Arjan van Rooij
Eindhoven University of Technology
j.w.v.rooij@tm.tue.nl
Draft, version: 15 June 2004
Work in progress! Please do not cite/ quote.
Engineering Contractors in the Chemical Industry. The
Development of Ammonia Processes, 1910-1940.
In 1924, Bruno Waeser, a German observer of the chemical industry, remarked: "Im Vergleich zu
dem, was die Stickstoffindustrie heute darstellt, war sie 1913/14 noch ein recht kümmerliches
Pflänzchen!"1 Indeed, the nitrogen fertiliser industry grew tremendously in these years. BASF's
development of an ammonia synthesis process was a crucial innovation that made this growth
possible. Ammonia, a chemical compound of nitrogen and hydrogen, is the crucial intermediate
for the production of nitrogen fertilisers. BASF's successful development of a large scale
ammonia synthesis process opened up an entirely new technological field and had a far-reaching
commercial impact on the company. It is one of the most important innovations of the twentiethcentury chemical industry. In 1924, when Waeser made his remarks, several other companies
besides BASF had developed ammonia processes. Some of these firms were engineering
contractors, companies that specialised in the engineering and construction of chemical plants.
These contractors built many plants and the nitrogen fertiliser industry took off.
The development of BASF's ammonia process is one of the best documented innovation
successes of the chemical industry. 2 Surprisingly little has been written on the processes that
1
B. Waeser (1924). Stickstoffindustrie. Dresden & Leipzig: Verlag von Theodor Steinkopff. Preface, no page
number. The quote can be translated as: compared to what the nitrogen industry is today, it looked like a
withering little plant in 1913/14.
2 The most important studies are: L. F. Haber (1971). The Chemical Industry, 1900-1930: International
Growth and Technological Change. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 84-97. M. Appl (1982). The Haber-Bosch
Process and the Development of Chemical Engineering. W. F. Furter, Ed. A Century of Chemical
Engineering. New York: Plenum, 29-53. G. Plumpe (1990). Die I.G. Farbenindustrie AG. Wirtschaft, Technik
und Politik. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot. 203-243. A. S. Travis (1998). High Pressure Industrial Chemistry:
The First Steps, 1909-1913, and the Impact. A. S. Travis, H. G. Schröter, E. Homburg & P. J. T. Morris, Eds.
Determinants in the Evolution of the Chemical Industry, 1900-1939. New Technologies, Political
Frameworks, Markets and Companies. Dordrecht, Boston & London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 3-21. H.
G. Schröter (2004). Ein Technologietransfer hat zwei Seiten. Zum Technologieaustausch zwischen
Deutschland und Nordeuropa (1920-1939). R. Petri, Ed. Technologietransfer aus der deutschen
Chemieindustrie (1925-1960). Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 81-101. The account of Carl Bosch, the BASF
2
were developed in the wake of this breakthrough however. Sometimes these alternative
technologies are characterised as 'imitations': simple copies of BASF's process. It is argued that
the other ammonia processes developed in the 1910s and '20s were only slight variations of the
technology of BASF, that the knowledge of the German company played a crucial role, and that
BASF manufactured the largest amounts of ammonia. The processes developed in the wake of
the German breakthrough were far less important.3
This article seeks to adjust the emphasis commonly placed on BASF. Instead of
focussing on BASF, I take up an industry perspective that examines the diffusion of technology
across different firms and countries. This will make it possible to weigh the work and the
importance of BASF's followers better, and will make it possible to complement what is already
known of engineering contractors. Several studies have tried to give an overview of the activities
and importance of engineering contractors. These authors have argued that the importance of
engineering contractors lies in the development and diffusion of technology across the industry.
Studies of engineering contracting have also claimed that engineering contractors had their
origins in work for the American petroleum industry at the beginning of the twentieth century and
widened their scope to the chemical industry only after the Second World War.4
Ammonia is a good example of engineering contractors diffusing technology across the
chemical industry and also shows that these companies were already active in the chemical
industry in the 1920s. Engineering contractors were crucial for the take off of the nitrogen fertiliser
industry. Extensive research in trade journals, handbooks and technical encyclopaedias forms the
basis of this article. It also draws on several company studies and general histories of the
chemical industry. This collage of sources results in a more comprehensive picture of the
development of ammonia synthesis technology.
This article has three parts. In the first section, BASF and its early followers are central.
These followers included large chemical companies in the United States and Great Britain, the
governments of these countries, and the French government. The second part of the article
engineer leading the development effort (see below), is still authoritative: C. Bosch (1966). The
Development of the Chemical High Pressure Method During the Establishment of the New Ammonia
Industry. Nobel Lecture, May 21, 1932. Nobel Lectures. Including Presentation Speeches and Laureates'
Biographies. Chemistry 1922-1941. Amsterdam: Elsevier for the Nobel Foundation, 197-241. See also
http://www.nobel.se/chemistry/laureates/1931/bosch-lecture.pdf. Alwin Mittasch, who developed the catalyst
for BASF's process, is also often quoted: A. Mittasch (1951). Geschichte der Ammoniaksynthese. Weinheim:
Verlag Chemie.
