily decreasing. Through a program of loans expanded by
former president Vicente Fox, production has remained stable. However, i feel with the heavy import of
American corn, many Mexican corn farmers have been made redundant. Farmers are not up
against one another but American "dumping"( economic term for exporting a product to another
country at a price which is below the price it charges in its home market). The cost of corn production in
Mexico does not coincide with the profit made for the demand of local corn. As the demand for Mexican meats
are made, the demand for American Yellow corn to feed these animals is also raised. Thus, I feel this puts the
country at a disadvantage. NAFTA has crippled Mexico's self-sufficiency.¶ Land has also been
affected. With the rise of competing imports, Mexican Farmers have been forced to industrialize, as
many cannot afford it. Thus, in order to compete with American boomers, Mexican farmers often rely
on growing methods that are heavily chemical dependent. This affects the nature of the land
and the water running off into the Gulf of Mexico. (Pollen 2004).
BioD Module
Small farms are key to biodiversity.
Boyce 2004 (James K Boyce, July 2004 Department of Economics & Political Economy Research and Environmental research at the University
of Massachusetts, “A Future for Small Farms? Biodiversity and Sustainable Agriculture”. Political Economic Research Institute,
http://www.peri.umass.edu/fileadmin/pdf/working_papers/working_papers_51-100/WP86.pdf)- RT
Today, perhaps the
single most important examples of humans acting as a keystone species are ¶ the
agro ecosystems that maintain the world’s crop genetic diversity. Most of the ‘keystone’ ¶ people
are small farmers. In part, this is because agricultural biodiversity is concentrated in ¶ regions
of the world where small farms still predominate. In part, too, it is because small farmers ¶ have
comparative advantages in the cultivation of diversity.¶ The centers of origin of the world’s crops are concentrated in a
few places, known as ‘Vavilov ¶ centers’ after the great Russian botanist of the early 20th century, Nikolai Vavilov. Most of the ¶ Vavilov
centers are in the developing countries of the global South (see Figure 1). Vavilov ¶ hypothesized that the ancient
centers of crop origin tend to be the modern centers of crop ¶ diversity, a suggestion that, by and large, has stood the test of time. The logic behind this ¶
correlation is straightforward: crops evolve as farmers select seed for replanting from individual¶ plants
that perform best in the face of local variations in soils, rainfall, altitude, pest populations, ¶
and so on. Diversity tends to be greatest where this process has had the longest time to unfold. In
the Bengal delta, for example, where ‘a few inches difference in elevation in relation to expected ¶ flooding depth and duration can cause farmers to
plant different rice varieties,’ some 10,000 ¶ different varieties of rice were being grown in the 1970s (Brammer, 1980, p. 25). ¶ Darwin described this
process in the opening chapter of The Origin of Species: ‘The key is man’s ¶ power of accumulative selection: nature gives successive variations; man adds
them up in certain ¶ directions useful to him.’ One of Darwin’s examples was the strawberry, a fruit that was growing ¶ in popularity at the time:
‘Gardeners picked out individual plants with slightly larger, earlier, or ¶ better fruit, and raised
¶
seedlings from them, and again picked out the best seedlings and bred ¶ from them.’ In this way, Darwin
explained, ‘those many admirable varieties of the strawberry ¶ were raised which have appeared during the last half-century’ (Darwin, 1952 [1859], pp.
18, 23). ¶ As Vavilov documented, crop genetic diversity is distributed very unevenly across the globe. ¶ The available data on this point are remarkably
sparse, but a rough indicator is the sources of ¶ seed samples that are stored in the world’s largest ‘gene banks’, ex situ (off-site) collections ¶ maintained
for possible future use by scientists and plant breeders. In the case of maize, for ¶ example, Mexico accounted for 4220 of the
maize accessions held at the International Maize and ¶ Wheat Improvement Center (known by its
Spanish acronym, CIMMYT) in the mid-1990s, and ¶ Guatemala for another 590; by contrast, the United States, with more
than three times the maize ¶ acreage of Mexico and Guatemala combined, accounted for only 43
samples (Boyce, 1996). ¶ Mexican farmers today are believed to grow roughly 5,000 different varieties
of maize, whereas ¶ in the United States – where corn is sown on roughly 70 million acres –
more than 70% of the ¶ acreage is planted with varieties ‘based on no more than half a dozen
inbred lines’ (Goodman ¶ 1995, p. 200)¶ Around the world, it is generally small farms – especially those in the Vavilov centers –
that ¶ practice high-diversity agriculture. Not only do individual small farmers often choose to
cultivate ¶ several varieties of the same crop, but also, and probably more importantly, different
farmers in a ¶ given locality often cultivate different varieties. Large farms, in contrast, are more
likely to sow a ¶ single variety over a wide area. This inverse relationship between farm size and varietal diversity ¶ has several
explanations.
Small farms key to biodiversity
Goldstein 10 (2010 Rob Goldstein Writer for conservation maven- conservation research and news “Small-scale, eco-friendly farms key to
preserving tropical biodiversity” http://conservationmaven.com/frontpage/small-scale-eco-friendly-farms-key-to-preserving-tropical-bi.html)-RT
The ongoing conflict between protecting biodiversity on the one-hand and feeding the world
through agriculture on the other, presents perhaps the biggest challenge for conservation.¶ This
tension has caused some to champion agricultural intensification as a way to protect tropical
forests. According to the logic behind this approach, intensified farming increases the amount of food we can
produce from a given amount of land, which in turn will free up areas that we can restore and
protect for biodiversity.¶ This logic has been used to argue for large-scale, industrial agriculture over small-scale, eco-friendly farming to
best support tropical conservation.¶ However, a new article in the Proceedings of the National Academy of
Sciences, presents a compelling counterargument that demonstrates the misconceptions that
underlie this logic.¶ Instead, scientists Ivette Perfecto and John Vandermeer propose an
alternative model for conservation in the tropics based on a matrix of small-scale, ecologically
friendly farms producing food while providing habitat that complements protected areas. ¶ A
false premise of the agricultural intensification model is that it assumes that increased
productivity will lead to an abandonment of inefficient farms in the tropics, migration from
rural to urban areas, and the return of farms to forests.¶ While there is historical precedence for this occuring in North
America and Europe, there is not certainty it will occur in tropical areas. In fact, numerous studies from the Tropics show
either "no effect or increased deforestation with either agricultural intensification or rural
population decline."¶ The scientists also shoot down a commonly assumed misconception that
large-scale industrial agricultural is able to grow more food per acre than alternative
approaches.¶ Perfecto and Vandermeer point to a meta-analysis of 300 studies comparing the yields of
organic versus conventional farming methods, which generally found no difference between
the two approaches.¶ Some proponents of agricultural intensification likely confuse the
productivity of land use with the profitability of operations. Large-scale, industrial agriculture
may be more profitable because it can grow more food with less labor and other inputs.¶
However the scientists point out that small agriculture may be able to utilize more nuanced
farming techniques based on the micro conditions of the property - a level of precision that
might not be worth the effort for large-scale operations.¶ This idea is supported by a study
across 15 countries, which found that output per unit area decreased with farm size.¶ Furthermore, the
authors argue that from a conservation perspective, a matrix of small-scale farms across the landscape with
ecologically-friendly practices and integrated habitat features will lead to better outcomes for
biodiversity than individual large protected areas within a biological wasteland.¶ The scientists
cement their idea within a new theoretical framework, which they term the Matrix Quality
Model and present as an alternative to the Agricultural Intensification concept.¶ Their model is
rooted in the idea that persistence of species depends on maintaining metapopulations within a
matrix of habitat patches across the landscape. The authors write, "A new rurality based on the matrix quality approach is
more likely to lead to situations in which biodiversity is conserved at the same time that more food is available to those who need it the most."
Loss of biodiversity causes extinction
Takacs 96 (Instructor in Department of Earth Systems Science and Policy at California State-Monterey Bay [David, 1996 Philosophies of Paradise,
pg. http://www.dhushara.com/book/diversit/restor/takacs.htm]
keeps the world running. It has value and of itself, as well as for us. Raven, Erwin, and Wilson oblige us to think about
eliminating rivets, we play
Russian roulette with global ecology and human futures: “It is likely that destruction of the rich complex of species in the
So biodiversity
the value of biodiversity for our own lives. The Ehrlichs’ rivet-popper trope makes this same point; by
Amazon basin could trigger rapid changes in global climate patterns. Agriculture remains heavily dependent on stable climate, and human beings remain
heavily dependent on food. By the end of the century the
extinction of perhaps a million species in the Amazon basin could have
entrained famines in which a billion human beings perished. And if our species is very unlucky, the famines could
lead to a thermonuclear war, which could extinguish civilization.” 13 Elsewhere Ehrlich uses different particulars with no
less drama: What then will happen if the current decimation of organic diversity continues? Crop yields will be
more difficult to maintain in the face of climatic change, soil erosion, loss of dependable water supplies,
decline of pollinators, and ever more serious assaults by pests. Conversion of productive land to
wasteland will accelerate; deserts will continue their seemingly inexorable expansion. Air pollution will
increase, and local climates will become harsher. Humanity will have to forgo many of the direct
economic benefits it might have withdrawn from Earth's wellstocked genetic library. It might, for example, miss out on a cure for
cancer; but that will make little difference. As ecosystem services falter, mortality from respiratory and epidemic
disease, natural disasters, and especially famine will lower life expectancies to the point where cancer
(largely a disease of the elderly) will be unimportant. Humanity will bring upon itself consequences
depressingly similar to those expected from a nuclear winter. Barring a nuclear conflict, it appears that civilization will
disappear some time before the end of the next century - not with a bang but a whimper.14
Biodiversity is key to stop catastrophic pandemics—malaria and lyme disease prove
Huang 09, “Rise of the Bugs”, Newsweek, http://www.newsweek.com/id/202865/page/1
The most important question not raised during the swine-flu panic could have been asked by a 6-year-old: where do viruses come from? The answer, it
turns out, is simple, and scary: viruses come from a giant wellspring of diseases—also known as the environment—that grown-ups should be very careful
not to disturb. Pathogens—viruses, bacteria and a wide variety of other parasites—appear in nature as unpredictable, minimalist
terrors equipped with little genetic material of their own but the ability to make things up as they go. A bird-flu virus can rest
coolly in pigs, then flare up in humans, scrambling genes from all three species in ways impossible to fully anticipate with
vaccines. The SARS virus bided its time among palm civets (a kind of mongoose) and horseshoe bats before killing humans in 2002. And possibly the
most diminutive of all, the retrovirus HIV emerged from the blood of wild monkeys to become the most efficient destroyer of the human immune system.
With strong enough poison and infinitely transmutable genes, a single pathogen could lay deadly siege to the rest of the living world. The
reason this has yet to happen in our lifetimes is that, brilliant as nature is at devising ways to kill, it has also come up with
countless ways to cope and survive. Put all the living species together and you have an impressive array of mechanisms to fend
off pathogens or contain them in particular ecosystems that have defenses built in. This arrangement, however, is now under serious
threat: humans, moving ever deeper into the wild to level forests, extract minerals and plant crops, are changing the balance of ecosystems the world
over and taking these defenses apart. These warped ecologies become ground zero for new and deadly infectious diseases, which emerge and spread at an
ever-greater rate. This amounts to "Armageddon in slow motion," says Eric Chivian, head of the Center for Health and the Global Environment at
Harvard Medical School. Chivian, who shared the Nobel Peace Prize in 1985 for alerting the public to the dangers of nuclear proliferation, now says the
danger to human health posed by a degraded planet is "no less devastating than a nuclear war … the ultimate impact might be just as catastrophic." The
evidence is already in. Malaria, currently the most prevalent cause of death in the world, can be ascribed almost entirely to human
acts of deforestation, which produces stagnant pools of water and allows more sunlight to reach water surfaces. This intensifies
the growth of algae and forms the perfect nursery for Anopheles mosquitoes, potent vectors for the malaria parasite.
Anopheles barely had a foothold in the ecosystem in its former state, but when conditions changed—as in the Amazon, East
Africa and Southeast Asia—vector mosquitoes quickly displaced other benign species. The spread of other diseases has
followed a similar trajectory. Some snails, for instance, harbor parasitic worms called schistosomes, which infect the human
bladder or intestines. In the Senegal River basin, populations of vector snails exploded upon construction of the Diama Dam in
1985, which made the water less saline. The region became a hotbed for schistosomiasis where it didn't exist before; currently,
more than 200 million people are victims. Among flies, too, malignant species are winning out: as a result of deforestation, sand
flies have surged into human populations in South America and South Asia, infecting millions each year with leishmaniasis, a
protozoan parasite that causes skin ulcers and attacks the liver, spleen, and bone marrow. With ecological collapse, the rapid
proliferation of disease agents is only half of the gruesome picture; the other is the demise of nonthreatening species. In recent
years, disease ecologists Richard Ostfeld and Felicia Keesing have shown how a diversity of species in an ecosystem actually
works to suppress infectious diseases. Since not all animals are good reservoirs or vectors for pathogens, the more species there are, the
better the chances for a pathogen to be blocked. Ostfeld and Keesing call this the "dilution effect." In healthy ecosystems—
say, one with a high diversity of snails or mosquitoes where the dilution effect is strong and infectious disease is better
contained—competition from nonvector snails or mosquitoes keeps the vector populations in check. So the loss of biodiversity
is itself a threat to public health, and not only in the deforested Amazon; the denatured suburbs of the United States bear
increasing risks, too. Throughout the U.S., the patchy woodlands interspersed among suburban homes are breeding grounds for
Lyme disease, a flulike illness that can produce neurological disorders and become impossible to cure. The ideal incubator for
the Lyme bacterium is the white-footed mouse, a remarkable survivor in fragmented habitats. Infected mice don't get sick, but
they allow the pathogen to multiply and pass it on to ticks who feed on all the local mammals, including humans. Other kinds of
forest life—opossums, thrushes, flying squirrels—don't transmit the disease as well to ticks (they're "incompetent hosts"), but
fewer and fewer of them remain in the forests. The rising incidence of Lyme disease—27,000 cases in the U.S. in 2007—is a direct result of
disappearing forests and the decline of species. "The more nonmouse hosts you have in an ecosystem," Ostfeld says, "the more of the ticks' blood meals
will be taken off a host that will not infect them. That will make more of the ticks harmless." Instead, ticks are finding their way to more disease-bearing
mice because the mice are increasingly rid of both their competitors and their predators—foxes, weasels, owls. A one- or two-acre scrap of forest poses
five times more risk for Lyme disease than a habitat of even five or six acres, with just a few more diverse species. A similar lack of ecological complexity
is responsible for the respiratory disease caused by hantavirus—which has a staggering mortality rate of one in three cases—and the neurological disease
caused by West Nile virus. These are not risks limited to bushwhackers and remote rice farmers. West Nile virus landed in New York City in 1999 and, by
2004, reached the West Coast, having found ready reservoir hosts in several common bird species and effective mosquito carriers. "We had vectors, in a
sense, sitting in wait," says Ostfeld. "All we needed was the virus to jump the pond." The risk of infection rises as the number of bird species falls: living
in a town with more than just the common run of birds—American robins, house sparrows, blue jays and common grackles—makes you 10 times less
likely to be infected. But there's a reason that most populated areas don't have much more than the common run, Ostfeld explains. "Those happen to be
the bird species that do really well in human-disturbed landscapes."
Uncontained disease leads to extinction
Toolis, the director of a major television series on the history of plagues, 09
(Kevin, The Express, April 28, 2009 U.K. 1st Edition “Pandemic Pandemonium” lexis)
It destroyed the Roman Empire, wiped out most of the New World and killed millions in Europe. How disease - not just
Mexico's swine fever - has shaped the planet SCIENTISTS call it the Big Die Off, when a terrifying new virus rips through a
species and kills up to a third of the entire population. And we all now could be facing a new apocalypse, though no one yet knows how potent
the new strain of Mexican swine fever will be, or how many millions could die. Yet if history teaches us anything it tells us that the greatest
danger the human race faces is not some crackpot North Korean dictator but a six-gene virus that could wipe out one third of the
global population. Our real enemy, a new plague virus, is so small you can barely see it even with an advanced electron
microscope. It has no morality, no thought or no plan. All it wants to do is reproduce itself inside another human body. We are
just another biological opportunity, a nice warm place to feed and replicate. Viruses are as old as life itself. What is startling though is how
vulnerable our globalised societies are to the threat of a new deadly plague. Before World Health Organisation scientists could identify this new
H1N1 virus it had travelled halfway across the world via international flights.
Climate Module
Small farms are key to cool the climate—independently key to slow down global
warming
Altieri 8 (Miguel Altierei Professor of Agro ecology at the Department¶ of Environmental Science, Policy and Management at the University of¶
California, Berkeley since 1981. He is a member of the Steering¶ Committee of the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization¶ (FAO)’s Globally
Important Agricultural Heritage Systems (GIAHS)¶ programmer, whose goal is to dynamically conserve the world’s remaining¶ traditional farming
systems. He is also President of the Latin American¶ Scientific Society of Agro ecology (SOCLA) and Coordinator of the¶ International Agro ecology
Program of the Center for the Study of the¶ Americas in Berkeley. He periodically lectures at universities in the USA,¶ Latin America and Europe, and
provides technical expertise to¶ international organizations as well as farmers’ organizations and nongovernmental organizations throughout the world.
He is the author of 12¶ books, including Agro ecology: The Science of Sustainable Agriculture¶ and Biodiversity and Pest Management in Agro
ecosystems, as well as¶ more than 250 scientific journal articles “Small Farms as a Planetary Ecological¶ Asset: Five Key Reasons Why We Should¶
Support the Revitalisation of Small¶ Farms in the Global South” http://agroeco.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/11/smallfarmes-ecolasset.pdf)- RT
While industrial agriculture contributes directly to climate¶ change through no less than onethird of total emissions of the¶ major greenhouse gases — carbon dioxide (CO2¶ ), methane
(CH4¶ ),¶ and nitrous oxide (N2¶ O), small biodiverse organic farms have¶ the opposite effect
by increasing the sequestration of carbon in¶ soils. Small farmers usually treat their soils with
organic compost materials which absorb and sequester carbon better than¶ soils that are
farmed with conventional fertilizers. Researchers¶ have suggested that the conversion of 10,000
small-to-medium sized farms to organic production, would allow to store so much¶ carbon in
the soil that it would be equivalent to taking 1,170,000¶ cars off the road (Rosenzweig and Hillel
1998).¶ Further climate amelioration contributions by small farms accrue from the fact that
most use significantly less fossil fuel in¶ comparison to conventional agriculture mainly due to
a reduction of chemical fertilizer and pesticide use, relying instead on¶ organic manures,
legume-based rotations and diversity schemes¶ to enhance beneficial insects. Farmers that live
in rural communities near cities and towns and linked to local markets,¶ avoid the energy
wasted and the gas emissions associated with¶ transporting food hundreds and even thousands
of miles.
Climate Change causes conflict
Kirkup 11 (July 7, 2011 James Kirkup Political Correspondent for the Telegraph “Chris Huhne: Climate change threatens UK security”
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/8622945/Chris-Huhne-Climate-change-threatens-UK-security.html)- RT
The Energy Secretary predicted that UK will be “exposed to the shocking and alarming”
consequences of a
warmer world. Unchecked, climate change poses “a systemic threat” to the international order,
he said.¶ Mr Huhne made the prediction in a speech to the Royal United Services Institute, a military think-tank.¶ The speech is meant to pave the way
for a White Paper next week that will set out plans to boost the use of nuclear power and “renewable” energy sources like wind farms.¶ “With luck, the UK
may well escape the worst physical impacts. But in a connected world, we will be exposed to the global
consequences. And they are both alarming and shocking,” he said.¶ “A changing climate will
imperil food, water, and energy security. It will affect human health, trade flows, and political
stability.Ӧ A hotter planet will mean that crop failures are more common and water is more
scarce, Mr Huhne predicted. That could mean conflicts between states for such resources.¶ That could
also mean huge movements of populations, with people fleeing the worst-hit areas for those
less affected.¶ “The knock-on effects will not stop at our borders,” Mr Huhne said. “Climate
change will affect our way of life – and the way we order our society. It threatens to rip out the
foundations on which our security rests.”
Manufacturing Scenario
1NC
Kills manufacturing sector
Public Citizen 13 (Public Citizen, nonprofit advocacy group with offices in Washington and Austin, “NAFTA’s
Broken Promises 1994-2013: Outcomes of the North American Free Trade Agreement,” 2013,
http://www.citizen.org/documents/NAFTAs-Broken-Promises.pdf, AL)
Devastation of American manufacturing erodes the tax base that supports U.S. schools,
hospitals and essential infrastructure. Since NAFTA’s implementation, over 60,000
manufacturing facilities have closed.41 The loss of these firms and erosion of manufacturing
employment means there are fewer firms and well-paid workers to contribute to local tax bases. Research
shows that a robust manufacturing base contributes to a wider local tax base and offering of social services.42
With the loss of manufacturing, tax revenue that could have expanded social services or funded
local infrastructure projects has declined,43 while displaced workers turn to welfare programs
that are ever-shrinking.44 This has resulted in the virtual collapse of some local governments in areas
hardest hit.45 Building trade and construction workers have also been directly impacted both by
shrinking government funds for infrastructure projects and declining demand for maintenance
of manufacturing firms.
Manufacturing base key to prevent Chinese Leadership in nanotech and ensure U.S.
Leadership
Manufacturing and Technology News 5
(“Lack of Manufacturing Base Imperils U.S. Lead in Nanotechnology” pg online @
http://www.manufacturingnews.com/news/05/0708/art1.html //um-ef)
Nanotechnology, often touted as a key to maintaining the United States' global lead in industrial
productivity, is far from a sure thing for the U.S., according to the warnings of experts who last week
offered lawmakers varying assessments of the likelihood that the country will be able to capture nano's economic benefits and varying
prescriptions for doing so. "The manufacturing train has already left the station" in some fields of nanomaterials,
Matthew Nordan of New York-based Lux Research Inc. told the House Science Subcommittee on Research at a June 29 hearing titled
"Nanotechnology: Where Does the U.S. Stand?" Any revitalization of the U.S. manufacturing base through
nanotechnology could end up limited to "pilot-scale manufacturing and manufacturing where specific
skills are required," he testified, characterizing these activities as "generally low volume." When it comes to the production of more basic
nanoproducts, he stated, "the U.S.'s economic opportunity is in coming up with the ideas that may be implemented in manufacturing plants on
other shores." Nordan's fellow witnesses -- venture capitalist Floyd Kvamme, who co-chairs the President's Council of Advisors on Science and
Technology (PCAST), and Sean Murdock, executive director of the nanotechnology policy and commercialization advocacy group NanoBusiness
Alliance -- appeared less "prepared to cede the manufacturing of nanotechnology-enabled products here in the United States," as Murdock put it.
But the three did agree in their fundamental assessment of the present: All view the United States as the world leader in
nanotechnology up to now, and all regard its lead as imperiled. Kvamme, citing an estimate contained in the review
of the National Nanotechnology Initiative (NNI) published by PCAST in May, testified that the $1 billion in federal funding for nano R&D in Fiscal
Year 2005 "is roughly one-quarter of the current global investment by all nations." He placed the U.S.'s overall annual nano R&D effort at $3
billion, "one-third of the approximately $9 billion in total worldwide spending by the public and private sectors." Additionally, the U.S. "leads
in the number of start-up companies based on nanotechnology and in research output as measured by
patents and publications." Still, Kvamme said, the U.S. is coming under "increased competitive
pressure," as "other countries are aggressively chasing [its] leadership position," both by
beefing up coordinated national programs and by focusing investments on "areas of existing national
economic strength." The U.S. lead in patents and publications, he added, " appears to be slipping ." According to
Nordan, whose company's figures were cited repeatedly by PCAST it its report, even the U.S.'s current R&D spending lead is open to question. On
the basis of purchasing-power parity, 2004 government spending on nano R&D in the U.S., at $5.42 per capita, came in below South Korea's
$5.62, Japan's $6.30, and Taiwan's $9.40. "The $130 million in estimated government spending on nanotech last year
in China equaled $611 million at purchasing-power parity, or 38 percent of U.S. expenditure," Nordan noted.
That nations like China are free to direct "initial capital investments toward the instrumentation needed
for nanotechnology research, without having to maintain technology infrastructures and skill sets that
were cutting-edge 20 years ago" could add to the comparative bang they're getting for their bucks . A figure
cited in Murdock's testimony seems to corroborate this assumption. In the period January to August 2004, China led the world in research papers
on nanotechnology, presenting 14 percent more than the U.S. And while the U.S., according to the NanoBusiness Alliance's database, accounted for
613 of 1,175 companies worldwide that are "involved with nanotechnology," Murdock said that "if one is to believe the announcements made at the
ChinaNano2005 trade expo," China now has almost 800 such companies. Keeping the edge in R&D is critical to
Nordan because he believes that, for
the U.S., the economic advantage to be derived from nanotechnology begins
and ends with intellectual property (IP). He pointed to Japan's Frontier Carbon, whose 40-ton-per-year capacity for the
manufacture of fullerenes, based on a process licensed from an MIT spinoff company, surpasses last year's total world demand by more than 25
times. "It's unlikely," he told the subcommittee, "that you're going to find U.S.-based companies investing that far ahead of demand in order to
attain manufacturing dominance" in basic nanomaterials. The U.S. cannot maintain an edge, he argued, by offering "low labor
costs or tax advantages for capital investment in manufacturing facilities" in an attempt to "go toe-to-toe
against...countries that have more runway to go down in terms of economic development based on
nanotechnology." Nor, he said, can it prevent the transfer overseas of research, whether "through a patent process [or] to a country that
perhaps does not have the respect for intellectual property rights that Western European and U.S. nations hold." Instead, the U.S.
should seek "to have an unremitting, relentless flow of novel ideas that take time and keep
us continually two, three, five years ahead of what other countries can attain," Nordan maintained.
"The achievement that we can drive toward is to always be ahead and always be first to market with those novel ideas, and through that I think
we'll attain economic rewards." Murdock, while concurring on the importance of enforcing IP laws, countered that keeping manufacturing in the
U.S. is critical to the nation's economic health. "I believe that we need to endeavor to be more than just IP companies," he stated, in view of a
projection by Nordan's firm that "new, emerging nanotechnology applications will...becom[e] incorporated into 15 percent of global manufacturing
output totaling $2.6 trillion in 2014." "If you look at the total value associated with any product, most of the value tends to accrue to those that are
closest to the customer -- that, in fact, make it. And while IP may have higher margins, ultimately there is a big value pool out there, and we need to
ensure that we're taking steps to capture the value. "Furthermore, IP is not the only source of intellectual
capital," Murdock added. "There is know-how. And that is the reason for the importance of
manufacturing. Ultimately, when we move from the knowledge or the proof of principle
into making the stuff, we develop process knowledge. That process knowledge helps us to refine
and improve both the quality of the product and the throughput, and it increases the marginal productivity
of the labor. That is what enables us to pay high wages and keep jobs here. "So while we need to be realistic and
understand that this is a global economy, we also need to take steps to do what we can to ensure that we do
commercialize and manufacture the set of technologies that we can here."
Chinese Leadership guarantees extinction
Lev Navrozov 2004 (Winner of the Albert Einstein Prize for Outstanding Intellectual Achievements, “The Center for Responsible
Nanotechnology ‘Plans Ahead’
“We at the Center for the Survival of Western Democracies, Inc., believe that the West being what it is at present, there is
only one scenario. Two countries could develop nuclear weapons by 1945: the United States and Germany. The latter did not launch a
Manhattan Project, since no one could vouch to Hitler in 1939 that nuclear weapons were possible within a few years, and he committed all
available resources to the conventional war for world domination. The U.S. Manhattan Project started up, and finally, in 1942, came into its own
for fear that Germany would develop nuclear weapons ahead of the United States. Similarly, two countries can develop molecular
nano assemblers: the United States and China. The latter launched in 1986 Project 863, a Manhattan Project for the development
of post-nuclear superweapons in seven fields, and, at the close of the 20th century and beginning of the 21st, molecular nano technology became
the eighth field. The United States has not launched a Manhattan Project for the development of any post-
nuclear superweapons, and certainly not, of molecular nanoweapons. In 1969 President Nixon announced the U.S.
termination of development of post-nuclear weapons, and it has been terminated, according to my research, not my benevolence. Just as Lloyd
George in England up to 1939 dreamed aloud about having a statesman as great as Hitler at the head of the British government, the Western
political establishment has been in love with the dictatorship of China. So, the United States has no need for molecular nano assemblers and the
defense against them. In 1939 Hitler made a fatal mistake: he grabbed Òthe rump of Czechoslovakia,Ó and the democratic West woke up. Imagine
the dictatorship of China suddenly invading Mexico! But the Chinese strategists regard such a war as purely Western and old-fashioned (see
ÒUnrestricted WarfareÓ). In a modern war (which, ironically, the United States initiated by using nuclear weapons against Japan in 1945),
a geostrategist confronts the enemy with annihilation or unconditional surrender. Let us now look at the article
ÒResponsible Nanotechnology.Ó At the CSWD, Inc., we believe that the only responsible molecular nanotechnology is for
the U.S. government to launch a nanotech Manhattan Project on the basis of the Foresight Institute, with Eric
Drexler, the founder of nanotechnology, at the head of the Project. Incidentally, the Advisory Board of the Center for Responsible Nanotechnology
consists of distinguished, gifted individuals who might become the core of the nanotech Manhattan Project. Great was my shock when I had read
the article posted by or on behalf of CRN. Here are its eight ÒscenariosÓ of the future of mankind (which the article presents out of numerical
sequence): Scenario 6. ÒMolecular manufacturingÓ develops Òquickly enough,Ó but mankind lives happily ever after. But what about the
possibility of a molecular nano attack, launched by the dictatorship of China on the West? What? Don't you know
that China is as peaceful as the democratic West thought Germany was peaceful in 1938? Scenario 5. The same as Scenario 6 but Òmolecular
manufacturing technologyÓ develops slowly, which is even better. Scenario 4. The leading world powers take a close look at the first three
scenarios we've described [the article describes 4 after 6 and 5], decide to avoid them at all costs, and agree to work together to avoid geopolitical
meltdown. We at CRN believe that sovereign nations ultimately may cooperate in this way, since the alternatives appear to suck! Again, China is no
problem even if China gets molecular manufacturing capability first. Surely China will not annihilate the
West even in this case, but will work together. What about the United States? Even [!] if the United States
gets molecular manufacturing capability first, and certain elements inside the government intend to
oppress the rest of the world with it, we can hope that other powerful entities in the U.S. will be more
sensible and influential. The above suggests that the form of government in the United States is much more dangerous for the world than
that in China, the largest dictatorship in world history. Inside the U.S. government Òcertain elementsÓ may Òintend to oppress the rest of the
world.Ó Not inside the government of China, which presumably consists of American liberal Democrats and peaceniks only. Scenario 3. Two or
more competent nations develop molecular manufacturing capability at about the same time. Fearing the potential military advantage this could
provide for their adversary, they each begin rapid and massive development of hideously powerful new weaponry. The resulting arms race is
almost certain to be highly unstable, for several reasons. This scenario can be considered an existential risk for the human race. Can you imagine
the dictators of China, hearing of Òexistential risk for the human raceÓ? They will develop a severe depression, and the American doctors talking
depression on TV will have to treat them. Scenario 2 A major Asian nation achieves robust molecular nanotechnology
manufacturing ahead of anyone else, and as a result the U.S. becomes something of a backwater. As I was
reading this, I could imagine only China in this role. I guessed right! But never mind, for China (if it's them) could turn
increasingly open/democratic as they continue to develop economically and scientifically isn't it? Of course!
Remember how increasingly open/democratic Germany turned as it developed economically and scientifically after 1933? If one knows
nothing about a foreign country, he or she can well daydream about its being open/democratic. Remember
how President Roosevelt's spouse and his ambassador in Moscow admired and extolled openness and
democracy in Stalin's Russia? Scenario 1. The United States of America is the first to develop
molecular technology manufacturing, and as a result can rule the world. Surely this is
better than the nano annihilation..”
Deterrence Module
Manufacturing capabilities key to technology necessary for U.S. deterrence
O’Hanlon et al 12
(Mackenzie Eaglen, American Enterprise Institute Rebecca Grant, IRIS Research Robert P. Haffa, Haffa Defense Consulting
Michael O'Hanlon, The Brookings Institution Peter W. Singer, The Brookings Institution Martin Sullivan, Commonwealth Consulting Barry Watts,
Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments “The Arsenal of Democracy and How to Preserve It: Key Issues in Defense Industrial Policy January
2012,”
pg
online
@
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2012/1/26%20defense%20industrial%20base/0126_defense_industrial_base_ohanlon
//um-ef)
The current wave of defense cuts is also different than past defense budget reductions in their likely industrial impact, as the
U.S. defense
industrial base is in a much different place than it was in the past . Defense industrial issues are
too often viewed through the lens of jobs and pet projects to protect in congressional districts . But the
overall health of the firms that supply the technologies our armed forces utilize does have
national security resonance . Qualitative superiority in weaponry and other key military technology
has become an essential element of American military power in the modern era— not only for winning wars
but for deterring them . That requires world-class scientific and manufacturing capabilities—
which in turn can also generate civilian and military export opportunities for the United States in a globalized
marketplace.
Defense industrial base deters war with Russia
Watts 2008 (Senior Fellow @ The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (Barry D, “The US Defense Industrial Base, Past, Present and
Future,” CBA,
__http://www.csbaonline.org/4Publications/PubLibrary/R.20081015._The_US_Defense_In/R.20081015._The_US_Defense_In.pdf__)
the US defense industrial base has been a source of long-term strategic advantage for the
United States, just as it was during World War II. American defense companies provided the bombers and
missiles on which nuclear deterrence rested and armed the US military with world-class
weapons, including low-observable aircraft, wide-area surveillance and targeting sensors,
and reliable guided munitions cheap enough to be employed in large numbers . They also
Since the 1950s,
contributed to the development of modern digital computers, successfully orbited the first reconnaissance satellites, put a man on the moon in less
than a decade, and played a pivotal role in developing the worldwide web. Critics have long emphasized President Eisenhower’s warning in his
farewell television address that the nation needed to “guard against the acquisition of undue influence, whether sought or unsought, by the
military-industrial complex.” Usually forgotten or ignored has been an earlier, equally important, passage in Eisenhower’s January 1961 speech: A
vital element in keeping the peace is our military establishment. Our arms must be mighty, ready for
instant action, so that no potential aggressor may be tempted to risk his own destruction .
Eisenhower’s warning about undue influence, rather than the need to maintain American military strength, tends to dominate contemporary
discussions of the US defense industrial base. While the percentage of US gross domestic product going to national defense remains low compared
to the 1950s and 1960s, there is a growing list of defense programs that have experienced problems with cost, schedule, and, in a few cases, weapon
performance. In fairness, the federal government, including the Department of Defense and Congress, is at least as much to blame for many of
these programmatic difficulties as US defense firms. Nevertheless, those critical of the defense industry tend to concentrate on these acquisition
shortcomings. The
main focus of this report is on a larger question. How prepared is the US defense industrial
base to meet the needs of the US military Services in coming decades? The Cold War challenge of Soviet power has
largely ebbed, but new challenges have emerged. There is the immediate threat of the violence stemming from
SalafiTakfiri and Khomeinist terrorist groups and their state sponsors, that have consumed so much American blood and treasure
in Iraq; the longer-term challenge of authoritarian capitalist regimes epitomized by the rise of China and a resurgent Russia; and,
not least, the worsening problem of proliferation, particularly of nuclear weapons. In the face of these more complex
and varied challenges, it would surely be premature to begin dismantling the US defense industry . From a
competitive perspective, therefore, the vital question about the defense industrial base is whether it will be as much
a source of long-term advantage in the decades ahead as it has been since the 1950s.
That’s the only scenario for Extinction
Bostrom, 2002
[Nick, Professor of Philosophy and Global Studies at Yale, "Existential Risks: Analyzing Human Extinction Scenarios and Related Hazards," 38,
www.transhumanist.com/volume9/risks.html]
A much greater existential risk emerged with the build-up of nuclear arsenals in the US and the USSR. An
all-out nuclear war was a possibility with both a substantial probability and with consequences that might have
been persistent enough to qualify as global and terminal. There was a real worry among those best acquainted with the information
available at the time that a nuclear Armageddon would occur and that it might annihilate our species or permanently
destroy human civilization.[4] Russia and the US retain large nuclear arsenals that could be used in a future
confrontation, either accidentally or deliberately. There is also a risk that other states may one day build up large nuclear arsenals. Note
however that a smaller nuclear exchange, between India and Pakistan for instance, is not an existential risk, since it would not destroy or thwart
humankind’s potential permanently. Such a war might however be a local terminal risk for the cities most likely to be targeted. Unfortunately, we
shall see that nuclear Armageddon and comet or asteroid strikes are mere preludes to the existential risks that we will encounter in the 21st
century.
Tech Innovation Module
All levels of manufacturing and R&D are interconnected – a sustainable manufacturing
base in the U.S. is critical to Advanced Manufacturing and R&D
Lind 12 (Michael Lind is policy director of New America’s Economic Growth Program and a co-founder of the New America Foundation. Joshua
Freedman is a program associate in New America’s Economic Growth Program. “Value Added: America’s Manufacturing Future,” pg online @
http://growth.newamerica.net/sites/newamerica.net/files/policydocs/Lind,%20Michael%20and%20Freedman,%20Joshua%20-%20NAF%20%20Value%20Added%20America%27s%20Manufacturing%20Future.pdf //um-ef)
Manufacturing, R&D and the U.S. Innovation Ecosystem Perhaps the greatest contribution of manufacturing to the U.S.
economy as a whole involves the disproportionate role of the manufacturing sector in R&D . The
expansion in the global market for high-value-added services has allowed the U.S. to play to its strengths
by expanding its trade surplus in services, many of them linked to manufacturing, including R&D, engineering,
software production and finance. Of these services, by far the most important is R&D. The United States has long led the world
in R&D. In 1981, U.S. gross domestic expenditure on R&D was more than three times as large as that of any other country in the world. And the
U.S. still leads: in 2009, the most recent year for which there is available data, the United States spent more than 400 billion dollars. European
countries spent just under 300 billion dollars combined, while China spent about 150 billion dollars.14 In the United States, private sector
manufacturing is the largest source of R&D. The private sector itself accounts for 71 percent of total R&D in the United States, and although U.S.
manufacturing accounts for only 11.7 percent of GDP in 2012, the manufacturing sector accounts for 70 percent of all R&D spending by the
private sector in the U.S.15 And R&D and innovation are inextricably connected:
a National Science Foundation
survey found that 22 percent of manufacturers had introduced product innovations and the same percentage introduced process innovations in the
period 2006-2008, while only 8 percent of nonmanufacturers reported innovations of either kind.16 Even as the manufacturing industry in the
United States underwent major changes and suffered severe job losses during the last decade, R&D spending continued to follow a general upward
growth path. A disproportionate share of workers involved in R&D are employed directly or indirectly by
manufacturing companies; for example, the US manufacturing sector employs more than a third of
U.S. engineers. 17 This means that manufacturing provides much of the demand for the U.S.
innovation ecosystem, supporting large numbers of scientists and engineers who might not
find employment if R&D were offshored along with production. Why America Needs the Industrial Commons
Manufacturing creates an industrial commons, which spurs growth in multiple sectors of the economy through linked industries. An
“industrial commons” is a base of shared physical facilities and intangible knowledge shared by a number
of firms. The term “commons” comes from communallyshared pastures or fields in premodern Britain. The industrial commons in
particular in the manufacturing sector includes not only large companies but also small and medium sized
enterprises (SMEs), which employ 41 percent of the American manufacturing workforce and account for 86
percent of all manufacturing establishments in the U.S. Suppliers of materials, component parts, tools, and
more are all interconnected ; most of the time, Harvard Business School professors Gary Pisano and Willy Shih point out, these
linkages are geographic because of the ease of interaction and knowledge transfer between firms.18 Examples of industrial commons surrounding
manufacturing are evident in the United States, including the I-85 corridor from Alabama to Virginia and upstate New York.19 Modern
economic scholarship emphasizes the importance of geographic agglomeration effects and co-location
synergies. 20 Manufacturers and researchers alike have long noted the symbiotic relationship that occurs
when manufacturing and R&D are located near each other: the manufacturer benefits from the
innovation, and the researchers are better positioned to understand where innovation can
be found and to test new ideas. While some forms of knowledge can be easily recorded and transferred, much “know-how” in
industry is tacit knowledge. This valuable tacit knowledge base can be damaged or destroyed by the erosion of
geographic linkages, which in turn shrinks the pool of scientists and engineers in the national innovation
ecosystem. If an advanced manufacturing core is not retained, then the economy stands to lose not only the manufacturing industry itself but
also the geographic synergies of the industrial commons, including R&D. Some have warned that this is already the case: a growing share of
R&D by U.S. multinational corporations is taking place outside of the United States. 21 In particular, a number of
large U.S. manufacturers have opened up or expanded R&D facilities in China over the last few years.22 Next Generation
Manufacturing A dynamic manufacturing sector in the U.S. is as important as ever . But thanks to
advanced manufacturing technology and technology-enabled integration of manufacturing and services, the very nature of manufacturing is
changing, often in radical ways. What will the next generation of manufacturing look like? In 1942, the economist Joseph Schumpeter declared
that “the process of creative destruction is the essential fact about capitalism.” By creative destruction, Schumpeter did not mean the rise and fall
of firms competing in a technologically-static marketplace. He referred to a “process of industrial mutation— if I may use that biological term—that
incessantly revolutionizes the economic structure from within, incessantly destroying the old one, incessantly creating the new one.” He noted that
“these revolutions are not strictly incessant; they occurred in discrete rushes that are separated from each other by spaces of comparative quiet.
The process as a whole works incessantly, however, in the sense that there is always either revolution or absorption of the results of revolution.”23
As Schumpeter and others have observed, technological innovation tends to be clustered in bursts or waves, each dominated by one or a few
transformative technologies that are sometimes called “general purpose technologies.” Among the most world-transforming general purpose
technologies of recent centuries have been the steam engine, electricity, the internal combustion engine, and information technology.24 As epochal
as these earlier technology-driven innovations in manufacturing processes and business models proved to be, they are rapidly being superseded by
new technologydriven changes as part of the never-ending process of Schumpeterian industrial mutation. The latest wave of innovation
in industrial technology has been termed “advanced manufacturing.”
The National Science and Technology
Council of the Executive Office of the President defines advanced manufacturing as “a family of activities that (a) depend on the use and
coordination of information, automation, computation, software, sensing, and networking, and/or (b) make use of cutting edge materials and
emerging capabilities enabled by the physical and biological sciences, for example, nanotechnology, chemistry, and
biology. It involves both new ways to manufacture existing products and the manufacture of new products
emerging from new advanced technologies.”25 Already computer-aided design (CAD) and computer-aided manufacturing (CAM)
programs, combined with computer numerical control (CNC), allow precision manufacturing from complex designs, eliminating many wasteful
trials and steps in finishing. CNC is now ubiquitous in the manufacturing sector and much of the employment growth occurring in the sector
requires CNC skills or training. Information technology has allowed for enterprise resource planning (ERP) and other forms of enterprise software
to connect parts of the production process (both between and within a firm), track systems, and limit waste when dealing with limited resources.
Other areas in which advanced manufacturing will play a role in creating new products and sectors and changing current ones
are: Supercomputing. America’s global leadership in technology depends in part on
whether the U.S. can compete with Europe and Asia in the race to develop “exascale
computing,” a massive augmentation of computer calculating power that has the potential to revolutionize predictive sci ences from
meteorology to economics. According to the Advanced Scientific Computing Advisory Committee (ASCAC), “If the U.S. chooses to be a
follower rather than a leader in exascale computing, we must be willing to cede leadership” in industries
including aerospace, automobiles, energy, health care, novel material development, and information
technology.26 Robotics: The long-delayed promise of robotics is coming closer to fulfillment. Google and other
firms and research consortiums are testing robotic cars, and Nevada recently amended its laws to permit autonomous automobiles.27 Amazon is
experimenting with the use of robots in its warehouses.28 Nanotechnology may permit manufacturing at extremely small
scales including the molecular and atomic levels.29 Nanotechnology is also a key research component in the semiconductor
indusmanutry, as government funding is sponsoring projects to create a “new switch” capable of supplanting current semiconductor technology.30
Photonics or optoelectronics, based on the conversion of information carried by electrons to photons and back, has potential applications in
sectors as diverse as telecommunications, data storage, lighting and consumer electronics. Biomanufacturing is the use of biological
processes or living organisms to create inorganic structures, as well as food, drugs and fuel . Researchers at MIT
have genetically modified a virus that generates cobalt oxide nanowires for silicon chips.31 Innovative materials include artificial “metamaterials”
with novel properties. Carbon nanotubes, for example, have a strength-to-weight ratio that no other material can match.32 Advanced
manufacturing using these and other cuttingedge technologies is not only creating new products and new methods of production but is also
transforming familiar products like automobiles. The rapid growth in electronic and software content in automobiles, in forms like GPS-based
guidance systems, information and entertainment technology, anti-lock brakes and engine control systems, will continue. According to Ford,
around 30 percent of the value of one of its automobiles is comprised by intellectual property, electronics and software. In the German automobile
market, electronic content as a share of production costs is expected to rise from 20-30 percent in 2007 to 50 percent by 2020.33
Independently, that innovation solves great power wars
Taylor 2k4 (Mark, Professor of Political Science – Massachusetts Institute of Technology, “The Politics of Technological Change: International
Relations versus Domestic Institutions”, 4-1, http://www.scribd.com/doc/46554792/Taylor)
Technological innovation is of central importance to the study of international relations (IR),
affecting almost every
aspect of the sub-field. 2 First and foremost, a nation’s technological capability has a significant effect on its
economic growth, industrial might, and military prowess ; therefore relative national technological capabilities
necessarily influence the balance of power between states, and hence have a role in calculations
of war and alliance formation. Second, technology and innovative capacity also determine a nation’s trade profile, affecting which
products it will import and export, as well as where multinational corporations will base their production facilities. 3 Third, insofar as innovationdriven economic growth both attracts investment and produces surplus capital, a nation’s technological ability will also affect
international financial flows and who has power over them. 4 Thus, in broad theoretical terms, technological change is
important to the study of IR because of its overall implications for both the relative and absolute power of states. And if theory alone does not
convince, then history
also tells us that nations on the technological ascent generally experience
a corresponding and dramatic change in their global stature and influence , such as Britain during the
first industrial revolution, the United States and Germany during the second industrial revolution, and Japan during the twentieth century. 5
Conversely, great powers which fail to maintain their place at the technological frontier generally drift and
fade from influence on international scene. 6 This is not to suggest that technological innovation alone determines international
politics, but rather that shifts in both relative and absolute tech nological capability have a major impact on
i nternational r elations, and therefore need to be better understood by IR scholars. Indeed, the importance of technological
innovation to international relations is seldom disputed by IR theorists. Technology is rarely the sole or overriding
causal variable in any given IR theory, but a broad overview of the major theoretical debates reveals the ubiquity of technological causality. For
example, from Waltz to Posen, almost all Realists have a place for technology in their explanations of international politics. 7 At the very least, they
describe it as an essential part of the distribution of material capabilities across nations, or an indirect source of military doctrine. And for some,
technology is the very cornerstone of great power domination, and its transfer the
main vehicle by which war and change occur in world politics . 8 Jervis tells us that the balance of
offensive and defensive military technology affects the incentives for war. 9 Walt agrees, arguing that
technological change can alter a state’s aggregate power, and thereby affect both alliance formation and the
international balance of threats. 10 Liberals are less directly concerned with technological change, but they must admit that by raising
like Gilpin quoted above,
or lowering the costs of using force, technological progress affects the rational attractiveness of international cooperation and regimes. 11
Technology also lowers information & transactions costs and thus increases the applicability of
international institutions,
a cornerstone of Liberal IR theory. 12 And in fostering flows of trade, finance, and information,
technological change can lead to Keohane’s interdependence 13 or Thomas Friedman et al’s globalization. 14 Meanwhile, over at the “third debate”,
Constructivists cover the causal spectrum on the issue, from Katzenstein’s “cultural norms” which shape security concerns and
to Wendt’s “stripped down technological determinism” in which technology inevitably
drives nations to form a world state. 16 However most Constructivists seem to favor Wendt, arguing
that new technology changes people’s identities within society , and sometimes even creates new crossnational constituencies, thereby affecting international politics. 17 Of course, Marxists tend to see technology as
determining all social relations and the entire course of history, though they describe mankind’s major fault lines as
thereby affect technological innovation; 15
running between economic classes rather than nation-states. 18 Finally, Buzan & Little remind us that without advances in the technologies of
transportation, communication, production, and war, international systems would not exist in the first place
And, advanced manufacturing technology will make war IMPOSSIBLE (This card is
dumb)
Paone 9
(Chuck, 66th Air Base Wing Public Affairs for the US Air Force, 8-10-09, “Technology convergence could prevent war, futurist says,”
http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123162500)
The convergence of "exponentially advancing technologies" will form a "super-intelligence" so
formidable that it could avert war, according to one of the world's leading futurists. Dr. James Canton, CEO and
chairman of the Institute for Global Futures, a San Francisco-based think tank, is author of the book "The Extreme Future" and an adviser to
leading companies, the military and other government agencies. He is consistently listed among the world's leading speakers
and has presented to diverse audiences around the globe. He will address the Air Force Command and Control Intelligence, Survelliance and
Reconnaissance Symposium, which will be held Sept. 28 through 30 at the MGM Grand Hotel at Foxwoods in Ledyard, Conn., joining Air Force
Chief of Staff Gen. Norton Schwartz and a bevy of other government and industry speakers. He offered a sneak preview of his symposium
presentation and answered various questions about the future of technology and warfare in early August. " The
superiority of
convergent technologies will prevent war," Doctor Canton said, claiming their power would present an
overwhelming deterrent to potential adversaries . While saying that the U.S. will build these super systems faster and
better than other nations, he acknowledged that a new arms race is already under way. "It will be a new MAD for the 21st century," he said,
referring to the Cold War-era acronym for Mutually Assured Destruction, the idea that a nuclear first strike would trigger an equally deadly
response. It's commonly held that this knowledge has essentially prevented any rational state from launching a nuclear attack. Likewise, Doctor
Canton said he believes rational nation states, considering this imminent technology explosion, will see the
futility of nation-on-nation warfare in the near future. Plus there's the "socio-economic linking of the global market system."
"The fundamental macroeconomics on the planet favor peace, security, capitalism and prosperity," he said. Doctor Canton projects that nations,
including those not currently allied, will work together in using these smart technologies to prevent non-state actors from engaging in disruptive
and deadly acts. As a futurist, Doctor Canton and his team study and predict many things, but their main area of expertise -- and the
is advanced and emerging technology. "I see that as the key catalyst of
strategic change on the planet, and it will be for the next 100 years," he said. He focuses on six specific technology
areas: "nano, bio, IT, neuro, quantum and robotics;" those he expects to converge in so powerful a
way. Within the information technology arena, Doctor Canton said systems must create "meaningful data," which can be validated and acted
upon. "Knowledge engineering for the analyst and the warfighter is a critical competency that we need to get
our arms around," he said. "Having an avalanche of data is not going to be helpful." Having the right data is. "There's no way for the human
one in which he's personally most interested --
operator to look at an infinite number of data streams and extract meaning," he said. "The question then is: How do we augment the human user
with advanced artificial intelligence, better software presentation and better visual frameworks, to create a system that is situationally aware and
can provide decision options for the human operator, faster than the human being can?" He said he believes the answers can often be found
already in what he calls 'edge cultures.' "I would look outside of the military. What are they doing in video games? What are they doing in
healthcare? What about the financial industry?" Doctor Canton said he believes that more sophisticated artificial intelligence
applications will transform business, warfare and life in general.
products, he says, even if people don't know it.
Many of these are already embedded in systems or
US-China War Module
Loss of manufacturing Risks a China-Taiwan War
Steven Mosher 2/14/06 (President of the Population Research Institute, CQ Congressional Testimony, “Chinese Influence on U.S. Foreign Policy”
pg lexis)
The ruthless mercantilism practiced by the CCP is thus a form of economic warfare. China's rulers seek to move as much of the
world's manufacturing base to their country as possible, thus increasing the PRC's "comprehensive national strength" at the
same time that it undermines U.S. national security by hollowing out America's industrial base in general and key defenserelated sectors of the economy in particular. China will not lightly abandon this policy, which strengthens China as it weakens the
U.S., and is an integral part of China's drive for Hegemony. China is Acquiring the Means to Project Force Far Beyond
Taiwan. Many of China's military modernization efforts supersonic anti- ship cruise missiles, stealthy submarines, theater based missiles with
terminal guidance systems are aimed specifically at U.S. forces and bases. By is acquiring weapons designed to exploit U.S. vulnerabilities, the PRC
is clearly preparing for a contest with the United States. Beijing is interested in deterring, delaying, or complicating U.S.
assistance to Taiwan in the event of an invasion, so as to force a quick capitulation by the democratically
elected Taiwan government. But while the near-term focus is Taiwan, many of China's new lethal capabilities are applicable to a wide
range of potential operations beyond the Taiwan Strait. As the 2005 Report to Congress of the USCC report notes, "China is in the midst of an
extensive force modernization program aimed at increasing its force projection capabilities and confronting U.S. and allied forces in the region."
The rapid growth in China's military power not only threatens Taiwan and by implication the U.S. but U.S. allies throughout the
Asian Pacific region. China possesses regional, even global ambitions, and is building a first-rate military to realize those ambitions. It is naive to
view the PRC's military build-up as "merely" part of the preparations for an invasion of Taiwan in which American military assets in the AsianPacific will have to be neutralized.
Extinction.
The Strait Times, 2000 [“No one gains in war over Taiwan”, June 25, Lexis]
The high-intensity scenario postulates a cross-strait war escalating into a full-scale war
between the US and China. If Washington were to conclude that splitting China would better serve its national interests, then a fullscale war becomes unavoidable. Conflict on such a scale would embroil other countries
far and near and -horror of horrors - raise the possibility of a nuclear war . Beijing has already told the US and Japan
privately that it considers any country providing bases and logistics support to any US forces attacking China as belligerent parties open to its retaliation. In the
region, this means South Korea, Japan, the Philippines and, to a lesser extent, Singapore. If China were to retaliate, east
Asia will be set on fire.
the US
distracted, Russia may seek to redefine Europe's political landscape. The balance of
power in the Middle East may be similarly upset by the likes of Iraq. In south Asia, hostilities
between India and Pakistan, each armed with its own nuclear arsenal, could enter a
new and dangerous phase. Will a full-scale Sino-US war lead to a nuclear war? According to General Matthew Ridgeway, commander of the US
And the conflagration may not end there as opportunistic powers elsewhere may try to overturn the existing world order. With
Eighth Army which fought against the Chinese in the Korean War, the US had at the time thought of using nuclear weapons against China to save the US from military
defeat. In his book The Korean War, a personal account of the military and political aspects of the conflict and its implications on future US foreign policy, Gen
Ridgeway said that US was confronted with two choices in Korea -truce or a broadened war, which could have led to the use of nuclear weapons. If the US had to
there is little hope of winning a war
against China 50 years later, short of using nuclear weapons . The US estimates that China possesses about 20 nuclear
resort to nuclear weaponry to defeat China long before the latter acquired a similar capability,
warheads that can destroy major American cities. Beijing also seems prepared to go for the nuclear option. A Chinese military officer disclosed recently that Beijing
was considering a review of its "non first use" principle regarding nuclear weapons. Major-General Pan Zhangqiang, president of the military-funded Institute for
Strategic Studies, told a gathering at the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars in Washington that although the government still abided by that principle,
there were strong pressures from the military to drop it. He said military leaders considered the use of nuclear weapons mandatory if the country risked
dismemberment as a result of foreign intervention. Gen Ridgeway said that should that come to pass, we
would see the destruction of
civilization. There would be no victors in such a war. While the prospect of a nuclear Armageddon over Taiwan might seem
inconceivable, it cannot be ruled out entirely, for China puts sovereignty above everything else.
Military Readiness Module
Manufacturing key to the economy and military readiness
Cooper 7 (Horace Cooper, Senior Fellow and deputy director of the Alliance for American Manufacturing, “Making it in America”, April 04, 2007,
http://www.americanmanufacturing.org/articles/making-it-america)
Why should those who support limited government and liberty care about what happens to manufacturing in America? Because
manufacturing is a crucial component of who we are as a country. As far back as Alexander Hamilton, our founders
understood that America’s merchants and industrialists would shape American society directly by providing jobs and indirectly by enhancing our
nation’s economic might. Today, manufacturing continues to play that role as part of a maturing and stable
manufacturing sector. Additionally, this key sector of the economy continues to provide Americans with better
jobs and a greater quality of life. And despite what you may think, manufacturing today isn’t a small part of our
economy. It is the key engine. If American manufacturing was its own country, it would have the world’s
8th-largest economy. With a manufacturing output nearly as great as the entire GDP of China and more
than the economies of Australia, Belgium and Brazil combined, “made in America” is more than a slogan,
it’s the American way. Yes, America is the world’s No. 1 manufacturer—its activities accounting for a
staggering one-quarter of all manufacturing on the planet as recently as 2004. As significant as it is worldwide,
it is its effects on our economy at home that are more noteworthy. Domestic manufacturing is vital to the
rest of our economy. Nearly 14.5 million Americans work directly in the manufacturing industry and another 8 million do so in related
industries such as wholesaling and finance. A phenomenon economists refer to as the multiplier effect causes the growth and expansion in the
manufacturing sector to generate significant salutary effects on other sectors, resulting in more jobs, investment and innovation in those sectors as
well. Today the manufacturing sector is responsible for 70 percent of all U.S. private-sector research and development. And more than half of all
U.S. exports stem from domestic manufacturing. Much of America’s energy conservation activity is found here; American manufacturing is the
center for a range of innovative technologies that reduce energy use and promote a cleaner environment. Letting this powerful engine slip away
would be disastrous. But as the attentive reader knows, all is not well with American manufacturing. Although many claim it is the manufacturing
sector itself which is to blame, the evidence rebuts this argument. U.S. companies are not running away from America. The latest available data
indicates that U.S. manufacturers invested about $170 billion in factories and equipment in the United States in 2005, while their foreign
investment to the rest of the world was only $39 billion. That means more than 80 percent of the investment by American firms stayed here at
home. The truth is that a combination of recessions in the United States, strikingly high energy prices along with the predatory trading practices of
many other countries have significantly eroded American manufacturing influence. Reaching a high of 53 percent of the economy in 1965,
domestic manufacturing accounts for only 9 percent of GDP 40 years later. Not since the beginning of the industrial revolution has a lower
percentage of Americans worked in American manufacturing as they do today. Tellingly, just since 2000, the manufacturing sector has lost nearly
3 million jobs. There can be no doubt, however, the manufacturing sector is under siege. The losses over time have been quite substantial. Now
some in Washington wonder if manufacturing can make it all. Worse, they openly speculate it wouldn’t be missed. The idea that manufacturing
can’t make it here in America is wrong-headed and dangerous. But perhaps greater than the economic disruption in the lives
of the workforce and their companies is the incalculable loss of a manufacturing base for our nation as a
whole. There are those in Washington who fail to appreciate the attendant decline in our nation’s security
and flexibility in foreign affairs that results from the collapse of this sector. The fall of the Berlin Wall and the
unipolarity that resulted presents the United States far greater responsibilities and concerns than those that existed during the Cold War. Yet, our
failure to sustain our domestic manufacturing base and instead pursuing a strategy of relying on other
countries for military products and technologies isn’t just short-sided, it’s dangerous. This decline in
our country’s military readiness is a signal to the rest of the world that we may not be
capable of defending our interests or allies. And perhaps one of the greatest lessons of the 20th century is that
weakness at home is provocative. Essentially, we provoke rogue nations into taking ill-advised
actions that must inevitably be countered by America’s military might. A policy that results in a
diminished security for Americans, fewer jobs, a declining tax base for communities and states and that
rejects our nation’s history is a policy that should be reassessed. Supporters of liberty and freedom recognize that American
ingenuity and know-how is a core ingredient of our manufacturing sector and has led to much of the high standard of living we Americans take for
granted. At our country’s founding and for much of its history, we’ve recognized the benefits of a strong and robust manufacturing sector. It is the
mainstay for our nation’s exports, provides salaries nearly 25 percent higher than other sectors, supports the tax base in communities across the
nation, and is essential to our nation’s security needs. It is a sector that should be welcomed and encouraged today.
Kills Heg
Spencer 2K Policy Analyst for Defense and National Security Institute for International Studies at The Heritage Foundation (Jack, “The Facts
about military readiness”, Heritage Foundation Backgrounder #1394)
Military readiness is vital because declines in America's military
readiness signal to the rest of the world that the United
States is not prepared to defend its interests. Therefore, potentially hostile nations will be more likely to lash out
against American allies and interests, inevitably leading to U.S. involvement in combat. A high state of military
readiness is more likely to deter potentially hostile nations from acting aggressively in regions of vital national
interest, thereby preserving peace
Leadership Module
Declining manufacturing competitiveness devastates the US economy and global
leadership
Choate 2002
(Pat Choate, director of the Manufacturing Policy Project and Edward Miller, president of DSI, former economic treaty negotiator,
2002, http://www.uscc.gov/researchpapers/2000_2003/reports/analysis.htm)
For two centuries, industrial and military self-sufficiency was America’s policy. It succeeded brilliantly. It
protected against European adventurism in the 19th century. It enabled the nation to become the richest, most industrialized
country in the world. And it allowed America to be the arsenal of democracy in the 20th century. Even when
America disarmed following World War I and again after World War II, it still had the industrial capacity - the potential -- to re-arm quickly if a threat emerged. And when one did, America’s factories quickly converted to
war production, allowing the Allied forces to out produce and ultimately overwhelm the Axis powers in the
1940s and hold off the enemy during the Korean War. Following the Korean War, the U.S. defense industrial base
was repeatedly modernized, again enabling the USA to cope with any foreign threat. And self-sufficiency
was taken a step further during the Cold War as the United States actively led Europe, Japan and others in
denying the Soviet Union the technologies, machinery, skills, and research they needed to keep apace —
economically and militarily. That policy of strength and containment succeeded, too. The Soviet Union could not match the West, its
people grew weary, and that empire broke into pieces. But with the collapse of the Soviet Union, America seems to have quickly
forgotten the older lessons and policies that long served it well. In a very real way, the mood of America in these
first days of the 21st century is akin to that of America in the 1920s . Then, the "war to end wars" had ended. The threat
was gone. America could return to the business of America, which was perceived to be business. With the collapse of the Soviet
Union, America remains the sole super power. Americans are generally prosperous. And while as recently as the
1980s, the global competitiveness of domestic industries was a top concern of national leaders, their successors now focus on assuring stockholders
higher share prices and American consumers a steady flow of inexpensively produced goods, regardless of where they are made. Once again, the
business of America seems to be business. Today, a smaller, simpler, more trusting, view dominates. Terrorists are seen as the
principal threat to national security. The emergence of China -- a one-party, repressive, Communist state — as an economic and
military power is mainly seen not as a danger, but as a business opportunity. And global economics is treated as something
analogous to celestial mechanics -- a self-driven, self-correcting system in which markets balance supply
and demand, assuring ever more growth and development. But there is also something different about what America is
doing now from what it did after World War I and World War II. Then, the United States shifted military production back to civilian uses and even
though military expenditures were cut, the U.S. industrial base remained in America. The long-held policy of self-sufficiency was not disturbed.
Unlike in the past, however, now that the Cold War is over, the U.S. industrial base is being taken apart, piece-by-piece,
and relocated to other nations. In the process, much of American’s industrial and military production base is
being sold to foreign interests, and more important a significant portion of it is being physically relocated
into other nations, including our most likely strategic rival — China.
Economy Module
Manufacturing key to the U.S. Economy and Global Leadership
Franklin J.
Vargo, 10/01/03, National Association of Manufacturers, FNS, l/n
I would like to begin my statement with a review of why manufacturing is vital to the U.S. economy. Since manufacturing only
represents about 16 percent of the nation's output, who cares? Isn't the United States a post-manufacturing services economy? Who needs
manufacturing? The answer in brief is that the United States economy would collapse without manufacturing, as would
our national security and our role in the world. That is because manufacturing is really the foundation of our
economy, both in terms of innovation and production and in terms of supporting the rest of the economy.
For example, many individuals point out that only about 3 percent of the U.S. workforce is on the farm, but they manage to feed the nation and
export to the rest of the world. But how did this agricultural productivity come to be? It is because of the tractors and combines and satellite
systems and fertilizers and advanced seeds, etc. that came from the genius and productivity of the manufacturing sector.
Similarly, in services -can you envision an airline without airplanes? Fast food outlets without griddles and freezers? Insurance companies or banks without computers?
Certainly not. The manufacturing industry is truly the innovation industry, without which the rest of the
economy could not prosper. Manufacturing performs over 60 percent of the nation's research and development.
Additionally, it also underlies the technological ability of the United States to maintain its national security and
its global leadership. Manufacturing makes a disproportionately large contribution to productivity, more
than twice the rate of the overall economy, and pays wages that are about 20 percent higher than in other
sectors. But its most fundamental importance lies in the fact that a healthy manufacturing sector truly underlies the entire U.S. standard of
living -because it is the principal way by which the United States pays its way in the world. Manufacturing accounts for over 80 percent of all
U.S. exports of goods. America's farmers will export somewhat over $50 billion this year, but America's manufacturers export almost that much
event month! Even when services are included, manufacturing accounts for two-thirds of all U.S. exports of goods and services. If the U.S.
manufacturing sector were to become seriously impaired, what combination of farm products together with architectural,
travel, insurance, engineering and other services could make up for the missing two-thirds of our exports represented by manufactures? The
answer is "none." What would happen instead is the dollar would collapse, falling precipitously -- not to the reasonable level of
1997, but far below it -and
with this collapse would come high U.S. inflation, a wrenching economic downturn
and a collapse in the U.S. standard of living and the U.S. leadership role in the world. That, most basically, is why
the United States cannot become a "nation of shopkeepers."
Manufacturing is the foundation of the economy ---- decline collapses the economy and
global leadership
Industrial Paint & Powder in ‘3 (“Study shows importance of strong manufacturing base; News Watch”, 10-1,
"Manufacturing spawns more economic activity and related jobs than does any other economic sector,"
says Popkin, president of Joel Popkin and Co. The study, Securing America's Future: The Case for a Strong Manufacturing Base,
which was commissioned by the Council of Manufacturing Associations (CMA), contends that manufacturing is "the heart of an
innovative process that powers the U.S. economy to global leadership. America's unprecedented wealth
and world economic leadership ate made possible by a critical mass of manufacturing within the geographic
confines of the American common market." "Popkin shows how the unique linkages of manufacturing to the rest of the economy create more
innovation, productivity and good jobs than any other sector of the economy," says Jerry Jasinowski, president of the National Association of
Manufacturers. "Popkin attributes America's high standard of living to the manufacturing innovation process. Research and
development stimulates investment in capital equipment and in workers, leads to new processes and
products, and ultimately leads to higher living standards." Industry in America, Jasinowski says, is being squeezed between
unprecedented foreign competition based on predatory trade practices that make it impossible to raise prices, and rising health-care costs, soaring
litigation and excessive regulation. The result is a dramatic decline in cash flow that forces firms to cut back on R&D and capital investment, and to
reduce employment. "If the U.S. manufacturing base continues to shrink at the present rate and the critical mass
is lost," Popkins' study concludes, "the manufacturing innovation process will shift to other global centers. If this
happens, a decline in U.S. living standards in the future is virtually assured."
Saving the manufacturing sector spills over to the larger economy – solves your
alternate causes
Jack Keough, 5/1/05,
Industrial Distribution, “Manufacturing's Ongoing Challenges; In a new white paper, the Bearing Specialists Assn.
focuses on the problems facing U.S. manufacturers and offers tips for dealing with them” pg lexis
That is the consensus of a special white paper published by the Bearing Specialists Assn., which represents more than 70 companies
distributing factory-warranted ball, roller and anti-friction bearings. The paper, entitled, "The Effects on the U.S. Bearing Industry and Homeland
Security of Manufacturers Moving Overseas," identifies the critical challenges facing manufacturers and recommends steps to help deal with those
problems. In the paper, BSA points out the importance of manufacturing by noting that the manufacturing process leads to
increased economic activity in other sectors. For every $1 of goods produced, an additional $1.43 worth of
additional economic activity is generated—much more than any other economic sector. In his book, Securing
America's Future: the Case for a Strong U.S. Manufacturing Base , author Joel Popkin points out that, "U.S. manufacturing is
the heart of a significant process that generates economic growth and has produced the highest standards
in history. But today, this complex process faces serious domestic and international challenges which, if not overcome, will lead to reduced
economic growth and, ultimately, a decline in living standards for future generations of Americans." The white paper adds that it's not just
manufactured products that make Americans prosperous; it's the manufacturing process. This process
starts with an idea that leads to new jobs and equipment and then to increased productivity, new products
and processes. "Prices fall and quality rises. Soon other parts of the economy are benefiting and,
ultimately, living standards rise," BSA notes. The economic impact Jim Berges, president of Emerson Electric, provides an eyeopening look at manufacturing's economic impact. "If the long-term health of this economy is threatened, then so are
we. Economies whose manufacturing sectors are not vibrant and not growing are doomed to low overall
growth," he says. "Those who call for a conversion to a service-based economy need only to look at Japan and
Germany to get a glimpse of the consequences of manufacturing's decline—not a pretty picture and not one we want to
see in this country." He went on to say, "U.S. manufacturing has demonstrated the ability to overcome pure wage differentials with trading
partners through innovation, capital investment and productivity. But when the structural cost multipliers are piled on, the task becomes
unmanageable for best-in-class companies. Concerted effort to get our state and federal legislators to focus on addressing and removing these
penalties will yield positive results for the economy."
1
Canadian Oil Sands Module
1NC Canadian Oil Sands
NAFTA is key to the Canadian Oil Sands
Zremski 8- Staff Writer for the Buffalo News (Jerry “NAFTA paves U. S. route to energy from north”, August
17, 2008, http://oilsandstruth.org/nafta-paves-u-s-route-energy-north-0)//RT
Beneath the forests of Alberta, 2,300 miles miles northwest of Buffalo, you’ll find the latest black gold: a mix of sand and oil being mined as a new kind of
gusher.¶ And Alberta’s Athabasca Oil Sands are just part of a petroleum boom that has made Canada
the world’s top supplier of oil to the United States.¶ The boom could make its way to Buffalo
through two proposed pipelines that would carry Canadian oil through Western New York to
refineries in the Philadelphia area.¶ The boom also serves as a backdrop for two of the big
issues in the U. S. presidential race between Sens. Barack Obama and John McCain: the future
of the North American Free Trade Agreement and the U. S. oil supply.¶ NAFTA became a
punching bag during the Democratic primary battle between Obama and Sen. Hillary Rodham Clinton. But the
treaty is one reason why the United States buys more oil from Canada than from Saudi Arabia,
Iraq, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates — combined. The trade deal prohibits Canada from
hoarding its oil reserves in these times of tight supplies and high prices, which might explain why Obama, the
presumptive Democratic nominee, has backed away from his harsh rhetoric about the agreement.¶ But he has not backed away from questioning
Canada’s mining of the carbon-laden heavy crude that it gets from the oil sands — which
environmentalists consider a far greater contributor than traditional crude to global warming.¶
Thousands of U. S. jobs¶ Add it all up, and the next energy debate may not be about the oil the United States gets from the Arab nations in the Middle
East, but the oil it gets from its neighbor to the north.¶ “Thousands upon thousands of jobs in the U. S. rely on that
oil,” said Christopher Sands, a senior fellow at the Washington- based Hudson Institute think tank who specializes in¶ U. S.-Canadian relations. “And
25 percent of all of our untapped resources are there. That’s a big deal.”¶ While Congress has been mired in never-ending debates about drilling in
Alaska’s Arctic National Wildlife Refuge and, more recently, off the U. S. coasts, Canada outstripped Saudi Arabia in 2004
as
the top U. S. oil supplier.¶ Canada still pumps plenty of oil the traditional way, but now nearly
half its output comes from the oil sands. Found beneath a vast forest the size of Florida, the sands contain an
estimated 170 billion barrels of oil — the second largest reserve in the world, after Saudi Arabia.¶ For decades, the oil
beneath that forest appeared too expensive to extract. But as oil prices have increased and
supplies have dwindled, oil companies are expected to invest $100 billion in the coming years
in the oil sands.¶ They’re mining near the surface — or more often, drilling deep underground —
to extract an oil as thick as peanut butter. Once it’s processed to resemble traditional crude oil, much of it goes to refineries in
the West and Midwest, then on to gas stations and to other uses.¶ ‘Proportionality clause’¶ With daily production projected to rise
over the next decade to 4 million barrels from 1.3 million barrels, oil and pipeline companies
have proposed 36 new pipeline projects — including two that cut through Western New York –
to get that oil to potential customers.¶ Sunoco has proposed a 24- inch pipeline to carry Canadian crude from Buffalo to its
Philadelphia refinery, possibly as soon as 2012. The pipeline would use the same right of way as the pipeline that brings gasoline to the Buffalo area from
Philadelphia, said Thomas Golembeski, a Sunoco spokesman.¶ Enbridge, Canada’s leading pipeline company, has proposed a 30-inch pipeline using the
same route.¶ The proposal is one of the company’s three alternatives for bringing crude from the oil sands into the Northeast, said Jennifer Varey, a
company spokeswoman.¶ “We’re always looking for ways to expand our system,” Varey said. “And we’re seeing tremendous interest in getting Canadian
crude into the Philadelphia market.Ӧ Refineries there now rely on overseas imports that are increasingly
being tapped by China and India. That can’t happen to the same degree to Canadian crude — all
because of NAFTA.¶ The trade deal includes a “proportionality clause” that bars Canada from
reducing its oil and gas shipments to the U. S. while increasing its domestic supply. ¶ “We looked at
whether Canada could reduce exports for the sake of conservation or environmental policy . . . or even for household heating. We cannot,” said John
Dillon, co-author of a report on the issue published by the University of Alberta’s Parkland Institute and the Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives.¶
But Canada might want to change all that if American politicians insist on renegotiating the trade deal.¶ Perhaps not surprisingly, Obama — who called
NAFTA “devastating” and “a big mistake” during his campaign against Clinton — softened his criticism once he clinched the Democratic nomination.¶
“Sometimes during campaigns, the rhetoric gets overheated and amplified,” he told Fortune magazine in June, saying he was simply interested in
“opening up a dialogue” with Canada and Mexico “and figuring out how we can make this work for all people.”¶ Campaign aides to McCain, the presumed
Republican nominee, did not respond to a request for comment, but others suggested that, for Obama, a more careful approach to NAFTA only made
sense.¶ “The Canadians might look for other options if we became difficult customers,” said Sands, of the Hudson Institute.¶ Yet while easing off his
aggressive anti-NAFTA rhetoric, Obama remains likely to be a difficult customer for the Canadian oil industry. A strong proponent of
developing alternative energy sources, the likely Democratic nominee appears concerned about
a possible overreliance on the Canadian oil sands.¶ The oil from the sands contains more
carbon, which makes it a bigger contributor than traditional sweet crude to global warming.
Alberta, therefore, plans to spend $2 billion to capture and store the carbon removed from the
oil.¶ “If it turns out that these technologies don’t advance, and the only way to produce these resources would be at a significant penalty to climate
change, then we don’t believe that those resources are going to be part of the long-term . . . future,” Jason Grumet, Obama’s senior energy adviser, told
reporters in June.¶ Environmental issues¶ Obama is not alone in worrying about the potential environmental cost of oil from the oil sands.¶ The U. S.
Conference of Mayors passed a resolution in June encouraging mayors to refrain from buying higher-carbon fuels for municipal vehicles.¶ And Liz
Barratt-Brown, a senior attorney at the Natural Resources Defense Council, said: “There
is a huge infrastructure investment
being made in a fuel that, in our view, is taking us in the wrong direction. It’s making it more
difficult for us to fully address the global warming issue.”¶ Environmentalists say Alberta’s
“dirty oil” contains three times as much carbon as sweet crude, and they note that its
production essentially involves strip-mining Alberta’s boreal forest and disrupting, if not
destroying, all the wildlife there.¶ Oil industry officials and Alberta provincial leaders counter
by saying they are doing everything they can to reduce the oil sands’ carbon footprint and
protect the environment.¶ “Yes, it’s a heavier oil,” said Greg Stringham, vice president of the Canadian Association of Petroleum
Producers, who, nevertheless, disputes the notion that it has three times as much carbon than light sweet crude.¶ Taking into account
transportation and production impacts, the carbon footprint of the sands oil is only about 10
percent greater than that of oil from other parts of the world, Stringham said.¶ He said he was
confident that the Canadian oil will be seen as clean enough to be used in the United States for
decades to come. And with the U. S. facing a dwindling oil supply from the Middle East and
troublesome suppliers like Venezuela and Nigeria, some say it may have no choice but to look
to Canada to provide a bridge to an oil-free future.
Impact is extinction from runaway climate change
Hansen, 12 --- directs the NASA Goddard Institute for Space Studies (5/9/2012, James, NYT, “Game Over for
the Climate,” http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/10/opinion/game-over-for-the-climate.html?_r=0)
GLOBAL warming isn’t a prediction. It is happening. That is why I was so troubled to read a recent interview
with President Obama in Rolling Stone in which he said that Canada would exploit the oil in its vast
tar sands reserves “regardless of what we do.” ¶ If Canada proceeds, and we do nothing, it will be
game over for the climate .¶ Canada’s tar sands, deposits of sand saturated with bitumen, contain
twice the amount of carbon dioxide emitted by global oil use in our entire history. If we were to
fully exploit this new oil source, and continue to burn our conventional oil, gas and coal supplies,
concentrations of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere eventually would reach levels higher than
in the Pliocene era, more than 2.5 million years ago, when sea level was at least 50 feet higher than it
is now. That level of heat-trapping gases would assure that the disintegration of the ice sheets
would accelerate out of control. Sea levels would rise and destroy coastal cities. Global
temperatures would become intolerable. Twenty to 50 percent of the planet’s species would be
driven to extinction. Civilization would be at risk.¶ That is the long-term outlook. But near-term, things
will be bad enough. Over the next several decades, the Western U nited S tates and the semi-arid region
from North Dakota to Texas will develop semi-permanent drought, with rain, when it does come,
occurring in extreme events with heavy flooding. Economic losses would be incalculable. More
and more of the Midwest would be a dust bowl. California’s Central Valley could no longer be irrigated. Food
prices would rise to unprecedented levels.¶ If this sounds apocalyptic, it is. This is why we need to
reduce emissions dramatically. President Obama has the power not only to deny tar sands oil additional access
to Gulf Coast refining, which Canada desires in part for export markets, but also to encourage economic
incentives to leave tar sands and other dirty fuels in the ground.
2NC NAFTA=Oil Sands
NAFTA causes Canadian Mining – leads to conflict and environmental and water
disputes
Paley ’13 – editor-member of the Media Co-op (Dawn, “NAFTA AND FOOD IN MEXICO,” Third World
Network Features, 3/7/13, http://www.twnside.org.sg/title2/susagri/2013/susagri261.htm)//ER
Canadian Mining Invasion¶ Not only did NAFTA usher a flood of lower-priced staple foods into
Mexico and increase migration away from rural areas, it also opened the door to a massive
expansion in the mining sector. Canadian companies dominate this sector, making up the
majority of foreign mining companies in the country.¶ In Oaxaca, Vancouver-based Fortuna Silver has
been at the centre of a deadly split between townspeople who are for and against the mine. I had the chance to
meet Bernardo Vแsquez, a prominent community activist and budding avocado farmer, before he was killed in
March, 2012. He explained to me how the government of Oaxaca claims his community – the rural Zapotec
village of San Jos้ del Progreso – is poor, but the people who live there have very basic needs and
desires that could be fulfilled if locals had better access to irrigation and fair supports from
government.¶ “The government calls us poor but we live well,” said Vแsquez. “The people say ‘we don’t want
luxurious houses, or luxurious cars, we need water for our crops, we need fuel,’ that’s all we want, we don’t even
need work. There’s a lot of work! What we don’t have is someone to pay us for it.” ¶ Vแsquez was clear about how
people in his community need access to money in order to supplement the crops they grow for
sustenance. The mining company, he said, didn’t bring anything worthwhile to the table.
Instead, it divided the community. “We have fields and lands, we have work, what we don’t have is cash to
get paid in, and the company isn’t giving us money, they’ll give you chickens or little things like that, which the
people don’t need,” he told me in an interview in February, 2012.¶ About a month after our interview, Vแsquez
was murdered when an unknown assailant shot up his car on the road to San Jos้ Progreso. His
cousin and brother, who were travelling with him, were both wounded in the attack.¶ Instead of
contributing to improving the situation of rural farmers, mega-mining projects have time and
again exacerbated local conflicts and created long term environmental and water management
problems.
2NC Oil Sands=Warming
Canadian oil sands makes climate change unsolvable
Carrington, 13 (5/19/2013, Damian, “Tar sands exploitation would mean game over for climate, warns
leading scientist; Prof James Hansen rebukes oil firms and Canadian government over stance on exploiting
fossil fuel, which he says would make climate problem unsolvable,”
http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2013/may/19/tar-sands-exploitation-climate-scientist, JMP)
Major international oil companies are buying off governments, according to the world's most
prominent climate scientist, Prof James Hansen. During a visit to London, he accused the Canadian government of acting as the
industry's tar sands salesman and "holding a club" over the UK and European nations to accept its "dirty" oil.¶ "Oil from tar sands makes
sense only for a small number of people who are making a lot of money from that product," he
said in an interview with the Guardian. "It doesn't make sense for the rest of the people on the planet. We are getting close to the
dangerous level of carbon in the atmosphere and if we add on to that unconventional fossil
fuels, which have a tremendous amount of carbon, then the climate problem becomes unsolvable ."¶ Hansen
met ministers in the UK government, which the Guardian previously revealed has secretly supported Canada's position at the highest level.¶ Canada's
natural resources minister, Joe Oliver, has also visited London to campaign against EU proposals to penalise oil from Alberta's tar sands as highly
polluting. "Canada can offer energy security and economic stability to the world," he said. Oliver also publicly threatened a trade war via the World Trade
Organisation if the EU action went ahead: "Canada will not hesitate to defend its interests." ¶ The lobbying for and against tar sands has intensified on
both sides of the Atlantic as the EU moves forward on its proposals, which Canada fears could set a global precedent, and Barack Barack Obama
considers approving the Keystone XL pipeline to transport tar sands oil from Canada to the US gulf coast refineries and ports. Canada's prime minister,
Stephen Harper, was met by protesters when he visited New York last week to tell audiences that KXL "absolutely needs to go ahead".¶ Canada's tar
sands are the third biggest oil reserve in the world, but separating the oil from the rock is energy intensive and
causes three to four times more carbon emissions per barrel than conventional oil. Hansen
argues that it would be "game over" for the climate if tar sands were fully exploited, given that existing
conventional oil and gas is certain to be burned.
Canadian oil Sands release a hug amount of GHG’s
Reuters 12—Found on Fox Business, News Website( “U.S. Oil Sands Release More Greenhouse Gasses Than
Other Crudes”, November 15, 2012, http://www.foxbusiness.com/industries/2012/11/15/us-oil-sands-releasemore-greenhouse-gasses-than-other-crudes/)//RT
As President Barack Obama faces a decision on whether to approve the Alberta-to-Texas Keystone XL pipeline, a study said Canadian oil
sands release more planet-warming gases compared to other crudes than originally thought.¶
Oil sands refined in the United States released 9 percent more greenhouse gases last year than
the average of other crudes processed in the country, according to the study released Wednesday by IHS CERA, an energy
research group.¶ In 2010, the group estimated that the emissions from oil sands refined in the United States were only 6 percent higher than those from
other crudes.¶ IHS CERA analyzed data from government, academic and industry sources to that conclude oil sands were more carbon intensive than
thought two years ago.¶ Many environmentalists oppose oil sands crude projects because they believe the fuel is higher in
emissions.¶ Still, IHS CERA played down the findings in the updated report. When it comes to emissions, oil
sands crude is still in the
league of many crude oils refined in the United States including petroleum from Venezuela,
Nigeria, Iraq and heavy oil from California, the group said.¶ "Although the numbers have shifted slightly ... the relative position
of the oil sands compared to all the other sources of crude hasn't changed much," said IHS CERA director Jackie Forrest, an author of the report called
"Oil Sands, Greenhouse Gases, and U.S. Oil Supply: Getting the Numbers Right -- 2012 Update."¶ Canada's energy sector is seeking
new markets for its oil sands crude, with such projects as TransCanada Corp's Keystone XL pipeline to Texas and Enbridge Inc's
Northern Gateway pipeline to Canada's Pacific Coast.¶ Obama blocked the Keystone XL in January, citing environmental concerns about the project in
Nebraska. Obama will likely decide on the project, which supporters say will offer thousands of jobs, early in his second term.¶ Ahead of Obama's
decision, green groups hope to persuade the administration that stopping the Keystone XL could
reduce emissions by keeping some Canadian crude in the ground.¶ The Natural Resources Defense Council, an
environmental group, has said life cycle emissions of oil sands are 8 to 37 percent higher than other crudes processed in the United States.¶ Responding
to the IHS Cera report Bill McKibben, an author and environmental activist, called "tar sands fuel is the dirtiest fuel on Earth." His group plans to protest
at the White House on Sunday about climate and Keystone XL.¶ Oil sands supporters say even if Keystone XL is
stopped the Canadian petroleum will eventually be sent to the United States in other pipelines
or get sent to other buyers such as China, making the "keep it underground" argument moot .¶
One supporter said the IHS CERA report simply reflected more accurate data now available.¶ Greg Stringham, vice president of the Canadian Association
of Petroleum Producers, the industry's main lobby group, said he is not alarmed by the higher average.¶ "We see it as being a similar range," compared to
the earlier study, Stringham said. "But it does show that we need to push on the technology side to make sure
that we continue to drive down to our objective to get that number smaller," he said.