3 Particularly Plumpe 1990, op. cit. 222. Schröter 2004, op. cit. 84.
4 P. H. Spitz (1988). Petrochemicals: The Rise of an Industry. New York: Wiley. R. Landau & N. Rosenberg
(1992). Successful Commercialization in the Chemical Process Industries. N. Rosenberg, R. Landau & D. C.
Mowery, Eds. Technology and the Wealth of Nations. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 73-119. J. K.
Smith (1998). Patents, Public Policy and Petrochemical Processes in the Post-World War II Era. Business
and Economic History 27, 413-419. Landau & Rosenberg's article gave rise to a number of similar studies,
for instance: A. Arora & N. Rosenberg (1998). Chemicals: A U.S. Success Story. A. Arora, R. Landau & N.
Rosenberg, Eds. Chemicals and Long-Term Economic Growth: Insights from the Chemical Industry. New
York: Wiley Interscience, 71-102. A. Arora & A. Gambardella (1998). Evolution of Industry Structure in the
Chemical Industry. A. Arora, R. Landau & N. Rosenberg, Eds. Chemicals and Long-Term Economic Growth:
Insights from the Chemical Industry. New York: Wiley Interscience, 379-413.
3
focuses on engineering contractors, how they entered ammonia and their importance for the
chemical industry. Not only the ammonia synthesis processes of engineering contractors were
crucial for the chemical industry but also the technologies contractors developed for the supply of
intermediates..
BASF, the Development of Ammonia Synthesis Technology and the First World War.
Although it was well-known by the beginning of the twentieth century that ammonia was a
compound of hydrogen and nitrogen, synthesising ammonia was believed to be impossible. Fritz
Haber, a German chemist working for the Technische Hochschule Karlsruhe started researching
this subject in 1903. Six years later he had developed a method that worked on laboratory scale.
He interested BASF in the process, one of the large German dyestuffs manufacturers and
operating extensive research facilities, where Carl Bosch was put in charge of a team of chemists
and engineers that scaled up Haber's process. Bosch and his colleagues confronted many
problems. Synthesising ammonia involved high pressure and high temperature, an unknown
territory in chemical technology, that made equipment design very difficult. The first converters,
the part of the ammonia plant where hydrogen and nitrogen reacted and formed ammonia,
frequently blew up and Bosch also had to find suitable, non-leaking, compressors capable of
achieving the desired pressure. In addition, Haber's process was catalytic, meaning that its yield
and speed could be increased in the presence of a particular substance. Bosch put Alwin
Mittasch in charge of finding a suitable catalyst and over the course of several years, Mittasch
tested numerous materials. In 1910 a suitable catalyst was found but research continued. By
1912, 2.500 substances had been tested in 6.500 experiments.5
Bosch and his team progressed quickly and built a small pilot plant in 1911. Two years
later the first industrial ammonia synthesis plant in the world began production at Oppau, near
BASF's headquarters in Ludwigshafen. The technology became known as the Haber-Bosch
process.
Ammonia was an important intermediate for the production of nitrogen fertilisers. The
town gas and coke industries produced limited quantities of ammonium sulphate, a nitrogen
fertiliser, on the basis of ammonia both industries had to extract from their gas. Chilean nitrate
had been available as a fertiliser product since the nineteenth century. Food production rested on
fertilisers, it was believed, and as the world population increased, many expected the depletion of
natural resources. In a famous address to the British Association for the Advancement of Science
in 1898, William Crookes predicted that the deposits of Chilean nitrate would be exhausted by
1921. Crookes pleaded for a technological solution: the unlimited quantities of nitrogen in the air
would have to be tapped to manufacture fertilisers and secure food production. Several
5
See the literature on the Haber-Bosch process mentioned above.
4
alternative routes were developed around 1900 but BASF's Haber-Bosch led to an abundant and
cheap source of ammonia and opened up a new field of chemical technology. 6
The Haber-Bosch process was an important breakthrough for another reason as well.
Chilean nitrate and ammonia were also intermediates for the production of ammunition and
explosives. Moreover, British and American companies controlled the Chilean nitrate industry and
this was a worrying perspective for Germany in a climate of increasing international tension.
Shortly after the outbreak of the First World War, the British navy blocked German harbours and
cut off the imports of Chilean nitrate. With financial assistance of the government, BASF
developed a process for the oxidation of ammonia to nitric acid, and built a large capacity for this
product still during the war. Nitric acid was vital for the production of ammunition because it led to
ammonium nitrate, an explosive. (See also figure 1.) BASF also built a second, and very large
ammonia plant in Leuna, near Merseburg in the middle of Germany, to secure production of
ammonia because of the high demand for ammonia and because the site at Oppau, close to the
French border, was vulnerable to air attacks. The German government funded an important part
of the Leuna works.7
Figure 1. Ammonia as an intermediate for the production of fertilisers and explosives. 8
Fertilisers:
Explosives and ammunition:
Ammonia
Ammonium sulphate
Ammonium nitrate
With sulphuric
acid
Nitric acid
Ammonia in the United States.