2NC Warming=Extinction
Warming causes extinction – oceans dry up and oxygen disappears.
Brandenburg & Paxson ’99 [John (physicist & rocket scientist) & Monica (award-winning author & expert on
global warming), Dead Mars, Dying Earth, p. 232]
One can imagine a scenario for global catastrophe that runs similarly. If the human race adopted a mentality like the crew aboard the ship Californian-as some
urge, saying that both ozone hole and global warming will disappear if statistics are properly examined, and we need do nothing about either-the following
scenario could occur. The world goes on its merry way and fossil fuels continue to power it. Rather than making painful or politically difficult choices, such as
investing ill fusion research or enacting a rigorous plan of conserving, the industrial world chooses to muddle through the temperature climb. Let's imagine
that America and Europe are too worried about economic dislocation to change course. The ozone hole
expands, driven by a monstrous
synergy with global warming that puts more catalytic ice crystals into the stratosphere, but this affects the far
north and south and not the major nations' heartlands. The seas rise, the tropics roast but the media networks no
longer cover it. The Amazon rainforest becomes the Amazon desert. Oxygen levels fall, but profits rise for those
who can provide it in bottles. An equatorial high pressure zone forms, forcing drought in central Africa and Brazil,
the Nile dries up and the monsoons fail. Then inevitably, at some unlucky point in time, a major unexpected event
occurs-a major volcanic eruption, a sudden and dramatic shift in ocean circulation or a large asteroid impact (those
who think freakish accidents do not occur have paid little attention to life or Mars), or a nuclear war that starts
between Pakistan and India and escalates to involve China and Russia . . . Suddenly the gradual climb in global
temperatures goes on a mad excursion as the oceans warm and release large amounts of dissolved carbon dioxide
from their lower depths into the atmosphere. Oxygen levels go down precipitously as oxygen replaces lost oceanic
carbon dioxide. Asthma cases double and then double again. Now a third of the world fears breathing. As the
oceans dump carbon dioxide, the greenhouse effect increases, which further warms the oceans, causing them to
dump even more carbon. Because of the heat, plants die and burn in enormous fires which release more carbon
dioxide, and the oceans evaporate, adding more water vapor to the greenhouse. Soon, we are in what is termed a
runaway greenhouse effect, as happened to Venus eons ago. The last two surviving scientists inevitably argue, one
telling the other, "See! I told you the missing sink was in the ocean!" Earth, as we know it, dies. After this
Venusian excursion in temperatures, the oxygen disappears into the soil, the oceans evaporate and are lost and
the dead Earth loses its ozone layer completely. Earth is too far from the Sun for it to be the second Venus for long.
Its atmosphere is slowly lost-as is its water-because of ultraviolet bombardment breaking up all the molecules
apart from carbon dioxide. As the atmosphere becomes thin, the Earth becomes colder. For a short while
temperatures are nearly normal, but the ultraviolet sears any life that tries to make a comeback. The carbon
dioxide thins out to form a thin veneer with a few wispy clouds and dust devils. Earth becomes the second Marsred, desolate, with perhaps a few hardy microbes surviving.
Warming causes planetary explosion.
Chalko ’01 [Tom, Head of Geophysics Division, Scientific E Research, Apr 8, “No second chance: can Earth explode
as a result of Global Warming?” http://sci-e-research.com/geophysics.html]
Consequences of global warming are far more serious than previously imagined. These consequences relate to the
newly discovered properties of the "inner core" of our planet. It is a well established fact, verified by decades of seismic measurements,
that the Earth's inner core is a nearly spherical solid of about 1220 km radius that occupies the central position of our planet. The generally accepted view
today is that this solid grew slowly to its current size as a result of the "crystallization" of the surrounding liquid. The "latent heat" of this "crystallization"
allegedly explains how the inner core generates heat. This
article considers global hydro-gravitational equilibrium conditions for
the Earth's inner core and presents a proof that the solid core of our planet could never be smaller or lighter than a
certain minimum, otherwise the core would not be able to remain in the center of the planet. Since the inner core
could have only been larger and heavier in the past than it is today - it cannot be the result of any "crystallization".
This simple conclusion has astonishing consequences. Imagine a gigantic object of 1220 km radius that slowly
becomes smaller, lighter and gives off heat for millions of years. What could it be? It can only be an object that
generates heat by nuclear decay. The main consequence of the above is that all heat generated inside Earth is of
radionic origin. In other words, Earth in its entirety can be considered a nuclear reactor fuelled by spontaneous
fission of various isotopes in the super-heavy inner core, as well as their daughter products of decay in the mantle
and in the crust. Life on Earth is possible only because of the efficient cooling of this reactor - a process that is
limited primarily by the atmosphere. Currently this cooling is responsible for a fine thermal balance between the heat from the core reactor, the
heat from the Sun and the radiation of heat into space, so that the average temperature on Earth is about 13 deg C. Since the radionic heat is
generated in the entire volume of nuclear fuel (the entire Earth) and cooling can occur only at the surface, the
hottest point of the planet should be in the very center of the planet.
This article examines the possibility of the "meltdown" of the
central part of the inner core due to the reduced cooling capacity of the atmosphere, which traps progressively more solar heat due to the so-called
greenhouse effect. Factors that can accelerate the meltdown process, such as an increased solar activity coinciding with increased emissions of greenhouse
The most serious consequence of such a "meltdown" could be a gravity-buoyancy based
segregation of unstable isotopes in the molten inner core. Such a segregation can "enrich" the nuclear fuel in the
core to the point of creating conditions for a chain reaction and a gigantic atomic explosion. Can Earth become
another "asteroid belt" in the Solar system? It is a common knowledge (experiencing seasons) that solar heat is the dominant factor that
gasses are discussed.
determines temperatures on the surface of Earth. In the polar regions however, the contribution of solar heat is minimal and this is where the contribution of
the heat from the inside of our planet can be seen best. Raising polar
ocean temperatures and melting of polar caps should
therefore be the first symptoms of overheating of the inner core reactor. While politicians and businessmen still
debate the need for reducing greenhouse emissions and take pride to evade accepting any responsibility, the
process of overheating of the inner core reactor has already begun - polar oceans have become warmer and polar
caps have begun to melt. Do we have enough imagination, intelligence and integrity to comprehend the danger
before the situation becomes irreversible?
Warming causes extinction – moral obligation
Thompson ‘9 [Allen, Assistant professor of philosophy at Clemson University, “Responsibility for the End of
Nature: Or, How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Global Warming”, Volume 14, Number 1, Spring 2009, Muse]
In the last year we have seen radical changes in public opinion about global warming. It is now widely accepted that human activity is
causally connected to global climate change. I will take it for granted that global warming is real and largely caused by human beings burning
[End Page 79] fossil fuel for energy. Grim forecasts include environmental changes on a scale unprecedented in human history ,
including melting polar ice caps, increased desertification, rising sea levels, and mass species extinction. The consequences for human beings and
other life on Earth are potentially catastrophic. Global warming poses a threat of outstanding magnitude. While some features of
this threat are expressed in descriptive predictions about a wide variety of ecological changes and potential consequences thereof, still another aspect of
the threat posed by global warming is an existential one connected to our moral responsibility.
Democracy Scenario
1NC
NAFTA kills democracy
Kuttner ‘1 – co-editor of The American Prospect (Robert, “NAFTA-STYLE TRADE DEAL BAD FOR
DEMOCRACY: [THIRD Edition],” 4/22/01, Boston Globe, ProQuest)//ER
NAFTA pays lip service to labor and environmental protections, but the weak laws on Mexican lawbooks are honored more in the breech. As a result,
American companies that shift production to Mexico outrun hard-won labor and environmental protections in
the United States.¶ Business, in other words, is keen to harmonize property rights, but not labor, environmental, or
consumer rights. And if NAFTA becomes a hemisphere-wide arrangement, the social balance tilts even more dramatically to
business, at the expense of both sovereignty and social regulation.¶ Brazil, for example, takes a very different view of
pharmaceutical patent protections than the United States.¶ Brazil treats life-saving drugs as social goods. American pharmaceutical companies, not
surprisingly, treat Brazilian policy as patent infringement.¶ It is the defiance of the big global drug companies by Brazil (and by India) that has sharply
brought down the cost of AIDS drugs in the Third World. But if NAFTA is extended, Brazil and its independent drug companies
could be more easily sued by American rivals who have a very different set of public health priorities.¶ Beneath the
proposed Free Trade Area of the Americas and kindred arrangements lurks an intriguing new ideology. This ideology holds that corporations are really
agents of the spread of democracy.¶ I recently participated in a debate at Columbia University sponsored by the Reuters Foundation, on the health of
democracy. One debater was Nancy Boswell, the managing director of a worldwide organization called Transparency International.¶ This wellintentioned group, funded by businesses, banks, and foundations, has branches in some 80 countries. It sees itself as fighting corruption in Third World
countries and thereby alleviating poverty, by pressing for US-style corporate accounting, enforceable strictures against bribery, and the openness to
investment characteristic of the United States.¶ In this view, nothing promotes democracy as much as the spread of free-market capitalism. It's an
audacious claim, and it may even be half-true. In Mexico, NAFTA probably hastened the downfall of the single-party regime. But in South Korea, a
reformist government had to abandon half of its social program to reassure foreign investors.¶ Historically, democracy has been spread
mostly by social movements, not by corporations. The free-market "transparency" promoted by business actually
promotes a narrow brand of democracy that is a sanitized version of American capitalism, circa 1890 - full rights for investors and for
corporations, at the expense of laws that protect labor, the environment, and consumers.¶ Today, some business leaders
are cautious reformers and business is beginning, grudgingly, to accept some minimal social standards as part of free trade agreements, but only because
of strenuous citizen and labor organizing. However, this social rebalancing works much more effectively within one country, where voters and social
movements can be direct counterweights to corporations by recourse to democratic politics.¶ There are no citizens of the republic of
NAFTA. That's why these trade deals threaten democracy, even as they claim to spread it.
Collapse of Democracy causes Extinction
Diamond 95
Larry, Senior Fellow – Hoover Institution, Promoting Democracy in the 1990s, December,
http://wwics.si.edu/subsites/ccpdc/pubs/di/1.htm
OTHER THREATS This hardly exhausts the lists of threats to our security and well-being in the coming years and
decades. In the former Yugoslavia nationalist aggression tears at the stability of Europe and could easily spread. The
flow of illegal drugs intensifies through increasingly powerful international crime syndicates that have made common
cause with authoritarian regimes and have utterly corrupted the institutions of tenuous, democratic ones . Nuclear,
chemical, and biological weapons continue to proliferate. The very source of life on Earth, the global ecosystem,
appears increasingly endangered. Most of these new and unconventional threats to security are associated with or
aggravated by the weakness or absence of democracy, with its provisions for legality, accountability, popular
sovereignty, and openness. LESSONS OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY The experience of this century offers
important lessons. Countries that govern themselves in a truly democratic fashion do not go to war with one
another. They do not aggress against their neighbors to aggrandize themselves or glorify their leaders. Democratic
governments do not ethnically "cleanse" their own populations, and they are much less likely to face ethnic
insurgency. Democracies do not sponsor terrorism against one another. They do not build w eapons of m ass
d estruction to use on or to threaten one another. Democratic countries form more reliable, open, and enduring
trading partnerships. In the long run they offer better and more stable climates for investment. They are more
environmentally responsible because they must answer to their own citizens, who organize to protest the
destruction of their environments. They are better bets to honor international treaties since they value legal obligations
and because their openness makes it much more difficult to breach agreements in secret. Precisely because, within
their own borders, they respect competition, civil liberties, property rights, and the rule of law , democracies are the
only reliable foundation on which a new world order of international security and prosperity can be built.
2NC I/L NAFTA Kills Democracy
NAFTA economic gains trade-off with loss of democracy—prevents safeguards in
Mexico and Canada
Kuttner 1 (Robert Kuttner, 12/9/01, Robert Kuttner is co-founder and co-editor of The American Prospect, as well as a
distinguished senior fellow of the think tank Demos. He was a longtime columnist for Business Week and continues to write
columns in The Boston Globe. He is the author of Obama's Challenge and other books, “NAFTA Style Trade Deal Bad for
Democracy”, http://prospect.org/article/nafta-style-trade-deal-bad-democracy(
This weekend's Summit of the Americas aims to extend a NAFTA-style free trade area to¶ the
entire Western Hemisphere. As Secretary of State Colin Powell recently put it, ''We¶ will be able to sell American
goods, technology, and services without obstacles or¶ restrictions from the Arctic to Cape
Horn.''¶ And foreign businesses will likewise be able to sell goods and services in the United States¶
''without obstacles or restrictions.'' But one person's restrictions are another person's vital
social¶ safeguards.¶ Here is a short list of ''obstacles and restrictions'' that constrain American
corporations - and¶ represent a century of struggle to make America a more decent society:¶ We allow workers to
organize unions.¶ We limit the pollutants that corporations can dump into the environment.¶ We have
regulations protecting employees from unsafe working conditions.¶ We assure consumers safe
food, and drugs, and drinking water, and other products.¶ We require business to partly
underwrite social insurance, such as Social Security, Medicare,¶ and unemployment compensation.¶ Each of these protections was
initially opposed by organized business in the United States.¶ And international business works hard to prevent such safeguards from being
NAFTA has indeed opened commercial trade flows between Mexico, Canada, and the United¶ States. But
also functioned as a convenient battering ram for business to resist social¶ regulation.¶ The
Ethyl Corp. used NAFTA to pressure Canada to end a ban on a toxic gasoline additive,¶ MMT,
which is not banned in the United States. Metalclad Corp., also based in the United¶ States, filed suit in a
Mexican state court demanding to be permitted to open a toxic waste¶ dump. The suit held that even Mexico's still rudimentary
environmental protections violated¶ property rights under NAFTA.¶ NAFTA pays lip service to labor and environmental
protections, but the weak laws on¶ Mexican lawbooks are honored more in the breech. As a result, American companies that shift¶ production to
enacted in Third¶ World countries.¶
it has
Mexico outrun hard-won labor and environmental protections in the United¶ States.¶ Business, in other words, is keen to harmonize property rights, but
not labor, environmental, or¶ consumer rights. And if NAFTA becomes a hemisphere-wide arrangement, the social
balance¶ tilts even more dramatically to business, at the expense of both sovereignty and social¶
regulation.
NAFTA violates basic democracy—lack of foreign regulations
O’Connell 3 (Jock O’Connell, Writer for Sacramento Bee, “Is NAFTA Good For Democracy?”,
http://www.jockoconnell.com/Forum03232003.html)
Referring specifically to NAFTA, Faux asks: "How will this new political economy be governed,
and in whose interest?" As with other skeptics of globalization, he is troubled that multinational corporations
may be able to operate in a laissez-faire business climate beyond the legal jurisdiction of any
one legitimate national authority. (He clearly lacks confidence in the American legal profession, whose ingenuity in discovering ways
of bringing suit against anyone, anywhere for almost any reason is legendary.)¶ Faux, it should be noted, was a co-founder of the Economic Policy
Institute, a Washington think tank closely associated with organized labor. In writing for the American Prospect - the magazine in which his article
originally appeared - Faux is preaching to a choir he himself describes as the "progressive" or "social-democratic" left. Probably for that reason, he
regrettably lapses into intellectual short-hand, fashioning his argument from the familiar slogans of previous debates and drawing from a list of old
canards aimed variously over the years at capitalism, free trade, and now globalization.¶ Thus, he laments how "American and Canadian
corporations have moved production and jobs south to take advantage of cheap Mexican labor."
But it's not clear what bothers him more: that non-unionized Mexican workers got a lot of
unionized American jobs or that faceless corporations have presumably been raking in huge
profits by playing an elaborate international game of musical chairs with people's jobs. It's a toss-up.
The latter certainly grates acutely on Faux's ideological bias, even though his populist - indeed, nationalist - heart definitely regrets that American
workers lost good jobs to foreigners.¶ Consider next Faux's contention that U.S. companies unfairly use the threat of
moving production to Mexico or even farther offshore to leverage wage concessions from their
employees and wheedle tax and regulatory relief from state and local governments in the U.S.
NAFTA, he writes, "is a potential battering ram aimed at destroying domestic protections that temper modern capitalism."¶ Faux is, of course, right to
suspect that big business is probably up to no good. After the ceaseless cascade of corporate scandals the past couple of years served to reveal how many
of the chieftains running U.S. companies have been crooks, thieves, embezzlers and incompetents, who
can really argue with the contention that corporate America should not be trusted with the
nation's welfare? That animal depicting the true nature of Wall Street these days is neither a bull nor a bear, but a rather mangy weasel.¶ Still,
it is when Faux offers up his solutions for the wrongs he perceives in global trade that he reveals that strange brew of elitism, disingenuity and naivete
not altogether uncommon among his progressive audience.¶ To prevent companies from abusing treaties like NAFTA, Faux
evidently wants our trading partners to agree to abide by roughly the same social, labor,
environmental and other regulatory constraints that we have here in America. In other words, he
would like to deprive U.S. companies of any incentive to move away, and he presumably wants
countries like Mexico - whose chief comparative advantage is precisely their more congenial regulatory regimes and a lower cost of doing
business - to accede to this gambit.
NAFTA undermines democracy and kills the environment
Gerdes ‘2 – journalist specializing in clean energy solutions, work has appeared at Yale Environment 360, the
Guardian, Forbes.com, MotherJones.com, ChinaDialogue, GreenBiz.com, Earth2Tech.com, Living Energy, and
Santa Clara Magazine (Justin, “OPINION: NAFTA's Chapter 11 Threatens Environment and Democracy,”
Knight Ridder Tribune Business News, 2/22/02, ProQuest)//ER
While business interests mobilize to defend Chapter 11, and even expand its reach, opposition is emerging -- sometimes from the most unlikely places.
Documents recently posted online at the U.S. State Department Web site reveal the dubiousness with which factions, even inside the federal government,
hold for investor protections found in Chapter 11.¶ In the government's Statement of Defense in the Methanex case, attorneys for the United States write
that Methanex's claim "does not remotely resemble" the type of grievance for which NAFTA parties created Chapter 11. They deem "absurd" the notion
that "whenever a state takes action to protect the public health or environment, the state is responsible for damages." Even a participant in the NAFTA
negotiations, Daniel Esty, a professor of environmental law and policy at Yale University who was the EPA's lead
negotiator, now believes that Chapter 11 "could have been and should have been more tightly crafted" and that
these "significant negative precedents" should not be replicated in the FTAA.¶ In his State of the Union address, President
Bush urged Congress to grant him "trade promotion authority" to expedite the completion of trade agreements like the FTAA. Yet in the fight over
construction of the FTAA, unlike the debate over NAFTA, environmentalists believe they are ready to thwart
investment conditions that threaten the sanctity of environmental legislation.¶ They need to convince Congress
to include restrictions on investment that protect environmental, health, and safety laws in the authorization it grants
the president to negotiate trade agreements. As Dan Seligman of the Sierra Club puts it, environmentalists need to ensure that they "hold negotiators
accountable to listen to a broad array of public interests." Wagner, the Earthjustice attorney, is cautiously optimistic about the inclusion of the safeguards
and believes that at this point legislators would have to be "blind or completely in the pocket of the corporate lobby"
to allow FTAA to pass with investment conditions intact.¶ The long-term ramifications of Chapter 11 are uncertain, but the
danger it poses to environmental standards, our judicial system, and to democracy at large has convinced its
detractors to argue for its demise. Sen. Kuehl from California said, "If I were a smart United States, I would move to
amend NAFTA." Dan Seligman went further, saying, "If we knew then what we now know, NAFTA would have been
defeated."
Democracy Good
Democracy creates world stability
Lagon 11
[Mark P. Lagon =Adjunct Senior Fellow for Human Rights at the council for forging relations, “Promoting Democracy: The Whys and Hows for the United States and the
International Community”, February 2011 http://www.cfr.org/democratization/promoting-democracy-whys-hows-united-states-international-community/p24090]
Furthering democracy is often dismissed as moralism distinct from U.S. interests or mere lip service to build support for strategic policies. Yet there
are tangible
stakes for the United States and indeed the world in the spread of democracy—namely, greater peace, prosperity, and
pluralism. Controversial means for promoting democracy and frequent mismatches between deeds and words have clouded appreciation of this truth. Democracies often
have conflicting priorities, and democracy promotion is not a panacea. Yet one of the few truly robust findings in international relations is
that established democracies never go to war with one another. Foreign policy “realists” advocate working with
other governments on the basis of interests, irrespective of character, and suggest that this approach best
preserves stability in the world. However, durable stability flows from a domestic politics built on consensus and
peaceful competition, which more often than not promotes similar international conduct for governments. There has long been controversy about whether
democracy enhances economic development. The dramatic growth of China certainly challenges this notion. Still, history will likely show that democracy yields the most
prosperity. Notwithstanding the global financial turbulence of the past three years, democracy’s
elements facilitate long-term economic
growth. These elements include above all freedom of expression and learning to promote innovation, and rule
of law to foster predictability for investors and stop corruption from stunting growth. It is for that reason that the
UN Development Programme (UNDP) and the 2002 UN Financing for Development Conference in Monterey, Mexico, embraced good
governance as the enabler of development. These elements have unleashed new emerging powers such as
India and Brazil and raised the quality of life for impoverished peoples. Those who argue that economic
development will eventually yield political freedoms may be reversing the order of influences—or at least discounting the
reciprocal relationship between political and economic liberalization. Finally, democracy affords all groups equal
access to justice—and equal opportunity to shine as assets in a country’s economy. Democracy’s support for
pluralism prevents human assets—including religious and ethnic minorities, women, and migrants—from being squandered. Indeed, a
shortage of economic opportunities and outlets for grievances has contributed significantly to the ongoing
upheaval in the Middle East. Pluralism is also precisely what is needed to stop violent extremism from
wreaking havoc on the world.
Mexican Agriculture Scenario
1NC
NAFTA kills Mexico’s domestic food production, health, agribusiness, job supply, and
the environment
Carlsen ’11 – Foreign Policy In Focus columnist Laura Carlsen is director of the Americas Program for the
Center for International Policy in Mexico City (Laura, “NAFTA Is Starving Mexico,” Foreign Policy in Focus,
9/20/11, ProQuest)//ER
The corporate takeover of Mexico's food system has led to the food and health catastrophe. Transnational food
corporations not only import freely into Mexican food markets, they are now the producers, exporters, and
importers all in one, operating inside the country.¶ Since NAFTA, corporations have gobbled up human and
natural resources on an almost unbelievable scale. Livestock production has moved from small farms for local
markets to Tyson, Smithfield, and Pilgrims Pride. The massive use and contamination of water and land has
led to health and environmental disasters across the country. Millions of jobs have been lost to concentration
and industrialized farming methods.¶ Take the case of Corn Products International (CPI). The transnational
filed a NAFTA claim against the Mexican government in 2003, claiming a loss to its business due to a tax levied
on high fructose corn syrup in beverages. Mexico's reason for imposing the tax was to save a sugarcane
industry that provided jobs for thousands of citizens and played a crucial economic role in many regions. The
government was also frustrated by its failure under NAFTA to access the highly protected U.S. sugar market.¶
A 2008 NAFTA tribunal ruled that Mexico had to pay $58.4 million to CPI. The government paid up on
January 25, 2011. CPI posted $3.7 billion dollars in net sales the year of the decision. The fine paid by the
Mexican government could have provided a year's worth of the basic food basket to more than 50,000 poor
families.¶ CPI's wholly owned subsidiary Arancia Corn Products is among the most powerful food
transnationals operating in the country, along with Maseca/Archers Daniel Midland and Cargill. Large
agribusiness companies allegedly played a key role in the 2007 tortilla crisis by hoarding harvest as the
international price went up, artificially drying up the national market and selling at nearly double the price they
paid for the harvest. That crisis brought tens of thousands of poor Mexicans out into the streets to protest a 50
percent rise in the price of tortillas.¶ NAFTA and other FTAs give corporations the power to define what we eat,
what we buy at the store, who will have a job and who won't, and whether a village sustained by local food
production will survive or witness the end of generations of livelihoods.
Causes Mexican food insecurity
Aziz 7 (Nikhil Aziz, Nikhil Aziz has been Executive Director of Grassroots International since 2005. Before
joining Grassroots, Nikhil was Associate Director at Political Research Associates, where he led a team that
studied the conservative movement and the political right in the United States, “NAFTA is Killing Tradition of
Corn in Mexico,” 9 November 2007, http://www.grassrootsonline.org/news/articles/nafta-killing-traditioncorn-mexico)
Along with the devastation of Mexico’s rural economy, NAFTA has had a major impact on its ecology.
Agrobiodiversity is gravely threatened as a small number of imported corn varieties root out the enormous
diversity of corn in the countryside; and as imported genetically modified and corporate patented varieties mix
with centuries old varieties developed by generations of Mexican farmers and indigenous peoples. The stakes
are enormous.¶ Food insecurity, especially around diet staples poses a grave risk. Last summer, tortilla prices
skyrocketed, and the growing pressure to convert corn from food to fuel for ethanol and the increasing
corporate concentration of food systems and supply can only make matters much worse. Already, more than
one-third of the population suffers from malnutrition and anemia; and in the rural sector, mainly among
indigenous peoples, this figure rises to over 50%.¶ Today, Grassroots’ partners and their allies argue, peasants
and indigenous peoples need a new social compact with the Mexican State that respects their human rights
including resource rights and food sovereignty; that recognizes the role and rights of rural Mexicans, including
indigenous peoples, as food producers and stewards of biodiversity who play a vital role in Mexico’s social and
economic well being and political sovereignty. As they point out: “the freedom to choose the quality, quantity
and price of our food depends on our ability to produce them: without a healthy and fair national production of
maize, Mexico can not continue to exist as the diverse and rich country we love.”
Food insecurity causes war
Brown 11 (Lester R. Brown 2011 Writer for the Earth Policy Institute “World on the Edge: How to prevent Environmental and Economic Collapse”
http://www.earth-policy.org/images/uploads/book_files/wotebook.pdf)- RT
For the Mayans, it was deforestation and soil erosion. As more and more land was cleared for
farming to support the expanding empire, soil erosion undermined the productivity of their
tropical soils. A team of scientists from the National Aeronautics and Space Administration has noted that the extensive land clearing by the
Mayans likely also altered the regional climate, reducing rainfall. In effect, the scientists suggest, it was the convergence of several environmental trends,
some reinforcing others, that led to the food shortages that brought down the Mayan civilization. 26 Although we live in a highly
urbanized, technologically advanced society, we are as dependent on the earth’s natural
support systems as the Sumerians and Mayans were. If we continue with business as usual,
civilizational collapse is no longer a matter of whether but when. We now have an economy that
is destroying its natural support systems, one that has put us on a decline and collapse path. We
are dangerously close to the edge. Peter Goldmark, former Rockefeller Foundation president, puts it well: “The death of our
civilization is no longer a theory or an academic possibility; it is the road we’re on.” 2 Judging
by the archeological records of earlier civilizations, more often than not food shortages appear
to have precipitated their decline and collapse. Given the advances of modern agriculture, I had
long rejected the idea that food could be the weak link in our twenty-first century civilization.
Today I think not only that it could be the weak link but that it is the weak link.
I/L—NAFTA killed Mexican Agriculture
NAFTA weakened Mexican agriculture
Zayas 5/16 (Rocío Zayas, writer for thenews.com, “NAFTA weakened Mexican agriculture,” 16 May 2013,
http://thenews.com.mx/index.php/home-articulos/9620-‘nafta-weakened-mexican-agriculture’)
MEXICO CITY – Economy Secretary Ildefonso Guajardo said on Wednesday that the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) has weakened Mexican agriculture, as producers haven’t been able to
take advantage of the trade pact.¶ A lack of public policies to strengthen the industry has led to
a dependency on imported foods that were once produced in Mexico, Guajardo said at a meeting
with the National Farmers Confederation (CNC).¶ “I was a negotiator in the NAFTA talks 20 years ago,”
Guajardo said. “Rather than talk about how we went wrong in the agricultural sector, it’s more about how we
made a mistake in implementing public policies to give more viability to the agricultural sector to address
exactly what was happening from the point of view of social integration. “The government should have,
from the agreement’s signing onward, invested money in a strategic sector to achieve a
transformation of productive efforts and take advantage” of the situation, he said.¶ The secretary
added that there have been conflicts among industry leaders and inconsistent food health
standards, which have led to increases in some prices in the basic food basket. “ We made our
agricultural industry weak, made the budget weak and, after 20 years, (the agreement) surpassed us,
without being able to find the best way to integral trade in this key sector,” he said.
High U.S. farm subsidies from NAFTA hurts Mexican agricultural exports
Wise 10 (Timothy Wise, Mexican Rural Development Research Report No. 7, Woodrow Wilson International
Center for Scholars, 2010, “Agricultural Dumping Under NAFTA: Estimating the Costs of U.S. Agricultural
Policies to Mexican Producers, http://www.ase.tufts.edu/gdae/policy_research/AgNAFTA.html
With the opening of the Mexican economy under the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA), Mexican agriculture came under new competitive pressures from U.S. exports. High
U.S. farm subsidies for exported crops, which compete with Mexican products, have prompted
charges that the level playing field NAFTA was supposed to create is in fact tilted heavily in favor of the
United States. This paper assesses the costs of U.S. agricultural policies to Mexican producers by examining
the extent to which the United States exported agricultural products to Mexico at prices below their costs of
production, one of the definitions of “dumping” in the WTO. ¶ We estimate “dumping margins” for eight
agricultural goods – corn, soybeans, wheat, rice, cotton, beef, pork, and poultry – all of which
are heavily supported (directly or indirectly) by the U.S. government, were produced in Mexico
in significant volumes before NAFTA, and experienced dramatic increases in U.S. exports to
Mexico after the agreement. We find that:¶ U.S. exports of the eight supported commodities analyzed
here have increased dramatically since the early 1990s, rising between 159% and 707%.¶ For
supported crops, the “dumping margins” – the percentage by which export prices are below production costs –
from 1997-2005 ranged from 12% for soybeans to 38% for cotton.¶ Assuming Mexican producer prices were
depressed by the same percentage as the dumping margins, below-cost exports cost Mexican producers
of corn, soybeans, wheat, cotton and rice an estimated $9.7 billion from 1997-2005, just over $1
billion per year. ¶ Corn showed the highest losses. Average dumping margins of 19% contributed to a 413%
increase in U.S. exports and a 66% decline in real producer prices in Mexico from the early 1990s to 2005. The
estimated cost to Mexican producers of dumping-level corn prices was $6.6 billion over the
nine-year period, an average of $99 per hectare per year, or $38 per ton.¶ Meats were exported at belowcost prices because U.S. producers benefited from below-cost soybeans and corn, key components in feed. This
so-called implicit subsidy to meat producers resulted in dumping margins of 5-10% on exported meat.
This cost Mexican livestock producers who did not use imported feed an estimated $3.2 billion
between 1997 and 2005. The largest losses were in beef, at $1.6 billion, or $175 million per year.¶ We
estimate total losses to Mexican producers from dumping-level U.S. export prices at $12.8
billion from 1997-2005 for the eight products (in constant 2000 US dollars). To put these losses in
context, the average annual loss of $1.4 billion is equivalent to 10% of the value of all Mexican
agricultural exports to the United States and greater than the current value of Mexican tomato
exports to the United States.
NAFTA causes starvation, food riots, and obesity in Mexico
Carlsen ’11 – Foreign Policy In Focus columnist Laura Carlsen is director of the Americas Program for the
Center for International Policy in Mexico City (Laura, “NAFTA Is Starving Mexico,” Foreign Policy in Focus,
9/20/11, ProQuest)//ER
Since the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) became the law of the land, millions of Mexicans
have joined the ranks of the hungry. Malnutrition is highest among the country's farm families, who used to
produce enough food to feed the nation.¶ As the blood-spattered violence of the drug war takes over the
headlines, many Mexican men, women, and children confront the slow and silent violence of starvation. The
latest reports show that the number of people living in "food poverty" (the inability to purchase the basic food
basket) rose from 18 million in 2008 to 20 million by late 2010.¶ About one-fifth of Mexican children currently
suffer from malnutrition. An innovative measurement applied by the National Institute for Nutrition registers a
daily count of 728,909 malnourished children under five for October 18, 2011. Government statistics report
that 25 percent of the population does not have access to basic food.¶ Since the 2008 food crisis, there has been
a three percent rise in the population without adequate access to food. The number of children with
malnutrition is 400,000 kids above the goal for this year. Newborns show the highest indices of malnutrition,
indicating that the tragedy begins with maternal health.¶ The dramatic change in Mexican eating habits since
NAFTA is not only reflected in the millions who go to bed hungry. On the other side of the scale, Mexico has in
just a decade and a half become second only to the United States worldwide in morbid obesity. Child obesity,
overweight, and diabetes now constitute major health problems, alongside the more traditional problem of
hunger.¶ It's not that the rich are getting too fat and the poor too thin, although inequality plays a role in the
erosion of healthy diets for all. Fatness no longer represents abundance. It is the poor who drink cheap Coca
Cola when they do not have access to potable water or who give their kids a bag of potato chips when local fresh
food is no longer available. The International Journal of Obesity finds that worldwide the spread of what they
call "the Western diet" ("high in saturated fats, sugar, and refined foods but low in fiber) has meant that "the
burden of obesity is shifting towards the poor." The NAFTA generation reflects the paradigm so eloquently
described by food researcher and activist Raj Patel of "stuffed and starved".¶ With another food crisis looming
due to rising international prices, Mexico could face food riots as well as the spread of starvation and its
consequences over the coming year. Unless the riots turn violent or spark more widespread social upheaval as
they did in Arab countries, it's not likely that the news media will pay any attention.
NAFTA starves Mexico
Carlsen 11 (Laura Carlsen, Foreign Policy In Focus columnist Laura Carlsen is director of the Americas
Program for the Center for International Policy in Mexico City, “NAFTA Is Starving Mexico,” 20 October 2011,
http://fpif.org/nafta_is_starving_mexico/, AL)
The corporate takeover of Mexico’s food system has led to the food and health catastrophe. Transnational food
corporations not only import freely into Mexican food markets, they are now the producers, exporters, and
importers all in one, operating inside the country.¶ Since NAFTA, corporations have gobbled up human and
natural resources on an almost unbelievable scale. Livestock production has moved from small farms for local
markets to Tyson, Smithfield, and Pilgrims Pride. The massive use and contamination of water and land has
led to health and environmental disasters across the country. Millions of jobs have been lost to concentration
and industrialized farming methods.¶ Take the case of Corn Products International (CPI). The transnational
filed a NAFTA claim against the Mexican government in 2003, claiming a loss to its business due to a tax levied
on high fructose corn syrup in beverages. Mexico’s reason for imposing the tax was to save a sugarcane
industry that provided jobs for thousands of citizens and played a crucial economic role in many regions. The
government was also frustrated by its failure under NAFTA to access the highly protected U.S. sugar market.¶
A 2008 NAFTA tribunal ruled that Mexico had to pay $58.4 million to CPI. The government paid up on
January 25, 2011. CPI posted $3.7 billion dollars in net sales the year of the decision. The fine paid by the
Mexican government could have provided a year’s worth of the basic food basket to more than 50,000 poor
families.¶ CPI’s wholly owned subsidiary Arancia Corn Products is among the most powerful food
transnationals operating in the country, along with Maseca/Archers Daniel Midland and Cargill. Large
agribusiness companies allegedly played a key role in the 2007 tortilla crisis by hoarding harvest as the
international price went up, artificially drying up the national market and selling at nearly double the price they
paid for the harvest. That crisis brought tens of thousands of poor Mexicans out into the streets to protest a 50
percent rise in the price of tortillas.¶ NAFTA and other FTAs give corporations the power to define what we eat,
what we buy at the store, who will have a job and who won’t, and whether a village sustained by local food
production will survive or witness the end of generations of livelihoods.
NAFTA increases food prices
Carlsen 11 (Laura Carlsen, Foreign Policy In Focus columnist Laura Carlsen is director of the Americas
Program for the Center for International Policy in Mexico City, “NAFTA Is Starving Mexico,” 20 October 2011,
http://fpif.org/nafta_is_starving_mexico/, AL)
Something has gone terribly wrong. The nation that was slated for prosperity when it signed NAFTA has
become an international example of severe structural problems in the food chain, from how it produces its food
to what and how much (or how little) it consumes.¶ Mexican malnutrition has its roots in the way NAFTA and
other neoliberal programs forced the nation to move away from producing its own basic foods to a “food
security” model. “Food security” posits that a country is secure as long as it has sufficient income to import its
food. It separates farm employment from food security and ignores unequal access to food within a country.¶
The idea of food security based on market access comes directly from the main argument behind NAFTA of
“comparative advantage.” Simply stated, economic efficiency dictates that each country should devote its
productive capacity to what it does best and trade liberalization will guarantee access across borders.¶ Under
the theory of comparative advantage, most of Mexico was deemed unfit to produce its staple food crop, corn,
since its yields were way below the average for its northern neighbor and trade partner. Therefore, Mexico
should turn to corn imports and devote its land to crops where it supposedly had a comparative advantage,
such as counter-seasonal and tropical fruits and vegetables.¶ Sounds simple. Just pick up three million
inefficient corn producers (and their families) and move them into manufacturing or assembly where their
cheap labor constitutes a comparative advantage. The cultural and human consequences of declaring entire
peasant and indigenous communities obsolete were not a concern in this equation.¶ Seventeen years after
NAFTA, some two million farmers have been forced off their land by low prices and the dismantling of
government supports. They did not find jobs in industry. Instead most of them became part of a mass exodus
as the number of Mexican migrants to the United States rose to half a million a year. In the first few years of
NAFTA, corn imports tripled and the producer price fell by half.¶ Conversion to other crops turned out to take
years in most cases. Prices were volatile and harvests unreliable. It was not feasible at all on many small, often
rocky plots where corn guarantees a subsistence diet for farm families. Niche markets failed to grow to much
more than 2 percent of total agricultural production.¶ The areas that adapted successfully to industrial
agriculture and agroexport crops are characterized by flagrant violation of the labor rights of migrant farm
workers, widespread pollution and water waste, and extreme concentration of land and resources.¶ For the
hungry, this means that prices set on the international market determine who eats and who starves. Mexican
consumers now pay more for tortillas and food in general. Price hikes on the international market push basic
food out of reach for the millions of poor in the country.
Kills Mexico’s corn economy
Paley 3/12 (Dawn Paley, Masters in Journalism from the University of British Columbia and BA in arts and
women’s studies and first nations studies from Simon Fraser University, “Corn on the Border: NAFTA and
Food in Mexico,” 13 March 2013, http://upsidedownworld.org/main/mexico-archives-79/4183-corn-on-theborder-nafta-and-food-in-mexico, AL)
Regardless of the difficulties they face, farmers make up 20 per cent of Mexico’s labour force, compared with
two per cent in Canada and the US. Small, medium, and large farmers throughout Mexico harvest a total of just
over 20 million hectares of land each year, according to INEGI, the country’s national statistics agency. Almost
eight million hectares of corn are planted in Mexico every year, followed by pastures for ranching, sorghum,
and beans. Mexico is widely known as the birthplace of corn, over 52 races of corn grow here, some of which
may be uniquely suited to withstand the impacts of climate change.¶ That genetic wealth and diversity of
Mexican corn stocks, however, is also under threat. It has been over 10 years since researchers began
publishing peer-reviewed articles proving that the DNA from genetically modified (GM) corn had begun mixing
with indigenous species of corn in remote mountain areas of Oaxaca. The fight against genetically modified
corn has been ongoing since the first evidence of GM corn was discovered. Some say this corn was introduced
in Mexico through aid programs, where farmers were given corn seeds without being warned that they were
genetically modified seeds.¶ According to Greenpeace Mexico, the world’s largest agro-business outfits, like
Monsanto, Pioneers, and Dow Agribusiness, have put pressure on Mexico’s new president, Enrique Peña Nieto,
to allow commercial planting and harvesting of genetically modified corn. A recent action to keep up the
pressure against genetically modified corn saw tens of thousands march in Mexico City as well as a rotating
hunger strike under the enormous Angel of Independence Statue.¶ “We believe that the only relation that we,
as the growers, have with Mother Earth are the natural seeds,” hunger striker Francisco Jiménez Murillo told
Democracy Now! “We have to remember that Mexico has 60 distinct varieties of corn that we have cultivated
over the last 10,000 years, and with this, we have fed the world. It is a struggle for the life and health of our
country.Ӧ The struggle for food sovereignty and health is one that is reflected in every facet of life in Mexico.
These days, markets like the one around the corner from where I live face stiff competition from big box
grocery stores popping up all over the country. In 2011 alone, Wal-Mart opened one store a day in Mexico and
Central America.¶ In the face of these changes, some farmers organize against genetically modified seeds,
others get by, planting traditional crops, while still others have packed up and moved away, mostly to the US,
but others to Canada, where they work to earn remittances for their families. The changes to Mexico’s
agricultural and food systems over the past 30 years have been severe, but they are not irreversible.
Pollution Scenario
1NC
NAFTA leads to emissions increases and harms the environment
Davis and Kahn ’10 – Lucas W. Davis is an Associate Professor, Harold Furst Chair in Management
Philosophy and Values, Economic Analysis and Policy Group, Haas School of Business, University of California,
Berkeley, Faculty Affiliate at Energy Institute at Haas, Research Associate at National Bureau of Economic
Research. Matthew E. Kahn is Professor, Institute of the Environment, Department of Public Policy,
Department of Economics (Lucas W. and Matthew E., “International Trade in Used Vehicles: The
Environmental Consequences of NAFTA,” American Economic Journal, 11/10, ProQuest)//ER
Our study focuses on the deregulation of US-Mexico trade in used cars and trucks¶ following the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). In accordance with¶ the conditions of NAFTA, in August 2005
Mexico issued a decree allowing vehicles¶ 10–15 years old to be imported from the United States and Canada.
This represented¶ a dramatic break from the previous policy that prohibited entry for all used vehicles¶ except
for certain vehicles used in agriculture. Virtually overnight a vigorous trade¶ flow emerged and we document
that between 2005 and 2008 over 2.5 million used¶ vehicles were exported from the United States to Mexico.¶
To evaluate the environmental consequences of this trade pattern, we assemble¶ the most comprehensive
dataset ever compiled on North American trade in used¶ vehicles and vehicle emissions. Our dataset allows us
to identify, at the vehicle level¶ (using the vehicle identification number (VIN)), which vehicles were traded.
The¶ results show that traded vehicles are higher-emitting per mile than the stock of vehicles¶ in the United
States, but lower-emitting per mile than the stock of vehicles in¶ Mexico. As a result, when a vehicle is traded,
average vehicle emissions per mile¶ tend to decrease in both countries. We also show that vehicles that are
exported to¶ Mexico are more likely to have failed emissions testing. This provides evidence for¶ the pollution
havens hypothesis, the idea that trade liberalization causes pollution to¶ move to countries with lax
environmental standards. The paper then goes on to examine vehicle retirement in both countries and new¶
vehicle sales in Mexico. Measuring changes in vehicle retirement and purchase¶ behavior is challenging
because one must construct a credible counterfactual to¶ describe what would have happened in the absence of
trade. Here we rely heavily¶ on before and after comparisons. The results indicate that the number of vehicles¶
in circulation in the United States changed little after 2005, suggesting that most of¶ the vehicles exported to
Mexico were vehicles that would have been scrapped otherwise.¶ In addition, there is no evidence that the
increased availability of used vehicles¶ has decreased sales of new vehicles in Mexico. These findings seem
reasonable, but¶ it is important to be upfront about the limitations of these before and after comparisons.¶
Although we can and do control for covariates that are changing over time, these results will be biased if there
are unobservable time-varying factors that affect¶ vehicle retirement and purchase behavior.¶ Overall, the
analysis suggests that trade has led to an increase in total emissions.¶ While trade decreases emissions in the
United States, this is not enough to offset¶ the increase in emissions in Mexico. Moreover, emissions increases
are highly¶ persistent because of low vehicle retirement rates in Mexico. We document that¶ vehicle retirement
rates in Mexico are much lower than vehicle retirement rates in¶ the United States and illustrate how this can
have a large impact on lifetime vehicle¶ emissions. These results highlight the importance for policy makers of
recognizing¶ the synergies between environmental legislation and free trade legislation. For¶ example, our
findings suggest that unilateral policies in the United States aimed¶ at reducing carbon emissions will increase
exports of fuel-inefficient vehicles to¶ Mexico, consistent with an emerging literature on carbon leakage.3 If the
goal of¶ US carbon policy is to minimize global emissions, then such trade effects must be¶ anticipated. Our
study is germane to a substantial literature on trade and the environment.¶ Whereas most previous studies
have focused on how trade affects where goods¶ are produced, this study focuses on how trade affects where
goods are consumed.¶ Several theoretical contributions have recognized the role of consumption-based¶
pollution (Brian R. Copeland and M. Scott Taylor 1995; Carol McAusland 2008;¶ Scott Holladay 2008), but
empirical studies in this area have typically been limited¶ by the lack of available data. Holladay (2008)
explains that, “high quality measures¶ of emissions from consumption rarely exist, making empirical work
difficult.”¶ Our focus on vehicles is valuable because vehicle emissions are well understood¶ and vehicles have
VIN numbers that allow them to be tracked consistently across¶ countries. Similar methods could be used to
examine emissions from other forms¶ of transportation equipment, as well as a broad class of residential and
commercial¶ durable goods.¶
Environmental Degradation causes Extinction
Dernbach 98,
Associate Professor of Law at Widener University, ’98 (John, Fall, “Sustainable Development as a
Framework for National Governance” Case Western University Law Review, Vol 49 p 16, lexis)
The global scale and severity of environmental degradation and poverty are unprecedented
in human history. Major adverse consequences are not inevitable, but they are likely if
these problems are not addressed. Many civilizations collapsed or were severely weakened
because they exhausted or degraded the natural resource base on which they depended. n76
In addition, substantial economic and social inequalities have caused or contributed to
many wars and revolutions. n77 These problems are intensified by the speed at which they
have occurred and are worsening, making it difficult for natural systems to adapt. The
complexity of natural and human systems also means that the effects of these problems are difficult to
anticipate. The potential impact of global warming on the transmission of tropical diseases in a time of
substantial international travel and commerce is but one example.
Drug Trafficking Scenario
1NC
NAFTA helps facilitate drug trafficking and crime
Peele ’12 – serves in the Bureau of Diplomatic Security within the Department of State. He is a Rotary Peace Fellow and holds a master’s in
International Relations from the Universidad del Salvador in Buenos Aires, Argentina (Justin, “A Call for Caution: The (Side) Effect of
Mexico’s Entry into the Trans-Pacific Partnership,” Small Wars Journal, 7/3/12, Google Scholar)//ER
In 1990 Mexico approached the U.S. with the idea of forming a free trade agreement between their ¶ countries,
an endeavor which would eventually culminate in the creation of NAFTA several years later. ¶ The then
Mexican President Salinas de Gortari had several motivations in pursuing such a pact with the ¶ United States,
namely to increase economic growth by attracting foreign direct investment, to boost ¶ exports, the creation of
industrial jobs and giving the Mexican economy an overall growth stimulus. ¶ Overall, the increased foreign
direct investment would help create jobs, increase wage rates, and reduce ¶ poverty within the country (p. 1). ¶
However, as an unintended consequence, the same policies which were designed to encourage business ¶ and
the integration of U.S.-Mexican economies aided significantly in the expansion of illicit markets, ¶ primarily
the illicit drug sector. NAFTA helped create not only the three most prominent drug trafficking ¶ organizations
in Mexico, but some of the country’s most notorious drug lords, criminals worth billions of ¶ dollars. ¶ As the
majority of maquiladoras (factories operating in a free trade zone) were located along the U.S.-¶ Mexican
border, it is no coincidence that the focus of Mexican drug-traffickers shifted from the Pacific ¶ coast to the
border states of Baja California, Chihuahua, and Tamaulipas. In time, these three states on the ¶ U.S.-Mexican
border would become the home of the Tijuana Cartel, Juarez Cartel, and Gulf Cartel ¶ respectively. As one
author describes the time period, Mexican drug trafficking organizations ¶ consolidated their power “amid the
gold rush of globalization (p. 75).” According to Eduardo Valle, ¶ who resigned as personal advisor to the
Mexican attorney general in 1994, the most successful drug capos ¶ had become “driving forces, pillars even, of
our economic growth (p. 129).Ӧ In response to the doubling of U.S. imports from Mexico between 1993, the
year before NAFTA took ¶ effect, and 1997, Phil Jordan, the former Director of the DEA’s El Paso Intelligence
Center remarked that ¶ NAFTA served as a “godsend” to drug trafficking, “the best thing that happened to
product ¶ distribution since Nike signed up Michael Jordan (p. 3).” Based on this ‘growth stimulus’ of the free ¶
trade agreement, it shouldn’t come as a surprise that the leader of the Sinaloa Federation, Joaquín “El ¶ Chapo”
Guzman currently appears for the fourth consecutive year on Forbes Magazine’s list of top ¶ billionaires. Not
only was he recently named “The world’s most powerful drug trafficker” by the U.S. ¶ Department of the
Treasury, he has been named repeatedly as one of Forbes Magazine’s “World’s Most ¶ Powerful People”
throughout the years. His current location on the list places him just a few spots down ¶ from President Bill
Clinton and the Dalai Lama. It is unlikely that so much wealth and power could be ¶ amassed without the
myriad of unintended consequences stemming from NAFTA.¶ In a study conducted to understand the impact
of Mexico’s market reforms on the illicit drug trade, ¶ a number of shocking conclusions were drawn, namely
that the increased trade flows between ColombiaMexico-U.S., brought about by trade liberalization, provided
the necessary cover for increased drug ¶ trafficking. The privatization of companies and services was also
utilized by cartels for money laundering ¶ and narco-investment. The deregulation of the trucking industry
inadvertently aided in the transport of ¶ both legal and illegal goods, thus increasing transport of large drug
shipments within Mexico and into the U.S. market. It was found that foreign debt repayments also provided
the incentives for a government to ¶ tolerate a heavy influx of drug revenues. As public sector salaries were
lowered, the incentives for ¶ officials to accept bribes increased, thus furthering corruption within the state.
Financial liberalization ¶ also increased money laundering opportunities for drug cartels, and capital markets
investment created a ¶ ‘narco-sector.’ The volume of legitimate cross-border trade increased significantly,
thereby providing a ¶ cover for increased illegitimate trade. Even agricultural reform brought about the
unintended ¶ consequences of families resorting to drug crop cultivation as a household survival strategy. This
would ¶ in turn increase narco-investment in rural areas of cultivation (p. 137). It is apparent that there was a ¶
significant amount of collateral damage created by governmental policies designed to increase the overall ¶
wealth of the country and the standard of living of the average Mexican citizen.¶ There is an average estimate of
210 million illegal drug users throughout the world. This illicit market is ¶ currently valued in the hundreds of
billions of dollars, a sum which “far exceeds the size of the ¶ legitimate economy” of some countries plagued by
drug trafficking (p. 8). With the Drug Trafficking ¶ Organizations having graduated in recent years to
Transnational Criminal Organizations, their portfolio of ¶ illicit businesses and practices has grown
exponentially. Edgardo Buscaglia, a leading Mexican academic ¶ and advisor to several U.S. government
agencies, has identified twenty-two illicit markets in which these ¶ TCOs operate. These same illicit markets
could be inadvertently expanded upon if given the opportunity ¶ by the new TPP, much like NAFTA of the
1990s.
Increased Drug Trafficking leads to Narco-Terror
Yager, 9 (Jordy, “Border lawmakers fear drug-terrorism link,” The Hill, 3/7/09, http://thehill.com/homenews/news/18629-border-lawmakers-feardrug-terrorism-link)
Members of Congress are raising the alarm that war-like conditions on the Mexican border could lead to Mexican
drug cartels helping terrorists attack the U.S. “When you have…gangs and they have loose ties
with al Qaeda and then you have Iran not too far away from building a nuclear capability,
nuclear terrorism may not be far off,” said Rep. Trent Franks (R- Ariz.), a member of the House Armed Services committee. The
Mexican drug cartels’ violence accounted for more than 6,000 deaths last year, and in recent months it has begun spilling over into the districts of
lawmakers from the southwest region, even as far north as Phoenix, Ariz. -- which has become, Franks noted, the “kidnap capital of the U.S.” Rep. Henry
Cuellar (D-Texas), whose district borders Mexico, said that while the situation is bad, it could easily get worse. “The
goal of the cartels is to make money,” said Cuellar, who sits on the House Homeland Security committee. “If they can
smuggle in drugs and human cargo, then certainly they can smuggle other things in, other
devices to cause us harm.” “We have not heard of any associations, but is there the possibility? I’ll be the first to say, yeah. They have the
routes, they can very easily smuggle in other things. If I was a bad guy in another country, I would go into Central America because the U.S. is not paying
the proper attention.” Violence reached new levels last week when the mayor of Juarez, a Mexican city with 1.6 million people that
serves as a major transit point for drug smugglers, moved his family to El Paso, Texas, after receiving threats against his and their lives. The move
corresponded with the resignation of the city’s police chief after a drug cartel promised to kill a police officer every 48 hours if he did not step down. The
city’s police director of operations, a police officer and a prison guard were killed by the cartels in days prior. “That was a mistake in my judgment,”
Franks said of the chief’s resignation. “The federal government should have come in and said listen, we’re going to put a Marine division there to help
you out if that’s what’s necessary, but narco-terrorists are not going to tell America who to elect and who
resigns.”
That results in WMD terrorist attacks
Anderson, 8 (10/8/2008, Curt, AP, “US officials fear terrorist links with drug lords,” http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/2008-10-08805146709_x.htm)
MIAMI — There is real danger that Islamic extremist groups such as al-Qaida and Hezbollah could
form alliances with wealthy and powerful Latin American drug lords to launch new terrorist
attacks, U.S. officials said Wednesday.
Extremist group operatives have already been identified in several Latin American countries,
mostly involved in fundraising and finding logistical support. But Charles Allen, chief of intelligence analysis at the
Homeland Security Department, said they could use well-established smuggling routes and drug profits to
bring people or even weapons of mass destruction to the U.S.
"The presence of these people in the region leaves open the possibility that they will attempt to
attack the U nited S tates," said Allen, a veteran CIA analyst. "The threats in this hemisphere are
real. We cannot ignore them."
Added U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration operations chief Michael Braun: "It is not in our interest to let that potpourri of scum to come together."
Extinction
Corsi, 5 [Jerome. PhD in Poli Sci from Harvard, Expert in Politically-Motivated Violence. Atomic Iran, Pg 176-8//JVOSS]
The combination of horror and outrage that will surge upon the nation will demand that the
president retaliate for the incomprehensible damage done by the attack. The problem will be
that the president will not immediately know how to respond or against whom. The perpetrators will have
been incinerated by the explosion that destroyed New York City. Unlike 9-11, there will have been no interval during the attack when those hijacked could
make phone calls to loved ones telling them before they died that the hijackers were radical Islamic extremists. There will be no such phone calls when
the attack will not have been anticipated until the instant the terrorists detonate their improvised nuclear device inside the truck parked on a curb at the
Empire State Building. Nor will there be any possibility of finding any clues, which either were
vaporized instantly or are now lying physically inaccessible under tons of radioactive rubble.
Still, the president, members of Congress, the military, and the public at large will suspect another attack by
our known enemy –Islamic terrorists. The first impulse will be to launch a nuclear strike on
Mecca, to destroy the whole religion of Islam. Medina could possibly be added to the target list just to make the point with
crystal clarity. Yet what would we gain? The moment Mecca and Medina were wiped off the map, the Islamic world – more than 1 billion
human beings in countless different nations – would feel attacked. Nothing would emerge intact after a war
between the United States and Islam. The apocalypse would be upon us. [CONTINUES} Or the president
might decide simply to launch a limited nuclear strike on Tehran itself. This might be the most rational option in the attempt to retaliate but still
communicate restraint. The problem is that a strike on Tehran would add more nuclear devastation to the world calculation. Muslims around
the world would still see the retaliation as an attack on Islam, especially when the United States
had no positive proof that the destruction of New York City had been triggered by radical Islamic
extremists with assistance from Iran. But for the president not to retaliate might be unacceptable to the American people. So
weakened by the loss of New York, Americans would feel vulnerable in every city in the nation. "Who is going to be next?" would be the question on
everyone's mind. For this there would be no effective answer. That the president might think politically at this instant
seems almost petty, yet every president is by nature a politician. The political party in power at
the time of the attack would be destroyed unless the president retaliated with a nuclear strike
against somebody. The American people would feel a price had to be paid while the country was
still capable of exacting revenge.
Kills Heg
Drug trade violence turns Mexico into a failed state and destabilizes the US
Broder, 9 senior editor for defense and foreign policy at Roll Call. Before joining Congressional Quarterly in 2002, he worked as an editor at National
Public Radio in Washington and as a foreign correspondent for the Associated Press, NBC News and the Chicago Tribune, based in Jerusalem, Beirut
and Beijing. graduate of the University of Virginia and studied international relations at Harvard University. (Jonathan, “Mexico's Drug War: Violence
Too Close to Home” 3/9/09 http://library.cqpress.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/cqweekly/weeklyreport111-000003069323.) // czhang
With an approving nod from the United States, Mexican President Felipe Calderon has thrown his army into the fight against the cartels, but the wellarmed gangs are fighting back. And according to some U.S. officials and experts, the Drug barons are winning.¶ In
Washington, where policy debates involving Mexico have been confined mostly to trade and immigration for the past two decades, sudden awareness of
the Drug war has produced some alarming assessments. Retired Gen. Barry McCaffrey, who was the Drug czar in the Clinton White House, warned
recently that unless the Mexican government gains control of the Drug gangs, the United States
could, within a decade, be confronting on its southern border a “narco-state” — meaning an
area controlled by Drug cartels. The Pentagon envisions an even worse scenario: Mexico and Pakistan, it says, are the
countries most at risk of swiftly collapsing into “failed states” — those whose central
governments are so weak they have little practical control over most of their territory.¶ Beset as he
is at home by the credit crisis and plunging economy, President Obama’s response to the chaos in Mexico has so far been to continue some George W.
Bush administration policies while beginning a search for others. He is expected to focus on possible regional approaches when he attends a Summit of
the Americas in Trinidad and Tobago next month.¶ Experts on the region, though, say the magnitude of the Drug war in Mexico
and its danger to the United States far exceed the reach of existing federal policies, perhaps
even the policies the new administration is considering, such as stepped-up military aid and
regional cooperation.¶ Uncontrolled Drug violence in Mexico, these experts say, might result in tens of
thousands of refugees surging across the border, adding to the estimated 12 million immigrants already in the country
illegally. U.S. Drug officials say that a narco-state in Mexico could turn the ungoverned territory along the
border into a permanent springboard for Mexican Drug traffickers smuggling their goods north
into California, Arizona, New Mexico and Texas. And economic analysts say that should the Mexican
government completely collapse, it would jeopardize oil exports from Mexico, from which the
United States receives a third of its supply.¶ “Any descent by Mexico into chaos,” the Pentagon’s Joint Forces Command wrote
in November, “would demand an American response based on the serious implications for homeland security alone.”
Collapses hegemony – the US will be too busy dealing with Mexico to project power in
other places
Haddick 8 - a contractor at U.S. Special Operations Command who wrote the “This Week at War” column for Foreign Policy - (Robert, “Now that would
change everything” December 2008, http://westhawk.blogspot.com/2008/12/now-that-would-change-everything.html)//WL
There is one dynamic in the literature of weak and failing states that has received relatively little attention, namely the phenomenon of “rapid collapse.”
For the most part, weak and failing states represent chronic, long-term problems that allow for management over sustained periods. The collapse of a
state usually comes as a surprise, has a rapid onset, and poses acute problems. The collapse of Yugoslavia into a chaotic tangle of warring nationalities in
1990 suggests how suddenly and catastrophically state collapse can happen - in this case, a state which had hosted the 1984 Winter Olympics at Sarajevo,
and which then quickly became the epicenter of the ensuing civil war. In terms of worst-case scenarios for the Joint Force and indeed the world, two
large and important states bear consideration for a rapid and sudden collapse: Pakistan and Mexico. Some forms of collapse in Pakistan would carry with
it the likelihood of a sustained violent and bloody civil and sectarian war, an even bigger haven for violent extremists, and the question of what would
happen to its nuclear weapons. That “perfect storm” of uncertainty alone might require the engagement of U.S. and coalition forces into a situation of
immense complexity and danger with no guarantee they could gain control of the weapons and with the real possibility that a nuclear weapon might be
used. The Mexican possibility may seem less likely, but the government, its politicians, police, and judicial
infrastructure are all under sustained assault and pressure by criminal gangs and drug cartels.
How that internal conflict turns out over the next several years will have a major impact on the stability of the Mexican state. Any descent by
the Mexico into chaos would demand an American response based on the serious implications
for homeland security alone. Yes, the “rapid collapse” of Mexico would change everything with
respect to the global security environment. Such a collapse would have enormous humanitarian,
constitutional, economic, cultural, and security implications for the U.S. It would seem the U.S. federal
government, indeed American society at large, would have little ability to focus serious attention on much
else in the world. The hypothetical collapse of Pakistan is a scenario that has already been well discussed. In the worst case, the U.S.
would be able to isolate itself from most effects emanating from south Asia. However, there would be no running from a
Mexican collapse.
Water Wars Scenario
1NC
NAFTA depletes water resources
Gilbreath and Ferretti ‘4 – Gilbreath was a secior associate of the CSIS, currently serves as an international
policy specialist for the US EPA, Ferretti is the chief of the environment division of the Inter-American
Development Bank (Jan and Janine, “Mixing Environment and Trade Policies under NAFTA,” Chapter 4 of
“NAFTA’s Impact on North America: The First Decade,” edited by Sidney Weintraub, published 2004,
CSIS)//ER
US.-Mexican Transboundary Resource Depletion¶ As NAFTA has spurred economic growth in the U.S.Mexican border¶ region, transboundary political tensions over water allocation and¶ management also have
grown. Both sides of the border are running out¶ of water both for agricultural and municipal use, and the
scarcity is¶ creating a series of unresolved disputes between agricultural and mu-¶ nicipal users. NAFTA's
implementation and its resulting impact on¶ growth in border region aggravated the demand for water for both
uses but did not cause it. Even so, failure to address the water manage-¶ ment issue over the next decade will
have an adverse impact on the abil-¶ ity of the United States and Mexico to continue their process of¶ economic
integration or to sustain regional economic growth.¶ The problem is more acute on the Mexican side of the
border because¶ existing supplies are threatened by municipal contamination. Mexico's¶ National Water
Commission reported in 2001 that Mexico's northern¶ border towns and cities, strapped for funds, could
adequately treat less¶ than 35 percent of the sewage generated daily (Thompson 2001). One¶ area of growing
concern was Ciudad Juarez, across the Rio Grande¶ from El Paso, Texas. As of 2001, this city of 1.3 million
residents was¶ growing by about 50,000 people a year, but the underground aquifer¶ that supplies the city and
El Paso was declining by about 5 feet per year.¶ City officials estimated that the aquifer would contain no
usable water in 20 years (Thompson 2001). ¶ Water is running short on the U.S. side of the border as well.
Failure¶ t0 conserve water and failure to regulate underground water pumping¶ are two of the issues that
threaten to limit economic development in the¶ southwestern United States. U.S. per capita use of water
declined from¶ 1,900 gallons of water per person per day in 1980 to 1,500 gallons per¶ day in 1995, but by
global standards, the United States is one of the¶ world's most gluttonous water users (Jehl 2002).
Extinction
Barlow 2008 – Senior Advisor on Water to the UN General Assembly, chair of the Food & Water Watch, executive member of the International Forum on
Globalization (2/25, Maude, Foreign Policy in Focus, "The global water crisis and the coming battle for the right to water",
http://www.fpif.org/articlesthe_global_water_crisis_and_the_coming_battle_for_the_right_to_water)
The three water crises – dwindling
freshwater supplies, inequitable access to water and the corporate control of water – pose
the greatest threat of our time to the planet and to our survival. Together with impending climate change from fossil fuel emissions, the
water crises impose some life-or-death decisions on us all. Unless we collectively change our behavior, we are heading
toward a world of deepening conflict and potential wars over the dwindling supplies of freshwater – between nations,
between rich and poor, between the public and the private interest, between rural and urban populations, and between the competing needs of
the natural world and industrialized humans. Around the world, more than 215 major rivers and 300 groundwater basins and aquifers are
shared by two or more countries, creating tensions over ownership and use of the precious waters they contain. Growing shortages and
unequal distribution of water are causing disagreements, sometimes violent, and becoming a security risk in many regions. Britain’s
former defense secretary, John Reid, warns of coming “water wars.” In a public statement on the eve of a 2006 summit on climate change, Reid predicted that violence and
political conflict
would become more likely as watersheds turn to deserts, glaciers melt and water supplies are
poisoned. He went so far as to say that the global water crisis was becoming a global security issue and that Britain’s armed forces should be prepared to tackle conflicts,
including warfare, over dwindling water sources. “Such changes make the emergence of violent conflict more, rather than less, likely,” former British prime minister Tony Blair
told The Independent. “The blunt truth is that the lack
of water and agricultural land is a significant contributory factor to the tragic conflict we
see unfolding in Darfur. We should see this as a warning sign.” The Independent gave several other examples of regions of potential conflict. These include
Israel, Jordan and Palestine, who all rely on the Jordan River, which is controlled by Israel; Turkey and Syria, where Turkish plans to build dams on
the Euphrates River brought the country to the brink of war with Syria in 1998, and where Syria now accuses Turkey of deliberately meddling with its water supply; China
and India, where the Brahmaputra River has caused tension between the two countries in the past, and where China’s proposal to divert the river is re-igniting the
divisions; Angola, Botswana and Namibia, where disputes over the Okavango water basin that have flared in the past are now threatening to re-ignite as
Namibia is proposing to build a threehundred- kilometer pipeline that will drain the delta; Ethiopia and Egypt, where population growth is threatening conflict
along the Nile; and Bangladesh and India, where flooding in the Ganges caused by melting glaciers in the Himalayas is wreaking havoc in Bangladesh, leading to
a rise in illegal, and unpopular, migration to India.
Environment Scenario
1NC Environment
NAFTA destroys the environment
Public Citizen ’13 (Organization in DC devoted to the protection/welfare of citizens “NAFTA’s Broken
Promises 1994-2013: Outcomes of the North American Free Trade Agreement”
http://www.citizen.org/documents/NAFTAs-Broken-Promises.pdf accessed 7/21 //NS)
In 1993, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was sold to the American public with
grand promises. NAFTA would create tens of thousands of good jobs here. U.S. farmers would export their
way to wealth. NAFTA would bring Mexico’s standard of living up, providing new economic opportunities there
that would reduce immigration to the United States. NAFTA was an experiment, establishing a radically new
“trade” agreement model. It exploded the boundaries of past trade pacts, which had focused narrowly on
cutting tariffs and quotas. In contrast, NAFTA contained chapters that created new privileges and protections
for foreign investors; required the three countries to waive domestic procurement preferences, such as Buy
American; limited regulation of services, such as trucking and banking; extended medicine patent monopolies
and limited food and product safety standards and border inspection. After nineteen years of NAFTA, we
can measure its actual outcomes. The grand promises made by proponents remain unfulfilled.
Many outcomes are exactly the opposite of what was promised. Many U.S. firms used the new
investor protections to relocate production to Mexico to take advantage of its low wages and
weak environmental standards and to attack NAFTA countries’ environmental and health laws
in foreign tribunals. Over $340 million in compensation to investors has been extracted from
NAFTA governments via these “investor-state” challenges.
Environmental Degradation causes Extinction
Dernbach 98,
Associate Professor of Law at Widener University, ’98 (John, Fall, “Sustainable Development as a
Framework for National Governance” Case Western University Law Review, Vol 49 p 16, lexis)
The global scale and severity of environmental degradation and poverty are unprecedented
in human history. Major adverse consequences are not inevitable, but they are likely if
these problems are not addressed. Many civilizations collapsed or were severely weakened
because they exhausted or degraded the natural resource base on which they depended. n76
In addition, substantial economic and social inequalities have caused or contributed to
many wars and revolutions. n77 These problems are intensified by the speed at which they
have occurred and are worsening, making it difficult for natural systems to adapt. The
complexity of natural and human systems also means that the effects of these problems are difficult to
anticipate. The potential impact of global warming on the transmission of tropical diseases in a time of
substantial international travel and commerce is but one example.
I/L—NAFTA kills the Environment
NAFTA creates trade deficits, took away one million US jobs, and led to an increase of
immigrants
Public Citizen ’13 (Organization in DC devoted to the protection/welfare of citizens ,“NAFTA’s Broken
Promises 1994-2013: Outcomes of the North American Free Trade Agreement”
http://www.citizen.org/documents/NAFTAs-Broken-Promises.pdf accessed 7/21 //NS)
The small U.S. trade surplus with Mexico pre-NAFTA turned into a massive new trade deficit.
The pre- NAFTA U.S. trade deficit with Canada expanded greatly. Overall, the inflation-adjusted
U.S. trade deficit with Canada of $29.1 billion and the $2.5 billion surplus with Mexico in 1993
(the year before NAFTA took effect) turned into a combined NAFTA trade deficit of $181 billion
by 2012.1 The Economic Policy Institute (EPI) estimated that the NAFTA deficit had eliminated
about one million net American jobs by 2004.2 Meanwhile, U.S. food processors moved to Mexico to
take advantage of low wages and food imports soared. U.S beef imports from Mexico and Canada, for example,
have risen 130 percent since NAFTA took effect, and today U.S. consumption of “NAFTA” beef tops $1.3 billion
annually.3 The export of subsidized U.S. corn did increase, displacing over one million Mexican
campesino farmers. Their desperate migration pushed down wages in Mexico’s border
maquiladora factory zone and contributed to a doubling of Mexican immigration to the United
States.
US Job loss, not gain
Public Citizen ’13 (Organization in DC devoted to the protection/welfare of citizens ,“NAFTA’s Broken
Promises 1994-2013: Outcomes of the North American Free Trade Agreement”
http://www.citizen.org/documents/NAFTAs-Broken-Promises.pdf accessed 7/21 //NS)
In 1993, Gary Hufbauer and Jeffrey Schott of the Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE)
projected that NAFTA would lead to a rising U.S. trade surplus with Mexico, which would create 170,000 net
new jobs in the United States.8 This figure was trumpeted by the Clinton administration and other NAFTA
proponents. Hufbauer and Schott based their projection on the observation that when export growth outpaces
the growth of imports, more jobs are created by trade than are destroyed by trade.9 Instead of an improved
trade balance with Canada and Mexico, however, NAFTA resulted in an explosion of imports
from Mexico and Canada that led to huge U.S. trade deficits. According to Hufbauer and Schott’s own
methodology, these deficits meant major job loss. Less than two years after NAFTA’s
implementation, even before the depth of the NAFTA deficit became evident, Hufbauer recognized
that his jobs prediction was incongruent with the facts, telling the Wall Street Journal, “The best
figure for the jobs effect of NAFTA is approximately zero...the lesson for me is to stay away
from job forecasting
Decreased wages, increased inequality
Public Citizen ’13 (Organization in DC devoted to the protection/welfare of citizens , “NAFTA’s Broken
Promises 1994-2013: Outcomes of the North American Free Trade Agreement”
http://www.citizen.org/documents/NAFTAs-Broken-Promises.pdf accessed 7/21 //NS)
Trade affects the composition of jobs available in an economy. The United States has lost millions of
manufacturing jobs during the NAFTA era, but overall unemployment has been stable (excluding recessions) as
new low-paying service sector jobs have been created. Proponents of NAFTA raise the quantity of jobs
to claim that NAFTA has not hurt American workers. But what they do not mention is that the quality
of jobs available, and the wages most American workers can earn, have been degraded. According to the
Brookings Institution, the average worker displaced from manufacturing went from earning
$40,154 to $32,123 when re-employed, a 20 percent drop in earnings.30 According to the
Bureau of Labor Statistics, two out of every five displaced manufacturing workers who were
rehired in 2012 experienced a wage reduction of even greater than 20 percent.31 Such
displacement not only spells wage reductions for former manufacturing workers, but also for
existing service sector workers. As increasing numbers of workers displaced from manufacturing jobs
have joined the glut of workers competing for non-offshorable, low-skill jobs in sectors such as hospitality and
food service, real wages have also fallen in these sectors under NAFTA.32 The shift in employment from
high-paying manufacturing jobs to low-paying service jobs has thus contributed to overall wage
stagnation. The average U.S. wage has grown less than one percent annually in real terms in the
19 years since NAFTA was enacted even as worker productivity has risen at more than three
times that pace.33 Given rising inequality, the median U.S. wage has fared even worse and
today remains at the same level seen in 1979.
Low wages outweigh cheaper prices under NAFTA
Public Citizen ’13 (Organization in DC devoted to the protection/welfare of citizens , “NAFTA’s Broken
Promises 1994-2013: Outcomes of the North American Free Trade Agreement”
http://www.citizen.org/documents/NAFTAs-Broken-Promises.pdf accessed 7/21 //NS)
Many proponents of NAFTA-style trade acknowledge that it will cause the loss of some
American jobs, but argue that U.S. workers still win overall by being able to purchase cheaper
goods imported from abroad. First, this promise has failed to materialize for many critical
consumer items, such as food. Despite a 188 percent rise in food imports from Canada and Mexico under
NAFTA the average nominal price of food in the United States has jumped 63 percent since the
deal went into effect. Second, even those reductions in consumer goods prices that have
materialized have not been sufficient to offset the losses to wages under NAFTA. The Center for
Economic and Policy Research discovered that when comparing the lower prices of cheaper
goods to the income lost from low-wage competition under current trade policy, the traderelated losses in wages outweigh the gains in cheaper goods for the vast majority of U.S.
workers. U.S. workers without college degrees (over 65 percent of the workforce) have likely lost an
amount equal to 12.2 percent of their wages under NAFTA-style trade even after accounting for the
benefits of cheaper goods, meaning a net loss of almost $3,300 per year for a worker earning the
median annual wage of $27,000.
NAFTA kills transition to renewables
Public Citizen ’13 (Organization in DC devoted to the protection/welfare of citizens , “NAFTA’s Broken
Promises 1994-2013: Outcomes of the North American Free Trade Agreement”
http://www.citizen.org/documents/NAFTAs-Broken-Promises.pdf accessed 7/21 //NS)
As governments have come to recognize the necessity of supporting renewable energy
generation and creating green jobs, corporations have started using NAFTA’s backdoor
investor-state system to try to undermine these policies. In July 2011, U.S.-based Mesa Power, LLC
announced that it would challenge a successful Ontario renewable energy program under NAFTA.69 Under the
new program, which has already created more than 20,000 jobs, renewable energy companies have committed
over $20 billion to clean energy investments.70 Michael Eckhart, President of the American Council on
Renewable Energy, called the program part of “the most comprehensive renewable energy policy entered
anywhere around the world.”71 Despite wide praise for this leading effort to combat climate change
and support green jobs, Mesa Power is now using NAFTA to undermine the program and
demand $775 million in taxpayer compensation.
NAFTA puts the people of Mexico into poverty
Dorval ’12 (Bryan, correspondent for the Boston Globe and writer for world watch, “NAFTA Doing More
Harm than Good”, http://blogs.worldwatch.org/nourishingtheplanet/nafta-doing-more-harm-than-good/,
accessed 7/21 //NS)
Since the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was signed by the governments of the
United States, Mexico and Canada in 1994, millions of Mexicans have joined the ranks of the
hungry. About one-fifth of Mexican children currently suffer from malnutrition. The Mexican
government reports that the number of people living in food poverty, the inability to purchase a basic
food basket of staple foods, has risen over the last few years from 18 million in 2008 to 20 million
in 2010. To see the affect NAFTA has had on the local economy you need only look at their rising
import costs. Forty two percent of the food consumed in Mexico comes from abroad. Before NAFTA, the
country spent USD $1.8 billion on food imports—today it spends $24 billion. The rise of
imported corn has caused the price of locally grown corn to fall by half, which has forced nearly
two million farmers off their land. With their livelihoods gone, the farmers are forced to look
for work elsewhere in order to support their families. Many of these farmers seek refuge in the
United States as migrant workers. As more corporations replace small farmers, the impact of NAFTA
on communities has been devastating. According to Jonathan Fox, an expert on rural Mexico at the
University of California, Santa Cruz, “[NAFTA] unravels rural communities, separates families and
makes it difficult for young people to see a future in their communities of origin.”
Increases taxes
Public Citizen 13 (Public Citizen, nonprofit advocacy group with offices in Washington and Austin, “NAFTA’s
Broken Promises 1994-2013: Outcomes of the North American Free Trade Agreement,” 2013,
http://www.citizen.org/documents/NAFTAs-Broken-Promises.pdf, AL)
Corporate demands for taxpayer compensation surge. Foreign corporations have launched
investor- state attacks on a wide array of consumer health and safety policies, environmental
and land-use laws, government procurement decisions, regulatory permits, financial
regulations, and other public interest polices that they allege as undermining “expected future
profits.” The number of investor-state cases has soared over the last decade – in 2011 the cumulative number
of launched investor-state cases was nine times the cumulative investor-state caseload in 2000, even though
treaties with investor-state provisions have existed since the 1950s.63 When the foreign investor wins a case,
the government must hand the corporation an amount of taxpayer money decided by the tribunal as
compensation for the offending policy. There is no limit to the amount of money tribunals can order
governments to pay corporations, and there are very limited appeal rights. Foreign firms have
won more than $340 million taxpayer dollars thus far in investor-state cases brought under
NAFTA. Of the more than $12.3 billion in the 14 claims still pending under NAFTA, all relate to
environmental, energy, land use, public health and transportation policies – not traditional trade issues.64
NAFTA undermines environmental policies and has poor working conditions
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 7/24 (“House Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on
Commerce, Manufacturing, and Trade Hearing; "The U.S.-E.U. Free Trade Agreement: Tipping Over the
Regulatory Barriers."; Testimony by Carroll Muffett, President and CEO, Center for International
Environmental Law”, Congressional Documents and Publications, section: U.S. House of Representatives
documents, LEXIS // NS)
Harmonization takes two or more differing standards or procedures and converts them into a single, uniform standard. While TTIP could offer an
opportunity to elevate regulations in the U.S. and the EU, the harmonization of regulatory standards to the "lowest-common denominator" has often
been the result of recent U.S. trade agreements, decreasing the level of protection afforded to the public in favor of private interests. n3 Other
agreements, such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), failed to harmonize standards between
Mexico, the U.S. and Canada, which has resulted in the transfer of dangerous and
environmentally unsound industrial activity to Mexico. n4 This poses a serious threat to the
environment, working families, and communities. It is therefore imperative not only that
regulations are harmonized upward, but also that any convergence of regulations serves as a
regulatory floor that allows governments the flexibility to develop more ambitious
environmental and public interest policies in the future.
NAFTA leads to environmental challenges for Canada and the US – pollution, chemicals,
and resource deterioration
Gilbreath and Ferretti ‘4 – Gilbreath was a secior associate of the CSIS, currently serves as an international
policy specialist for the US EPA, Ferretti is the chief of the environment division of the Inter-American
Development Bank (Jan and Janine, “Mixing Environment and Trade Policies under NAFTA,” Chapter 4 of
“NAFTA’s Impact on North America: The First Decade,” edited by Sidney Weintraub, published 2004,
CSIS)//ER
United States-Canada Growth in Pollution and¶ Resource Deterioration¶ In U.S.-Canada relations, successful
economic integration and eco-¶ nomic growth in both countries since the inception of the
Canada-U/S¶ Free Trade Agreement in 1989 are generating new environmental chal-¶ lenges in
the energy and logging sectors, and in an overall rise in land-¶ based toxic chemical releases.
The CEC monitors some of these trends,¶ accepts citizen complaints about each government's resolve to
enforce¶ its own environmental laws, and urges all three of the NAFTA countries¶ to consider the
environmental consequences of increasing electricity-¶ generating capacity over the next several
years."¶ The growth in timber cutting during the past decade in both the¶ United States and
Canada has drawn the ire of many environmental¶ groups in both countries, who have filed
complaints with the CEC al-¶ leging that both governments are failing to protect wildlife as the
log-¶ ging sector booms. High-profile complaints have been filed against¶ logging operations in
British Columbia and Ontario, and one against¶ the U.S. government for broad-scale failure to
protect migratory birds¶ during logging operations." ln the most recent complaint, against On~¶ tario,
the CEC asked the Canadian federal government to defend itself¶ against allegations that it allows 85,000 nests
containing eggs and baby¶ birds to be destroyed every year. A coalition of environmental groups¶
claimed the federal government does not enforce the Migratory Birds¶ Convention Act against
Ontario forestry companies that destroy nests¶ by clear cutting. But forestry companies say that while
some nests are¶ destroyed when trees are cut down, the companies follow regulations¶ that protect the overall
migratory bird habitat (Jaimet 2002). Rising energy demand in all three NAFTA countries is creating
tri-¶ lateral tensions over pollution from new electricity-generating facili-¶ ties. The CEC addressed
this issue in a 2002 report on electricity¶ generation in North America, warning that the continent's air
quality¶ will worsen with the addition of 2,000 new power plants over a five-year¶ period
beginning in 2002 (Leatherclale 2002). The growth of the energy¶ sector is a reflection not only of growthled demand in all three coun-¶ tries but also of the recent deregulation of electricity in 16 U.S. states¶ and the
Canadian provinces of Alberta and Ontario. In all, the CEC¶ l'€P0rt predicted that electricity demand will
grow during the next de~¶ Cade by 66 percent in Mexico, 21 percent in the United States, and 14 ¶
percent in Canada.
Chapter 11 damages environmental regulations
Kagalwalla 2009—Adnan Kagalwalla, JD The Ohio State University Michael E. Moritz College of Law
[Entrepreneurial Bus. L.J. 112 2008-2009/lexis]//MM
The S.D. Myers case essentially undermined Canada's environmental regulations and "obligations under
international law to prohibit the transboundary movement of hazardous wastes" using NAFTA Chapter 11, a
provision meant to protect investors against takings by a foreign government. Canada's motives may not have
been purely environmental when passing the regulation, but the fact remains that an environmental regulation,
a matter of sovereign control, was nullified quickly and effectively by a tribunal because of a single complaint
brought 61 by a lone foreign company.¶ S.D. Myers points to the strong ability of foreign investors to
circumvent environmental regulations that post-date the investment in the host State; those investors can then
exit a problematic situation with cash in hand. Perhaps of even greater concern is the fact that domestic entities
may not be able to get similar treatment because they are limited to domestic courts and do not have NAFTA
Chapter 11 provisions to protect their interests as strongly. This creates a strong competitive advantage for any
foreign entity in comparison to their domestic rivals, since foreign companies do not have to "just live with"
environmental regulations. This advantage is particularly pronounced in chemical-related businesses, where a
business is just one high-profile study away from being dismantled.