6
Appl 1982, op. cit. 29, 46. Travis 1998, op. cit. 3. F. A. Ernst & M. S. Sherman (1927). The World's
Inorganic Nitrogen Industry. Industrial & Engineering Chemistry 19(2), 196-204. There 196. T. P. Hughes
(1975). Das "technologische Momentum" in der Geschichte. Zur entwicklung des Hydrierverfahrens in
Deutschland 1898-1933. K. Hausen & R. Rürup, Eds. Moderne Technikgeschichte. Köln: Kiepenheuer &
Witsch. Originally published as Technological Momentum in History: Hydrogenation in Germany 1898-1933.
Past and Present 1969, 44, 106-132.
7 Plumpe 1990, op. cit. 212-217. H. Grossmann & P. Weicksel (1930). Die Stickstoffindustrie der Welt.
Berlin: Allgemeiner Industrie-Verlag. 97-107. J. A. Johnson (2002). Die Macht der Synthese (1900-1925). W.
Abelshauser, Ed. Die BASF: eine Unternehmensgeschichte. München: Beck, 117-220. There 168-181.
8 In the early 1930s, ammonium nitrate was mixed with clay or marl and this yielded a nitrogen fertiliser. In
the United States ammonium nitrate was also directly used as a fertiliser, but usually with a lower nitrogen
content compared to when ammonium nitrate was used as an intermediate for the production of explosives
and ammunition. This again underlines the possible dual use of ammonia.
5
BASF's activities, and the German government's involvement, aroused much interest in other
countries. In 1912, the General Chemical Co., one of the largest American chemical companies,
also began working on ammonia synthesis. Two years later the Bureau of Soils, the research unit
of the department of agriculture, started research on the synthesis of ammonia and other
processes which could provide nitrogen. Researchers from the Bureau of Soils were working on
nitrogen fertilisers in general since 1911. The outbreak of the First World War triggered a public
debate on ammonia regardless of the neutral position of the United States at that time and
regardless of the secure supply of Chilean nitrate. In 1916 the federal government funded some
research but it took another year before it organised a coordinated effort. The federal government
confiscated BASF's patents in 1918 after the United States had entered the war. 9
In 1917, the projects of the Bureau of Soils and General Chemical reached the pilot plant
stage. The Bureau of Soils built a small experimental unit, which was started in Arlington
(Virginia) in August 1917, but they had trouble finding a suitable catalyst. In April of the same
year, General Chemical started an ammonia synthesis pilot plant, probably in Shadyside (New
York). General Chemical encountered many technical difficulties as well and approached the
government for support. The government and General Chemical agreed that an ammonia plant
should be built on the basis of General Chemical's process. The government funded the
construction of this plant, which was named Nitrate Plant #1, and later assigned thirty chemists
and engineers form the Army to the project.10 In August of 1916, the government had already
initiated research on the oxidation of ammonia to nitric acid. The Bureau of Soils worked on this
project, together with the Semet-Solvay Company, a firm that specialised in the engineering and
construction of coke oven plants. The Solvay Process Company, the American arm of the Solvay
group that operated a large soda plant at Syracuse (New York), established the Semet-Solvay
Company in 1902. Semet-Solvay built a pilot plant equipped with an experimental nitric acid
process at Syracuse near the soda plant. The coke industry supplied the necessary ammonia. 11
After the government and General Chemical concluded their contract, work progressed
quickly. Nitrate Plant #1 was built at Sheffield (Alabama) and produced the first ammonia on 16
September 1918. Only one, the smallest, of the three foreseen units worked at that time,
however, and the catalyst General Chemical had developed proved to be completely unsuitable.
The equipment also failed frequently. The converters were of poor quality, and the valves and
9
H. Wigglesworth (1927). The Nitrogen Industry in the United States. Journal of the Society of Chemical
Industry, Chemistry and Industry 46(13), 313-314. There 314. W. Haynes (1945). American Chemical
Industry. Volume II: The World War One Period: 1912-1922. New York: D. van Nostrand. 87, 91-96. R. O. E.
Davis (1949). Forty Years of Fertilizer Research. Chemical & Engineering News 27(7), 410-412. There 410411. D. C. Mowery & N. Rosenberg (1998). Paths of Innovation. Technological Change in 20th-Century
America. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 75.
10 Haynes 1945, op. cit. 87, 97. B. Waeser (1922). Die Luftstickstoffindustrie. Mit besonderer
Berücksichtigung der Gewinnung von Ammoniak und Salpetersäure. Leipzig: Otta Spamer. 216-217.
11 Waeser 1922, op. cit. 210-211. W. Haynes (1954). American Chemical Industry. Volume I: Background
and Beginnings. New York: D. van Nostrand. 273.
6
pipes leaked frequently so that the desired pressure could not be reached. The plant did not
reach the stage of continuous operations.12
Only two months after Nitrate Plant #1 had been started, the warring parties agreed upon
an armistice in November 1918. Within the American administration different opinions existed as
to what to do with the plant. The government could also not reach agreement with General
Chemical, and therefore Nitrate Plant #1 closed in January 1919. In June, the American
government sent a commission of experts to inspect BASF's plant at Oppau, now under French
control, and the information this commission gathered became available for American companies.
In the spring of 1919, the government also established the Fixed Nitrogen Research Laboratory
(FNRL). The Bureau of Soils' ammonia research group moved to this new organisation. Among
other research projects, the FNRL continued to work on an ammonia synthesis process,
particularly on its basic design, the catalyst, and the equipment. In 1924 they started a small
experimental unit with a capacity of half a ton of ammonia per day. The FNRL made its
technology, known as the 'American process', available to private companies but those firms had
to do the work necessary to build a plant. Mathieson Alkali Works was the first to use FNRL
know-how when they decided to build an ammonia plant in 1922. 13
General Chemical continued to work on ammonia as well. In 1919 they established the
Atmospheric Nitrogen Co. together with Solvay Process, interested in the field through the work
of the Semet-Solvay Co. on nitric acid. Moreover, General Chemical and the American Solvay
group merged into Allied Chemical & Dye in 1920, with the Atmospheric Nitrogen Co. becoming a
subsidiary of the new firm. The problems with the ammonia process were worked out after 1919
and a small plant started at Syracuse in 1921. Allied developed into a major manufacturer of
ammonia and nitrogen fertilisers on the basis of this technology and started a large plant at
Hopewell (Virginia) in 1928.14
Through the efforts of the Bureau of Soils and General Chemical, Haber-Bosch ammonia
technology entered the United Staes. The example of General Chemical is interesting for a
number of reason. The company started work on ammonia before the First World War, and even
before BASF's plant started production, showing that there were other pioneering companies as
well. The problems General Chemical faced, finding suitable equipment designs and a suitable
catalyst, were the same problems BASF faced. BASF's patents helped little here because they
were nationalised only in 1918, when work had already been done for a number of years. In
12
Waeser 1922, op. cit. 220. Haynes 1945, op. cit. 101-104. Ammonia. Chemical & Engineering News 1950,
28(37), 3104-3109. There 3104-3105.
13 Haynes 1945, op. cit. 120-122. A. B. Lamb (1920). The Fixed Nitrogen Research Laboratory. Chemical &
Metallurgical Engineering 21(21), 977-979. R. S. Tour (1922). The German and American Synthetic
Ammonia Plants. Chemical & Metallurgical Engineering, part 1: 26(6), 245-248; part 2: 26(7), 307-311; part
3: 26(8), 359-362; part 4: 26(9), 411-415; part 5: 26(10), 463-465. There part 1, 245-246. The 'American
Process' for Nitrogen Fixation. Chemical & Metallurgical Engineering 1924, 30(24), 948. W. Haynes (1948).
American Chemical Industry. Volume IV: The Merger Era. New York: D. van Nostrand. 86.
14 Waeser 1922, op. cit. 223-224. Haynes 1948, op. cit. 86.
7
addition, there was not one patent covering the entire Haber-Bosch process but over 200. None
of these patents contained crucial details as the materials of construction, nor the composition of
the catalyst.15 Only research could overcome these problems and when the Atmospheric Nitrogen
Co., General Chemical's successor, had developed appropriate equipment designs, engineering
works had to be found which could manufacture them. Ammonia synthesis was a completely
novel field.
Great Britain and France.
The American government chose to cooperate with private companies in the development of
ammonia synthesis technology but the British government was more active. In 1913 the British
government initiated research on ammonia, and right at the outbreak of the First World War
confiscated BASF's patents. Several years of work led to little results, and at the end of the war,
the government tried to interest private companies in the project. They approached Brunner
Mond, a large chemical company that would merge into Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI) in
1926. Brunner Mond hesitated at first but representatives of the company visited Oppau in April
and May 1919. They met with fierce opposition from BASF employees and Brunner Mond could
gather little information. An unknown thief then stole the final version of the British report.
Although little practical information came out of the visit to Oppau, it bolstered Brunner Mond's
confidence in the Haber-Bosch process, and the company decided to take over the government's
ammonia project, including BASF's British patents. At the end of 1919 Brunner Mond started, and
soon confronted problems, the design of the equipment being the bottle neck. In 1920, the
Atmospheric Nitrogen Co. disclosed its process to Brunner Mond as Brunner Mond was a large
shareholder of the former Solvay Process Company. Brunner Mond also hired two engineers who
claimed to have worked in BASF's ammonia plants. Through their various efforts, Brunner Mond
solved the technical problems, and started a pilot plant in 1921, followed by an industrial plant at
Billingham three years later.16
The experiences of Brunner Mond in developing an ammonia process were similar to
those of the Bureau of Soils and General Chemical in the United States. Interestingly, the visit of
Brunner Mond engineers to BASF's plant at Oppau did not reveal much useful information but
was crucial in making the decision that an ammonia process could be developed. The input for
this development project was original research work and, at a later stage, the experience and
knowledge of two German engineers.
15
A. Arora (1997). Patents, Licensing, and Market Structure in the Chemical Industry. Research Policy 26,
391-403. There 392-394.