NAFTA trucking hurts the environment
Public Citizen 13 (Public Citizen, nonprofit advocacy group with offices in Washington and Austin, “NAFTA’s
Broken Promises 1994-2013: Outcomes of the North American Free Trade Agreement,” 2013,
http://www.citizen.org/documents/NAFTAs-Broken-Promises.pdf, AL)
NAFTA requires access to U.S. roads for trucks without safety or environmental standards. The
NAFTA truck saga provides an example of how NAFTA reaches “behind the border” to undermine important
domestic environmental and safety policies, and how Congress can lose control of such ¶ domestic policies if
they are implicated by a trade pact. NAFTA’s service sector chapter included a requirement that all
three countries’ highways be fully accessible to vehicles of trucking companies based in any
NAFTA nation by 2000, an item pushed by large U.S. trucking firms seeking deregulation and lower wages.75
NAFTA also recommended, but did not require, that Mexican and U.S. truck safety, emissions
and driver standards be harmonized (i.e. made uniform). That provision had no deadline, nor did
it require that Mexican standards be brought up rather than U.S. standards brought down.76
Post- NAFTA negotiations on the standards issues went nowhere.77 The U.S. Department of
Transportation’s Inspector General (IG) conducted studies that repeatedly revealed severe safety and
environmental problems with Mexico’s truck fleet and drivers’ licensing.78 For instance, Mexico’s commercial
drivers’ licenses permitted 18-year-old drivers and required no medical exam or drug testing. Nor did the
government have a system for tracking driver violations, insurance or hours of service. The Clinton
administration relied on the IG reports and did not implement the NAFTA trucking rules.79
Mexico uses NAFTA to supersede US standards
Public Citizen 13 (Public Citizen, nonprofit advocacy group with offices in Washington and Austin, “NAFTA’s
Broken Promises 1994-2013: Outcomes of the North American Free Trade Agreement,” 2013,
http://www.citizen.org/documents/NAFTAs-Broken-Promises.pdf, AL)
Mexico uses NAFTA dispute to supersede U.S. standards. To enforce its NAFTA-granted rights,
Mexico launched a formal NAFTA dispute resolution case. In 2001 a three-person NAFTA tribunal ruled
that the United States was required to allow full access to U.S. roads for Mexican-domiciled
trucks or face trade sanctions.80 Shortly after entering office, George W. Bush sought to implement the
NAFTA tribunal order.81 Public Citizen, Sierra Club and a coalition of other consumer, labor and
environmental groups successfully sued in U.S. federal court to block the order based on the
administration’s failure to conduct an environmental impact assessment as required by the
National Environmental Policy Act. At issue was the prospect that Mexico-domiciled trucks driving
throughout the United States would exacerbate air pollution, since the Mexican truck fleet is older and emits
greater quantities of pollutants, including nitrogen oxide and particulate matter.82 Some U.S. border states
supported the suit, as the influx of these trucks was projected to put them out of compliance
with the Clean Air Act. This victory for safety and the environment was later overturned by a
2004 Supreme Court ruling.83 In a chilling ruling with implications¶ for a wide array of domestic policies
implicated by NAFTA and other FTAs, the court concluded that the executive branch had significant discretion
on this domestic highway safety policy because it implicated the president’s foreign affairs authority relating to
enforcement of an international agreement.84
Destroys safety and environmental concerns
Public Citizen 13 (Public Citizen, nonprofit advocacy group with offices in Washington and Austin, “NAFTA’s
Broken Promises 1994-2013: Outcomes of the North American Free Trade Agreement,” 2013,
http://www.citizen.org/documents/NAFTAs-Broken-Promises.pdf, AL)
“Pilot” program favors NAFTA compliance over safety and environmental concerns. During
Bush’s second term, his administration worked with the Mexican government to finalize a
controversial pilot program for Mexico-domiciled trucks to be allowed access – despite ongoing
safety concerns.85 A bipartisan coalition in Congress intervened, setting specific safety and environmental
conditions that had to be met before the program could go into effect. In response, a private Mexican
association of truck drivers launched a case against the United States under the investor-state privileges of
NAFTA, demanding $6 billion in damages from U.S. taxpayers for their representatives’ failure to implement
the¶ NAFTA “open-border” trucking policy.86 Meanwhile, environmental and consumer groups filed
another lawsuit against the so-called pilot program for its failure to meet basic statutory
requirements for a pilot program, such as providing safety data to determine if congressional
requirements were met to transition the test period into a permanent policy. The Bush
administration implemented its “pilot program” anyway, claiming congressional dictates only applied to a final
open border policy, not a test program.
Trucks run over safety and health concerns
Public Citizen 13 (Public Citizen, nonprofit advocacy group with offices in Washington and Austin, “NAFTA’s
Broken Promises 1994-2013: Outcomes of the North American Free Trade Agreement,” 2013,
http://www.citizen.org/documents/NAFTAs-Broken-Promises.pdf, AL)
Obama administration caves to Mexico’s $2.4 billion NAFTA trade sanctions threat, allows
NAFTA trucks to run over safety and health concerns. In March 2009, after years of congressional
pressure, President Obama signed into law a bill that ended Bush’s 18-month “pilot” truck program. A few days
later, Mexico announced that it would impose tariffs on U.S. trade worth $2.4 billion in retaliation. 87 The
sanctions initially targeted exports from the states of House and Senate members that had voted in favor of the
measure to forbid access until safety and environmental improvements were made.88 In April 2010, 78
members of Congress, including Rep. Peter DeFazio (D-Ore.), then-Chairman of the Highways and Transit
Subcommittee of the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, sent a letter to¶ Department of
Transportation Secretary Ray LaHood and U.S. Trade Representative Ron Kirk, urging them to negotiate with
Mexico to remove the cross-border trucking provisions from NAFTA. They asked the administration to swap
improved access in another sector to “buy back” the policy space to maintain U.S. highway safety. Such
negotiated compensation is allowed under NAFTA. The administration refused, instead allowing the sanctions
to remain in place. Then, in a shocking move, the Obama administration caved to NAFTA in 2011 by
signing a deal to allow Mexican-domiciled trucks into the U.S. interior for three years despite
the unresolved safety and environmental concerns, thereby imperiling highway safety and
clean air for the sake of NAFTA’s extreme provisions.89 The first Mexico-domiciled truck
crossed into the U.S. interior in October 2011 without needing to show it was built to U.S. safety
standards, while Public Citizen, the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, and the Sierra Club filed a
lawsuit to block the dangerous new “pilot” program. The program does not even serve its stated purpose of
evaluating the ability of Mexico-domiciled trucks to operate safely in the United States, since there is no plan to
collect a statistically valid sample of program participants.90
NAFTA kills the environment
Sierra Club 2013 – one of the oldest grassroots environmental organizations in the U.S. (“RESPONSIBLE TRADE PROGRAM:
THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT” http://www.sierraclub.org/trade/globalization/nafta.aspx //SRM)
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which came into effect on January 1, 1994, required the
elimination of most tariffs and other trade barriers on products and services traded between Mexico, Canada
and the United States. While trade agreements have the potential to promote more sustainable and just
development, NAFTA did very little to safeguard our environment or communities that depend on it. It
transferred enormous power from democratic governments to multinational corporations and faceless global
market forces - and today communities across North America are at greater risk. NAFTA has allowed
environmentally irresponsible companies to continue their offenses outside U.S. borders where regulations are
less stringent or poorly enforced. Health officials are now investigating a link between the swine flu outbreak
and an industrial pig farm in Mexico, run by a subsidiary of the U.S.-based Smithfield Farms. Smithfield Farms
is notorious for its environmental record in the U.S., having committed 6,900 violations of the U.S. Clean
Water Act for dumping hog waste into a tributary of the Chesapeake Bay. Following passage of NAFTA, the
company was able to easily set-up operations in Mexico, circumventing U.S. regulations that force them to
properly treat hog waste. NAFTA also gave multinational corporations the power to by-pass the
domestic judicial system and directly challenge environmental and public interest laws in
secret tribunals. For example, Dow AgroSciences LLC, a U.S. company, recently filed a $2 million dollar
lawsuit against Canada, in light of Québec's ban on cosmetic lawn pesticides containing the dangerous
chemical, 2, 4-D. The pesticide was banned in Québec due to 2, 4-D's link to leukemia, respiratory problems,
and neurological disorders, among other health-related problems. However, this move by the Canadian
province to protect its citizens from potentially devastating health problems is now being contested under
NAFTA's Chapter 11 investment provisions. In another example, California's new low-carbon fuel rules (LCFR)
may violate NAFTA's "national treatment" provisions. The LCFR rules require refineries, producers and
importers of motor fuel sold in the state to reduce the "carbon intensity" of their products by 10 percent by
2020. Since synthetic crude from Alberta's oil sands emits more carbon than conventional oil, the new rules
would force those Canadian refiners to produce cleaner oil for export to California. Since Canadian refiners
may need to spend more money than competitors in order to make their oil clean enough for export to
California, Canadian trade officials contend that the LCFR rules are unfair. This dispute highlights the
disconnect between citizens' ability to fight global warming and current international trade rules outlined in
NAFTA. See "NAFTA's Corporate Investor Rights and Their Threat to the Environment," below. We can do
better! In an increasingly globalized world, global warming and environmental degradation have no borders,
and it is vital that our trade agreements reflect that reality. Trade agreements should promote a higher quality
of life for all, not simply serve as vehicles to increase corporate profits. We must learn from the failed trade
agreements of the past and stake out a different course for a future where people's lives and livelihoods
are protected and respected.
NAFTA devastates the environment
Vaughan ‘4- Visiting
Scholar; Carnegie Endowment, (former) North American Commission for Environmental
Cooperation, (former) United Nations Environmental Program (Scott, “The Greenest Trade Agreement Ever?,
http://carnegieendowment.org/files/nafta1.pdf)//AD
Based on these limited examples, I draw the following three conclusions. First, there is little evidence that the environmental safeguards in NAFTA have
directly improved environmental quality in the farm sector. To date, none of the environmental safeguards inserted in
NAFTA or its environmental side accord—the North American Agreement for Environmental
Cooperation—have been used in any disputes involving agricultural liberalization. At the same
time, the accelerated NAFTA liberalization schedule adopted by Mexico to phase out tariff-rate
quotas for maize has opened the maize market too quickly to imports and related price and
employment shocks. During this turbulent transitional period, this market has increased ecological
risk in Mexico, as well as environmental damage in the United States. Finally, the absence in NAFTA of
disciplines that can constrain farm subsidies for maize, wheat, and other crops has led to an increase in total subsidy payments in the United States, with
the amended 2002 Farm Act, as well as increased subsidy payments in Mexico. Increased farm subsidy payments have increased pricing and market
failures, resulting in the overproduction of some crops, as well as the excessive application of fertilizers and other capital inputs, which further magnifies
environmental degradation. In addition, the pattern of subsidy payments appears to favor large farms over smaller ones, thereby contributing to the
expansion of subsistence farming in marginalized areas in the southern regions of Mexico.
Free trade causes shift to large farms – NAFTA proves
Vaughan ‘4 - Visiting Scholar; Carnegie Endowment, (former) North American Commission for Environmental Cooperation, (former) United Nations
Environmental Program (Scott, “The Greenest Trade Agreement Ever?, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/nafta1.pdf)//AD
My second conclusion is that NAFTA
has accelerated the structural shift toward large-scale, commercially
viable, export-oriented farms. Clearly, this restructuring began well before NAFTA, with the introduction of liberalization reforms in
the late
s in Mexico. However, recalling the argument of Jeffrey Sachs and Andrew Warner that the opening of the economy through trade
liberalization is the “sine qua non of the overall reform process,” it is reasonable to assume that NAFTA has both accelerated and
significantly deepened structural changes in Mexico.6 In addition, the distribution of subsidy
payments has accelerated structural changes in the grains and horticulture sector so as to favor
large-scale, export-oriented, vertically and horizontally integrated farms.
Large/Export farms harm environment
Vaughan ‘4 - Visiting Scholar; Carnegie Endowment, (former) North American Commission for Environmental Cooperation, (former) United Nations
Environmental Program (Scott, “The Greenest Trade Agreement Ever?, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/nafta1.pdf)//AD
My second conclusion is that NAFTA has accelerated the structural shift toward large-scale, commercially viable, export-oriented farms. Clearly, this
restructuring began well before NAFTA, with the introduction of liberalization reforms in the late
s in Mexico. However, recalling the argument of
Jeffrey Sachs and Andrew Warner that the opening of the economy through trade liberalization is the “sine qua non of the overall reform process,” it is
reasonable to assume that NAFTA has both accelerated and significantly deepened structural changes in Mexico.6 In addition, the distribution of
subsidy payments has accelerated structural changes in the grains and horticulture sector so as to favor large-scale, export-oriented, vertically and
horizontally integrated farms. The structural shift appears to have increased the concentrations of
nitrogen and phosphorus, water polluting agrochemicals used as inputs in larger scale farms.
Export-oriented farms also appear to use greater amounts of irrigated water inputs per yield,
compared to producers of similar products destined for domestic markets. Since farming is the largest consumer of
freshwater by a very wide margin, this structural shift has magnified water scarcity in Mexico.
Canadian Soft Power Scenario
1NC
NAFTA key to Canada’s soft power
Potter 9 (Evan J. Potter, “Branding Canada: Projecting Canada’s Soft Power Through Public Diplomacy”)
The placement of Canada in the quadrant next to Australia, indicating that these countries have
low visibility but very positive valence, is not based on a detailed content analysis of international media
coverage, but rather is suggestive and based on what little empirical evidence exists (e.g., a search of
the New York times database would reveal very few stories on Canada’s politics or economics, but those that
exist would be more positive than negative). Positioning Australia, a country with two-thirds of Canada’s gross
domestic product, next to Canada suggests that Australia (especially after having hosted the Olympic Games)
receives at least as much positive international media coverage in Canada (in other words, there are probably
as many positive mentions). In contrast, it would not be incorrect to suggest that Mexico belongs in quadrant
two. Mexico’s image within the English-language elite media (e.g. the New York Times, The Financial Times of
London, The Economist) is that of a country that exports impoverished citizens to the United States and is
home to violent drug cartels, an image that is difficult for the Mexican government to shake at the same time
that it is billing itself as a trade and investment partner in the North American Free Trade Agreement.
Canada, on the other hand, stands to see an improvement in their international perception from
the North American Free Trade Agreement. Right now, ountries such as the United Kingdom,
France, and Germany garner significantly more sustained international media coverage than
Canada; China and Russia receive considerable international media coverage, but with a mixture of negative
and positive stories, given the attention that is paid both to their economic development as well as their
military build-ups and human rights records. NAFTA can provide Canada with the necessary
components to give the country a higher visibility in addition its high positive valence. The
United States, on the other hand, by far the most visible country in the international media, is a magnet for
both negative and positive coverage. Judging by the Pew Research Center’s global surveys, since the invasion of
Iraq, the United States’ national image as constructed by the global mass media is probably more negative than
positive.
¶ What can one conclude from figure 1.3? As Michael Kunzcik points out, communications research has shown
that the protective shield of selective perceptions works asymmetrically, that is, that in contrast to positive
information, negative information is not filtered out. This finding has more important implications for national
image maintenance because it is much easier for a country to gain (and keep) a negative image “even among
supporters of one’s own position than to build a positive image among opponents of that position” Since
images, once created, over the longer term tend to remain stable, a country that has developed a negative image
(e.g. Mexico) will find it much harder to reverse this image in global public opinion. However, for most
countries, negative media coverage on a particular issue will not do long-term damage if they
have had a positive image. Therefore, countries will likely move very slowly within each of the
four quandrants and rarely between them. But this is not to suggest that countries like Canada,
with relatively sparse but positive international media coverage, should be complacement.
Countries that do not invest adequately in managing their international images are in effect
throwing themselves at the mercy of international media, who play a predominant role in framing
national images either negatively or positively. Countries such as Canada that are highly dependent on
global markets for their economic prosperity need to be the most concerned about their
international images, and the role of NAFTA will be pivotal for a positive international image.
Canada’s soft power prevents Sino-Japan war---it goes nuclear.
FATDC 12 – Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Canada, Stopping the Free-Fall Implications of SinoJapanese Rivalry for Regional Stability and Canadian
Interests, 2012-09-14 http://www.international.gc.ca/arms-armes/isrop-prisi/research-recherche/intl_security-securite_int/yuan2007/section1a.aspx?lang=eng)//A-Berg
This report discusses developments in Sino-Japanese
relations since the end of the Cold War and analyses some of the underlining causes of mistrust,
misunderstanding, hostility, and emerging rivalry between these two major Asia powers. It presents a
preliminary assessment of the key issues and controversies ranging from Chinese views on the evolving U.S.-Japan military alliance, Japan's aspiration to become a normal
state and its pursuit of greater international role and enhancement of military capabilities, to historical legacies and rising nationalism in both countries, unresolved territorial
disputes and competition for resources, and growing Japan-Taiwan ties. The report argues that the end of the Cold War, the changing international security environment in
East Asia, domestic politics and leadership transition in both China and Japan, especially China's rise as a major power, present serious challenges for the regional balance of
power and the need for adaptation and adjustments to the power shift and transformation. This dramatic shift in the power balance also leads to worst-case interpretations by
both Beijing and Tokyo of the other's intentions and behavior. Under such circumstances, the old wounds of history are further aggravated by new nationalism, personality,
and changing domestic foreign policy making processes where societal pressures impose significant constraints on conciliatory gestures and "new thinking" on managing
bilateral relations. The report also reviews and evaluates the validity of limited confidence building measures and security dialogue between Beijing and Tokyo and concludes
that their utility is constrained by the overall political relationship between the two countries. At the same time, the report also notes that growing economic interdependence,
the recognition that continued deterioration of relations serves neither side's interests; consequently, the resolve of Chinese and Japanese leaders in the post-Koizumi era to
mend fences and promote common interests at least for now have prevented the free fall in Asia's most important bilateral relationship. Sino-Japanese
relations have important implications for Canada's interests. Canada has long maintained good
relationships with both China and Japan for economic and politico-security reasons. Japan has been a
traditional trading partner of Canada while China's phenomenal growth over the last quarter century has drawn significant interest from Canadian businesses. Ottawa made
significant efforts in promoting its ties with Asian Pacific countries in the 1990s, as well as participated in and introduced multilateral security institution-building. In this
context, the
continuing free fall of the Sino-Japanese relationship could seriously affect Canadian
interests in the region. Canada remains a "stakeholder" in the future developments in Sino-Japanese relations for at least three reasons: China's
rise and its future direction affect both regional peace and stability and the geo-strategic
landscape at the global level. China has become an important trading partner for Canada and
Canadian "soft power" in engaging and encouraging China to adopt a multilateral approach to
regional security and good governance has achieved important results. Ottawa should continue
to play an active role in engaging Beijing to promote a disarmament agenda and encourage
military transparency so that China's emergence could be better integrated into the existing
international norms and frameworks, values a middle power such as Canada holds dear. Japan and Canada share many common values and
interests. Both are members of the G-8 and OECD, and are concerned with emerging non-traditional security challenges, human security, and international peacekeeping.
However, Ottawa and Tokyo have placed different emphasis and have different priorities due to their respective threat perceptions, geography and alliance commitments.
Continued Sino-Japanese rivalry has serious implications for Canadian interests. Prolonged instability and deteriorating security in that region would negatively affect
Canada's interests. Intensified
disputes leading to militarized conflicts between China and Japan could
result in a number of negative developments. There is the potential for an arms race. Japan
strives for greater military capabilities, including nuclear and missile capabilitie s as Tokyo's
confidence in U.S. nuclear umbrella and the alliance protection wanes.
Regional instability leads to extinction
Toon et. Al. 7 Department of Atmosphere and Oceanic Sciences, Laboratory for Atmosphere and Space Physics, University of Colorado, Boulder
(Owen B. Toon, 2 March 2007, “Consequences of Regional-Scale Nuclear Conflicts,” Science Magazine, Vol 315,
http://climate.envsci.rutgers.edu/pdf/SciencePolicyForumNW.pdf)//KP
*Secondary authors include: Alan Robock (Department of Environmental Sciences, Rutgers University), Richard P. Turco (Department of Atmospheric
and Oceanic Sciences, University of California – Los Angeles), Charles Bardeen (Department of Atmosphere and Oceanic Sciences, Laboratory for
Atmosphere and Space Physics, University of Colorado, Boulder), Luke Oman (Department of Environmental Sciences, Rutgers University; and
Department of Earth and Planetary Sciences, Johns Hopkins University), and Georgiy L. Stenchikov (Department of Environmental Sciences, Rutgers
University).
The world may no longer face a serious threat of global nuclear warfare, but regional
conflicts continue. Within this milieu, acquiring
nuclear weapons has been considered a potent political, military, and social tool (1–3). National ownership
of nuclear weapons offers perceived international status and insurance against aggression at a modest financial cost. Against this backdrop, we provide a
quantitative assessment of the potential for casualties in a regional-scale nuclear conflict, or a
terrorist attack, and the associated environmental impacts (4, 5). Eight nations are known to have nuclear weapons. In addition, North
Korea may have a small, but growing, arsenal. Iran appears to be seeking nuclear weapons capability, but it probably needs several years to obtain enough fissionable
material.
Of great concern, 32 other nations—including Brazil, Argentina, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan—have sufficient
fissionable materials to produce weapons (1, 6). A de facto nuclear arms race has emerged in Asia
between China, India, and Pakistan, which could expand to include North Korea, South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan (1). In the Middle East, a
nuclear confrontation between Israel and Iran would be fearful. Saudi Arabia and Egypt could also seek nuclear weapons to balance Iran and Israel. Nuclear arms programs in
South America, notably in Brazil and Argentina, were ended by several treaties in the 1990s (6). We can hope that these agreements will hold and will serve as a model for
other regions, despite Brazil’s new, large uranium enrichment facilities. Nuclear arsenals containing 50 or more weapons of low yield [15 kilotons (kt), equivalent to the
Hiroshima bomb] are relatively easy to build (1, 6). India and Pakistan, the smallest nuclear powers, probably have such arsenals, although no nuclear state has ever disclosed
its inventory of warheads (7). Modern
weapons are compact and lightweight and are readily transported (by car,
basic concepts of weapons design can be found on of the Internet. The
only serious obstacle to constructing a bomb is the limited availability of purified fissionable
fuels. There are many political, economic, and social factors that could trigger a regionalscale
nuclear conflict, plus many scenarios for the conduct of the ensuing war. We assumed (4) that the densest
truck, missile, plane, or boat) (8). The
population centers in each country—usually in megacities—are attacked. We did not evaluate specific military targets and related casualties. We considered a nuclear exchange
involving 100 weapons of 15-kt yield each, that is, ~0.3% of the total number of existing weapons (4). India and Pakistan, for instance, have previously tested nuclear weapons
and are now thought to have between 109 and 172 weapons of unknown yield (9). Fatalities were estimated by means of a standard population database for a number of
countries that might be targeted in a regional conflict (see figure, above). For instance, such an exchange between India and Pakistan (10) could produce about 21 million
fatalities—about half as many as occurred globally during World War II. The
direct effects of thermal radiation and nuclear
blasts, as well as gamma-ray and neutron radiation within the first few minutes of the blast,
would cause most casualties. Extensive damage to infrastructure, contamination by long-lived
radionuclides, and psychological trauma would likely result in the indefinite abandonment of
large areas leading to severe economic and social repercussions. Fires ignited by nuclear bursts
would release copious amounts of light-absorbing smoke into the upper atmosphere. If 100 small
nuclear weapons were detonated within cities, they could generate 1 to 5 million tons of carbonaceous smoke particles (4), darkening the sky and
affecting the atmosphere more than major volcanic eruptions like Mt. Pinatubo (1991) or Tambora (1815) (5).
Carbonaceous smoke particles are transported by winds throughout the atmosphere but also induce circulations in response to solar heating. Simulations (5) predict that such
radiativedynamical interactions would loft and stabilize the smoke aerosol, which would allow it to persist in the middle and upper atmosphere for a decade. Smoke
emissions of 100 lowyield urban explosions in a regional nuclear conflict would generate substantial
globalscale climate anomalies, although not as large as in previous “nuclear winter” scenarios for a full-scale war (11, 12). However, indirect
effects on surface land temperatures, precipitation rates, and growing season lengths (see figure, page
1225) would be likely to degrade agricultural productivity to an extent that historically has led to
famines in Africa, India, and Japan after the 1783–1784 Laki eruption (13) or in the northeastern United States
and Europe after the Tambora eruption of 1815 (5). Climatic anomalies could persist for a decade or more
because of smoke stabilization, far longer than in previous nuclear winter calculations or after
volcanic eruptions. Studies of the consequences of full-scale nuclear war show that indirect effects of the war could cause more casualties than direct ones,
perhaps eliminating the majority of the world’s population (11, 12). Indirect effects such as damage to transportation, energy,
medical, political, and social infrastructure could be limited to the combatant nations in a
regional war. However, climate anomalies would threaten the world outside the combat zone.
The predicted smoke emissions and fatalities per kiloton of explosive yield are roughly 100
times those expected from estimates for full-scale nuclear attacks with high-yield weapons (4).
Unfortunately, the Treaty on NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons has failed to prevent the expansion of nuclear states. A bipartisan group including two former U.S.
secretaries of state, a former secretary of defense, and a former chair of the Senate Armed Services Committee has recently pointed out that nuclear deterrence is no longer
effective and may become dangerous (3). Terrorists, for instance, are outside the bounds of deterrence strategies. Mutually assured destruction may not function in a world
with large numbers of nuclear states with widely varying political goals and philosophies. New nuclear states may not have well-developed safeguards and controls to prevent
nuclear accidents or unauthorized launches. This bipartisan group detailed numerous steps to inhibit or prevent the spread of nuclear weapons (3). Its list, with which we
concur, includes removing nuclear weapons from alert status to reduce the danger of an accidental or unauthorized use of a nuclear weapon; reducing the size of nuclear forces
in all states; eliminating tactical nuclear weapons; ratifying the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty worldwide; securing all stocks of weapons, weaponsusable plutonium, and
highly enriched uranium everywhere in the world; controlling uranium enrichment along with guaranteeing that uranium for nuclear power reactors could be obtained from
controlled international reserves; safeguarding spent fuel from reactors producing electricity; halting the production of fissile material for weapons globally; phasing out the
use of highly enriched uranium in civil commerce and research facilities and rendering the materials safe; and resolving regional confrontations and conflicts that give rise to
new nuclear powers. The analysis summarized here shows that the
world has reached a crossroads. Having survived the threat of global nuclear
world is increasingly threatened by the prospects of regional nuclear
war. The consequences of regional-scale nuclear conflicts are unexpectedly large, with the
potential to become global catastrophes. The combination of nuclear proliferation, political
instability, and urban demographics may constitute one of the greatest dangers to the stability
of society since the dawn of humans.
war between the superpowers so far, the
Conflict Res. Module
Canada soft power is k/t UN cred and conflict prevention
Carment* and Marriott** 2003, *is the Director of the Centre for Security and Defence Studies at Carleton University, where he is Associate Professor
at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, **is a graduate of the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs at Carleton University, (David B. and Koren
“Conflict Prevention in Canada A Survey of Canadian Conflict Prevention Professionals,” September 2003, http://httpserver.carleton.ca/~dcarment/papers/conflictpreventionsurvey1.pdf)
According to IMPACS, “Canada
has the resources and capability to play a lead role in conflict prevention
internationally. It could provide support by delivering training or by building local capacities and developing local assets. Canada should
support initiatives related to media and peacebuilding, dialogues and roundtable sessions,
mediation efforts, etc”. In general, many of the respondents had basically positive things to say about Canada’s role in conflict prevention. Often
this also included ways to increase effectiveness, or to capitalize on what one respondent described as the ‘deferring’ to Canada on certain issues in multilateral fora. Basically,
the responses leave the impression that respondents believe that Canada and Canadians have made a good start and are generally motivated by the right intentions but that
more could be done. Particular suggestions included pushing for inclusion of women’s rights in international
treaties, strengthening of the
UN and its procedures, the championing of international law and the encouragement of other
states to adopt international treaties relating to the safety and security of people around the
globe. The overriding theme that appeared in several of the responses was that Canada should support the work of international and regional organizations. UNICEF
stated that by using soft power, “Canada is in a strong position to champion international laws and
treaties through the UN and other regional and international bodies”. CUSO’s response reflected similar views,
stating; “Canada is respected internationally for being a promoter of peace and human security,
and should continue this role. It should continue to work within multi-lateral frameworks,
including the UN, ensuring rule of law is adhered to in all its conflict prevention and
interventions. Canada should support the reform of the UN in order to make it a more effective
international body capable of effecting positive change in today's world. Canada should be more active in ensuring
that people around the world share equitably in its resources. Canada should promote human rights and democratic development in all its international dealings including in
trade and development.” Theresa Dunn expressed a related opinion, saying she believes Canada
is strategically placed to become a
leader in conflict prevention through its role as peacebuilder and often impartial agent. She went on
to say that because of Canada’s size and commitment to conflict resolution through collaboration “we are
able to move internationally with knowledge and expertise”. These views are fairly representative of a major portion of the
responses received.
Southeast Asia is on the track to collapse---multiple regional and interstate hotspots are
on the brink---effective UN conflict prevention is key
Wainwright 10 - Elsina, Deputy Director for Personnel and a Senior Fellow in the Statebuilding Program at New York University’s Center on International
Cooperation, Adjunct Associate Professor at the Centre for International Security Studies (CISS) at the University of Sydney, Australia. PhD at Oxford University in
International Relations, Conflict Prevention in Southeast Asia and the South Pacific April 2010,
http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/E9F30DCAFE830FC9492577140018C276-Full_Report.pdf)//A-Berg
The Asia Pacific region is in the most broadly peaceful era in its history – it has experienced thirty years without interstate conflict. Extraordinary economic growth has lifted
hundreds of millions out of poverty. Notwithstanding this striking record, however, a
host of long-running, low-level internal
conflicts continue in Southeast Asia, and several South Pacific states have recent experience of instability. Significant tensions
also exist at the inter-state level, which could be amplified by a raft of growing transnational threats such as climate
change and resource scarcity. Dramatic shifts in regional power dynamics are also creating new uncertainty. While
for several decades, U.S military strength and its network of alliances have underpinned stability in the region, the rise of China and India may
signal the end of this period of American predominance. By 2025 China and India will probably both have overtaken the GDP of
all states except the US and Japan;1 by 2030, China’s economy could overtake that of the US.2 The global financial crisis appears to have accelerated China and India’s rise,
and China is on track this year to overtake Japan to become the second largest economy globally.3 The Asia Pacific’s growing economic dominance is accompanied by
increasing diplomatic and strategic clout, and the 2009 US National Intelligence Community Estimate describes the
region as ‘poised to become
the long-term power center of the world.’4 China and India’s emergence is also recasting
Southeast Asia’s geopolitical landscape, as both compete for energy, markets, diplomatic
influence, and naval access. States in the region apprehend this strategic flux and the uncertainty surrounding continued
US strategic primacy. A number, including Australia, Cambodia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam, have increased their defense
spending, amplifying the very strategic uncertainty for which they are preparing.5 Who will take responsibility for conflict prevention and conflict management in this
transitional period? During any power shift, major power competition can complicate or obstruct efforts to tackle conflicts,
even where robust international or regional mechanisms have been established for prevention, peacemaking and peacekeeping. In the Asia Pacific, the
existing conflict management mechanisms are under-developed.6 A review of operational conflict prevention efforts in
the region shows that while international organizations, particularly the UN, and regional organizations perform some conflict prevention roles in Southeast Asia and the
South Pacific, these roles are circumscribed.7 The constraints upon them flow from the high degree of respect for sovereignty prevalent in the Asia Pacific, but they also have
historical, institutional, and political underpinnings. The UN itself faces particular skepticism, including the charge that it and the other Bretton Woods institutions have a
relative disinterest in the region, as well as having governance structures that have yet to accommodate the Asia Pacific’s accelerating economic and geostrategic importance.8
Structural prevention initiatives have been less constrained, with a plethora of actors, including the UN, using statebuilding and development tools to build state resilience,
manage transnational threats, and avert violence.9 A number of multilateral ‘track two’ networks and confidence-building processes also contribute to conflict prevention in
the region. But the
sum of all these efforts is still limited. Given the long-running conflicts and sources
of tension in the Asia Pacific, the limited conflict prevention role played by international and
regional institutions in Southeast Asia and the South Pacific is at first glance surprising. Yet, as this paper argues,
a fair amount of conflict prevention activity has taken place in Southeast Asia and the South Pacific, though less by grand design than in an ad hoc fashion, as opportunities
have arisen. In the absence of a major, formalized role for international and regional organizations, regional crisis management has drawn in a variety of other actors,
including states and NGOs, and seen ad hoc, multi-actor mechanisms assume a particular prominence. A series of case-specific, multi-actor mechanisms have worked well in
the region; their good track record and the ongoing features of the Asia Pacific suggest that they are likely to remain the region’s primary conflict management vehicles. What
role can the
UN and regional organizations play in this context? This paper argues that in spite of their limitations, they can still make
a significant contribution to conflict prevention and management in the Asia Pacific. Their priorities
should be to strengthen existing prevention mechanisms; support other actors on a caseby-case basis; and flexibly add in capabilities to facilitate prevention efforts led by
others. This report concludes with recommendations on how the UN and other actors can develop new tools and networks to underpin a flexible strategy for prevention in the
Asia Pacific. The first recommendation stresses the importance in the Asia Pacific of a focus on cooperation in functional areas, such as civil-military cooperation in a disaster
response context. Such functional cooperation is less constrained by regional sensitivities than full-scale political or security cooperation, and offers the prospect of enabling
future political/security cooperation in the region, by allaying concerns about outside involvement. The analysis within this paper falls into two parts. First, it reviews the
nature of crises in the region – highlighting the complexity and diversity of current and potential conflicts, and noting how growing transnational threats may exacerbate
these. Second, it analyzes existing conflict prevention mechanisms, beginning with the UN and regional organizations, but also considering states, NGOs and financial
institutions as preventive actors. This
paper shows that there are significant resources for conflict prevention
in the Asia Pacific. The challenge is to harness these in a period of growing strategic uncertainty. 1. Regional Crises Since the end of the Cold
War, low-level internal violence has been the prevailing type of conflict in Southeast Asia and the
South Pacific. This has arguably contributed to the fragmented nature of conflict prevention in the
region: case-specific coalitions of actors have emerged to help deal with specific low-level conflicts. In some cases, conflict management
processes have been complicated by tensions arising from poor socio-economic conditions. There is also a risk of inter-state
conflict in the region, while transnational issues such as resource scarcity and climate change may foster instability
and even conflict. a. Internal conflicts, current and potential Internal conflicts persist in the southern part of Thailand,
Mindanao in the Philippines, Papua in Indonesia, and in Myanmar. All involve separatist insurgencies fuelled by enduring
grievances about representation, access to resource-derived revenues, or employment opportunities, and all have ethnic and/or religious dimensions. In Southern Thailand,
violence between the militants and the Thai central government continues, with over 3,400 deaths since the conflict
rekindled five years ago.10 The crisis within the Thai political system has reduced attention to the conflict and slowed peace negotiations. Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva’s
government declared itself open to dialogue with the militants, and formulated fresh guidelines towards the conflict, which focus more on education, justice and development.
However, the central political turmoil has made the government loath to move too far on this issue, lest it be used against them in a domestic political dispute. This has left the
Thai military in charge of the response in the south. On the Philippine island of Mindanao, fighting reignited between the Philippine army and a Moro Islamic Liberation Front
(MILF) rogue command in 2008 after the Philippine Supreme Court declared unconstitutional the Philippine government-MILF draft peace agreement. The court decision
damaged the credibility of moderate MILF members who support negotiation, and burnished the credibility of those that want to fight. Contact between the government and
the MILF has resumed – talks were held in December 2009, notwithstanding the pall cast by the massacre by the private militia of a local warlord in Maguindanao a few weeks
prior. An International Contact Group comprised of Japan, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the NGOs the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HDC), the Asia Foundation,
Conciliation Resources, and Muhammadiyah has been established to assist with the negotiations process.11 The Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), from which the
MILF splintered, is also still an actor in Mindanao’s four-decade, stop-start separatist insurgency. The 1976 Philippine government-MNLF agreement has not been fully
implemented and has yet to resolve that dimension of the conflict. In addition, the Philippines continues to experience a Communist insurgency, particularly in its south: the
Myanmar
remains embroiled in the world’s longestrunning contemporary conflict – over 60 years – with numerous ethnic
groups against the military regime. Myanmar’s junta has concluded ceasefires with over a dozen of these ethnic groups, but these ceasefires are fragile.
Political and development promises made to various groups by the junta have not materialized, and over
New People’s Army (NPA) has been battling government forces for 40 years, and anticipated formal talks, the first in five years, have yet to take place.
the last year the military has launched fresh offensives against some of the groups. With elections scheduled for this year and ethnic groups supposed to play an opposition
role, Myanmar is heading into a period of considerable uncertainty . In the Indonesian province of Papua,12 President
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono has repaired some of the damage wrought by previous efforts to undermine the 2001 special autonomy initiative.13 A number of Free Papua
Movement’s (Organisasi Papua Merdeka’s or OPM’s) political demands have been met, and the President has stated that the over 40-year separatist struggle requires a
political rather than military solution. The focus in the province is also shifting from political issues to development, and there has been an increase in development spending.
However, violence (by the fragmented OPM or its affiliates against the security sector; as well as ethnic Papuans against immigrants; intra-Papuan tensions; and the targeting
of the resources sector, especially Freeport mine) increased in 2009, particularly in the lead up to the legislative elections last April. The military reaction was robust, with
accusations of Indonesian security sector intimidation.14 So while the last few years have seen a more positive political and development trajectory in Papua, the situation
remains volatile. Timor-Leste and the provinces of Aceh in Indonesia and Bougainville in Papua New Guinea are all in the consolidating phase after their respective conflicts.
Timor-Leste in particular has a tumultuous recent history, and around 550 Australian and New Zealand military personnel remain on the ground, at the Timorese
government’s request, to help maintain security. TimorLeste has stabilized politically since the 2006 security crisis and the 2008 assassination attempt on President Jose
Ramos Horta, and the Timorese government has taken more of a leading role over the UN mission – for example, the government has assumed responsibility for policing.
Many serious problems remain, however. These include a young and largely unemployed population (nearly half of whom are under 15); significant land and food pressures;
quasi-militias in the form of martial arts groups; and a highly problematic security sector, which is politicized and rife with internal tensions, and in which the roles of the
police and military are still blurred. Aceh, meanwhile, is enjoying the results of a reasonably successful peace process, with the incorporation of Free Aceh Movement (GAM)
militants into democratic political structures. The disarmament of GAM and decommissioning of its weapons, and relocation of nonorganic military and police contributed to
an upswing in security.15 Occasional violence in Aceh tends now to stem more from elite competition for Aceh’s revenues than from actions against the state. Aceh’s growing
prosperity has helped to reinforce the peace, as has public distaste for the involvement of former GAM militants in illegal activities and intimidation. The winding up of the
post-tsunami funding apparatus has created some uncertainty in Aceh, and a few aspects of the peace agreement, such as a truth and reconciliation commission, have not been
implemented. And while dramatic post-tsunami reconstruction has helped to reinforce the peace in tsunami-affected communities, a number of conflict- but not tsunamiaffected communities have not received a similar level of donor support, and there is a risk that growing disparity in support and poverty levels might undermine the peace
process. Furthermore, the recent discovery of a terrorist training camp in Aceh indicates that such a
fragile post-conflict setting can be
attractive to terrorists and transnational criminal elements.16 Notwithstanding these risks, however, the autonomy
framework is by and large working, and in the July 2009 presidential election, the reelected Indonesian President received a greater percentage of the votes in Aceh – 90% –
than in any other part of Indonesia.17 While the 2001 peace agreement in Bougainville also involved the granting of autonomy, the situation on the ground is not as positive as
in Aceh.18 Nor has Bougainville received a similar amount of attention from the international donor community or its national government, and its interim decentralization
framework and the PNG government-Autonomous Bougainville Government (ABG) relationship are dysfunctional. Bougainville has not seen a significant improvement in
development since the 2005 withdrawal of the UN observer mission,19 and the south of the province has been restive, with little economic activity or government service
provision. The ongoing presence of weapons – with new ones coming in from neighboring Solomon Islands – continues to destabilize the province, particularly its south. The
election of President James Tanis in December 2008 resolved an ABG leadership vacuum, and there are signs that some of these problems might be addressed. But
Bougainville remains fragile as it moves towards its 2012 referendum on possible independence, and ongoing challenges include youth unemployment, and weapons collection
and disposal. Internal conflicts will likely remain the most common type of conflict in the Asia Pacific
region in the medium term. Domestic political imperatives have inhibited resolution of the conflicts in Mindanao and Southern Thailand, for example, and Papua (where
political concessions have been made and the state-periphery relationship is sounder) and Myanmar both experienced an upsurge in violence last year. In addition to postconflict Timor-Leste and Solomon Islands, Southeast
Asia and the South Pacific contain a number of other fragile
states, including Cambodia, Laos and Papua New Guinea, which have weak institutions of governance and jobless young
populations. With limited state resilience, there is a risk such states might experience heightened
social and political instability, even conflict, if faced with a significant shock. b. Inter-state tensions in the Asia
Pacific While internal conflict is the predominant type of conflict in the region, multiple inter-state territorial disputes persist and occasionally
escalate. The starkest recent example is the 2008 Thai-Cambodia border crisis, in which the UNESCO World Heritage listing of the Preah Vihear Temple in Cambodia
rekindled Thai contestation of the temple and its nearby border, and the situation escalated into a military standoff. Cambodia brought the issue to ASEAN and the UN
Security Council, whereas Thailand sought to handle the issue bilaterally. While the two states eventually held bilateral negotiations and tensions lessened, Cambodia has not
formally withdrawn its request for the matter to be on the Security Council agenda, so the issue continues to simmer. Thai-Cambodian relations have been further exacerbated
by the Cambodian Prime Minister’s appointment of ousted former Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra as economic advisor, and Cambodia’s subsequent rejection of
Thailand’s request for Thaksin’s extradition. Other territorial
disputes in the region include the islands and waters of
the South China Sea, which are contested by the Southeast Asian states of Brunei, Malaysia, the
Philippines, and Vietnam, as well as by China and Taiwan; the energy-rich Gulf of Thailand, contested
by Thailand and Vietnam; and the Ambalat maritime area, over which ongoing Indonesian-Malaysian tensions heightened last
year, with Indonesia accusing Malaysia of a naval incursion into its waters.20 In North Asia, territorial disputes persist (such as those between
China-Japan and Japan-South Korea), and traditional regional flashpoints include Taiwan and
North Korea. With enduring territorial disputes and a shifting geostrategic landscape
dominated by China and to a lesser extent India’s rise, Asia’s continuing peaceful trajectory is by no
means guaranteed.21 Discontinuities are always possible, and potential threats to stability are many. At the great power level,
China-Japan relations are still fraught, though they have improved from their low point of several years ago; and the US-China relationship, as US President Obama recently
declared, will ‘shape the 21st Century.’22 For several decades Asia-Pacific stability has been premised on US strategic primacy, and the US has managed the region with a
traditional hub-andspokes alliance model. But China, if its rise continues, will at some point challenge this US primacy, while India’s rise is complicating the regional picture
further. c. Transnational security challenges Southeast
Asia and the South Pacific also face a host of pressing
transnational challenges including food, water and energy scarcity; climate change; lingering
effects of the global financial crisis; terrorism; transnational crime; and pandemics. A number of
these challenges are interconnected and can exacerbate each other.23 The 2008 food crisis hit
Southeast Asia hard, with protests over soybean scarcity in Indonesia and government crackdowns on those hoarding rice in the Philippines.24 Potable water
availability and transboundary water management are growing problems throughout the region. Along the Mekong river basin, for example, Thailand, Laos,
Cambodia, Vietnam and Myanmar are downstream of Chinese dam projects which will control the
river’s flow and have a potentially dramatic effect on those countries’ fresh water and food supplies. Southeast Asia
and the South Pacific will be among the regions most affected by climate change and the attendant increase in the number and strength of natural disasters. The
Asia Pacific broadly defined is the most natural disaster-prone region – in the last ten years, the region has experienced more than half of the world’s disasters.25 Urbanization
and high-density living in Southeast Asia make its population highly vulnerable to such events. Flooding is expected to increase in coastal areas, particularly affecting the lowlying megadelta regions in Southeast Asia and coastal Pacific island villages.26 Rising temperatures and rising sea levels will increase the risk of illnesses such as malaria, and
likely force
mass people movements throughout the region.27 Some of Indonesia’s smaller islands and whole Pacific Island states
South Pacific as an existential threat.28 The effects of climate change
are already being felt by the archipelagic states of Southeast Asia and the low-lying atolls of the South Pacific. Storms are intensifying in the
South China Sea, and their patterns are altering: cyclones which once passed over the Philippines on their way to Vietnam are now bouncing back to batter the
will probably be subsumed. Climate change is therefore regarded in the
Philippines a second time, in effect doubling its number of storm events. Rising sea levels are starting to submerge Pacific Island atolls such as Tuvalu and the Carteret Islands
within PNG, coastal villages in the South Pacific are emptying as waters rise (the evacuation of Carteret Islanders has already begun), and states such as Kiribati are making
plans to relocate its population. Food,
water and energy scarcity are all linked challenges, and climate change will
serve as a ‘major threat multiplier’.29 Climate change is already exacerbating existing water problems such as the
salination of the Mekong Delta; salt water is contaminating acquifers across the region, compromising drinking water.30 Experts predict that climate change will also cause
food shortages in the region due to lower crop yields and declining fish populations. The risk of significant political and social instability in the region from the global financial
crisis has diminished as the recovery has proceeded. In fact Asia, in particular China, India and Indonesia, has experienced the world’s most pronounced economic recovery,
and has driven a significant amount of broader global growth.31 However, the
financial crisis amplified the stresses on a number of other
regional states – including Cambodia, Thailand, Malaysia and Timor-Leste, which all experienced a rise in the numbers of people in poverty32 – and increased the
possibility of instability within those states. Southeast Asia also faces an ongoing threat from Islamic
terrorist groups with links to Al-Qaeda. The threat from Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) has diminished, due in large measure to regional law enforcement cooperation
and Indonesia’s policing and deradicalization efforts. JI retains some capability, however, as the hotel bombings in Jakarta last July demonstrated, and the recent discovery of
an Acehbased terrorist training camp – seemingly a new grouping which includes disaffected former members of JI and other groups – indicates the durability of the terrorist
threat.33 The militant group Abu Sayaff also remains active in southern Philippines, and the Philippine military has launched further operations against it.
Transnational crime, including drug production and trafficking, sex trafficking, money
laundering and identity fraud, is also a serious problem in the region, particularly emanating from states with weak
security infrastructure and control over their territory. Laos, for example, has porous borders with its five neighbors, and over recent years, there has been a significant
increase in opium poppy cultivation and opium production and trafficking. Cambodia is susceptible to money laundering as well as drug trafficking. Large-scale quantities of
heroin and metamphetamines are produced in territory controlled by the Wa ethnic group within Myanmar, and then trafficked throughout the region and beyond.
Piracy had long plagued the Malacca Straits, one of the world’s most heavily used and strategic
waterways, through which the vast majority of sea-borne energy passes from the Middle East to
the Asia Pacific. The number of attacks has decreased markedly over the last few years, however, as a result of a concerted regional effort that will be discussed
later in this paper. Finally, human proximity to birds and livestock in Asia make it the world’s greatest reservoir of viruses transmissible to humans. As SARS and the Avian flu
virus showed, Asia
is a likely source of future pandemics which have the potential to overwhelm the
health systems of fragile states. All of these transnational threats have significant implications for
regional security and could exacerbate the region’s ongoing conflicts. Natural disasters occurring in
Mindanao, Southern Thailand, and Bougainville, for instance, can contribute to instability and worsen the plight of those affected by conflict. Recent
flooding in Mindanao has displaced thousands of people already displaced by the conflict there, increasing upheaval and the risk of disease.34 Climate change is now expected
to have major geostrategic implications, such as the destabilization of state governments, the fuelling of terrorism, and the mass movement of refugees and internally displaced
persons.35 The US Department of Defense is factoring climate change into US national security strategy.36 US defense planners are concerned that the humanitarian and
relief operations required after climate change-associated events will pose a significant burden on the US military, including its transportation and support assets, and
consequently affect its combat readiness posture.37 Transnational threats are also likely to be among the drivers of future instability and possibly internal conflict. A
major shock to a fragile state’s system, for example from a severe pandemic or water shortage, could significantly weaken
governments and their institutions, and overwhelm a fragile state’s already-reduced capacity to
function. Growing food, water and energy scarcity could likewise cause an internal crisis if sub-state groups come into
competition over access. And threats such as water and energy scarcity have the potential to inflame interstate
tensions. The continuing drive for energy security, for instance, is intensifying competition between India and China within Myanmar, and could cause conflict between
states contesting energy-rich territory such as the South China Sea. The above analysis suggests that, while the main challenge in the Asia Pacific in the near to medium term is
likely to remain low-level internal conflicts, there is also a risk of rising inter-state tensions and even inter-state conflicts. The region’s many
transnational challenges could also generate or exacerbate instability. But these transnational challenges – for example, piracy, resource scarcity and climate change – are also
opening up new opportunities for functional cooperation between both Asia Pacific and outside actors.
South Asia tension causes nuclear war - low-intensity conflict, terrorism, cross-border
spillover
Khan 09 – Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Affairs (ACDA), Strategic Plans Division, Joint Services Headquarters, Rawalpindi, Pakistan, fellow at Wilson
Center (Feroz Hassan, Reducing the Risk of Nuclear War in South Asia, December 2009, http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=cab359a39328-19cc-a1d2-8023e646b22c&lng=en&id=112786)//A-Berg
The new international environment has altered the concept of national security. Threats
to international peace and security now
emanate not from strategic confrontation between the major powers, but from regional conflicts and tensions and the spread
of violent extremism by nonstate actors, threatening nation-states from within and
transcending state boundaries and international security. In recent years, the levels of security enjoyed by various states have
become increasingly asymmetric—some enjoy absolute security, others none at all. This environment of security imbalance has
forced weaker states to adopt a repertoire of strategies for survival and national security that
includes alliances and strategic partnerships, supporting low-intensity conflicts, and engaging in
limited wars and nuclear deterrence . South Asia has witnessed increased regional tensions , a rise in
r eligious extremism , a growing arms race, crisis stand-offs, and even armed conflict in recent years.
Nuclear tests did not bring an era of genuine stability between India and Pakistan, though military crises in the region did not escalate
into full-fledged wars, underscoring the need for greater imagination to rein in the risks due to the fragility of relations between two nuclear neighbors in
an increasingly complex set of circumstances. Pakistan’s primary and immediate threat now is from within. Its western borderlands are rapidly
converting into a battleground where ungoverned tribal space in proximity to the porous and disputed border is degenerating into
insurgency both to its east into Pakistan as well as to its west into Afghanistan . The al Qaeda threat has now
metastasized into a spreading insurgency in the tribal borderlands, which is taking a heavy toll on both Pakistan and Western forces in Afghanistan. The newly elected
government in Pakistan has hit the ground running; but still mired in domestic politics, it has been unable to focus on the al Qaeda and Taliban threat that is rapidly
expanding its influence and targeting strategy. The
most tragic aspect of this conundrum is the success of al Qaeda in
creating cracks of misunderstanding between Pakistan and the Western allies, while
exacerbating tensions and mistrust between Pakistan’s traditional adversaries, India and
Afghanistan.1 For example, Pakistan’s security nightmare which perceives India-Afghanistan collusion in squeezing Pakistan is exacerbated, while the Indian and
Afghan security establishments perceive Pakistani Intelligence malfeasance as perpetuating the Afghan imbroglio. Worse, the outcome of this confusion and blame generates
real advantage for al Qaeda and the Taliban. Any terrorist act that pits Kabul, New Delhi, and Islamabad against each other and intensifies existing tensions and crises also
throws Washington off balance, allowing al Qaeda and its sympathizers the time and space to recoup, reorganize, and reequip, and continue to survive. The only silver lining in
this unhealthy regional security picture is the slowly improving relationship between India and Pakistan, which has developed over the past 4 years. Though
relations
are tense and still fragile , there is a glimmer of hope in this overall crisis-ridden region. The dialogue process between India and Pakistan has been somewhat
resilient in the face of significant setbacks and changing domestic, political, and international landscapes within each. It is very improbable that a nuclear war between
Pakistan and India would spontaneously occur. The history of the region and strategic nuclear weapons theories suggest that a
nuclear exchange between
India and Pakistan would result from an uninhibited escalation of a conventional war vice a spontaneous
unleashing of nuclear arsenals. However, this region seems to be the one place in the world most likely to suffer
nuclear warfare due to the seemingly undiminished national, religious, and ethnic animosities
between these
lack of transparency in nuclear programs leaves room to doubt the security
surrounding each country’s nuclear arsenal and the safeguards preventing accidental launches.
Therefore, discussions aimed at mitigating a catastrophic nuclear war in South Asia should focus mostly on the unilateral and bilateral anti-escalation
measures Pakistan and India can take regarding existing issues. Additionally, each country’s perception of its security is interwoven with the
political, diplomatic, and strategic movements of the external powers that wield significant
influence in the region. Coherent and consistent behavior that discourages conventional and nuclear escalation, although sometimes
imperceptibly, is needed from the United States, China, and Russia. Without this, both Pakistan and India are unlikely to feel confident
enough to reduce the aggressive posturing of their conventional forces over existing crossborder issues, leaving the escalation from conventional warfare to nuclear warfare a very real possibility.
two countries. Furthermore,
sino-japan War ext.
Military conflict will occur by the end of the year and will escalate to great power war
White 12 professor of strategic studies at Australian’s National University, visiting fellow at the Lowy Institute (Hugh White, 26 December 2012,
“Caught in a bind that threatens an Asian war nobody wants,” The Sydney Morning Herald, http://www.smh.com.au/opinion/politics/caught-in-a-bindthat-threatens-an-asian-war-nobody-wants-20121225-2bv38.html#ixzz2GAKA8VUy)//KP
This is how wars usually start: with a steadily escalating stand-off over something intrinsically
worthless. So don't be too surprised if the US and Japan go to war with China next year over the
uninhabited rocks that Japan calls the Senkakus and China calls the Diaoyu islands. And don't assume the war would be
contained and short. Of course we should all hope that common sense prevails. It seems almost laughably unthinkable that the world's three
richest countries - two of them nuclear-armed - would go to war over something so trivial. But that is to confuse what starts a war with what causes it.
The Greek historian Thucydides first explained the difference almost 2500 years ago. He wrote that the catastrophic Peloponnesian War started from a
spat between Athens and one of Sparta's allies over a relatively insignificant dispute. But what caused the war was something much graver: the growing
wealth and power of Athens, and the fear this caused in Sparta. The analogy with Asia today is uncomfortably close and not at all reassuring. No one in
431BC really wanted a war, but when Athens threatened one of Sparta's allies over a disputed colony, the Spartans felt they had to intervene. They feared
that to step back in the face of Athens' growing power would fatally compromise Sparta's position in the Greek world, and concede supremacy to Athens.
The Senkakus issue is likewise a symptom of tensions whose cause lies elsewhere, in China's
growing challenge to America's long-standing leadership in Asia, and America's response. In the
past few years China has become both markedly stronger and notably more assertive . America has countered
with the strategic pivot to Asia. Now, China is pushing back against President Barack Obama's pivot by targeting
Japan in the Senkakus. The Japanese themselves genuinely fear that China will become even more overbearing as its strength grows, and
they depend on America to protect them. But they also worry whether they can rely on Washington as China becomes more formidable. China's
ratcheting pressure over the Senkakus strikes at both these anxieties. The push and shove over the islands has been escalating for months. Just before
Japan's recent election, China flew surveillance aircraft over the islands for the first time, and since the election both sides have reiterated their tough
talk. Where will it end? The risk is that, without a clear circuit-breaker, the escalation will continue until at
some point shots are exchanged, and a spiral to war begins that no one can stop. Neither side
could win such a war, and it would be devastating not just for them but for the rest of us. No one
wants this, but the crisis will not stop by itself. One side or other, or both, will have to take positive steps to break the cycle of action
and reaction. This will be difficult, because any concession by either side would so easily be seen as a backdown,
with huge domestic political costs and international implications. It would therefore need real
political strength and skill, which is in short supply all round - especially in Tokyo and Beijing, which both have new and untested
leaders. And each side apparently hopes that they will not have to face this test, because they expect the other side will back
down first. Beijing apparently believes that if it keeps pushing, Washington will persuade Tokyo to make concessions over the disputed islands in
order to avoid being dragged into a war with China, which would be a big win for them. Tokyo on the other hand fervently hopes that, faced with firm US
support for Japan, China will have no choice but to back down. And in Washington, too, most people seem to think China will back off. They argue that
China needs America more than America needs China, and that Beijing will back down rather than risk a break with the US which would devastate
China's economy. Unfortunately, the Chinese seem to see things differently. They believe America will not risk a break
with China because America's economy would suffer so much. These mutual misconceptions
carry the seeds of a terrible miscalculation, as each side underestimates how much is at stake
for the other. For Japan, bowing to Chinese pressure would feel like acknowledging China's right to push them around, and accepting that
America can't help them. For Washington, not supporting Tokyo would not only fatally damage the alliance with Japan, it would amount to an
acknowledgment America is no longer Asia's leading power, and that the ''pivot'' is just posturing. And for Beijing, a backdown would mean that instead
of proving its growing power, its foray into the Senkakus would simply have demonstrated America's continued primacy. So for all of them, the
largest issues of power and status are at stake. These are exactly the kind of issues that great
powers have often gone to war over.
It goes nuclear --- tensions escalate.
Anokhin 09 – Pravda.Ru columnist, (Vladimir, “Nuclear war to break out in South Asia,” 12.05.2009 http://english.pravda.ru/world/asia/12-05-2009/107537nuclear_war-0/)//A-Berg
The danger of a nuclear war in the world will remain even if Russia and the United States agree to reduce their strategic offensive arms.
Asia’s nuclear powers - India and Pakistan – do not intend to follow the example of the two superpowers.
The ongoing standoff in South Asia may lead to catastrophic consequences for the whole world.
The conflict between India and Pakistan lasts for over 60 years already. Their confrontation became especially dangerous after 1998, when both India and Pakistan conducted
a series of nuclear tests and showed the world their ability to build nuclear weapons. India has never concealed an intention to possess nuclear weapons. The nuclear doctrine
was approved in the nation in 2001. It is worthy of note that India never signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The Indian government believes that it has a full right to
possess nuclear arms just like Russia, the USA, China, France and Great Britain. In accordance with the nuclear doctrine, India ’s nuclear arsenal will have the air, the ground
and the sea constituents. The country’s Air Force already has nuclear-capable Mirage-2000, MiG-27 and Jaguar aircraft. It also has ground-based ballistic missiles. India does
not have nuclear submarines yet, but it may become a reality very soon. Pakistan
is India’s primary potential enemy. China can
also be a threat to one of Asia’s largest nations. The Indian nuclear program of the 1960s was a response to its own defeat, which the
nation suffered as a result of the border war with China in 1962. Several dozens of nuclear warheads will be enough for India to contain Pakistan.
Even if Pakistan launches a massive attack against India’s vast territory, it will be impossible to destroy most of the Indian strategic nuclear arms. Quite on the contrary:
India’s nuclear retaliation with the use of 15-20 nukes will cause much bigger damage to Pakistan, which is a lot smaller in size. India
has 115 nukes
at the moment. About 80 warheads will be enough to destroy Pakistan entirely. However, India
will not be able to attack China afterwards. The latter has 410 nuclear warheads. Therefore,
India will most likely try to enlarge its nuclear potential. Unlike India, Pakistan does not have its nuclear doctrine officially
documented. There is not enough information about the details and the structure of the nuclear forces of this country either. Official spokesmen for the Pakistani authorities
say that the development of the nation’s nuclear forces will fully depend on the actions of the Indian government. Pakistan possesses nuclear arms as a nuclear deterrent
against a possible attack from India. In addition, Pakistan aims to reduce India’s predominance in other arms. Pakistan has all chances to build 40-45 nuclear warheads. The
country has ballistic missiles too A
nuclear blow in South Asia can result in a global catastrophe. The
population of India and Pakistan totals over one billion people. The two countries do not have
any means of protection against a nuclear attack. Even a minor nuclear explosion will kill
millions of people and trigger a humanitarian catastrophe.
Disputes ensure nuclear escalation
Weitz, 10 - director of the Center for Political-Military Analysis and a Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute, (Richard, “South Asia’s Nuclear War Risk,” July 12, 2010,
http://thediplomat.com/2010/07/12/south-asia%E2%80%99s-nuclear-war-risk/?all=true
But there’s more to the Chasma reactor dispute than the question of equity between India and Pakistan—the deal goes to the heart of concerns
over civilian
nuclear cooperation and proliferation in Asia. Chinese assertions of the need to maintain a
nuclear balance between Pakistan and India reflect the interconnected nature of these three
countries’ nuclear programmes. After the Sino-Soviet split of the late 1950s, the Chinese Communists redoubled their efforts to acquire nuclear
weapons to counter the USSR’s superiority in nuclear and conventional force. China’s successful development of an atomic bomb in 1964 in turn persuaded Indian leaders to
pursue nuclear weapons. After India detonated a non-deliverable fission device in May 1974 at its Pokhran testing site, China increased its sharing of nuclear material and
technology with Pakistan, allowing Islamabad to respond quickly when India finally detonated several deliverable nuclear warheads in May 1998. Indian policymakers cited
China’s actions, including its growing nuclear weapons capacity and Beijing’s transfer of nuclear weapons and ballistic missile technologies to Pakistan, as the reasons for their
tests (and in the process implied that New Delhi was seeking the capacity to target China with nuclear weapons). But what’s perhaps the most fundamental point about the
dispute with Pakistan is that it could so easily apply to many other Asian countries that might plausibly seek nuclear weapons—after
all, its successful acquisition of an expanding nuclear force encourages other governments to believe they too could acquire a nuclear arsenal and overcome the resulting
international opprobrium. That’s not all. Nuclear
proliferation anywhere increases the risk that a non-rational
actor, whether a leader of a state or a terrorist group, will acquire nuclear weapons. Everything being
equal, the risk of nuclear accidents or nuclear weapons diversion to non-state actors rises with the increase in the number of nuclear weapons states. Both these considerations
also apply to India, North Korea, Iran and other potential new nuclear weapons states. In addition, Pakistan’s sometimes acute political instability raises the risk of regime
collapse followed by the transfer of Pakistani nuclear weapons to a less moderate government, domestic extremists, or foreign countries or non-state actors such as an
international terrorist group or transnational criminal organization. The larger Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, the more difficult it becomes for Islamabad to secure all its weapons
adequately. But it wouldn’t even take regime collapse for extremists to possibly gain control of a Pakistani nuclear weapon. In its 2008 report, the Commission on the
Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism describes Pakistan as ‘the geographic crossroads for terrorism and weapons of mass destruction’ given the presence of so
many Islamist extremists, with suspected sympathizers in the government and armed forces, in a country with a rapidly growing arsenal of nuclear weapons. Yet even setting
aside the question of nuclear weapons falling into terrorist hands, nuclear competition between India and Pakistan is especially dangerous. Active
(and
ongoing) political disputes between the two countries have resulted in three past wars as well
as numerous proxy conflicts. Pakistani leaders in particular have concluded that their nuclear arsenal has deterred India from again using its
conventional forces to attack Pakistani territory. As a result, Pakistan’s implicit nuclear doctrine presumes the possible first use of nuclear weapons. The risks of such tensions
are compounded by the physical proximity of the two countries, as well as their reliance on ballistic missiles as delivery vehicles, which means that early warning times might
be as little as five to ten minutes. Although it remains unclear whether India or Pakistan have combined its nuclear warheads with their assigned delivery systems, such a
precarious stance would increase the risks of both accidental and catalytic war (a nuclear
conflict between both governments precipitated by a third party, such as a terrorist group ).
Throw China into the mix, with Pakistan at risk of viewing its own nuclear programme as
increasingly inadequate as India seeks to achieve mutual deterrence with China, and the
picture becomes more complicated. And add in the risk of widespread political disorder in
either India or Pakistan, which could see a dangerous political adventurism as political leaders look to rally
domestic support, and the peculiar challenges posed by the region become clearer. The fact is South Asia is particularly prone to a destabilizing
arms race. And
perhaps
nuclear war.
Nuclear war
Tatlow 12 - International Herald Tribune- (Didi K., Rising Tension — and Stakes — in Japan-China Island Dispute, September 14, 2012,
http://rendezvous.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/09/14/rising-tension-and-stakes-in-japan-china-island-dispute/)//A-Berg
BEIJING — It has all the ingredients of a future tragedy, peppered with grim farce. A collapsing Japanese ambassador. A noodle soup attack. A
nuclear war threat. Music concerts canceled along with tens of thousands of private vacations and major friendship celebrations. An 81-yearold national trauma revived. And underneath all that, the shopping continues. Welcome to Chinese-Japanese relations in 2012.
In China, the state-run media were so angry on Friday over the Japanese government’s purchase earlier in the week of some of the Diaoyu islands, which
the two nations both claim — Japan calls them the Senkakus — that the word “purchase” appears only in quotation marks in stories, as if it didn’t
happen. (It did.) Early on Friday morning, six Chinese navy surveillance vessels arrived at the newly nationalized islands, bought from a Japanese family,
prompting a protest from the Japanese government. So far so normal, perhaps, in this long running, acrimonious dispute between
these love-hate neighbors over a clutch of small, craggy islands in the East China Sea (for background on the issue, see this post by my colleague
Mark McDonald.) Yet this round of fury in China may prove worse than previous ones. This week, in a startling, apparently onetime call, the state-run Beijing Evening News suggested China should use nuclear weapons in the dispute, claiming it would
be “simpler.” “Just skip to the main course and drop an atomic bomb. Simpler,” the newspaper posted on its Weibo account, provoking both critical and
supportive responses from readers. Continuing the – perhaps unusual – food and war metaphor, early on Friday, a user writing in Chinese under the
name izhangzhe mocked the newspaper: “Did you explode the bomb? Did it taste good?” Other Chinese commentators pointed out that it was one thing
for angry netizens to make extreme calls, but quite another for an official newspaper to do so(this link is in Chinese). The People’s Daily on Friday carried
a furiously worded article demanding that Japan “return to reason,” with the headline on its online news page blaring (in Chinese): “Is Japan prepared
for the consequences of its odious acts?” In Tokyo, the new Japanese ambassador to Beijing, Shinichi Nishimiya, appointed just two days before,
collapsed on the street near his home and was taken to hospital unconscious, Japanese media reported. He has since recovered somewhat but Japan will
choose a new ambassador, China News Service said. His predecessor was recalled after a Japanese national flag was plucked off the ambassadorial car on
a Beijing highway recently, apparently by Chinese nationalist hotheads. On Thursday in Shanghai, a bowl of hot noodle soup was thrown in the face of a
Japanese, the Kyodo news agency reported, in a first recorded attack on a Japanese person since the islands dispute flared after Japan purchased three
islands on Tuesday from the family that owned them, for about $26 million. Photographs circulating online purport to show a burning Japanese-made
car in Shanghai, apparently set on fire by its owner, with anti-Japanese banners in the background. Relations are almost certain to
worsen. Next Tuesday is the anniversary of the 1931 Mukden Incident, the trigger for the Japanese seizure of Manchuria in northeast China, and for
many Chinese the beginning of 14 years of vicious subjugation by Japan that ended only when the United States dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima
and Nagasaki, leading to a Japanese surrender in World War II. “9.18,” as it’s known by its dates, is on people’s minds here. Marching in Tokyo
yesterday, Chinese men held a handwritten cardboard sign proclaiming: “New scores and old scores will be settled together,” in this photograph on the
People’s Daily Web site. Celebrities are getting in on the act, with the Chinese actress Li Bingbing canceling a trip to Japan, The Beijing News reported.
Friendship events planned for the end of the month to mark the 40th anniversary of the resumption of Chinese-Japanese ties are falling like ninepins. A
report in the Asahi Shimbun outlined many other cancellations. Hong Kong’s South China Morning Post presented a dark picture of the situation,
writing: “Ten Chinese generals issued a joint statement yesterday warning that the People’s
Liberation Army is ‘ready to take Japan on’,” and citing an editor of a Communist Party-run magazine, the Central Party
School’s Study Times, Deng Yuwen, that there was a chance of armed clashes after the party’s 18th congress, which will probably be held next month. The
government is believed to want a peaceful meeting at all costs, since it is when an heir to the party general-secretary, President Hu Jintao, will be
announced. While all this is very disquieting in this region, what does it mean to the world? Nuclear war talk makes everyone
nervous. And then there’s the importance of global trade and a weak global economy. In a new twist, China’s deputy minister of commerce, Jiang
Zengwei, said on Thursday that economic and trade ties could be affected by the dispute, Reuters reported.
at: no war
Lack of communication means accidental war and escalation is probable
Wittmeyer 3/19/13 Assistant Editor at Foreign Policy Magazine (Alicia P.Q. Wittmeyer, 19 March 2013, “Why Japan and China could accidentally end
up at war,” Foreign Policy, http://blog.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/03/19/china_japan_accidental_war_islands)//KP
Great. At a time when Chinese authorities seem to be making efforts to dial down tensions with Japan over disputed islands, could a war
between East Asian superpowers be sparked by accident -- by some frigate commander gone rogue? That
nuclear war could come about in just such a scenario was, of course, a major concern during the
Cold War. But decades of tension, as well as apocalyptic visions of global annihilation as a result
of the U.S. and U.S.S.R. locking horns, produced carefully designed systems to minimize the damage
any one rogue actor could inflict (only the president can access the nuclear codes), and to minimize misunderstandings from more
minor incidents (the Kremlin-White House hotline). But East Asia -- relatively free of military buildup until recently -- doesn't have
these same systems in place. A soon-to-be-released report from the International Institute for Strategic
Studies highlights the danger that emerges when a region's military systems develop faster than
its communication mechanisms, and finds that accidental war in East Asia is a real possibility:
Across East Asia, advanced military systems such as anti-ship missiles, new submarines, advanced
combat aircraft are proliferating in a region lacking security mechanisms that could defuse
crises. Bilateral military-to-military ties are often only embryonic. There is a tangible risk of accidental conflict and
escalation, particularly in the absence of a strong tradition of military confidence-building measures."
at: no escalation
Any conflict in the region escalates
Sutton 4/3/13 Ph.D., visiting fellow at the World Trade Organization Research Center, former assistant professor of International Relations
(Michael Sutton, 3 April 2013, “War with China is not inevitable, so tread carefully,” The Japan Times,
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2013/04/03/commentary/war-with-china-is-not-inevitable-so-tread-carefully/#.UdSgl_m1Fsk)
There are dangers for the United States and Japan in underestimating or confronting China. The
Abe government’s interest in changing the postwar Japanese Constitution threatens relations not only with China but also with the U.S. Despite the
optimists, military conflict in the region would be uncontainable. Any form of confrontation
involving China would likely spiral out of control and engulf the entire region, if not the world.
Since the Liberal Democratic Party was last in power, the world has profoundly changed. The first noticeable change is that the U.S. is in serious, perhaps
irretrievable trouble. Much has been said about how the Chinese giant awoke and arose, but much less has been said about what happens when the U.S.
giant stumbles and falls. The decline of the U.S. has sent shock waves around the world, and even America’s enemies shudder. The cumulative
effects of poor financial decisions, social fragmentation, national debt and overseas conflict
have taken their toll, injecting a profound and deleterious sense of uncertainty. The second
noticeable change is the immaturity of Chinese ambition. China has risen during a time of
peace. U.S.-sanctioned free trade underpinned this success. Instead, Beijing talks of islands, oceans, and territories in
terms of rights to ownership. This reflects an immature China that coexists alongside a
confident, global-oriented China. Politically, Chinese leadership is dysfunctional. China has
effectively dominated the global economy, but it seems obsessed with a few islands of minimal
value in the East and South China Seas. Both the uncertain path ahead for the U.S. and the immature ambitions of China threaten
the future of Japan. Changing the Constitution would inject further uncertainty into an already tense region.
Mexican Economy Scenario
1NC
Hurts Mexican economy
Aziz 7 (Nikhil Aziz, Nikhil Aziz has been Executive Director of Grassroots International since 2005. Before
joining Grassroots, Nikhil was Associate Director at Political Research Associates, where he led a team that
studied the conservative movement and the political right in the United States, “NAFTA is Killing Tradition of
Corn in Mexico,” 9 November 2007, http://www.grassrootsonline.org/news/articles/nafta-killing-traditioncorn-mexico)
The urgent nature of this campaign is clear as we near January 1, 2008, when the last remaining protections
that Mexican peasants and indigenous peoples have preventing the flooding of their country with subsidized
U.S. corn and beans, the two staples of the Mexican diet, will be erased. And so, on November 18, 2007 they
will undertake a national mobilization to call attention to this looming disaster. ¶ When the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was signed by the United States, Canada and Mexico in 1994 over the
widespread opposition of Mexico’s rural poor and indigenous peoples, some time-limited tariff protections
were put in place to prevent U.S. exports of these two foods from deluging Mexico and causing economic
upheaval. The immediate and long term impact of such a deluge might well be much larger than the recent
floods caused by Hurricane Noel in Tabasco and Chiapas states.¶ Since the implementation of NAFTA, and
even with these limited protections, millions of Mexicans, particularly from rural communities, have been hard
hit. More than 2 million rural people have been displaced from the countryside and forced to emigrate to cities
or to the North in search of a means for survival—an endless supply of cheap labor for maquiladoras on the
border or low wage jobs in the United States.¶ The stage for this massive social and economic upheaval was set
even before NAFTA when in 1982 the Mexican government began putting in place a neoliberal economic
program that aimed at the privatization and deregulation of agriculture and food systems, closely tying it to
similar moves in industry. In 1992, the Salinas government pushed through a constitutional amendment
privatizing the traditional Mexican ejido and indigenous communal landholdings—land rights that were won
after enormous peasant and indigenous struggles and sacrifices culminating in the 1910 Mexican revolution.
Mexican growth is key to the US economy.
Marczak 4/18 - director of policy at Americas Society and Council of the Americas, senior editor of the AS/COA policy journal, Americas Quarterly,
and managing editor of AQ Online (Jason, “Immigration Reform get U.S. in on Mexico’s Boom”, 4/18/13; <
http://www.cnn.com/2013/04/18/opinion/marczak-immigration-the-new-mexico>)//Beddow
As Congress crafts comprehensive immigration legislation, Democrats and Republicans must keep in mind that Mexico is changing rapidly,
and policies crafted to reflect yesterday's Mexico will not help the U.S. make the most of the potential of today's and tomorrow's Mexico. Mexico's
future is bright, and tapping into this growth and economic prosperity is vital to U.S.
competitiveness. But the U.S. needs immigration reform to build on its huge bilateral trade with Mexico -- more than $1 billion in goods and
services each day, or $45 million an hour. Mexico's President Enrique Peña Nieto has achieved in less than five months in office what eluded previous
administrations for six years. In the second half of 2013, he hopes to add energy to the improvements in education and telecommunications that are
sailing through under the umbrella of the Pact for Mexico political agreement.
Economic decline breaks down cooperation and leads to war – heg decline, falling
trade, rising protectionism, and diversionary tactics.
Royal 10 – Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction Policy, US-Department of Defense, policy advisor
(Jedidiah, “Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal, and Political Perspectives”, pg. 212-214;
Print.)//Beddow
The counterargument to contagion is the ‘risk-sharing’ argument. It suggests that while trade and financial linkages may spread a
crisis, this creates a cushioning effect that, overall, minimizes the effects on any individual state. In other
words, interdependence creates shock-absorbing linkages that soften a state’s vulnerability to dramatic
economic downturns (see, e.g., Kelemli-Ozcan, Sorensen, & Yosha, 2003). Gallegati, Greenwald, Richiardi, and Stiglitz (2008) have made a
convincing observation that would appear to clarify this debate. They have provided statistical modeling indicating that risk-sharing
and contagion are in fact two sides of the same coin. When economic times are good, inter-linkages provide
mechanisms for the diffusion of individual agents that face a liquidity crisis. A leader can request a creditor defer payment,
whereas a creditor can then transfer this cost on to other agents. As such the system would absorb the crisis. When liquidity is relatively
more scarce during down times, a sufficiently large negative shock will use those very same inter-linkages to
transmit that shock to other agents in the system. As a result, ‘risk sharing is beneficial only when the overall
economic environment is favourable, while in harsh times it might be better to stay alone… [linkage during
market downturns] becomes socially detrimental; not only is it that the expected number of defaults is higher when the economic
agents are connected, but defaults become a systemic failure’ (Gallegati et al., 2008. Pp.5. 16). Kose, Prasad, and Terrones (2009) considered the same
question and found only mild support for risk-sharing and only among developed, industrial economies. They found no evidence that developing, nonindustrial countries are able to share risk. The authors break relatively new ground in suggesting why this is the case for non-industrial states: One
possibility is that these countries rely more on less stable capital such as bank loans and other forms of debt that may not allow for efficient risk sharing.
Indeed, we break up stocks of external assets and liabilities into different categories – FDI, portfolio equity, portfolio debt, etc. – we find that the
underlying composition of capital flows influences the ability of developing countries to share risk. In particular, external debt appears to hinder the
ability of emerging market economies to share their consumption risk. (Kose, Prasad, & Terrones, 2009. P. 259) One reason why interdependent states
may not be well-suited to share risk is due to the fact that interdependence leads to economic specialization and reliance on external financing. Gande,
John, and Senbet (2008) and Corsetii et al. (1999) provide conceptual and analytical links between specialization, moral hazard, and contagion. Thus,
the answer to the first question set out at the beginning of this section, whether economic integration and economic crises are linked, seems reasonably
well-established. Substantial recent scholarship indicates a positive association between economic interdependence and economic crises. What then
about the second question? Is there a positive correlation between economic crises and armed conflict? The impacts at an individual level and on a state
level are intuitive and well-documented (See, e.g., Richards & Gelleny, 2006). Rodrik (1997a, 197b), among others, argues that the instability in
the global economic system contributes to social disintegration and political conflict.’ Social unrest, regime
changes, and even civil war have directly resulted from the vagaries of economic integration. Less intuitive is how
periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of external conflict. Political science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to
the impact of economic decline and the security and defence behavior of interdependent states. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic,
dyadic and national levels. Several notable contributions follow. First, on the systemic level, Pollins (2008) advances Modelski
and Thompson’s (1996) work on leadership cycle theory, finding that rhythms in the global economy are
associated with the rise and fall of a pre-eminent power and the often bloody transition from
one pre-eminent leader to the next. As such, exogenous shocks such as economic crises could user in a
redistribution of relative power (see also Gilpin, 1981) that leads to uncertainty about power balances,
increasing the risk of miscalculation (Fearon, 1995). Alternatively, even a relatively certain redistribution of
power could lead to a permissive environment for conflict as a rising power may seek to challenge a declining
power (Werner, 1999). Separately, Pollins (1996) shows that global economic cycles combined with
parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium, and small
powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remain unknown.
Second, on a dyadic level, Copeland’s (1996, 2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that ‘future expectation of
trade’ is a significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behavior of states. He argues
that interdependent states are likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view
of future trade relations. However, if the expectations of future trade decline, particularly for
difficult to replace items such as energy resources, the likelihood for conflict increases, as
states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources. Crises could potentially be the
trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by
interdependent states. Third, others have considered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level.
Blomberg and Hess (2002) find a strong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict, particularly
during periods of economic downturn. They write, The linkages between internal and external conflict and
prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict tends to spawn internal conflict, which in
turn returns the favour. Moreover, the presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which
international and external conflicts self-reinforce each other. (Blomberg & Hess., 2002, p. 89). Economic decline has
also been linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism (Blomberg, Hess & Weerapana,
2004), which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions. Furthermore, crises
generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government. ‘Diversionary theory’ suggests that, when facing
unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting governments have increased incentives to
fabricate external military conflicts to create a ‘rally around the flag’ effect. Wang (1996), DeRouen (1995),
and Blomberg, Hess, and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force are at
least indirectly correlated. Gelpi (1997), Miller (1999), and Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest that the tendency towards
diversionary tactics are greater for democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic
leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support. DeRouen
(2000) has provided evidence showing that periods of weak economic performance in the United States, and thus weak
Presidential popularity, are statistically linked to an increase in the use of force. In summary, recent economic scholarship
positively correlates economic integration with an increase in the frequency of economic crises, whereas political science scholarship links economic
decline with external conflict at systemic, dyadic and national levels. This implied connection between integration, crises, and armed conflict has not
featured prominently in the economic-security debate and deserves more attention.
2NC- I/L NAFTA kills Mex. Econ
NAFTA created poor Mexican schooling and a brain drain
Wise and Cypher 2007—Dr. Raúl Delgado Wise is president of the International Network on Migration and
Development; UNESCO Chair on Migration, Development and Human Rights; and Professor of the Doctoral
Programme in Development Studies at the Autonomous University of Zacatecas, Mexico. Dr. James M. Cypher
received his Ph.D. degree in economics from the University of California, Riverside in 1973. His B.A. and M.A.
degrees were awarded by University of California, Santa Barbara. His early research interests were focused on
the macroeconomic impacts of US military spending, and he has published numerous articles in this area.
Since the late 1980s he has concentrated on the Mexican Economy and issues of internationalization and
economic development of poor nations. His book, State and Capital in Mexico (Westview, 1990) was published
in Mexico by Siglo XXI publishers. He has taught or worked at several universities in Latin America, and is
currently engaged in a large project to assess the pattern of industrialization in Chile. The senior member of the
Department’s faculty, Dr. Cypher has devoted his career to undergraduate teaching for over three decades.
With James Dietz he co-authored a text, The Process of Economic Development (Routledge) the second edition
of which will appear in 2003. [“The Strategic Role of Mexican Labor under NAFTA: Critical Perspectives on
Current Economic Integration.” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science , Vol. 610,
NAFTA and Beyond: Alternative Perspectives in the Study of Global Trade and Development (Mar., 2007), pp.
120-142]//MM
In terms of schooling, 39 percent of the population aged fifteen years and older born in Mexico and residing in
the United States have attained a level higher than a high school diploma. This figure rises to 52 percent if the
full spectrum of the population of Mexican origin in the United States is taken into consideration. By contrast,
the average figure for Mexico is 28 percent, which means that in general, and in contrast to what is commonly
believed, more qualified workers are leaving than remaining in the country. In other words, there is a clear
selective trend, in line with the underlying rationale behind international migrations. It should also be noted,
however, that in comparison to other immigrant groups in the United States, the Mexican contingent is the one
with the lowest average levels of schooling. ¶ One high-profile form of migration that does not fall in with the
stereotypes involves Mexican residents in the United States who have university degrees or postgraduate
qualifications. This population includes slightly more than 385,000 individuals born in Mexico. Of those,
86,000 have postgraduate studies, and 10,000 have doctorates (Current Population Survey,
http://www.census.gov/cps). This indicates that "brain drain" is beginning to emerge as a major problem.
Trade is key to Mexico economy- most of trade is from NAFTA
Global Tender, ( “Economy of Mexico” http://www.globaltenders.com/economy-mexico.htm) //ST
The economy contains a mixture of modern and outmoded industry and agriculture, both of which are
increasingly dominated by the private sector. Recent administrations have expanded competition in ports,
railroads, telecommunications, electricity generation, natural gas distribution and airports, with the aim of
upgrading infrastructure. As an export-oriented economy, more than 90% of Mexican trade is
under free trade agreements (FTAs) with more than 40 countries, including the European Union, Japan,
Israel, and much of Central and South America. The most influential FTA is the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which came into effect in 1994, and was signed in 1992 by the governments of
the United States, Canada and Mexico. In 2006, trade with Mexico's two northern partners
accounted for almost 90% of its exports and 55% of its imports. Recently, the Congress of the Union
approved important tax, pension and judicial reforms, and reform to the oil industry is currently being
debated. According to the Forbes Global 2000 list of the world's largest companies in 2008, Mexico had 16
companies in the list. Mexico is an export oriented economy. It is an important trade power as measured by the
value of merchandise traded, and the country with the greatest number of free trade agreements. In 2005,
Mexico was the world's fifteenth largest merchandise exporter and twelfth largest merchandise importer with a
12% annual percentage increase in overall trade. In fact, from 1991 to 2005 Mexican trade increased fivefold.
Mexico is the biggest exporter and importer in Latin America; in 2005, Mexico alone exported US $213.7
billion, roughly equivalent to the sum of the exports of Brazil, Argentina, Venezuela, Uruguay, and Paraguay.
However, Mexican trade is fully integrated with that of its North American partners: close to 90% of Mexican
exports and 50% of its imports are traded with the United States and Canada. Nonetheless, NAFTA has not
produced trade diversion. While trade with the United States increased 183% from 1993–2002, and that with
Canada 165%, other trade agreements have shown even more impressive results: trade with Chile increased
285%, with Costa Rica 528% and Honduras 420%. Trade with the European Union increased 105% over the
same time period. The North American Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is by far the most important
Trade Agreement Mexico has signed both in the magnitude of reciprocal trade with its partners
as well as in its scope. Unlike the rest of the Free Trade Agreements that Mexico has signed, NAFTA is more
comprehensive in its scope and was complemented by the North American Agreement for Environmental
Cooperation (NAAEC) and the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC).