16 Waeser 1922, op. cit. 153-172. B. Waeser (1932). Die Luftstickstoffindustrie. Mit Berücksichtigung der
chilenischen Industrie und des Kokereistickstoffs. Leipzig: Otto Spamer. 129. W. J. Reader (1970-1975).
Imperial Chemical Industries: A History. London: Oxford University Press. Two volumes. Vol. 1, 1970, 351367.
8
BASF's Haber-Bosch process also aroused the interest of French chemical companies.
Saint Gobain, one of the largest firms in the industry, tried to sway BASF to license Haber-Bosch
in 1913 but failed. Together with Kuhlmann, another large French chemical company, and several
other firms, Saint Gobain established the Société d'Etudes de l'Azote in 1919 with the aim to
acquire ammonia and nitrogen fertiliser technologies. This society persuaded the French
government to help them gain access to BASF's Haber-Bosch process. In comparison to the
British and American governments, the French took a much more straightforward approach: in
1919 they forced BASF to license its process under the treaty of Versailles. The French
government pressured BASF to assist in the engineering of an ammonia plant in France and let
private French companies run it. In 1924 the government changed its mind, and decided for state
exploitation through the Office National Industriel de l'Azote (ONIA), a company specifically
established for that purpose. Ammonia was produced for the first time in 1927 but in the mean
time the government had also changed its mind with respect to the technology. ONIA's plant at
Toulouse did not use the Haber-Bosch process, but with technology developed by Luigi Casale.
He was part of another force that was making itself felt in ammonia and the nitrogen fertiliser
industry: engineering contractors. These companies will be the subject of the next section.17
Table 1. Large companies and governments in ammonia.
Company/
organisation
Process
Start of
research
Pilot
Plant
First industrial
plant
BASF
Haber-Bosch
1911
1913
General Chemical/
Allied Chemical
Bureau of Soils/ FNRL
Brunner Mond/ ICI
Allied Chemical
-1903 (Haber)
-1909 (BASF)
1912
1917
1914
1913 (by British
government
1917
1921
-1921 (small plant)
-1928 (large plant)
1922
Turn of the year
1923-1924
American Process
ICI
Sources: see text.
17
Waeser 1922, op. cit. 140-142. Waeser 1932, op. cit. 113, 115. First Complete List of Licenses of Casale
Ammonia Process. Chemical & Metallurgical Engineering 1924, 31(21), 832. France is Increasing Home
Supply of Nitrogen-Carrying Products. Chemical & Metallurgical Engineering 1925, 32(17), 893. F. Ullmann.
Enzyklopädie der technischen Chemie. Berlin: Urban & Schwarzenberg. Second edition, 10 volumes, 19281932. Vol. 1, 1928, 376.
9
Engineering Contractors in Ammonia.
After the end of the First World War ended, demand for ammunition and explosives fell, but the
use of nitrogen fertilisers grew, and continued to grow, with the exception of the economic crisis
of the 1930s. (See graph 1.) Interest in ammonia synthesis remained high therefore, and by the
early 1920s, not only governments and large chemical companies involved themselves in
ammonia but also smaller companies and even individual engineers. Engineering contractors
entered ammonia and developed further alternative Haber-Bosch processes.
Graph 1. World nitrogen fertiliser use, 1905/06 – 1938/39
3,0
Million ton nitrogen
2,5
2,0
1,5
1,0
0,5
1937/38
1935/36
1933/34
1931/32
1929/30
1927/28
1925/26
1923/24
1921/22
1919/20
1917/18
1915/16
1913/14
1911/12
1909/10
1907/08
1905/06
0,0
Fertiliser year
Source: Long-Term Trends of World Fertilizer Consumption. Monthly Bulletin of Agricultural and Economic
Statistics 1962, 11(2), 1.
Note: the source for these statistics is the FAO. Fertilisers years ran from 1 July in one year to 1 July in the
following year.
The ammonia process of Allied and the FNRL were not the only processes to come out of the
American ammonia research projects of the First World War. Louis L. Jones had worked on the
development of a nitric acid process at Semet-Solvay during the war, and on ammonia synthesis
thereafter. Together with Charles C. Brown, who worked part-time for Semet-Solvay, he
established the Nitrogen Engineering Corporation (NEC) in the early 1920s. NEC was more or
less a consulting engineering venture, aimed at engineering ammonia plants for various clients.
The American company Mathieson Alkali Works granted NEC its first project. In 1922, Mathieson
had decided to build an ammonia plant annex the production of chlorine at Niagara Falls (New
10
York) with the American process of the FNRL but Mathieson turned to NEC to get the project of
the ground. The plant started production in 1926. American Cyanamid, a large producer of
calcium carbide that wanted to diversify, acquired NEC three years later. The acquisition enabled
the Chemical Construction Co. (Chemico), an engineering contractor and already owned by
American Cyanamid, to engineer and construct ammonia plants. Together with Kuhlmann and
other companies, American Cyanamid also established the Hydro Nitro AG in Switzerland in 1928
to sell licenses on the NEC ammonia process, probably in Europe. Kuhlmann secured its entry
into ammonia and fertilisers in this way. It hired NEC in the same year for an ammonia plant at
Lille, that started production in 1930. NEC and Kuhlmann developed a close relationship at that
time, and were active in developing technologies related to ammonia synthesis. 18
In France, Italy and Germany, private interests also got involved with ammonia synthesis
during the First World War and thereafter. In France, Georges Claude started working on an
ammonia process in 1917. Following Linde, Claude had tried to separate air into its components
by cooling to low temperatures (liquefaction of air) since 1896. Claude established Air Liquide in
1902 and built a number of oxygen plants in France and other countries in the following years. In
ammonia, Claude aimed at using pressures of up to 1000 atmospheres, much higher than those
used in other processes. This increased the mechanical design problems even further, and
Claude had to develop special compressors to reach the pressure he desired. In 1920 a pilot
plant was built, followed by an industrial installation a year later. Like NEC, Claude decided to
license his process to other companies. In 1919, Air Liquide and Saint Gobain established the
Société de la Grande Paroisse Azote et Produits Chimiques for the development and exploitation
of the Claude ammonia process. Grande Paroisse started to license other companies after the
first industrial plant was in operation.19
In Italy, Luigi Casale began research on ammonia synthesis at the university of Turin in
1916. In 1920 he built a pilot plant, followed by a plant on an industrial scale a year later. Casale
developed his own catalyst and converter design. In 1921, Ammonia Casale was established in
Switzerland with the intention to license the Casale ammonia process. Ammonia Casale supplied
the technology for the ONIA plant at Toulouse after the French government had decided in 1924
not to use BASF's Haber-Bosch process. A French sublicensor of Casale, and a series of
18
Waeser 1932, op. cit. 58-60, 160. Haynes 1945, op. cit. 46 and note on that page. Haynes 1948, op. cit.
44-45, 86, 90 and note on that page. Reader, op. cit. vol. 2, 1975, 110. State archives Maastricht (the
Netherlands), company archives DSM 17.26/34, inventory number 782: Letter Chemico to Hoek, 18 March
1968.
19 Waeser 1924, op. cit. 75-76. Waeser 1932, op. cit. 111. H. L. Thomson, P. Guillaumeron & N. C.
Updegraff (1952). Ammoia Synthesis at 1000 Atmospheres. The Present Day Claude Process. Chemical
Engineering Progress 48(9), 468-475. There 468, 470. 100 Years of Inspiration: The Air Liquide Adventure.
(2002). http://www.100ans.airliquide.com/en/. Accessed 26 June 2003.
11
subcontractors, built the ONIA plant. BASF did not provide such assistance, although it was
obliged to on paper, making the transfer of technology very difficult.20
By using different catalysts, varying the design of the equipment and by changing the
pressure and temperature, NEC, Claude and Casale developed alternative ammonia synthesis
processes. In outline though, these processes followed Haber-Bosch. BASF's process consisted
of three basic steps. A mixture of hydrogen and nitrogen was first produced (synthesis gas), this
mixture was compressed, and finally synthesised into ammonia. BASF's followers did not change
this configuration, and this is often used as an argument to classify these followers as imitators. 21
This ignores, however, the necessary work that needed to be done before these 'imitations'
worked on an industrial scale. Research was above all needed to find a suitable catalyst, and
varying the pressure and temperature meant specific equipment design problems and also
influenced the economics of the process. Solving these problems required a lot of work. 22
Two other important ammonia synthesis processes were developed in the 1920s.
Giacomo Fauser, an Italian consulting engineer, built a small pilot unit in 1921. He interested
Montecatini in his process, an Italian firm established in 1888 to exploit a copper mine but that
had entered the chemical industry in the 1910s and that pursued further expansion. Montecatini
built the first Fauser ammonia plant and started it in 1923. Montecatini built several more in Italy
in the 1920s but in 1925 also decided to license the Fauser process. The company licensed
directly, and established the SA Ammoniaque Synthétique et Dérivés (ASED) in Brussels in 1926.
Evence Coppée, a large engineering contractor in the field of coke oven plants and related
installations, was the second major shareholder of ASED. Montecatini and Coppée intended
ASED to manufacture nitrogen fertilisers in Belgium, and to engineer and construct Fauser
ammonia plants.23
In Germany too, BASF's monopoly in ammonia technology was challenged. Between
1916 and 1919, the Swedish chemist J.W. Cederberg researched ammonia catalysts. His work
continued in the laboratories of Norsk Hydro in the following two years. Norsk Hydro was a
Norwegian company that manufactured fertilisers with the so-called arc process. With this
technology, nitrogen and oxygen reacted at high temperature to form nitric oxide, this compound
was then processed into diluted nitric acid, and this acid was finally used to manufacture
fertilisers. The arc process consumed a lot of electricity but Norsk Hydro had cheap hydroelectric
20
Waeser 1932, op. cit. 141-142. New Italian Process for the Manufacture of Synthetic Ammonia. Chemical
& Metallurgical Engineering 1920, 23(19), 945. http://www.casale.ch/ammonia/ Accessed 12 May 2003.
21 Plumpe 1990, op. cit. 222. Schröter 2004, op. cit. 84. This is argument is also strongly present in the
German technical literature: see Waeser 1922, 1924 and 1932 op. cit. and Ullmann, op. cit. vol. 1, 1928,
402-412, and particularly 402.