NAFTA hurts Mexico
Wharton 3/20 (Wharton, Public Policy and Management, “NAFTA’s ‘Uninvited Guest’: Why China’s Path to
U.S. manufacturing Runs Through Mexico,” 20 March 2013,
http://www.wharton.universia.net/index.cfm?fa=viewArticle&id=2324&language=english)
For his part, Enrique Dussel Peters, professor of economics at UNAM, the Mexican National University,
highlights unique sources of tension in the China-Mexico relationship. First, he notes, Mexican elites began
their integration with NAFTA way back in 1994, when NAFTA was established. That was long before the
leading South American countries deregulated their trade regimes. As a result, “Mexican trade is very
integrated into specific trade flows with the U.S. and Canada.” Second, Dussel Peters says, “Mexico prefers to
settle its trade disputes via multilateral panels at the World Trade Organization, rather than settle disputes
bilaterally. This is highly disliked by the Chinese,” who prefer to settle disputes bilaterally. This difference in
mindset has fostered “distrust and misunderstanding” between Mexico and China. Third, although China has
been Mexico’s second-biggest trading partner (behind only the U.S.) ever since 2003, Mexican policymakers
have yet to develop a clear and coherent strategy toward China. Dussel Peters argues that despite China’s rising
importance for NAFTA nations, China remains “NAFTA’s uninvited guest. China is of critical importance to the
region, but NAFTA has not been able to formalize relationships between the NAFTA countries and China.Ӧ
Felipe Monteiro, a senior fellow at Wharton’s Mack Center for Technological Innovation, stresses that ChinaMexico ties have been complicated by the fact that “China is a direct competitor of Mexico in the United
States.” There was a time, notes Monteiro, when Mexico could afford to relegate its relationship with China to
the back burner, but Mexican policy makers “have realized that you need a bilateral strategy with China. China
is too big a country [not to do so].” Short term, Mexico’s competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis China has “been
tempered in the last year,” notes Gallagher, for two key reasons. On the one hand, the Chinese yuan has risen in
value, making Chinese exports a bit more expensive. On the other hand, while Chinese wages have risen versus
the peso or the dollar, Mexican wages have been largely stagnant -- thus, cutting into China’s wage-rate
advantage. For years, Gallagher notes, China benefitted from having both an undervalued yen, and
manufacturing wages of about 73 U.S. cents per hour. Since NAFTA, Mexican wages have risen at an annual
rate of only 1.5%. While that sounds like something positive for Mexican workers, most Mexican manufacturing
takes place in maquiladora enclaves into which 70% to 90% of all inputs are imported from outside Mexico,
and then re-exported to the U.S. and Canada “with little impact on the rest of Mexico,” says Gallagher.
Hurts Mexico’s economy
Valdez ’12 (Diana Washington Valdez, Senior reporter for the El Paso Times, “NAFTA protesters raise awareness around economic injustices in Mexico, U.S”,
News section of El Paso Times- January 1st, LEXIS //NS)
About 30 people protested this afternoon at the entrance of the Paso delNorte bridge to raise
awareness of what they say are economic injustices in Mexico and the United States associated
with free trade. Joe Heyman, a border expert at the University of Texas at El Paso andspokesman for the event, said the group represents
the "99 percent" that got left out of the economic prosperity that Wall Street and several big
U.S. corporations gained since the North American Free Trade Agreement went into effect . "We're
here to let people know about the economic injustices in Mexico andthe United States," Heyman said. "This is not a U.S. versus Mexico issue. Weare all in this
together. NAFTA cost El Paso 35,000 jobs, and is responsiblefor 15 to 25 percent of the wage inequality in the U.S. "About 500,000 workers enter the United States
each year as economicrefugees, and about 500,000 children on the U.S.-Mexico border live inpoverty." The protesters held up signs that said "NAFTA favors
corporations," "work,justice and dignity," and "NAFTA creates poverty." The group chose the 19th anniversary of NAFTA to conduct the protest. The free trade accord
between the United States, Canada and Mexico went intoeffect Jan. 1, 1994, and was designed to increase trade by eliminatingtariffs or import taxes between the three
countries.
NAFTA has no effect on maquiladoras
Gruben ’98 – Assistant Vice President, Director, Center for Latin American Economics, Federal Reserve Bank
of Dallas (William C, “NAFTA Revisited: The Impact of the North American Free Trade Agreement on
Maquiladora Employment, Texas Business Review, December 1998, Google Scholar)//ER
Using these measures, I analyzed the effects of NAFTA on the growth of maquiladoras. The final results of¶ this
econometric analysis indicate that a negative correlation exists between maquiladora employment and the¶
wage variables with a positive correlation between maquiladora employment and demand. What is most¶
interesting about the results, however, is the persistently negative and insignificant role of NAFTA in the
recent¶ growth in maquiladora employment. This finding runs contrary certainly to the allegations of NAFTA¶
opponents such as H. Ross Perot and others.4¶ While no one can deny that the rate of growth in maquiladora¶
employment has been remarkably rapid since the implementation of the North American Free Trade¶
Agreement in 1994, the expansion apparently has little to do with the agreement itself.
NAFTA resulted in uneven financial integration, hurting Mexico’s economy in the long
run
Correa and Seccareccia 2009—Mario Seccareccia has been teaching at the University of Ottawa since 1978.
He has authored/co-authored or co-edited some eight books or monographs, and has published some 75
articles or chapters of books. He is also editor of the New York-based International Journal of Political
Economy. His principal research interests are in the areas of monetary economics, history of economic thought
and methodology, labour economics, and Canadian economic history. Eugenia Correa is a professor at the
National Autonomous University of Mexico. ["The United States Financial Crisis and Its NAFTA Linkages."
International Journal Of Political Economy 38.2 (2009): 70-99. Political Science Complete. JSTOR. 27 July
2013]//MM
The founders of NAFTA did not consider the possibility of a financial crisis in the United States; nor did they
imagine that the headquarters of international banks with subsidiaries in Mexico could face bankruptcy or
nationalization. In reality, this sui generis process of financial integration between Mexico and the United
States has left the country with a neocolonial financial system controlled by absentee owners, which is based on
rent-seeking activities, particularly those related to international arbitrage. Financial authorities have been
complacent, lacking independence and legal instruments to act with.¶ In the course of the financial crisis
period of 2007–8, the local subsidiaries of global banks have been rapidly reducing their credit portfolios,
although their capture of deposits continues to increase unabated. They are quickly increasing their cash
holdings in foreign accounts, and their profits have repatriated to headquarters during successive quarters
(Mexico Securities and Banking Commission 2008). At the same time, economic activity fell abruptly in the
last months of 2008, along with the export sector and related economic actors. Particularly hard hit have been
the automobile and auto parts industries. ¶ The financial conditions of the country continue to deteriorate day
by day as its economic model is sustained by a constant inflow of dollars (as has happened in other instances of
dollarization in Latin America). All the principal sources of dollars have been contracting abruptly, including
the export of crude oil, worker remittances, and foreign direct and portfolio investment. Meanwhile, all the
obligations that imply capital outflows have continued or sharpened, including the import of food and energy,
the payment of dividends and earnings of subsidiaries of global corporations (including banks), the outflow of
portfolio investment, and the interest on external debt, both public and private. The domestic currency
depreciated in relation to the U.S. dollar by almost 50 percent from September 2008 to March 2009 but then
was propped up and stabilized at about two-thirds of its ¶ 2008 value until May 2009.¶ Mexico’s central bank
has spent more than $18 billion (equivalent to 21 percent of its international reserves) to sustain the exchange
rate. To understand the magnitude of the problem, one only has to consider that the size of short-term private
debt has surpassed $20 billion, and interest payments on external debt are estimated at $14 billion in 2009.
Portfolio investment in government bonds of foreign residents is estimated at $27 billion in the third quarter of
2008. None of this takes into consideration the large dollar requirements that an abrupt seizure of positions in
the derivatives market would demand. ¶ The global crisis of the originate–distribute financial model also
represents an endogenous financial crisis in Mexico, of a still undetermined size. As often happens with
banking crises, the amount of losses becomes known only once they are all brought to light. However, the
consequences can be clearly seen on the horizon: contraction in employment, salaries, and levels of well-being;
lower levels of economic activity; and a growing deterioration in the fundamental functions of the government,
including ensuring security and territorial integrity, among other factors. These considerations are highlighted
by the growing fears that Mexico could become a failed state or at least a failed government (Brogan, Dolan,
Helman, and Vardi 2008; Enfoque 2009; Kurtzman 2009).¶ The financial and trade opening, the
commitments derived from NAFTA, and the balanced budget law severely limit the ability of the government
authorities to address the economic crisis with a well-directed and sufficiently large countercyclical program.
However, the same authorities broadly endorse the policies of the IMF, and as such they have no intention of
committing themselves to even minimal countercyclical measures. At least for the moment, even the large
domestic corporations are being left with no support. Such is the case of the Vitro group, one of the ten largest
groups in the country and in operation for over one hundred years, which recently declared a moratorium on
several bonds, is selling assets at fire-sale prices and, barring unforeseen developments, could declare
bankruptcy in the coming months.¶ NAFTA might be seen as an innocuous part of the global financial crisis,
but it is not. NAFTA created an unequal financial integration between Mexico and the United States, and that
must be changed to build more equal economic relations within the North American economic region.
NAFTA led to a subordinated integration of Mexico, laundry list of effects
Wise and Cypher 2007—Dr. Raúl Delgado Wise is president of the International Network on Migration and
Development; UNESCO Chair on Migration, Development and Human Rights; and Professor of the Doctoral
Programme in Development Studies at the Autonomous University of Zacatecas, Mexico. Dr. James M. Cypher
received his Ph.D. degree in economics from the University of California, Riverside in 1973. His B.A. and M.A.
degrees were awarded by University of California, Santa Barbara. His early research interests were focused on
the macroeconomic impacts of US military spending, and he has published numerous articles in this area.
Since the late 1980s he has concentrated on the Mexican Economy and issues of internationalization and
economic development of poor nations. His book, State and Capital in Mexico (Westview, 1990) was published
in Mexico by Siglo XXI publishers. He has taught or worked at several universities in Latin America, and is
currently engaged in a large project to assess the pattern of industrialization in Chile. The senior member of the
Department’s faculty, Dr. Cypher has devoted his career to undergraduate teaching for over three decades.
With James Dietz he co-authored a text, The Process of Economic Development (Routledge) the second edition
of which will appear in 2003. [“The Strategic Role of Mexican Labor under NAFTA: Critical Perspectives on
Current Economic Integration.” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science , Vol. 610,
NAFTA and Beyond: Alternative Perspectives in the Study of Global Trade and Development (Mar., 2007), pp.
120-142]//MM
Implications for Mexico ¶ In its essence, the labor export-led model gives rise to a process of disaccumulation
as the economic surplus is transferred abroad, depriving Mexico of potential multiplier and spread effects
through forward and backward linkages. Surplus transference has taken many forms, including net reallocation
of profits, interest income, licensing fees, and disguised profits through transfer pricing and intrafirm
transactions in the maquiladora and disguised maquila firms. ¶ Net transference also entails the derived
benefits from education, health care, and the nurturance of children to maturity. An impressively large fund of
social capital created in Mexico is then reassigned to the United States as emigrants produce there while the
costs of their training are paid in Mexico. Substantial levels of spending by the Mexican State on education and
health care are essentially subsidized inputs into the U.S. transnational production system. ¶ To the above
transfers should be added the subsidies and lost tax revenues that the Mexican government has permitted to
continue up to the present. Firms operating in the maquila and disguised maquila sector pay no tariff charges,
are exempt from the value added tax, and pay no income tax. For the maquila sector in 2000, the value of
subsidies received exceeded taxes paid to the degree that these firms had a net profit tax rate of -7.2 percent
(Dussel Peters 2003, 334; Schatan 2002). ¶ Inside Mexico, the labor export-led model has involved collateral
costs in terms of deindustrialization and rising unemployment, along with deskilling as industrial workers are
forced to shift to the informal sector or to underemployment—in effect dismantling much of the productive
apparatus of Mexico. Making matters worse, neoliberal policy makers have imposed very restrictive monetary
policies in their single-minded effort to contain inflationary pressures. The result has been a long-term
overvaluation of the peso—estimated to be 30 percent—which has undercut the export market for Mexican
producers, particularly medium-sized producers who might otherwise be able to generate employment through
the export of Mexican-made products. For these Mexican producers, a second impact is that imported inputs
are essentially subsidized, making it extremely difficult for these firms to play the role of domestic suppliers to
either the transnational or the Mexican conglomerates (Dussel Peters 2006a).16 Furthermore, these firms, as
well as numerous small firms, have every incentive to buy imported inputs, further strengthening the vicious
circle. ¶ All this points to a process of asymmetric and subordinated integration in Mexico—a process to a great
degree accelerated by NAFTA and the neoliberal policies that created the framework for the NAFTA accord. At
the same time, the process captures the passivity and emptiness of state policy making in Mexico—the adoption
of a neoliberal horizontal stance where there will be no intervention to attempt to direct production by way of
the creation of new forms of dynamic competitive advantage, or to forestall processes that are clearly
undermining Mexico's production base. Instead, the Mexican state has adopted a posture wherein it is assumed
that the dynamic external effects of new forms of production directed toward the foreign market will bring
automatically—through the forces of the market—a positive restructuring of Mexico's economy. State policy has
been limited to a series of opportunistic maneuvers: seeking more maquilas, pursuing more foreign direct
investment, using the boom in oil prices to cover the public sectors' debt and boost the economy through
government spending that generally will not build vital skills or infrastructure, and relying upon massive
inflows of foreign remittances from emigrants to create an informal social welfare system.
NAFTA resulted in uneven financial integration—free flow of capital, opening of
domestic financial market, dollarization
Correa and Seccareccia 2009—Mario Seccareccia has been teaching at the University of Ottawa since 1978. He has authored/co-
authored or co-edited some eight books or monographs, and has published some 75 articles or chapters of books. He is also editor of the New York-based
International Journal of Political Economy. His principal research interests are in the areas of monetary economics, history of economic thought and
methodology, labour economics, and Canadian economic history. Eugenia Correa is a professor at the National Autonomous University of Mexico. ["The
United States Financial Crisis and Its NAFTA Linkages." International Journal Of Political Economy 38.2 (2009): 70-99. Political Science Complete.
JSTOR. 27 July 2013]//MM
Financial Liberalization in Mexico and NAFTA¶ Financial Liberalization and Integration¶ The original designers of NAFTA conceived of an economic and
financial structure that did not take into account the possibility of financial crises. In any case, such crises were assumed to result
merely from errors of economic policy and would generate fluctuations that would eventually be selfcorrecting. The recurring tendency for Mexico to run a current account deficit was taken into consideration
under NAFTA, and the establishment of a credit line of $6 billion from the U.S. Federal Reserve and the Bank of Canada was envisioned. When
NAFTA began in 1994, this amount was the equivalent of only three months of external debt payment and was used for the first time in April 1994. ¶
Months later, this amount proved to be absurdly small in the face of the large financial commitments that were put in evidence by the rescue package of
$50 billion offered by the Fed, Bank for International Settlements, IMF, Citibank, and JPMorgan in January 1995 and that covered the amortization of
part of the public and private short-term external debt for several months. This package of loans was fundamental in avoiding a default, which among
other things would have jeopardized the financial investments of Goldman Sachs, Merrill Lynch, and other investment funds such as Fidelity, Scudder,
Oppenheimer, and Putman (Girón et al. 1995). This is the size of the hole in the NAFTA financial chapter that nobody wants
to face, until the financial crisis explodes. Indeed, as recently as February 2009, the Fed extended $30 billion
on its line of credit to the Mexican central bank. Although debates on and analyses of the financial aspects of NAFTA during the past
fifteen years have been abundant and diverse, in this paper we consider only three of its fundamental components. ¶ First, NAFTA requires and
forces the maintenance of the free movement of capital. No restriction can be imposed unless it is general and
temporary and is accompanied by an immediate negotiation with the IMF to return to this original state. This
obligation is naturally of the greatest interest, not for the expansion of direct and portfolio investment but rather for the free flow
of footloose financial capital and for the outflow of earnings, dividends, and profits of all types. Such a
guarantee at the level of an international commercial treaty is difficult to justify under any circumstances, but,
in the case of Mexico, it also subordinates monetary and fiscal policy to the maintenance of macroeconomic stability (balanced
budgets or surpluses), growing external indebtedness (private and public), and the permanent desirability of external capital inflows (foreign direct and
portfolio investments).¶ Second, NAFTA committed Mexico to the opening up of its domestic financial market, or rather
to the participation of foreign bank subsidiaries through their association with local banks or via the
acquisition of established banks. Original provisions created a transitional period to protect the national
ownership of banks. However, the reality of the 1995 banking crisis modified the time frames and accelerated the entrance of foreign banks. At
the same time, the government’s bailout of banks through capitalization and the purchase of assets increased foreign banks’ interest in a greater
positioning in the domestic banking sector, whose balances had just been restored to health via public funds. The first to arrive were the Spanish banks,
which sought wider markets in the face of the new competition envisioned with the creation of the European Economic and Monetary Union. Later, the
large global players such as Citibank and HSBC came into the domestic market, by buying large local banks,
along with the Canadian bank (Scotiabank). This change of ownership among the largest Mexican banks
increased foreign ownership of the local financial system to around 80 percent over the course of some six
years, bypassing the clauses for the protection of the payments system in the original NAFTA (Correa 2004).¶ Third,
NAFTA consolidated the dual monetary system, making the dollar the dominant currency, and thereby shaped the
perspectives and dynamics of business profit generated in the local currency. This dual currency system also provides an important
control over the payment of wages and the level of earnings of medium- to low-income sectors in local
currency. This type of control cannot be achieved under the modalities of dollarization as it existed in Argentina or currently exists in Ecuador.¶
Therefore, NAFTA was an instrument of financial integration between Mexico and the United States, with very
specific characteristics that were not necessarily planned or agreed upon. But due to this process of integration,
the financial system in Mexico has now become part of the geoeconomic territory of the current financial crisis
and not simply a victim of current circumstances. This is a relevant issue that we will consider further.
I/L- Mexico Econ k2 US Econ
Mexican prosperty is key to the US economy – consumption.
– Senior Fellow for Latin America Studies, contributor to the Council on Foreign Relations and the
Wilson Institute (Shannon K., “U.S. Depends on Mexico for Exports”, 1/14/13;
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/01/14/us-depends-on-mexico-for-_n_2471961.html)//Beddow
Surprising to many Americans is the importance of the United States’ trade with Mexico. While Asia captures
the headlines, U.S. exports to Mexico are double those to China, and second only to Canada. And while many of
these goods come from border states -- Texas, Arizona, New Mexico and California -- Mexico matters for much
more of the union. Seventeen states send more than 10 percent of their exports to Mexico, and it is the
number one or two destination for U.S. goods for nearly half the country. The graph below shows
those states most economically dependent on our southern neighbor --notice that South Dakota and Nebraska
outpace New Mexico and California. These flows are only accelerating. During the first ten months of 2012
exports heading south grew by $17 billion (or 10 percent) compared to 2011, reaching a total of $181 billion.
They include petroleum products (some $17 billion worth) and intermediate goods such as vehicle parts,
electrical apparatuses, industrial supplies, metals, and chemicals (over $40 billion combined). Spurred on by
deep supply chains, these pieces and parts move fluidly back and forth across the border (often quite a few
times) before ending up as finished goods on store shelves in both countries. U.S. exports and Mexico The
uptick should be seen as a good thing. According to economic studies, these exports support some six million
American jobs (directly and indirectly). But to continue this dynamism, the United States and Mexico
need to improve border infrastructure and facilitate flows. This means expanding border crossings and
highways, and harmonizing regulations and customs to make the process easier and faster. Prioritizing and
investing in bilateral trade will provide greater opportunity and security—for U.S. companies and workers
alike.
O’Neill 1/14
Mexican growth is key to the US economy – manufacturing.
– Senior Fellow for Latin America Studies, contributor to the Council on Foreign Relations and the
Wilson Institute (Shannon K., “Mexico Makes It”, March/April 2013; <
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138818/shannon-k-oneil/mexico-makes-it>)//Beddow
Since NAFTA was passed, U.S.-Mexican trade has more than tripled. Well over $1 billion worth of goods
crosses the U.S.-Mexican border every day, as do 3,000 people, 12,000 trucks, and 1,200 railcars. Mexico is
second only to Canada as a destination for U.S. goods, and sales to Mexico support an estimated six million
American jobs, according to a report published by the Woodrow Wilson International Center's Mexico
Institute. The composition of that bilateral trade has also changed in recent decades. Approximately 40 percent
of the products made in Mexico today have parts that come from the United States. Many consumer goods,
including cars, televisions, and computers, cross the border more than once during their production.
Admittedly, this process has sent some U.S. jobs south, but overall, cross-border production is good for U.S.
employment. There is evidence that U.S. companies with overseas operations are more likely to create domestic
jobs than those based solely in the United States. Using data collected confidentially from thousands of large
U.S. manufacturing firms, the scholars Mihir Desai, C. Fritz Foley, and James Hines upended the conventional
wisdom in a 2008 study, which found that when companies ramp up their investment and employment
internationally, they invest more and hire more people at home, too. Overseas operations make companies
more productive and competitive, and with improved products, lower prices, and higher sales, they are able to
create new jobs everywhere. Washington should welcome the expansion of U.S. companies in
Mexico because increasing cross-border production and trade between the two countries would
boost U.S. employment and growth. Mexico is a ready, willing, and able economic partner, with which the
United States has closer ties than it does with any other emerging-market country.
O’Neill 13
Impacts
Econ. Decline causes War
Harris and Burrows 9 - *Mathew, PhD European History @ Cambridge, counselor in the National Intelligence Council (NIC) , **Jennifer, a member
of the NIC’s Long Range Analysis Unit
(“Revisiting the Future: Geopolitical Effects of the Financial Crisis” http://www.ciaonet.org/journals/twq/v32i2/f_0016178_13952.pdf)//BB
Increased Potential for Global Conflict¶ Of course, the report encompasses more than economics and indeed believes the future is likely to be the result of a number
of intersecting and interlocking forces. With so many possible permutations of outcomes, each with ample Revisiting the Future opportunity for unintended
consequences, there is a growing sense of insecurity. Even so, history may be more instructive than ever . While we continue to believe that the
Great Depression is not likely to be repeated, the lessons to be drawn from that period include the harmful effects on fledgling democracies
and multiethnic societies (think Central Europe in 1920s and 1930s) and on the sustainability of multilateral institutions (think League of
Nations in the same period). There is no reason to think that this would not be true in the twenty-first as much as in the twentieth
century. For that reason, the ways in which the potential for greater conflict could grow would seem to be even more apt in a constantly
volatile economic environment as they would be if change would be steadier. In surveying those risks, the report stressed the likelihood that terrorism and
nonproliferation will remain priorities even as resource issues move up on the international agenda.
Terrorism’s appeal will decline if
economic growth continues in the Middle East and youth unemployment is reduced. For those terrorist groups that remain
active in 2025, however, the diffusion of technologies and scientific knowledge will place some of the world’s most dangerous capabilities within their reach.
Terrorist groups in 2025 will likely be a combination of descendants of long established groups_inheriting organizational structures, command and control
processes, and training procedures necessary to conduct sophisticated attacks_and newly emergent collections of the angry and disenfranchised that become
self-radicalized, particularly in the absence of economic outlets that would become narrower in an economic downturn.
The most dangerous casualty of any economically-induced drawdown of U.S. military presence would
almost certainly be the Middle East. Although Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons is not inevitable, worries about a nuclear-armed Iran could lead
states in the region to develop new security arrangements with external powers, acquire additional weapons, and consider
pursuing their own nuclear ambitions. It is not clear that the type of stable deterrent relationship that existed between the great powers for most of the
Cold War would emerge naturally in the Middle East with a nuclear Iran. Episodes of low intensity conflict and terrorism taking place under a nuclear umbrella
could lead to an unintended escalation and broader conflict if clear red lines between those states involved are not well established. The close
proximity of potential nuclear rivals combined with underdeveloped surveillance capabilities and mobile dual-capable Iranian missile systems also
will produce inherent difficulties in achieving reliable indications and warning of an impending nuclear attack. The lack of strategic depth in neighboring
states like Israel, short warning and missile flight times, and uncertainty of Iranian intentions may place more focus on preemption
rather than defense, potentially leading to escalating crises. 36 Types of conflict that the world continues to experience, such as over resources,
could reemerge, particularly if protectionism grows and there is a resort to neo-mercantilist practices. Perceptions of renewed
energy scarcity will drive countries to take actions to assure their future access to energy supplies. In the worst case, this could result in interstate
conflicts if government leaders deem assured access to energy resources, for example, to be essential for maintaining domestic stability
and the survival of their regime. Even actions short of war, however, will have important geopolitical implications. Maritime security concerns are
providing a rationale for naval buildups and modernization efforts, such as China’s and India’s development of blue water naval capabilities. If the fiscal
stimulus focus for these countries indeed turns inward, one of the most obvious funding targets may be military. Buildup of
regional naval capabilities could lead to increased tensions , rivalries , and counterbalancing moves , but it
also will create opportunities for multinational cooperation in protecting critical sea lanes. With water also becoming scarcer in Asia and the
Middle East, cooperation to manage changing water resources is likely to be increasingly difficult both within and
between states in a more dog-eat-dog world.
Economic growth solves war – increased state capacity.
HSRP 10 – Human Security Report Project, Simon Fraser University, Canada (“Human Security Report 2009/2010”, 12/2/10; Part one page 20,
<http://www.hsrgroup.org/human-security-reports/20092010/text.aspx>)//Beddow
But despite the widespread lack of consensus over the causes of civil war, very few quantitative researchers would disagree that there is a robust
high levels of national income and a lower risk of war. Other things being equal, high
national incomes translate into greater state capacity and more resources for governments to buy
association between
off grievances and defeat insurgents in those wars that cannot be prevented. The conflict trends in East
Asia over the past 30 years, which are the focus of Chapter 3, provide an instructive example of the association between
rising levels of economic development and the incidence of armed conflict. As national incomes in the region have
steadily risen since the late 1970s, state capacity and performance legitimacy have also increased—and conflict
numbers have declined by some 60 percent. Indeed, insurgents—who have been largely excluded from the benefits of economic
growth in the region—have not achieved a single military victory since the 1970s.
Economic decline turns heg and growth ensures it.
– American diplomat, president of the Council on Foreign Relations, Director of Policy Planning for the
Department of State, advisor to Colin Powell, US Coordinator for the Future of Afghanistan (Richard N., “The
Irony of American Strategy: Putting the Middle East in Proper Perspective”, May/June 2013 issue of Foreign
Affairs)//Beddow
Haass 13
Asia, however, does call for more U.S. military, diplomatic and economic involvement. Other regions can also
stake a claim to a share of Washington’s attention. Negotiating a transatlantic free-trade agreement (ideally, one involving both
Canada and Mexico) would be a major economic and strategic accomplishment; so, too, would be negotiating and implementing a NAFTA 2.0 that would
more closely link the United States with its immediate neighbors so as to better manage shared interests related to trade and investment, security,
energy, infrastructure, and the flow of people. Narrowing the gap between global challenges and the current institutional
arrangements for dealing with them is also an important issue, particularly in the case of climate change. Here and elsewhere,
though, global accords with broad participation may not be possible, and it may be more realistic and rewarding to focus on agreements with narrower
aims, less participation, or both. Any U.S. rebalancing among regions and issues, finally, needs to be complemented by
another sort of rebalancing, between the internal and the external, the domestic and the foreign. The United
States needs to restore the foundations of American economic power so that it will once again
have the resources to act freely and lead in the world, so that it can compete, so that it can
discourage threats from emerging and contend with them if need be, so that it is less vulnerable to
international developments it cannot control, and so that it can set an example others will want to
emulate. The vast sums spent on the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq did not cause the nation’s current budgetary or economic predicament, but they
did contribute to it. Spending more on national security now would only make it more difficult to set things right. The goal at home must be to
restore historical levels of domestic economic growth, reduce the ratio of debt to GDP, and improve the quality
of the nation’s infrastructure and human capital. During the next several years, facing no rival great power or
existential threat, the United States is likely to enjoy something of a strategic respite. The question is whether
the United States will take advantage of that respite to renew the sources of its strength or squander it through
continued overreaching in the Middle East, not attending to Asia, and underinvesting in home.
Recessions lock nations in a self-reinforcing death spiral to war.
Conceição and Kim 10 – Director of the Office of Development Studies at UNPD, assistant professor at the Technical University of Lisbon, degrees in
Physics and Economics from the Technical University of Lisbon and PhD in Public Policy from the LBJ School of Public Affairs at the University of Texas
at Austin / Office of Development Studies UNDP (Pedro and Namsuk, “The Economic Crisis, Violent Conflict, and Human Development”, International
Journal of Peace Studies, V.15 No. 1, Spring/Summer 2010; http://www.gmu.edu/programs/icar/ijps/vol15_1/KimConceicao15n1.pdf)//Beddow
The unfolding global economic crisis is expected to bring the world economy into recession in 2009. Figure 1 shows the population weighted real GDP
growth from 1991 to 2009 (estimates for 2008 and projection for 2009) for the world economy and for different groups of countries. The annual real
GDP growth rate of the global economy was 5.1% in 2007 but the world economy is projected to shrink by -1.3% in 2009 (IMF, 2009). Emerging and
developing economies are also projected to suffer a sharp slowdown as a result of the crisis, with a projected growth rate of 1.6% in 2009 compared to
8.3% in 2007. For many developing countries, the sharp economic slowdowns will translate into deep recessions. The UN projects that 15 developing
countries will have ne gative per capita growth in 2009 1 , while projections from the World Bank adjusting for terms-of-tra de changes increase this to
50 2 . A recent strand of literature, reviewed in some detail in this paper, suggests that economic conditions are
important determinants of the outbreak and recurrence of conflict. In particular, wars often start following
growth collapses (Collier et al, 2009, p.15). Sharp economic slowdowns and low levels of income per capita appear to
increase the likelihood of conflicts. In this context, it is opportune to explore insights fro m this literature,
linking it also with the human development implications of both growth slow downs and conflict. In particular, the
paper highlights the risks of the emergence of low-human-development/conflict traps. Given that the probability of conflict recurrence
is high, as elaborated upon below, post-conflict countries – those that have experienced armed conflicts until
recent years – may be particularly vulnerable. 3 As Figure 1 shows, post-conflict countrie s are projected to have a substantial decrease
in the economic growth, from 7.4% in 2007 to 3.1% in 2009. Advanced economies may have a sharper slowdown (2.7% in 2007 and -3.8% in 2009), but
they have well-developed social protection, and stable political systems that may facilitate the rec overy and absorb the pressures for social instability and
conflict. In contrast, post-conflict countries, ma y be more vulnerable to a more protracted and slower recovery from the slowdown, given the hi gher
risks of conflict recurrence. Drawing on a review of both theoretical and empirical literature, this paper frames the the connection between economic
factors and conflict within a conceptual framework in which levels of human development and the risk of conflict are linked. Violent conflict is one of the
most extreme forms of suppressing choices and advancing rights, and therefore a major threat to human development (UNDP, 2005, p.151). Since 1990,
more than 3 million people have died in armed conflicts in developing countries (Marshall, 2005). The total war deaths are far more than the battle
deaths. For example, the total war deaths are estimated as 1.2 million in Ethiopia during 1976-1991, but only 2% of them were directly engaged in the
battles. (Bethany and Gleditsch, 2004) Conflict has also non-lethal consequences that may last across generations (UNDP, 2008a). As far as
drivers of conflict are concerned, one of the most robust findings in the literature is that many economic
conditions (low income, slow growth, and especially severe economic downturns) are correlated with the
outbreak of conflict, with some evidence strongly suggesting that the causal direction runs from economic
conditions to conflict (Col lier and Hoeffler, 2004). There is also a rich literature on the impact of horizontal inequality
and dependence on natural resources as drivers of increases in the risk of conflict. This paper however focuses only on the
economic factors, reviewing the fi ndings in light of the current economic crisis and the severe economic downturn that it now occurring. When it
comes to the consequences of conflict, there is no doubt that it is harmful to human welfare, but it becomes
even more hazardous if conflict results in a persistent low human development/conflict trap. A typical country
reaching the end of a civil war faces a 44 percent risk of returning to conflict within five years (Collier et al, 2003, p. 83). Whether or not a country will
experience a new civil war can be best predicted by whether the country experienced wars in the past (Collier, et al, 2004). The high rates of recurrence of
conflict, along with the economic determinants of conflict, suggest the possibility of the existence of poverty-conflict traps (Collier et al, 2003; Bloomberg
and others 2000). Given that pove rty and low per capita income ar e also correlated with worse health and education outcomes, and also that these
outcomes suffer as a result of conflict, the conflict trap can be conceptualized in the framework of a low human development – conflict trap (Collier and
Hoeffler, 2004; Justino and Verwimp, 2006; Alderman, Hoddinott and Kinsey, 2004). A self-reinforcing circle from conflict to low
human development, and vice versa, is suggestively illustrated below (Chart 1). Conflict destroys accumulated
physical and human capital, forces replacement of labor, deteriorates institutional capacity. A country
experiencing conflict cannot secure long term returns for investments in both in physical and human capital,
resulting in low investment in health and education. All of these factors lead to low levels of human development. A country
with low levels of human development has more difficulty in improving institutions, and in increasing
productivity and potential growth. In turn, lower growth rates heighten the risk of conflict, potentially trapping
a country in the loop. The remainder of the paper discusses the empirical findings and theoretical background for linkage between the low-
human development and conflict. Section 2 consid ers how low levels of human development can affect the risk of violent conflict. Section 3 shows how
the conflict can result in low human development, completing the vicious circle. Section 4 concludes the paper with a brief discussion on the policy
responses. 2. From Low Human Development to Conflict While there are number of factor s that could cause conflict, empirical studies find that poor
economic performance is associated with higher incidence of conflict. Being a poor country is correlated with most forms of violence (UNDP, 2008a).
Figure 2 shows that economic development and conflicts are observed to be clearly related. The level of GDP is negatively correlated with observing a
new conflict. Collier et al (2009) fi nd that the predicted risk for a hypothetical country with characteristics set at the study’s sample mean was 4.6 per
cent. If the level of per capita income were to be halved from this level, the risk woul d be increased to 5.3 per cent. Growth rates are also strongly
associated with risks of conflict in deve loping countries. If the growth rate in developing countries is increase d by one percentage point from the mean,
the risk of conflict decreases by 0.6 per centage points to 4.0 per cent (Collier et al, 2009). Kang and Meernik (2005) show that the grow th rate in
conflict countries in the five years prior to conflict, including cases of conf lict recurrence, was on average 0.5 pe rcent compared to 2 percent in countries
that remained peaceful. Empirical analysis of growth a nd conflict has inherent data limitations, but some recent studies using more careful methodology
shows a st rong causal link running from poor economic performance to conflict. One probl em is that the direction of impact between the income per
capita and conflict can run both wa ys. Assuming a priori one-way causality – that is, ignoring endogeneity – in regression analysis can result in biased
estimates. Other information used in the empirical studies, such as income inequality, po pulation, ethnic distributi on, are also subject to difficulties of
econometric identification and data quality (Hegre and Sambanis, 2006; Sambanis, 2004).To address the endogeneity problem, some studi es adopt
instrumental variable analysis, using a strictly exogenous variable that moves with income per cap ita, but not with conflict. For instance, Miguel,
Satyannath and Sergenti (2004) use annual changes in rainfall data as an instrument for income growth. The rainfall data predicts growth fluctuation in
agricultural economies in Africa. They find that income shocks are drive conflict. Besley and Persson (2008) and Bazzi and Blattman (2008) use
internationa l commodity price and trade shocks as the exogenous variables, but they find that the evidence on the relations hip between economic
shocks as drivers of conflict is mixed.
Economic crisis triggers war.
ETH 13 – engineering, science, technology, and management university in Switzerland, part of the Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology Domain,
subordinate to Switzerland’s Department of Home Affairs (Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich, “Intrastate Conflict: Data, Trends and Drivers”,
2/4/13; < http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/SpecialFeature/Detail/?id=158597&tabid=1453496807&contextid774=158597&contextid775=158627>)//Beddow
“The most robustly significant predictor of [armed] conflict risk and its duration is some
indicator of economic prosperity. At a higher income people have more to lose from the
destructiveness of conflict; and higher per-capita income implies a better functioning social
contract, institutions and state capacity.”[3] This correlation between underdevelopment and armed
conflict is confirmed in a 2008 paper by Thania Paffenholz[4] which notes that “since 1990, more than 50% of
all conflict-prone countries have been low income states…. Two thirds of all armed conflicts take place in African countries with the
highest poverty rates. Econometric research found a correlation between the poverty rate and likelihood of armed violence….[T]he lower the GDP per
capita in a country, the higher the likelihood of armed conflict.” Of course, it is important to point out that this is not a claim that there is a direct causal
connection between poverty and armed conflict. To repeat, the causes of conflict are complex and context specific,
nevertheless, says Paffenholz, there is a clear correlation between a low and declining per capita income and a
country’s vulnerability to conflict. It is also true, on the other hand, that there are low income countries that experience precipitous
economic decline, like Zambia in the 1980s and 1990s, without suffering the kind of turmoil that has visited economically more successful countries like
Kenya and Cote d’Ivoire. Referring to both Zambia and Nigeria, Pafenholz says these are cases in which “the social compact” has proven to be resilient.
Both have formal and informal mechanisms that are able to address grievances in ways that allowed them to be aired and resolved or managed without
recourse to violence. A brief review of literature on economics and armed conflict, published in the Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine, indicates
the complexity and imprecision behind the question, “does poverty cause conflict?” While many of the “world’s poorest countries are riven by armed
conflict,” and while poverty, conflict and under-development set up a cycle of dysfunction in which each element of the cycle is exacerbated by the other,
it is also the case that “conflict obviously does not just afflict the poorest countries” – as Northern Ireland and the former Yugoslavia demonstrate. “Many
poor countries are not at war; shared poverty may not be a destabilizing influence. Indeed, economic growth can destabilize, as the
wars in countries afflicted by an abundance of particular natural resources appear to show.”[5] Another review
of the literature makes the general point that “the escalation of conflict during economic downturns is more
likely in countries recovering from conflict, or fragile states.” That makes Africa especially vulnerable on two counts: economic
deprivation and recent armed conflict are present in a relatively high number of states, making the continent especially vulnerable to economic shocks.
As a general rule, “weak economies often translate into weak and fragile states and the presence of violent
conflict, which in turn prevents economic growth.” One study argues that “the risk of war in any given
country is determined by the initial level of income, the rate of economic growth and the level of
dependency on primary commodity exports.” Changes in rates of economic growth thus lead to changes in
threats of conflict. As unemployment rises in fragile states this can “exacerbate conflict due to comparatively better income opportunities for
young men in rebel groups as opposed to labour markets.”[6] The concentration of armed conflict in lower income countries is also reflected in the
conflict tabulation by Project Ploughshares over the past quarter century. The 2009 Human Development Index ranks 182 countries in four categories of
Human Development – Very High, High, Medium, Low. Of the 98 countries in the Medium and Low categories of human development in 2009, 55 per
cent experienced war on their territories in the previous 24 years. In the same period, only 24 per cent of countries in the High human development
category saw war within their borders, while just two (5 per cent) countries in the Very High human development ranking had war on their territory (the
UK re Northern Ireland and Israel). The wars of the recent past were overwhelmingly fought on the territories of states at the low end of the human
development scale. A country’s income level is thus a strong indicator of its risk of being involved in sustained armed
conflict. Low income countries lack the capacity to create conditions conducive to serving the social, political, and economic welfare of their people.
And when economic inequality is linked to differences between identity groups, the correlation to armed conflict is even stronger. In other words, group
based inequalities are especially destabilizing.[7] These failures in human security are of course heavily shaped by external factors, notably international
economic and security conditions and the interests of the major powers (in short, globalization),[8] and these factors frequently combine with internal
political/religious/ethnic circumstances that create conditions especially conducive to conflict and armed conflict.
US Economy Scenario
1NC
NAFTA negatively impacted US capital formation and labor
Wise and Cypher 2007—Dr. Raúl Delgado Wise is president of the International Network on Migration and
Development; UNESCO Chair on Migration, Development and Human Rights; and Professor of the Doctoral
Programme in Development Studies at the Autonomous University of Zacatecas, Mexico. Dr. James M. Cypher
received his Ph.D. degree in economics from the University of California, Riverside in 1973. His B.A. and M.A.
degrees were awarded by University of California, Santa Barbara. His early research interests were focused on
the macroeconomic impacts of US military spending, and he has published numerous articles in this area.
Since the late 1980s he has concentrated on the Mexican Economy and issues of internationalization and
economic development of poor nations. His book, State and Capital in Mexico (Westview, 1990) was published
in Mexico by Siglo XXI publishers. He has taught or worked at several universities in Latin America, and is
currently engaged in a large project to assess the pattern of industrialization in Chile. The senior member of the
Department’s faculty, Dr. Cypher has devoted his career to undergraduate teaching for over three decades.
With James Dietz he co-authored a text, The Process of Economic Development (Routledge) the second edition
of which will appear in 2003. [“The Strategic Role of Mexican Labor under NAFTA: Critical Perspectives on
Current Economic Integration.” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science , Vol. 610,
NAFTA and Beyond: Alternative Perspectives in the Study of Global Trade and Development (Mar., 2007), pp.
120-142]//MM
NAFTA and the general neoliberal restructuring of the Mexican economy that began in the 1980s have had a
profound impact on the U.S. production system. Notable in this process has been the shifting of U.S.
investment into Mexico. Without the neoliberal restructuring process in Mexico, such investments would have
been directed—in most instances—to the United States, creating jobs, raising the skill level, enhancing
productivity, and producing spread effects via forward and backward linkages, along with stimulating
aggregate demand through the consumer spending of workers.14 Increasing capital mobility has undermined
the rate of capital formation in the United States. A countertendency was created through the increasing
portion of the Mexican economic surplus that was displaced to the United States as profits rose from the
Mexican operations of U.S. transnationals. This countertendency was reinforced as Mexican immigrants flowed
into the United States and into industrial sectors, lowering production costs and raising profits. Thus, the
impact of capital shifting to Mexico fell on the U.S. labor force, particularly organized labor, while the U.S.
restructuring process created two significant avenues to increased profits, with these benefits flowing to a small
percentage of owners and managers and stockholders located in manufacturing and finance. ¶ At the same
time, the U.S. economy receives a certain type of stimulus from Mexican emigration to the degree that new
investments occur—derivative of substantially different consumption patterns arising from the 7 million
Mexican emigrant workers and their dependents. This is to be noted in the so-called migration industry
(Guarnizo 2003). ¶ Shifting capital to Mexico destroyed jobs in the United States, as did the size able trade
deficit the United States developed with Mexico once the NAFTA agreement had been consummated. Bringing
more of Mexico's economic surplus back to the United States stimulated the economy, and the influx of
millions of ¶ Mexican emigrants helped push down labors' share of national income. The net effect was to
create a new social structure of accumulation; a leaner and meaner social environment for all workers,
emigrant or not; and a corpulent, more contented, business elite in the United States now better positioned to
meet foreign competitors either by locating production in the United States or in Mexico, as profit
maximization strategies indicated. ¶ The resulting macroeconomic relationships, however, did not determine
the repositioning of U.S. capital in Mexico. Viewing the matter from the standpoint of the restructuring of the
U.S. production system, a separate logic—driven by the desire to maximize profits and out-perform the
competition—prevailed. Under this logic, shifting capital to Mexico could enable U.S. firms to purchase labor
processes at as low as 9 percent of the cost in the United States while accepting that productivity per hour
might not be as high as that in the United States.15 At the microeconomic level of the firm—assuming the
stability of final demand for products exported from Mexico to the United States—shifting capital to Mexico to
achieve labor efficiencies was a logical step in many instances. In highly oligopolized industries, such as autos,
the available research indicates that the cost-saving production processes adopted in Mexico were taken as
profits (Cypher 2001). In less capital-intensive industries, such as apparel, where brand identity is strong,
similar profit-enhancing results should be anticipated. ¶ Shifting production to Mexico made credible the
threat of further production transfers, thereby weakening all U.S. labor and particularly organized labor. The
stagnation in U.S. production workers' pay is broadly consistent with the increasing tendency of U.S.
corporations to move their production operations to Mexico. Thus, in the process of restructuring the U.S.
production system—a perceived necessity during the course of the 1980s—a complex, mutually reinforcing,
triple movement began: (1) significant elements of U.S. capital shifted to Mexico, thereby lowering costs of
production; (2) while capital often threatened to move to Mexico, thereby strengthening its bargaining power
over labor, either reducing wage increases or lowering wages; and (3) growing numbers of workers were
displaced by the production movement to Mexico thereby reducing the portion of the labor force in unions and
thus reducing the impact of unionized labor that tends to push up wages for all (but near minimum-wage)
workers.
Economic decline breaks down cooperation and leads to war – heg decline, falling
trade, rising protectionism, and diversionary tactics.
Royal 10 – Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction Policy, US-Department of Defense, policy advisor
(Jedidiah, “Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal, and Political Perspectives”, pg. 212-214;
Print.)//Beddow
The counterargument to contagion is the ‘risk-sharing’ argument. It suggests that while trade and financial linkages may spread a
crisis, this creates a cushioning effect that, overall, minimizes the effects on any individual state. In other
words, interdependence creates shock-absorbing linkages that soften a state’s vulnerability to dramatic
economic downturns (see, e.g., Kelemli-Ozcan, Sorensen, & Yosha, 2003). Gallegati, Greenwald, Richiardi, and Stiglitz (2008) have made a
convincing observation that would appear to clarify this debate. They have provided statistical modeling indicating that risk-sharing
and contagion are in fact two sides of the same coin. When economic times are good, inter-linkages provide
mechanisms for the diffusion of individual agents that face a liquidity crisis. A leader can request a creditor defer payment,
whereas a creditor can then transfer this cost on to other agents. As such the system would absorb the crisis. When liquidity is relatively
more scarce during down times, a sufficiently large negative shock will use those very same inter-linkages to
transmit that shock to other agents in the system. As a result, ‘risk sharing is beneficial only when the overall
economic environment is favourable, while in harsh times it might be better to stay alone… [linkage during
market downturns] becomes socially detrimental; not only is it that the expected number of defaults is higher when the economic
agents are connected, but defaults become a systemic failure’ (Gallegati et al., 2008. Pp.5. 16). Kose, Prasad, and Terrones (2009) considered the same
question and found only mild support for risk-sharing and only among developed, industrial economies. They found no evidence that developing, nonindustrial countries are able to share risk. The authors break relatively new ground in suggesting why this is the case for non-industrial states: One
possibility is that these countries rely more on less stable capital such as bank loans and other forms of debt that may not allow for efficient risk sharing.
Indeed, we break up stocks of external assets and liabilities into different categories – FDI, portfolio equity, portfolio debt, etc. – we find that the
underlying composition of capital flows influences the ability of developing countries to share risk. In particular, external debt appears to hinder the
ability of emerging market economies to share their consumption risk. (Kose, Prasad, & Terrones, 2009. P. 259) One reason why interdependent states
may not be well-suited to share risk is due to the fact that interdependence leads to economic specialization and reliance on external financing. Gande,
John, and Senbet (2008) and Corsetii et al. (1999) provide conceptual and analytical links between specialization, moral hazard, and contagion. Thus,
the answer to the first question set out at the beginning of this section, whether economic integration and economic crises are linked, seems reasonably
well-established. Substantial recent scholarship indicates a positive association between economic interdependence and economic crises. What then
about the second question? Is there a positive correlation between economic crises and armed conflict? The impacts at an individual level and on a state
level are intuitive and well-documented (See, e.g., Richards & Gelleny, 2006). Rodrik (1997a, 197b), among others, argues that the instability in
the global economic system contributes to social disintegration and political conflict.’ Social unrest, regime
changes, and even civil war have directly resulted from the vagaries of economic integration. Less intuitive is how
periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of external conflict. Political science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to
the impact of economic decline and the security and defence behavior of interdependent states. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic,
dyadic and national levels. Several notable contributions follow. First, on the systemic level, Pollins (2008) advances Modelski
and Thompson’s (1996) work on leadership cycle theory, finding that rhythms in the global economy are
associated with the rise and fall of a pre-eminent power and the often bloody transition from
one pre-eminent leader to the next. As such, exogenous shocks such as economic crises could user in a
redistribution of relative power (see also Gilpin, 1981) that leads to uncertainty about power balances,
increasing the risk of miscalculation (Fearon, 1995). Alternatively, even a relatively certain redistribution of
power could lead to a permissive environment for conflict as a rising power may seek to challenge a declining
power (Werner, 1999). Separately, Pollins (1996) shows that global economic cycles combined with
parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium, and small
powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remain unknown.
Second, on a dyadic level, Copeland’s (1996, 2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that ‘future expectation of
trade’ is a significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behavior of states. He argues
that interdependent states are likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view
of future trade relations. However, if the expectations of future trade decline, particularly for
difficult to replace items such as energy resources, the likelihood for conflict increases, as
states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources. Crises could potentially be the
trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by
interdependent states. Third, others have considered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level.
Blomberg and Hess (2002) find a strong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict, particularly
during periods of economic downturn. They write, The linkages between internal and external conflict and
prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict tends to spawn internal conflict, which in
turn returns the favour. Moreover, the presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which
international and external conflicts self-reinforce each other. (Blomberg & Hess., 2002, p. 89). Economic decline has
also been linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism (Blomberg, Hess & Weerapana,
2004), which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions. Furthermore, crises
generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government. ‘Diversionary theory’ suggests that, when facing
unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting governments have increased incentives to
fabricate external military conflicts to create a ‘rally around the flag’ effect. Wang (1996), DeRouen (1995),
and Blomberg, Hess, and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force are at
least indirectly correlated. Gelpi (1997), Miller (1999), and Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest that the tendency towards
diversionary tactics are greater for democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic
leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support. DeRouen
(2000) has provided evidence showing that periods of weak economic performance in the United States, and thus weak
Presidential popularity, are statistically linked to an increase in the use of force. In summary, recent economic scholarship
positively correlates economic integration with an increase in the frequency of economic crises, whereas political science scholarship links economic
decline with external conflict at systemic, dyadic and national levels. This implied connection between integration, crises, and armed conflict has not
featured prominently in the economic-security debate and deserves more attention.
2NC-I/L
NAFTA increased Mexican tax audits on US companies
PR Newswire 6/13 (PR Newswire, Public corporations in the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, and other nations, use PR Newswire to
reach the investment and financial news community with important announcements, thus achieving the standard of "simultaneous disclosure" required
by financial markets and regulatory agencies, “U.S. NAFTA Exporters Beware: No End in Sight for Taxing Mexico Audits; U.S. exporters face growing
number of North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) audits by Mexico’s tax collecting agency,” 13 June 2013,
http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/hottopics/lnacademic/)
Frustration levels are rising among U.S.exportersas the number of North America Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) audits by Mexico's tax collecting agency-the Servicio de Administracion Tributaria (SAT)-continue to
grow. Despite the current administration's promises that it would change course from its predecessor by
streamlining audit procedures, global traders are still facing costly and time-consuming NAFTA audits and reaudits as they attempt to interpret mixed messages from the Mexican government.¶ "Mexico's SAT, recently
underwent a reorganization and everyone was hoping that the NAFTA audit process would be less timeconsuming and costly," explains customs and trade attorney Elise Shibles, a partner with Sandler, Travis &
Rosenberg, P.A. "Unfortunately, that doesn't seem to be the case, especially for companies in the textile and
apparel trade" she says. "NAFTA rules of origin in this industry are very complex and require review of multiple
levels of processing, which usually occurs at different companies. It's hard enough having to go through a
NAFTA verification audit once, but being subjected to re-auditing when you've already passed with flying
colors seems unduly harsh on business."¶ The SAT's policy inconsistencies are also tying many U.S. and
Mexican companies up into knots, says trade expert Jorge Morales, Managing Director of STTAS de Mexico
Servicios de Comercio Exterior, the Mexico City arm of leading global trade services provider Sandler & Travis
Trade Advisory Services, Inc. "Despite the fact that SAT is telling us that Mexican importers can submit NAFTA
documentation on behalf of U.S. exporters, only a small number of Mexican importers know about this
important benefit because SAT is handling this issue only as an internal regulation that hasn't been properly
disseminated among all involved companies. The lack of uniformity is confusing for our clients," he continues.
"Without clear guidance there is no way a company can maintain compliance. You have to know what the rules
are before you can be expected to follow them."
NAFTA hurt the US economy—Jobs
Strachan 11—Staff Writer for The Huffington Post (“U.S. Economy Lost Nearly 700,000 Jobs Because Of NAFTA, EPI Says”, July 12, 2011,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/05/12/nafta-job-loss-trade-deficit-epi_n_859983.html)//RT
When the North American Free Trade Agreement was first signed in 1994, proponents said it
would eventually create jobs for the U.S. economy.¶ 17 years later, a new report estimates, the
American worker only has hundreds of thousands of job losses to show for it.¶ According to a report by
Economic Policy Institute economist Robert Scott, entitled "Heading South: U.S.-Mexico trade and job displacement after NAFTA," an estimated
682,900 U.S. jobs have been "lost or displaced" because of the agreement and the resulting trade deficit.¶ The historic agreement,
signed just three years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, tore down trade barriers between
the U.S., Canada and Mexico, making trade and investment easier for businesses without
allowing for the cross-border movement of labor. Despite the agreement being considered a
boon for Mexico, the country's economy grew only 1.6 percent per capita on average between
1992 and 2007, The New York Times reported in 2009.¶ The EPI's calculation of 682,900 jobs
lost to NAFTA takes into account jobs created as a result, too. Last year, for example, U.S. exports to
Mexico supported 791,900 jobs. It's just that those jobs created pale in comparison to the 1.47
million U.S. jobs that would be necessary without the imports resulting from NAFTA, the report
found.¶ Still, the number of jobs lost to NAFTA looks minimal when placed against the havoc
freaked by the financial crisis. Only in 2008, at the height of the crisis, the U.S. economy
hemorrhaged 2.6 million jobs, according to CNNMoney.¶ The U.S. is currently considering a similar trade
agreement with South Korea, called U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA). KORUS,
like NAFTA, could similarly displace American jobs, EPI warns.¶ Perhaps the most drastic switch post-NAFTA has been in
the two country's trade deficit. In 1993, before the signing of NAFTA, the U.S. held a $1.6 billion trade surplus over their
neighbor to the south, which supported 29,400 jobs. By 1997, the tides had turned, and Mexico laid claim to a much larger surplus of $16.6
billion. As of 2010, it's not even close. Mexico's trade surplus now hovers around $97.2 billion.¶ Jobs continue
to be lost to NAFTA today. In the years 2007-2010, the U.S. economy has lost 116,400 as a result of the trade deficit created by NAFTA.
And last year, the growth of Mexican auto exports to the United States alone created more Mexican jobs -- 30,400 -- than the entire U.S. auto industry.¶
It's the U.S. manufacturing sector that has suffered most mightily from NAFTA, alone accounting for 60.8 percent -- 415,000 total -- of the jobs lost to
the agreement. Specifically, those making computer of electronic parts have accounted for 22 percent of all job losses, and motor vehicle and parts
workers accounted for 15 percent of job losses.¶ Job losses haven't been limited to certain geographic regions, either, as all fifty states have lost jobs as a
result. And while the states with the largest total number of job losses, California and Texas, do hug the southern border , it's actually
manufacturing-heavy states to the north, such as Michigan, Indiana and Kentucky, that have
lost the largest share of jobs to Mexico.
Kills export growth and costs millions of jobs
Public Citizen 13 (Public Citizen, nonprofit advocacy group with offices in Washington and Austin, “NAFTA’s
Broken Promises 1994-2013: Outcomes of the North American Free Trade Agreement,” 2013,
http://www.citizen.org/documents/NAFTAs-Broken-Promises.pdf, AL)
Services and manufacturing export growth slows under NAFTA. A key claim of supporters of
NAFTA-style trade pacts is that they create jobs by promoting faster U.S. export growth. By contrast, growth of
U.S. exports to countries that are not Free Trade Agreement (FTA) partners has exceeded U.S. export growth to
countries that are FTA partners by 38 percent over the last decade.14 Manufacturing and services exports in
particular grew slower after NAFTA took effect. Since NAFTA’s enactment, U.S. manufacturing
exports to Canada and Mexico have grown at less than half the rate seen in the years before
NAFTA.15 Even growth in services exports, which were supposed to do especially well under the trade pact
given a presumed U.S. comparative advantage in services, dropped precipitously after NAFTA’s
implementation. During NAFTA’s first decade, the average growth rate in U.S. services exports
fell by 58 percent compared to the decade before NAFTA, and has remained well below the preNAFTA rate through the present.16¶ One million American jobs lost to NAFTA. The Economic
Policy Institute estimates that the rising trade deficit with Mexico and Canada since NAFTA went into effect
eliminated about one million net jobs in the United States by 2004.17 EPI further calculates that the
ballooning trade deficit with Mexico alone destroyed about seven hundred thousand net U.S.
jobs between NAFTA’s implementation and 2010.18 Moreover, official government data reveals that
nearly five million U.S. manufacturing jobs have¶ been lost overall since NAFTA took effect.19 Obviously, not all
of these lost U.S. manufacturing jobs – one out of every four of our manufacturing jobs – is due to NAFTA. The
United States entered the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995, China joined WTO in 2000 and the U.S.
trade deficit with China soared thereafter. However, at the same time, given the methodology employed, it is
also likely that the EPI estimates do not capture the full U.S. job loss associated with NAFTA. Service sector
jobs have also been negatively impacted by NAFTA, as closed factories no longer demand
services. EPI estimates that one third of the jobs lost due to the rising trade deficit under
NAFTA were in non-manufacturing sectors of the economy.20
NAFTA hurts US – imports from Mexico kill jobs
Scott 3 (Robert E. Scott, PhD in Economics form the University of California at Berkeley and BS in
Engineering from Washington University at St. Louis, “The high price of ‘free’ trade: NAFTA’s failure has cost
the United States jobs across the nation,” 17 November 2003,
http://www.epi.org/publication/briefingpapers_bp147/, AL)
Proponents of new trade agreements that build on NAFTA, such as the proposed Free Trade Agreement of the
Americas (FTAA), have frequently claimed that such deals create jobs and raise incomes in the United States.
When the Senate recently approved President Bush’s request for fast-track trade negotiating authority1 for an
FTAA, Bush called the bill’s passage a “historic moment” that would lead to the creation of more jobs and more
sales of U.S. products abroad. Two weeks later at his economic forum in Texas, the president argued, “(i)t is
essential that we move aggressively [to negotiate new trade pacts], because trade means jobs. More trade
means higher incomes for American workers.Ӧ The problem with these statements is that they misrepresent
the real effects of trade on the U.S. economy: trade both creates and destroys jobs. Increases in U.S. exports
tend to create jobs in this country, but increases in imports tend to reduce jobs because the imports displace
goods that otherwise would have been made in the United States by domestic workers.¶ President Bush’s
statements—and similar remarks from others in his administration and from members of both major parties in
Congress—are based only on the positive effects of exports, ignoring the negative effects of imports. Such
arguments are an attempt to hide the costs of new trade deals, in order to boost the reported benefits. These
are effectively the same tactics that led to the bankruptcies of Enron, WorldCom, and several other major
corporations.¶ The impact on employment of any change in trade is determined by its effect on the trade
balance, the difference between exports and imports. Ignoring imports and counting only exports is like
balancing a checkbook by counting only deposits but not withdrawals. The many officials, policy analysts, and
business leaders who ignore the negative effects of imports and talk only about the benefits of exports are
engaging in false accounting.¶ NAFTA supporters frequently tout the benefits of exports while remaining silent
on the effects of rapid import growth (Scott 2000). Former President George H.W. Bush, whose administration
negotiated NAFTA, recently claimed that “two million NAFTA-related jobs have been created in the United
States since 1993″ (Bush 2002). But any evaluation of the impact of trade on the domestic economy must
include the impact of both imports and exports. If the United States exports 1,000 cars to Mexico, many
American workers are employed in their production. If, however, the United States imports 1,000 cars from
Mexico rather than building them domestically, then a similar number of Americans who would have otherwise
been employed in the auto industry will have to find other work.¶ Another critically important promise made
by the promoters of NAFTA was that the United States would benefit because of increased exports to a large
and growing consumer market in Mexico. This market, in turn, was to be based on an expansion of the middle
class that, it was claimed, would grow rapidly due to the wealth created in Mexico by NAFTA. Thus, most U.S.
exports were predicted to be consumer products destined for consumption in Mexico.¶ In fact, most U.S.
exports to Mexico are parts and components that are shipped to Mexico and assembled into final products that
are then returned to the United States. The number of products that Mexico assembles and exports—such as
refrigerators, TVs, automobiles, and computers—has mushroomed under the NAFTA agreement. Many of these
products are produced in the Maquiladora export processing zones in Mexico, where parts enter duty free and
are re-exported to the United States in assembled products, with duties paid only on the value added in Mexico.
The share of total U.S. exports to Mexico that is represented by Maquiladora imports has risen from 39% of
U.S. exports in 1993 to 61% in 2002.2 The number of such plants increased from 2,114 in 1993 to 3,251 in 2002
(INEGI 2003a, 2003b).
NAFTA hurts jobs and increases trade deficits
Scott 3 (Robert E. Scott, PhD in Economics form the University of California at Berkeley and BS in
Engineering from Washington University at St. Louis, “The high price of ‘free’ trade: NAFTA’s failure has cost
the United States jobs across the nation,” 17 November 2003,
http://www.epi.org/publication/briefingpapers_bp147/, AL)
NAFTA’s impact in the United States, however, has been often obscured by the “boom-and-bust” cycle that
drove domestic consumption, investment, and speculation in the mid- and late 1990s. Between 1994 (when
NAFTA was implemented) and 2000, total employment rose rapidly in the United States, causing overall
unemployment to fall to record low levels. But unemployment began to rise early in 2001, and 2.4 million jobs
were lost in the domestic economy between March 2001 and October 2003 (BLS 2003). These job losses have
been primarily concentrated in the manufacturing sector, which has experienced a total decline of 2.4 million
jobs since March 2001. As job growth has dried up in the economy, the underlying problems caused by U.S.
trade deficits have become much more apparent, especially in manufacturing.¶ The United States has
experienced steadily growing global trade deficits for nearly three decades, and these deficits accelerated
rapidly after NAFTA took effect on January 1, 1994. For the purposes of this report it is necessary to distinguish
between exports produced domestically and foreign exports, which are goods produced in other countries but
exported to the United States, and then re-exported from the United States. Foreign exports made up 11.6% of
total U.S. exports to Mexico and Canada in 2002. However, because only domestically produced exports
generate jobs in the United States, our trade calculations are based only on domestic exports. Our measure of
the net impact of trade, which is used here to calculate the employment content of trade, is the difference
between domestic exports and total imports.3 We refer to this as “net exports,” to distinguish it from the more
commonly reported gross trade balance. However, both concepts are measures of net trade flows.¶ Although
U.S. domestic exports to its NAFTA partners have increased dramatically—with real growth of 95.2% to Mexico
and 41% to Canada—growth in imports of 195.3% from Mexico and 61.1% from Canada overwhelmingly
surpass export growth, as shown in Table 1. The resulting $30 billion U.S. net export deficit with these
countries in 1993 increased by 281% to $85 billion in 2002 (all figures in inflation-adjusted 2002 dollars). As a
result, NAFTA has led to job losses in all 50 states and the District of Columbia, as shown in Figure 1. Through
September 2003, the U.S. goods trade deficit with Mexico and Canada has increased 12% over the same period
last year (U.S. Census Bureau 2003a). Job losses for the remainder of 2003 are likely to grow at a similar rate.
Number of workers hurt by NAFTA far outweighs the tiny percent that benefitted
Scott 3 (Robert E. Scott, PhD in Economics form the University of California at Berkeley and BS in
Engineering from Washington University at St. Louis, “The high price of ‘free’ trade: NAFTA’s failure has cost
the United States jobs across the nation,” 17 November 2003,
http://www.epi.org/publication/briefingpapers_bp147/, AL)
NAFTA has also contributed to growing income inequality and to the declining relative wages of U.S. workers
without college degree, who made up 72.1% of the workforce in 2001 (Mishel et al. 2003, 163). NAFTA,
however, is but one contributor to a larger process of globalization and growing structural trade deficits that
has shaped the U.S. economy and society over the last few decades.6 Rapid growth in U.S. trade and foreign
investment as a share of U.S. gross domestic product (GDP) has played a large role in the growth of inequality
in income distribution in the last 20 years. NAFTA has continued and accelerated international economic
integration, and thus contributed to the growing tradeoffs that have accompanied this integration process.¶
The growth in U.S. trade and trade deficits has put downward pressure on the wages of workers without a
college degree, especially those who have no formal education beyond a high school degree. This group
includes most middle- and low-wage workers, including the 68.5% of the total workforce with the lowest pay,
those earning a wage that is e¶ qual to 200% or less of poverty level wages in 2001 (Mishel et al. 2003, p. 134).
In March 2000, the base year used for data, these workers earned wages of $16.93 or less per hour (See
Appendix 1). These U.S. workers bear the brunt of the costs and pressures of globalization (Mishel et al. 2003,
181-89).¶ A large and growing body of research has demonstrated that expanding trade has reduced the price
of import-competing products and put downward pressure on the real wages of workers engaged in producing
those goods. Trade, however, is also expected to increase the wages of the workers producing exports, but
growing trade deficits have meant that the number of workers hurt by imports has exceeded the number who
have benefited through increased exports. Because the United States tends to import goods that make intensive
use of skills of less-educated workers in production, it is not surprising to find that the increasing openness of
the U.S. economy to trade has reduced the wages of less-educated workers relative to other workers in the
United States.7
Kills jobs and lowers wages
Scott 3 (Robert E. Scott, PhD in Economics form the University of California at Berkeley and BS in
Engineering from Washington University at St. Louis, “The high price of ‘free’ trade: NAFTA’s failure has cost
the United States jobs across the nation,” 17 November 2003,
http://www.epi.org/publication/briefingpapers_bp147/, AL)
Globalization has put downward pressure on the wages of less-educated workers for three primary reasons.
First, the steady growth in U.S. trade deficits over the past two decades has eliminated millions of
manufacturing jobs and job opportunities in this country. Most displaced workers find jobs in other sectors
where wages are much lower, which in turn leads to lower average wages for all U.S. workers. Recent surveys
have shown that, even when displaced workers are able to find new jobs in the United States, they face a
reduction in wages, with earnings declining by an average of over 13% (Mishel et al. 2001, 24). These displaced
workers’ new jobs are likely to be in the service industry, the source of 98% of net new jobs created in the
United States between 1989 and 2000, and a sector in which average compensation is only 81% of the
manufacturing sector’s average (Mishel et al. 2003, 177). This competition also extends to export sectors, where
pressures to cut product prices are often intense.¶ Second, the effects of growing U.S. trade and trade deficits
on wages goes beyond just those workers exposed directly to foreign competition. As the trade deficit limits
jobs in the manufacturing sector, the new supply of workers to the service sector (from displaced workers plus
young workers not able to find manufacturing jobs) depresses the wages of those already holding service jobs.
The growth in import competition and capital mobility under NAFTA has also contributed to stagnant and
falling wages in the United States (Bronfenbrenner 1997a).¶ Finally, “threat effects” arise when firms threaten
to close plants and move them abroad while bargaining with workers over wages and working conditions.
Employers’ credible threats to relocate plants, outsource portions of their operations, and purchase
intermediate goods and services directly from foreign producers can have a substantial impact on workers’
bargaining positions. The use of these kinds of threats is widespread. A Wall Street Journal survey in 1992
reported that one-fourth of almost 500 American corporate executives polled admitted that they were “very
likely” or “somewhat likely” to use NAFTA as a bargaining chip to hold down wages (Tonelson 2000, 47). In a
unique study of union organizing drives in 1993 though 1995, it was found that more than 50% of all employers
made threats to close all or part of their plants during organizing drives (Bronfenbrenner 1997b). This study
also found that plant closing threats in National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) union certification elections
nearly doubled following the implementation of NAFTA, and that threat rates were substantially higher in
mobile industries, where employers can credibly threaten to shut down or move their operations in response to
union activity.
Hurts jobs more than anything else
Scott 3 (Robert E. Scott, PhD in Economics form the University of California at Berkeley and BS in
Engineering from Washington University at St. Louis, “The high price of ‘free’ trade: NAFTA’s failure has cost
the United States jobs across the nation,” 17 November 2003,
http://www.epi.org/publication/briefingpapers_bp147/, AL)
The U.S. economy created 21 million jobs between 1992 and March 2001 (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2003c).
All of those gains are explained by growth in domestic consumption, investment, and government spending.
The growth in the overall U.S. trade deficit eliminated production supported by three million jobs in the same
period (Scott 2001). Thus, NAFTA and other sources of growing trade deficits were responsible for a change in
the composition of employment, shifting workers from manufacturing to other sectors and, frequently, from
good jobs to low-quality, low-pay work.¶ Since the onset of recession in early 2001, trade-displaced workers
have been especially hard hit. Workers have experienced longer unemployment spells, and they have found it
much more difficult to get new jobs. Many have concluded that their jobs in manufacturing will never come
back. The growth of the trade deficit since early 2001 has contributed to an absolute decline of jobs, not just a
shift in jobs from manufacturing to other sectors.¶ When trying to identify the causes behind trends such as the
disappearance of manufacturing jobs, the rise in income inequality, and the decline in wages in the United
States, NAFTA and growing trade deficits only provide part of the picture. Other major contributors include
deregulation and privatization, declining rates of unionization, sustained high levels of unemployment, and
technological change. While each of these factors has played some role, a large body of economic research has
concluded that trade is responsible for at least 15% to 25% of the growth in wage inequality in the United States
(U.S. Trade Deficit Review Commission 2000, 110-18). In addition, trade also has indirect effects on wage
inequality by contributing to many of these other causes. For example, the decline of the manufacturing sector
attributable to increased globaliza¶ tion has resulted in a reduction in unionization rates, since unions
represent a larger share of the workforce in this sector than in other sectors of the economy.¶ Although NAFTA
is not responsible for all U.S. labor market problems, it has made a significant contribution to the state of the
U.S. economy, both directly and indirectly. Without major changes in NAFTA to address unequal levels of
development and enforcement of labor rights and environmental standards, continued integration of North
American markets will threaten the prosperity of a growing share of the U.S. workforce. Expansion of a
NAFTA-style agreement, such as the proposed Free Trade Agreement of the Americas, will only worsen these
problems. Past experience suggests that workers have good reasons to be concerned as NAFTA enters its
second decade.
NAFTA kills jobs
Joseph ’11 (Joel D. Joseph, Founder/Chairman of the Made in the USA Foundation, “Trade Insanity”, PR Newswire December 30, LEXIS //NS)
Every trade agreement that we have entered into in the past forty years has led to a destruction
of American jobs. The North American Free Trade Agreement, the largest free trade agreement
that we have signed, caused nearly two million jobs to shift from the United States to Mexico.
Even Hillary Clinton, whose husband signed NAFTA into law, admitted during the 2008
Democratic presidential debates that NAFTA was a failure. Before NAFTA, in 1992, we had a $5 billion trade surplus with
Mexico. That same year we had an $8 billion trade deficit with Canada. Before NAFTA trade with both nations was fairly
equal. After NAFTA our trade deficit with Canada ballooned to $80 billion a year. Similarly, trade with
Mexico exploded to a trade deficit of $75 billion. The Great Recession has brought those numbers down a bit: according to the U.S. Census Bureau, our trade deficit
with Canada was "only" $28 billion in 2010 and $66 billion with Mexico, a staggering $94 billion deficit with our NAFTA partners.
Based on the
standard that each $1 billion of deficit costs 20,000 jobs, we have lost 1.88 million jobs because
we entered into the North American Free Trade Agreement. Mexico is not too happy about
NAFTA either. Victor Suarez, a representative for the Democratic Revolutionary Party, or PRD, is in the Mexican House of Representatives. Suarez said,
"With NAFTA we had promises of economic prosperity, and now we have the facts," Suarez told
United Press International. He emphasized that "NAFTA was a failure for the farmers and it
failed to slow down the migration that was already under way." Richard Nixon opened the door to trade with China in
1972. Before 1972 we had virtually no trade with that communist nation. Now we have a massive trade deficit with China that has cost us more jobs than NAFTA trade
expansion has cost the United States. Free trade with China and Vietnam didn't create jobs in the United States. Trade with both of those Asian nations has been a oneway street to unemployment in the United States. Our trade surplus last year was $11 billion with Vietnam, and a staggering $273 billion with China. Is our trade policy
insane? AFL-CIO President Richard Trumka said in a recent speech in Washington, D.C. that the Korean, Columbia and Panamanian agreements would destroy
159,000 jobs by encouraging companies to send work overseas. While these job losses pale by comparison to our job losses with Mexico and China, the new
trade agreements will not create jobs in the United States. These trade agreements have led to
the vast disparity between rich and poor in the United States. Trade agreements have
undermined our middle class, those working in factories, while making the rich who control
international trade richer and richer. They have done the same to Mexico, driving poor farmers
out of business and into the United States. Do we ever learn from our mistakes? We should get tough with China. China has stolen our
intellectual property. China manipulates its currency to favor exports over imports. We need to renegotiate NAFTA. And we need to get out of these new trade
agreements before they steal more American jobs.
NAFTA trade deficits hurt job growth in the US and Mexico
Scott ’11 – Law Professor at Columbia Law School (Robert E, “Heading South: U.S.-Mexico Trade And Job
Displacement After NAFTA,” EPI Briefing Paper, Economic Policy Institute, 5/3/11, Google Scholar)//ER
The United States had a small $1.6 billion trade surplus with Mexico in 1993, the year before NAFTA took
effect. By ¶ 1997, the United States had developed a $16.6 billion trade deficit with Mexico, which increased to
$97.2 billion in ¶ 2010, as shown in Table 1. Between 1997 and 2010, the U.S. trade deficit with Mexico
increased $6.2 billion per year, ¶ or 14.6% per year.¶ This paper estimates the impact of that change in trade on
employment by calculating the labor content of changes ¶ in the trade balance—the difference between exports
and imports. For example, each $1 billion in U.S. auto parts ¶ exported to Mexico supports U.S. jobs, but each
$1 billion in autos and trucks imported from Mexico displaces the ¶ workers who would have been making
them in the United States. On balance, the net employment effect of trade flows ¶ is determined by changes in
the trade balance. Growing trade deficits usually result in job displacement.¶ The employment impacts of trade
deficits are assessed using an input-output model that estimates the direct and ¶ indirect labor requirements of
producing output in a given domestic industry. The model includes 202 U.S. industries, ¶ 84 of which are in the
manufacturing sector.9¶ The model estimates the amount of labor (number of jobs) required to ¶ produce a
given volume of exports and the labor displaced when a given volume of imports is substituted for domestic ¶
output. The net of these two numbers is the estimated number of jobs displaced by changes in the trade
balance, holding ¶ all else equal. ¶ U.S. exports to Mexico in 2010 supported 791,900 jobs, but U.S. imports
displaced production that would have ¶ supported 1,474,800 jobs, as shown in the bottom half of Table 1.
Therefore, the $97.2 billion U.S. trade deficit with ¶ Mexico in 2010 displaced 682,900 jobs.10 Since the
United States had a small trade surplus in 1993 (not shown), all of ¶ those jobs were displaced between 1993
and 2010.11 On average, 40,200 jobs have been lost or displaced per year since ¶ NAFTA took effect.12¶ U.S.
jobs displaced by the trade deficit with Mexico are a net drain on employment in trade-related industries, ¶
especially those in the manufacturing sector. Even if increased demand in other sectors absorbs all the workers
displaced ¶ by trade (an unlikely event), job quality is likely to suffer, as many non-trade-related industries,
such as retail and home ¶ health care, pay lower wages and have less comprehensive benefits than trade-related
industries.
NAFTA costs skilled labor in the US – kills the economy
Sullivan ’11 – American Correspondent, graduate from Santa Clara University (Bartholomew, “Study says
NAFTA free-trade pacts cost jobs,” McClatchy - Tribune Business News, 5/15/11, ProQuest)//ER
But a report by the Economic Policy Institute earlier this month analyzed the terms of the agreement and
concluded it would lead to displacing 159,000 American jobs in its first seven years.¶ The same report,
"Heading South: U.S.-Mexico Trade and job displacement after NAFTA," makes the case that the free-trade
agreement with Mexico and Canada that went into effect in 1994 has cost 682,900 American jobs, three-fifths
of them in the manufacturing sector.¶ In the three states of the Mid-South, while some jobs were created from
increased exports, far more were lost when manufacturing production lines left the region as tariff barriers fell.
Tennessee, which picked up 18,600 export-related jobs from 1994 to 2010, lost 35,100, for a net job loss of
16,400.¶ In Arkansas and Mississippi, the net job losses were 5,800 and 5,300, respectively.¶ The five
congressional districts of the Greater Memphis area lost 7,500 jobs in that period, the report indicates.¶
Tennessee's 9th District, which includes Memphis, lost 1,000 jobs. Tennessee's 8th, which includes Millington,
Covington, and Jackson, lost 1,400. Tennessee's 7th, which includes parts of Germantown, Collierville and
Bartlett, lost 1,900.¶ Mississippi's 1st, which includes DeSoto and Marshall counties, lost 1,700, and Arkansas'
1st, which includes Crittenden County, Blytheville and Jonesboro, lost 1,500, it found.¶ As the report says,
"Trade both creates and destroys jobs. While exports tend to support domestic employment, imports lead to
job displacement: As imports are substituted for domestically produced goods, production that supports
domestic jobs falls, displacing existing jobs and preventing new job creation..."¶ "Like NAFTA, the (Korean
Free Trade Agreement) will likely result in growing trade deficits and hence U.S. job displacement, not
economy-wide growth," it says.¶ The EPI, since 1986 a leading nonprofit think tank that analyzes the impact of
economic policy on the middle- and lower classes, predicts in the 32-page report that domestic jobs in the
motor vehicle and auto parts and computer and electronic parts industries, in particular, would be hardest hit
if the Korean agreement goes through. Those are the same industries negatively affected by bilateral free trade
agreements, it said.¶ Opponents of NAFTA as it worked its way through Congress in the early 1990s predicted
job losses and a race to the bottom as good-paying jobs went to export assembly plants, known as
maquiladoras, across the border in Mexico.¶ International Brotherhood of Teamsters president James P. Hoffa
said in response to an inquiry by The Commercial Appeal last week that "EPI's findings come as no surprise to
our membership.¶ "We have said from the beginning that NAFTA was a job killer. We shouldn't be sending
American jobs with good American benefits to countries with cheap labor and no benefits. That is not fair
trade," Hoffa said.
NAFTA causes trade deficits and job losses
Sullivan ’11 – American Correspondent, graduate from Santa Clara University (Bartholomew, “Study says
NAFTA free-trade pacts cost jobs,” McClatchy - Tribune Business News, 5/15/11, ProQuest)//ER
The U.S. Trade Representative's website indicates the U.S. has been running a trade deficit with Mexico and
Canada amounting to $41 billion in 2009 and $95 billion last year.¶ The EPI report says that the North
American Free Trade Agreement made it attractive to companies all over the world to invest in Mexico to get
duty-free access to the U.S. market. Foreign direct investment in Mexico tripled after the agreement was
signed.¶ Tennessee tied with New Hampshire, Kentucky and Ohio for third place in the percentage of jobs lost
because of the free-trade agreement, the report indicates. Only Michigan and Indiana, which saw the
automobile industry decimated, fared worse as a percentage of their overall labor forces.¶ Another effect of
NAFTA has been that wages have not kept pace with labor productivity, resulting in rising income inequality,
and putting more pressure on the American manufacturing base, according to Edward Alden, a senior fellow at
the Council on Foreign Relations.
Kills US jobs
Strachan 11 (Maxwell Strachan, Maxwell Strachan is the Business Editor at The Huffington Post. He has
previously worked at Salon.com, the Center for Governmental Studies, and PBS-affiliate KCET.org, “U.S.
Economy Lost Nearly 700,000 Jobs Because of NAFTA, EPI Says,” 12 July 2011,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/05/12/nafta-job-loss-trade-deficit-epi_n_859983.html, AL)
The historic agreement, signed just three years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, tore down trade barriers
between the U.S., Canada and Mexico, making trade and investment easier for businesses without allowing for
the cross-border movement of labor. Despite the agreement being considered a boon for Mexico, the
country's economy grew only 1.6 percent per capita on average between 1992 and 2007, The New
York Times reported in 2009.¶ The EPI's calculation of 682,900 jobs lost to NAFTA takes into
account jobs created as a result, too. Last year, for example, U.S. exports to Mexico supported 791,900 jobs.
It's just that those jobs created pale in comparison to the 1.47 million U.S. jobs that would be
necessary without the imports resulting from NAFTA, the report found.¶ Still, the number of jobs lost
to NAFTA looks minimal when placed against the havoc freaked by the financial crisis. Only in 2008, at the
height of the crisis, the U.S. economy hemorrhaged 2.6 million jobs, according to CNNMoney.¶ The U.S. is
currently considering a similar trade agreement with South Korea, called U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement
(KORUS FTA). KORUS, like NAFTA, could similarly displace American jobs, EPI warns.¶ Perhaps the most
drastic switch post-NAFTA has been in the two country's trade deficit. In 1993, before the signing of
NAFTA, the U.S. held a $1.6 billion trade surplus over their neighbor to the south, which
supported 29,400 jobs. By 1997, the tides had turned, and Mexico laid claim to a much larger surplus of $16.6
billion. As of 2010, it's not even close. Mexico's trade surplus now hovers around $97.2 billion.¶ Jobs
continue to be lost to NAFTA today. In the years 2007-2010, the U.S. economy has lost 116,400
as a result of the trade deficit created by NAFTA. And last year, the growth of Mexican auto exports to
the United States alone created more Mexican jobs -- 30,400 -- than the entire U.S. auto industry.¶ It's the
U.S. manufacturing sector that has suffered most mightily from NAFTA, alone accounting for 60.8
percent -- 415,000 total -- of the jobs lost to the agreement. Specifically, those making computer of
electronic parts have accounted for 22 percent of all job losses, and motor vehicle and parts workers accounted
for 15 percent of job losses.
Threatens green jobs
Public Citizen 13 (Public Citizen, nonprofit advocacy group with offices in Washington and Austin, “NAFTA’s
Broken Promises 1994-2013: Outcomes of the North American Free Trade Agreement,” 2013,
http://www.citizen.org/documents/NAFTAs-Broken-Promises.pdf, AL)
NAFTA threatens green jobs programs. As governments have come to recognize the necessity of
supporting renewable energy generation and creating green jobs, corporations have started
using NAFTA’s backdoor investor-state system to try to undermine these policies. In July 2011,
U.S.-based Mesa Power, LLC announced that it would challenge a successful Ontario renewable energy
program under NAFTA.69 Under the new program, which has already created more than 20,000
jobs, renewable energy companies have committed over $20 billion to clean energy
investments.70 Michael Eckhart, President of the American Council on Renewable Energy, called the
program part of “the most comprehensive renewable energy policy entered anywhere around the world.”71
Despite wide praise for this leading effort to combat climate change and support green jobs,
Mesa Power is now using NAFTA to undermine the program and demand $775 million in
taxpayer compensation.72
Increases trade deficit and costs jobs
Public Citizen 13 (Public Citizen, nonprofit advocacy group with offices in Washington and Austin, “NAFTA’s
Broken Promises 1994-2013: Outcomes of the North American Free Trade Agreement,” 2013,
http://www.citizen.org/documents/NAFTAs-Broken-Promises.pdf, AL)
Projections on trade balance, jobs prove wrong. In 1993, Gary Hufbauer and Jeffrey Schott of the
Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE) projected that NAFTA would lead to a rising U.S. trade
surplus with Mexico, which would create 170,000 net new jobs in the United States.8 This figure was
trumpeted by the Clinton administration and other NAFTA proponents. Hufbauer and Schott based their
projection on the observation that when export growth outpaces the growth of imports, more jobs are created
by trade than are destroyed by trade.9 Instead of an improved trade balance with Canada and
Mexico, however, NAFTA resulted in an explosion of imports from Mexico and Canada that led
to huge U.S. trade deficits. According to Hufbauer and Schott’s own methodology, these deficits meant
major job loss. Less than two years after NAFTA’s implementation, even before the depth of the
NAFTA deficit became evident, Hufbauer recognized that his jobs prediction was incongruent with the facts,
telling the Wall Street Journal, “The best figure for the jobs effect of NAFTA is approximately zero...the lesson
for me is to stay away from job forecasting.”10¶ Huge new NAFTA trade deficit emerges. The U.S. trade
deficit with Canada of $29.1 billion and the $2.5 billion surplus with Mexico in 1993 (the year
before NAFTA took effect) turned into a combined NAFTA trade deficit of $181 billion by 2012.11
This represents an increase in the “NAFTA deficit” of 580 percent. These are inflation-adjusted numbers,
meaning the difference is not due to inflation, but an increase in the deficit in real terms. The U.S. deficit
with NAFTA partners Mexico and Canada has worsened considerably more than the U.S. deficit
with countries with which we have not signed NAFTA- style deals. Since NAFTA, the average annual
growth of the U.S. trade deficit has been 45 percent higher with Mexico and Canada than with countries that
are not party to a NAFTA-style trade pact.12 Defenders of NAFTA argue that the NAFTA deficit is really only oil
imports. Although oil accounts for a substantial portion of the trade deficit with Canada and Mexico, the oil
share of the trade deficit with Canada and Mexico actually declined from 77 percent in 1993 to 55 percent in
2012.13
TAA data proves job loss
Public Citizen 13 (Public Citizen, nonprofit advocacy group with offices in Washington and Austin, “NAFTA’s
Broken Promises 1994-2013: Outcomes of the North American Free Trade Agreement,” 2013,
http://www.citizen.org/documents/NAFTAs-Broken-Promises.pdf, AL)
Trade Adjustment Assistance data tracks the NAFTA jobs devastation. While EPI’s estimates of the
job losses resulting from NAFTA summarize the overall effect of the trade deficit, the government itself
tracks some of the layoffs known to have specifically occurred due to imports or offshoring
through a government program called Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA). The TAA program is
quite narrow, only covering a subset of jobs lost at manufacturing facilities, while excluding a portion of the
jobs that have directly relocated to Mexico or Canada. The program is also difficult to qualify for, which has led
some unions to direct workers to other assistance programs. Thus the NAFTA TAA numbers
significantly undercount NAFTA job loss. Still, under TAA, over 720,000 workers were certified
by 2010 (the most recent date for which public information is available) as having lost their jobs due to
trade with Canada and Mexico or the shift in factories to those countries.21 A report produced by
PIIE estimates that fewer than 10 percent of workers who lose their jobs in industries facing heavy import
competition receive assistance under TAA.22 Thus, even the pro-NAFTA PIIE believes that TAA vastly
underestimates the number of jobs lost due to trade-related displacement. The federal government also tried to
determine specific jobs created by NAFTA rather than destroyed. The Department of Commerce established
such a program, but after finding fewer than 1,500 specific jobs that could be attributed to NAFTA, the
program was shut down because its findings were so bleak.23
Promotes offshoring which further devastates unemployment rates
Public Citizen 13 (Public Citizen, nonprofit advocacy group with offices in Washington and Austin, “NAFTA’s
Broken Promises 1994-2013: Outcomes of the North American Free Trade Agreement,” 2013,
http://www.citizen.org/documents/NAFTAs-Broken-Promises.pdf, AL)
Corporate promises of job creation are broken. In addition to NAFTA supporters’ unfulfilled promises
of overall job creation, specific companies also lobbied for NAFTA by claiming that the deal would boost their
own hiring and reduce the need to move jobs to Mexico and Canada. In reality, the vast majority of their
promises of job creation failed to materialize and many of these companies have actually
moved operations to Mexico and Canada since NAFTA’s passage.24 For example, Caterpillar,
Inc. said that NAFTA would eliminate the incentive to move jobs to Mexico and that it would
export more equipment.25 However, in 2008 Caterpillar laid off 338 workers at its Mapleton,
Illinois facility as it shifted production to Mexico, while 105 workers were laid off from its Pendergrass,
Georgia facility due to rising imports from Mexico in the same year.26 Siemens made claims similar to
Caterpillar’s, and yet it has eliminated over 1,500 U.S. jobs while shifting production to
Mexico.27 Johnson and Johnson promised that it would hire hundreds of U.S. workers if
NAFTA was approved, but it has ended up offshoring over 800 U.S. jobs to Mexico and Canada
since NAFTA went into effect.28¶ Special investor privileges promote offshoring of American jobs.