22 E. Homburg & A. van Rooij (2004). Die Vor- und Nachteile enger Nachbarschaft. Der Transfer deutscher
chemischer Technologie in de Niederlande bis 1952. R. Petri, Ed. Technologietransfer aus der deutschen
Chemieindustrie (1925-1960). Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 201-251. There 225-227.
23 State archives Maastricht (the Netherlands), company archives DSM 17.26/ 03A inv.no. 2475: Recueil des
Actes et Documents Relatifs aux Société Commerciales, Acte 196, December 1926. Ullmann, op. cit. vol. 1,
1928, 376. The Montecatini Concern and its Activities. (ca. 1948). Milano: Montecatini. 5-6, 21-24.
12
power available. The Haber-Bosch process threatened the arc process, and Norsk Hydro
therefore supported the work of Cederberg but also worked on diversifications and was
developing the arc process further. In 1921, Norsk Hydro stopped the work on ammonia
synthesis because management felt that an improved arc process would be able to compete.
Cederberg, however, interested the Gewerkschaft der Steinkohlenzeche Mont Cenis, a German
colliery located at Herne-Sodingen, three years later. Mont Cenis and Friedrich Uhde, a German
engineer who had established an engineering contracting company in 1921, developed an
ammonia process. In 1926 Uhde built a pilot plant at Mont Cenis, and an industrial plant started
production two years later. Mont Cenis and others established the Gasverarbeitungsgesellschaft
(GAVEG) around 1926 to licence the technology to other companies while Uhde engineered and
constructed the plants.24
The work of Claude, Casale, Fauser and NEC and Uhde, made a substantial number of
ammonia processes available by the middle of the 1920s. (See also table 2.) Most histories of
ammonia have up till now focused on BASF's radical innovation and have neglected the work of
engineering contractors. Histories of engineering contracting, on the other hand, have neglected
ammonia. These studies argue that the roots of engineering contracting can be found in the
American petroleum industry and that engineering contractors started to work for the chemical
industry only after the Second World War.25 The example of ammonia shows, however, that
engineering contractors already entered the chemical industry in the 1920s. This confirms the
results of an earlier study by myself and Ernst Homburg. We tried to show that engineering
contracting has much older and much more diverse roots than suggested in the literature. In
areas like beet sugar, sulphuric acid, distillation and coke for instance, specialised suppliers
emerged in the second half of the nineteenth century. These companies had a background in
engineering and equipment manufacture or were established with the specific purpose of
engineering and constructing installations for the process industries. Around 1900, civil and
electrical engineering contractors also branched out. 26
From this perspective, ammonia is another example of an early form of engineering
contracting. The companies involved were specifically set up for engineering and constructing
ammonia plants. Their methods enabled the entry into the fertiliser industry of companies which
would otherwise have been unable to do so. 27 The consequences of this practice will be the
subject of the next section.
24
Waeser 1932, op. cit. 49-51. H. Gieseler, Ed. (1996). Von der Druckerschwärze zum High-TechEngineering. Die Uhde-Story. 75 years Engineering with Ideas. Uhde 1921 - 1996. Dortmund, Uhde-GmbH.
3-5. For Norsk Hydro see: Grossmann & Weicksel 1930, op. cit. 68-69, 160-163, Schröter 2004, op. cit. 90.
25 Landau & Rosenberg 1992, op. cit. Smith 1998, op. cit.
26 A. van Rooij & E. Homburg (2002). Building the Plant. A History of Engineering Contracting in the
Netherlands. Zutphen: Walburg Pers. Chapters 2 and 3.
27 For a company case study see: A. van Rooij (2004). Building Plants. Markets for Technologies and
Internal Capabilities in DSM's Nitrogen Fertiliser Business. Amsterdam: Aksant. Dissertation Eindhoven
University of Technology. Chapter 3.
13
Table 2. Ammonia processes of engineering contractors.
Process
Start of
research
Pilot
plant
Industrial
plant
Licensing company Country
Established
Claude
1917
1920
1921
Grande Paroisse
France
1919
Casale
1916
1920
1921
Ammonia Casale
Switzerland
1921
Fauser
1920
1921
1923
Montecatini
Italy
1925*
ASED
Belgium
1926
NEC
1915
Uhde-Mont 1916
Cenis
X
1926
Hydro Nitro
Switzerland
1928
1926
1928
Gasverarbeitungsgesellschaft
(GAVEG)
Germany
ca. 1926
Source: A. van Rooij (2004). Building Plants. Markets for Technologies and Internal Capabilities in DSM's
Nitrogen Fertiliser Business. Amsterdam: Aksant. Dissertation Eindhoven University of Technology. Table
3.2.
The Importance of Engineering Contractors in Ammonia.