NAFTA’s special new rights and privileges for foreign investors eliminated many of the risks and costs that had
been associated with relocating production to a low-wage venue. The incentives these rules offered for
offshoring included a guaranteed minimum standard of treatment that Mexico had to provide
to relocating U.S. firms, which went above and beyond the treatment provided to domestic
firms. This included the right for foreign investors to directly challenge the Mexican government in United
Nations and World Bank tribunals, demanding compensation for environmental, zoning, health and other
government regulatory actions of general application that investors claimed as undermining their expected
profits. (Some of these cases are described below.) By providing foreign investors access to foreign tribunals,
NAFTA also eliminated the risk of having to rely on Mexico’s domestic court system. The protections granted to
corporations
NAFTA hurts the economy – jobs
Strachan 11—Staff Writer for The Huffington Post (“U.S. Economy Lost Nearly 700,000 Jobs Because Of NAFTA, EPI Says”, July 12, 2011,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/05/12/nafta-job-loss-trade-deficit-epi_n_859983.html)//RT
When the North American Free Trade Agreement was first signed in 1994, proponents said it
would eventually create jobs for the U.S. economy.¶ 17 years later, a new report estimates, the
American worker only has hundreds of thousands of job losses to show for it.¶ According to a report by
Economic Policy Institute economist Robert Scott, entitled "Heading South: U.S.-Mexico trade and job displacement after NAFTA," an estimated
682,900 U.S. jobs have been "lost or displaced" because of the agreement and the resulting trade deficit.¶ The historic agreement,
signed just three years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, tore down trade barriers between
the U.S., Canada and Mexico, making trade and investment easier for businesses without
allowing for the cross-border movement of labor. Despite the agreement being considered a
boon for Mexico, the country's economy grew only 1.6 percent per capita on average between
1992 and 2007, The New York Times reported in 2009.¶ The EPI's calculation of 682,900 jobs
lost to NAFTA takes into account jobs created as a result, too. Last year, for example, U.S. exports to
Mexico supported 791,900 jobs. It's just that those jobs created pale in comparison to the 1.47
million U.S. jobs that would be necessary without the imports resulting from NAFTA , the report
found.¶ Still, the number of jobs lost to NAFTA looks minimal when placed against the havoc
freaked by the financial crisis. Only in 2008, at the height of the crisis, the U.S. economy
hemorrhaged 2.6 million jobs, according to CNNMoney.¶ The U.S. is currently considering a similar trade
agreement with South Korea, called U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA). KORUS,
like NAFTA, could similarly displace American jobs, EPI warns.¶ Perhaps the most drastic switch post-NAFTA has been in
the two country's trade deficit. In 1993, before the signing of NAFTA, the U.S. held a $1.6 billion trade surplus over their
neighbor to the south, which supported 29,400 jobs. By 1997, the tides had turned, and Mexico laid claim to a much larger surplus of $16.6
billion. As of 2010, it's not even close. Mexico's trade surplus now hovers around $97.2 billion.¶ Jobs continue
to be lost to NAFTA today. In the years 2007-2010, the U.S. economy has lost 116,400 as a result of the trade deficit created by NAFTA.
And last year, the growth of Mexican auto exports to the United States alone created more Mexican jobs -- 30,400 -- than the entire U.S. auto industry.¶
It's the U.S. manufacturing sector that has suffered most mightily from NAFTA, alone accounting for 60.8 percent -- 415,000 total -- of the jobs lost to
the agreement. Specifically, those making computer of electronic parts have accounted for 22 percent of all job losses, and motor vehicle and parts
workers accounted for 15 percent of job losses.¶ Job losses haven't been limited to certain geographic regions, either, as all fifty states have lost jobs as a
result. And while the states with the largest total number of job losses, California and Texas, do hug the southern border , it's actually
manufacturing-heavy states to the north, such as Michigan, Indiana and Kentucky, that have
lost the largest share of jobs to Mexico.
NAFTA hurt wages and growth and caused income inequality—demand couldn’t meet
the amount of consumption, caused the financial crisis
Correa and Seccareccia 2009—Mario Seccareccia has been teaching at the University of Ottawa since 1978.
He has authored/co-authored or co-edited some eight books or monographs, and has published some 75
articles or chapters of books. He is also editor of the New York-based International Journal of Political
Economy. His principal research interests are in the areas of monetary economics, history of economic thought
and methodology, labour economics, and Canadian economic history. Eugenia Correa is a professor at the
National Autonomous University of Mexico. ["The United States Financial Crisis and Its NAFTA Linkages."
International Journal Of Political Economy 38.2 (2009): 70-99. Political Science Complete. JSTOR. 27 July
2013]//MM
The Underlying Cause of the Subprime Crisis and the NAFTA Linkage¶ From the initial pressures under
NAFTA, and with the implementation of a competitiveness strategy resting on rigorous anti-inflationary
monetary and fiscal policies in both Canada and Mexico, this growing trade and financial liberalization
imparted a deflationary bias on the evolution of money and real wages as well as prices in the respective
countries on the North American continent while widening the share of profit (see Baragar and Seccareccia
2008; Seccareccia 2007). On the other hand, for the NAFTA model to actually succeed, high consumption (and
therefore high wages), especially in the United States, is needed to sustain aggregate demand and their ELG
strategies, not only for Canada’s and Mexico’s economies but also for the rest of the world economy.¶ This
pattern of growth for North America—based on high consumption growth for the United States and a lowinflation environment (because of austere macroeconomic policy, low labor costs in Mexico, and low energy
and raw materials prices from Canada)—did occur, and the ELG model quickly extended its tentacles beyond
North America as growing industrial giants, such as China, began to replace Mexico as a source of laborintensive manufactured products (see Blecker and Seccareccia forthcoming). However, the impact this had on
real wage growth on each of the three NAFTA countries is of great interest. As evidenced from the series
provided by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, real wages (at least for the manufacturing sector) grew
somewhat in the United States, grew rather marginally in Canada, and actually declined during the early years
of NAFTA in Mexico, only to reach a level in 2006 that was just marginally above its 1996 level!¶ Interestingly,
all three countries showed practically no growth and, in one case, there was a significant decline in real wages
until the turn of the millennium. Real wages showed some upward trend in the United States, reaching a
plateau between 2003 and 2005, but grew only by an average of less than 1 percent annually for the decade
between 1996 and 2007 as a whole, which was well below the trend of growth in productivity for that same
period. Although one could not argue outright that the growing U.S. trade deficit (which was partly a by-
product of this reconfiguration of both the North American and world economy based on outwardlooking
measures to stimulate growth) was actually a source of impoverishment for the rest of the world (see Scott
2007), the experience of Mexico in the NAFTA context confirms that real wages collapsed during the early
NAFTA era and have not grown much beyond their pre-NAFTA levels even during the first decade of the
twenty-first century. This labor market state of anemic real wage growth led to another undesirable
consequence when looked at from the angle of income inequality, primarily in Canada and the United States.
Although the evidence for Mexico does suggest some improved, yet fluctuating pattern of income distribution,
throughout the NAFTA era both the United States and Canada witnessed a significant growth in income
inequality; and therefore, contrary to what the supporters of NAFTA marketed, the rising tide of trade did not
lift all boats! The ratio of the share of the highest income quintile to that of the lowest income quintile for the
three NAFTA countries was a simple measure of income disparity adopted for the purpose (Figure 2).¶ Starting
with the FTA, from 1989 onward, income inequality grew a great deal in Canada until this ratio reached a
plateau by the turn of the twenty-first century. In the case of the United States, the ratio rose consistently since
the early 1990s to 2006 and, by 2005/6, actually surpassed that of Mexico according to our simple measure of
income inequality. Undoubtedly other factors affecting income distribution were also at work, reflecting such
tendencies as the long-term pattern of deindustrialization and growth of the service sector; but, as the shaded
area for the FTA and then the NAFTA period suggests, trade liberalization must have contributed by
accelerating this trend toward greater income inequality in both Canada and the United States.¶ With a
relatively flat real wage movement in the United States and Canada that was accompanied by growing income
disparities, how then could domestic consumption grow quickly enough to absorb the rising quantity of raw
materials and manufactured goods being produced in Canada, Mexico, and elsewhere to supply what became a
growing U.S. consumption binge? The answer of course is that it was the fairly loose monetary policy during
the Greenspan era coupled with a plethora of financial innovations made possible in an age of financial
deregulation that promoted a significant rise in consumer spending.¶ The rising inequality accompanied by
growing accessibility to credit promoted household indebtedness on a scale not hitherto seen. As shown in the
left-hand panel of Figure 3, ratios of household debt to disposable personal income exploded beginning in the
mid-1990s and peaked as house prices reached a plateau by 2006/7. The plummeting of house prices brought
about by significant monetary tightening (as the effective federal funds rate rose from an average of 1.13 to 5.02
percent between 2003 and 2007) was the coup de grâce that ended what was otherwise a typical housing
bubble and triggered the subprime debacle starting in the summer of 2007. In fact, even though all forms of
consumer credit expanded during the pre-2007 era, the more interest-sensitive residential mortgages
dominated over all other forms of household debt. ¶ Despite the rising problem of effective demand
engendered by flat real wages and increasing income inequality, this growing household indebtedness and
plummeting saving rate initially spurred growth forward (either domestically or via exports) in the three
NAFTA economies. But, as predicted by such distinguished scholars as ¶ Wynne Godley since the late 1990s, it
was only a matter of time before the United States, together with its trading partners, would face a severe
collapse when looked at from the angle of the net financial imbalances across the wide sectors of the U.S.
economy (see Godley 1999; Godley and Izurieta 2001).¶ Securitization made it easier for the financial sector to
spread, as well as to hide, the high risk associated with ballooning household debt. Eventually, as evidenced by
the subprime crisis, growing securitization merely ensured that the speed and breadth of the financial
collapse’s propagation across the financial sector would be all the more severe as these subprime mortgages
were repackaged into various kinds of financial derivatives—the so-called collateralized debt obligations—held
by investment banks and other financial institutions both in the United States and internationally. However,
the seed of the financial collapse was the underlying imbalance between debt and income. The high consumer
spending that was pushing forward household debt ratios throughout the NAFTA era (see Figure 3) simply
could not be sustained without a significant rise in real incomes for those low-income households accumulating
ever more debt during the pre-2007 period.
NAFTA hurts wages
Public Citizen 13 (Public Citizen, nonprofit advocacy group with offices in Washington and Austin, “NAFTA’s
Broken Promises 1994-2013: Outcomes of the North American Free Trade Agreement,” 2013,
http://www.citizen.org/documents/NAFTAs-Broken-Promises.pdf, AL)
Wages decline due to NAFTA. Trade affects the composition of jobs available in an economy.
The United States has lost millions of manufacturing jobs during the NAFTA era, but overall unemployment
has been stable (excluding recessions) as new low-paying service sector jobs have been created. Proponents
of NAFTA raise the quantity of jobs to claim that NAFTA has not hurt American workers. But
what they do not mention is that the quality of jobs available, and the wages most American
workers can earn, have been degraded. According to the Brookings Institution, the average worker
displaced from manufacturing went from earning $40,154 to $32,123 when re-employed, a 20
percent drop in earnings.30 According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, two out of every five
displaced manufacturing workers who were rehired in 2012 experienced a wage reduction of
even greater than 20 percent.31 Such displacement not only spells wage reductions for former
manufacturing workers, but also for existing service sector workers. As increasing numbers of workers
displaced from manufacturing jobs have joined the glut of workers competing for non-offshorable, low-skill
jobs in sectors such as hospitality and food service, real wages have also fallen in these sectors under NAFTA.32
The shift in employment from high-paying manufacturing jobs to low-paying service jobs has thus contributed
to overall wage stagnation. The average U.S. wage has grown less than one percent annually in real
terms in the 19 years since NAFTA was enacted even as worker productivity has risen at more
than three times that pace.33 Given rising inequality, the median U.S. wage has fared even
worse and today remains at the same level seen in 1979.34
Increases economic inequality
Public Citizen 13 (Public Citizen, nonprofit advocacy group with offices in Washington and Austin, “NAFTA’s
Broken Promises 1994-2013: Outcomes of the North American Free Trade Agreement,” 2013,
http://www.citizen.org/documents/NAFTAs-Broken-Promises.pdf, AL)
Economic inequality reaches new extremes. The richest 10 percent of Americans are now taking nearly
half of the economic pie, while the top 1 percent is taking one fifth. Since NAFTA’s implementation, the
share of national income collected by the richest 10 percent has risen by 18 percent, while the
top 1 percent’s share has shot up by nearly 40 percent.35 NAFTA-style trade helps explain the soaring
inequality. NAFTA has placed downward pressure on wages for the middle and lower economic
classes by forcing decently-paid U.S. manufacturing workers to compete with imports made by
poorly-paid workers abroad. The resulting displacement of those decently-paid U.S. workers has further
depressed middle class wages by adding to the surplus of workers seeking service sector jobs. NAFTA also
contributes to rising inequality by enabling employers to threaten to move their companies
overseas during wage bargaining with workers. For instance, a Cornell University study commissioned
by the NAFTA Labor Commission found that after the passage of NAFTA, as many as 62 percent of U.S. union
drives faced employer threats to relocate abroad, and the factory shut-down rate following successful union
certifications tripled.36 NAFTA-style deals also dampen middle class wages by forbidding federal
and state governments from requiring that U.S. workers perform the jobs created by the
outsourcing of government work. “Anti-off-shoring” policies, Buy American procurement provisions and
prevailing wage laws (designed to ensure goods wages for construction work) are subject to challenge in foreign
tribunals for violating trade agreement rules. Even proponents of NAFTA admit that such trade
pressures have likely contributed to today’s historic degree of inequality. The pro-NAFTA PIIE has
estimated that as much as 39 percent of the observed growth in U.S. wage inequality is attributable to trade
trends.37
Wage loses outweigh cheaper prices
Public Citizen 13 (Public Citizen, nonprofit advocacy group with offices in Washington and Austin, “NAFTA’s
Broken Promises 1994-2013: Outcomes of the North American Free Trade Agreement,” 2013,
http://www.citizen.org/documents/NAFTAs-Broken-Promises.pdf, AL)
Wage losses outweigh cheaper prices under NAFTA. Many proponents of NAFTA-style trade
acknowledge that it will cause the loss of some American jobs, but argue that U.S. workers still win overall by
being able to purchase cheaper goods imported from abroad. First, this promise has failed to materialize for
many critical consumer items, such as food. Despite a 188 percent rise in food imports from Canada
and Mexico under NAFTA,38 the average nominal price of food in the United States has¶
jumped 63 percent since the deal went into effect.39 Second, even those reductions in
consumer goods prices that have materialized have not been sufficient to offset the losses to
wages under NAFTA. The Center for Economic and Policy Research discovered that when comparing the
lower prices of cheaper goods to the income lost from low-wage competition under current
trade policy, the trade-related losses in wages outweigh the gains in cheaper goods for the vast
majority of U.S. workers. U.S. workers without college degrees (over 65 percent of the workforce) have
likely lost an amount equal to 12.2 percent of their wages under NAFTA-style trade even after accounting for
the benefits of cheaper goods, meaning a net loss of almost $3,300 per year for a worker earning the median
annual wage of $27,000.40
Impacts
Econ. Decline causes War
Harris and Burrows 9 - *Mathew, PhD European History @ Cambridge, counselor in the National Intelligence Council (NIC) , **Jennifer, a member
of the NIC’s Long Range Analysis Unit
(“Revisiting the Future: Geopolitical Effects of the Financial Crisis” http://www.ciaonet.org/journals/twq/v32i2/f_0016178_13952.pdf)//BB
Increased Potential for Global Conflict¶ Of course, the report encompasses more than economics and indeed believes the future is likely to be the result of a number
of intersecting and interlocking forces. With so many possible permutations of outcomes, each with ample Revisiting the Future opportunity for unintended
consequences, there is a growing sense of insecurity. Even so, history may be more instructive than ever . While we continue to believe that the
Great Depression is not likely to be repeated, the lessons to be drawn from that period include the harmful effects on fledgling democracies
and multiethnic societies (think Central Europe in 1920s and 1930s) and on the sustainability of multilateral institutions (think League of
Nations in the same period). There is no reason to think that this would not be true in the twenty-first as much as in the twentieth
century. For that reason, the ways in which the potential for greater conflict could grow would seem to be even more apt in a constantly
volatile economic environment as they would be if change would be steadier. In surveying those risks, the report stressed the likelihood that terrorism and
nonproliferation will remain priorities even as resource issues move up on the international agenda.
Terrorism’s appeal will decline if
economic growth continues in the Middle East and youth unemployment is reduced. For those terrorist groups that remain
active in 2025, however, the diffusion of technologies and scientific knowledge will place some of the world’s most dangerous capabilities within their reach.
Terrorist groups in 2025 will likely be a combination of descendants of long established groups_inheriting organizational structures, command and control
processes, and training procedures necessary to conduct sophisticated attacks_and newly emergent collections of the angry and disenfranchised that become
self-radicalized, particularly in the absence of economic outlets that would become narrower in an economic downturn.
The most dangerous casualty of any economically-induced drawdown of U.S. military presence would
almost certainly be the Middle East. Although Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons is not inevitable, worries about a nuclear-armed Iran could lead
states in the region to develop new security arrangements with external powers, acquire additional weapons, and consider
pursuing their own nuclear ambitions. It is not clear that the type of stable deterrent relationship that existed between the great powers for most of the
Cold War would emerge naturally in the Middle East with a nuclear Iran. Episodes of low intensity conflict and terrorism taking place under a nuclear umbrella
could lead to an unintended escalation and broader conflict if clear red lines between those states involved are not well established. The close
proximity of potential nuclear rivals combined with underdeveloped surveillance capabilities and mobile dual-capable Iranian missile systems also
will produce inherent difficulties in achieving reliable indications and warning of an impending nuclear attack. The lack of strategic depth in neighboring
states like Israel, short warning and missile flight times, and uncertainty of Iranian intentions may place more focus on preemption
rather than defense, potentially leading to escalating crises. 36 Types of conflict that the world continues to experience, such as over resources,
could reemerge, particularly if protectionism grows and there is a resort to neo-mercantilist practices. Perceptions of renewed
energy scarcity will drive countries to take actions to assure their future access to energy supplies. In the worst case, this could result in interstate
conflicts if government leaders deem assured access to energy resources, for example, to be essential for maintaining domestic stability
and the survival of their regime. Even actions short of war, however, will have important geopolitical implications. Maritime security concerns are
providing a rationale for naval buildups and modernization efforts, such as China’s and India’s development of blue water naval capabilities. If the fiscal
stimulus focus for these countries indeed turns inward, one of the most obvious funding targets may be military. Buildup of
regional naval capabilities could lead to increased tensions , rivalries , and counterbalancing moves , but it
also will create opportunities for multinational cooperation in protecting critical sea lanes. With water also becoming scarcer in Asia and the
Middle East, cooperation to manage changing water resources is likely to be increasingly difficult both within and
between states in a more dog-eat-dog world.
Economic growth solves war – increased state capacity.
HSRP 10 – Human Security Report Project, Simon Fraser University, Canada (“Human Security Report 2009/2010”, 12/2/10; Part one page 20,
<http://www.hsrgroup.org/human-security-reports/20092010/text.aspx>)//Beddow
But despite the widespread lack of consensus over the causes of civil war, very few quantitative researchers would disagree that there is a robust
high levels of national income and a lower risk of war. Other things being equal, high
national incomes translate into greater state capacity and more resources for governments to buy
association between
off grievances and defeat insurgents in those wars that cannot be prevented. The conflict trends in East
Asia over the past 30 years, which are the focus of Chapter 3, provide an instructive example of the association between
rising levels of economic development and the incidence of armed conflict. As national incomes in the region have
steadily risen since the late 1970s, state capacity and performance legitimacy have also increased—and conflict
numbers have declined by some 60 percent. Indeed, insurgents—who have been largely excluded from the benefits of economic
growth in the region—have not achieved a single military victory since the 1970s.
Economic decline turns heg and growth ensures it.
– American diplomat, president of the Council on Foreign Relations, Director of Policy Planning for the
Department of State, advisor to Colin Powell, US Coordinator for the Future of Afghanistan (Richard N., “The
Irony of American Strategy: Putting the Middle East in Proper Perspective”, May/June 2013 issue of Foreign
Affairs)//Beddow
Haass 13
Asia, however, does call for more U.S. military, diplomatic and economic involvement. Other regions can also
stake a claim to a share of Washington’s attention. Negotiating a transatlantic free-trade agreement (ideally, one involving both
Canada and Mexico) would be a major economic and strategic accomplishment; so, too, would be negotiating and implementing a NAFTA 2.0 that would
more closely link the United States with its immediate neighbors so as to better manage shared interests related to trade and investment, security,
energy, infrastructure, and the flow of people. Narrowing the gap between global challenges and the current institutional
arrangements for dealing with them is also an important issue, particularly in the case of climate change. Here and elsewhere,
though, global accords with broad participation may not be possible, and it may be more realistic and rewarding to focus on agreements with narrower
aims, less participation, or both. Any U.S. rebalancing among regions and issues, finally, needs to be complemented by
another sort of rebalancing, between the internal and the external, the domestic and the foreign. The United
States needs to restore the foundations of American economic power so that it will once again
have the resources to act freely and lead in the world, so that it can compete, so that it can
discourage threats from emerging and contend with them if need be, so that it is less vulnerable to
international developments it cannot control, and so that it can set an example others will want to
emulate. The vast sums spent on the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq did not cause the nation’s current budgetary or economic predicament, but they
did contribute to it. Spending more on national security now would only make it more difficult to set things right. The goal at home must be to
restore historical levels of domestic economic growth, reduce the ratio of debt to GDP, and improve the quality
of the nation’s infrastructure and human capital. During the next several years, facing no rival great power or
existential threat, the United States is likely to enjoy something of a strategic respite. The question is whether
the United States will take advantage of that respite to renew the sources of its strength or squander it through
continued overreaching in the Middle East, not attending to Asia, and underinvesting in home.
Recessions lock nations in a self-reinforcing death spiral to war.
Conceição and Kim 10 – Director of the Office of Development Studies at UNPD, assistant professor at the Technical University of Lisbon, degrees in
Physics and Economics from the Technical University of Lisbon and PhD in Public Policy from the LBJ School of Public Affairs at the University of Texas
at Austin / Office of Development Studies UNDP (Pedro and Namsuk, “The Economic Crisis, Violent Conflict, and Human Development”, International
Journal of Peace Studies, V.15 No. 1, Spring/Summer 2010; http://www.gmu.edu/programs/icar/ijps/vol15_1/KimConceicao15n1.pdf)//Beddow
The unfolding global economic crisis is expected to bring the world economy into recession in 2009. Figure 1 shows the population weighted real GDP
growth from 1991 to 2009 (estimates for 2008 and projection for 2009) for the world economy and for different groups of countries. The annual real
GDP growth rate of the global economy was 5.1% in 2007 but the world economy is projected to shrink by -1.3% in 2009 (IMF, 2009). Emerging and
developing economies are also projected to suffer a sharp slowdown as a result of the crisis, with a projected growth rate of 1.6% in 2009 compared to
8.3% in 2007. For many developing countries, the sharp economic slowdowns will translate into deep recessions. The UN projects that 15 developing
countries will have ne gative per capita growth in 2009 1 , while projections from the World Bank adjusting for terms-of-tra de changes increase this to
50 2 . A recent strand of literature, reviewed in some detail in this paper, suggests that economic conditions are
important determinants of the outbreak and recurrence of conflict. In particular, wars often start following
growth collapses (Collier et al, 2009, p.15). Sharp economic slowdowns and low levels of income per capita appear to
increase the likelihood of conflicts. In this context, it is opportune to explore insights fro m this literature,
linking it also with the human development implications of both growth slow downs and conflict. In particular, the
paper highlights the risks of the emergence of low-human-development/conflict traps. Given that the probability of conflict recurrence
is high, as elaborated upon below, post-conflict countries – those that have experienced armed conflicts until
recent years – may be particularly vulnerable. 3 As Figure 1 shows, post-conflict countrie s are projected to have a substantial decrease
in the economic growth, from 7.4% in 2007 to 3.1% in 2009. Advanced economies may have a sharper slowdown (2.7% in 2007 and -3.8% in 2009), but
they have well-developed social protection, and stable political systems that may facilitate the rec overy and absorb the pressures for social instability and
conflict. In contrast, post-conflict countries, ma y be more vulnerable to a more protracted and slower recovery from the slowdown, given the hi gher
risks of conflict recurrence. Drawing on a review of both theoretical and empirical literature, this paper frames the the connection between economic
factors and conflict within a conceptual framework in which levels of human development and the risk of conflict are linked. Violent conflict is one of the
most extreme forms of suppressing choices and advancing rights, and therefore a major threat to human development (UNDP, 2005, p.151). Since 1990,
more than 3 million people have died in armed conflicts in developing countries (Marshall, 2005). The total war deaths are far more than the battle
deaths. For example, the total war deaths are estimated as 1.2 million in Ethiopia during 1976-1991, but only 2% of them were directly engaged in the
battles. (Bethany and Gleditsch, 2004) Conflict has also non-lethal consequences that may last across generations (UNDP, 2008a). As far as
drivers of conflict are concerned, one of the most robust findings in the literature is that many economic
conditions (low income, slow growth, and especially severe economic downturns) are correlated with the
outbreak of conflict, with some evidence strongly suggesting that the causal direction runs from economic
conditions to conflict (Col lier and Hoeffler, 2004). There is also a rich literature on the impact of horizontal inequality
and dependence on natural resources as drivers of increases in the risk of conflict. This paper however focuses only on the
economic factors, reviewing the fi ndings in light of the current economic crisis and the severe economic downturn that it now occurring. When it
comes to the consequences of conflict, there is no doubt that it is harmful to human welfare, but it becomes
even more hazardous if conflict results in a persistent low human development/conflict trap. A typical country
reaching the end of a civil war faces a 44 percent risk of returning to conflict within five years (Collier et al, 2003, p. 83). Whether or not a country will
experience a new civil war can be best predicted by whether the country experienced wars in the past (Collier, et al, 2004). The high rates of recurrence of
conflict, along with the economic determinants of conflict, suggest the possibility of the existence of poverty-conflict traps (Collier et al, 2003; Bloomberg
and others 2000). Given that pove rty and low per capita income ar e also correlated with worse health and education outcomes, and also that these
outcomes suffer as a result of conflict, the conflict trap can be conceptualized in the framework of a low human development – conflict trap (Collier and
Hoeffler, 2004; Justino and Verwimp, 2006; Alderman, Hoddinott and Kinsey, 2004). A self-reinforcing circle from conflict to low
human development, and vice versa, is suggestively illustrated below (Chart 1). Conflict destroys accumulated
physical and human capital, forces replacement of labor, deteriorates institutional capacity. A country
experiencing conflict cannot secure long term returns for investments in both in physical and human capital,
resulting in low investment in health and education. All of these factors lead to low levels of human development. A country
with low levels of human development has more difficulty in improving institutions, and in increasing
productivity and potential growth. In turn, lower growth rates heighten the risk of conflict, potentially trapping
a country in the loop. The remainder of the paper discusses the empirical findings and theoretical background for linkage between the low-
human development and conflict. Section 2 consid ers how low levels of human development can affect the risk of violent conflict. Section 3 shows how
the conflict can result in low human development, completing the vicious circle. Section 4 concludes the paper with a brief discussion on the policy
responses. 2. From Low Human Development to Conflict While there are number of factor s that could cause conflict, empirical studies find that poor
economic performance is associated with higher incidence of conflict. Being a poor country is correlated with most forms of violence (UNDP, 2008a).
Figure 2 shows that economic development and conflicts are observed to be clearly related. The level of GDP is negatively correlated with observing a
new conflict. Collier et al (2009) fi nd that the predicted risk for a hypothetical country with characteristics set at the study’s sample mean was 4.6 per
cent. If the level of per capita income were to be halved from this level, the risk woul d be increased to 5.3 per cent. Growth rates are also strongly
associated with risks of conflict in deve loping countries. If the growth rate in developing countries is increase d by one percentage point from the mean,
the risk of conflict decreases by 0.6 per centage points to 4.0 per cent (Collier et al, 2009). Kang and Meernik (2005) show that the grow th rate in
conflict countries in the five years prior to conflict, including cases of conf lict recurrence, was on average 0.5 pe rcent compared to 2 percent in countries
that remained peaceful. Empirical analysis of growth a nd conflict has inherent data limitations, but some recent studies using more careful methodology
shows a st rong causal link running from poor economic performance to conflict. One probl em is that the direction of impact between the income per
capita and conflict can run both wa ys. Assuming a priori one-way causality – that is, ignoring endogeneity – in regression analysis can result in biased
estimates. Other information used in the empirical studies, such as income inequality, po pulation, ethnic distributi on, are also subject to difficulties of
econometric identification and data quality (Hegre and Sambanis, 2006; Sambanis, 2004).To address the endogeneity problem, some studi es adopt
instrumental variable analysis, using a strictly exogenous variable that moves with income per cap ita, but not with conflict. For instance, Miguel,
Satyannath and Sergenti (2004) use annual changes in rainfall data as an instrument for income growth. The rainfall data predicts growth fluctuation in
agricultural economies in Africa. They find that income shocks are drive conflict. Besley and Persson (2008) and Bazzi and Blattman (2008) use
internationa l commodity price and trade shocks as the exogenous variables, but they find that the evidence on the relations hip between economic
shocks as drivers of conflict is mixed.
Economic crisis triggers war.
ETH 13 – engineering, science, technology, and management university in Switzerland, part of the Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology Domain,
subordinate to Switzerland’s Department of Home Affairs (Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich, “Intrastate Conflict: Data, Trends and Drivers”,
2/4/13; < http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/SpecialFeature/Detail/?id=158597&tabid=1453496807&contextid774=158597&contextid775=158627>)//Beddow
“The most robustly significant predictor of [armed] conflict risk and its duration is some
indicator of economic prosperity. At a higher income people have more to lose from the
destructiveness of conflict; and higher per-capita income implies a better functioning social
contract, institutions and state capacity.”[3] This correlation between underdevelopment and armed
conflict is confirmed in a 2008 paper by Thania Paffenholz[4] which notes that “since 1990, more than 50% of
all conflict-prone countries have been low income states…. Two thirds of all armed conflicts take place in African countries with the
highest poverty rates. Econometric research found a correlation between the poverty rate and likelihood of armed violence….[T]he lower the GDP per
capita in a country, the higher the likelihood of armed conflict.” Of course, it is important to point out that this is not a claim that there is a direct causal
connection between poverty and armed conflict. To repeat, the causes of conflict are complex and context specific,
nevertheless, says Paffenholz, there is a clear correlation between a low and declining per capita income and a
country’s vulnerability to conflict. It is also true, on the other hand, that there are low income countries that experience precipitous
economic decline, like Zambia in the 1980s and 1990s, without suffering the kind of turmoil that has visited economically more successful countries like
Kenya and Cote d’Ivoire. Referring to both Zambia and Nigeria, Pafenholz says these are cases in which “the social compact” has proven to be resilient.
Both have formal and informal mechanisms that are able to address grievances in ways that allowed them to be aired and resolved or managed without
recourse to violence. A brief review of literature on economics and armed conflict, published in the Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine, indicates
the complexity and imprecision behind the question, “does poverty cause conflict?” While many of the “world’s poorest countries are riven by armed
conflict,” and while poverty, conflict and under-development set up a cycle of dysfunction in which each element of the cycle is exacerbated by the other,
it is also the case that “conflict obviously does not just afflict the poorest countries” – as Northern Ireland and the former Yugoslavia demonstrate. “Many
poor countries are not at war; shared poverty may not be a destabilizing influence. Indeed, economic growth can destabilize, as the
wars in countries afflicted by an abundance of particular natural resources appear to show.”[5] Another review
of the literature makes the general point that “the escalation of conflict during economic downturns is more
likely in countries recovering from conflict, or fragile states.” That makes Africa especially vulnerable on two counts: economic
deprivation and recent armed conflict are present in a relatively high number of states, making the continent especially vulnerable to economic shocks.
As a general rule, “weak economies often translate into weak and fragile states and the presence of violent
conflict, which in turn prevents economic growth.” One study argues that “the risk of war in any given
country is determined by the initial level of income, the rate of economic growth and the level of
dependency on primary commodity exports.” Changes in rates of economic growth thus lead to changes in
threats of conflict. As unemployment rises in fragile states this can “exacerbate conflict due to comparatively better income opportunities for
young men in rebel groups as opposed to labour markets.”[6] The concentration of armed conflict in lower income countries is also reflected in the
conflict tabulation by Project Ploughshares over the past quarter century. The 2009 Human Development Index ranks 182 countries in four categories of
Human Development – Very High, High, Medium, Low. Of the 98 countries in the Medium and Low categories of human development in 2009, 55 per
cent experienced war on their territories in the previous 24 years. In the same period, only 24 per cent of countries in the High human development
category saw war within their borders, while just two (5 per cent) countries in the Very High human development ranking had war on their territory (the
UK re Northern Ireland and Israel). The wars of the recent past were overwhelmingly fought on the territories of states at the low end of the human
development scale. A country’s income level is thus a strong indicator of its risk of being involved in sustained armed
conflict. Low income countries lack the capacity to create conditions conducive to serving the social, political, and economic welfare of their people.
And when economic inequality is linked to differences between identity groups, the correlation to armed conflict is even stronger. In other words, group
based inequalities are especially destabilizing.[7] These failures in human security are of course heavily shaped by external factors, notably international
economic and security conditions and the interests of the major powers (in short, globalization),[8] and these factors frequently combine with internal
political/religious/ethnic circumstances that create conditions especially conducive to conflict and armed conflict.
Government Laws I/L
NAFTA rulings are inconsistent and harmful to government law
Kagalwalla 2009—Adnan Kagalwalla, JD The Ohio State University Michael E. Moritz College of Law
[Entrepreneurial Bus. L.J. 112 2008-2009/lexis]//MM
B. The Metalclad Case Metalclad Corporation was a U.S. waste disposal company operating a Mexican
subsidiary ("COTERIN") that sought a municipal license to operate a hazardous waste treatment facility near
Guadalcazar, Mexico.41 The license was rejected, although Metalclad did acquire three permits from Mexican
state and federal authorities. 42 Metalclad, upon the assurances of federal and local regulators that no license
was needed, began to build its facility without a municipal license, although it chose to apply for this permit,
having already been rejected once.43 After Metalclad had already invested considerable sums in the project
and completed construction, but before any permit was issued, the state government declared the entire area
an ecological zone, effectively closing down Metalclad's operation and rendering its investment worthless. 4
Metalclad then sought the protection of NAFTA Chapter 11 by filing claims against Mexico for violating Articles
1105 and 1110.45 The tribunal made history by ruling against a State and in favor of the foreign investor, going
so far as to award damages because Mexico had violated Articles 1105 and 1110(1).46¶ On appeal, Mexico
argued that "[t]he tribunal committed two acts in excess of jurisdiction in connection with Article 1105.47
Mexico first argued that "the Tribunal used NAFTA's transparency provisions as a basis for finding a breach of
Article 1105.” 48 Second, Mexico contended that the Tribunal then created essentially new transparency
obligations that have no basis in the text of NAFTA.49 Furthermore, Mexico argued that the tribunal
inappropriately interpreted Mexican domestic law.50 The Supreme Court of British Columbia, the appellate
court, found these arguments compelling enough to warrant a partial reversal of the tribunal's decision (a
first).51 The tribunal had construed expropriation in Article 1110 too broadly, making even incidental
interference with an investment compensable even when the host State derived no benefit from the
interference.52 The appeals court did not explicitly reject this broad expropriation idea but used a different line
of reasoning, one less nebulous and more tailor-made to this particular case, thereby "dulling the edge of the
proverbial sword" by approaching the issue more cautiously. 53¶ The Metalclad case, when considered in
conjunction with the Methanex case (discussed infra) creates serious concerns about problems of overly broad
and too-narrow interpretations and generally inconsistent rulings from NAFTA Chapter 11 tribunals. Because
these NAFTA tribunals only bind the parties to the arbitration and have no precedential value, the decisions
made by one tribunal technically have no effect on any future arbitrations. It is probably naïve, however, to
think that later tribunals never look back on the prior holdings for help and support.54
Chapter 11 damages relations, impedes state sovereignty
Kagalwalla 2009—Adnan Kagalwalla, JD The Ohio State University Michael E. Moritz College of Law
[Entrepreneurial Bus. L.J. 112 2008-2009/lexis]//MM
Thus far this Note has briefly surveyed some of the major disputes that have been brought before a NAFTA
Chapter 11 tribunal. This Note is meant to provide a solid surface from which to make some observations about
how these tribunals are affecting the legal system of the U.S. and likely also those of Canada and Mexico. Each
case study, though brief, was meant to highlight a different problem and potential effects on a NAFTA Party's
legal system.¶ NAFTA Chapter 11 tribunals, as they stand, can be capricious and arbitrary, meddlesome in the
laws of States, damaging to the finality of judicial awards and potentially can have ramifications even between
the relations of two sovereign States. This Note does not intend to be partisan and demand either a repeal or a
massive overhaul of NAFTA Chapter 11.¶ Instead, this Note merely seeks to make the potential pitfalls more
noticeable and urge some stronger, more coherent and less nebulous boundaries to NAFTA Chapter 11
tribunals so that they can operate within well-defined limits and not tempt the avarice of investors at the
expense of the environment, public health and the autonomy of States and their legal systems.
Trade Conflicts I/L
NAFTA increased trade conflicts
Public Citizen 13 (Public Citizen, nonprofit advocacy group with offices in Washington and Austin, “NAFTA’s
Broken Promises 1994-2013: Outcomes of the North American Free Trade Agreement,” 2013,
http://www.citizen.org/documents/NAFTAs-Broken-Promises.pdf, AL)
NAFTA partners lead the world in trade pact attacks on the United States. Despite claims that
NAFTA would help deepen alliances with Mexico and Canada, these two countries are among the top
challengers of U.S. policies – not only in NAFTA – but also at the WTO, where Canada has brought
three times more cases against the United States than the United States has brought against Canada.102
(Mexico has brought nine cases against the United States, while the United States has filed six cases against
Mexico.) Next to the European Union, Canada has launched more WTO cases against the United
States than any other country, while Mexico ranks as the fourth most frequent challenger of
U.S. policy in the WTO.103¶ NAFTA countries challenge U.S. consumer protection rules.
Among the WTO cases brought against the United States by its NAFTA partners are Canada and
Mexico’s joint 2009 challenge of a popular U.S. meat country-of-origin labeling policy. The
United States instituted the policy so consumers could make informed choices about their purchases of meat.
In 2012 Canada and Mexico won the case in a decision by the WTO Appellate Body, meaning that
the United States must weaken or eliminate its country-of- origin meat labeling requirement or risk facing
trade sanctions from Canada and Mexico. Continuing its attacks on U.S. consumer safety measures, Mexico
even joined in on Indonesia’s successful WTO attack on U.S. measures to reduce teenage
smoking.
Trade Deficit I/L
Predictions failed—NAFTA has increased deficit with Mexico and decreased
manufacturing jobs
Engardio et. al 8 (Pete Engardio, Geri Smith, and Jane Sasseen, Contributors to the Bloomberg Businessweek Magazine, “What You Don’t
Know abuot NAFTA”, http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2008-03-18/what-you-dont-know-about-nafta)
There is no shortage of statistics making Nafta look bad. Free traders' claims in the early '90s
that Nafta would create hundreds of thousands of U.S. jobs, turn the slight deficit with Mexico
into a $10 billion annual trade surplus, and eliminate illegal immigration proved wildly off the
mark. Instead, America's deficit with Mexico passed $74 billion in 2007. The U.S. has also shed 3
million manufacturing jobs since the early '90s.
Unsafe Foods I/L
Undermines ability to regulate foods
Public Citizen 13 (Public Citizen, nonprofit advocacy group with offices in Washington and Austin, “NAFTA’s
Broken Promises 1994-2013: Outcomes of the North American Free Trade Agreement,” 2013,
http://www.citizen.org/documents/NAFTAs-Broken-Promises.pdf, AL)
NAFTA undermines safety standards for imported food. Since NAFTA was enacted, imports of
food from Canada and Mexico have surged 188 percent.46 NAFTA required the United States to
replace its long-standing requirement that only meat and poultry meeting U.S. safety standards could be
imported. Under this standard, only meat from plants specifically approved by U.S. Department of Agriculture
(USDA) inspectors could gain access. NAFTA required that meat and poultry for all facilities must be provided
access if Mexico and Canada could show that their overall safety and inspection systems provide
“equivalent” levels of protection, even if core aspects of U.S. food safety requirements were not
met. “Equivalence” was not defined in NAFTA. The resulting equivalence determinations have
allowed meat imports even after infrequent USDA spot checks of a sample of Canadian and
Mexican processing plants found major health threats.47 Despite such threats, under NAFTA U.S.
consumers are eating increasing quantities of meat imported from Mexico and Canada. For instance, U.S. beef
imports from both countries have risen 130 percent since NAFTA took effect – Americans now consume about
$1.3 billion worth of imported NAFTA beef each year.48
Rate of food imported overwhelms ability to inspect food
Public Citizen 13 (Public Citizen, nonprofit advocacy group with offices in Washington and Austin, “NAFTA’s
Broken Promises 1994-2013: Outcomes of the North American Free Trade Agreement,” 2013,
http://www.citizen.org/documents/NAFTAs-Broken-Promises.pdf, AL)
Surging food imports overwhelm food inspections. A dangerous side effect of the flood of imports has
been the inability of U.S. inspectors to ensure the safety of the food supply. The Food and Drug
Administration only inspects 1.5 percent of the food imports that it regulates (vegetables, fruit,
seafood, grains, dairy, and animal feed) at the border. Imported seafood rates are even lower, with
FDA checking only 0.1 percent of imported seafood for drug residues.49 Only 9 percent of beef,
pork, and chicken is inspected at the border by the USDA.50 Among the most notorious NAFTA-related
food borne illness outbreaks was the hepatitis-A infection of Michigan schoolchildren and teachers in 1997.51 A
severe hepatitis-A outbreak related to strawberries imported from Mexico resulted in 163
children and teachers becoming ill, several seriously.52
Undermines ability to regulate food
Public Citizen 7 (Public Citizen, nonprofit advocacy group with offices in Washington and Austin, “Trade
Deficit in Food Safety: Proposed NAFTA Expansions Replicate Limits on U.S. Food Safety Policy That Are
Contributing to Unsafe Food Imports,” July 2007,
http://www.citizen.org/documents/FoodSafetyReportFINAL.pdf, AL)
The figures above demonstrate that the FDA’s ability to protect the public with regard to imports has
essentially ceased to exist. The lack of FDA authority regarding ensuring the safety of overseas
production, and the abysmal level of the FDA’s import inspection funding, reflect a disconnect
between the reality of a food supply comprised of a significant amount of imported food and a
regulatory mindset that predates WTO and NAFTA and the import flood they set off. The FDA’s
budget for food safety has failed to keep pace with the increase in foreign food shipments. The percent of
U.S. food safety dollars going to the FDA has remained flat over the last five years and the FDA’s
budget for inspecting foreign seafood processing facilities dropped to zero in the 2007 budget.28 All that
remains as a last line of defense for consumers are a few border inspectors looking at less than
1 percent of FDA-regulated products entering the United States.
Corporations I/L
1NC
NAFTA gives corporations too much power
Public Citizen 13 (Public Citizen, nonprofit advocacy group with offices in Washington and Austin, “NAFTA’s
Broken Promises 1994-2013: Outcomes of the North American Free Trade Agreement,” 2013,
http://www.citizen.org/documents/NAFTAs-Broken-Promises.pdf, AL)
NAFTA grants multinational corporations new privileges and an extreme enforcement
process.¶ NAFTA included an array of new investment privileges and protections that were unprecedented in
scope and power. NAFTA elevates foreign investors to the level of sovereign signatory
governments, uniquely empowering corporations to skirt domestic laws and courts and
privately enforce the terms of the public treaty by directly challenging governments’ public
interest policies before World Bank and U.N. tribunals. The tribunals are comprised of three private
sector attorneys, unaccountable to any electorate, who rotate between serving as “judges” and bringing cases
for corporations against governments.62 This process is called “investor-state” enforcement. Only
commercial interests have standing to challenge government policy, not unions or consumer
groups. Despite being embedded in a “trade” agreement, NAFTA’s sweeping investor privileges
have nothing to do with the flow of goods across borders. Ostensibly, this investor-state regime was
intended to provide foreign investors a venue to obtain compensation when their factory or land was
expropriated by a government that did not have a reliable domestic court system. However, the actual
NAFTA provisions expand far beyond that reasonable safeguard, providing foreign investors extreme
privileges not available to domestic firms, and creating incentives to offshore investments to
gain the new privileges. For example, the new protections include a guaranteed “minimum standard of
treatment” that host governments must provide, which investor-state tribunals have increasingly interpreted as
a foreign investor’s “right” to a regulatory framework that conforms to their expectations.
Allows companies to attack health laws, avoid environmental regulations, and the
behavior of government officials
Public Citizen 13 (Public Citizen, nonprofit advocacy group with offices in Washington and Austin, “NAFTA’s
Broken Promises 1994-2013: Outcomes of the North American Free Trade Agreement,” 2013,
http://www.citizen.org/documents/NAFTAs-Broken-Promises.pdf, AL)
NAFTA cases target health laws, environmental regulations and even the behavior of
government officials. The U.S. Ethyl Corporation used NAFTA’s investor-state system in the late
1990s to reverse a Canadian environmental ban of the carcinogenic gasoline additive MMT, also
banned by numerous U.S. states, while also obtaining $13 million in compensation from the
Canadian government.65 In another infamous NAFTA case, a Mexican municipality’s refusal to
grant the U.S. firm Metalclad a construction permit, which it had also denied to the contaminated
facility’s previous Mexican owner (until and unless the site was cleaned up), resulted in $15.6 million in
compensation being paid by Mexico.66 A British Colombian official’s rude conduct was the target of
another NAFTA investor-state challenge launched by the U.S. Pope & Talbot firm. The corporation sought over
half a million in compensation for the official’s rudeness, which a tribunal deemed a violation of NAFTA’s
guaranteed minimum standard of treatment.67 Of the 70 investor-state cases launched under NAFTA,
foreign investors have won 10 cases, governments have won 17 cases and the rest are pending
or have otherwise finished.68 Recently filed cases include U.S. corporate attacks on a Canadian province’s
ban on fracking and Canada’s revocation of a drug patent for a medicine that its courts found to not deliver on
the promises used to obtain monopoly patent rights. Canadian financial interests, meanwhile, have
threatened to challenge elements of the U.S. Dodd-Frank financial regulation.
AT: Democracy Scenario (NAFTA GOOD)
No democracy spread in Mexico—corruption and lack of knowledge
Johnson 13 (Tim Johnson, 5/16/13, McClatchy Foreign Staff, “In Mexico, fears for democracy as threatened journalists curtail coverage”,
http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2013/05/16/191415/in-mexico-fears-for-democracy.html#storylink=cpy)
SALTILLO, Mexico — Quitze Fernandez, a columnist for the El Guardian newspaper in this capital of Coahuila
state abutting Texas, picked up the phone in his newsroom one day.¶ “Either you come or we are coming for
you,” he heard.¶ Within minutes, he was in an SUV surrounded by heavily armed gangsters. One held a knife to
his throat. Another jabbed a gun barrel into his ribs. They said they didn’t like a headline in the newspaper. ¶
They tossed a copy in his face. He glanced down and saw it wasn’t El Guardian. Thinking quickly, he convinced
the gunmen that they had mistaken his newspaper for another. They let him go, deeply shaken but alive. ¶
Mexico is easily the most dangerous place in the Western Hemisphere for reporters to ply their
trade. Dozens of journalists have been killed or disappeared. Nearly every month, a newspaper or a
radio or TV station is firebombed, attacked with explosives or raked with gunfire, targeted by the country’s
rising criminal gangs who use violence to discourage reporting the gangsters don’t like.¶ And
the violence has worked. In much of Mexico, local news outlets no longer report on organized
crime or corruption. Analysts call these areas “zones of silence,” where the lights have gone out on the dark
activities within.¶ The success of the intimidation alarms advocates of both free speech and
democracy. With no news reports on Mexico’s drug and crime problems, citizens find it
difficult to stay informed about what could be life-threatening situations developing nearby.
They also cannot effectively participate in the normal give and take of public discussion that
fuels a democracy. The muffling has been so effective that many Mexicans don’t even realize that a near
blackout of news on crime exists in swaths of the country.¶ “If journalists don’t act as a viewfinder to say
who is winning the contracts, who will become police chief, if there’s no accountability, they can do
whatever they want,” said Andres Solis Alvarez, a former crime reporter and author of a self-protection
manual for Mexican journalists.¶ A television journalist in Veracruz, a Gulf Coast state with an authoritarian
tradition, and where nine journalists have been killed in the past two years, said state officials benefit when
journalists flee, taking heat off them for corruption.¶ “When a reporter’s constant criticism makes them
uncomfortable, the state communications department calls and says (to one’s boss) that one is at risk, that they
have intelligence that something might happen, and thereupon they invite one to leave the state,” said Hugo
Gallardo, who once worked for the Televisa network.¶ Rosental Alves, a journalism professor at the University
of Texas and head of its Knight Center for Journalism in the Americas, calls what’s taking place unprecedented.
“We have never seen anything like this in the history of Mexico in terms of attacks against journalists,” he said.¶
Just how many journalists have been murdered is the subject of dispute. The National Commission on
Human Rights says that from 2000 to April 30 of this year, 84 journalists were murdered. But
some of them had left journalism, or were killed for reasons unrelated to their profession. Since 2005, it says,
another 19 journalists have disappeared and presumably were killed. Other watchdog groups have lower tallies.
Mexico democracy at a crossroads now
O’Neil 11 (Shannon O’Neil, “Mexico: Development and Democracy at a Crossroads”, http://www.cfr.org/mexico/mexico-development-democracycrossroads/p240890
Making Democracy Work¶ In 2000, Mexicans and the international community hailed the victory of
opposition candidate Vicente Fox from the National Action Party (PAN) as president. His
election and inauguration were the culmination of Mexico's slow transition to democracy,
ending seventy years of one-party rule. Today Mexico's three main parties—the PAN, the Institutional
Revolutionary Party (PRI), and the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD)—compete in reasonably clean
and transparent elections, by all accounts fulfilling the requisite of electoral democracy.¶ Yet many worry
about the true depth of change within Mexico's political system. Mexico's formal and informal
rules still limit transparency and accountability from the political class. The blanket
prohibition of reelection—whether for president or local town council—leaves few incentives for
politicians to fulfill their campaign promises. Instead, as they seek higher office, they must have the
support of unelected party leaders. Informally, some of the most powerful ministries in Mexico, as well as the
increasingly influential state governments within the federal system, have begun to push back against broader
transparency and accountability. Denied or ignored requests under Mexico's freedom of
information act are increasing, particularly in the realm of security. Continued weak
democratic governance and a lack of accountability is perpetuating corruption, and persistent
impunity erodes the credibility of institutions.¶ Public opinion is showing increasing
disillusionment with democracy. Last year's Latinobarómetro survey of attitudes toward democracy in
eighteen Latin American countries showed Mexico with the lowest level of support in the region. Only 62
percent of Mexicans agreed that “democracy was the best form of government,” compared to an
average of 76 percent across the region.10¶ The possible resurgence of the old ruling party— the
PRI—in recent state-level elections and within the national congress has many worried about a return to
the past. Today, by most accounts, the 2012 presidential election is the PRI's to lose. A PRI win might
signal a further entrenchment of corporatist-clientelist governance beholden to oligarchic
interests.¶ But as the economic side has its silver lining, so too does Mexico's political system. After ten
years of democracy, Mexico's politics have indeed been transformed. The days of Mexico's “imperial
presidency” are gone. Government institutions— from the Federal Electoral Institute (IFE) to the Federal
Institute for Access to Information (IFAI)—have gained ground, opening up the workings of elections
and government to a vibrant and independent media and to Mexico's citizens more broadly.
Congress and the Supreme Court now matter for policymaking. In fact, the lack of significant reform in Mexico
bemoaned by many reflects a common democratic occurrence—legislative gridlock. And even there, Mexico's
political parties are slowly learning to work together. President Calderón has cobbled together
legislative majorities to reform pensions, taxes, and the oil sector, as well as the judicial system and electoral
laws.¶ Mexico has also seen a burgeoning of civil society. Years of co-optation, and at times repression,
by the authoritarian PRI government decimated the ranks of independent non-governmental organizations.
Today, although still weak in comparison to the rest of the region, the number, plurality, and
vibrancy of civil society organizations, networks, and alliances is unprecedented. Their focus
has also expanded, from social development to grassroots democracy, human rights, and, more
recently, security.11 Their work has broken new ground with the passage of the country's federal freedom of
information act in 2002, which represents a milestone in a campaign for transparent and accountable
government begun in the 1970s, and with the 2008 judicial reforms, which, once implemented, will
fundamentally transform Mexico's judicial system.¶ Last year's July state-level elections show evidence
for optimism. With elections for twelve governorships up for grabs during a difficult election year, half of them
changed party hands. Among these were three that had been ruled continuously by the PRI for over eighty
years—representing the more authoritarian tendencies of the past. Voters in each of these states galvanized to
“throw the scoundrels out,” hoping to bring in a more open and inclusive future government. In the other
three, voters unhappy with the previous administration kicked out the incumbents, also a common occurrence
in flourishing democracies.¶ The fight against drug trafficking, however, is exacting a political toll. Drug
trafficking organizations are increasingly gaining influence over the state by alternatively funding or
threatening (mostly local) political campaigns, and by infiltrating law enforcement and court systems. In the
lead-up to last July's elections drug traffickers played their most visible role yet in trying to subvert the
democratic process. Several campaign offices were bombed, candidates were threatened and killed, and dead
bodies were hung from bridges on the morning of the polling. However, in spite of the violence, Mexico's voters
turned out in large numbers to elect new governors, mayors, and state representatives. In fact, they rejected
candidates with perceived links to traffickers. Despite the escalating violence, Mexico's democracy, flawed as it
may be, endures.¶ It is unrealistic to expect a country to turn instantly from a closed corporatist economic
system to an open competitive market, or from an authoritarian one-party state to a truly open, competitive,
and inclusive democracy. At the same time, Mexico has now been on these paths for over two decades, and in a
global world, time may be running out. Mexico's relatively slow economic growth and
marginalization in the global economic and democratic subgroups (the BRICs and the BASIC
countries, among others) has at least in part to do with its inability to get past its own legacies.
Mexico today is at a crossroads—the question is which path it will take.
NAFTA has no influence—Democracy will prevail anyways
Ciriaco 11 (Carol Ciriaco, COHA Research Associate, 7/18/11, “Democracy in Mexico: The Past, Present, and Future”,
http://www.coha.org/democracy-in-mexico-the-past-present-and-future/)
While the PAN and the PRD have struggled to gain momentum since the 2006 presidential election,
the PRI has risen from the ashes. Capitalizing on the PRD’s self-destructive stunts and the PAN’s failure
to solve the nation’s ailing drug and financial problems, the PRI has gained enough of a following to dominate
ongoing state and Congressional elections. In 2009, the PRI captured 237 of the 500 available seats in
the Lower House of the Mexican Congress—a feat reflective of its strong constituency. [13]
Although these victories indicate that the party has a chance of winning the 2012 presidential elections,
nothing is certain. Current Mexico State Governor Enrique Peña Nieto, the projected PRI presidential
candidate, will have to present a radical yet sound plan for reform in order to prevail over the predicted
political actors on both the PAN and the PRD tickets (Mexican Finance Minister Ernesto Cordero and either
Mexico City Mayor Marcelo Ebrard or former presidential candidate Andrés Manuel López Obrador,
respectively). [14]¶ However, the actual winner of the 2012 elections will hardly make a difference.
Mexico is simply a new democracy with old parties—the weakened structure of the newer PAN
and PRD allows the PRI to continue to dominate the political show behind the scenes. Many
fear that the re-installation of the PRI would cause a complete reversion to an authoritarian
establishment. The PRD and the PAN, however, have also begun to practice clientelism as a means of
survival. Until the PRD and the PAN find the strength to go out on a limb and break from the old
regime’s corrupt practices, the nation will continue on the same path of regression, regardless
of which party assumes power.
Generic NAFTA Bad
NAFTA hurts Mexico
LAHT 9 (Latin American Herald Tribune, “NAFTA Hurts Mexico More Than Spaniards Did, Farmers Say,” 2009,
http://www.laht.com/article.asp?ArticleId=366312&CategoryId=14091, AC)
¶ MEXICO CITY – The North American Free Trade Agreement has done more harm
to Mexico than
Spain did during the colonial period, the influential CNC farmers confederation said.¶ “NAFTA has done in 16 years what it took
the Spanish Empire nearly five centuries to do, as the transnational firms that operate in Mexico likewise control
production, marketing, fertilizers and transportation of food in the country,” the CNC said in a statement.¶
The agreement linking the U.S., Mexican and Canadian economies took effect Jan. 1, 1994. ¶ On the eve of the Sept. 15-16 bicentennial of independence
from Spain, Mexico finds its food sovereignty diminished by half, according to the CNC, a group with traditional ties to
the main opposition Institutional Revolutionary Party, or PRI.¶ Imports now account for 33 percent of the corn – the heart of the Mexican diet – and 75
percent of the rice consumed in the country, while beef imports have surged 440 percent in the last three years, the CNC says.¶ CNC leader Cruz Lopez
Aguilar, who is also a PRI congressman, blames the ills of Mexican agriculture on NAFTA.¶ “The trade agreement is as bad as, or worse than, the
presence of the Spanish monarchy 200 years ago and I accuse it (NAFTA) of the existence of nearly 3 million jobless,
the 17 percent fall in remittances (from emigrants) and the increasing cost of food,” he said.¶ NAFTA
was negotiated and signed during the PRI’s 1929-2000 tenure in power, but some elements of the party have joined voices on the left in calling for a
revision of the trade pact.
NAFTA kills natives
Landau 99 (Saul Landau, “NAFTA Hurts Mexico’s Poorest,” 01/01/1999, http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/1999-01-01/news/9812310564_1_zapatistaarmy-chiapas-mexico-s-ruling-pri, AC)
Five years ago, on Jan. 1, 1994, the Zapatista Army of National Liberation announced its presence and demanded justice for Mayan peasants -- the
poorest inhabitants of Mexico. Subcomandante Marcos, the spokesman, said the Zapatistas chose Jan. 1 to launch the uprising because it marked the
beginning of the North American Free Trade Agreement among the United States, Canada and Mexico. "For Indian people, NAFTA is a death
sentence," Marcos said.¶ The Zapatistas claimed the Chiapas uprising was a necessary response to the violence felt every day by indigenous and
other poor people in Mexico. But above and beyond the daily injustice that poor Mexicans experience, NAFTA marked Mexico's
official entry into the globalization process. To prepare Mexico for the massive entrance of foreign capital, President Carlos
Salinas de Gortari revised an article in Mexico's constitution that protected communal lands from sale, rent or lease. This prevented Mayan
and other Indian nations from reproducing their families and cultures on their sacred land.¶ The
Zapatistas revolted to alert people around the world to the threat that globalization posed to indigenous and peasant societies. The rebellion burst the
"happy Mexico" bubble spun by NAFTA's promoters. But it did not redress the income gap between the handful of very rich and the 60 million very poor;
nor did it lessen injustice in Chiapas.¶ The Mexican government has not met the basic demands of its people.
Instead of responding to issues of land, education, medical care, justice and democracy, it has stationed its occupation army in the pro-Zapatista areas.¶
And the Mexican army has helped equip and train paramilitary gangs. On Dec. 22, 1997, such a group entered the village of Acteal in the Chiapas
highlands and systematically slaughtered 45 people, mostly women and children. The Catholic diocese and other reputable organizations linked the
killings to the highest levels of the Chiapas state government. In turn, those ruling party officials had links to Mexico's ruling PRI party. Many of those
implicated have gone unpunished.¶ By waging this counterinsurgency war and occupying part of its own territory, the Mexican
government is forcing Indians to flee their ancient lands, pushing them out of peasant life and
into the vast world labor force. This is NAFTA in action, just as Marcos warned.¶ It's time to face facts. Neither U.S.
policy nor the much-heralded Mexican economic model have improved the lives of Mexico's poorest citizens. Congress must examine
our so-called free-trade policy with Mexico and our support for the Mexican government. The
costs to human life are too great.
NAFTA hurts jobs and causes income inequality
New York Times 3 (Celia W. Dugger, “Report Finds Few Benefits for Mexico in NAFTA,” 11/19/2003,
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/11/19/world/report-finds-few-benefits-for-mexico-in-nafta.html, AC)
As the North American Free Trade Agreement nears its 10th anniversary, a
study from the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace concludes that the pact failed to generate substantial job growth in Mexico,
hurt hundreds of thousands of subsistence farmers there and had ''minuscule'' net effects on
jobs in the United States.¶ The Carnegie Endowment, an independent, Washington-based research institute, issued its report on Tuesday to coincide with
new trade negotiations aimed at the adoption of a Nafta-like pact for the entire Western Hemisphere. Trade ministers from 34 countries in the Americas are gathering now in
Miami.¶ The report seeks to debunk both the fears of American labor that Nafta would lure large numbers of jobs to low-wage Mexico, as well as the hopes of the trade deal's
proponents that it would lead to rising wages, as well as declines in income inequality and illegal immigration.¶ Though sorting out the exact causes is complicated, trends are
clear. Real
wages in Mexico are lower now than they were when the agreement was adopted despite
inequality is greater there and immigration has continued to soar.¶ ''On balance,
Nafta's been rough for rural Mexicans,'' said John J. Audley, who edited the report. ''For the country, it's probably a wash. It takes more than
higher productivity, income
just trade liberalization to improve the quality of life for poor people around the world.''¶ The Carnegie findings strike a much more pessimistic note than those of a World
Bank team that concluded in a draft report this year that the trade accord ''has brought significant economic and social benefits to the Mexican economy.''¶ The bank's
economists argue that Mexico would have been worse off without the agreement as the country struggled to recover from a deep financial crisis in the mid-1990's and that the
income gap between Mexico and the United States is smaller than it would have been otherwise.¶ Luis Servén, research manager for Latin America at the bank, said in an
interview that he disagreed with the Carnegie report's contention that the trade agreement had hurt small subsistence farmers. He also said that the higher productivity
Mexico had achieved in the Nafta years was ultimately the only route to higher wages there.¶ The intensity of the debate about the agreement's consequences is likely to grow
with the approach of the pact's 10th anniversary in January as pro- and antiglobalization forces marshal arguments to influence negotiations for a Free Trade Area of the
Americas and for a new bilateral trade deal between the United States and Central America.¶ Carnegie's policy experts stop short of contending that Mexico would have been
better off without the agreement. ''Mexico
would have been better off with a better Nafta,'' said Sandra Polaski, a senior associate
say developing
countries have much to learn from Mexico's mistakes in the Nafta deal.¶ Trade negotiators for Central and South
at Carnegie who was director of economic research at the Nafta labor secretariat from 1996 to 1999.¶ The authors of the report
American countries, they said, should bargain for more gradual tariff reductions on corn, rice and beans -- the staples of subsistence farming -- to give peasants time to adjust
to tough competition from large, highly efficient and heavily subsidized American farmers.¶ Carnegie's researchers also say developing countries should push international
donors and rich countries to finance transitional assistance for the retraining of workers and farmers displaced by global competition.¶ Developing countries should also seek
greater leeway to promote the use of domestic suppliers in manufacturing over imported components -- a step that would increase job creation, the authors say.
NAFTA eliminates job opportunities and undermines growth
Fletcher 11 (Ian, Senior Economist of the Coalition for a Prosperous America and research fellow at the U.S. Business and Industry Council, “More Free
Trade Agreements? When NAFTA Failed?” Huffington Post The Blog, 03/11/2011, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ian-fletcher/more-free-tradeagreement_b_838196.html, AC)
With the Republicans and the Obama administration attempting to rush headlong into a new trade agreement with Korea, and possibly also with
Panama and Colombia as well, it is incumbent on Americans to apply a bit of empiricism. How have our past trade agreements worked at all, how's the
grand-daddy of them all, NAFTA, doing?¶ Unfortunately, NAFTA is a veritable case study in failure.¶ This is all the more
damning because this treaty was created, and is administered, by the very Washington elite that is loudest in proclaiming free trade's virtues. So there is
no room for excuses about incompetent implementation, the standard alibi for free trade's failures in the developing world. So if free trade was going to
work anywhere, it should have been here.¶ Instead, what happened? NAFTA was sold as a policy that would reduce America's trade deficit. But our
trade balance actually worsened against both Canada and Mexico.¶ For the four years prior to NAFTA's implementation in
1994, America's annual deficit with Canada averaged a modest $8.1 billion. Twelve years later, it was up to $71 billion. ¶ Our trade with
Mexico showed a $1.6 billion surplus in 1993 but by 2010, our deficit had reached $61.6 billion.¶
Eccentric billionaire and 1992 presidential candidate H. Ross Perot was roundly mocked for predicting a "giant sucking sound" of jobs going to Mexico if
NAFTA passed. But he has been vindicated. The Department of Labor has estimated that NAFTA cost America
525,000 jobs between 1994 and 2002. According to the more aggressive Economic Policy Institute:¶ NAFTA has
eliminated some 766,000 job opportunities--primarily for non-college-educated workers in manufacturing. Contrary to what
the American promoters of NAFTA promised U.S. workers, the agreement did not result in an increased trade surplus
with Mexico, but the reverse. As manufacturing jobs disappeared, workers were down-scaled to lower-paying, less-secure services jobs.
Within manufacturing, the threat of employers to move production to Mexico proved a powerful weapon for undercutting workers' bargaining power.¶
The idea of Mexico as a vast export market for American products is a sad joke; Mexicans are simply too poor. In the 1997 words of Business Mexico, a
pro-NAFTA publication of the American Chamber of Commerce of Mexico:¶ The reality is that only between 10 and 20 percent of
the population are really considered consumers. The extreme unequal distribution of wealth
has created a distorted market, the economy is hamstrung by a work force with a poor level of
education, and a sizable chunk of the gross domestic product in devoted to exports rather than
production for home consumption.¶ According to official figures that year, fewer than 18 million Mexicans made more than 5,000
pesos a month. And even that was only about $625: roughly half the U.S. poverty line for a family of four. This has not improved much since, so, as Paul
Krugman has pointed out, "Mexico's economy is so small--its GDP is less than four percent that of the United States--that for the foreseeable future it
will be neither a major supplier nor a major market."¶ But if NAFTA wasn't a plausible economic bonanza for the U.S. and America's establishment knew
it, then what was going on? Krugman again supplies an answer, writing in Foreign Affairs that, "For the United States, NAFTA is essentially a foreign
policy rather than an economic issue." The real agenda was to keep people like President Carlos Salinas, friendly with
powerful interests in the U.S., in power in Mexico City.¶ Bottom line? Free trade was pushed not because of any sincerely anticipated
economic benefits, but to serve an extraneous foreign policy agenda. To his credit, Krugman later admitted the utter chicanery of it all, writing in The
New Democrat in 1996 that:¶ The agreement was sold under false pretences. Over the protests of most economists, the Clinton Administration chose to
promote NAFTA as a jobs-creation program. Based on little more than guesswork, a few economists argued that NAFTA would boost our trade surplus
with Mexico, and thus produce a net gain in jobs. With utterly spurious precision, the administration settled on a figure of 200,000 jobs created--and
this became the core of the NAFTA sales pitch.¶ NAFTA was sold in Mexico as Mexico's ticket to the big time. Mexicans were told they were choosing
between gradually converging with America's advanced economy and regressing to the status of a backwater like neighboring Guatemala.¶ What actually
happened? In reality, the income gap between the United States and Mexico grew (by over 10 percent) in the first decade of the agreement. This doesn't
mean America boomed; we didn't. But Mexico slumped terribly.¶ In NAFTA's first decade, the Mexican economy averaged 1.8 percent real growth per
capita. By contrast, under the protectionist economic policies of 1948-73, Mexico had averaged 3.2 percent growth.¶ Because Mexico's labor force grows
by a million people a year, job creation must get ahead of this curve in order to raise wages; this is simply not happening. Mexican workers can often be
hired for less than the taxes on American workers; the average maquiladora wage is $1.82/hr. The maquiladora sector is deliberately isolated from the
rest of the Mexican economy and contributes little to it. Workers' rights, wages, and benefits are deliberately suppressed. Environmental laws are
frequently just ignored.¶ Mexican agriculture hasn't benefited either: NAFTA turned Mexico from a food exporter to a food
importer overnight and over a million farm jobs were wiped out by cheap American food
exports, massively subsidized by our various farm programs.¶ Promoters of NAFTA have tried to cover up its problems by using inappropriate
yardsticks of success. For example, they have claimed that the expansion of total trade among the three nations vindicates
the pact. But this expansion has been due to a growing American deficit. Because a growing deficit means, by
definition, that our imports have been growing faster than our exports, there is no way that economic
growth per se will ever solve the problem.¶ Congress was right to reject NAFTA initially, which never enjoyed sincere majority
support in either the House or the Senate and was bought with sheer patronage by Bill Clinton.¶ To be fair, NAFTA is not the only thing that has been
wrong with the Mexican economy in recent decades. But NAFTA was the capstone to a series of dubious free-market economic experiments carried out
there since the early 1980s. Between 1990 and 1999, Mexican manufacturing wages fell 21 percent.¶ It gets worse. Despite the fact that, compared to the
U.S., Mexico is a cheap-labor economy, there are plenty of nations with even lower average wages. For example, Mexico is now losing manufacturing jobs
to China in such areas as computer parts, electrical components, toys, textiles, sporting goods, and shoes: 200,000 in the first two years of the
millennium alone.¶ Mexico's trade deficit against the rest of the world has actually worsened since NAFTA was signed. In the words of liberal
commentator William Greider, "The Mexican maquiladora cities thought they were going to become the next South Korea, but instead they may be the
next Detroit."¶ NAFTA is not America's only free trade agreement, of course. But our other agreements tell similar tales. We have signed 11 since 2000:
with Australia, Bahrain, Chile, Colombia, Jordan, Korea, Oman, Morocco, Singapore, Panama, and Peru. (El Salvador, Nicaragua, Honduras, Guatemala,
and the Dominican Republic were lumped together in the Central America Free Trade Agreement or CAFTA.) Every agreement but one has coincided
with greater American deficits. The only exception is Singapore, where our existing surplus increased somewhat. But Singapore is tiny, a mere city-state.¶
Nevertheless, our government pushes for more. As of 2011, country agreements with Colombia, South Korea, Oman and Panama were pending
ratification, and the U.S. was in stalled negotiations with Malaysia, Thailand and the United Arab Emirates. Next on the list are reportedly Algeria, Egypt,
Tunisia, Saudi Arabia and Qatar.¶ In December 2009, the Obama administration announced its intention to eventually join the existing Trans-Pacific
Partnership and elevate it into a full-blown free trade area comprising the U.S. plus Singapore, Chile, New Zealand, Brunei, Australia, Peru, and Vietnam.
In December 2010, the administration reached a slightly-improved deal with South Korea and announced it would push for Congressional ratification. ¶
When will we ever learn?
Imports under NAFTA displace domestic goods and kill jobs
Scott 3 (Robert E., international economist at the Economic Policy Institute, “The High Price of ‘Free Trade’: NAFTA’s Failure Has Cost The United
States Jobs Across The Nation,” 11/17/2003, http://www.epi.org/publication/briefingpapers_bp147/, AC)
Since the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was signed in 1993, the rise in the U.S. trade deficit with Canada and
Mexico through 2002 has
caused the displacement of production that supported 879,280 U.S. jobs.
Most of those lost jobs were high-wage positions in manufacturing industries. The loss of these jobs is
just the most visible tip of NAFTA’s impact on the U.S. economy. In fact, NAFTA has also contributed to rising
income inequality, suppressed real wages for production workers, weakened workers’
collective bargaining powers and ability to organize unions, and reduced fringe benefits.¶ NAFTA
is a free trade and investment agreement that provided investors with a unique set of guarantees designed to stimulate foreign
direct investment and the movement of factories within the hemisphere, especially from the United States to Canada and Mexico.
Furthermore, no protections were contained in the core of the agreement to maintain labor or environmental standards. As a
result, NAFTA tilted the economic playing field in favor of investors, and against workers and the
environment, resulting in a hemispheric “race to the bottom” in wages and environmental quality.¶ False promises¶
Proponents of new trade agreements that build on NAFTA, such as the proposed Free Trade Agreement of the Americas
(FTAA), have frequently claimed that such deals create jobs and raise incomes in the United
States. When the Senate recently approved President Bush’s request for fast-track trade negotiating authority1 for an FTAA,
Bush called the bill’s passage a “historic moment” that would lead to the creation of more jobs and more sales of U.S. products
abroad. Two weeks later at his economic forum in Texas, the president argued, “(i)t is essential that we move aggressively [to
negotiate new trade pacts], because trade means jobs. More trade means higher incomes for American workers.” ¶ The problem
with these statements is that they misrepresent the real effects of trade on the U.S. economy: trade both creates and destroys jobs.
Increases in U.S. exports tend to create jobs in this country, but increases in imports tend to
reduce jobs because the imports displace goods that otherwise would have been made in the
United States by domestic workers.¶ President Bush’s statements—and similar remarks from others in his
administration and from members of both major parties in Congress—are based only on the positive effects of exports, ignoring the
negative effects of imports. Such arguments are an attempt to hide the costs of new trade deals, in order to boost the reported
benefits. These are effectively the same tactics that led to the bankruptcies of Enron, WorldCom, and several other major
corporations.¶ The impact on employment of any change in trade is determined by its effect on the trade balance, the difference
between exports and imports. Ignoring imports and counting only exports is like balancing a checkbook by counting only deposits
but not withdrawals. The many officials, policy analysts, and business leaders who ignore the negative effects of imports and talk
only about the benefits of exports are engaging in false accounting.¶ NAFTA supporters frequently tout the
benefits of exports while remaining silent on the effects of rapid import growth (Scott 2000). Former
President George H.W. Bush, whose administration negotiated NAFTA, recently claimed that “two million NAFTA-related jobs have
been created in the United States since 1993″ (Bush 2002). But any evaluation of the impact of trade on the domestic economy must
include the impact of both imports and exports. If the United States exports 1,000 cars to Mexico, many American workers are
employed in their production. If, however, the United States imports 1,000 cars from Mexico rather than building them
domestically, then a similar number of Americans who would have otherwise been employed in the auto industry will have to find
other work.¶ Another critically important promise made by the promoters of NAFTA was that the United States would benefit
because of increased exports to a large and growing consumer market in Mexico. This market, in turn, was to be based on an
expansion of the middle class that, it was claimed, would grow rapidly due to the wealth created in Mexico by NAFTA. Thus, most
U.S. exports were predicted to be consumer products destined for consumption in Mexico.¶ In fact, most U.S. exports to Mexico are
parts and components that are shipped to Mexico and assembled into final products that are then returned to the United States.
The number of products that Mexico assembles and exports—such as refrigerators, TVs, automobiles, and computers—has
mushroomed under the NAFTA agreement. Many of these products are produced in the Maquiladora export processing zones in
Mexico, where parts enter duty free and are re-exported to the United States in assembled products, with duties paid only on the
value added in Mexico. The share of total U.S. exports to Mexico that is represented by Maquiladora imports has risen from 39% of
U.S. exports in 1993 to 61% in 2002.2 The number of such plants increased from 2,114 in 1993 to 3,251 in 2002 (INEGI 2003a,
2003b).
NAFTA devastates the manufacturing sector
Scott 3 (Robert E., international economist at the Economic Policy Institute, “The High Price of ‘Free Trade’:
NAFTA’s Failure Has Cost The United States Jobs Across The Nation,” 11/17/2003,
http://www.epi.org/publication/briefingpapers_bp147/, RLA)
NAFTA’s impact in the United States, however, has been often obscured by the “boom-and-bust” cycle that drove domestic consumption, investment,
and speculation in the mid- and late 1990s. Between 1994 (when NAFTA was implemented) and 2000, total
employment rose rapidly in the United States, causing overall unemployment to fall to record low levels. But
unemployment began to rise early in 2001, and 2.4 million jobs were lost in the domestic economy
between March 2001 and October 2003 (BLS 2003). These job losses have been primarily concentrated
in the manufacturing sector, which has experienced a total decline of 2.4 million jobs since March 2001. As job growth has dried up in
the economy, the underlying problems caused by U.S. trade deficits have become much more apparent,
especially in manufacturing.
NAFTA increases the trade deficit, resulting in unemployment
Scott 3 (Robert E., international economist at the Economic Policy Institute, “The High Price of ‘Free Trade’:
NAFTA’s Failure Has Cost The United States Jobs Across The Nation,” 11/17/2003,
http://www.epi.org/publication/briefingpapers_bp147/, RLA)
Research by Monge-Naranjo (2002) shows that the passage
of NAFTA immediately translated into significant
increases in FDI into Mexico, in large part because NAFTA made Mexico an attractive export platform
for labor-intensive manufacturing. A recent report from the World Bank reaches a similar conclusion: “In particular, a conservative
estimate of NAFTA’s influence would suggest that it is responsible for increasing FDI in Mexico by about 70%” (Cuevas, Messmacher, and Werner
2002).¶ NAFTA has resulted in a huge surge of foreign direct investment into Canada and Mexico, as shown in Figure 2. This figure measures changes in
the stock of FDI over 10-year periods, before and after NAFTA took effect (IMF 2003).4 Between 1983 and 1992, before NAFTA, the stock of FDI in
Mexico increased by $23 billion U.S. dollars. In the decade after NAFTA, between 1993 and 2002, the stock of FDI increased $124 billion, an increase of
435% over the decade before NAFTA. In Canada, the story is much the same. Between 1983 and 1992, before NAFTA, the stock of FDI in Canada
increased by $44 billion U.S. dollars. In the decade after NAFTA, between 1993 and 2002, the stock of FDI increased $202 billion, an increase of 354%
over the decade before NAFTA.¶ Inflows of FDI, along with bank loans and other types of foreign financing, have funded the
construction of thousands of Mexican and Canadian factories that produce goods for export to
the United States. Canada and Mexico have absorbed $326 billion in FDI from all sources since
1993. One result is that the United States absorbed 84% of Mexico’s total exports in 2002, up from 77% in 1993.5 The growth of U.S.
imports from these factories has contributed substantially to the growing U.S. trade deficit and
the related job losses. The growth of foreign production capacity in these factories has played a major role in the rapid growth in exports to
the United States.¶
***NAFTA Good***
UQ- NAFTA High Now
US Economy Scenario
2AC
NAFTA is key to the US economy
Canadian- American Business Council 8- The Premier Voice of the Canadian American Business Community (“The economic benefits of NAFTA”,
April 2008, http://canambusco.org/resources/TheEconomicBenefitsofNAFTA.pdf)//RT
From the current U.S. government’s perspective, the U.S. economy has been a big ¶ winner under NAFTA. U.S.
Trade Representative Susan Schwab says U.S. merchandise ¶ exports to Canadian and Mexico
grew more rapidly – 157% – than U.S. exports to the rest of ¶ the world, which was 108%.¶ About
US$2.4 billion worth of goods crosses the northern and southern borders ¶ each day. As a result,
Canada and Mexico are the U.S.’s first and second largest export ¶ markets, although China is soon expected
to be the U.S.'s largest trading partner. Initial ¶ worries about NAFTA, from the U.S. perspective, had little to do with trade with Canada. ¶ Instead,
former presidential candidate Ross Perot, characterized then widespread concerns ¶ about America job losses to Mexico as “that giant sucking sound.¶
That does not appear to have happened.¶ Instead, Schwab says that U.S. economic growth during the past 14 years of
NAFTA ¶ has been strong: U.S. employment rose 22% to 137.2 million in December 2006 from
112.2 ¶ million in December 1993. The average unemployment rate was 5.1% between 1994 and ¶
2006, compared with 7.1% between 1981 and 1993.¶ U.S. manufacturing output rose by 63%
between 1993 and 2006, nearly double the ¶ 37% seen between 1980 and 1993. Wages in the same sector
increased 1.6% between ¶ 1993 and 2006 compared with 0.9% between 1980 and 1993.¶ Excluding housing, U.S. business investment has risen by 107%
since 1993, ¶ compared with 45% between 1980 and 1993The U.S. Trade Representative also insists that NAFTA’s
investment provisions such ¶ as Chapter 11 do not prevent the U.S. – or any NAFTA country –
from adopting or ¶ maintaining non-discriminatory laws or regulations that protect the
environment, worker ¶ rights, health and safety or other public interest. ¶ Schwab notes that to date the U.S.
has not lost a challenge in cases decided under ¶ NAFTA, nor has it paid a penny in damages to resolve any investment dispute. Even if the ¶ U.S. were to
lose a case, it could be directed to pay compensation but it could not be ¶ required to change the
laws or regulations at issue.
Economic decline breaks down cooperation and leads to war – heg decline, falling
trade, rising protectionism, and diversionary tactics.
Royal 10 – Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction Policy, US-Department of Defense, policy advisor
(Jedidiah, “Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal, and Political Perspectives”, pg. 212-214;
Print.)//Beddow
The counterargument to contagion is the ‘risk-sharing’ argument. It suggests that while trade and financial linkages may spread a
crisis, this creates a cushioning effect that, overall, minimizes the effects on any individual state. In other
words, interdependence creates shock-absorbing linkages that soften a state’s vulnerability to dramatic
economic downturns (see, e.g., Kelemli-Ozcan, Sorensen, & Yosha, 2003). Gallegati, Greenwald, Richiardi, and Stiglitz (2008) have made a
convincing observation that would appear to clarify this debate. They have provided statistical modeling indicating that risk-sharing
and contagion are in fact two sides of the same coin. When economic times are good, inter-linkages provide
mechanisms for the diffusion of individual agents that face a liquidity crisis. A leader can request a creditor defer payment,
whereas a creditor can then transfer this cost on to other agents. As such the system would absorb the crisis. When liquidity is relatively
more scarce during down times, a sufficiently large negative shock will use those very same inter-linkages to
transmit that shock to other agents in the system. As a result, ‘risk sharing is beneficial only when the overall
economic environment is favourable, while in harsh times it might be better to stay alone… [linkage during
market downturns] becomes socially detrimental; not only is it that the expected number of defaults is higher when the economic
agents are connected, but defaults become a systemic failure’ (Gallegati et al., 2008. Pp.5. 16). Kose, Prasad, and Terrones (2009) considered the same
question and found only mild support for risk-sharing and only among developed, industrial economies. They found no evidence that developing, nonindustrial countries are able to share risk. The authors break relatively new ground in suggesting why this is the case for non-industrial states: One
possibility is that these countries rely more on less stable capital such as bank loans and other forms of debt that may not allow for efficient risk sharing.
Indeed, we break up stocks of external assets and liabilities into different categories – FDI, portfolio equity, portfolio debt, etc. – we find that the
underlying composition of capital flows influences the ability of developing countries to share risk. In particular, external debt appears to hinder the
ability of emerging market economies to share their consumption risk. (Kose, Prasad, & Terrones, 2009. P. 259) One reason why interdependent states
may not be well-suited to share risk is due to the fact that interdependence leads to economic specialization and reliance on external financing. Gande,
John, and Senbet (2008) and Corsetii et al. (1999) provide conceptual and analytical links between specialization, moral hazard, and contagion. Thus,
the answer to the first question set out at the beginning of this section, whether economic integration and economic crises are linked, seems reasonably
well-established. Substantial recent scholarship indicates a positive association between economic interdependence and economic crises. What then
about the second question? Is there a positive correlation between economic crises and armed conflict? The impacts at an individual level and on a state
level are intuitive and well-documented (See, e.g., Richards & Gelleny, 2006). Rodrik (1997a, 197b), among others, argues that the instability in
the global economic system contributes to social disintegration and political conflict.’ Social unrest, regime
changes, and even civil war have directly resulted from the vagaries of economic integration. Less intuitive is how
periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of external conflict. Political science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to
the impact of economic decline and the security and defence behavior of interdependent states. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic,
dyadic and national levels. Several notable contributions follow. First, on the systemic level, Pollins (2008) advances Modelski
and Thompson’s (1996) work on leadership cycle theory, finding that rhythms in the global economy are
associated with the rise and fall of a pre-eminent power and the often bloody transition from
one pre-eminent leader to the next. As such, exogenous shocks such as economic crises could user in a
redistribution of relative power (see also Gilpin, 1981) that leads to uncertainty about power balances,
increasing the risk of miscalculation (Fearon, 1995). Alternatively, even a relatively certain redistribution of
power could lead to a permissive environment for conflict as a rising power may seek to challenge a declining
power (Werner, 1999). Separately, Pollins (1996) shows that global economic cycles combined with
parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium, and small
powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remain unknown.
Second, on a dyadic level, Copeland’s (1996, 2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that ‘future expectation of
trade’ is a significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behavior of states. He argues
that interdependent states are likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view
of future trade relations. However, if the expectations of future trade decline, particularly for
difficult to replace items such as energy resources, the likelihood for conflict increases, as
states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources. Crises could potentially be the
trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by
interdependent states. Third, others have considered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level.
Blomberg and Hess (2002) find a strong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict, particularly
during periods of economic downturn. They write, The linkages between internal and external conflict and
prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict tends to spawn internal conflict, which in
turn returns the favour. Moreover, the presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which
international and external conflicts self-reinforce each other. (Blomberg & Hess., 2002, p. 89). Economic decline has
also been linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism (Blomberg, Hess & Weerapana,
2004), which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions. Furthermore, crises
generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government. ‘Diversionary theory’ suggests that, when facing
unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting governments have increased incentives to
fabricate external military conflicts to create a ‘rally around the flag’ effect. Wang (1996), DeRouen (1995),
and Blomberg, Hess, and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force are at
least indirectly correlated. Gelpi (1997), Miller (1999), and Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest that the tendency towards
diversionary tactics are greater for democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic
leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support. DeRouen
(2000) has provided evidence showing that periods of weak economic performance in the United States, and thus weak
Presidential popularity, are statistically linked to an increase in the use of force. In summary, recent economic scholarship
positively correlates economic integration with an increase in the frequency of economic crises, whereas political science scholarship links economic
decline with external conflict at systemic, dyadic and national levels. This implied connection between integration, crises, and armed conflict has not
featured prominently in the economic-security debate and deserves more attention.
I/L
NAFTA key to US economy—farming industry
USTR 1 (Office of the United States Trade Representative, Executive Office of the President, “NAFTA Good for
Farmers, Good for America”, http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/factsheets/archives/2001/june/nafta-good-farmers-good-america)
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) has been part of the American economic success
story of the 1990's and is an important part of America’s economic future.¶ In particular,
America’s farmers have benefitted greatly from NAFTA, because it’s meant more export
opportunities. Since NAFTA was approved in 1993, United States agricultural exports to Mexico
have nearly doubled. Mexico now imports $6.5 billion of United States agricultural products making
it our third largest agricultural market. United States exports of agricultural products to Canada
since implementation of NAFTA have increased 44 percent. Canada is the second largest market for
United States agricultural exports, with Canadians purchasing $7.6 billion worth of American
products last year. Canada and Mexico purchased over 25 percent of the United States agricultural product
exported in 2000. American farmers can’t afford to lose access to the NAFTA markets.¶ Current
United States Department of Agriculture projections anticipate an improvement in global agricultural demand
and trade over the next several years, and United States exports are projected to rise. Over the longer
term, economic growth, especially in developing countries, is projected to strengthen,
providing a solid foundation for future expansion in global agricultural demand and trade.¶ It’s
important to remember that United States agricultural imports benefit consumers with lower
prices and expanded choices.
NAFTA key to growth of US businesses
Bravo 12 (Eduard Bravo, Writer for Houston Chronicle, “NAFTA has been good for all of North America”,
http://www.chron.com/opinion/outlook/article/NAFTA-has-been-good-for-all-of-North-America-4038237.php)
As a Mexican national who has been doing business in Mexico and the U.S. since 1988, who launched a
publishing business in 1992, who moved from Mexico to San Antonio in 2009, and who has continued doing
business in both countries, I believe that North America is better off with NAFTA than without it. ¶ The North
American Free Trade Agreement united Canada, Mexico and the U.S. as a powerful trading
bloc. The agreement established trade rules and regulations that provide a business-friendly environment so
that the three nations can trade products and services more easily among each other by eliminating tariffs and
trade barriers.¶ Since its implementation in the early '90s, NAFTA has stimulated economic growth and
sustained the economies of the three-nation region. According to the U.S. Department of Commerce,
in 2011 exports grew more than 45 percent and were strongest with the U.S. NAFTA partners,
Canada and Mexico. U.S. trade with Mexico increased substantially in 2011, with exports to
Mexico increasing by 21.6 percent between 2010 and 2011.¶ Despite economic turbulence, I have seen
many business success stories unfold thanks to NAFTA. Corona, for example, is a Mexican beer that
was introduced in the U.S. in 1981. After NAFTA was implemented, the trading process became easier
and the brand's marketing efforts helped it become the No. 1 import beer in the U.S. The beer that
originated in Mexico crossed borders when the brand and its parent company were acquired by AnheuserBusch earlier this year. But beer isn't the only Mexican product that has benefited from NAFTA. In San
Antonio's key grocery store chain, H.E.B, one can buy many products from my homeland because H.E.B.
operates in Mexico and the U.S., thanks to NAFTA.¶ Additionally, NAFTA has made it easier to buy
American products in Mexico. I can shop at H.E.B. and other stores in Mexico and buy Procter & Gamble
and other American-made products that we could not buy in Mexico before NAFTA. Before NAFTA, the
taxes imposed on American products in Mexico made them unaffordable. In fact, people called
"contrabandistas" would buy American products, smuggle them into Mexico, and sell them to Mexicans at
three times the American price. Thanks to NAFTA, the process of smuggling American products into
Mexico is less common because NAFTA eliminated tariffs, making American-made products
more competitively priced in Mexico.¶ Mexico is also the second largest destination for U.S.
exports and the third largest source of imports; 6 million American jobs depend on trade with
Mexico. And I have seen the business landscape in Mexico become Americanized. In most of Mexico's major
cities, today one will see the familiar brands of American stores and restaurants that have grown due to
expansion in Mexico. Familiar brands include McDonalds, Burger King, Applebee's and Walmart, to name a
few.¶ Mary Kay is a testament to the beauty of NAFTA. In 2007, Mary Kay, one of the largest directselling skin care and color cosmetic companies in the world, opened a new headquarters and distribution
center in the northern Mexico region. Mary Kay's $20 million investment in the two facilities reflects
its commitment to the country. The new distribution center focuses on the needs of some
200,000 Mary Kay independent beauty consultants throughout Mexico. It is estimated that 75
million units will be shipped from the distribution center annually, increasing Mary Kay's business capacity by
50 percent.¶ Caterpillar also paved its way into Mexico and Canada, and is a huge supporter of NAFTA. The
chairman and CEO attributes much of the company's economic success to the benefits of free
trade, and says that it is an excellent case study of how American workers can compete and win
in the international marketplace. Because the company exports billions of dollars from products made in
U.S. factories, many of Catepillar's U.S. employees depend on international trade for their
livelihoods. That is why the company is a strong advocate for international trade and NAFTA.¶ The company
stories I mentioned are just a few examples, but there are hundreds more, and we, as Mexican nationals who
are living in the U.S. and successfully operating businesses on an international level, are strong proponents for
developing a NAFTA future that will generate smarter, more innovative ways to grow and sustain the
economies of Canada, Mexico and the U.S.
NAFTA key to the US economy
Bravo ’12 (Eduardo, Publisher at The Society Diaries
Chairman at AEM "Asociacion Empresarios Mexicanos" Publisher at Empresarios AEM President & CEO
at M.M.G.COMMUNICATIONS, INC. Presidente y Director General at Suplementos Corporativos, “NAFTA has taken North American trade to a higher level”,
December 9th issue of El Paso times- columnist section //LEXIS //NS)
The agreement established trade rules and regulations that provide a business friendly environment so that the three nations can trade products and services more easily
among each other by eliminating tariffs and trade barriers.
Since its implementation in the early '90s, NAFTA has
stimulated economic growth and sustained the economies of the three-nation region.
According to the U.S. Department of Commerce, in 2011, exports grew over 45 percent . Despite
economic turbulence, I have seen many business success stories unfold thanks to NAFTA. Corona, for example, is a Mexican beer that was introduced in the U.S. in
1981. After NAFTA was implemented, the trading process became easier and the brand's marketing efforts helped it become the number one import beer in the
U.S. NAFTA has made it easier to buy American products in Mexico. I can shop at HEB and other stores in Mexico
and buy Procter & Gamble and other American-made products that we could not buy in Mexico before NAFTA. When I lived in Mexico and wanted American
products before NAFTA, the taxes imposed on American products made them unaffordable. Mexico is also the second- largest
destination for U.S. exports and the third-largest source of imports; 6 million American jobs
depend on trade with Mexico. And I have seen the business landscape in Mexico become Americanized. In most of Mexico's major cities, today
one will see the familiar brands of American stores and restaurants that have grown due to expansion in Mexico. Familiar brands include McDonalds, Burger King,
Applebee's and Walmart, to name a few. Mary Kay is a testament to the beauty of NAFTA. In 2007, Mary Kay, one of the largest direct-selling skin care and color
cosmetic companies in the world, opened a new headquarters and distribution center in the Northern Mexico region. Caterpillar also paved its way to Mexico and
Canada, and is a huge supporter of NAFTA. The chairman and CEO attributes much of the company's economic success to the benefits of free trade, and says that the
company is an excellent case study of how American workers can compete and win in the international marketplace. Because the company exports billions of dollars of
its products made in U.S. factories, many of Catepillar's U.S. employees depend on international trade for their livelihoods. That is why the company is a strong
advocate for international trade and NAFTA. The company stories I mentioned are just a few examples, but there are hundreds more, and we,
as Mexican
nationals who are living in the U.S. and successfully operating businesses on an international
level, are strong proponents for developing a NAFTA future that will generate smarter, more
innovative ways to grow and sustain the economies of Canada, Mexico and the U.S. In the
future, the Asociacicn de Empresarios Mexicanos will hold more frequent summits to continue
the international dialogue on how to take NAFTA to a higher level that will benefit the entire
world.
NAFTA key to the economy of all three countries
U.S. Chamber of Commerce ’12 (Targeted News Service November 16, LEXIS //NS)
"The bottom line is that NAFTA has supported millions of good jobs, raised standards of living,
and enhanced the competitiveness of North American industry in a rapidly changing global
economy," said Donohue. "NAFTA's tremendous benefits for American workers, farmers, and
companies are hidden in plain sight. Today more than ever, we need the millions of jobs and
the huge boost to our competitiveness that NAFTA has provided. However, the United States can't rest on its laurels.
Elected officials and business leaders in Canada, Mexico, and the United States must work
together to build on this foundation in the years ahead." "North America is experiencing a
renaissance in energy production of epic proportions," he added. "The potential in the United States
alone is tremendous. Unconventional oil and natural gas development will attract
manufacturing back to the United States, boost exports, expand our tax base and revenues, and
reduce our dependence on unfriendly or risky suppliers. When you add up the potential of all three countries, our energy
resources are truly staggering. We must do everything in our power to seize the extraordinary energy
opportunity in North America." In conjunction with Donohue's participation in the NAFTA20 Summit, the Chamber released a new report
entitled NAFTA Triumphant: Assessing Two Decades of Gains in Trade, Growth, and Jobs.
Impacts
Econ. Decline causes War
Harris and Burrows 9 - *Mathew, PhD European History @ Cambridge, counselor in the National Intelligence Council (NIC) , **Jennifer, a member
of the NIC’s Long Range Analysis Unit
(“Revisiting the Future: Geopolitical Effects of the Financial Crisis” http://www.ciaonet.org/journals/twq/v32i2/f_0016178_13952.pdf)//BB
Increased Potential for Global Conflict¶ Of course, the report encompasses more than economics and indeed believes the future is likely to be the result of a number
of intersecting and interlocking forces. With so many possible permutations of outcomes, each with ample Revisiting the Future opportunity for unintended
consequences, there is a growing sense of insecurity. Even so, history may be more instructive than ever . While we continue to believe that the
Great Depression is not likely to be repeated, the lessons to be drawn from that period include the harmful effects on fledgling democracies
and multiethnic societies (think Central Europe in 1920s and 1930s) and on the sustainability of multilateral institutions (think League of
Nations in the same period). There is no reason to think that this would not be true in the twenty-first as much as in the twentieth
century. For that reason, the ways in which the potential for greater conflict could grow would seem to be even more apt in a constantly
volatile economic environment as they would be if change would be steadier. In surveying those risks, the report stressed the likelihood that terrorism and
nonproliferation will remain priorities even as resource issues move up on the international agenda.
Terrorism’s appeal will decline if
economic growth continues in the Middle East and youth unemployment is reduced. For those terrorist groups that remain
active in 2025, however, the diffusion of technologies and scientific knowledge will place some of the world’s most dangerous capabilities within their reach.
Terrorist groups in 2025 will likely be a combination of descendants of long established groups_inheriting organizational structures, command and control
processes, and training procedures necessary to conduct sophisticated attacks_and newly emergent collections of the angry and disenfranchised that become
self-radicalized, particularly in the absence of economic outlets that would become narrower in an economic downturn.
The most dangerous casualty of any economically-induced drawdown of U.S. military presence would
almost certainly be the Middle East. Although Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons is not inevitable, worries about a nuclear-armed Iran could lead
states in the region to develop new security arrangements with external powers, acquire additional weapons, and consider
pursuing their own nuclear ambitions. It is not clear that the type of stable deterrent relationship that existed between the great powers for most of the
Cold War would emerge naturally in the Middle East with a nuclear Iran. Episodes of low intensity conflict and terrorism taking place under a nuclear umbrella
could lead to an unintended escalation and broader conflict if clear red lines between those states involved are not well established. The close
proximity of potential nuclear rivals combined with underdeveloped surveillance capabilities and mobile dual-capable Iranian missile systems also
will produce inherent difficulties in achieving reliable indications and warning of an impending nuclear attack. The lack of strategic depth in neighboring
states like Israel, short warning and missile flight times, and uncertainty of Iranian intentions may place more focus on preemption
rather than defense, potentially leading to escalating crises. 36 Types of conflict that the world continues to experience, such as over resources,
could reemerge, particularly if protectionism grows and there is a resort to neo-mercantilist practices. Perceptions of renewed
energy scarcity will drive countries to take actions to assure their future access to energy supplies. In the worst case, this could result in interstate
conflicts if government leaders deem assured access to energy resources, for example, to be essential for maintaining domestic stability
and the survival of their regime. Even actions short of war, however, will have important geopolitical implications. Maritime security concerns are
providing a rationale for naval buildups and modernization efforts, such as China’s and India’s development of blue water naval capabilities. If the fiscal
stimulus focus for these countries indeed turns inward, one of the most obvious funding targets may be military. Buildup of
regional naval capabilities could lead to increased tensions , rivalries , and counterbalancing moves , but it
also will create opportunities for multinational cooperation in protecting critical sea lanes. With water also becoming scarcer in Asia and the
Middle East, cooperation to manage changing water resources is likely to be increasingly difficult both within and
between states in a more dog-eat-dog world.
Economic growth solves war – increased state capacity.
HSRP 10 – Human Security Report Project, Simon Fraser University, Canada (“Human Security Report 2009/2010”, 12/2/10; Part one page 20,
<http://www.hsrgroup.org/human-security-reports/20092010/text.aspx>)//Beddow
But despite the widespread lack of consensus over the causes of civil war, very few quantitative researchers would disagree that there is a robust
high levels of national income and a lower risk of war. Other things being equal, high
national incomes translate into greater state capacity and more resources for governments to buy
association between
off grievances and defeat insurgents in those wars that cannot be prevented. The conflict trends in East
Asia over the past 30 years, which are the focus of Chapter 3, provide an instructive example of the association between
rising levels of economic development and the incidence of armed conflict. As national incomes in the region have
steadily risen since the late 1970s, state capacity and performance legitimacy have also increased—and conflict
numbers have declined by some 60 percent. Indeed, insurgents—who have been largely excluded from the benefits of economic
growth in the region—have not achieved a single military victory since the 1970s.
Economic decline turns heg and growth ensures it.
– American diplomat, president of the Council on Foreign Relations, Director of Policy Planning for the
Department of State, advisor to Colin Powell, US Coordinator for the Future of Afghanistan (Richard N., “The
Irony of American Strategy: Putting the Middle East in Proper Perspective”, May/June 2013 issue of Foreign
Affairs)//Beddow
Haass 13
Asia, however, does call for more U.S. military, diplomatic and economic involvement. Other regions can also
stake a claim to a share of Washington’s attention. Negotiating a transatlantic free-trade agreement (ideally, one involving both
Canada and Mexico) would be a major economic and strategic accomplishment; so, too, would be negotiating and implementing a NAFTA 2.0 that would
more closely link the United States with its immediate neighbors so as to better manage shared interests related to trade and investment, security,
energy, infrastructure, and the flow of people. Narrowing the gap between global challenges and the current institutional
arrangements for dealing with them is also an important issue, particularly in the case of climate change. Here and elsewhere,
though, global accords with broad participation may not be possible, and it may be more realistic and rewarding to focus on agreements with narrower
aims, less participation, or both. Any U.S. rebalancing among regions and issues, finally, needs to be complemented by
another sort of rebalancing, between the internal and the external, the domestic and the foreign. The United
States needs to restore the foundations of American economic power so that it will once again
have the resources to act freely and lead in the world, so that it can compete, so that it can
discourage threats from emerging and contend with them if need be, so that it is less vulnerable to
international developments it cannot control, and so that it can set an example others will want to
emulate. The vast sums spent on the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq did not cause the nation’s current budgetary or economic predicament, but they
did contribute to it. Spending more on national security now would only make it more difficult to set things right. The goal at home must be to
restore historical levels of domestic economic growth, reduce the ratio of debt to GDP, and improve the quality
of the nation’s infrastructure and human capital. During the next several years, facing no rival great power or
existential threat, the United States is likely to enjoy something of a strategic respite. The question is whether
the United States will take advantage of that respite to renew the sources of its strength or squander it through
continued overreaching in the Middle East, not attending to Asia, and underinvesting in home.
Recessions lock nations in a self-reinforcing death spiral to war.
Conceição and Kim 10 – Director of the Office of Development Studies at UNPD, assistant professor at the Technical University of Lisbon, degrees in
Physics and Economics from the Technical University of Lisbon and PhD in Public Policy from the LBJ School of Public Affairs at the University of Texas
at Austin / Office of Development Studies UNDP (Pedro and Namsuk, “The Economic Crisis, Violent Conflict, and Human Development”, International
Journal of Peace Studies, V.15 No. 1, Spring/Summer 2010; http://www.gmu.edu/programs/icar/ijps/vol15_1/KimConceicao15n1.pdf)//Beddow
The unfolding global economic crisis is expected to bring the world economy into recession in 2009. Figure 1 shows the population weighted real GDP
growth from 1991 to 2009 (estimates for 2008 and projection for 2009) for the world economy and for different groups of countries. The annual real
GDP growth rate of the global economy was 5.1% in 2007 but the world economy is projected to shrink by -1.3% in 2009 (IMF, 2009). Emerging and
developing economies are also projected to suffer a sharp slowdown as a result of the crisis, with a projected growth rate of 1.6% in 2009 compared to
8.3% in 2007. For many developing countries, the sharp economic slowdowns will translate into deep recessions. The UN projects that 15 developing
countries will have ne gative per capita growth in 2009 1 , while projections from the World Bank adjusting for terms-of-tra de changes increase this to
50 2 . A recent strand of literature, reviewed in some detail in this paper, suggests that economic conditions are
important determinants of the outbreak and recurrence of conflict. In particular, wars often start following
growth collapses (Collier et al, 2009, p.15). Sharp economic slowdowns and low levels of income per capita appear to
increase the likelihood of conflicts. In this context, it is opportune to explore insights fro m this literature,
linking it also with the human development implications of both growth slow downs and conflict. In particular, the
paper highlights the risks of the emergence of low-human-development/conflict traps. Given that the probability of conflict recurrence
is high, as elaborated upon below, post-conflict countries – those that have experienced armed conflicts until
recent years – may be particularly vulnerable. 3 As Figure 1 shows, post-conflict countrie s are projected to have a substantial decrease
in the economic growth, from 7.4% in 2007 to 3.1% in 2009. Advanced economies may have a sharper slowdown (2.7% in 2007 and -3.8% in 2009), but
they have well-developed social protection, and stable political systems that may facilitate the rec overy and absorb the pressures for social instability and
conflict. In contrast, post-conflict countries, ma y be more vulnerable to a more protracted and slower recovery from the slowdown, given the hi gher
risks of conflict recurrence. Drawing on a review of both theoretical and empirical literature, this paper frames the the connection between economic
factors and conflict within a conceptual framework in which levels of human development and the risk of conflict are linked. Violent conflict is one of the
most extreme forms of suppressing choices and advancing rights, and therefore a major threat to human development (UNDP, 2005, p.151). Since 1990,
more than 3 million people have died in armed conflicts in developing countries (Marshall, 2005). The total war deaths are far more than the battle
deaths. For example, the total war deaths are estimated as 1.2 million in Ethiopia during 1976-1991, but only 2% of them were directly engaged in the
battles. (Bethany and Gleditsch, 2004) Conflict has also non-lethal consequences that may last across generations (UNDP, 2008a). As far as
drivers of conflict are concerned, one of the most robust findings in the literature is that many economic
conditions (low income, slow growth, and especially severe economic downturns) are correlated with the
outbreak of conflict, with some evidence strongly suggesting that the causal direction runs from economic
conditions to conflict (Col lier and Hoeffler, 2004). There is also a rich literature on the impact of horizontal inequality
and dependence on natural resources as drivers of increases in the risk of conflict. This paper however focuses only on the
economic factors, reviewing the fi ndings in light of the current economic crisis and the severe economic downturn that it now occurring. When it
comes to the consequences of conflict, there is no doubt that it is harmful to human welfare, but it becomes
even more hazardous if conflict results in a persistent low human development/conflict trap. A typical country
reaching the end of a civil war faces a 44 percent risk of returning to conflict within five years (Collier et al, 2003, p. 83). Whether or not a country will
experience a new civil war can be best predicted by whether the country experienced wars in the past (Collier, et al, 2004). The high rates of recurrence of
conflict, along with the economic determinants of conflict, suggest the possibility of the existence of poverty-conflict traps (Collier et al, 2003; Bloomberg
and others 2000). Given that pove rty and low per capita income ar e also correlated with worse health and education outcomes, and also that these
outcomes suffer as a result of conflict, the conflict trap can be conceptualized in the framework of a low human development – conflict trap (Collier and
Hoeffler, 2004; Justino and Verwimp, 2006; Alderman, Hoddinott and Kinsey, 2004). A self-reinforcing circle from conflict to low
human development, and vice versa, is suggestively illustrated below (Chart 1). Conflict destroys accumulated
physical and human capital, forces replacement of labor, deteriorates institutional capacity. A country
experiencing conflict cannot secure long term returns for investments in both in physical and human capital,
resulting in low investment in health and education. All of these factors lead to low levels of human development. A country
with low levels of human development has more difficulty in improving institutions, and in increasing
productivity and potential growth. In turn, lower growth rates heighten the risk of conflict, potentially trapping
a country in the loop. The remainder of the paper discusses the empirical findings and theoretical background for linkage between the low-
human development and conflict. Section 2 consid ers how low levels of human development can affect the risk of violent conflict. Section 3 shows how
the conflict can result in low human development, completing the vicious circle. Section 4 concludes the paper with a brief discussion on the policy
responses. 2. From Low Human Development to Conflict While there are number of factor s that could cause conflict, empirical studies find that poor
economic performance is associated with higher incidence of conflict. Being a poor country is correlated with most forms of violence (UNDP, 2008a).
Figure 2 shows that economic development and conflicts are observed to be clearly related. The level of GDP is negatively correlated with observing a
new conflict. Collier et al (2009) fi nd that the predicted risk for a hypothetical country with characteristics set at the study’s sample mean was 4.6 per
cent. If the level of per capita income were to be halved from this level, the risk woul d be increased to 5.3 per cent. Growth rates are also strongly
associated with risks of conflict in deve loping countries. If the growth rate in developing countries is increase d by one percentage point from the mean,
the risk of conflict decreases by 0.6 per centage points to 4.0 per cent (Collier et al, 2009). Kang and Meernik (2005) show that the grow th rate in
conflict countries in the five years prior to conflict, including cases of conf lict recurrence, was on average 0.5 pe rcent compared to 2 percent in countries
that remained peaceful. Empirical analysis of growth a nd conflict has inherent data limitations, but some recent studies using more careful methodology
shows a st rong causal link running from poor economic performance to conflict. One probl em is that the direction of impact between the income per
capita and conflict can run both wa ys. Assuming a priori one-way causality – that is, ignoring endogeneity – in regression analysis can result in biased
estimates. Other information used in the empirical studies, such as income inequality, po pulation, ethnic distributi on, are also subject to difficulties of
econometric identification and data quality (Hegre and Sambanis, 2006; Sambanis, 2004).To address the endogeneity problem, some studi es adopt
instrumental variable analysis, using a strictly exogenous variable that moves with income per cap ita, but not with conflict. For instance, Miguel,
Satyannath and Sergenti (2004) use annual changes in rainfall data as an instrument for income growth. The rainfall data predicts growth fluctuation in
agricultural economies in Africa. They find that income shocks are drive conflict. Besley and Persson (2008) and Bazzi and Blattman (2008) use
internationa l commodity price and trade shocks as the exogenous variables, but they find that the evidence on the relations hip between economic
shocks as drivers of conflict is mixed.
Economic crisis triggers war.
ETH 13 – engineering, science, technology, and management university in Switzerland, part of the Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology Domain,
subordinate to Switzerland’s Department of Home Affairs (Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich, “Intrastate Conflict: Data, Trends and Drivers”,
2/4/13; < http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/SpecialFeature/Detail/?id=158597&tabid=1453496807&contextid774=158597&contextid775=158627>)//Beddow
“The most robustly significant predictor of [armed] conflict risk and its duration is some
indicator of economic prosperity. At a higher income people have more to lose from the
destructiveness of conflict; and higher per-capita income implies a better functioning social
contract, institutions and state capacity.”[3] This correlation between underdevelopment and armed
conflict is confirmed in a 2008 paper by Thania Paffenholz[4] which notes that “since 1990, more than 50% of
all conflict-prone countries have been low income states…. Two thirds of all armed conflicts take place in African countries with the
highest poverty rates. Econometric research found a correlation between the poverty rate and likelihood of armed violence….[T]he lower the GDP per
capita in a country, the higher the likelihood of armed conflict.” Of course, it is important to point out that this is not a claim that there is a direct causal
connection between poverty and armed conflict. To repeat, the causes of conflict are complex and context specific,
nevertheless, says Paffenholz, there is a clear correlation between a low and declining per capita income and a
country’s vulnerability to conflict. It is also true, on the other hand, that there are low income countries that experience precipitous
economic decline, like Zambia in the 1980s and 1990s, without suffering the kind of turmoil that has visited economically more successful countries like
Kenya and Cote d’Ivoire. Referring to both Zambia and Nigeria, Pafenholz says these are cases in which “the social compact” has proven to be resilient.
Both have formal and informal mechanisms that are able to address grievances in ways that allowed them to be aired and resolved or managed without
recourse to violence. A brief review of literature on economics and armed conflict, published in the Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine, indicates
the complexity and imprecision behind the question, “does poverty cause conflict?” While many of the “world’s poorest countries are riven by armed
conflict,” and while poverty, conflict and under-development set up a cycle of dysfunction in which each element of the cycle is exacerbated by the other,
it is also the case that “conflict obviously does not just afflict the poorest countries” – as Northern Ireland and the former Yugoslavia demonstrate. “Many
poor countries are not at war; shared poverty may not be a destabilizing influence. Indeed, economic growth can destabilize, as the
wars in countries afflicted by an abundance of particular natural resources appear to show.”[5] Another review
of the literature makes the general point that “the escalation of conflict during economic downturns is more
likely in countries recovering from conflict, or fragile states.” That makes Africa especially vulnerable on two counts: economic
deprivation and recent armed conflict are present in a relatively high number of states, making the continent especially vulnerable to economic shocks.
As a general rule, “weak economies often translate into weak and fragile states and the presence of violent
conflict, which in turn prevents economic growth.” One study argues that “the risk of war in any given
country is determined by the initial level of income, the rate of economic growth and the level of
dependency on primary commodity exports.” Changes in rates of economic growth thus lead to changes in
threats of conflict. As unemployment rises in fragile states this can “exacerbate conflict due to comparatively better income opportunities for
young men in rebel groups as opposed to labour markets.”[6] The concentration of armed conflict in lower income countries is also reflected in the
conflict tabulation by Project Ploughshares over the past quarter century. The 2009 Human Development Index ranks 182 countries in four categories of
Human Development – Very High, High, Medium, Low. Of the 98 countries in the Medium and Low categories of human development in 2009, 55 per
cent experienced war on their territories in the previous 24 years. In the same period, only 24 per cent of countries in the High human development
category saw war within their borders, while just two (5 per cent) countries in the Very High human development ranking had war on their territory (the
UK re Northern Ireland and Israel). The wars of the recent past were overwhelmingly fought on the territories of states at the low end of the human
development scale. A country’s income level is thus a strong indicator of its risk of being involved in sustained armed
conflict. Low income countries lack the capacity to create conditions conducive to serving the social, political, and economic welfare of their people.
And when economic inequality is linked to differences between identity groups, the correlation to armed conflict is even stronger. In other words, group
based inequalities are especially destabilizing.[7] These failures in human security are of course heavily shaped by external factors, notably international
economic and security conditions and the interests of the major powers (in short, globalization),[8] and these factors frequently combine with internal
political/religious/ethnic circumstances that create conditions especially conducive to conflict and armed conflict.
Heg Scenario
2AC
NAFTA is key to heg and preventing protectionism – hemispheric integration and liberal
institutional support
Agrasoy, 4 - Bachelor of Arts degree in International Trade and a Bachelor of Science degree in Management Information Systems from Bogazici
University in Istanbul, Turkey, where he specialized in international trade and investment, Master of Arts in Economics from McGill University in
Montreal, ROI Research Analyst Director of Operations, Public Sector, overseeing worldwide public sector operations at ROI (Emre, “NAFTA: as a
Means of an U.S. Hegemony Creation in the Region?” May 23 2004, http://emreagrasoy.awardspace.com/nafta.pdf)
Although U.S.
seemed the sole dominant power after the collapse of Soviet Union, U.S. envisaged that some areas of
influence 2 would have a huge potential to challenge its politic and economic hegemony in the world, which is leading
towards a tripolar economic structure. 3 Thus, “Fortress North America” must be erected to challenge “Fortress Europe”. Both must be prepared to repel
onslaught of Asian products. 4 At that time the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) came into effect with the initiatives of
U.S. The NAFTA includes Canada, the United States, and Mexico, with a total (as of 2000) combined population of 410 million inhabitants, and
combined GDP of over $11 billion U.S. 5 It created the world’s largest regional freetrade zone, directly challenging the
growing primacy of the European Community and the Japan-East Asia bloc 6 and aiming to maintain its
superpower position. In contrast to the EU, the NAFTA represents a less ambitious effort 7 to establish a common continental market for goods
and services, and common protections for private investors and businesses, with little attention or interest devoted to developing a continental political
or institutional dimension. The important structural and institutional differences among the NAFTA partners are the reasons behind that the NAFTA has
limited its scope to the deregulation of trade and investment flows within the NAFTA zone, rather than attempting a deeper, European-style political and
regulatory harmonization. The model of the world economy assumes cut-throat trade competition between the three regional blocks. To survive in this
competition each block should have a leading nation, which provides the capital and managerial skills, and a group of less developed nations, which
supply the cheap labor and mineral resources takes the role of a regulatory body and dominates the NAFTA economically and politically. So, U.S. as
the dominant nation 8 intended to hook up with Mexico to obtain low-cost labor and oil. Canada’s role is primarily “an
energy and resource hinterland”. 9 For U.S., NAFTA will mean a chance to regain competitive positions eroded by
Japanese and European rivals. 10 For the U.S. the implementation of a North American free trade zone represented an
important but hardly epochal development, one which mostly served to reinforce its already-existing economic and strategic
dominance on the continent and even in the world. Trade patterns within the NAFTA conform largely to a
“hub-and-spoke” structure 11 , with the U.S. located at both the geographical and the economic center of the
continent. 12 The United States adopted economic regionalism toward the end of the twentieth century. NAFTA of the early 1990s were
crafted to apply the liberal policies and free market principles closer to U.S policies. The United States did not
impose NAFTA on North America but it clearly had an inordinate and even hegemonic influence on North America’s
adherence to the disciplines and principles favored by the United States. 13 Free trade, reciprocity, national treatment of
investment, domestic trade policy, dispute settlement, labor and environment protection, and liberalization of services as well as agriculture were
NAFTA tenets. 14 NAFTA is a U.S.-led RIA, a symbolic and genuine innovation that more formally organized North
America with the United States at its geo-economic hub. The NAFTA would draw both neighbors more closely
into the U.S. sphere of influence, reducing the perceived geopolitical risk to U.S. interests that had been posed
by occasional outbreaks of nationalist sentiment in Mexico and Canada. 15 Mexico’s place in North America raises issues
about the tradeoffs involved in integrating more closely developed and developing economies. This is what made NAFTA so consequential for
the possibility of linking the global North and the global South in the Americas. The NAFTA is contributing to
the broad US goal of promoting economic growth, political stability, and progress toward democracy in Mexico.
16 The NAFTA’s provisions should complement and augment the extensive economic reforms already under way in Mexico and provide an
insurance policy against any reversion to past protectionist and interventionist policies that impeded US trade with Mexico. 17 As a
result, a prosperous Mexico would become a thriving market for U.S. exports. 18 NAFTA reinforces ongoing Mexican trade and investment
reforms 19 , which along with reforms in Mexican laws relating to intellectual property rights have generated substantial new
opportunities for U.S. firms. The United States has long championed a Pan American vision of a liberal, democratic,
capitalist hemisphere based on precepts long held to be sacrosanct among its public 20 and private leaders. Integrating
North and South America or at least bringing them closer together meant allowing for a substantial role in
Latin America for U.S. power and policy. For the United States, organizing a RIA in North America was a strategy more than an ultimate
goal. Befitting its global status, it had a more ambitious agenda for the world economy beyond its own neighborhood. The United States pursued two
tracks in economic regionalism during the waning years of the twentieth century. One was a North American or continental track. The second track is
Pan American. As a unipolar region, North America had unique advantages; its hegemonic structure made NAFTA
an obvious first step for a free trade area. After NAFTA, trade dependence and other economic relations are greater than before. The steep
concessions that Mexico had to make to gain admittance to this exclusive North American club were palatable to most Mexicans because the two highly
interdependent economies made structure and policy more congruent. 21 The same is not true of the hemisphere in general. 22 During the mid-1990s,
the United States entertained the view that NAFTA would be the vehicle for the more ambitious project of building a RIA for
the entire hemisphere. It did not quite work out that way. The idea was to widen or broaden NAFTA by including new members through the
accession clause 23 , but NAFTA did not expand. 24 NAFTA was bereft of support as the vehicle for creating a FTAA 25 . While structural power is
important, so too are two other elements of power: the soft power of economic liberalism and the use of leadership to affect outcomes . U.S.
influence depends partially upon an inter-American convergence around liberal market ideas and trade policy
preferences of the United States. In other words, if Latin American leaders agree with the United States on the
principles and disciplines it advocates in the FTAA process, U.S. dominance is more assured. The ultimate goal
of U.S. is that the nations will converge around political and economic liberalization. 26 Especially, in the wake of the
terrorist acts of September 11, Iraq War and thus increasing sociotropic threat 27 and patriotism in different countries, the American foreign
policy in NAFTA become more important in preserving the support of its neighbors and indirectly of the entire
world. U.S. should change the context of NAFTA from mere a free trade area to a union with a Social Charter characteristic. NAFTA should better use a
regime of fair and peaceful competition, through positive integration and institution building strategies. 28 U.S should emphasize the social quality
aspects of NAFTA and help its NAFTA partners improve their economic as well as socio-political conditions to gain new allies
at
the same level in the world arena. The improvement of the rule of law and democracy should not be left in the hands of U.S., but they should
be realized by institutionalization 29 taking the E.U as a model. 30 Taking all these arguments into consideration, the NAFTA’ s success will not
only shape North America’s faith, but also the future of the U.S influence on world politics as a superpower. NAFTA is
used by U.S. to some extent as a model 31 and a vehicle to maintain its superpower role throughout the world.
U.S. is given the opportunity to compete with the European Union and China, the most potential emerging power, by exploiting Mexico’s cheap labor
force and Canada’s natural resources. The strategic policies and actions will determine its NAFTA partners’ position against U.S. They will either lead to
stronger strategic alliances between these countries, even including other Latin American counties, which will enhance the U.S.
dominance or lead to an opposition in Mexico and Canada, which could mean the loss of its superpower role. NAFTA’s future will play an
important role; the success can help U.S. sustain its superpower role, but failure, such faced by U.S. in the FTAA, can
lead to a loss of this power, thus being a follower of E.U. in the world economy and politics it would be sufficient for U.S.
Heg is key to global stability and accesses every major impact – Prevents Great Power War
Thayer, 6, Professor of Strategic Studies – Associate Professor of Defense and Strategic Study @ Missouri
State University, Former Research Fellow @ International Security Program @ Harvard Belfer Center of
Science and International Affairs (Bradley, “In Defense of Primacy,” The National Interest,
November/December)
A grand strategy based on American primacy means ensuring the United States stays the world's number one power-the diplomatic, economic and military leader. Those
arguing against primacy claim that the United States should retrench, either because the United States lacks the power to maintain its primacy and should withdraw from its
global commitments, or because the maintenance of primacy will lead the United States into the trap of "imperial overstretch." In the previous issue of The National Interest,
Christopher Layne warned of these dangers of primacy and called for retrenchment.1 Those arguing for a grand strategy of retrenchment are a diverse lot. They include
isolationists, who want no foreign military commitments; selective engagers, who want U.S. military commitments to centers of economic might; and offshore balancers, who
want a modified form of selective engagement that would have the United States abandon its landpower presence abroad in favor of relying on airpower and seapower to
defend its interests. But retrenchment, in any of its guises, must be avoided. If the United States adopted such a strategy, it would be a profound strategic mistake
that would lead to far greater instability and war in the world, imperil American security and deny the United States and its allies the
benefits of primacy. There are two critical issues in any discussion of America's grand strategy: Can America remain the dominant state? Should it strive to do this? America
can remain dominant due to its prodigious military, economic and soft power capabilities. The totality of that equation of power answers the first issue. The United States has
overwhelming military capabilities and wealth in comparison to other states or likely potential alliances. Barring some disaster or tremendous folly, that will remain the case
for the foreseeable future. With few exceptions, even those who advocate retrenchment acknowledge this. So the debate revolves around the desirability of maintaining
American primacy. Proponents of retrenchment focus a great deal on the costs of U.S. action but they fall to realize what is good about American primacy. The price and risks
of primacy are reported in newspapers every day; the benefits that stem from it are not. A GRAND strategy of ensuring American
primacy takes as its
starting point the protection of the U.S. homeland and American global interests. These interests include ensuring that critical resources like oil
flow around the world, that the global trade and monetary regimes flourish and that Washington's worldwide network of allies
is reassured and protected. Allies are a great asset to the United States, in part because they shoulder some of its burdens. Thus, it is no surprise to see NATO in Afghanistan or
the Australians in East Timor. In contrast, a strategy based on retrenchment will not be able to achieve these fundamental objectives of the United States. Indeed,
retrenchment will make the United States less secure than the present grand strategy of primacy. This is because threats
will exist no matter what role America chooses to play in international politics. Washington cannot call a "time out", and it cannot
hide from threats. Whether they are terrorists, rogue states or rising powers, history shows that threats must be
confronted. Simply by declaring that the United States is "going home", thus abandoning its commitments or making unconvincing
half-pledges to defend its interests and allies, does not mean that others will respect American wishes to retreat. To
make such a declaration implies weakness and emboldens aggression. In the anarchic world of the animal kingdom, predators prefer
to eat the weak rather than confront the strong. The same is true of the anarchic world of international politics. If there is no diplomatic
solution to the threats that confront the United States, then the conventional and strategic military power of the United States is what protects the country from such threats.
And when enemies must be confronted, a strategy based on primacy focuses on engaging enemies overseas, away from .American soil. Indeed, a key tenet of the Bush Doctrine
is to attack terrorists far from America's shores and not to wait while they use bases in other countries to plan and train for attacks against the United States itself. This
requires a physical, on-the-ground presence that cannot be achieved by offshore balancing. Indeed, as Barry Posen has noted, U.S. primacy is secured because America, at
present, commands the "global common"--the oceans, the world's airspace and outer space-allowing the United States to project its power far from its borders, while denying
those common avenues to its enemies. As a consequence, the costs of power projection for the United States and its allies are reduced, and the robustness of the United States'
conventional and strategic deterrent capabilities is increased.' This is not an advantage that should be relinquished lightly. A remarkable fact about international politics
today--in
a world where American primacy is clearly and unambiguously on display--is that countries want to
align themselves with the United States. Of course, this is not out of any sense of altruism, in most cases, but because doing so
allows them to use the power of the United States for their own purposes, their own protection, or to gain greater
influence. Of 192 countries, 84 are allied with America--their security is tied to the United States through treaties and other informal arrangements-and they include almost
all of the major economic and military powers. That is a ratio of almost 17 to one (85 to five), and a big change from the Cold War when the ratio was about 1.8 to one of states
aligned with the United States versus the Soviet Union. Never before in its history has this country, or any country, had so many allies.
the bandwagoning effect-has also given us extensive influence
U.S. primacy--and
in international politics, allowing the United States to shape
to create coalitions of
like-minded states to free Kosovo, stabilize Afghanistan, invade Iraq or to stop proliferation through the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). Doing so allows
the behavior of states and international institutions. Such influence comes in many forms, one of which is America's ability
the United States to operate with allies outside of the where it can be stymied by opponents. American-led wars in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq stand in contrast to the UN's
inability to save the people of Darfur or even to conduct any military campaign to realize the goals of its charter. The quiet effectiveness of the PSI in dismantling Libya's WMD
programs and unraveling the A. Q. Khan proliferation network are in sharp relief to the typically toothless attempts by the UN to halt proliferation. You can count with one
hand countries opposed to the United States. They are the "Gang of Five": China, Cuba, Iran, North Korea and Venezeula. Of course, countries like India, for example, do not
agree with all policy choices made by the United States, such as toward Iran, but New Delhi is friendly to Washington. Only the "Gang of Five" may be expected to consistently
resist the agenda and actions of the United States. China is clearly the most important of these states because it is a rising great power. But even Beijing is intimidated by the
United States and refrains from openly challenging U.S. power. China proclaims that it will, if necessary, resort to other mechanisms of challenging the United States,
including asymmetric strategies such as targeting communication and intelligence satellites upon which the United States depends. But China may not be confident those
strategies would work, and so it is likely to refrain from testing the United States directly for the foreseeable future because China's power benefits, as we shall see, from the
international order U.S. primacy creates. The other states are far weaker than China. For three of the "Gang of Five" cases--Venezuela, Iran, Cuba-it is an anti-U.S. regime that
is the source of the problem; the country itself is not intrinsically anti-American. Indeed, a change of regime in Caracas, Tehran or Havana could very well reorient relations.
THROUGHOUT HISTORY, peace and stability have been great benefits of an era where there was a dominant power--Rome, Britain or the United States today. Scholars and
the current
international order - free trade, a robust monetary regime, increasing respect for human rights, growing democratization--is directly linked to U.S. power. Retrenchment proponents seem to think that the current system can be maintained
without the current amount of U.S. power behind it. In that they are dead wrong and need to be reminded of one of history's most significant lessons: Appalling
things happen when international orders collapse. The Dark Ages followed Rome's collapse.
Hitler succeeded the order established at Versailles. Without U.S. power, the liberal order created
by the United States will end just as assuredly. As country and western great Rai Donner sang: "You don't know what you've got (until you lose it)." Consequently, it is
important to note what those good things are. In addition to ensuring the security of the United States and its allies, American primacy within the international system
causes many positive outcomes for Washington and the world. The first has been a more peaceful world. During the Cold War, U.S.
leadership reduced friction among many states that were historical antagonists, most notably France and West Germany. Today,
American primacy helps keep a number of complicated relationships aligned--between Greece and Turkey, Israel and Egypt, South Korea
and Japan, India and Pakistan, Indonesia and Australia. This is not to say it fulfills Woodrow Wilson's vision of ending all war. Wars
still occur where Washington's interests are not seriously threatened, such as in Darfur, but a Pax Americana does reduce war's
likelihood, particularly war's worst form: great power wars. Second, American power gives the United States the
ability to spread democracy and other elements of its ideology of liberalism. Doing so is a source of much good for the countries concerned as well as the
statesmen have long recognized the irenic effect of power on the anarchic world of international politics. Everything we think of when we consider
United States because, as John Owen noted on these pages in the Spring 2006 issue, liberal democracies are more likely to align with the United States and be sympathetic to
once states are governed democratically,
the likelihood of any type of conflict is significantly reduced. This is not because democracies do not have clashing interests.
Indeed they do. Rather, it is because they are more open, more transparent and more likely to want to resolve things amicably in
concurrence with U.S. leadership. And so, in general, democratic states are good for their citizens as well as for advancing the interests of the
the American worldview.3 So, spreading democracy helps maintain U.S. primacy. In addition,
United States. Critics have faulted the Bush Administration for attempting to spread democracy in the Middle East, labeling such an effort a modern form of tilting at
windmills. It is the obligation of Bush's critics to explain why democracy is good enough for Western states but not for the rest, and, one gathers from the argument, should not
even be attempted. Of course, whether democracy in the Middle East will have a peaceful or stabilizing influence on America's interests in the short run is open to question.
Perhaps democratic Arab states would be more opposed to Israel, but nonetheless, their people would be better off. The United States has brought democracy to Afghanistan,
where 8.5 million Afghans, 40 percent of them women, voted in a critical October 2004 election, even though remnant Taliban forces threatened them. The first free elections
were held in Iraq in January 2005. It was the military power of the United States that put Iraq on the path to democracy. Washington fostered democratic governments in
Europe, Latin America, Asia and the Caucasus. Now even the Middle East is increasingly democratic. They may not yet look like Western-style democracies, but democratic
progress has been made in Algeria, Morocco, Lebanon, Iraq, Kuwait, the Palestinian Authority and Egypt. By all accounts, the march of democracy has been impressive. Third,
along with the growth in the number of democratic states around the world has been the growth of the global economy. With its allies, the United States has labored to create
an economically liberal worldwide network characterized by free trade and commerce, respect for international property rights, and mobility of capital and labor markets. The
economic stability and prosperity that stems from this economic order is a global public good from which all states benefit, particularly the poorest
states in the Third World. The United States created this network not out of altruism but for the benefit and the economic well-being of America. This economic order forces
American industries to be competitive, maximizes efficiencies and growth, and benefits defense as well because the size of the economy makes the defense burden manageable.
Economic spin-offs foster the development of military technology, helping to ensure military prowess. Perhaps the greatest testament to the benefits of the economic network
comes from Deepak Lal, a former Indian foreign service diplomat and researcher at the World Bank, who started his career confident in the socialist ideology of
post-independence India. Abandoning the positions of his youth, Lal now recognizes that the only way to bring relief to desperately poor countries of the Third World is
market economic policies and globalization, which are facilitated through American primacy.4 As a witness to the failed alternative economic systems, Lal is one of the strongest academic proponents of American primacy due to the economic
through the adoption of free
prosperity it provides.
I/L
NAFTA is key to heg – facilitates cooperation and integration
Balze, 1 - Director of the Argentine Council on Foreign Relations and Professor of International Economics at the Foreign Service School and at the
Advanced School of the Ministry of Defense in Buenos Aires. His recent books include Mercosur: Entre la Retorica y el Realismo. (Felipe A. M. de la
“Finding Allies in the Back Yard;NAFTA and the Southern Cone Foreign Affairs July, 2001 / August, 2001” Council on Foreign Relations, Inc. Foreign
Affairs, Lexis)//ahayes
The United States -- preeminent but not hegemonic -- cannot maintain its global leadership without the
cooperation of like-minded nations that share its interests and values. In fact, in the coming years,
American preeminence will likely remain stable only in regions where the United States has
signed agreements with countries that have congenial economic and sociopolitical systems.
Fortunately, creating agreements based on the promotion of regional economic growth,
integration into the world economy, and the consolidation of democracy is feasible under
certain circumstances. Witness the successive expansions of the European integration project (now the European Union), which
incorporated Italy in the 1950s, Spain in the 1970s, and then Greece, Ireland, and Portugal in the 1980s. Now a similar opportunity for integration exists
in the Southern Cone of South America. A core group of countries -- Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay -- have made great strides in recent years and
are poised, despite their short-term economic problems, to make steady political and economic gains over the next decade. The right incentives are
critical, however, to ensure that these nations become fully democratic, market-oriented allies of the United States. To this end, the best
incentive the United States can provide is an expansion of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) to the Southern Cone, making
these South American nations members of the pact alongside the United States, Canada, and Mexico. But economic integration will not succeed without
a compelling political rationale as well: namely, the promotion of democracy and regional security that could
follow the creation of a "super NAFTA." Such a comprehensive treaty system would offer great advantages to all its
participants, helping to stabilize and enrich the Americas, and would further the process of
hemispheric integration.
Impact
US primacy prevents global conflict – diminishing power creates a vacuum that causes
transition wars in multiple places
Brooks et al 13 [Stephen G. Brooks is Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College.G. John Ikenberry is the Albert G. Milbank
Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University in the Department of Politics and the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and
International Affairs. He is also a Global Eminence Scholar at Kyung Hee University.William C. Wohlforth is the Daniel Webster Professor in the
Department of Government at Dartmouth College. “Don't Come Home, America: The Case against Retrenchment”, Winter 2013, Vol. 37, No. 3, Pages 751,http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1162/ISEC_a_00107, GDI File]
engagement is that it prevents the emergence of a far more dangerous global security environment. For one thing, as noted above, the
United States’ overseas presence gives it the leverage to restrain partners from taking provocative action. Perhaps more
A core premise of deep
important, its core alliance commitments also deter states with aspirations to regional hegemony from contemplating expansion and make its partners more secure, reducing their incentive to adopt solutions to their security problems that threaten others
and thus stoke security dilemmas. The contention that engaged U.S. power dampens the baleful effects of anarchy is consistent with influential variants of realist theory. Indeed, arguably the scariest portrayal of the war-prone world that would emerge absent the
“American Pacifier” is provided in the works of John Mearsheimer, who forecasts dangerous multipolar regions replete with security competition, arms races, nuclear proliferation and associated preventive wartemptations, regional rivalries, and even runs
at regional hegemony and full-scale great power war. 72 How do retrenchment advocates, the bulk of whom are realists, discount this benefit? Their arguments are complicated, but two capture most of the variation: (1) U.S. security guarantees are not necessary
to prevent dangerous rivalries and conflict in Eurasia; or (2) prevention of rivalry and conflict in Eurasia is not a U.S. interest. Each response is connected to a different theory or set of theories, which makes sense given that the whole debate hinges on a complex
future counterfactual (what would happen to Eurasia’s security setting if the United States truly disengaged?). Although a certain answer is impossible, each of these responses is nonetheless a weaker argument for retrenchment than advocates acknowledge. The
first response flows from defensive realism as well as other international relations theories that discount the conflict-generating potential of anarchy under contemporary conditions. 73 Defensive realists maintain that the high expected costs of territorial conquest,
defense dominance, and an array of policies and practices that can be used credibly to signal benign intent, mean that Eurasia’s major states could manage regional multipolarity peacefully without theAmerican pacifier. Retrenchment would be a bet on this
scholarship, particularly in regions where the kinds of stabilizers that nonrealist theories point to—such as democratic governance or dense institutional linkages—are either absent or weakly present. There are three other major bodies of scholarship, however,
that might give decisionmakers pause before making this bet. First is regional expertise. Needless to say, there is no consensus on the net security effects of U.S. withdrawal. Regarding each region, there are optimists and pessimists. Few experts expect a return of
intense great power competition in a post-American Europe, but many doubt European governments will pay the political costs of increased EU defense cooperation and the budgetary costs of increasing military outlays. 74 The result might be
Europe that is incapable of securing itself from various threats that could be destabilizing within the region and beyond (e.g., a regional conflict akin to the 1990s Balkan wars), lacks capacity for global security
the United States has a substantial military
presence? Regarding the Middle East, the balance begins toswing toward pessimists concerned that states currently backed by Washington— notably Israel, Egypt, and Saudi
Arabia—might take actions upon U.S. retrenchment that would intensify security dilemmas. And concerning East Asia, pessimismregarding the region’s prospects without the
American pacifier is pronounced. Arguably the principal concern expressed by area experts is that Japan and South Korea are likely to obtain a nuclear
a
missions in which U.S. leaders might want European participation, and is vulnerable to the influence of outside rising powers. What about the other parts of Eurasia where
capacity and increase their military commitments, which could stoke a destabilizing reaction from China . It is notable that during the Cold War, both South Korea and
Taiwan moved to obtain a nuclear weapons capacity and were only constrained from doing so by astill-engaged United States. 75 The second body of scholarship casting doubt on the bet on defensive realism’s sanguine portrayal is all of the research that
undermines its conception of state preferences. Defensive realism’s optimism about what would happen if the United States retrenched is very much dependent on itsparticular—and highly restrictive—assumption about state preferences; once we relax
this assumption, then much of its basis for optimism vanishes. Specifically, the prediction of post-American tranquility throughout Eurasia rests on the assumption that security is the only relevant state preference, with security defined narrowly in terms of
protection from violent external attacks on the homeland. Under that assumption, the security problem is largely solved as soon as offense and defense are clearly distinguishable, and offense is extremely expensive relative to defense.
research across the social and other sciences, however,undermines that core assumption: states have preferences not only for security but
for prestige, status, and other aims, and theyengage in trade-offs among the various objectives. 76 In addition, they define security not just in terms of territorial protection but in view of many and
varied milieu goals. It follows that even states that are relatively secure may nevertheless engage in highly competitive behavior. Empirical studies show that this is indeed sometimes the case.
Burgeoning
also
77 In sum, a bet on a benign postretrenchment Eurasia is a bet that leaders of major countries will never allow these nonsecurity preferences to influence their strategic choices. To the degree that these bodies of scholarly knowledge have predictive
retrenchment would result in a significant deterioration in the security environment in at least some of the world’s key regions. We
withdrawal of the American pacifier will yield either a competitive regional multipolarity complete with associated
insecurity, arms racing, crisis instability, nuclear proliferation, and the like, or bids for regional hegemony, which may
be beyond the capacity of local great powers to contain (and which in any case would generate intensely competitive behavior, possibly including regional great power
war).
leverage, U.S.
have already mentioned the third, even more alarming body of scholarship. Offensive realism predicts thatthe
Agriculture Scenario
2AC
NAFTA is key to agriculture
Research and Markets ’12 (The worlds largest business researcher, Business Wire February 1, 2012, LEXIS //NS)
Agricultural Products - North America (NAFTA) Industry Guide is an essential resource for top-level data and analysis
covering the Agricultural Products industry in each of the North American Free Trade Agreement (United States,
Canada, and Mexico) countries. The report includes easily comparable data on market value, volume, segmentation and market share, plus full five year
market forecasts. It examines future problems, innovations and potential growth areas within the market. Scope of the Report Contains an executive summary and data
on value, volume and segmentation Provides textual analysis of the industry's prospects, competitive landscape and profiles of the leading companies Incorporates indepth five forces competitive environment analysis and scorecards Compares data from the US, Canada and Mexico, alongside individual chapters on each country. .
Includes a five-year forecast of the industry Highlights The
agricultural products industry within the NAFTA countries
had a total market value of $185,345.1 million in 2010. Mexico was the fastest growing country ,
with a CAGR of 9.1% over the 2006-10 period. The US is the leading country among the NAFTA bloc, with market
revenues of $143,500 million in 2010. The US is expected to lead the Agricultural Products
industry in the NAFTA bloc, with a value of $168,400 million in 2015
Increased food prices will cause mass starvation killing 95% of the world
Adams 8 – staff writer for naturalnews.com (April 23, “The Biofuels Scam, Food Shortages and the Coming Collapse of the Human Population”,
http://www.naturalnews.com/023091.html)
So, to repeat, the food bubble is now starting to implode. What does it all mean? It means that as these economic and climate realities unfold, our world
is facing massive starvation and food shortages. The first place this will be felt is in poor developing nations. It is
there that people live on the edge of economic livelihood, where even a 20% rise in the price of basic food
staples can put desperately-needed calories out of reach of tens of millions of families. If something is
not done to rescue these people from their plight, they will starve to death. Wealthy nations like America,
Canada, the U.K., and others will be able to absorb the price increases, so you won't see mass starvation
in North America any time soon (unless, of course, all the honeybees die, in which case prepare to start chewing your shoelaces...), but it
will lead to significant increases in the cost of living, annoying consumers and reducing the amount of money available for other purchases (like
vacations, cars, fuel, etc.). That, of course, will put downward pressure on the national economy. But what we're seeing right now, folks, is just a small
foreshadowing of events to come in the next couple of decades. Think about it: If these minor climate changes and foolish biofuels policies are
already unleashing alarming rises in food prices , just imagine what we'll see when Peak Oil kicks in and global oil supplies really start to
dwindle. When gasoline is $10 a gallon in the U.S., how expensive will food be around the world? The answer, of course, is that it will be triple or
quadruple the current price. And that means many more people will starve. Fossil fuels, of course, aren't the only limiting factor threatening future food
supplies on our planet: There's also fossil water. That's water from underground aquifers that's being pumped up to the surface to water crops, then it's
lost to evaporation. Countries like India and China are depending heavily on fossil water to irrigate their crops, and not surprisingly, the water levels in
those aquifers is dropping steadily. In a few more years (as little as five years in some cases), that water will simply run dry, and the crops that were once
irrigated to feed a nation will dry up and turn to dust. Mass starvation will only take a few months to kick in. Think North
Korea after a season of floods. Perhaps 95% of humanity is just one crop season away from mass
starvation.
I/L
NAFTA increased US agricultural subsidies
Baumann 1/11 (Susana G. Baumann, BA in accounting from Colegio Americano and Business Contributor for
VOXXI, “Mexican Farmers Affected By Agricultural Subsidies From NAFTA, Other International Agreements,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/01/11/mexican-farmers-agricultural-subsidies_n_2457845.html, AL)
Impact of NAFTA in combination with US agricultural subsidies¶ Click here for "U.S. Dumping on Mexican
Producers" table¶ The impact of NAFTA and other international agreements in combination with U.S.
agricultural subsidies expel millions of Mexicans and other rural workers from their countries of origin into the
United States territory every year.¶ According to Wise, who carried out a comparison of farm product prices in
the U.S.-Mexico trade between 1997 and 2005, Mexico was flooded with agricultural imports exported at prices
below production costs.¶ In his research, the eight products studied included corn, soybeans, wheat, cotton,
rice, beef, pork and poultry. All products showed significant increase in exports—from the lowest 159 percent in
soybean to the largest in pork exports at 707 percent.¶ For all products, Mexican producers’ prices fell from 44
to 67 percent from early 1990’s levels, declining local production and increasing import dependency. Mexican
crop production also fell except for corn and meats, which at lower prices, was rapidly adopted for
consumption in the Mexican families’ diet.¶ “An estimated 2.3 million people have left agriculture in a country
desperate for livelihoods,” said Wise. The study estimated that the cost to Mexican producers was around $12.8
billion in the nine-year period, more than 10 percent of the U.S.-Mexico agricultural trade value annually.¶ The
other cost, the one that we, north of the border pay, is the constant migration of these displaced rural workers
into the United States.
Competitiveness Scenario
1NC
NAFTA solves jobs and increases US competitiveness
Becker ‘4 – economic development authority and management trainer specializing in Latin America, degrees
in Latin American Studies and Ph.D. in International Business, former President and Managing Director of the
Business Association of Latin American Studies (Thomas H, “Doing Business in Latin America: A Guide to
Cultures, Practices, and Opportunities,” 2004)//ER
The leading example in Latin America of the effect of size on the eco~¶ nomic health of a country is Mexico's
involvement in the North Ameri-¶ can Free Trade Agreement. NAFTA has been in effect since 1994 and is¶ now
responsible for 20 percent of Mexico's economic output," creating¶ many more jobs than it has lost, while
simultaneously lowering the cost¶ of living for countless Mexican households." By fusing the economies of¶ the
U.S., Canada, and Mexico into a mega-market of 420 million con-¶ sumers, NAFTA changed the business face
of Mexico almost overnight,¶ propelling its economy into a world-class manufacturing and assembly¶
powerhouse.¶ NAFTA drove Mexico to displace Japan as the number two trading¶ partner of the United States
by 1998. Between 1994 and 2002, U.S.-Mex-¶ ico trade had almost tripled, and had made both countries more
compet-¶ itive internationally. The incoming tide of export and import deals made¶ the possibility of trading
with Mexico loom large on the radar screens of¶ U.S. firms that had never before considered doing business in
Latin Amer-¶ ica. Meanwhile, those same screens were blipping another regional-market¶ trade target further
to the south.
US growth solves great power war
– PhD, Former Professor of Political Science @ Columbia, Former ambassador to Iraq and
Afghanistan
(Zalmay Khalilzad was the United States ambassador to Afghanistan, Iraq, and the United Nations during the
presidency of George W. Bush and the director of policy planning at the Defense Department from 1990 to
1992. "The Economy and National Security" Feb 8 http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/259024/economyand-national-security-zalmay-khalilzad)//BB
Khalilzad 11
economic and fiscal trends pose the most severe long-term threat to the United States’ position as global leader. While the
United States suffers from fiscal imbalances and low economic growth, the economies of rival powers are developing rapidly. The
continuation of these two trends could lead to a shift from American primacy toward a multi-polar global system, leading in turn
to increased geopolitical rivalry and even war among the great powers. The current recession is the result of a deep financial crisis, not a mere fluctuation in the business
Today,
cycle. Recovery is likely to be protracted. The crisis was preceded by the buildup over two decades of enormous amounts of debt throughout the U.S. economy — ultimately totaling almost 350 percent of GDP — and
the development of credit-fueled asset bubbles, particularly in the housing sector. When the bubbles burst, huge amounts of wealth were destroyed, and unemployment rose to over 10 percent. The decline of tax
revenues and massive countercyclical spending put the U.S. government on an unsustainable fiscal path. Publicly held national debt rose from 38 to over 60 percent of GDP in three years .
Without
faster economic growth and actions to reduce deficits, publicly held national debt is projected to reach dangerous proportions. If interest rates were to rise significantly, annual interest
would crowd out other spending
payments — which already are larger than the defense budget —
or require substantial tax increases that would undercut economic growth. Even worse, if unanticipated events trigger what
economists call a “sudden stop” in credit markets for U.S. debt, the United States would be unable to roll over its outstanding obligations, precipitating a sovereign-debt crisis that would almost certainly compel a radical retrenchment of the United States
It was the economic devastation of Britain and France during World War II, as well as the rise of other powers, that led
both countries to relinquish their empires. In the late 1960s, British leaders concluded that they lacked the economic capacity to maintain a presence “east of Suez.” Soviet economic weakness, which crystallized
under Gorbachev, contributed to their decisions to withdraw from Afghanistan, abandon Communist regimes in Eastern Europe, and allow the Soviet Union to fragment. If the U.S. debt problem goes critical, the United States would
be compelled to retrench, reducing its military spending and shedding international commitments. We face this domestic challenge while
internationally. Such scenarios would reshape the international order.
other major powers are experiencing rapid economic growth. Even though countries such as China, India, and Brazil have profound political, social, demographic, and economic
If U.S. policymakers fail to act and other powers
The closing of the gap between the United States and its rivals could intensify geopolitical
competition among major powers, increase incentives for local powers to play major powers against one another, and undercut our will to preclude or respond to international crises because of the higher risk
of escalation. The stakes are high. In modern history, the longest period of peace among the great powers has been the era of U.S. leadership. By
contrast, multi-polar systems have been unstable, with their competitive dynamics resulting in frequent crises and major wars among the great powers. Failures of multipolar international systems produced both world wars. American retrenchment could have devastating consequences . Without an American security blanket, regional powers could
rearm in an attempt to balance against emerging threats. Under this scenario, there would be a heightened possibility of arms races, miscalculation, or other
crises spiraling into all-out conflict. Alternatively, in seeking to accommodate the stronger powers, weaker powers may shift their geopolitical posture away
from the United States. Either way, hostile states would be emboldened to make aggressive moves in their regions.
problems, their economies are growing faster than ours, and this could alter the global distribution of power. These trends could in the long term produce a multi-polar world.
continue to grow, it is not a question of whether but when a new international order will emerge.
Manufacturing Scenario
2AC
NAFTA Helped Manufacturing and Jobs on both sides
Becker 11—Thomas H. Becker is an economic development authority and management trainer specializing in
Latin America. He has lived, operated businesses, or worked in 16 Latin American countries, and currently
serves as advisor to government agencies, private businesses, universities, and NGOs. His academic
background includes degrees in Latin American American Studies and a Ph.D. in International Business. He
has served on the Business faculty of five universities in the U.S. and Latin America, has written over 100
articles and book chapters in English and Spanish, and is a former President and Managing Director of the
Business Association of Latin American Studies. [Becker, Thomas H.“Doing Business in the New Latin
America: Keys to Profit in America’s Next-Door Markets”—2nd Edition. Pg 51]//MM
Myth No. 1: NAFTA has cost the United States jobs. Fact: U.S. employment rose from 110.8 million people in
1993 to 137.6 million in 2007, an increase of 24 percent. The average unemployment rate was 5.1 percent
during the post-NAFTA period 1994-2007, compared to 7.1 percent during the pre-NAFTA period 19801993.21¶ Myth No. 2: NAFTA has hurt the U.S. manufacturing base. Fact: U.S. manufacturing output rose by
58 percent between 1993 and 2006, as compared to 42 percent between 1980 and 1993.22¶ Myth No. 3:
NAFTA has suppressed U.S. wages. Fact: U.S. business sector real (i.e., adjusted for inflation) hourly
compensation rose by 1.5 percent each year between 1993 and 2007, for a total of 23.6 percent over the full
period. During 1979-1993, the annual rate of real hourly compensation rose by 0.7 percent each year, or 11
percent over the full 14-year period.23¶ Myth No. 4: NAFTA has reduced wages in Mexico. Fact: Mexican
wages grew steadily after the 1994 peso crisis, reached precrisis levels in 1997, and have increased each year
since. Several studies conclude that Mexican industries that export or that are in regions with a higher
concentration of foreign investment and trade also have higher wages.
Manufacturing base key to prevent Chinese Leadership in nanotech and ensure U.S.
Leadership
Manufacturing and Technology News 5
(“Lack of Manufacturing Base Imperils U.S. Lead in Nanotechnology” pg online @
http://www.manufacturingnews.com/news/05/0708/art1.html //um-ef)
Nanotechnology, often touted as a key to maintaining the United States' global lead in industrial
productivity, is far from a sure thing for the U.S., according to the warnings of experts who last week
offered lawmakers varying assessments of the likelihood that the country will be able to capture nano's economic benefits and varying
prescriptions for doing so. "The manufacturing train has already left the station" in some fields of nanomaterials,
Matthew Nordan of New York-based Lux Research Inc. told the House Science Subcommittee on Research at a June 29 hearing titled
"Nanotechnology: Where Does the U.S. Stand?" Any revitalization of the U.S. manufacturing base through
nanotechnology could end up limited to "pilot-scale manufacturing and manufacturing where specific
skills are required," he testified, characterizing these activities as "generally low volume." When it comes to the production of more basic
nanoproducts, he stated, "the U.S.'s economic opportunity is in coming up with the ideas that may be implemented in manufacturing plants on
other shores." Nordan's fellow witnesses -- venture capitalist Floyd Kvamme, who co-chairs the President's Council of Advisors on Science and
Technology (PCAST), and Sean Murdock, executive director of the nanotechnology policy and commercialization advocacy group NanoBusiness
Alliance -- appeared less "prepared to cede the manufacturing of nanotechnology-enabled products here in the United States," as Murdock put it.
But the three did agree in their fundamental assessment of the present: All view the United States as the world leader in
nanotechnology up to now, and all regard its lead as imperiled. Kvamme, citing an estimate contained in the review
of the National Nanotechnology Initiative (NNI) published by PCAST in May, testified that the $1 billion in federal funding for nano R&D in Fiscal
Year 2005 "is roughly one-quarter of the current global investment by all nations." He placed the U.S.'s overall annual nano R&D effort at $3
billion, "one-third of the approximately $9 billion in total worldwide spending by the public and private sectors." Additionally, the U.S. "leads
in the number of start-up companies based on nanotechnology and in research output as measured by
patents and publications." Still, Kvamme said, the U.S. is coming under "increased competitive
pressure," as "other countries are aggressively chasing [its] leadership position," both by
beefing up coordinated national programs and by focusing investments on "areas of existing national
economic strength." The U.S. lead in patents and publications, he added, " appears to be slipping ." According to
Nordan, whose company's figures were cited repeatedly by PCAST it its report, even the U.S.'s current R&D spending lead is open to question. On
the basis of purchasing-power parity, 2004 government spending on nano R&D in the U.S., at $5.42 per capita, came in below South Korea's
$5.62, Japan's $6.30, and Taiwan's $9.40. "The $130 million in estimated government spending on nanotech last year
in China equaled $611 million at purchasing-power parity, or 38 percent of U.S. expenditure," Nordan noted.
That nations like China are free to direct "initial capital investments toward the instrumentation needed
for nanotechnology research, without having to maintain technology infrastructures and skill sets that
were cutting-edge 20 years ago" could add to the comparative bang they're getting for their bucks . A figure
cited in Murdock's testimony seems to corroborate this assumption. In the period January to August 2004, China led the world in research papers
on nanotechnology, presenting 14 percent more than the U.S. And while the U.S., according to the NanoBusiness Alliance's database, accounted for
613 of 1,175 companies worldwide that are "involved with nanotechnology," Murdock said that "if one is to believe the announcements made at the
ChinaNano2005 trade expo," China now has almost 800 such companies. Keeping the edge in R&D is critical to
Nordan because he believes that, for
the U.S., the economic advantage to be derived from nanotechnology begins
and ends with intellectual property (IP). He pointed to Japan's Frontier Carbon, whose 40-ton-per-year capacity for the
manufacture of fullerenes, based on a process licensed from an MIT spinoff company, surpasses last year's total world demand by more than 25
times. "It's unlikely," he told the subcommittee, "that you're going to find U.S.-based companies investing that far ahead of demand in order to
attain manufacturing dominance" in basic nanomaterials. The U.S. cannot maintain an edge, he argued, by offering "low labor
costs or tax advantages for capital investment in manufacturing facilities" in an attempt to "go toe-to-toe
against...countries that have more runway to go down in terms of economic development based on
nanotechnology." Nor, he said, can it prevent the transfer overseas of research, whether "through a patent process [or] to a country that
perhaps does not have the respect for intellectual property rights that Western European and U.S. nations hold." Instead, the U.S.
should seek "to have an unremitting, relentless flow of novel ideas that take time and keep
us continually two, three, five years ahead of what other countries can attain," Nordan maintained.
"The achievement that we can drive toward is to always be ahead and always be first to market with those novel ideas, and through that I think
we'll attain economic rewards." Murdock, while concurring on the importance of enforcing IP laws, countered that keeping manufacturing in the
U.S. is critical to the nation's economic health. "I believe that we need to endeavor to be more than just IP companies," he stated, in view of a
projection by Nordan's firm that "new, emerging nanotechnology applications will...becom[e] incorporated into 15 percent of global manufacturing
output totaling $2.6 trillion in 2014." "If you look at the total value associated with any product, most of the value tends to accrue to those that are
closest to the customer -- that, in fact, make it. And while IP may have higher margins, ultimately there is a big value pool out there, and we need to
ensure that we're taking steps to capture the value. "Furthermore, IP is not the only source of intellectual
capital," Murdock added. "There is know-how. And that is the reason for the importance of
manufacturing. Ultimately, when we move from the knowledge or the proof of principle
into making the stuff, we develop process knowledge. That process knowledge helps us to refine
and improve both the quality of the product and the throughput, and it increases the marginal productivity
of the labor. That is what enables us to pay high wages and keep jobs here. "So while we need to be realistic and
understand that this is a global economy, we also need to take steps to do what we can to ensure that we do
commercialize and manufacture the set of technologies that we can here."
Chinese Leadership guarantees extinction
Lev Navrozov 2004 (Winner of the Albert Einstein Prize for Outstanding Intellectual Achievements, “The Center for Responsible
Nanotechnology ‘Plans Ahead’
“We at the Center for the Survival of Western Democracies, Inc., believe that the West being what it is at present, there is
only one scenario. Two countries could develop nuclear weapons by 1945: the United States and Germany. The latter did not launch a
Manhattan Project, since no one could vouch to Hitler in 1939 that nuclear weapons were possible within a few years, and he committed all
available resources to the conventional war for world domination. The U.S. Manhattan Project started up, and finally, in 1942, came into its own
for fear that Germany would develop nuclear weapons ahead of the United States. Similarly, two countries can develop molecular
nano assemblers: the United States and China. The latter launched in 1986 Project 863, a Manhattan Project for the development
of post-nuclear superweapons in seven fields, and, at the close of the 20th century and beginning of the 21st, molecular nano technology became
the eighth field. The United States has not launched a Manhattan Project for the development of any post-
nuclear superweapons, and certainly not, of molecular nanoweapons. In 1969 President Nixon announced the U.S.
termination of development of post-nuclear weapons, and it has been terminated, according to my research, not my benevolence. Just as Lloyd
George in England up to 1939 dreamed aloud about having a statesman as great as Hitler at the head of the British government, the Western
political establishment has been in love with the dictatorship of China. So, the United States has no need for molecular nano assemblers and the
defense against them. In 1939 Hitler made a fatal mistake: he grabbed Òthe rump of Czechoslovakia,Ó and the democratic West woke up. Imagine
the dictatorship of China suddenly invading Mexico! But the Chinese strategists regard such a war as purely Western and old-fashioned (see
ÒUnrestricted WarfareÓ). In a modern war (which, ironically, the United States initiated by using nuclear weapons against Japan in 1945),
a geostrategist confronts the enemy with annihilation or unconditional surrender. Let us now look at the article
ÒResponsible Nanotechnology.Ó At the CSWD, Inc., we believe that the only responsible molecular nanotechnology is for
the U.S. government to launch a nanotech Manhattan Project on the basis of the Foresight Institute, with Eric
Drexler, the founder of nanotechnology, at the head of the Project. Incidentally, the Advisory Board of the Center for Responsible Nanotechnology
consists of distinguished, gifted individuals who might become the core of the nanotech Manhattan Project. Great was my shock when I had read
the article posted by or on behalf of CRN. Here are its eight ÒscenariosÓ of the future of mankind (which the article presents out of numerical
sequence): Scenario 6. ÒMolecular manufacturingÓ develops Òquickly enough,Ó but mankind lives happily ever after. But what about the
possibility of a molecular nano attack, launched by the dictatorship of China on the West? What? Don't you know
that China is as peaceful as the democratic West thought Germany was peaceful in 1938? Scenario 5. The same as Scenario 6 but Òmolecular
manufacturing technologyÓ develops slowly, which is even better. Scenario 4. The leading world powers take a close look at the first three
scenarios we've described [the article describes 4 after 6 and 5], decide to avoid them at all costs, and agree to work together to avoid geopolitical
meltdown. We at CRN believe that sovereign nations ultimately may cooperate in this way, since the alternatives appear to suck! Again, China is no
problem even if China gets molecular manufacturing capability first. Surely China will not annihilate the
West even in this case, but will work together. What about the United States? Even [!] if the United States
gets molecular manufacturing capability first, and certain elements inside the government intend to
oppress the rest of the world with it, we can hope that other powerful entities in the U.S. will be more
sensible and influential. The above suggests that the form of government in the United States is much more dangerous for the world than
that in China, the largest dictatorship in world history. Inside the U.S. government Òcertain elementsÓ may Òintend to oppress the rest of the
world.Ó Not inside the government of China, which presumably consists of American liberal Democrats and peaceniks only. Scenario 3. Two or
more competent nations develop molecular manufacturing capability at about the same time. Fearing the potential military advantage this could
provide for their adversary, they each begin rapid and massive development of hideously powerful new weaponry. The resulting arms race is
almost certain to be highly unstable, for several reasons. This scenario can be considered an existential risk for the human race. Can you imagine
the dictators of China, hearing of Òexistential risk for the human raceÓ? They will develop a severe depression, and the American doctors talking
depression on TV will have to treat them. Scenario 2 A major Asian nation achieves robust molecular nanotechnology
manufacturing ahead of anyone else, and as a result the U.S. becomes something of a backwater. As I was
reading this, I could imagine only China in this role. I guessed right! But never mind, for China (if it's them) could turn
increasingly open/democratic as they continue to develop economically and scientifically isn't it? Of course!
Remember how increasingly open/democratic Germany turned as it developed economically and scientifically after 1933? If one knows
nothing about a foreign country, he or she can well daydream about its being open/democratic. Remember
how President Roosevelt's spouse and his ambassador in Moscow admired and extolled openness and
democracy in Stalin's Russia? Scenario 1. The United States of America is the first to develop
molecular technology manufacturing, and as a result can rule the world. Surely this is
better than the nano annihilation..”
I/L
NAFTA is key to jobs in the Manufacturing Sector
Irwin ‘9 – professor of economics at Dartmouth College and the author of Against the Tide: An Intellectual
History of Free Trade (Douglas A, “Free Trade under Fire,” 2009, Princeton University Press)//ER
Even those who may agree that the effect of trade on total employment¶ is essentially zero may oppose free
trade in the belief that it shifts jobs¶ into less desirable sectors. One of the greatest concerns in recent de¶ cades has been that trade has led to the "deindustrialization" of the U.S. ¶ economy in which
good jobs in manufacturing have been sacrificed for¶ bad jobs in services.¶ It is certainly true that
the number of jobs in manufacturing has¶ declined in recent decades. US employment in
manufacturing fell from¶ 17.9 million workers in 1970 to 15.9 million in 2007. Manufacturing’s¶ share of total
employment fell even more sharply. from 25 percent of the¶ nonfarm workforce in 1970 to 10 percent in 2007.
At the same time, real¶ manufacturing output has increased significantly, by nearly 40 percent in¶
the 1990s alone, and has declined only slightly as a share of GDP when¶ measured at constant
prices. This contrast is shown in figure 4.3, which illustrates the vast increase in domestic manufacturing
output while the¶ manufacturing workforce has been unchanged or declining. How is this¶ possible? By
rapid increases in labor productivity. Just as US agricultural¶ output has increased steadily even as the
number of farmers has de-¶ clined, manufacturing has been a victim of its own success in increasing¶
labor productivity.¶ The flip side to these developments is that a growing share of¶ the labor force is
employed in the service sector. As consumers have¶ shifted their spending to such services as
health care, education, recre-¶ ation, and personal finance, the economy has responded by
devoting¶ more resources to those sectors. Because of the relatively poor produc-¶ tivity performance in
these service sectors, a greater share of the labor¶ force has to be devoted to these occupations in
order to increase output¶ and meet consumer demands.
Deterrence Module
Manufacturing capabilities key to technology necessary for U.S. deterrence
O’Hanlon et al 12
(Mackenzie Eaglen, American Enterprise Institute Rebecca Grant, IRIS Research Robert P. Haffa, Haffa Defense Consulting
Michael O'Hanlon, The Brookings Institution Peter W. Singer, The Brookings Institution Martin Sullivan, Commonwealth Consulting Barry Watts,
Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments “The Arsenal of Democracy and How to Preserve It: Key Issues in Defense Industrial Policy January
2012,”
pg
online
@
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2012/1/26%20defense%20industrial%20base/0126_defense_industrial_base_ohanlon
//um-ef)
The current wave of defense cuts is also different than past defense budget reductions in their likely industrial impact, as the
U.S. defense
industrial base is in a much different place than it was in the past . Defense industrial issues are
too often viewed through the lens of jobs and pet projects to protect in congressional districts . But the
overall health of the firms that supply the technologies our armed forces utilize does have
national security resonance . Qualitative superiority in weaponry and other key military technology
has become an essential element of American military power in the modern era— not only for winning wars
but for deterring them . That requires world-class scientific and manufacturing capabilities—
which in turn can also generate civilian and military export opportunities for the U nited States in a globalized
marketplace.
Defense industrial base deters war with Russia
Watts 2008 (Senior Fellow @ The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (Barry D, “The US Defense Industrial Base, Past, Present and
Future,” CBA,
__http://www.csbaonline.org/4Publications/PubLibrary/R.20081015._The_US_Defense_In/R.20081015._The_US_Defense_In.pdf__)
the US defense industrial base has been a source of long-term strategic advantage for the
United States, just as it was during World War II. American defense companies provided the bombers and
missiles on which nuclear deterrence rested and armed the US military with world-class
weapons, including low-observable aircraft, wide-area surveillance and targeting sensors,
and reliable guided munitions cheap enough to be employed in large numbers . They also
Since the 1950s,
contributed to the development of modern digital computers, successfully orbited the first reconnaissance satellites, put a man on the moon in less
than a decade, and played a pivotal role in developing the worldwide web. Critics have long emphasized President Eisenhower’s warning in his
farewell television address that the nation needed to “guard against the acquisition of undue influence, whether sought or unsought, by the
military-industrial complex.” Usually forgotten or ignored has been an earlier, equally important, passage in Eisenhower’s January 1961 speech: A
vital element in keeping the peace is our military establishment. Our arms must be mighty, ready for
instant action, so that no potential aggressor may be tempted to risk his own destruction .
Eisenhower’s warning about undue influence, rather than the need to maintain American military strength, tends to dominate contemporary
discussions of the US defense industrial base. While the percentage of US gross domestic product going to national defense remains low compared
to the 1950s and 1960s, there is a growing list of defense programs that have experienced problems with cost, schedule, and, in a few cases, weapon
performance. In fairness, the federal government, including the Department of Defense and Congress, is at least as much to blame for many of
these programmatic difficulties as US defense firms. Nevertheless, those critical of the defense industry tend to concentrate on these acquisition
shortcomings. The
main focus of this report is on a larger question. How prepared is the US defense industrial
base to meet the needs of the US military Services in coming decades? The Cold War challenge of Soviet power has
largely ebbed, but new challenges have emerged. There is the immediate threat of the violence stemming from
SalafiTakfiri and Khomeinist terrorist groups and their state sponsors, that have consumed so much American blood and treasure
in Iraq; the longer-term challenge of authoritarian capitalist regimes epitomized by the rise of China and a resurgent Russia; and,
not least, the worsening problem of proliferation, particularly of nuclear weapons. In the face of these more complex
and varied challenges, it would surely be premature to begin dismantling the US defense industry . From a
competitive perspective, therefore, the vital question about the defense industrial base is whether it will be as much
a source of long-term advantage in the decades ahead as it has been since the 1950s.
That’s the only scenario for Extinction
Bostrom, 2002
[Nick, Professor of Philosophy and Global Studies at Yale, "Existential Risks: Analyzing Human Extinction Scenarios and Related Hazards," 38,
www.transhumanist.com/volume9/risks.html]
A much greater existential risk emerged with the build-up of nuclear arsenals in the US and the USSR. An
all-out nuclear war was a possibility with both a substantial probability and with consequences that might have
been persistent enough to qualify as global and terminal. There was a real worry among those best acquainted with the information
available at the time that a nuclear Armageddon would occur and that it might annihilate our species or permanently
destroy human civilization.[4] Russia and the US retain large nuclear arsenals that could be used in a future
confrontation, either accidentally or deliberately. There is also a risk that other states may one day build up large nuclear arsenals. Note
however that a smaller nuclear exchange, between India and Pakistan for instance, is not an existential risk, since it would not destroy or thwart
humankind’s potential permanently. Such a war might however be a local terminal risk for the cities most likely to be targeted. Unfortunately, we
shall see that nuclear Armageddon and comet or asteroid strikes are mere preludes to the existential risks that we will encounter in the 21st
century.
Tech Innovation Module
All levels of manufacturing and R&D are interconnected – a sustainable manufacturing
base in the U.S. is critical to Advanced Manufacturing and R&D
Lind 12 (Michael Lind is policy director of New America’s Economic Growth Program and a co-founder of the New America Foundation. Joshua
Freedman is a program associate in New America’s Economic Growth Program. “Value Added: America’s Manufacturing Future,” pg online @
http://growth.newamerica.net/sites/newamerica.net/files/policydocs/Lind,%20Michael%20and%20Freedman,%20Joshua%20-%20NAF%20%20Value%20Added%20America%27s%20Manufacturing%20Future.pdf //um-ef)
Manufacturing, R&D and the U.S. Innovation Ecosystem Perhaps the greatest contribution of manufacturing to the U.S.
economy as a whole involves the disproportionate role of the manufacturing sector in R&D . The
expansion in the global market for high-value-added services has allowed the U.S. to play to its strengths
by expanding its trade surplus in services, many of them linked to manufacturing, including R&D, engineering,
software production and finance. Of these services, by far the most important is R&D. The United States has long led the world
in R&D. In 1981, U.S. gross domestic expenditure on R&D was more than three times as large as that of any other country in the world. And the
U.S. still leads: in 2009, the most recent year for which there is available data, the United States spent more than 400 billion dollars. European
countries spent just under 300 billion dollars combined, while China spent about 150 billion dollars.14 In the United States, private sector
manufacturing is the largest source of R&D. The private sector itself accounts for 71 percent of total R&D in the United States, and although U.S.
manufacturing accounts for only 11.7 percent of GDP in 2012, the manufacturing sector accounts for 70 percent of all R&D spending by the
private sector in the U.S.15 And R&D and innovation are inextricably connected:
a National Science Foundation
survey found that 22 percent of manufacturers had introduced product innovations and the same percentage introduced process innovations in the
period 2006-2008, while only 8 percent of nonmanufacturers reported innovations of either kind.16 Even as the manufacturing industry in the
United States underwent major changes and suffered severe job losses during the last decade, R&D spending continued to follow a general upward
growth path. A disproportionate share of workers involved in R&D are employed directly or indirectly by
manufacturing companies; for example, the US manufacturing sector employs more than a third of
U.S. engineers. 17 This means that manufacturing provides much of the demand for the U.S.
innovation ecosystem, supporting large numbers of scientists and engineers who might not
find employment if R&D were offshored along with production. Why America Needs the Industrial Commons
Manufacturing creates an industrial commons, which spurs growth in multiple sectors of the economy through linked industries. An
“industrial commons” is a base of shared physical facilities and intangible knowledge shared by a number
of firms. The term “commons” comes from communallyshared pastures or fields in premodern Britain. The industrial commons in
particular in the manufacturing sector includes not only large companies but also small and medium sized
enterprises (SMEs), which employ 41 percent of the American manufacturing workforce and account for 86
percent of all manufacturing establishments in the U.S. Suppliers of materials, component parts, tools, and
more are all interconnected ; most of the time, Harvard Business School professors Gary Pisano and Willy Shih point out, these
linkages are geographic because of the ease of interaction and knowledge transfer between firms.18 Examples of industrial commons surrounding
manufacturing are evident in the United States, including the I-85 corridor from Alabama to Virginia and upstate New York.19 Modern
economic scholarship emphasizes the importance of geographic agglomeration effects and co-location
synergies. 20 Manufacturers and researchers alike have long noted the symbiotic relationship that occurs
when manufacturing and R&D are located near each other: the manufacturer benefits from the
innovation, and the researchers are better positioned to understand where innovation can
be found and to test new ideas. While some forms of knowledge can be easily recorded and transferred, much “know-how” in
industry is tacit knowledge. This valuable tacit knowledge base can be damaged or destroyed by the erosion of
geographic linkages, which in turn shrinks the pool of scientists and engineers in the national innovation
ecosystem. If an advanced manufacturing core is not retained, then the economy stands to lose not only the manufacturing industry itself but
also the geographic synergies of the industrial commons, including R&D. Some have warned that this is already the case: a growing share of
R&D by U.S. multinational corporations is taking place outside of the United States.21 In particular, a number of
large U.S. manufacturers have opened up or expanded R&D facilities in China over the last few years.22 Next Generation
Manufacturing A dynamic manufacturing sector in the U.S. is as important as ever . But thanks to
advanced manufacturing technology and technology-enabled integration of manufacturing and services, the very nature of manufacturing is
changing, often in radical ways. What will the next generation of manufacturing look like? In 1942, the economist Joseph Schumpeter declared
that “the process of creative destruction is the essential fact about capitalism.” By creative destruction, Schumpeter did not mean the rise and fall
of firms competing in a technologically-static marketplace. He referred to a “process of industrial mutation— if I may use that biological term—that
incessantly revolutionizes the economic structure from within, incessantly destroying the old one, incessantly creating the new one.” He noted that
“these revolutions are not strictly incessant; they occurred in discrete rushes that are separated from each other by spaces of comparative quiet.
The process as a whole works incessantly, however, in the sense that there is always either revolution or absorption of the results of revolution.”23
As Schumpeter and others have observed, technological innovation tends to be clustered in bursts or waves, each dominated by one or a few
transformative technologies that are sometimes called “general purpose technologies.” Among the most world-transforming general purpose
technologies of recent centuries have been the steam engine, electricity, the internal combustion engine, and information technology.24 As epochal
as these earlier technology-driven innovations in manufacturing processes and business models proved to be, they are rapidly being superseded by
new technologydriven changes as part of the never-ending process of Schumpeterian industrial mutation. The latest wave of innovation
in industrial technology has been termed “advanced manufacturing.”
The National Science and Technology
Council of the Executive Office of the President defines advanced manufacturing as “a family of activities that (a) depend on the use and
coordination of information, automation, computation, software, sensing, and networking, and/or (b) make use of cutting edge materials and
emerging capabilities enabled by the physical and biological sciences, for example, nanotechnology, chemistry, and
biology. It involves both new ways to manufacture existing products and the manufacture of new products
emerging from new advanced technologies.”25 Already computer-aided design (CAD) and computer-aided manufacturing (CAM)
programs, combined with computer numerical control (CNC), allow precision manufacturing from complex designs, eliminating many wasteful
trials and steps in finishing. CNC is now ubiquitous in the manufacturing sector and much of the employment growth occurring in the sector
requires CNC skills or training. Information technology has allowed for enterprise resource planning (ERP) and other forms of enterprise software
to connect parts of the production process (both between and within a firm), track systems, and limit waste when dealing with limited resources.
Other areas in which advanced manufacturing will play a role in creating new products and sectors and changing current ones
are: Supercomputing. America’s global leadership in technology depends in part on
whether the U.S. can compete with Europe and Asia in the race to develop “exascale
computing,” a massive augmentation of computer calculating power that has the potential to revolutionize predictive sci ences from
meteorology to economics. According to the Advanced Scientific Computing Advisory Committee (ASCAC), “If the U.S. chooses to be a
follower rather than a leader in exascale computing, we must be willing to cede leadership” in industries
including aerospace, automobiles, energy, health care, novel material development, and information
technology.26 Robotics: The long-delayed promise of robotics is coming closer to fulfillment. Google and other
firms and research consortiums are testing robotic cars, and Nevada recently amended its laws to permit autonomous automobiles.27 Amazon is
experimenting with the use of robots in its warehouses.28 Nanotechnology may permit manufacturing at extremely small
scales including the molecular and atomic levels.29 Nanotechnology is also a key research component in the semiconductor
indusmanutry, as government funding is sponsoring projects to create a “new switch” capable of supplanting current semiconductor technology.30
Photonics or optoelectronics, based on the conversion of information carried by electrons to photons and back, has potential applications in
sectors as diverse as telecommunications, data storage, lighting and consumer electronics. Biomanufacturing is the use of biological
processes or living organisms to create inorganic structures, as well as food, drugs and fuel . Researchers at MIT
have genetically modified a virus that generates cobalt oxide nanowires for silicon chips.31 Innovative materials include artificial “metamaterials”
with novel properties. Carbon nanotubes, for example, have a strength-to-weight ratio that no other material can match.32 Advanced
manufacturing using these and other cuttingedge technologies is not only creating new products and new methods of production but is also
transforming familiar products like automobiles. The rapid growth in electronic and software content in automobiles, in forms like GPS-based
guidance systems, information and entertainment technology, anti-lock brakes and engine control systems, will continue. According to Ford,
around 30 percent of the value of one of its automobiles is comprised by intellectual property, electronics and software. In the German automobile
market, electronic content as a share of production costs is expected to rise from 20-30 percent in 2007 to 50 percent by 2020.33
Independently, that innovation solves great power wars
Taylor 2k4 (Mark, Professor of Political Science – Massachusetts Institute of Technology, “The Politics of Technological Change: International
Relations versus Domestic Institutions”, 4-1, http://www.scribd.com/doc/46554792/Taylor)
Technological innovation is of central importance to the study of international relations (IR),
affecting almost every
aspect of the sub-field. 2 First and foremost, a nation’s technological capability has a significant effect on its
economic growth, industrial might, and military prowess ; therefore relative national technological capabilities
necessarily influence the balance of power between states, and hence have a role in calculations
of war and alliance formation. Second, technology and innovative capacity also determine a nation’s trade profile, affecting which
products it will import and export, as well as where multinational corporations will base their production facilities. 3 Third, insofar as innovationdriven economic growth both attracts investment and produces surplus capital, a nation’s technological ability will also affect
international financial flows and who has power over them. 4 Thus, in broad theoretical terms, technological change is
important to the study of IR because of its overall implications for both the relative and absolute power of states. And if theory alone does not
convince, then history
also tells us that nations on the technological ascent generally experience
a corresponding and dramatic change in their global stature and influence , such as Britain during the
first industrial revolution, the United States and Germany during the second industrial revolution, and Japan during the twentieth century. 5
Conversely, great powers which fail to maintain their place at the technological frontier generally drift and
fade from influence on international scene. 6 This is not to suggest that technological innovation alone determines international
politics, but rather that shifts in both relative and absolute tech nological capability have a major impact on
i nternational r elations, and therefore need to be better understood by IR scholars. Indeed, the importance of technological
innovation to international relations is seldom disputed by IR theorists. Technology is rarely the sole or overriding
causal variable in any given IR theory, but a broad overview of the major theoretical debates reveals the ubiquity of technological causality. For
example, from Waltz to Posen, almost all Realists have a place for technology in their explanations of international politics. 7 At the very least, they
describe it as an essential part of the distribution of material capabilities across nations, or an indirect source of military doctrine. And for some,
technology is the very cornerstone of great power domination, and its transfer the
main vehicle by which war and change occur in world politics . 8 Jervis tells us that the balance of
offensive and defensive military technology affects the incentives for war. 9 Walt agrees, arguing that
technological change can alter a state’s aggregate power, and thereby affect both alliance formation and the
international balance of threats. 10 Liberals are less directly concerned with technological change, but they must admit that by raising
like Gilpin quoted above,
or lowering the costs of using force, technological progress affects the rational attractiveness of international cooperation and regimes. 11
Technology also lowers information & transactions costs and thus increases the applicability of
international institutions,
a cornerstone of Liberal IR theory. 12 And in fostering flows of trade, finance, and information,
technological change can lead to Keohane’s interdependence 13 or Thomas Friedman et al’s globalization. 14 Meanwhile, over at the “third debate”,
Constructivists cover the causal spectrum on the issue, from Katzenstein’s “cultural norms” which shape security concerns and
to Wendt’s “stripped down technological determinism” in which technology inevitably
drives nations to form a world state. 16 However most Constructivists seem to favor Wendt, arguing
that new technology changes people’s identities within society , and sometimes even creates new crossnational constituencies, thereby affecting international politics. 17 Of course, Marxists tend to see technology as
determining all social relations and the entire course of history, though they describe mankind’s major fault lines as
thereby affect technological innovation; 15
running between economic classes rather than nation-states. 18 Finally, Buzan & Little remind us that without advances in the technologies of
transportation, communication, production, and war, international systems would not exist in the first place
And, advanced manufacturing technology will make war IMPOSSIBLE (This card is
dumb)
Paone 9
(Chuck, 66th Air Base Wing Public Affairs for the US Air Force, 8-10-09, “Technology convergence could prevent war, futurist says,”
http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123162500)
The convergence of "exponentially advancing technologies" will form a "super-intelligence" so
formidable that it could avert war, according to one of the world's leading futurists. Dr. James Canton, CEO and
chairman of the Institute for Global Futures, a San Francisco-based think tank, is author of the book "The Extreme Future" and an adviser to
leading companies, the military and other government agencies. He is consistently listed among the world's leading speakers
and has presented to diverse audiences around the globe. He will address the Air Force Command and Control Intelligence, Survelliance and
Reconnaissance Symposium, which will be held Sept. 28 through 30 at the MGM Grand Hotel at Foxwoods in Ledyard, Conn., joining Air Force
Chief of Staff Gen. Norton Schwartz and a bevy of other government and industry speakers. He offered a sneak preview of his symposium
presentation and answered various questions about the future of technology and warfare in early August. " The
superiority of
convergent technologies will prevent war," Doctor Canton said, claiming their power would present an
overwhelming deterrent to potential adversaries . While saying that the U.S. will build these super systems faster and
better than other nations, he acknowledged that a new arms race is already under way. "It will be a new MAD for the 21st century," he said,
referring to the Cold War-era acronym for Mutually Assured Destruction, the idea that a nuclear first strike would trigger an equally deadly
response. It's commonly held that this knowledge has essentially prevented any rational state from launching a nuclear attack. Likewise, Doctor
Canton said he believes rational nation states, considering this imminent technology explosion, will see the
futility of nation-on-nation warfare in the near future. Plus there's the "socio-economic linking of the global market system."
"The fundamental macroeconomics on the planet favor peace, security, capitalism and prosperity," he said. Doctor Canton projects that nations,
including those not currently allied, will work together in using these smart technologies to prevent non-state actors from engaging in disruptive
and deadly acts. As a futurist, Doctor Canton and his team study and predict many things, but their main area of expertise -- and the
is advanced and emerging technology. "I see that as the key catalyst of
strategic change on the planet, and it will be for the next 100 years," he said. He focuses on six specific technology
areas: "nano, bio, IT, neuro, quantum and robotics;" those he expects to converge in so powerful a
way. Within the information technology arena, Doctor Canton said systems must create "meaningful data," which can be validated and acted
upon. "Knowledge engineering for the analyst and the warfighter is a critical competency that we need to get
our arms around," he said. "Having an avalanche of data is not going to be helpful." Having the right data is. "There's no way for the human
one in which he's personally most interested --
operator to look at an infinite number of data streams and extract meaning," he said. "The question then is: How do we augment the human user
with advanced artificial intelligence, better software presentation and better visual frameworks, to create a system that is situationally aware and
can provide decision options for the human operator, faster than the human being can?" He said he believes the answers can often be found
already in what he calls 'edge cultures.' "I would look outside of the military. What are they doing in video games? What are they doing in
healthcare? What about the financial industry?" Doctor Canton said he believes that more sophisticated artificial intelligence
applications will transform business, warfare and life in general.
products, he says, even if people don't know it.
Many of these are already embedded in systems or
US-China War Module
Loss of manufacturing Risks a China-Taiwan War
Steven Mosher 2/14/06 (President of the Population Research Institute, CQ Congressional Testimony, “Chinese Influence on U.S. Foreign Policy”
pg lexis)
The ruthless mercantilism practiced by the CCP is thus a form of economic warfare. China's rulers seek to move as much of the
world's manufacturing base to their country as possible, thus increasing the PRC's "comprehensive national strength" at the
same time that it undermines U.S. national security by hollowing out America's industrial base in general and key defenserelated sectors of the economy in particular. China will not lightly abandon this policy, which strengthens China as it weakens the
U.S., and is an integral part of China's drive for Hegemony. China is Acquiring the Means to Project Force Far Beyond
Taiwan. Many of China's military modernization efforts supersonic anti- ship cruise missiles, stealthy submarines, theater based missiles with
terminal guidance systems are aimed specifically at U.S. forces and bases. By is acquiring weapons designed to exploit U.S. vulnerabilities, the PRC
is clearly preparing for a contest with the United States. Beijing is interested in deterring, delaying, or complicating U.S.
assistance to Taiwan in the event of an invasion, so as to force a quick capitulation by the democratically
elected Taiwan government. But while the near-term focus is Taiwan, many of China's new lethal capabilities are applicable to a wide
range of potential operations beyond the Taiwan Strait. As the 2005 Report to Congress of the USCC report notes, "China is in the midst of an
extensive force modernization program aimed at increasing its force projection capabilities and confronting U.S. and allied forces in the region."
The rapid growth in China's military power not only threatens Taiwan and by implication the U.S. but U.S. allies throughout the
Asian Pacific region. China possesses regional, even global ambitions, and is building a first-rate military to realize those ambitions. It is naive to
view the PRC's military build-up as "merely" part of the preparations for an invasion of Taiwan in which American military assets in the AsianPacific will have to be neutralized.
Extinction.
The Strait Times, 2000 [“No one gains in war over Taiwan”, June 25, Lexis]
The high-intensity scenario postulates a cross-strait war escalating into a full-scale war
between the US and China. If Washington were to conclude that splitting China would better serve its national interests, then a fullscale war becomes unavoidable. Conflict on such a scale would embroil other countries
far and near and -horror of horrors - raise the possibility of a nuclear war . Beijing has already told the US and Japan
privately that it considers any country providing bases and logistics support to any US forces attacking China as belligerent parties open to its retaliation. In the
region, this means South Korea, Japan, the Philippines and, to a lesser extent, Singapore. If China were to retaliate, east
Asia will be set on fire.
the US
distracted, Russia may seek to redefine Europe's political landscape. The balance of
power in the Middle East may be similarly upset by the likes of Iraq. In south Asia, hostilities
between India and Pakistan, each armed with its own nuclear arsenal, could enter a
new and dangerous phase. Will a full-scale Sino-US war lead to a nuclear war? According to General Matthew Ridgeway, commander of the US
And the conflagration may not end there as opportunistic powers elsewhere may try to overturn the existing world order. With
Eighth Army which fought against the Chinese in the Korean War, the US had at the time thought of using nuclear weapons against China to save the US from military
defeat. In his book The Korean War, a personal account of the military and political aspects of the conflict and its implications on future US foreign policy, Gen
Ridgeway said that US was confronted with two choices in Korea -truce or a broadened war, which could have led to the use of nuclear weapons. If the US had to
there is little hope of winning a war
against China 50 years later, short of using nuclear weapons . The US estimates that China possesses about 20 nuclear
resort to nuclear weaponry to defeat China long before the latter acquired a similar capability,
warheads that can destroy major American cities. Beijing also seems prepared to go for the nuclear option. A Chinese military officer disclosed recently that Beijing
was considering a review of its "non first use" principle regarding nuclear weapons. Major-General Pan Zhangqiang, president of the military-funded Institute for
Strategic Studies, told a gathering at the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars in Washington that although the government still abided by that principle,
there were strong pressures from the military to drop it. He said military leaders considered the use of nuclear weapons mandatory if the country risked
dismemberment as a result of foreign intervention. Gen Ridgeway said that should that come to pass, we
would see the destruction of
civilization. There would be no victors in such a war. While the prospect of a nuclear Armageddon over Taiwan might seem
inconceivable, it cannot be ruled out entirely, for China puts sovereignty above everything else.
Military Readiness Module
Manufacturing key to the economy and military readiness
Cooper 7 (Horace Cooper, Senior Fellow and deputy director of the Alliance for American Manufacturing, “Making it in America”, April 04, 2007,
http://www.americanmanufacturing.org/articles/making-it-america)
Why should those who support limited government and liberty care about what happens to manufacturing in America? Because
manufacturing is a crucial component of who we are as a country. As far back as Alexander Hamilton, our founders
understood that America’s merchants and industrialists would shape American society directly by providing jobs and indirectly by enhancing our
nation’s economic might. Today, manufacturing continues to play that role as part of a maturing and stable
manufacturing sector. Additionally, this key sector of the economy continues to provide Americans with better
jobs and a greater quality of life. And despite what you may think, manufacturing today isn’t a small part of our
economy. It is the key engine. If American manufacturing was its own country, it would have the world’s
8th-largest economy. With a manufacturing output nearly as great as the entire GDP of China and more
than the economies of Australia, Belgium and Brazil combined, “made in America” is more than a slogan,
it’s the American way. Yes, America is the world’s No. 1 manufacturer—its activities accounting for a
staggering one-quarter of all manufacturing on the planet as recently as 2004. As significant as it is worldwide,
it is its effects on our economy at home that are more noteworthy. Domestic manufacturing is vital to the
rest of our economy. Nearly 14.5 million Americans work directly in the manufacturing industry and another 8 million do so in related
industries such as wholesaling and finance. A phenomenon economists refer to as the multiplier effect causes the growth and expansion in the
manufacturing sector to generate significant salutary effects on other sectors, resulting in more jobs, investment and innovation in those sectors as
well. Today the manufacturing sector is responsible for 70 percent of all U.S. private-sector research and development. And more than half of all
U.S. exports stem from domestic manufacturing. Much of America’s energy conservation activity is found here; American manufacturing is the
center for a range of innovative technologies that reduce energy use and promote a cleaner environment. Letting this powerful engine slip away
would be disastrous. But as the attentive reader knows, all is not well with American manufacturing. Although many claim it is the manufacturing
sector itself which is to blame, the evidence rebuts this argument. U.S. companies are not running away from America. The latest available data
indicates that U.S. manufacturers invested about $170 billion in factories and equipment in the United States in 2005, while their foreign
investment to the rest of the world was only $39 billion. That means more than 80 percent of the investment by American firms stayed here at
home. The truth is that a combination of recessions in the United States, strikingly high energy prices along with the predatory trading practices of
many other countries have significantly eroded American manufacturing influence. Reaching a high of 53 percent of the economy in 1965,
domestic manufacturing accounts for only 9 percent of GDP 40 years later. Not since the beginning of the industrial revolution has a lower
percentage of Americans worked in American manufacturing as they do today. Tellingly, just since 2000, the manufacturing sector has lost nearly
3 million jobs. There can be no doubt, however, the manufacturing sector is under siege. The losses over time have been quite substantial. Now
some in Washington wonder if manufacturing can make it all. Worse, they openly speculate it wouldn’t be missed. The idea that manufacturing
can’t make it here in America is wrong-headed and dangerous. But perhaps greater than the economic disruption in the lives
of the workforce and their companies is the incalculable loss of a manufacturing base for our nation as a
whole. There are those in Washington who fail to appreciate the attendant decline in our nation’s security
and flexibility in foreign affairs that results from the collapse of this sector. The fall of the Berlin Wall and the
unipolarity that resulted presents the United States far greater responsibilities and concerns than those that existed during the Cold War. Yet, our
failure to sustain our domestic manufacturing base and instead pursuing a strategy of relying on other
countries for military products and technologies isn’t just short-sided, it’s dangerous. This decline in
our country’s military readiness is a signal to the rest of the world that we may not be
capable of defending our interests or allies. And perhaps one of the greatest lessons of the 20th century is that
weakness at home is provocative. Essentially, we provoke rogue nations into taking ill-advised
actions that must inevitably be countered by America’s military might. A policy that results in a
diminished security for Americans, fewer jobs, a declining tax base for communities and states and that
rejects our nation’s history is a policy that should be reassessed. Supporters of liberty and freedom recognize that American
ingenuity and know-how is a core ingredient of our manufacturing sector and has led to much of the high standard of living we Americans take for
granted. At our country’s founding and for much of its history, we’ve recognized the benefits of a strong and robust manufacturing sector. It is the
mainstay for our nation’s exports, provides salaries nearly 25 percent higher than other sectors, supports the tax base in communities across the
nation, and is essential to our nation’s security needs. It is a sector that should be welcomed and encouraged today.
Kills Heg
Spencer 2K Policy Analyst for Defense and National Security Institute for International Studies at The Heritage Foundation (Jack, “The Facts
about military readiness”, Heritage Foundation Backgrounder #1394)
Military readiness is vital because declines in America's military
readiness signal to the rest of the world that the United
States is not prepared to defend its interests. Therefore, potentially hostile nations will be more likely to lash out
against American allies and interests, inevitably leading to U.S. involvement in combat. A high state of military
readiness is more likely to deter potentially hostile nations from acting aggressively in regions of vital national
interest, thereby preserving peace
Leadership Module
Declining manufacturing competitiveness devastates the US economy and global
leadership
Choate 2002
(Pat Choate, director of the Manufacturing Policy Project and Edward Miller, president of DSI, former economic treaty negotiator,
2002, http://www.uscc.gov/researchpapers/2000_2003/reports/analysis.htm)
For two centuries, industrial and military self-sufficiency was America’s policy. It succeeded brilliantly. It
protected against European adventurism in the 19th century. It enabled the nation to become the richest, most industrialized
country in the world. And it allowed America to be the arsenal of democracy in the 20th century. Even when
America disarmed following World War I and again after World War II, it still had the industrial capacity - the potential -- to re-arm quickly if a threat emerged. And when one did, America’s factories quickly converted to
war production, allowing the Allied forces to out produce and ultimately overwhelm the Axis powers in the
1940s and hold off the enemy during the Korean War. Following the Korean War, the U.S. defense industrial base
was repeatedly modernized, again enabling the USA to cope with any foreign threat . And self-sufficiency
was taken a step further during the Cold War as the United States actively led Europe, Japan and others in
denying the Soviet Union the technologies, machinery, skills, and research they needed to keep apace —
economically and militarily. That policy of strength and containment succeeded, too. The Soviet Union could not match the West, its
people grew weary, and that empire broke into pieces. But with the collapse of the Soviet Union, America seems to have quickly
forgotten the older lessons and policies that long served it well. In a very real way, the mood of America in these
first days of the 21st century is akin to that of America in the 1920s . Then, the "war to end wars" had ended. The threat
was gone. America could return to the business of America, which was perceived to be business. With the collapse of the Soviet
Union, America remains the sole super power. Americans are generally prosperous. And while as recently as the
1980s, the global competitiveness of domestic industries was a top concern of national leaders, their successors now focus on assuring stockholders
higher share prices and American consumers a steady flow of inexpensively produced goods, regardless of where they are made. Once again, the
business of America seems to be business. Today, a smaller, simpler, more trusting, view dominates. Terrorists are seen as the
principal threat to national security. The emergence of China -- a one-party, repressive, Communist state — as an economic and
military power is mainly seen not as a danger, but as a business opportunity. And global economics is treated as something
analogous to celestial mechanics -- a self-driven, self-correcting system in which markets balance supply
and demand, assuring ever more growth and development. But there is also something different about what America is
doing now from what it did after World War I and World War II. Then, the United States shifted military production back to civilian uses and even
though military expenditures were cut, the U.S. industrial base remained in America. The long-held policy of self-sufficiency was not disturbed.
Unlike in the past, however, now that the Cold War is over, the U.S. industrial base is being taken apart, piece-by-piece,
and relocated to other nations. In the process, much of American’s industrial and military production base is
being sold to foreign interests, and more important a significant portion of it is being physically relocated
into other nations, including our most likely strategic rival — China.
Economy Module
Manufacturing key to the U.S. Economy and Global Leadership
Franklin J.
Vargo, 10/01/03, National Association of Manufacturers, FNS, l/n
I would like to begin my statement with a review of why manufacturing is vital to the U.S. economy. Since manufacturing only
represents about 16 percent of the nation's output, who cares? Isn't the United States a post-manufacturing services economy? Who needs
manufacturing? The answer in brief is that the United States economy would collapse without manufacturing, as would
our national security and our role in the world. That is because manufacturing is really the foundation of our
economy, both in terms of innovation and production and in terms of supporting the rest of the economy .
For example, many individuals point out that only about 3 percent of the U.S. workforce is on the farm, but they manage to feed the nation and
export to the rest of the world. But how did this agricultural productivity come to be? It is because of the tractors and combines and satellite
systems and fertilizers and advanced seeds, etc. that came from the genius and productivity of the manufacturing sector.
Similarly, in services -can you envision an airline without airplanes? Fast food outlets without griddles and freezers? Insurance companies or banks without computers?
Certainly not. The manufacturing industry is truly the innovation industry, without which the rest of the
economy could not prosper. Manufacturing performs over 60 percent of the nation's research and development.
Additionally, it also underlies the technological ability of the United States to maintain its national security and
its global leadership. Manufacturing makes a disproportionately large contribution to productivity, more
than twice the rate of the overall economy, and pays wages that are about 20 percent higher than in other
sectors. But its most fundamental importance lies in the fact that a healthy manufacturing sector truly underlies the entire U.S. standard of
living -because it is the principal way by which the United States pays its way in the world. Manufacturing accounts for over 80 percent of all
U.S. exports of goods. America's farmers will export somewhat over $50 billion this year, but America's manufacturers export almost that much
event month! Even when services are included, manufacturing accounts for two-thirds of all U.S. exports of goods and services. If the U.S.
manufacturing sector were to become seriously impaired, what combination of farm products together with architectural,
travel, insurance, engineering and other services could make up for the missing two-thirds of our exports represented by manufactures? The
answer is "none." What would happen instead is the dollar would collapse, falling precipitously -- not to the reasonable level of
1997, but far below it -and
with this collapse would come high U.S. inflation, a wrenching economic downturn
and a collapse in the U.S. standard of living and the U.S. leadership role in the world. That, most basically, is why
the United States cannot become a "nation of shopkeepers."
Manufacturing is the foundation of the economy ---- decline collapses the economy and
global leadership
Industrial Paint & Powder in ‘3 (“Study shows importance of strong manufacturing base; News Watch”, 10-1,
"Manufacturing spawns more economic activity and related jobs than does any other economic sector,"
says Popkin, president of Joel Popkin and Co. The study, Securing America's Future: The Case for a Strong Manufacturing Base,
which was commissioned by the Council of Manufacturing Associations (CMA), contends that manufacturing is "the heart of an
innovative process that powers the U.S. economy to global leadership. America's unprecedented wealth
and world economic leadership ate made possible by a critical mass of manufacturing within the geographic
confines of the American common market." "Popkin shows how the unique linkages of manufacturing to the rest of the economy create more
innovation, productivity and good jobs than any other sector of the economy," says Jerry Jasinowski, president of the National Association of
Manufacturers. "Popkin attributes America's high standard of living to the manufacturing innovation process. Research and
development stimulates investment in capital equipment and in workers, leads to new processes and
products, and ultimately leads to higher living standards." Industry in America, Jasinowski says, is being squeezed between
unprecedented foreign competition based on predatory trade practices that make it impossible to raise prices, and rising health-care costs, soaring
litigation and excessive regulation. The result is a dramatic decline in cash flow that forces firms to cut back on R&D and capital investment, and to
reduce employment. "If the U.S. manufacturing base continues to shrink at the present rate and the critical mass
is lost," Popkins' study concludes, "the manufacturing innovation process will shift to other global centers. If this
happens, a decline in U.S. living standards in the future is virtually assured."
Saving the manufacturing sector spills over to the larger economy – solves your
alternate causes
Jack Keough, 5/1/05,
Industrial Distribution, “Manufacturing's Ongoing Challenges; In a new white paper, the Bearing Specialists Assn.
focuses on the problems facing U.S. manufacturers and offers tips for dealing with them” pg lexis
That is the consensus of a special white paper published by the Bearing Specialists Assn., which represents more than 70 companies
distributing factory-warranted ball, roller and anti-friction bearings. The paper, entitled, "The Effects on the U.S. Bearing Industry and Homeland
Security of Manufacturers Moving Overseas," identifies the critical challenges facing manufacturers and recommends steps to help deal with those
problems. In the paper, BSA points out the importance of manufacturing by noting that the manufacturing process leads to
increased economic activity in other sectors. For every $1 of goods produced, an additional $1.43 worth of
additional economic activity is generated—much more than any other economic sector. In his book, Securing
America's Future: the Case for a Strong U.S. Manufacturing Base , author Joel Popkin points out that, "U.S. manufacturing is
the heart of a significant process that generates economic growth and has produced the highest standards
in history. But today, this complex process faces serious domestic and international challenges which, if not overcome, will lead to reduced
economic growth and, ultimately, a decline in living standards for future generations of Americans." The white paper adds that it's not just
manufactured products that make Americans prosperous; it's the manufacturing process. This process
starts with an idea that leads to new jobs and equipment and then to increased productivity, new products
and processes. "Prices fall and quality rises. Soon other parts of the economy are benefiting and,
ultimately, living standards rise," BSA notes. The economic impact Jim Berges, president of Emerson Electric, provides an eyeopening look at manufacturing's economic impact. "If the long-term health of this economy is threatened, then so are
we. Economies whose manufacturing sectors are not vibrant and not growing are doomed to low overall
growth," he says. "Those who call for a conversion to a service-based economy need only to look at Japan and
Germany to get a glimpse of the consequences of manufacturing's decline—not a pretty picture and not one we want to
see in this country." He went on to say, "U.S. manufacturing has demonstrated the ability to overcome pure wage differentials with trading
partners through innovation, capital investment and productivity. But when the structural cost multipliers are piled on, the task becomes
unmanageable for best-in-class companies. Concerted effort to get our state and federal legislators to focus on addressing and removing these
penalties will yield positive results for the economy."
Auto Industry Scenario
2AC
Mexico staying in NAFTA is especially essential to the U.S. auto industry
Villarreal 2012 – Specialist in International Trade and Finance, Congressional Research Service (M. Angeles, “U.SMEXICO ECONOMIC RELATIONS: TRENDS, ISSUES, AND IMPLICATIONS” August 9, 2012
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32934.pdf //SRM)
The overall effect of NAFTA on the U.S. economy has been relatively small, primarily because two-way trade
with Mexico amounts to less than 3% of U.S. GDP. Thus, any changes in trade patterns with Mexico would not
be expected to be significant in relation to the overall U.S. economy. In some sectors, however, trade-related
effects could be more significant, especially in those industries that were more exposed to the removal of tariff
and non-tariff trade barriers, such as the textile and apparel, and automotive industries. Since NAFTA, the
automotive, textile, and apparel industries have experienced some of the more noteworthy
changes in trading patterns, which may also have affected U.S. employment in these industries.
U.S. trade with Mexico has increased considerably more than U.S. trade with other countries, and
Mexico has become a more significant trading partner with the United States since NAFTA
implementation. In the automotive industry, the industry comprising the most U.S. trade with Mexico,
NAFTA provisions consisted of a phased elimination of tariffs, the gradual removal of many non-tariff barriers
to trade including rules of origin provisions, enhanced protection of intellectual property rights, less restrictive
government procurement practices, and the elimination of performance requirements on investors from other
NAFTA countries. These provisions may have accelerated the ongoing trade patterns between the United States
and Mexico. Because the United States and Canada were already highly integrated, most of the trade impacts
on the U.S. automotive industry relate to trade liberalization with Mexico. Prior to NAFTA
Mexico had a series of government decrees protecting the domestic auto sector by reserving the
domestic automobile market for domestically produced parts and vehicles. NAFTA established
the removal of Mexico’s restrictive trade and investment policies and the elimination of U.S. tariffs on
autos and auto parts. By 2006, the automotive industry has had the highest dollar increase ($41
billion) in total U.S. trade with Mexico since NAFTA passage.
Auto Industry Key To Heg – Air Power And Naval Power
Ronis, Director Of Mba Programs At Walsh College, 7/17/2006 [SHEILA R,
http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2006hearings/written_testimonies/06_07_17wrts/ronis_statement.pdf]
The DMSMS database is an example of how badly the industrial base is deteriorating. According to the Government Industry Data Exchange Program (GIDEP), in 2002,
“1,523 manufacturers reported 253,832 DMSMS parts. According to the Air Force DMSMS Guide, “ In
today’s high-tech Air Force, the ultimate
performance of aircraft, missiles, and numerous other weapon systems depends on a multitude of important and often complex
components. When one of these components (e.g. a microcircuit) becomes obsolete or unavailable, the impact can
extend throughout the weapon system affecting cost and system readiness.” The services are all trying to “lessen or eliminate the
risks caused by parts non-availability before the weapon system is adversely affected.” The commercial manufacturers increasingly lose
interest in supporting the military market because it is so small. Many manufacturing companies find that it is
not economically feasible to support very small volumes over long periods of time. All the services have DMSMS issues. As an
example for the DMSMS effort at the Air Force Research Laboratory at Wright-Patterson AFB, “DMSMS impacts every weapon system in the inventory – past, present and
future….” The Air Force has said that DMSMS is driven by many factors but one reason is the extended weapon system’s life in the Air Force inventory. For example, B-52s
may be used more than 94 years, C-130s, more than 79 years, C-135s, more than 86 years and the F-15, more than 51 years. None of these planes was designed to fly that long.
So, mission capable systems and readiness are put at risk if DMSMS issues are left unresolved. What
is not always understood is the reality that
the auto industry affects DMSMS at DoD because the industrial infrastructure that supports the
Department of Defense is shared by the auto industry. When a tier supplier to the automobile industry goes
under whether it is a machine tool company or in micro-electronics, it reduces DoD’s ability to function and
solve its DMSMS problems. When government R&D investment in an industry deteriorates, it is only a matter
of time before an industry is in trouble. Manufacturing R&D by the federal government is declining. According to Manufacturing News, “in the mid
1990s, the government was spending $1.5 billion on manufacturing related R&D, including such programs as Technologies Enabling Agile Manufacturing at the Energy
Department and $500 million in electronics manufacturing programs at DARPA. Both of those programs have been discontinued.” In May 2001, the U.S. Department of
Commerce’s Office of Strategic Industries and Economic Security, in partnership with the Carderock Division of the Naval Surface Warfare Center, completed a three-year
national security assessment of the U.S. shipbuilding and repair industry. Some of the findings were disconcerting though related to both DMSMS and the auto industry.
According to the study, employment in the industry has “dropped sharply since the early 1980s, when total private employment was close to 180,000 workers. Survey
estimates indicated that employment would decline to about 83,500 in 2000.” In addition, “orders for U.S. warships have declined 60 percent during the 10 years since the
end of the Cold War.” Young people no longer view working in a shipyard as a viable way to make a living. Consequently, according to DOC, “survey responses indicate that
labor shortages have reduced profits, impacted construction costs, and delayed project completion for most shipyards.” According to the study, the basis for U.S. ship-building
superiority has been the research and development expertise that currently resides in Navy’s laboratories, acquisition commands, and certain shipbuilders and universities.
“Collectively, these organizations have conceived and designed most of the state-of-the-art hull, mechanical, electrical, power projection, air defense and undersea warfare
capabilities that are operational today. With reduced research and development budgets, some of that capability now is becoming fragmented.” Many
lower tier
companies supply to both the auto industry and shipbuilding, but the auto industry is much larger. This
situation in shipbuilding also exists in other industries, such as machine tools, the high performance explosives
and explosive components industry, cartridge and propellant actuated device sector and welding and all of these
industries share the bottom of the base with the auto industry. We need to maintain a capability to be globally
competitive in product and process innovation – we must regain our manufacturing prowess and leadership. We
cannot become a country that manufactures little. We need to reinvigorate the Manufacturing Extension Partnership program at the National Institute of Standards and
Technology. We need to prioritize those technologies that are critical to regaining and then maintaining leadership and competitive advantage in the overall industrial base so
China does not become the world’s leader in technologies we need to be a superpower. China is becoming the manufacturing capital of the world. A small example is that
Chinese officials have publicly stated they want to become the foundry capital of the world to have a world-wide monopoly on cast parts. The Casting Emissions Reduction
Program (CERP) of the U.S. Army is an excellent example of ways that Congress can provide mechanisms for industry and the military to work together to stem the erosion of
the industrial base to everyone’s benefit. We need to increase our investment in R&D to produce the leading edge knowledge, capabilities and patents the country must have
to remain an economic and military superpower. This means we must increase funding to the national laboratories not only from Energy, Commerce and Defense but across
the board. We also need to rethink our trade, offset and CFIUS policies to encourage the maintenance of high value-added jobs inside the country and we need to reform those
national systems that are keeping our industry uncompetitive including pension and health care, particularly in the auto industry. The bankruptcy of Delphi is only the first of
many dominos to fall if we don’t do something dramatic about this situation. CFIUS must be completely rethought. Having General Motors under the control of foreigners is
not the answer. Many foreign entities buy U.S. assets not to use them, but to dismantle them. Even Daimler’s takeover of Chrysler removed serious capabilities to Germany,
The Department of Defense regularly implies that the U.S. industrial base is healthy.
DoD does not take into consideration all the systems that compose their piece of the industrial base, nor how
their systems interact with others such as autos. Cooperation between government and industry is essential because there are elements of the U.S.
though no one will go on the record with specifics.
industrial base that are disintegrating, and are putting the national security of the United States at risk. Unless we look at the industrial base as a system, we do not even see
the problem or the possible military implications. We also are not even asking whether or not a U.S. “owned” industrial base matters, and we must explore this issue as a
nation. The White House, Congress and the entire spectrum of the agencies and departments of the federal government need to understand these issues. At the moment they
do not. Unless something changes, the
U.S. may cease to be a superpower.
And, Flexible rapid reaction of US airpower is crucial to averting and de-escalating
WMD conflicts in the Persian Gulf, Koreas, South China Seas and between India and
Pakistan
Zalmay Khalizad and Ian Lesser, Senior Analysts at RAND. Sources of Conflict in the 21st Century, 1998,
http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR897/MR897.chap3.pdf
This subsection attempts to synthesize some of the key operational implications distilled from the analyses relating to the rise of Asia and the potential for conflict in each
of its constituent regions. The first key implication derived from the analysis of trends in Asia suggests that American
air and space power will
critical for conventional and unconventional deterrence in Asia. This argument is justified by the fact that several
subregions of the continent still harbor the potential for full-scale conventional war. This potential is most conspicuous on the
Korean peninsula and, to a lesser degree, in South Asia, the Persian Gulf, and the South China Sea. In some of
continue to remain
these areas, such as Korea and the Persian Gulf, the United States has clear treaty obligations and, therefore, has preplanned the use of air power should contingencies
arise. U.S. Air Force assets could also be called upon for operations in some of these other areas. In almost all these cases, U.S.
air power would be at
the forefront of an American politico-military response because (a) of the vast distances on the Asian continent;
(b) the diverse range of operational platforms available to the U.S. Air Force, a capability unmatched by any other country or service; (c) the possible
unavailability of naval assets in close proximity, particularly in the context of surprise contingencies; and (d) the heavy payload
that can be carried by U.S. Air Force platforms. These platforms can exploit speed, reach, and high operating tempos to sustain continual operations until
the political objectives are secured. The entire range of warfighting capability—fighters, bombers, electronic warfare (EW), suppression
of enemy air defense (SEAD), combat support platforms such as AWACS and J-STARS, and tankers—are relevant in the Asia-Pacific region, because many of
the regional contingencies will involve armed operations against large, fairly modern, conventional forces, most of which are built around large land armies, as is the case
in Korea, China-Taiwan, India-Pakistan, and the Persian Gulf. In addition to conventional combat, the demands of unconventional deterrence will increasingly confront
the U.S. Air Force in Asia. The Korean peninsula, China,
and the Indian subcontinent are already arenas of WMD
proliferation. While emergent nuclear capabilities continue to receive the most public attention, chemical and biological
warfare threats will progressively become future problems. The delivery systems in the region are increasing in range and diversity. China
already targets the continental United States with ballistic missiles. North Korea can threaten northeast Asia with existing Scud-class theater ballistic missiles. India will
acquire the capability to produce ICBM-class delivery vehicles, and both China and India will acquire long-range cruise missiles during the time frames examined in this
report. The second key implication derived from the analysis of trends in Asia suggests that air and space power
will function as a vital
rapid reaction force in a breaking crisis. Current guidance tasks the Air Force to prepare for two major regional conflicts that could break out in the
Persian Gulf and on the Korean peninsula. In other areas of Asia, however, such as the Indian subcontinent, the South China Sea, Southeast Asia, and Myanmar, the
United States has no treaty obligations requiring it to commit the use of its military forces. But as past experience has shown, American policymakers have regularly
displayed the disconcerting habit of discovering strategic interests in parts of the world previously neglected after conflicts have already broken out. Mindful of this
trend, it would behoove U.S. Air Force planners to prudently plan for regional contingencies in nontraditional areas of interest, because naval and air power will of
necessity be the primary instruments constituting the American response. Such responses would be necessitated by three general classes of
contingencies. The first involves the politico-military collapse of a key regional actor, as might occur in the case of North Korea, Myanmar, Indonesia, or Pakistan. The
second involves acute politicalmilitary crises that have a potential for rapid escalation, as may occur in the Taiwan Strait, the Spratlys, the Indian subcontinent, or on the
Korean peninsula. The third involves cases of prolonged domestic instability that may have either spillover or contagion effects, as in China, Indonesia, Myanmar, or
North Korea.
Naval Power Module
Key to the Navy
Ronis 06 Prepared Statement of Dr. Sheila Ronis, Director, MBA/MS Programs, Walsh College; Vice President, National Defense University Foundation, Troy,
Michigan CHINA’S IMPACT ON THE U.S. AUTO AND AUTO PARTS INDUSTRIES HEARING BEFORE THE U.S.-CHINA ECONOMIC AND SECURITY REVIEW
COMMISSION ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION _________ July 17, 2006
http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2006hearings/transcripts/july_17/06_07_17_trans.pdf
In May 2001, the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Office of Strategic Industries and Economic Security, in partnership with the Carderock Division of the Naval Surface
Warfare Center, completed a three-year national security assessment of the U.S. shipbuilding and repair industry. Some of the findings were disconcerting though related to
both DMSMS and the auto industry. According to the study, employment in the industry has “dropped sharply since the early 1980s, when total private employment was close
to 180,000 workers. Survey estimates indicated that employment would decline to about 83,500 in 2000.” In addition, “orders for U.S. warships have declined 60 percent
during the 10 years since the end of the Cold War.” Young
people no longer view working in a shipyard as a viable way to make a
living. Consequently, according to DOC, “survey responses indicate that labor shortages have reduced profits, impacted construction costs, and delayed project completion
for most shipyards.” According to the study, the basis for U.S. ship-building superiority has been the research and
development expertise that currently resides in Navy’s laboratories, acquisition commands, and certain
shipbuilders and universities. “Collectively, these organizations have conceived and designed most of the
state-of-the-108 art hull, mechanical, electrical, power projection, air defense and undersea warfare capabilities
that are operational today. With reduced research and development budgets, some of that capability now is becoming fragmented.” Many lower tier
companies supply to both the auto industry and shipbuilding, but the auto industry is much larger. This
situation in shipbuilding also exists in other industries, such as machine tools, the high performance explosives and explosive
components industry, cartridge and propellant actuated device sector and welding and all of these industries share the bottom of the
base with the auto industry.
Solves great power wars
Conway et al 7 [James T., General, U.S. Marine Corps, Gary Roughead, Admiral, U.S. Navy, Thad W. Allen, Admiral, U.S. Coast Guard, “A Cooperative Strategy for
21st Century Seapower,” October, http://www.navy.mil/maritime/MaritimeStrategy.pdf]
Deter major power war.
No other disruption is as potentially disastrous to global stability as war among major powers .
Maintenance and extension of this Nation’s comparative seapower advantage is a key component of deterring
major power war. While war with another great power strikes many as improbable, the near-certainty of its ruinous effects demands
that it be actively deterred using all elements of national power. The expeditionary character of maritime
forces—our lethality, global reach, speed, endurance, ability to overcome barriers to access, and operational
agility—provide the joint commander with a range of deterrent options. We will pursue an approach to deterrence that includes a
credible and scalable ability to retaliate against aggressors conventionally, unconventionally, and with nuclear forces. Win our Nation’s wars. In times
of war, our ability to impose local sea control, overcome challenges to access, force entry, and project and
sustain power ashore, makes our maritime forces an indispensable element of the joint or combined force.
This expeditionary advantage must be maintained because it provides joint and combined force commanders with freedom of maneuver. Reinforced by a robust
sealift capability that can concentrate and sustain forces, sea control and power projection enable extended
campaigns ashore.
Econ Module
And, Auto Recovery is essential to U.S. Economic recovery – the auto industry will
drive other sectors and ensure job growth
U.S. News 2k12 (“Is the U.S. Auto Industry on Track for a Comeback?,” pg online @ http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2012/01/09/is-the-us-auto-industryon-track-for-a-comeback //um-ef)
More than three years after bad management, a swooning global economy, and foreign competition gutted the
U.S. auto industry, car makers are revving up for a comeback at what's likely to be one of the snazziest auto industry shows in
years. The North American International Auto Show opened in Detroit this weekend for a nine-day run, and many eyes are on the annual pow-wow for clues about what's in
store for 2012. The initial signs look good. The past two months
have seen decent sales numbers, a trend that's likely to continue as
the jobs outlook strengthens and Americans feel more financially secure, experts say. December was a good month for Nissan and especially the "Big Three"—
Chevrolet, Chrysler and GM—all of which posted sales increases for the month and year. [Read: New Economic Data Points to Hope in 2012.] "The economy is such that
people are feeling a little more comfortable about their job outlook and where they're going," says Bruce Belzowski, research scientist at University of Michigan's
Transportation Research Institute. Economists forecast U.S. auto sales will jump to about 13.5 million in 2012,
up from 12.8 million last year. While 13 or 14 million units sold certainly isn't bad, Belzowski says it's not the 15 or 16 million units auto makers used to enjoy several years ago.
Still, the auto industry's recovery is playing a significant role in bolstering the broader
economic recovery in the U nited S tates, primarily because automotive manufacturing touches so
many other areas of the economy , from manufacturing gas caps to keeping the diner next to the plant
open, says Aaron Bragman, senior analyst at IHS Global Insight. The resurgence in demand also bodes well for the job
market. Auto makers have already re-hired nearly everyone they laid off during the recession, Bragman says, and if
demand remains elevated, companies are likely to hire more to keep up with production needs. [See today's best
photos.] Demand is likely to stay elevated, too. The average age of vehicles in the United States is the oldest it's ever been at more than 10 years old. While buying a new car
might be a fun upgrade for some, for others it's becoming a necessity. "In some cases people are looking at [their cars] and saying, 'It's just time, I need to turn the car in,' as
opposed to previous cycles where it was largely desire-based and not necessarily need-based," Bragman says. Auto makers are also releasing some new smaller-scale products,
which wasn't entirely unexpected. Americans have been downsizing from mega-sized monster trucks for awhile, and car makers are responding by broadening their selection
of mid-sized cars and even sprucing up smaller cars with luxury items that used to be only available on larger models. "Everyone has kind of stepped down a notch," Bragman
says. Partly due to the earthquake and tsunami that ravaged Japan last year, it's
difficult to say whether U.S. brands can hold onto
the market share they captured over the past year. Furthermore, the landscape of the auto industry has changed dramatically over the
past couple of years as carmakers have restructured and cut their losses on underperforming brands. [Read: Unemployment Falls to 8.5 Percent.] "GM canceled four of its
The big question remains
whether Japanese brands can make up the market share they lost due to last year's natural disasters and the
increased competitiveness of U.S. brands. "Everyone is just so much more competitive than they used to be," Bragman says, especially when
eight brands and part of Chevrolet's growth is coming from the fact that the Saturn brand is no longer here," Bragman says.
it comes to U.S. brands, which have completely revamped their business models in some cases. "They've got fully competitive product, they've got fully competitive
profitability, and now they've got people actually interested in what they're selling. That's going to be hard for the Japanese."
Auto industry is key to the economy- consumer goods and multiplier effect
Hill et al 10-
Sustainable Transportation and Communities Group and Project Lead, Project Manager of the center for automotive research, Research Associate at
the center for automotive research, (Kim, Debbie Menk, Adam Cooper, “Contribution of the Automotive Industry to the Economics of All Fifty States and the Unites States”,
http://www.oesa.org/Doc-Vault/Industry-Information-Analysis/CAR-Economic-Significance-Report.pdf0.
The auto industry is one of the most important industries in the United States. It historically has contributed 3 – 3.5
percent to the overall Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The industry directly employs over 1.7 million people
engaged in designing, engineering, manufacturing, and supplying parts and components to assemble, sell and
service new motor vehicles. In addition, the industry is a huge consumer of goods and services from many other
sectors, including raw materials, construction, machinery, legal, computers and semi-conductors, financial,
advertising, and healthcare. The auto industry spends $16 to $18 billion every year on research and product development – 99 percent of which is
funded by the industry itself. Due to the industry’s consumption of products from many other manufacturing sectors, it is a major driver of the
11.5% manufacturing contribution to GDP. Without the auto sector, it is difficult to imagine manufacturing
surviving in this country.
Auto manufacturing key to econ- vital to job growth
Hill et al 10- Sustainable Transportation and Communities Group and Project Lead,
Project Manager of the center for automotive research, Research Associate at
the center for automotive research, (Kim, Debbie Menk, Adam Cooper, “Contribution of the Automotive Industry to the Economics of All Fifty States and the Unites States”,
http://www.oesa.org/Doc-Vault/Industry-Information-Analysis/CAR-Economic-Significance-Report.pdf0.
The economic performance of the automotive sector, and the broader manufacturing sector, is extremely important for the
continued development and growth of the national and regional economies, as it comprises a large share of total U.S. output (see
Figures 1.2 and 1.3). At the end of 2008, U.S. automotive output was 2.2% of GDP, and overall manufacturing contributed
11.5% to GDP. The sizeable contribution to economic output by the manufacturing industry is attributable to
several factors, including international trade opportunities that allow for the export of highly specialized
manufactured products. Many of these products are high value-added goods that are made through the use of skilled laborers and advanced equipment. The
complexity of making these products contributes to the large job-creating multiplier effect of manufacturing
within the U.S.
Automotive industry is vital to the econ and manufacturing.
Hill et al 10- Sustainable Transportation and Communities Group and Project Lead, Project Manager of the center for automotive research, Research Associate at
the center for automotive research, (Kim, Debbie Menk, Adam Cooper, “Contribution of the Automotive Industry to the Economics of All Fifty States and the Unites States”,
http://www.oesa.org/Doc-Vault/Industry-Information-Analysis/CAR-Economic-Significance-Report.pdf0.
The automotive industry is a very important industry in the U.S. economy; no other single industry links as closely to the U.S.
manufacturing sector or directly generates as much retail business and overall employment. Manufacturing has been the backbone of the
American economy, and the automotive industry is its heart. A look at the entire production and supply chain provides a rich narrative of
how a strong automotive industry historically supports the growth and stability of many other industries, such as
basic materials suppliers of steel, plastic, rubber and glass, which are used for making bodies, interiors and
trim, tires, gaskets and windows. Figure 1.4 provides a comparison of the value added per employee (measured in thousands of dollars per year) across
several manufacturing industries. The value added per employee can be thought of as the difference between the cost of materials and the sale price of the good. Effective
deployment of land, labor, and capital create value; in
2006, each employee in the motor vehicle assembly industry created
$321,000 of value in the final products shipped; fourth highest amongst manufacturing industries. An economy
is reinforced by the size and job creating capability of its manufacturing base. Within the broad manufacturing landscape of the
U.S., few industries are as large or provide so many indirect and ancillary opportunities for job creation as the
motor vehicle industry. Figure 1.5 highlights the sheer size of the motor vehicle assembly and parts manufacturing industry which is the second largest employer
within the subset of manufacturing. Some industries inherently create more jobs than other industries. A high jobs creation multiplier tends to be
associated with industries that require large amounts of inputs from other industries, source inputs from
industries that have a high regional purchase coefficient, or pay above average wages.
Auto sector key to mobility and trade.
Hill et al 10- Sustainable Transportation and Communities Group and Project Lead,
Project Manager of the center for automotive research, Research Associate at
the center for automotive research, (Kim, Debbie Menk, Adam Cooper, “Contribution of the Automotive Industry to the Economics of All Fifty States and the Unites States”,
http://www.oesa.org/Doc-Vault/Industry-Information-Analysis/CAR-Economic-Significance-Report.pdf0.
While not included in the economic modeling of the impact analysis, the
manufacture of medium and heavy duty trucks and parts is a
key component of the motor vehicle industry, and here we provide an overview of the activity of this sub-sector of the industry. Medium duty trucks
include Classes 3 to 6 (10,000 to 26,000 lbs.) and heavy duty trucks include Classes 6 to 8 (26,001 to over 33,000 lbs). Currently there are over 10.6
million medium and heavy trucks registered in the United States. 2 Together, the medium duty and heavy duty
truck markets in the United States sell 433,263 units annually 3 and have a value of $125.5 billion. 4 Of the total
U.S. sales, over 420,000 are domestically produced vehicles and nearly 13,000 are imported vehicles. The
United States is the largest medium and heavy duty truck market in the world, accounting for 43.5% of the world market, followed
by the Asia-Pacific region with 30.8% of the market and Europe with 17.4% of the market. 5 Figure 1.9 illustrates the distribution of the global medium and heavy truck
market. The medium and heavy duty vehicles comprise slightly less than 6.5% of all motor vehicle sales, with medium duty trucks accounting for over 250,000 sales and heavy
duty trucks accounting for over 180,000 sales annually. primarily of class 3 vehicles (over 53% of units sold) while the heavy duty vehicle market consists primarily of on-road
interstate trucks in the Class 8 category (over 73% of units sold). 7 Table 1.1 contains sales data pertaining to the United States truck market. The annual production and sales
of this class of vehicle are highly cyclical. The
heavy duty vehicle sector, similar to that of light duty vehicles, is affected by the
economic forces of the general economy, but its cycles are also affected by governmental regulation. Most recently, Class 8 sales have been on a
downward trend since 2006, when their sales peaked at over 280,000 units. The peak was led by a need to replace the fleet of Class 8 rigs as they aged and by operators who
wanted to purchase vehicles before new EPA pollution regulations on diesel engines took effect in that year. Since 2006, annual sales fell to just over 150,000 in 2007 and
continued to decrease to around 133,000 units in 2008, similar to sales numbers from 2001 to 2003. 9 U.S.
production of heavy duty trucks ranges
from 200,000 to 300,000 units annually with assembly facilities employing just over 26,000 in 2009, dropping
from approximately 28,700 individuals in 2008, and 36,800 individuals in 2006. 10 In addition to manufacturing heavy duty trucks, over
20,000 individuals were employed manufacturing trailers in 2009 (down from 30,300 in 2008 and 39,700 in 2006). number of
individuals who work as suppliers to the heavy duty truck OEMs. These suppliers, in many cases, supply both heavy duty and light duty motor vehicle manufacturers. These
vehicles are instrumental in keeping America’s economy going by transporting goods and products in a timely
and cost-effective manner. As of 2007, over 68% of America’s freight—by gross tonnage — is hauled by truck.
When considering the value of shipments, this figure climbs to around 70%. 12 Between 1965 and the present, use of heavy duty trucks on
the highway has increased by a factor of nearly five ─ from almost 32 billion vehicle miles traveled (VMT) in 1965 to over 145 billion VMT in
2007. 13 Meanwhile, medium duty trucks have increased their use by a factor of nearly four ─ from just over 27
billion VMT in 1970 to almost 82 billion VMT in 2007. Figure 1.10 displays the increases in total VMT for these two vehicle classes.4
The Auto industry increases job growth in every state- even those without manufacturing plants
Hill et al 10- Sustainable Transportation and Communities Group and Project Lead, Project Manager of the center for automotive research, Research Associate at
the center for automotive research, (Kim, Debbie Menk, Adam Cooper, “Contribution of the Automotive Industry to the Economics of All Fifty States and the Unites States”,
http://www.oesa.org/Doc-Vault/Industry-Information-Analysis/CAR-Economic-Significance-Report.pdf0.
The motor vehicle industry’s breadth and depth of operations extends into every state economy in the nation. The industry
impacts an unusually large number of individual communities because the supplier network is spread across many states. Beyond that, motor vehicle
dealerships have a presence in nearly every community in the country. The tables in this section examine the estimated employment
and income contributions of the industry to individual state economies. Even for those states with relatively few direct jobs in the
industry, the number of jobs supported by the industry is significant. In many states, large numbers of jobs are
generated due to the state’s proximity to manufacturing or technical facilities located in a neighboring state. All
states see major additional impact from substantial numbers of spin-off jobs resulting from the spending of direct and indirect
employees of the industry. The automotive industry is a mature industry, with assembly and parts manufacturing plants well established throughout
most of the states east of the Mississippi, as seen in Figure 2.1, which shows the top states for OEM employment, as a percentage of state population. Many states in
the Midwest are well known for supporting a strong base of manufacturing. The entire Midwest is connected by
a strong and efficient network of road and rail systems. This transportation integration provides intra-state and
inter-state options for sourcing intermediate goods and supplies to manufacturing operations. It is this broad, efficient
network of suppliers (located across many states) which leads to the dispersion of total employment contributions from
manufacturing operations to all areas of the nation. Figure 2.2 below shows the impact of employment in the industry for motor vehicle
assemblers, parts, systems and components manufacturers, motor vehicle dealerships, and the suppliers to these operations. This map does not include expenditure-induced
employment. It is a portrayal of the direct impacts of employment and suppliers to the industry. As can be seen, the industry provides significant numbers of jobs to every state
in the nation. Each
individual state’s economic impact is one effect of the total contribution of the industry to the
nation. That is, jobs in one state are not only attributable to investment in that state, but are supported by the
auto industry’s investments and activities in nearby states as well. Therefore, an employment multiplier is not calculated for any
individual state. Employment multipliers apply to the national economy and are not applicable to, nor can be derived from,
any one state’s economy
Heg Module
The auto industry is vital to hegemony and conquering 21st century rivals
Clark, ‘8 - retired Army general and former supreme allied commander of NATO, is a senior fellow at the Burkle Center for International Relations at the University of
California at Los Angeles. (Wesley K., “What’s Good for G.M. Is Good for the Army”, New York Times, November 16, 2008,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/16/opinion/16clark.html?_r=3) //CH
AMERICA’S automobile industry is in desperate trouble. Financial instability, the credit squeeze and closed capital markets are hurting domestic automakers, while decades of
competition from foreign producers have eroded market share and consumer loyalty. Some economists question the wisdom of Washington’s intervening to help the Big
Three, arguing that the automakers should pay the price for their own mistakes or that the market will correct itself. But we must act: aiding
the American
automobile industry is not only an economic imperative, but also a national security imperative. When President Dwight
Eisenhower observed that America’s greatest strength wasn’t its military, but its economy, he must
have had companies like General Motors and Ford in mind. Sitting atop a vast pyramid of tool makers, steel producers, fabricators and
component manufacturers, these companies not only produced the tanks and trucks that helped win World
War II, but also lent their technology to aircraft and ship manufacturing. The United States
truly became the arsenal of democracy. During the 1950s, advances in aviation, missiles, satellites and electronics made Detroit
seem a little old-fashioned in dealing with the threat of the Soviet Union. The Army’s requests for new trucks and other basic
transportation usually came out a loser in budget battles against missile tech nology and new
modifications for the latest supersonic jet fighter. Not only were airplanes far sexier but they also counted as part of our military
“tooth,” while much of the land forces’ needs were “tail.” And in those days, “more teeth, less tail” had become a key concept in military spending. But in 1991, the
Persian Gulf War demonstrated the awesome utility of American land power, and the Humvee
(and its civilian version, the Hummer) became a star. Likewise, the ubiquitous homemade bombs of the current Iraq
insurgency have led to the development of innovative armor-protected wheeled vehicles for American forces,
as well as improvements in our fleets of Humvees, tanks, armored fighting vehicles, trucks and
cargo carriers. In a little more than a year, the Army has procured and fielded in Iraq more than a thousand so-called mine-resistant ambush-protected vehicles.
The lives of hundreds of soldiers and marines have been saved, and their tasks made more
achievable, by the efforts of the American automotive industry. And unlike in World War II, America
didn’t have to divert much civilian capacity to meet these military needs. Without a vigorous
automotive sector, those needs could not have been quickly met. More challenges lie ahead for
our military, and to meet them we need a strong industrial base . For years the military has
sought better sources of electric power in its vehicles — necessary to allow troops to monitor their
radios with diesel engines off, to support increasingly high-powered communications technology, and eventually
to support electric propulsion and innovative armaments like directed-energy weapons. In sum, this
greater use of electricity will increase combat power while reducing our footprint. Much research and
development spending has gone into these programs over the years, but nothing on the manufacturing scale we really need. Now, though, as Detroit moves to plug-in hybrids
and electric-drive technology, the scale problem can be remedied. Automakers
are developing innovative electric motors, many with
permanent magnet technology, that will have immediate military use. And only the auto
industry, with its vast purchasing power, is able to establish a domestic advanced battery industry. Likewise,
domestic fuel cell production — which will undoubtedly have many critical military applications — depends on a vibrant car
industry. To be sure, the public should demand transformation and new standards in the auto industry before paying to keep it alive. And we should insist that Detroit’s
goals include putting America in first place in hybrid and electric automotive technology, reducing the emissions of the country’s transportation fleet, and strengthening our
competitiveness abroad. This should be no giveaway. Instead, it is a historic opportunity to get it right in Detroit for the good of the country. But Americans
must
bear in mind that any federal assistance plan would not be just an economic measure. This is, fundamentally, about national
security.
Semiconductors Module
The auto sector is vital to semiconductor tech growth
Hill et al 10-
Sustainable Transportation and Communities Group and Project Lead, Project Manager of the center for automotive research, Research Associate at
the center for automotive research, (Kim, Debbie Menk, Adam Cooper, “Contribution of the Automotive Industry to the Economics of All Fifty States and the Unites States”,
http://www.oesa.org/Doc-Vault/Industry-Information-Analysis/CAR-Economic-Significance-Report.pdf0.
The auto industry is one of the most important industries in the United States. It historically has contributed 3 – 3.5
percent to the overall Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The industry directly employs over 1.7 million people
engaged in designing, engineering, manufacturing, and supplying parts and components to assemble, sell and
service new motor vehicles. In addition, the industry is a huge consumer of goods and services from many
other sectors, including raw materials, construction, machinery, legal, computers and semi-conductors , financial, advertising, and healthcare.
The auto industry spends $16 to $18 billion every year on research and product development – 99 percent of
which is funded by the industry itself. Due to the industry’s consumption of products from many other manufacturing sectors, it is a major
driver of the 11.5% manufacturing contribution to GDP. Without the auto sector, it is difficult to imagine
manufacturing surviving in this country.
Semiconductors are vital to addressing climate change
Bauer 9 – CEO of Infineon, a leading semiconductor company (Peter, “A change of pace for the semiconductor industry?”, PricewaterhouseCoopers, November 2009,
http://www.pwc.com/en_GX/gx/technology/pdf/change-of-pace-in-the-semiconductor-industry.pdf)//CH
The increasing
global demand for energy, the limited availability of natural resources, rising energy
prices and the threat of climate change require solutions for enabling energy to be handled more
efficiently. In order to meet the requirements of climate policy, for instance for reducing CO2 emissions, it is
necessary to increase efficiency throughout the entire chain of utilisable energy ñ that is, for the production, transmission and consumption of
energy. Innovations from the semiconductor industry are playing a key role with regard to
implementing these objectives. The requirement for more energy efficiency will have a positive impact particularly on demand for power
semiconductors in the course of the next few years. This is applicable specifically to renewable energies, as well as for example to
motor drives in industrial applications and in household products. With regard to power semiconductors for renewable
1
energies, market researchers are assuming average annual growth rates of 18% in the course of the next years. Solar and wind power will
continue to be two of the main growth drivers. Power semiconductors are the core of rectifiers in
photovoltaic and wind power installations, and are a key component for efficiently supplying
power to the network.
Mexican Economy Scenario
2AC
NAFTA is key to the Mexican Economy—assumes all of their alt cause claims
Irwin ‘9 – professor of economics at Dartmouth College and the author of Against the Tide: An Intellectual
History of Free Trade (Douglas A, “Free Trade under Fire,” 2009, Princeton University Press)//ER
Unfortunately, not all countries that have liberalized their trade policies have enjoyed such dramatic successes.
For example, Mexico significantly reduced tariffs and other trade barriers when it joined the GATT in 1985 and
signed free trade agreements with the United States and Canada (NAFTA) in 1994 and the European Union in
2000. As a result, Mexico’s trade and foreign investment increased significantly. The share of trade (average of
exports and imports) in GDP rose from 13 percent in 1985 to 52 percent in 2002. These reforms improved
productivity in industries exposed to international competition, as described in chapter 2.¶ However, Mexico’s
overall macroeconomic performance has been disappointing since NAFTA. Economic growth has been
lackluster.¶ Employment is only slightly higher than before the agreement took effect, and real wages are
actually lower. NAFTA opponents blame open¶ trade for Mexico’s problems. These critics say that NAFTA has
harmed¶ farmers and is responsible for the lack of improvement in the standard of¶ living of workers.¶ The
real source of Mexico’s malaise is macroeconomic, In December 1994, about a year alter NAFTA went into
effect, and for reasons¶ not related to the trade agreement, Mexico faced a speculative attack on¶ the peso and
was forced to devalue its currency. The peso crisis stemmed¶ from an inconsistency between Mexico’s
monetary policy and its commitment to maintain at a fixed exchange rate. The peso devaluation was a¶ severe
setback that slashed real wages overnight and sent the economy¶ into a deep recession.¶ By keeping trade flows
moving, NAFTA helped the Mexican¶ economy through a difficult period. The continued expansion of trade¶
promoted the country’s recovery from this traumatic shock. Yet since the¶ initial rebound, the Mexican
economy has been weak. The reason for¶ this disappointing performance is not trade related, but a persistent
and¶ severe credit crunch, including a deterioration in contract enforceability¶ and an increase in
nonperforming bank loans. Indeed, Mexico’s credit-to-GDP ratio fell from 49 percent in 1994 to 17 percent in
2002, preventing any broad-based economic recovery?"
Mexican growth is key to the US economy.
Marczak 4/18 - director of policy at Americas Society and Council of the Americas, senior editor of the AS/COA policy journal, Americas Quarterly,
and managing editor of AQ Online (Jason, “Immigration Reform get U.S. in on Mexico’s Boom”, 4/18/13; <
http://www.cnn.com/2013/04/18/opinion/marczak-immigration-the-new-mexico>)//Beddow
As Congress crafts comprehensive immigration legislation, Democrats and Republicans must keep in mind that Mexico is changing rapidly,
and policies crafted to reflect yesterday's Mexico will not help the U.S. make the most of the potential of today's and tomorrow's Mexico. Mexico's
future is bright, and tapping into this growth and economic prosperity is vital to U.S.
competitiveness. But the U.S. needs immigration reform to build on its huge bilateral trade with Mexico -- more than $1 billion in goods and
services each day, or $45 million an hour. Mexico's President Enrique Peña Nieto has achieved in less than five months in office what eluded previous
administrations for six years. In the second half of 2013, he hopes to add energy to the improvements in education and telecommunications that are
sailing through under the umbrella of the Pact for Mexico political agreement.
Economic decline breaks down cooperation and leads to war – heg decline, falling
trade, rising protectionism, and diversionary tactics.
Royal 10 – Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction Policy, US-Department of Defense, policy advisor
(Jedidiah, “Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal, and Political Perspectives”, pg. 212-214;
Print.)//Beddow
The counterargument to contagion is the ‘risk-sharing’ argument. It suggests that while trade and financial linkages may spread a
crisis, this creates a cushioning effect that, overall, minimizes the effects on any individual state. In other
words, interdependence creates shock-absorbing linkages that soften a state’s vulnerability to dramatic
economic downturns (see, e.g., Kelemli-Ozcan, Sorensen, & Yosha, 2003). Gallegati, Greenwald, Richiardi, and Stiglitz (2008) have made a
convincing observation that would appear to clarify this debate. They have provided statistical modeling indicating that risk-sharing
and contagion are in fact two sides of the same coin. When economic times are good, inter-linkages provide
mechanisms for the diffusion of individual agents that face a liquidity crisis. A leader can request a creditor defer payment,
whereas a creditor can then transfer this cost on to other agents. As such the system would absorb the crisis. When liquidity is relatively
more scarce during down times, a sufficiently large negative shock will use those very same inter-linkages to
transmit that shock to other agents in the system. As a result, ‘risk sharing is beneficial only when the overall
economic environment is favourable, while in harsh times it might be better to stay alone… [linkage during
market downturns] becomes socially detrimental; not only is it that the expected number of defaults is higher when the economic
agents are connected, but defaults become a systemic failure’ (Gallegati et al., 2008. Pp.5. 16). Kose, Prasad, and Terrones (2009) considered the same
question and found only mild support for risk-sharing and only among developed, industrial economies. They found no evidence that developing, nonindustrial countries are able to share risk. The authors break relatively new ground in suggesting why this is the case for non-industrial states: One
possibility is that these countries rely more on less stable capital such as bank loans and other forms of debt that may not allow for efficient risk sharing.
Indeed, we break up stocks of external assets and liabilities into different categories – FDI, portfolio equity, portfolio debt, etc. – we find that the
underlying composition of capital flows influences the ability of developing countries to share risk. In particular, external debt appears to hinder the
ability of emerging market economies to share their consumption risk. (Kose, Prasad, & Terrones, 2009. P. 259) One reason why interdependent states
may not be well-suited to share risk is due to the fact that interdependence leads to economic specialization and reliance on external financing. Gande,
John, and Senbet (2008) and Corsetii et al. (1999) provide conceptual and analytical links between specialization, moral hazard, and contagion. Thus,
the answer to the first question set out at the beginning of this section, whether economic integration and economic crises are linked, seems reasonably
well-established. Substantial recent scholarship indicates a positive association between economic interdependence and economic crises. What then
about the second question? Is there a positive correlation between economic crises and armed conflict? The impacts at an individual level and on a state
level are intuitive and well-documented (See, e.g., Richards & Gelleny, 2006). Rodrik (1997a, 197b), among others, argues that the instability in
the global economic system contributes to social disintegration and political conflict.’ Social unrest, regime
changes, and even civil war have directly resulted from the vagaries of economic integration. Less intuitive is how
periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of external conflict. Political science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to
the impact of economic decline and the security and defence behavior of interdependent states. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic,
dyadic and national levels. Several notable contributions follow. First, on the systemic level, Pollins (2008) advances Modelski
and Thompson’s (1996) work on leadership cycle theory, finding that rhythms in the global economy are
associated with the rise and fall of a pre-eminent power and the often bloody transition from
one pre-eminent leader to the next. As such, exogenous shocks such as economic crises could user in a
redistribution of relative power (see also Gilpin, 1981) that leads to uncertainty about power balances,
increasing the risk of miscalculation (Fearon, 1995). Alternatively, even a relatively certain redistribution of
power could lead to a permissive environment for conflict as a rising power may seek to challenge a declining
power (Werner, 1999). Separately, Pollins (1996) shows that global economic cycles combined with
parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium, and small
powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remain unknown.
Second, on a dyadic level, Copeland’s (1996, 2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that ‘future expectation of
trade’ is a significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behavior of states. He argues
that interdependent states are likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view
of future trade relations. However, if the expectations of future trade decline, particularly for
difficult to replace items such as energy resources, the likelihood for conflict increases, as
states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources. Crises could potentially be the
trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by
interdependent states. Third, others have considered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level.
Blomberg and Hess (2002) find a strong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict, particularly
during periods of economic downturn. They write, The linkages between internal and external conflict and
prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict tends to spawn internal conflict, which in
turn returns the favour. Moreover, the presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which
international and external conflicts self-reinforce each other. (Blomberg & Hess., 2002, p. 89). Economic decline has
also been linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism (Blomberg, Hess & Weerapana,
2004), which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions. Furthermore, crises
generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government. ‘Diversionary theory’ suggests that, when facing
unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting governments have increased incentives to
fabricate external military conflicts to create a ‘rally around the flag’ effect. Wang (1996), DeRouen (1995),
and Blomberg, Hess, and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force are at
least indirectly correlated. Gelpi (1997), Miller (1999), and Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest that the tendency towards
diversionary tactics are greater for democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic
leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support. DeRouen
(2000) has provided evidence showing that periods of weak economic performance in the United States, and thus weak
Presidential popularity, are statistically linked to an increase in the use of force. In summary, recent economic scholarship
positively correlates economic integration with an increase in the frequency of economic crises, whereas political science scholarship links economic
decline with external conflict at systemic, dyadic and national levels. This implied connection between integration, crises, and armed conflict has not
featured prominently in the economic-security debate and deserves more attention.
Corruption I/L
Free trade solves corruption
Reyes-Heroles ‘4 – president of Structura, a Mexican consulting firm, cofounder and executive president of
the Grupo de Economistas y Asociados, was ambassador of Mexico to the United States from October 1997 to
November 2000, was secretary of energy in President Ernesto Zedillo’s Cabinet (Jesus F, “North American
Integration: A Spontaneous or a Driven Enterprise?” from chapter 15 of “NAFTA’s Impact on North America:
The First Decade,” edited by Sidney Weintraub, published 2004, CSIS)//ER
To an extent, global trade stimulates accountability and therefore can¶ contribute to the reduction
of one of the most damaging problems for¶ economic growth and public morale: corruption.
The interconnection¶ of markets and enhanced transparency, which comes with trade liberal-¶
ization, can become critical elements for reducing discretionary powers¶ and economic rent
seeking, both of which are well-known sources of¶ corruption.¶ Free trade has also contributed
directly to a lessening of corruption.¶ As multiple firms from various nations compete to get access to
domes-¶ tic markets, both for investment opportunities and trade deals, free¶ trade contributes to make
the procedures of international transactions¶ more transparent and homogeneous. The room
for bribery and cor-¶ ruption can diminish to a certain extent when traders do not have t0¶
obtain import licenses or to negotiate the terms of FDI with govern-¶ ment officials.
Corruption kills the Mexican Economy
Zabludovsky, 2013-24 Horas Anchor---[Karla Zabludovsky, “Starting to Come to Light”, New York Times, 6-23-13,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/24/world/americas/official-corruption-in-mexico-once-rarely-exposed-is-starting-to-come-tolight.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0]
¶ MEXICO CITY — Andrés Granier has a sumptuous wardrobe and lifestyle. He has bragged about owning 400 pairs of shoes, 300 suits and 1,000 shirts,
collected from luxury stores in New York and Los Angeles. His purchases barely fit in his several properties, scattered throughout Mexico and abroad.¶
Enlarge This Image¶ ¶ Bernardo Montoya/Reuters¶ Tapes of Andrés Granier, center, the former governor of Tabasco State, boasting of his lifestyle were
leaked to a radio station.¶ ¶ America Rocio/Associated Press¶ Cash that was found on a property linked to José Manuel Saiz, Mr. Granier’s treasurer. Mr.
Saiz was arrested this month.¶ A tape recording of Mr. Granier’s boasts, making him sound like a highflying corporate executive, was leaked to a local
radio station last month. But his job title, until December, was governor of a midsize southeastern Mexican state, a position that currently pays about
$92,000 a year after taxes.¶ ¶ “We go to Fifth Avenue and buy a pair of shoes; $600,” Mr. Granier is heard saying about one of his trips abroad. “I took
clothes to Miami, I took clothes to Cancún, I took clothes to my house, and I have leftovers,” he added, saying, “I’m going to auction them off.” (The day
after the recording was made public, he said that he had been inebriated while making those statements in October.)¶ ¶ But just as eye-opening as the
extravagances of a public official — now under investigation after Mr. Granier’s successor discovered that about $190
million in state funds was unaccounted for, the state government said this month — is that they came to light at all in a country
where state and local corruption, a serious drag on Mexico’s development, run deep and are rarely
exposed.¶ ¶ The case of Mr. Granier, who was taken into custody on June 14 at a Mexico City hospital where he is being treated for a heart ailment, is just
the latest among several former governors and public officials who have recently found themselves under investigation or facing public scorn.¶ ¶
Watchdog groups are gaining strength, opposition parties are challenging and exposing the faults of the status quo, and social and traditional news
media organizations are increasingly seeking to hold officials accountable.¶ ¶ “There will be more of these because the issue has taken off,” said Ricardo
Corona, a public finance expert at the Mexican Institute for Competitiveness, a research group in Mexico City. “There is encouragement on the issues of
transparency, accountability, access to information.”¶ ¶ Mr. Granier’s case is one of the more closely followed political spectacles here in recent years.¶ ¶
By January, when the new government in his state, Tabasco, found holes in the budget, Mr. Granier, 65, had retreated into obscurity. This month, after
public shock and outrage over the recording reached a fever pitch, he suddenly resurfaced on television, saying he was in Miami.¶ ¶ “I’m going back to
Mexico,” he declared in an interview on one of Mexico’s most-watched morning shows, Primero Noticias. “I don’t owe absolutely anything.”¶ ¶ Upon his
arrival at the airport in the capital the following day, a chaotic news media swarm engulfed Mr. Granier — at one point he stumbled before the cameras —
before he was whisked away in a white S.U.V., with camera crews on motorcycles giving chase.¶ ¶ Three days later, the Tabasco state attorney’s office
issued an arraignment order for Mr. Granier on suspicion of embezzlement and improper exercise of public service. ¶ ¶ His treasurer, José Manuel Saiz,
already had been arrested this month on suspicion of embezzlement as he tried to cross the border into the United
States, after boxes containing nearly $7 million in unexplained cash were discovered on a property linked to him. ¶ ¶ A decade ago, such suspicious
accounting would have most likely been kept under wraps, as Mexican officials tended to protect one another and the public took their malfeasance for
granted. During the uninterrupted 71-year rule of the Institutional Revolutionary Party, or PRI, governors, who often secured their appointments based
on friendly ties with the autocratic presidents, were almost expected to pillage state treasuries.¶ ¶ When the party lost the 2000 presidential election, it
left a political vacuum across the states. Governors around the country acquired unprecedented autonomy and almost no oversight, said Alfonso Zárate,
the president of Grupo Consultor Interdisciplinario, a political consulting firm in Mexico.¶ ¶ State debt rose to $30 billion in 2012
from about $15 billion in 2008, according to the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit. Accounting for inflation, that was a
70.4 percent increase, according to an article in the online publication Animal Político by Marco Cancino, a political analyst in Mexico City.
Governments have reported scant details of how they have spent the money from these loans.¶ ¶ But with governors from opposing political parties
succeeding one another and doing away with the unspoken pact of the PRI years, in which incoming leaders protected departing ones, a system of checks
and balances — some have called it political retribution — is emerging.¶ ¶ Freedom of information laws, recent legislative overhauls demanding more
accountability from state governments and an increasingly technologically engaged society have been more successful at preventing murky finances from
going unquestioned.¶ ¶ As a result, tales of disgraced former governors are becoming a staple of the news here, and are part of what Mr. Zárate calls an
“incipient democracy.”¶ ¶ In 2011, the federal attorney general’s office opened an investigation into a $3 billion debt in the state of Coahuila, acquired
mostly during the administration of Humberto Moreira, a former president of the PRI, which recovered the presidency in December. The former
governor of the state of Aguascalientes, Luis Armando Reynoso, is being investigated over improper exercise of
public service, news organizations have reported.¶ ¶ Last year, Mario Ernesto Villanueva Madrid, the former governor of the
state of Quintana Roo who was extradited to the United States in 2010, pleaded guilty to conspiring to launder
millions of dollars in bribes he received from the powerful Juárez drug organization, to ensure that its
cocaine moved safely through his state, undisturbed by law enforcement.¶ ¶ Inroads in transparency, however, have yet to change the culture and
mentality of “El que no tranza, no avanza,” or “He who does not cheat, does not get ahead,” a popular motto here. And these victories have yet to
transform the country’s image abroad: Mexico fell in Transparency International’s corruption perception index to 105th place in 2012 from 57th in 2002,
with a lower ranking indicating that the country is seen as more corrupt.¶ ¶ “We still don’t have accountability,” said Mr. Cancino, the political analyst,
who warned that progress in transparency practices at the federal level would slowly make their way down to the local and state levels. “There are still 32
battles that we have to wage,” he said, referring to Mexico’s 31 states and one federal district.¶ ¶ Small gains in transparency, seen through scandals like
the one enveloping Mr. Granier, have not translated into justice served, experts say. Governors are investigated but rarely charged.¶ ¶ “We know what is
going on,” said Sergio Aguayo, a political analyst at the Colegio de México. “But no measures are being taken.”¶ ¶ Mexicans who are active on Twitter
discuss these scandals for days and sometimes weeks, shaming politicians and pressing traditional news media to cover them extensively. But political
analysts argue that there are no effective mechanisms yet to translate citizen participation into structural change. ¶ ¶ “What do we do so that society goes
from indignation to action?” Mr. Cancino asked.¶ ¶ In the meantime, former politicians who endure public scrutiny and a dose of humiliation often come
out of these scandals largely unscathed. In April, the newspaper Reforma reported that Mr. Moreira, the repudiated former Coahuila governor, was living
with his family in an upscale neighborhood in Barcelona, Spain, while attending a local university.
I/L- NAFTA k2 Mexican Econ.
NAFTA is key to Mexico economy
M. Angeles Villarreal, specialist in International Trade and Finance, “NAFTA and the Mexican
Economy”, 6/3/10, (http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34733.pdf)
A 2005 World Bank study assessing some of the economic impacts from NAFTA on Mexico concluded that NAFTA helped Mexico get
closer to the levels of development in the United States and Canada. The study states that NAFTA
helped Mexican manufacturers to adopt to U.S. technological innovations more quickly and
likely had positive impacts on the number and quality of jobs. Another finding was that since NAFTA went into
effect, the overall macroeconomic volatility, or wide variations in the GDP growth rate, has declined in
Mexico. Business cycles in Mexico, the United States, and Canada have had higher levels of synchronicity since NAFTA, and NAFTA has reinforced
the high sensitivity of Mexican economic sectors to economic developments in the United States.24 Several economists have noted that it is likely that
NAFTA contributed to Mexico’s economic recovery directly and indirectly after the 1995
currency crisis. Mexico responded to the crisis by implementing a strong economic adjustment program but also by fully adhering to its NAFTA
obligations to liberalize trade with the United States and Canada. NAFTA may have supported the resolve of the Mexican
government to continue with the course of market-based economic reforms, resulting in
increasing investor confidence in Mexico. The World Bank study estimates that FDI in Mexico
would have been approximately 40% lower without NAFTA.
Villarreal, 10
NAFTA benefits Mexican economy—imports
Porter 8 (Eduardo Porter, Eduardo Porter writes the Economic Scene column for The New York Times. Formerly he was a
member of The Times’
editorial board, where he wrote about business, economics, and a mix of other matters, 2/11/8, “NAFTA is a sweet deal, so why are they sour”,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/11/opinion/11mon4.html?_r=0)
Last week, tens of thousands of poor Mexican farmers marched down Mexico City’s fancy Paseo de la Reforma
demanding that Nafta be reversed, their cows and donkeys occasionally taking a nibble from the grass along
the median strip. Florida’s sugar barons sent their lobbyists to Capitol Hill.¶ This shared outrage underscores
how egalitarian free trade is: undermining inefficient producers who survive behind protective barriers, be they
fabulously wealthy sugar producers in Florida or campesinos on tiny plots in Michoacán.¶ But despite their
shared fears, the two sides of this divide will be affected by Nafta in very different ways. American sugar barons
are right to be afraid. Free trade in sugar within North America will allow cheaper Mexican sugar to flood in,
undercutting the government system of sugar supports, which guarantees farmers high prices and costs
consumers about $1.5 billion a year. Mexico’s rural poor, even if they don’t believe it now, are likely to come out
ahead.¶ Mexican farmers fear that a flood of cheap agricultural imports from the United States
will take away their meager livelihoods, and end a centuries-old way of life revolving around small-scale
farming of corn. Nafta has already shaken up Mexican farming — mostly for the better. The value
of agricultural imports from the United States has doubled since 1994, when tariffs started to
gradually decline. Imports of corn have more than doubled by volume.¶ But this isn’t displacing
Mexico’s small-scale farmers. Most corn from the United States is used for feed and doesn’t compete with
white corn farmed in Mexico. Mexican corn production is about a third higher than before Nafta
came into effect. And cheap American corn is providing cheap feed to Mexico’s livestock
farmers.¶ Mexico confronts a daunting challenge in dealing with rural poverty. One in five Mexicans depends
on agriculture, and of those, a third live in extreme poverty. But farming corn on tiny plots will not provide the
solution.¶ The Mexican government must revamp its own system of supports that now favors
mainly big farmers, and provide small farmers with access to credit and know-how. Rural
Mexico needs investment to increase yields and move out of corn and into more lucrative crops that
are better suited to the country’s arid and mountainous terrain. And Nafta will help, providing a market
for Mexican agricultural exports.¶ America’s sugar barons have been pressing hard to stop the
opening of Nafta’s sugar trade. They first cut a deal with Mexico’s sugar barons that would have created a
new system limiting trade in sugar and other sweeteners — a direct refutation of Nafta’s spirit and rules. Last
week, the sugar lobby announced that it was dropping that idea. Yet the sugar support system is still in place in
the United States — which means the government may have to start picking up the tab — and the fight isn’t
over.¶ Opening up the sugar trade with Mexico will be good news for Americans: it will lead to
lower sugar prices for everybody, from confectionary manufacturers to regular consumers.
And Nafta will be good news for Mexico’s consumers and many of its farmers.¶ The political fight
in Mexico isn’t over either. While the government will have to help some of its farmers adapt to a
more competitive world, its main agricultural challenge is to keep food prices low to feed a growing urban
population. It will also need to help more rural Mexicans find jobs outside agriculture. On all
these fronts, Nafta is likely to help.
NAFTA drives Mexico’s economy – skilled labor and a growing middle class
Taylor ’12 – State Department Correspondent at The Washington Times, Editor at World Politics Review
(Guy, “NAFTA key to economic, social growth in Mexico,” The Washington Times, 5/15/12, ProQuest)//ER
The North American Free Trade Agreement, which went into effect in 1994, has been the key driver
of Mexico's economic and social transformation of the past 20 years, analysts say.¶ NAFTA at first
brought an explosion of low-skill-labor factories to the Mexican side of the U.S. border. By the mid-2000s, the
trade pact had triggered an increasingly sophisticated manufacturing base that now reaches
across Mexico's 31 states.¶ "What we're seeing now is a growth of industry in Mexico that
requires more engineers," said Christopher Wilson, an associate with the Mexico Institute at the
Washington-based Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.¶ "To put a name on it, specifically,
we're talking about automobiles and aerospace," Mr. Wilson said. "Mexico is now graduating
more engineers than Germany every year."¶ A 40 percent jump in Mexico's per capita gross
domestic product since the inception of NAFTA has brought with it an increasingly robust
middle class.¶ "What that means is Mexicans are becoming more educated, and there is more investment in
children, which is why you are able to see the development of an aerospace sector," Mr. Wilson said.¶ Poverty
rate nearly halved¶ About 47 percent of Mexico's 115 million people live in poverty, down dramatically from the
80 percent rate half a century ago. Today, 98 percent of homes have electricity, and more than 4 million people
study at the university level each year.
Mexico loves NAFTA- helped them become a global trade competitor
Valdez ’12 (Diana Washington Valdez, Senior reporter for the El Paso Times, “NAFTA helped Mexico”, February 8th El Paso Times in news section, LEXIS
//NS)
Mexico pursued passage of the North American Free Trade Agreement to increase foreign
investment and create jobs -- something that has worked -- said Herminio Blanco, his country's chief negotiator for the
landmark accord with the United States and Canada. "It all started in 1990 when President Carlos Salinas raised the idea for this," Blanco said Tuesday. "We
began the negotiations in 1991, and the point was to bring investment to Mexico to create more
jobs." The former minister of commerce and industry said the overall impact of NAFTA on
Mexico has been positive. He said Mexico conducts $2 billion in trade each day with the world
in great part because of NAFTA. He added that free trade also transformed Mexico into a global
economic competitor. Since NAFTA was passed nearly 20 years ago, Mexico has done $160
billion worth of trade and Mexican companies have set up operations coast to coast in the
United States.
NAFTA key to Mexico’s manufacturing industry
Sabatini 1/8 (Christopher Sabatini, Professor at Columbia and Director for Latin America at the National
Endowment for Democracy with a PhD in Comparative Government and International Relations from the
University of Virginia and a BS in Political Science and Government from Syracuse University, “In Latin
America, Creative Focus Could Pay Off,” 8 January 2013,
http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12609/in-latin-america-creative-focus-could-pay-off, AL)
Since it came into force in 1994, the North American Free Trade Agreement has become a
centerpiece of U.S. policy toward the region, even though many of its original ambitions have been left
unmet. Trade among the United States, Mexico and Canada, which has risen threefold since the
agreement came into force, is currently estimated to support 14 million U.S. jobs. ¶ The free trade
zone was also critical to Mexico’s development and its recent recovery after the 2007 crisis. In 2012,
Mexico’s economic growth outpaced the one-time economic darling of the hemisphere, Brazil. Even more
propitiously, Mexico exports more manufactured products, and not just to the U.S., than all
other Latin American countries combined. Mexico’s access to the U.S. market has allowed
Mexican manufacturers to build competencies in value-added production that they are now
exploiting on the global market. ¶ But there is still much to do to deepen and improve NAFTA so that it can
serve as a catalyst for broader development, such as spurring greater infrastructure investment along the
border and throughout Mexico, and expanding and improving the energy networks among all three members. ¶
Deepening NAFTA will require presidential initiative. NAFTA has languished from suspicions over the
agreement left over from before it was approved as well as lack of understanding of its potential. It has also
fallen victim to the bureaucratic inertia of frequent technical meetings and summits that lack the necessary
vision and executive commitment to really effect change. Now is the time to make the push to seize the
economic and regional diplomatic potential of NAFTA.
Coordination between NAFTA is key to US Mexico economy
Hufbauer and Schott 07 (Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Professor of International Finance and Director of ILaw at
Georgetown; currently works for the US treasury organizing international trade and investment; Jeffrey J.
Schott, senior research staff at Georgetown and member of the Trade and Environment Policy Advisory
Committee of the US government, “Recommendations for North American Economic Integration”, October
2007, https://mail.google.com/mail/ca/u/0/#inbox/13f2b0c7788bf2e8)
Nonetheless, closer cooperation on monetary policy among the three NAFTA countries would be desirable. To
that end, we recommend that the Federal Reserve Board of Governors invite representatives of the Banco de
Mexico and the Bank of Canada to participate in its key meet- ings—those where interest rate decisions are
made—on a nonvoting basis. Reciprocal invitations should be forthcoming from the Banco de Mexico and the
Bank of Canada. At the same time, the NAFTA partners could usefully coordinate their
approaches to the regulation of financial services. Mexico has experienced a series of bank
failures, while the collapse of Enron, Arthur Andersen, Global Crossing, and WorldCom,
followed by a string of Wall Street and CEO scandals, starkly revealed the seamy underside of
US finance. Canada has a cumbersome capital-market regulatory regime, which is run by the provinces.27
Mexico and the United States are both well along on their own cleanup acts, but more could be
done in a North American con- text. In Canada, the trend toward harmonized securities regulation among
the provinces is long overdue. A single national system would help even more.28 North American
regulatory task forces should exchange views on the re- form of accounting standards and
corporate governance. They could pro- vide a voice for convergent regulation of banks,
insurance companies, securities firms, pension funds, mutual funds, and other asset
management companies throughout North America. Mutual recognition of standards for
issuing securities should command greater support, particularly in the Securities and Exchange
Commission.29 If the NAFTA members agreed in principle to mutual recognition of federal standards, but not
state or provin- cial standards, it would give a useful push to rationalization of the Cana- dian system.30
NAFTA is currently key to Mexico’s economic success.
Taylor, 2012 –
State Department correspondent of Washington Times, international news editor for World
Politics Watch, recipient of international reporting award from The Stanley Foundation, winner of a Society of
Professional Journalists award for coverage of September 11 terrorist attacks
[Guy, “NAFTA key to economic, social growth in Mexico”, The Washington Times, 5/14/12,
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/may/14/nafta-key-to-economic-social-growth-inmexico/?page=all]//GH
CHIHUAHUA CITY, Mexico — The North American Free Trade Agreement, which went into effect in 1994, has
been the key driver of Mexico’s economic and social transformation of the past 20 years, analysts say. ¶ NAFTA
at first brought an explosion of low-skill-labor factories to the Mexican side of the U.S. border. By
the mid-2000s, the trade pact had triggered an increasingly sophisticated manufacturing base that
now reaches across Mexico’s 31 states.¶ “What we’re seeing now is a growth of industry in Mexico
that requires more engineers,” said Christopher Wilson, an associate with the Mexico Institute at the
Washington-based Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.¶ “To put a name on it, specifically, we’re
talking about automobiles and aerospace,” Mr. Wilson said. “Mexico is now graduating more engineers than
Germany every year.”¶ A 40 percent jump in Mexico’s per capita gross domestic product since the
inception of NAFTA has brought with it an increasingly robust middle class.¶ “What that means is
Mexicans are becoming more educated, and there is more investment in children, which is why you are
able to see the development of an aerospace sector,” Mr. Wilson said.¶ About 47 percent of Mexico’s 115
million people live in poverty, down dramatically from the 80 percent rate half a century ago. Today,
98 percent of homes have electricity, and more than 4 million people study at the university
level each year.¶ Through early 2012, the nation of 112 million had an unemployment rate of roughly 5
percent.¶ The per capita salary of about $15,000 ranks the country 81 out of 195 nations.¶ North of the border, however, NAFTA’s
reputation remains a topic of heated debate. From the onset, when 1992 U.S. presidential candidate Ross Perot, an independent, described the “giant sucking sound” that would be heard if the agreement were implemented, critics have long
decried the flight of U.S. manufacturing jobs to Mexico.¶ U.S. unemployment is running above 8 percent.¶ Some NAFTA critics point to less publicized impacts wrought by the trade agreement.¶ “During the first few years, there was a massive
overhaul of Mexico’s agricultural trade rules through NAFTA,” said Todd Tucker, who heads Global Trade Watch at the Washington-based nonprofit advocacy organization Public Citizen.¶ “This meant small-scale Mexican farmers were massively
displaced by subsidized imports from companies in the United States,” Mr. Tucker said. “That led to overcrowding in cities, as well as new immigration into the United States.”¶ To address the displacement, the Mexican government attempted to
create jobs programs in rural areas. But NAFTA had granted large U.S. companies new powers to challenge such programs on grounds they interfere with potential profits.¶ One such challenge in 2009 saw a NAFTA tribunal order the Mexican
government to pay $77.3 million in damages to the U.S.-based agribusiness giant Cargill, a maker and marketer of high-fructose-corn-syrup products.¶ “So now you have Mexican taxpayers paying big U.S. companies,” Mr. Tucker said.¶ “So the
net impact of a trade agreement like NAFTA is that, on the one hand, it creates displacement, and then on the other, Mexico is put in a bind in terms of how its government can try to navigate social and economic problems created by the
agreement.Ӧ
Apart from such concerns, others assert the increasingly globalized nature of Mexico’s
manufacturing economy has laid the groundwork for decades of future growth .¶ Before NAFTA,
U.S. foreign direct investment in Mexico was roughly $15 billion. Today it’s more than $90 billion .¶ A
growing number of European, Japanese and Chinese firms also are investing in Mexican
manufacturing.¶ Aside from tapping a labor market where unions are largely irrelevant and worker pay
averages $6 per hour, foreign companies are attracted by Mexico’s proximity to massive auto sales
markets in the United States and Canada.¶ Twenty-five vehicle-assembly factories owned by foreign
automakers - Ford, General Motors, Volkswagen, Honda and Nissan - produced more than 2 million
new cars and trucks from Mexico during 2011.¶ “We’re not talking about people putting brake pads on a
car in a free-trade zone on the border,” said Christopher Sabatini, senior director of policy at the Americas
Society and Council of the Americas in New York.¶ “The downside [to the United States], and I say this as a
dedicated free-trader, is that Mexico is now on the verge of cutting into the higher-skilled
manufacturing, design and engineering jobs,” he added.¶ “That raises the implication that the U.S. needs
to invest in infrastructure, so that … the U.S. higher-skilled manufacturing and design jobs don’t head south.”
NAFTA has helped Mexico’s economic state become closer to that of the US
– specialists in International Trade and Finance
[M. Angeles & Ian F., “NAFTA at 20: Overview and Trade Effects”, Congressional Research Service, 2/21/13,
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42965.pdf, pg. 15-16]//GH
A number of studies have found that NAFTA has brought economic and social benefits to the ¶
Mexican economy as a whole, but that the benefits have not been evenly distributed throughout ¶
the country. 63 The agreement also had a positive impact on Mexican productivity. A 2011 World ¶
Bank study found that the increase in trade integration after NAFTA had a positive effect on ¶
stimulating the productivity of Mexican plants.64 Most post-NAFTA studies on economic effects ¶
have found that the net overall effects on the Mexican economy tended to be positive but
modest. ¶ While there have been periods of positive and negative economic growth in Mexico after the ¶
agreement was implemented, it is difficult to measure precisely how much of these economic ¶ changes were
attributed to NAFTA. A World Bank study assessing some of the economic impacts ¶ from NAFTA on Mexico
concluded that NAFTA helped Mexico get closer to the levels of ¶ development in the United
States and Canada. The study states that NAFTA helped Mexican ¶ manufacturers adapt to U.S.
technological innovations more quickly; likely had positive impacts ¶ on the number and
quality of jobs; reduced macroeconomic volatility, or wide variations in the ¶ GDP growth rate, in
Mexico; increased the levels of synchronicity in business cycles in Mexico, ¶ the United States,
and Canada; and reinforced the high sensitivity of Mexican economic sectors to ¶ economic
developments in the United States.65¶ Other studies suggest that NAFTA has been disappointing in that it
failed to significantly improve ¶ the Mexican economy or lower income disparities between Mexico and its
northern neighbors.66¶ Some argue that the success of NAFTA in Mexico was probably limited by the fact that
NAFTA ¶ was not supplemented by complementary policies that could have promoted a deeper regional ¶
integration effort. These policies could have included improvements in education, industrial ¶ policies, and/or
investment in infrastructure.67¶ One of the more controversial aspects of NAFTA is related to the agricultural
sector in Mexico ¶ and the perception that NAFTA has caused a higher amount of worker displacement in this
sector ¶ than in other economic sectors. Many critics of NAFTA say that the agreement led to severe job ¶
displacement in agriculture, especially in the corn sector. One study estimates these losses to have ¶ been over a
million lost jobs in corn production between 1991 and 2000.68 However, while some ¶ of the changes in
the agricultural sector are a direct result of NAFTA as Mexico began to import ¶ more lower-priced products
from the United States, many of the changes can be attributed to ¶ Mexico’s unilateral agricultural
reform measures in the 1980s and early 1990s. Most domestic ¶ reform measures consisted of
privatization efforts and resulted in increased competition. Measures included eliminating state enterprises
Villarreal and Fergusson, 2013
related to agriculture and removing staple price ¶ supports and subsidies.69 These reforms coincided with
NAFTA negotiations and continued ¶ beyond the implementation of NAFTA in 1994. The unilateral reforms in
the agricultural sector ¶ make it difficult to separate those effects from the effects of NAFTA.
NAFTA fixed a broken economy
USDA January 2008 *Government agency oversight of the Agriculture sector of the US
(United States Department of Agriculture, “FACT SHEET: North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA),”
http://www.fas.usda.gov/info/factsheets/NAFTA.asp)//MW)
The final provisions of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) were fully implemented on January 1, 2008. Launched on January 1, 1994,
NAFTA is one of the most successful trade agreements in history and has contributed to significant
increases in agricultural trade and investment between the United States, Canada and Mexico and has benefited farmers,
ranchers and consumers throughout North America.¶ With full implementation, the last remaining trade restriction on a handful of agricultural
commodities such as U.S. exports to Mexico of corn, dry edible beans, nonfat dry milk and high fructose corn syrup and Mexican exports to the United
States of sugar and certain horticultural products are now removed. The United States will continue to work with Mexico to
build on the successes achieved to date. Since 2005, the United States has invested nearly $20 million in programs and technical
exchanges to assist Mexico in addressing production, distribution and marketing-related challenges associated with the transition to free and open
trade.¶ The agricultural provisions of the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement (CFTA), in effect since 1989, were incorporated into the NAFTA. Under
these provisions, all tariffs affecting agricultural trade between the United States and Canada, with a few exceptions for items covered by tariff-rate
quotas (TRQ's), were removed before January 1, 1998.¶ Mexico and Canada reached a separate bilateral NAFTA agreement on market access for
agricultural products. The Mexican-Canadian agreement eliminated most tariffs either immediately or over 5, 10, or 15 years.¶ Benefits to U.S.
Agriculture¶ In 2007, Canada and Mexico were, respectively, the first and second largest export markets for U.S. agricultural products. Exports to the
two markets combined were greater than exports to the next six largest markets combined.¶ From 1992-2007, the value of U.S. agricultural exports
worldwide climbed 65 percent. Over that same period, U.S. farm and food exports to our two NAFTA partners grew by 156 percent.¶ Trade with Mexico:
It estimated that U.S. farm and food exports to Mexico exceeded $11.5 billion in 2007 -- the highest
level ever under NAFTA. From 2001 to 2006, U.S. farm and food exports to Mexico climbed by $3.6 billion to $10.8 billion. U.S. exports of soybean
meal, red meats, and poultry meat all set new records in 2006.¶ In the years immediately prior to NAFTA, U.S. agricultural products
lost market share in Mexico as competition for the Mexican market increased. NAFTA reversed this trend. The United States
supplied more than 72 percent of Mexico's total agricultural imports in 2007, due in part to the price advantage and preferential access that U.S.
products now enjoy. For example, Mexico's imports of U.S. red meat and poultry have grown rapidly, exceeding pre-NAFTA levels and reaching the
highest level ever in 2006.¶ NAFTA kept Mexican markets open to U.S. farm and food products in 1995 during the worst economic crisis in Mexico's
modern history. In the wake of the peso devaluation and its aftermath, U.S. agricultural exports dropped by 23 percent that year, but
have since surged back setting new annual records. NAFTA cushioned the downturn and helped speed the recovery
because of preferential access for U.S. products. In fact, rather than raising import barriers in response to its economic problems, Mexico adhered to
NAFTA commitments and continued to reduce tariffs.¶ Agricultural trade has increased in both directions under NAFTA
from $7.3 billion in 1994 to $20.1 billion in 2006.¶ Trade with Canada: Canada had been a steadily growing market for U.S. agriculture under the U.S.Canada Free Trade Agreement (CFTA), with U.S. farm and food exports reaching a record $11.9 billion in 2006, up from $4.2 billion in 1990. Fresh and
processed fruits and vegetables, snack foods, and other consumer foods account for close to three-fourths of U.S. sales.¶ U.S. exports of consumeroriented products to Canada continued to set records in 2007 in virtually every category. Additionally, new value highs were recorded for vegetable oils,
planting seeds, and sugars, sweeteners, and beverage bases. With a few exceptions, tariffs not already eliminated dropped to zero on January 1, 1998.¶ In
1996, the first NAFTA dispute settlement panel reviewed the higher tariffs Canada is applying to its dairy, poultry, egg, barley, and margarine products,
which were previously subject to non-tariff barriers before implementation of the Uruguay Round. The panel ruled that Canada's tariff-rate quotas are
consistent with NAFTA, and thus do not have to be eliminated.¶
‘
NAFTA has drastically helped Mexico’s Economy
Villarreal, 12- Specialist in International Trade and Violence (M. Angeles Villarreal, “US-Mexico Economic Relations:
Trends, Issues, and Implications”, Published by congressional research service, published on August 9, 2012,
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32934.pdf)//NG
A 2005 World Bank study assessing some of the economic impacts from NAFTA on Mexico ¶ concluded
that NAFTA helped Mexico get closer to the levels of development in the United ¶ States and
Canada. The study states that NAFTA helped Mexican manufacturers adapt to U.S. ¶ technological
innovations more quickly and likely had positive impacts on the number and ¶ quality of jobs. Another
finding was that since NAFTA went into effect, the overall ¶ macroeconomic volatility, or wide
variations in the GDP growth rate, has declined in Mexico. ¶ Business cycles in Mexico, the
United States, and Canada have had higher levels of synchronicity ¶ since NAFTA, and NAFTA has
reinforced the high sensitivity of Mexican economic sectors to ¶ economic developments in the United
States.54¶ Several economists have noted that it is likely that NAFTA contributed to Mexico’s economic ¶
recovery directly and indirectly after the 1995 currency crisis. Mexico responded to the crisis by ¶
implementing a strong economic adjustment program but also by fully adhering to its NAFTA ¶
obligations to liberalize trade with the United States and Canada. NAFTA may have supported
the ¶ resolve of the Mexican government to continue with the course of market-based economic
reforms, resulting in increasing investor confidence in Mexico. The World Bank study
estimates ¶ that FDI in Mexico would have been approximately 40% lower without NAFTA.55¶
One of the main arguments in favor of NAFTA at the time it was being proposed by policymakers ¶ was that the
agreement would improve economic conditions in Mexico and narrow the income ¶ gap between
Mexico and the United States. Studies that have addressed the issue of economic ¶ convergence56 have
noted that economic convergence in North America might not materialize ¶ under free trade as long as
“fundamental differences” in initial conditions persist over time. One ¶ study argues that NAFTA is not enough
to help narrow the disparities in economic conditions ¶ between Mexico and the United States and that Mexico
needs to invest more in education; ¶ innovation and infrastructure; and in the quality of national institutions.
The study states that ¶ income convergence between a Latin American country and the United States is limited
by the ¶ wide differences in the quality of domestic institutions, in the innovation dynamics of domestic ¶ firms,
and in the skills of the labor force.57 Another study also notes that the ability of Mexico to ¶ improve economic
conditions depends on its capacity to improve its national institutions, adding ¶ that Mexican institutions did
not improve significantly more than those of other Latin American ¶ countries during the post-NAFTA
period.58¶ Mexican wages rose steadily from the early 1980s until the mid-1990s, when the
currency crisis ¶ hit. After a drop in average real wages in 1996 of 15.5%, real wages increased
steadily until 2000, ¶ when the average rate of growth was 11.8%. Since then the average rate of
growth has only ¶ varied slightly. Mexico’s trade liberalization measures may have affected the ratio between
skilled ¶ and non-skilled workers in Mexico. In 1988, the real average wage of skilled workers in Mexico’s ¶
manufacturing industry was 2.25 times larger than that of non-skilled workers. This ratio ¶ increased until
1996, when it was about 2.9, but then remained stable until 2000.59 The World ¶ Bank study found that
NAFTA brought economic and social benefits to the Mexican economy, ¶ but that the agreement
in itself was not sufficient to ensure a narrowing of the wage gap between ¶ Mexico and the
United States. The study states that NAFTA had a positive effect on wages and ¶ employment in
some Mexican states, but that the wage differential within the country increased ¶ as a result of trade
liberalization.60
I/L- Mexico Econ k2 US Econ
Mexican prosperty is key to the US economy – consumption.
– Senior Fellow for Latin America Studies, contributor to the Council on Foreign Relations and the
Wilson Institute (Shannon K., “U.S. Depends on Mexico for Exports”, 1/14/13;
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/01/14/us-depends-on-mexico-for-_n_2471961.html)//Beddow
Surprising to many Americans is the importance of the United States’ trade with Mexico. While Asia captures
the headlines, U.S. exports to Mexico are double those to China, and second only to Canada. And while many of
these goods come from border states -- Texas, Arizona, New Mexico and California -- Mexico matters for much
more of the union. Seventeen states send more than 10 percent of their exports to Mexico, and it is the
number one or two destination for U.S. goods for nearly half the country. The graph below shows
those states most economically dependent on our southern neighbor --notice that South Dakota and Nebraska
outpace New Mexico and California. These flows are only accelerating. During the first ten months of 2012
exports heading south grew by $17 billion (or 10 percent) compared to 2011, reaching a total of $181 billion.
They include petroleum products (some $17 billion worth) and intermediate goods such as vehicle parts,
electrical apparatuses, industrial supplies, metals, and chemicals (over $40 billion combined). Spurred on by
deep supply chains, these pieces and parts move fluidly back and forth across the border (often quite a few
times) before ending up as finished goods on store shelves in both countries. U.S. exports and Mexico The
uptick should be seen as a good thing. According to economic studies, these exports support some six million
American jobs (directly and indirectly). But to continue this dynamism, the United States and Mexico
need to improve border infrastructure and facilitate flows. This means expanding border crossings and
highways, and harmonizing regulations and customs to make the process easier and faster. Prioritizing and
investing in bilateral trade will provide greater opportunity and security—for U.S. companies and workers
alike.
O’Neill 1/14
Mexican growth is key to the US economy – manufacturing.
– Senior Fellow for Latin America Studies, contributor to the Council on Foreign Relations and the
Wilson Institute (Shannon K., “Mexico Makes It”, March/April 2013; <
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138818/shannon-k-oneil/mexico-makes-it>)//Beddow
Since NAFTA was passed, U.S.-Mexican trade has more than tripled. Well over $1 billion worth of goods
crosses the U.S.-Mexican border every day, as do 3,000 people, 12,000 trucks, and 1,200 railcars. Mexico is
second only to Canada as a destination for U.S. goods, and sales to Mexico support an estimated six million
American jobs, according to a report published by the Woodrow Wilson International Center's Mexico
Institute. The composition of that bilateral trade has also changed in recent decades. Approximately 40 percent
of the products made in Mexico today have parts that come from the United States. Many consumer goods,
including cars, televisions, and computers, cross the border more than once during their production.
Admittedly, this process has sent some U.S. jobs south, but overall, cross-border production is good for U.S.
employment. There is evidence that U.S. companies with overseas operations are more likely to create domestic
jobs than those based solely in the United States. Using data collected confidentially from thousands of large
U.S. manufacturing firms, the scholars Mihir Desai, C. Fritz Foley, and James Hines upended the conventional
wisdom in a 2008 study, which found that when companies ramp up their investment and employment
internationally, they invest more and hire more people at home, too. Overseas operations make companies
more productive and competitive, and with improved products, lower prices, and higher sales, they are able to
create new jobs everywhere. Washington should welcome the expansion of U.S. companies in
Mexico because increasing cross-border production and trade between the two countries would
boost U.S. employment and growth. Mexico is a ready, willing, and able economic partner, with which the
United States has closer ties than it does with any other emerging-market country.
O’Neill 13
Impacts
Econ. Decline causes War
Harris and Burrows 9 - *Mathew, PhD European History @ Cambridge, counselor in the National Intelligence Council (NIC) , **Jennifer, a member
of the NIC’s Long Range Analysis Unit
(“Revisiting the Future: Geopolitical Effects of the Financial Crisis” http://www.ciaonet.org/journals/twq/v32i2/f_0016178_13952.pdf)//BB
Increased Potential for Global Conflict¶ Of course, the report encompasses more than economics and indeed believes the future is likely to be the result of a number
of intersecting and interlocking forces. With so many possible permutations of outcomes, each with ample Revisiting the Future opportunity for unintended
consequences, there is a growing sense of insecurity. Even so, history may be more instructive than ever . While we continue to believe that the
Great Depression is not likely to be repeated, the lessons to be drawn from that period include the harmful effects on fledgling democracies
and multiethnic societies (think Central Europe in 1920s and 1930s) and on the sustainability of multilateral institutions (think League of
Nations in the same period). There is no reason to think that this would not be true in the twenty-first as much as in the twentieth
century. For that reason, the ways in which the potential for greater conflict could grow would seem to be even more apt in a constantly
volatile economic environment as they would be if change would be steadier. In surveying those risks, the report stressed the likelihood that terrorism and
nonproliferation will remain priorities even as resource issues move up on the international agenda.
Terrorism’s appeal will decline if
economic growth continues in the Middle East and youth unemployment is reduced. For those terrorist groups that remain
active in 2025, however, the diffusion of technologies and scientific knowledge will place some of the world’s most dangerous capabilities within their reach.
Terrorist groups in 2025 will likely be a combination of descendants of long established groups_inheriting organizational structures, command and control
processes, and training procedures necessary to conduct sophisticated attacks_and newly emergent collections of the angry and disenfranchised that become
self-radicalized, particularly in the absence of economic outlets that would become narrower in an economic downturn.
The most dangerous casualty of any economically-induced drawdown of U.S. military presence would
almost certainly be the Middle East. Although Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons is not inevitable, worries about a nuclear-armed Iran could lead
states in the region to develop new security arrangements with external powers, acquire additional weapons, and consider
pursuing their own nuclear ambitions. It is not clear that the type of stable deterrent relationship that existed between the great powers for most of the
Cold War would emerge naturally in the Middle East with a nuclear Iran. Episodes of low intensity conflict and terrorism taking place under a nuclear umbrella
could lead to an unintended escalation and broader conflict if clear red lines between those states involved are not well established. The close
proximity of potential nuclear rivals combined with underdeveloped surveillance capabilities and mobile dual-capable Iranian missile systems also
will produce inherent difficulties in achieving reliable indications and warning of an impending nuclear attack. The lack of strategic depth in neighboring
states like Israel, short warning and missile flight times, and uncertainty of Iranian intentions may place more focus on preemption
rather than defense, potentially leading to escalating crises. 36 Types of conflict that the world continues to experience, such as over resources,
could reemerge, particularly if protectionism grows and there is a resort to neo-mercantilist practices. Perceptions of renewed
energy scarcity will drive countries to take actions to assure their future access to energy supplies. In the worst case, this could result in interstate
conflicts if government leaders deem assured access to energy resources, for example, to be essential for maintaining domestic stability
and the survival of their regime. Even actions short of war, however, will have important geopolitical implications. Maritime security concerns are
providing a rationale for naval buildups and modernization efforts, such as China’s and India’s development of blue water naval capabilities. If the fiscal
stimulus focus for these countries indeed turns inward, one of the most obvious funding targets may be military. Buildup of
regional naval capabilities could lead to increased tensions , rivalries , and counterbalancing moves , but it
also will create opportunities for multinational cooperation in protecting critical sea lanes. With water also becoming scarcer in Asia and the
Middle East, cooperation to manage changing water resources is likely to be increasingly difficult both within and
between states in a more dog-eat-dog world.
Economic growth solves war – increased state capacity.
HSRP 10 – Human Security Report Project, Simon Fraser University, Canada (“Human Security Report 2009/2010”, 12/2/10; Part one page 20,
<http://www.hsrgroup.org/human-security-reports/20092010/text.aspx>)//Beddow
But despite the widespread lack of consensus over the causes of civil war, very few quantitative researchers would disagree that there is a robust
high levels of national income and a lower risk of war. Other things being equal, high
national incomes translate into greater state capacity and more resources for governments to buy
association between
off grievances and defeat insurgents in those wars that cannot be prevented. The conflict trends in East
Asia over the past 30 years, which are the focus of Chapter 3, provide an instructive example of the association between
rising levels of economic development and the incidence of armed conflict. As national incomes in the region have
steadily risen since the late 1970s, state capacity and performance legitimacy have also increased—and conflict
numbers have declined by some 60 percent. Indeed, insurgents—who have been largely excluded from the benefits of economic
growth in the region—have not achieved a single military victory since the 1970s.
Economic decline turns heg and growth ensures it.
– American diplomat, president of the Council on Foreign Relations, Director of Policy Planning for the
Department of State, advisor to Colin Powell, US Coordinator for the Future of Afghanistan (Richard N., “The
Irony of American Strategy: Putting the Middle East in Proper Perspective”, May/June 2013 issue of Foreign
Affairs)//Beddow
Haass 13
Asia, however, does call for more U.S. military, diplomatic and economic involvement. Other regions can also
stake a claim to a share of Washington’s attention. Negotiating a transatlantic free-trade agreement (ideally, one involving both
Canada and Mexico) would be a major economic and strategic accomplishment; so, too, would be negotiating and implementing a NAFTA 2.0 that would
more closely link the United States with its immediate neighbors so as to better manage shared interests related to trade and investment, security,
energy, infrastructure, and the flow of people. Narrowing the gap between global challenges and the current institutional
arrangements for dealing with them is also an important issue, particularly in the case of climate change. Here and elsewhere,
though, global accords with broad participation may not be possible, and it may be more realistic and rewarding to focus on agreements with narrower
aims, less participation, or both. Any U.S. rebalancing among regions and issues, finally, needs to be complemented by
another sort of rebalancing, between the internal and the external, the domestic and the foreign. The United
States needs to restore the foundations of American economic power so that it will once again
have the resources to act freely and lead in the world, so that it can compete, so that it can
discourage threats from emerging and contend with them if need be, so that it is less vulnerable to
international developments it cannot control, and so that it can set an example others will want to
emulate. The vast sums spent on the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq did not cause the nation’s current budgetary or economic predicament, but they
did contribute to it. Spending more on national security now would only make it more difficult to set things right. The goal at home must be to
restore historical levels of domestic economic growth, reduce the ratio of debt to GDP, and improve the quality
of the nation’s infrastructure and human capital. During the next several years, facing no rival great power or
existential threat, the United States is likely to enjoy something of a strategic respite. The question is whether
the United States will take advantage of that respite to renew the sources of its strength or squander it through
continued overreaching in the Middle East, not attending to Asia, and underinvesting in home.
Recessions lock nations in a self-reinforcing death spiral to war.
Conceição and Kim 10 – Director of the Office of Development Studies at UNPD, assistant professor at the Technical University of Lisbon, degrees in
Physics and Economics from the Technical University of Lisbon and PhD in Public Policy from the LBJ School of Public Affairs at the University of Texas
at Austin / Office of Development Studies UNDP (Pedro and Namsuk, “The Economic Crisis, Violent Conflict, and Human Development”, International
Journal of Peace Studies, V.15 No. 1, Spring/Summer 2010; http://www.gmu.edu/programs/icar/ijps/vol15_1/KimConceicao15n1.pdf)//Beddow
The unfolding global economic crisis is expected to bring the world economy into recession in 2009. Figure 1 shows the population weighted real GDP
growth from 1991 to 2009 (estimates for 2008 and projection for 2009) for the world economy and for different groups of countries. The annual real
GDP growth rate of the global economy was 5.1% in 2007 but the world economy is projected to shrink by -1.3% in 2009 (IMF, 2009). Emerging and
developing economies are also projected to suffer a sharp slowdown as a result of the crisis, with a projected growth rate of 1.6% in 2009 compared to
8.3% in 2007. For many developing countries, the sharp economic slowdowns will translate into deep recessions. The UN projects that 15 developing
countries will have ne gative per capita growth in 2009 1 , while projections from the World Bank adjusting for terms-of-tra de changes increase this to
50 2 . A recent strand of literature, reviewed in some detail in this paper, suggests that economic conditions are
important determinants of the outbreak and recurrence of conflict. In particular, wars often start following
growth collapses (Collier et al, 2009, p.15). Sharp economic slowdowns and low levels of income per capita appear to
increase the likelihood of conflicts. In this context, it is opportune to explore insights fro m this literature,
linking it also with the human development implications of both growth slow downs and conflict. In particular, the
paper highlights the risks of the emergence of low-human-development/conflict traps. Given that the probability of conflict recurrence
is high, as elaborated upon below, post-conflict countries – those that have experienced armed conflicts until
recent years – may be particularly vulnerable. 3 As Figure 1 shows, post-conflict countrie s are projected to have a substantial decrease
in the economic growth, from 7.4% in 2007 to 3.1% in 2009. Advanced economies may have a sharper slowdown (2.7% in 2007 and -3.8% in 2009), but
they have well-developed social protection, and stable political systems that may facilitate the rec overy and absorb the pressures for social instability and
conflict. In contrast, post-conflict countries, ma y be more vulnerable to a more protracted and slower recovery from the slowdown, given the hi gher
risks of conflict recurrence. Drawing on a review of both theoretical and empirical literature, this paper frames the the connection between economic
factors and conflict within a conceptual framework in which levels of human development and the risk of conflict are linked. Violent conflict is one of the
most extreme forms of suppressing choices and advancing rights, and therefore a major threat to human development (UNDP, 2005, p.151). Since 1990,
more than 3 million people have died in armed conflicts in developing countries (Marshall, 2005). The total war deaths are far more than the battle
deaths. For example, the total war deaths are estimated as 1.2 million in Ethiopia during 1976-1991, but only 2% of them were directly engaged in the
battles. (Bethany and Gleditsch, 2004) Conflict has also non-lethal consequences that may last across generations (UNDP, 2008a). As far as
drivers of conflict are concerned, one of the most robust findings in the literature is that many economic
conditions (low income, slow growth, and especially severe economic downturns) are correlated with the
outbreak of conflict, with some evidence strongly suggesting that the causal direction runs from economic
conditions to conflict (Col lier and Hoeffler, 2004). There is also a rich literature on the impact of horizontal inequality
and dependence on natural resources as drivers of increases in the risk of conflict. This paper however focuses only on the
economic factors, reviewing the fi ndings in light of the current economic crisis and the severe economic downturn that it now occurring. When it
comes to the consequences of conflict, there is no doubt that it is harmful to human welfare, but it becomes
even more hazardous if conflict results in a persistent low human development/conflict trap. A typical country
reaching the end of a civil war faces a 44 percent risk of returning to conflict within five years (Collier et al, 2003, p. 83). Whether or not a country will
experience a new civil war can be best predicted by whether the country experienced wars in the past (Collier, et al, 2004). The high rates of recurrence of
conflict, along with the economic determinants of conflict, suggest the possibility of the existence of poverty-conflict traps (Collier et al, 2003; Bloomberg
and others 2000). Given that pove rty and low per capita income ar e also correlated with worse health and education outcomes, and also that these
outcomes suffer as a result of conflict, the conflict trap can be conceptualized in the framework of a low human development – conflict trap (Collier and
Hoeffler, 2004; Justino and Verwimp, 2006; Alderman, Hoddinott and Kinsey, 2004). A self-reinforcing circle from conflict to low
human development, and vice versa, is suggestively illustrated below (Chart 1). Conflict destroys accumulated
physical and human capital, forces replacement of labor, deteriorates institutional capacity. A country
experiencing conflict cannot secure long term returns for investments in both in physical and human capital,
resulting in low investment in health and education. All of these factors lead to low levels of human development. A country
with low levels of human development has more difficulty in improving institutions, and in increasing
productivity and potential growth. In turn, lower growth rates heighten the risk of conflict, potentially trapping
a country in the loop. The remainder of the paper discusses the empirical findings and theoretical background for linkage between the low-
human development and conflict. Section 2 consid ers how low levels of human development can affect the risk of violent conflict. Section 3 shows how
the conflict can result in low human development, completing the vicious circle. Section 4 concludes the paper with a brief discussion on the policy
responses. 2. From Low Human Development to Conflict While there are number of factor s that could cause conflict, empirical studies find that poor
economic performance is associated with higher incidence of conflict. Being a poor country is correlated with most forms of violence (UNDP, 2008a).
Figure 2 shows that economic development and conflicts are observed to be clearly related. The level of GDP is negatively correlated with observing a
new conflict. Collier et al (2009) fi nd that the predicted risk for a hypothetical country with characteristics set at the study’s sample mean was 4.6 per
cent. If the level of per capita income were to be halved from this level, the risk woul d be increased to 5.3 per cent. Growth rates are also strongly
associated with risks of conflict in deve loping countries. If the growth rate in developing countries is increase d by one percentage point from the mean,
the risk of conflict decreases by 0.6 per centage points to 4.0 per cent (Collier et al, 2009). Kang and Meernik (2005) show that the grow th rate in
conflict countries in the five years prior to conflict, including cases of conf lict recurrence, was on average 0.5 pe rcent compared to 2 percent in countries
that remained peaceful. Empirical analysis of growth a nd conflict has inherent data limitations, but some recent studies using more careful methodology
shows a st rong causal link running from poor economic performance to conflict. One probl em is that the direction of impact between the income per
capita and conflict can run both wa ys. Assuming a priori one-way causality – that is, ignoring endogeneity – in regression analysis can result in biased
estimates. Other information used in the empirical studies, such as income inequality, po pulation, ethnic distributi on, are also subject to difficulties of
econometric identification and data quality (Hegre and Sambanis, 2006; Sambanis, 2004).To address the endogeneity problem, some studi es adopt
instrumental variable analysis, using a strictly exogenous variable that moves with income per cap ita, but not with conflict. For instance, Miguel,
Satyannath and Sergenti (2004) use annual changes in rainfall data as an instrument for income growth. The rainfall data predicts growth fluctuation in
agricultural economies in Africa. They find that income shocks are drive conflict. Besley and Persson (2008) and Bazzi and Blattman (2008) use
internationa l commodity price and trade shocks as the exogenous variables, but they find that the evidence on the relations hip between economic
shocks as drivers of conflict is mixed.
Economic crisis triggers war.
ETH 13 – engineering, science, technology, and management university in Switzerland, part of the Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology Domain,
subordinate to Switzerland’s Department of Home Affairs (Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich, “Intrastate Conflict: Data, Trends and Drivers”,
2/4/13; < http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/SpecialFeature/Detail/?id=158597&tabid=1453496807&contextid774=158597&contextid775=158627>)//Beddow
“The most robustly significant predictor of [armed] conflict risk and its duration is some
indicator of economic prosperity. At a higher income people have more to lose from the
destructiveness of conflict; and higher per-capita income implies a better functioning social
contract, institutions and state capacity.”[3] This correlation between underdevelopment and armed
conflict is confirmed in a 2008 paper by Thania Paffenholz[4] which notes that “since 1990, more than 50% of
all conflict-prone countries have been low income states…. Two thirds of all armed conflicts take place in African countries with the
highest poverty rates. Econometric research found a correlation between the poverty rate and likelihood of armed violence….[T]he lower the GDP per
capita in a country, the higher the likelihood of armed conflict.” Of course, it is important to point out that this is not a claim that there is a direct causal
connection between poverty and armed conflict. To repeat, the causes of conflict are complex and context specific,
nevertheless, says Paffenholz, there is a clear correlation between a low and declining per capita income and a
country’s vulnerability to conflict. It is also true, on the other hand, that there are low income countries that experience precipitous
economic decline, like Zambia in the 1980s and 1990s, without suffering the kind of turmoil that has visited economically more successful countries like
Kenya and Cote d’Ivoire. Referring to both Zambia and Nigeria, Pafenholz says these are cases in which “the social compact” has proven to be resilient.
Both have formal and informal mechanisms that are able to address grievances in ways that allowed them to be aired and resolved or managed without
recourse to violence. A brief review of literature on economics and armed conflict, published in the Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine, indicates
the complexity and imprecision behind the question, “does poverty cause conflict?” While many of the “world’s poorest countries are riven by armed
conflict,” and while poverty, conflict and under-development set up a cycle of dysfunction in which each element of the cycle is exacerbated by the other,
it is also the case that “conflict obviously does not just afflict the poorest countries” – as Northern Ireland and the former Yugoslavia demonstrate. “Many
poor countries are not at war; shared poverty may not be a destabilizing influence. Indeed, economic growth can destabilize, as the
wars in countries afflicted by an abundance of particular natural resources appear to show.”[5] Another review
of the literature makes the general point that “the escalation of conflict during economic downturns is more
likely in countries recovering from conflict, or fragile states.” That makes Africa especially vulnerable on two counts: economic
deprivation and recent armed conflict are present in a relatively high number of states, making the continent especially vulnerable to economic shocks.
As a general rule, “weak economies often translate into weak and fragile states and the presence of violent
conflict, which in turn prevents economic growth.” One study argues that “the risk of war in any given
country is determined by the initial level of income, the rate of economic growth and the level of
dependency on primary commodity exports.” Changes in rates of economic growth thus lead to changes in
threats of conflict. As unemployment rises in fragile states this can “exacerbate conflict due to comparatively better income opportunities for
young men in rebel groups as opposed to labour markets.”[6] The concentration of armed conflict in lower income countries is also reflected in the
conflict tabulation by Project Ploughshares over the past quarter century. The 2009 Human Development Index ranks 182 countries in four categories of
Human Development – Very High, High, Medium, Low. Of the 98 countries in the Medium and Low categories of human development in 2009, 55 per
cent experienced war on their territories in the previous 24 years. In the same period, only 24 per cent of countries in the High human development
category saw war within their borders, while just two (5 per cent) countries in the Very High human development ranking had war on their territory (the
UK re Northern Ireland and Israel). The wars of the recent past were overwhelmingly fought on the territories of states at the low end of the human
development scale. A country’s income level is thus a strong indicator of its risk of being involved in sustained armed
conflict. Low income countries lack the capacity to create conditions conducive to serving the social, political, and economic welfare of their people.
And when economic inequality is linked to differences between identity groups, the correlation to armed conflict is even stronger. In other words, group
based inequalities are especially destabilizing.[7] These failures in human security are of course heavily shaped by external factors, notably international
economic and security conditions and the interests of the major powers (in short, globalization),[8] and these factors frequently combine with internal
political/religious/ethnic circumstances that create conditions especially conducive to conflict and armed conflict.
Environment Scenario
1NC
NAFTA is good – environment projects
Newman 13—Writer for The Global Perspective (“Thank you, NAFTA … !”, July 15, 2013,
http://globalperspective.bangordailynews.com/2013/07/15/home/thank-you-nafta/)//RT
Yes, you read that right.¶ While it’s old hat, if not a broken record, to deride NAFTA, the North American Free
Trade Agreement (remember Ross Perot and the “giant sucking sound?”) much good continues to emerge
from the extraordinary cooperation between the three signatory countries.¶ In addition to
burgeoning trade and cross-border investment that has resulted from the agreement’s full
implementation, there’s exciting news of increasing collaboration and standardization of
environmental regulations.¶ A number of new initiatives agreed upon by the parties will likely reduce
gasoline consumption and air pollution, particularly along borders and coasts in the NAFTA region,
according to the Commission for Environmental Cooperation, which looks after and advocates
for environmental issues and improvements within the region.¶ Indeed, the existence of crossborder organizations that arise as part and parcel, or as a result of trade negotiations, are an
often overlooked benefit of trade and investment dialogue. When nations and regions have structures
in place to address issues, propose solutions, fund studies, implement pilot projects and so on, good things can
happen.¶ Now, I don’t expect many folks to wake up tomorrow and say, “You know, I really misjudged
NAFTA. It’s a good thing after all,” never mind the abundant evidence of economic growth,
competitiveness and supply chain integration that have contributed to a resurgence in N.
American manufacturing.¶ But it would be nice if more people considered trade agreements in
the fuller context of multilateral issues, even beyond trade. Harmonization of standards –
which begins with dialogue – is a critical step on the path towards a business and investment
environment that respects not only economic concerns, but important social objectives, as well.
Environmental Degradation causes Extinction
Dernbach 98,
Associate Professor of Law at Widener University, ’98 (John, Fall, “Sustainable Development as a
Framework for National Governance” Case Western University Law Review, Vol 49 p 16, lexis)
The global scale and severity of environmental degradation and poverty are unprecedented
in human history. Major adverse consequences are not inevitable, but they are likely if
these problems are not addressed. Many civilizations collapsed or were severely weakened
because they exhausted or degraded the natural resource base on which they depended. n76
In addition, substantial economic and social inequalities have caused or contributed to
many wars and revolutions. n77 These problems are intensified by the speed at which they
have occurred and are worsening, making it difficult for natural systems to adapt. The
complexity of natural and human systems also means that the effects of these problems are difficult to
anticipate. The potential impact of global warming on the transmission of tropical diseases in a time of
substantial international travel and commerce is but one example.
2NC—I/L NAFTA helps the environment
Free Trade Helps Environment
Becker 11—Thomas H. Becker is an economic development authority and management trainer specializing in
Latin America. He has lived, operated businesses, or worked in 16 Latin American countries, and currently
serves as advisor to government agencies, private businesses, universities, and NGOs. His academic
background includes degrees in Latin American American Studies and a Ph.D. in International Business. He
has served on the Business faculty of five universities in the U.S. and Latin America, has written over 100
articles and book chapters in English and Spanish, and is a former President and Managing Director of the
Business Association of Latin American Studies. [Becker, Thomas H.“Doing Business in the New Latin
America: Keys to Profit in America’s Next-Door Markets”—2nd Edition.
Anxiety No. 4: Free trade is destroying Latin America's environment.¶ Perception: Almost all businesses tend
to degrade the environment. That stark fact is evident wherever industry is found. In places like Cubatão,
Brazil's center of chemical production, the air is as thick as soup. Yet, it is notable that the worst polluters are
Brazilian, not multinational, plants. As in smog-choked Mexico City or along the string of environmentaleyesore maquiladora (assembly facility) communities that dot the Mexican side of the U.S. border, much of the
blame can be laid at the door of poor local planning, lax government policy, and economic need.¶ Banning
international trade will not decontaminate the planet or stop global warming. Quite the contrary: if every
country produced all and only the products it consumed, waste would be rife. International trade exists because
of production efficiencies that are synonymous with conservation. But the environment's greatest enemy is
poverty. People everywhere want to live in a healthier environment. Trade affords them the means to do so by
raising their incomes. It remains a mystery why, in the words of a prominent Latin American, “[free-trade]
protestors have come together to save the people of developing countries from development.”79 Moreover,
multinational firms-the motors of international trade-tend to be environmentally cleaner than local firms
because (a) their production technologies are designed for and attuned to global standards and (b) the
developed-country consumers of their products are more likely to penalize environmental abusers.¶ Although
some, especially unconstrained local, industries continue to despoil Latin America's environment,
globalization’s counterforces are at work to slow the process. Indeed, trade and environmental goals often
reinforce each other. Developed-country standards on pesticide residues, for example, are causing more and
more “developing-country farmers…to respond by converting to organic production methods.”80 Breaking the
myth that government is held hostage by powerful industries, Brazil is monitoring 15,000 Amazon cattle
ranches by satellite to stop their expansion and further damage to the rain forest.81 Nestlê is an example of
how global business can advance environmental well-being, having been described by former president
Ricardo Lagos of Chile as “a model of corporate social responsibility.”82 The company's purchasing guidelines
"give preference to integrated farming methods that preserve soil, water, air, energy and genetic diversity, and
minimize waste.”83 Nestlé’s environmentally oriented production improvements reduced wastewater
generation by 45 percent, water consumption by 26 percent, and greenhouse gases by 16 percent for each ton of
product produced between 2001 and 2004.84 Enel plans to invest more than 4 billion euros in Latin America
between 2009 and 2014, thus enabling it to “avoid the emission of over 4 million tons of CO2 a year” by
developing renewable energy resources and building new plants.85 Ecuador's San Carlos sugar mill entered an
international joint venture over 40 years ago to utilize its bagasse, a residue from processing sugarcane, as the
fibrous raw material for paper pulp, thus preserving trees that would otherwise have to be cut for pulp. 86 San
Carlos continued its quest for ecofriendly projects, spending more than $1 million in 2008 on sustainability
projects, such as reforestation, lubricant recycling, and a closed-loop system that enabled it to reduce water
usage by 315 cubic meters per hour. San Carlos spent more than $l.5 million on environmental projects in
2009.87
Helped the environment—created organizations
Becker 11—Thomas H. Becker is an economic development authority and management trainer specializing in
Latin America. He has lived, operated businesses, or worked in 16 Latin American countries, and currently
serves as advisor to government agencies, private businesses, universities, and NGOs. His academic
background includes degrees in Latin American American Studies and a Ph.D. in International Business. He
has served on the Business faculty of five universities in the U.S. and Latin America, has written over 100
articles and book chapters in English and Spanish, and is a former President and Managing Director of the
Business Association of Latin American Studies. [Becker, Thomas H.“Doing Business in the New Latin
America: Keys to Profit in America’s Next-Door Markets”—2nd Edition. Pg 52]//MM
Myth No. 5: NAFTA has done nothing to improve the environment. Fact: NAFTA created two binational
institutions that certify and finance environmental infrastructure projects to provide a clean and healthy
environment for residents along the U.S.-Mexico border. To date, they have provided nearly $1 billion for 135
environmental infrastructure projects with a total estimated cost of $2.89 billion and allocated $55.1 million in
assistance and grants for over 450 other border environmental projects. The Mexican government has also
made substantial new investments in environmental protection, increasing the federal budget for the
environmental sector by 81 percent between 2003 and 2008.25
NAFTA helps the environment-renewables
Canadian Government News 7/20 ( “Cleantech Mission to Mexico September 2013” //LEXIS //NS)
Since NAFTA took effect in 1994, Mexico has experienced important progress in the
development and enforcement of its environmental legal and regulatory framework . The Law
for the Use of Renewable Energy and For the Financing of Energy Transition includes a specific
target of 35% of non-fossil fuels electricity production by 2018. According to the National Energy Strategy
2013-2027 this target implies the installation of 18,000 MW at a competitive level. Mexico faces substantial environmental
challenges and the market for environmental technologies is growing at a 6% rate annually, and
worth over $2 billion. Due to many environmental factors (pollution, rising costs of fuels, decreasing prices in clean
energy, and global warming), Mexico is moving towards a greener future and is seeking to become a
world leader in tackling climate change.
it is
Even if globalization is bad, the alternative is far worse
Becker 11—Thomas H. Becker is an economic development authority and management trainer specializing in
Latin America. He has lived, operated businesses, or worked in 16 Latin American countries, and currently
serves as advisor to government agencies, private businesses, universities, and NGOs. His academic
background includes degrees in Latin American American Studies and a Ph.D. in International Business. He
has served on the Business faculty of five universities in the U.S. and Latin America, has written over 100
articles and book chapters in English and Spanish, and is a former President and Managing Director of the
Business Association of Latin American Studies. [Becker, Thomas H.“Doing Business in the New Latin
America: Keys to Profit in America’s Next-Door Markets”—2nd Edition. Pg 36]//MM
Anxiety No. 2: Globalization makes the poor poorer.¶ Perception: Globalization produces losers as well as
winners. Among the winners are the world's poorest. As globalization has advanced in recent decades, global
poverty rates have retreated. At the same time, however, inequalities in income, within and between countries,
have risen.65 This latter reality has spawned much of the sentiment against globalization.¶ Yet, by
subordinating deliverance from poverty to parity in poverty, does the antiglobalization movement build a
better world?¶ Nicholas Stern, former vice president and chief economist of the World Bank, summarizes the
effect of globalization on the poor:¶ Some anxieties about globalization are well-founded, but reversing
globalization would come at an intolerably high price, destroying prospects of prosperity for many millions of
poor people. We do not agree with those who would retreat into a world of nationalism and protectionism. That
way leads to deeper poverty and it is fundamentally hostile to the well-being of people in developing countries.
Instead, we must make globalization work for the poor people of the world. 66
NAFTA partners promotes Environmental Protection
Foreign Affair and International Trade Canada No Date,
http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/nafta-alena/brochmain.aspx
NAFTA partners recognize the importance of enhancing environmental protection, and the
need to cooperate in the enforcement of environmental laws. In order to achieve these goals, NAFTA
partners have established several institutions through the North American Agreement on
Environmental Cooperation. Along the U.S.-Mexico border the North American Development
Bank and the Border Environmental Cooperation Commission are working on the development
and financing of environmental infrastructure projects. To date, 40 projects have been certified. The
Commission for Environmental Cooperation (CEC) promotes environmental protection and
conservation through projects for pollution prevention, waterways management and wildlife
protection, among others. Through the North American Fund for Environmental Cooperation, the CEC has
financed over 127 community based environmental projects in Canada, Mexico and the United States.
NAFTA beneficial for trilateral cooperation
Schott 08
[Jeffrey J. Peterson Institute for International Economics. The North American Free Trade Agreement: Time for a Change? Page
13. November 21-23, 2008. http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/20081218schott.pdf. //SRSL]
Climate-change initiatives could change NAFTA’s profile in the US policy debate and create
constructive channels for trilateral cooperation. Along with border and energy security, these
are the issues that will bring the three countries together in a new dialogue that can benefit all
the peoples of North America.
NAFTA renegotiation key to reducing emissions
Schott 08
[Jeffrey J. Peterson Institute for International Economics. The North American Free Trade Agreement: Time for a Change? Page
13. November 21-23, 2008. http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/20081218schott.pdf . //SRSL]
Climate change presents a big challenge for the NAFTA partners. North America is home to
about 7 percent of the world’s population but is responsible for 25 percent of global emissions
of the most important greenhouse gas (GHG), carbon dioxide. And North American GHG
releases have grown significantly since 1990 in all three countries (see table 8). States and provinces are taking
the lead in developing regulatory regimes that seek to reduce GHGs. Invariably such policies affect the competitiveness of
domestic industries, which have to bear the burden of investing in new equipment or paying
carbon taxes, and seek to influence the composition of national strategies under construction.
Frictions already exist between state and federal policies, and competitiveness concerns
threaten to spill over the NAFTA borders. For example, in the United States, numerous bills on
the congressional docket endorse alternative-energy subsidies and border taxes against
carbon-intensive imports, presaging new barriers to North American trade. Similar legislation is being
vetted in Canada. Before policies are locked in statutory concrete, NAFTA partners should consider
several avenues of cooperation: NAFTA partners need to agree on common industrial
standards and competitiveness provisions that will apply to regional trade. Cooperative efforts
are essential for monitoring GHG emissions and creating efficient trading markets for North
American emissions permits. If the United States and Canada both adopt carbon taxes, they should agree on the same base and rates to
minimize border adjustments. This principle also applies to auctioned CO2 permits. In light of Mexico’s interest in reducing
GHG emissions, the three countries could innovate on ways to extend technical and financial
assistance to help developing countries reduce GHG emissions; these precedents could then
help inform the global negotiations.
NAFTA needs to change environmental provisions
Schott 08
[Jeffrey J. Peterson Institute for International Economics. The North American Free Trade Agreement: Time for a Change? Page
13. November 10-11, 2008. http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/20081218schott.pdf . //SRSL]
The NAFTA partners need to examine the environmental provisions in their various bilateral
free trade agreements and agree to upgrade the NAFTA regime drawing on best practices from
their other accords —especially recent US and Canadian pacts with Peru and Colombia. The US FTAs with these countries contain the most
detailed set of environmental provisions of any trade agreement and incorporate the new rights and obligations mandated by the May 2007 bipartisan
accord on US trade policy between the Democratic-led Congress and the Bush administration.
Protectionism Scenario
2AC
Collapse of NAFTA causes protectionism
Palmer 8- Staff Writer for Reuters (Randall “Canada concerned about protectionism if NAFTA dies”, February 27,2008,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/02/27/idUSN27455425)//RT
OTTAWA, Feb 27 (Reuters) - Canada voiced concern on Wednesday about "protectionist outbursts" from
the United States
if that country were to pull out of the NAFTA trade agreement as Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton are threatening. The two
Democratic presidential candidates said in a debate on Tuesday that they would opt out of NAFTA, the North American Free Trade Agreement, unless
certain environmental and labor standards were renegotiated. "I've been very concerned for a couple of years now. The rhetoric of
protectionism has been creeping, it's been getting more strident, it's permeating Congress,
protectionist groups are flexing their muscle," Canadian International Trade Minister David Emerson told a crush of
reporters. "And it's not just the heat of the election campaign that's causing concern ." Emerson said that if the United States
left NAFTA, which also includesMexico, he did not envisage it suddenly erecting large tariff
barriers. But he did see the possibility of long-standing disputes erupting again and not being
easily settled. "The biggest risk is that there will be periodic outbursts of protectionist sentiment. It may be
softwood lumber one day, it may be beef another day. The real risk is that you lose the ability to resolve these
disputes in a relatively neutral and objective way," he said. Canada has run substantial trade surpluses with the United
States under NAFTA -- for 2007 it was C$85.2 billion ($86.9 billion at current exchange rates) -- but Emerson dismissed this as "simply an accounting
outcome". He said inputs and outputs from manufacturing plants go both ways, and he pointed out that Canada is the largest supplier of energy to the
United States "and NAFTA has been the foundation of integrating the North American energy market." The Conservative minister, a former lumber
company executive, predicted the United States will not pull out of NAFTA. "I think sound, wise judgment will prevail at the end of the day," he said.
Liberal Member of Parliament John McCallum, a former bank economist, said he was concerned about protectionist sentiment among some Democrats.
"If the U.S. were to pull out of NAFTA it would be a catastrophe for Canada," he said.
Protectionism will cause global wars – risks extinction
Panzner 8 – faculty at the New York Institute of Finance, 25-year veteran of the global stock, bond, and currency markets who has worked in New York and London
for HSBC, Soros Funds, ABN Amro, Dresdner Bank, and JPMorgan Chase (Michael, “Financial Armageddon: Protect Your Future from Economic Collapse,” p. 136-138)
curbs on the flow of finance and trade will inspire the United States and other nations to spew forth protectionist
legislation like the notorious Smoot-Hawley bill. Introduced at the start of the Great Depression, it triggered a series of tit-for-tat economic responses, which many
Continuing calls for
commentators believe helped turn a serious economic downturn into a prolonged and devastating global disaster. But if history is any guide, those lessons will have been long
forgotten during the next collapse. Eventually, fed by a mood of desperation and growing public anger, restrictions on trade, finance, investment, and immigration will almost
certainly intensify. Authorities and ordinary citizens will likely scrutinize the cross-border movement of Americans and outsiders alike, and lawmakers may even call for a
general crackdown on nonessential travel. Meanwhile, many nations will make transporting or sending funds to other countries exceedingly difficult. As desperate officials try
to limit the fallout from decades of ill-conceived, corrupt, and reckless policies, they will introduce controls on foreign exchange. Foreign individuals and companies seeking to
acquire certain American infrastructure assets, or trying to buy property and other assets on the cheap thanks to a rapidly depreciating dollar, will be stymied by limits on
investment by noncitizens. Those efforts will cause spasms to ripple across economies and markets, disrupting global payment, settlement, and clearing mechanisms. All of
this will, of course, continue to undermine business confidence and consumer spending. In a world of lockouts and lockdowns, any link that transmits systemic financial
pressures across markets through arbitrage or portfolio-based risk management, or that allows diseases to be easily spread from one country to the next by tourists and
wildlife, or that otherwise facilitates unwelcome exchanges of any kind will be viewed with suspicion and dealt with accordingly. The rise in isolationism and
protectionism will bring about ever more heated arguments and dangerous confrontations over shared sources of oil, gas, and other key
commodities as well as factors of production that must, out of necessity, be acquired from less-than-friendly nations. Whether involving raw materials used in strategic
industries or basic necessities such as food, water, and energy, efforts to secure adequate supplies will take increasing precedence in a world where demand seems constantly
out of kilter with supply. Disputes over the misuse, overuse, and pollution of the environment and natural resources will become more commonplace. Around the world, such
tensions will give rise to full-scale military encounters, often with minimal provocation. In some instances, economic
conditions will serve as a convenient pretext for conflicts that stem from cultural and religious differences. Alternatively, nations may look to divert attention away from
domestic problems by channeling frustration and populist sentiment toward other countries and cultures. Enabled by cheap technology and the waning threat of American
Turbulent
conditions will encourage aggressive saber rattling and interdictions by rogue nations running amok. Age-old clashes will also take on a new,
more heated sense of urgency. China will likely assume an increasingly belligerent posture toward Taiwan, while Iran may embark
on overt colonization of its neighbors in the Mideast. Israel, for its part, may look to draw a dwindling list of allies from around the
world into a growing number of conflicts. Some observers, like John Mearsheimer, a political scientist at the University of Chicago, have even speculated that an
retribution, terrorist groups will likely boost the frequency and scale of their horrifying attacks, bringing the threat of random violence to a whole new level.
“intense confrontation” between the United States and China is “inevitable” at some point. More than a few disputes will turn out to be almost wholly ideological. Growing
cultural and religious differences will be transformed from wars of words to battles soaked in blood. Long-simmering
resentments could also degenerate quickly, spurring the basest of human instincts and triggering genocidal acts. Terrorists employing biological or nuclear
weapons will vie with conventional forces using jets, cruise missiles, and bunker-busting bombs to cause widespread destruction. Many will interpret stepped-up conflicts
between Muslims and Western societies as the beginnings of a new world war.
I/L—NAFTA stops Protectionism
NAFTA is key to heg and preventing protectionism – hemispheric integration and liberal
institutional support
Agrasoy, 4 - Bachelor of Arts degree in International Trade and a Bachelor of Science degree in Management Information Systems from Bogazici
University in Istanbul, Turkey, where he specialized in international trade and investment, Master of Arts in Economics from McGill University in
Montreal, ROI Research Analyst Director of Operations, Public Sector, overseeing worldwide public sector operations at ROI (Emre, “NAFTA: as a
Means of an U.S. Hegemony Creation in the Region?” May 23 2004, http://emreagrasoy.awardspace.com/nafta.pdf)
Although U.S.
seemed the sole dominant power after the collapse of Soviet Union, U.S. envisaged that some areas of
influence 2 would have a huge potential to challenge its politic and economic hegemony in the world, which is leading
towards a tripolar economic structure. 3 Thus, “Fortress North America” must be erected to challenge “Fortress Europe”. Both must be prepared to repel
onslaught of Asian products. 4 At that time the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) came into effect with the initiatives of
U.S. The NAFTA includes Canada, the United States, and Mexico, with a total (as of 2000) combined population of 410 million inhabitants, and
combined GDP of over $11 billion U.S. 5 It created the world’s largest regional freetrade zone, directly challenging the
growing primacy of the European Community and the Japan-East Asia bloc 6 and aiming to maintain its
superpower position. In contrast to the EU, the NAFTA represents a less ambitious effort 7 to establish a common continental market for goods
and services, and common protections for private investors and businesses, with little attention or interest devoted to developing a continental political
or institutional dimension. The important structural and institutional differences among the NAFTA partners are the reasons behind that the NAFTA has
limited its scope to the deregulation of trade and investment flows within the NAFTA zone, rather than attempting a deeper, European-style political and
regulatory harmonization. The model of the world economy assumes cut-throat trade competition between the three regional blocks. To survive in this
competition each block should have a leading nation, which provides the capital and managerial skills, and a group of less developed nations, which
supply the cheap labor and mineral resources takes the role of a regulatory body and dominates the NAFTA economically and politically. So, U.S. as
the dominant nation 8 intended to hook up with Mexico to obtain low-cost labor and oil. Canada’s role is primarily “an
energy and resource hinterland”. 9 For U.S., NAFTA will mean a chance to regain competitive positions eroded by
Japanese and European rivals. 10 For the U.S. the implementation of a North American free trade zone represented an
important but hardly epochal development, one which mostly served to reinforce its already-existing economic and strategic
dominance on the continent and even in the world. Trade patterns within the NAFTA conform largely to a
“hub-and-spoke” structure 11 , with the U.S. located at both the geographical and the economic center of the
continent. 12 The United States adopted economic regionalism toward the end of the twentieth century. NAFTA of the early 1990s were
crafted to apply the liberal policies and free market principles closer to U.S policies. The United States did not
impose NAFTA on North America but it clearly had an inordinate and even hegemonic influence on North America’s
adherence to the disciplines and principles favored by the United States. 13 Free trade, reciprocity, national treatment of
investment, domestic trade policy, dispute settlement, labor and environment protection, and liberalization of services as well as agriculture were
NAFTA tenets. 14 NAFTA is a U.S.-led RIA, a symbolic and genuine innovation that more formally organized North
America with the United States at its geo-economic hub. The NAFTA would draw both neighbors more closely
into the U.S. sphere of influence, reducing the perceived geopolitical risk to U.S. interests that had been posed
by occasional outbreaks of nationalist sentiment in Mexico and Canada. 15 Mexico’s place in North America raises issues
about the tradeoffs involved in integrating more closely developed and developing economies. This is what made NAFTA so consequential for
the possibility of linking the global North and the global South in the Americas. The NAFTA is contributing to
the broad US goal of promoting economic growth, political stability, and progress toward democracy in Mexico.
16 The NAFTA’s provisions should complement and augment the extensive economic reforms already under way in Mexico and provide an
insurance policy against any reversion to past protectionist and interventionist policies that impeded US trade with Mexico. 17 As a
result, a prosperous Mexico would become a thriving market for U.S. exports. 18 NAFTA reinforces ongoing Mexican trade and investment
reforms 19 , which along with reforms in Mexican laws relating to intellectual property rights have generated substantial new
opportunities for U.S. firms. The United States has long championed a Pan American vision of a liberal, democratic,
capitalist hemisphere based on precepts long held to be sacrosanct among its public 20 and private leaders. Integrating
North and South America or at least bringing them closer together meant allowing for a substantial role in
Latin America for U.S. power and policy. For the United States, organizing a RIA in North America was a strategy more than an ultimate
goal. Befitting its global status, it had a more ambitious agenda for the world economy beyond its own neighborhood. The United States pursued two
tracks in economic regionalism during the waning years of the twentieth century. One was a North American or continental track. The second track is
Pan American. As a unipolar region, North America had unique advantages; its hegemonic structure made NAFTA
an obvious first step for a free trade area. After NAFTA, trade dependence and other economic relations are greater than before. The steep
concessions that Mexico had to make to gain admittance to this exclusive North American club were palatable to most Mexicans because the two highly
interdependent economies made structure and policy more congruent. 21 The same is not true of the hemisphere in general. 22 During the mid-1990s,
the United States entertained the view that NAFTA would be the vehicle for the more ambitious project of building a RIA for
the entire hemisphere. It did not quite work out that way. The idea was to widen or broaden NAFTA by including new members through the
accession clause 23 , but NAFTA did not expand. 24 NAFTA was bereft of support as the vehicle for creating a FTAA 25 . While structural power is
important, so too are two other elements of power: the soft power of economic liberalism and the use of leadership to affect outcomes. U.S.
influence depends partially upon an inter-American convergence around liberal market ideas and trade policy
preferences of the United States. In other words, if Latin American leaders agree with the United States on the
principles and disciplines it advocates in the FTAA process, U.S. dominance is more assured. The ultimate goal
of U.S. is that the nations will converge around political and economic liberalization. 26 Especially, in the wake of the
terrorist acts of September 11, Iraq War and thus increasing sociotropic threat 27 and patriotism in different countries, the American foreign
policy in NAFTA become more important in preserving the support of its neighbors and indirectly of the entire
world. U.S. should change the context of NAFTA from mere a free trade area to a union with a Social Charter characteristic. NAFTA should better use a
regime of fair and peaceful competition, through positive integration and institution building strategies. 28 U.S should emphasize the social quality
aspects of NAFTA and help its NAFTA partners improve their economic as well as socio-political conditions to gain new allies
at
the same level in the world arena. The improvement of the rule of law and democracy should not be left in the hands of U.S., but they should
be realized by institutionalization 29 taking the E.U as a model. 30 Taking all these arguments into consideration, the NAFTA’ s success will not
only shape North America’s faith, but also the future of the U.S influence on world politics as a superpower. NAFTA is
used by U.S. to some extent as a model 31 and a vehicle to maintain its superpower role throughout the world.
U.S. is given the opportunity to compete with the European Union and China, the most potential emerging power, by exploiting Mexico’s cheap labor
force and Canada’s natural resources. The strategic policies and actions will determine its NAFTA partners’ position against U.S. They will either lead to
stronger strategic alliances between these countries, even including other Latin American counties, which will enhance the U.S.
dominance or lead to an opposition in Mexico and Canada, which could mean the loss of its superpower role. NAFTA’s future will play an
important role; the success can help U.S. sustain its superpower role, but failure, such faced by U.S. in the FTAA, can
lead to a loss of this power, thus being a follower of E.U. in the world economy and politics it would be sufficient for U.S.
NAFTA has Increased Trade Between the US and Mexico
Villarreal, 12- Specialist in International Trade and Violence (M. Angeles Villarreal, “US-Mexico Economic Relations:
Trends, Issues, and Implications”, Published by congressional research service, published on August 9, 2012,
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32934.pdf)//NG
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) has been in effect since January 1994. ¶ There
are numerous indications that
NAFTA has achieved many of the intended trade and ¶ economic benefits as well as incurred adjustment costs.
This has been in keeping with what most ¶ economists maintain, that trade liberalization promotes overall economic
growth among trading partners, but that there are significant adjustment costs. ¶ Most of the trade effects in the
United States related to NAFTA are due to changes in U.S. trade and investment patterns with
Mexico. At the time of NAFTA implementation, the U.S.-Canada ¶ Free Trade Agreement already had been in effect for five years, and some
industries in the United ¶ States and Canada were already highly integrated. Mexico, on the other hand, had followed an ¶ aggressive
import-substitution policy for many years prior to NAFTA in which it had sought to ¶ develop certain
domestic industries through trade protection. One example is the Mexican ¶ automotive industry, which had been regulated
by a series of five decrees issued by the Mexican ¶ government between 1962 and 1989. The decrees established import tariffs as
high as 25% on automotive goods and had high restrictions on foreign auto production in Mexico. Under NAFTA, Mexico agreed
to eliminate these restrictive trade policies.
NAFTA increased trade between US and Mexico- specific industries listed
Villarreal, 12- Specialist in International Trade and Violence (M. Angeles Villarreal, “US-Mexico Economic Relations:
Trends, Issues, and Implications”, Published by congressional research service, published on August 9, 2012,
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32934.pdf)//NG
Since NAFTA, the automotive, textile, and apparel industries have experienced some of the
more noteworthy changes in trading patterns, which may also have affected U.S. employment
in these industries. U.S. trade with Mexico has increased considerably more than U.S. trade
with other countries, and Mexico has become a more significant trading partner with the
United States since NAFTA implementation. ¶ In the automotive industry, the industry
comprising the most U.S. trade with Mexico, NAFTA ¶ provisions consisted of a phased
elimination of tariffs, the gradual removal of many non-tariff ¶ barriers to trade including rules of origin
provisions, enhanced protection of intellectual property ¶ rights, less restrictive government procurement
practices, and the elimination of performance ¶ requirements on investors from other NAFTA countries. These
provisions may have accelerated ¶ the ongoing trade patterns between the United States and Mexico. Because
the United States and ¶ Canada were already highly integrated, most of the trade impacts on the U.S.
automotive industry ¶ relate to trade liberalization with Mexico. Prior to NAFTA Mexico had a series of
government ¶ decrees protecting the domestic auto sector by reserving the domestic automobile
market for ¶ domestically produced parts and vehicles. NAFTA established the removal of Mexico’s
restrictive ¶ trade and investment policies and the elimination of U.S. tariffs on autos and auto
parts. By 2006, ¶ the automotive industry has had the highest dollar increase ($41 billion) in
total U.S. trade with ¶ Mexico since NAFTA passage.
NAFTA has quintupled Trade between US and Mexico
Lee and Wilson 12- Associate at the Mexico Institute of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, (Erik Lee and
Christopher E. Wilson, “The State of Trade, Competitiveness, and Economic Well-Being in the US-Mexico Border Region”, published by
the North American Center for Transborder Studies, published in June 2012,
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/State_of_Border_Trade_Economy_0.pdf)//NG
The economic vitality of the U.S.-Mexico border region—which includes manufacturing, ¶ infrastructure, human capital
and tourism, among other elements—is a key part of this overall ¶ economic success. With more than a billion dollars of
commercial traffic crossing the border ¶ each day, it is literally at the U.S.-Mexico border region where “the rubber hits the road” in ¶ terms of this
expanded regional trade. This is because more than 70% of total binational ¶ commerce passes through the border
region via trucks. This already massive truck traffic is ¶ expected to increase significantly in the coming decades (see Figure 1 below). Since the
implementation of the North
American Free Trade Agreement in 1994, total trade ¶ between the two
countries has more than quintupled, and goods and services trade is now at a ¶ half trillion
dollars per year. An estimated six million U.S. jobs and probably even more Mexican ¶ jobs
depend on bilateraltrade.2
Democracy Scenario
1NC
NAFTA solves the environment and democracy in Mexico
Gilbreath and Ferretti ‘4 – Gilbreath was a secior associate of the CSIS, currently serves as an international
policy specialist for the US EPA, Ferretti is the chief of the environment division of the Inter-American
Development Bank (Jan and Janine, “Mixing Environment and Trade Policies under NAFTA,” Chapter 4 of
“NAFTA’s Impact on North America: The First Decade,” edited by Sidney Weintraub, published 2004,
CSIS)//ER
NAFTA SUCCESS: ENVIRONMENTAL TEST¶ OF THE NEW MEXICAN DEMOCRACY¶ Some media and
academic writing during the past decade has chroni-¶ cled both the opening of Mexico's
economy and the simultaneous shift¶ to effective suffrage and more open government. The
consensus has¶ been that the two types of openings-political and economic-must¶ operate in tandem for both to
be successful. The NAFTA experience¶ shows that the integration of trade and environmental policies
oper-¶ ates under the same principle. The transparency that is needed in gov-¶ ernment to
optimize economic policies is the same transparency¶ needed to optimize environmental
policies. Transparency, in turn, em-¶ powers the public by holding government accountable for
its actions.¶ The emerging role of NGOs during NAFTA negotiations and imple-¶ mentation set
a precedent not only for Canadian and U.S. groups but¶ also most importantly for Mexican
groups, whose political influence at¶ the domestic level had been more limited before trade negotiations be-¶
gan. Since NAFTA implementation, Mexican environmental groups have¶ been more involved in
both domestic and trilateral decisionmaking on¶ trade and economic policy issues-issues that would
have been beyond¶ the scope of most Mexican environmentalists before 1990. However,¶ the scope of Mexican
NGO participation in domestic trade policies is¶ not as broad as it is in the United States or Canada. For
example, Cana-¶ dian and U.S. environmental organizations are represented on federal¶ trade policy advisory
committees that serve trade negotiators.¶ New Institutions Empower Mexican NGOs¶ NAFTA provided two
institutions in which public participation tends¶ to push the three parties into greater
transparency and accountability¶ for environmental actions. The institution that affects citizens in
all¶ three countries is the CEC, which was established under the NAAECF¶ The other institution, the Border
Environment Cooperation Commis-¶ sion (BECC), affects only the U.S. and Mexican publics.¶ The NAAEC
reinforced public participation and principles of trans-¶ parency and the right of public access to information
about govern-¶ ment operations by setting out obligations for all three signatories in¶ these areas. These
obligations helped to provide the conditions for¶ Mexican NGOs to change their relationships to their federal
govern-¶ ment. The agreement emphasized transparency and public participa-¶ tion by providing
opportunities for NGOs to comment on a broad range of proposed laws, regulations,
procedures, and administrative¶ rulings in each country. It promoted public access to
information by¶ setting out detailed procedures that the public could use to air com-¶ plaints
about a governments failure to enforce its own environmental¶ laws and by instituting
cooperative efforts with Mexico to develop a¶ broad-based emissions inventory that would be
available to the Mexi-¶ can public.¶ The agreement also contained other, indirect pressures on the three¶
federal governments to expand the scope of the environmental infor-¶ mation made publicly available. For
example, article 10 of the NAAEC¶ encouraged the CEC Council, which consists of thc environmental¶ ministers
from each country, to promote the exchange of information¶ on criteria and methodologies used in establishing
domestic environ-¶ mental standards, to promote public awareness of environmental is-¶ sues, and to establish a
process for developing recommendations on¶ greater compatibility of environmental technical regulations,
stan-¶ dards, and conformity assessment procedures? Article 13 makes provi-¶ sion for most CEC reports to be
issued to the public in draft form so¶ that individual citizens or NGOs may comment on them. Other parts¶ of
the agreement emphasized that council reports should be made pub-¶ lic and that council
proceedings must be transparent.
Collapse of Democracy causes Extinction
Diamond 95
Larry, Senior Fellow – Hoover Institution, Promoting Democracy in the 1990s, December,
http://wwics.si.edu/subsites/ccpdc/pubs/di/1.htm
OTHER THREATS This hardly exhausts the lists of threats to our security and well-being in the coming years and
decades. In the former Yugoslavia nationalist aggression tears at the stability of Europe and could easily spread. The
flow of illegal drugs intensifies through increasingly powerful international crime syndicates that have made common
cause with authoritarian regimes and have utterly corrupted the institutions of tenuous, democratic ones . Nuclear,
chemical, and biological weapons continue to proliferate. The very source of life on Earth, the global ecosystem,
appears increasingly endangered. Most of these new and unconventional threats to security are associated with or
aggravated by the weakness or absence of democracy, with its provisions for legality, accountability, popular
sovereignty, and openness. LESSONS OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY The experience of this century offers
important lessons. Countries that govern themselves in a truly democratic fashion do not go to war with one
another. They do not aggress against their neighbors to aggrandize themselves or glorify their leaders. Democratic
governments do not ethnically "cleanse" their own populations, and they are much less likely to face ethnic
insurgency. Democracies do not sponsor terrorism against one another. They do not build w eapons of m ass
d estruction to use on or to threaten one another. Democratic countries form more reliable, open, and enduring
trading partnerships. In the long run they offer better and more stable climates for investment. They are more
environmentally responsible because they must answer to their own citizens, who organize to protest the
destruction of their environments. They are better bets to honor international treaties since they value legal obligations
and because their openness makes it much more difficult to breach agreements in secret. Precisely because, within
their own borders, they respect competition, civil liberties, property rights, and the rule of law , democracies are the
only reliable foundation on which a new world order of international security and prosp