Although BASF's followers cannot be called mere imitators, the question remains if the ammonia
processes developed by engineering contractors were at all important for the chemical industry. A
reason to doubt this importance can be found in capacity figures for the different processes. In
1927, almost 73% of all ammonia was manufactured with the Haber-Bosch process. In 1936, this
percentage had declined spectacularly but still almost a third of all ammonia came from BASF
plants. (Table 3.) These plants were now part of IG Farbenindustrie, the conglomerate which
resulted form the merger of BASF, Bayer, Hoechst and several smaller German chemical
companies in 1925.28
As these figures indicate, the plants at Leuna and Oppau were extremely large and IG
Farben dominated the industry completely. The second largest company in 1927 was ICI. While
IG Farben had capacities installed of 450.000 tons of nitrogen per year, ICI's plant in Billingham
had a capacity of only 14.400 tons: ICI was roughly 31 times smaller than IG Farben! By this
measure the German company's dominance also declined but in 1936 it was still about five times
larger than the second and third largest firms.
Table 3. Capacity of ammonia synthesis processes in 1927 and 1936.
Process
28
Capacity
See Plumpe 1990, op. cit.
14
Percentage of total capacity
1927
1936
Haber-Bosch
Casale
Claude
Fauser
ICI
ANC
FNRL
NEC
Mont Cenis
Other
72,72
11,62
5,36
4,32
2,33
2,06
1,13
0,47
-
32,74
14,51
16,45
10,65
0,98
6,08
0,22
13,71
4,67
0,00
Total (tons N/ year)
618.850
3.452.411
Sources: F. Ullmann. Enzyklopädie der technischen Chemie. Berlin: Urban & Schwarzenberg. Second
edition, 1928-1932. Vol. 1, 1928, 414-415. J. D. Breslauer (1936). World Nitrogen Industry Survives
International Crises. Chemical & Metallurgical Engineering 43(5), 282-285. Table 1, 283-284.
Historians have often used such capacity figures to claim a crucial role for Haber-Bosch in the
development of the nitrogen industry and downplay the importance of other ammonia
processes.29 Although capacity figures clearly indicate the enormous size of IG Farben in
comparison to its competitors, they therefore also indicate that many companies operated plants
at much smaller capacities. Using capacity figures as a measure of the importance of engineering
contractors in the nitrogen fertiliser industry might be flawed therefore. From a technology
diffusion perspective, the number of plants is also a better measure than capacity figures. When
looking at the number of plants, it becomes clear that engineering contractors sold many plants.
Of the 39 ammonia plants in operation in 1927, only two used the Haber-Bosch process. In 1936
the number of ammonia plants had risen to 105 and only four used Haber-Bosch. (Tables 4 and
5.)
29
For instance: Haber 1971, op. cit. 96. Schröter 2004, op. cit. 84-87.
15
Table 4. Number of ammonia plants per process in 1927.
Process
Plants
Number
Percentage of total
Claude
Casale
Fauser
FNRL
Haber-Bosch
ICI
Allied Chemical
NEC
13
13
5
3
2
1
1
1
33,33
33,33
12,82
7,69
5,13
2,56
2,56
2,56
Total
39
100
Source: F. Ullmann. Enzyklopädie der technischen Chemie. Berlin: Urban & Schwarzenberg. Second
edition, 1928-1932. Vol. 1, 1928, 414-415.
Table 5. Number of ammonia plants per process in 1936.
Process
Plants
Number
Percentage of total
Casale
NEC
Fauser
Claude
Mont Cenis
Haber-Bosch
ICI
FNRL
Allied Chemical
Other
21
21
21
19
8
4
3
3
2
3
20,00
20,00
20,00
18,10
7,62
3,81
2,86
2,86
1,90
2,86
Total
105
100
Source: J. D. Breslauer (1936). World Nitrogen Industry Survives International Crises. Chemical &
Metallurgical Engineering 43(5), 282-285. Table 1, 283-284.
Tables 4 and 5 also show the most important engineering contractors. Claude and Casale had
entered the field of ammonia first and had established a lead over their competitors, enabling
them to be the most successful licensors in 1927. In 1936, however, Fauser and NEC had also
established themselves as important processes. Many plants used the Fauser process although
Montecatini, a company with interests in fertiliser manufacture, backed this technology.
16
Apparently the Italian company thought that it could safely license its technology without being
hurt in its business. Montecatini reserved the Italian market for itself but neglected exports. A
Swedish firm bought the first license for instance while Montecatini also established a company in
the Netherlands, a large and growing market, instead of exporting fertilisers. Montecatini did not
license other Italian firms however. 30
The contrast between Montecatini and IG Farben, and BASF before, is interesting. As the
fertiliser market grew, Montecatini started to license while IG Farben expanded its plants at
Oppau and Leuna. Occasionally, IG Farben did license. Of the four Haber-Bosch plants in 1936,
two belonged to IG Farben while ONIA's plant is also taken as a Haber-Bosch plant. The fourth
plant was licensed to the Norwegian company Norsk Hydro. At the end of 1926, Norsk Hydro
finally lost its confidence in the arc process and decided to build an ammonia synthesis plant. The
company contracted NEC for this project but at the end of 1927 reached an agreement with IG
Farben. The German company agreed to let Norsk Hydro use the Haber-Bosch process but at
the same time attained control over the output of the Norwegian plant. 31 For IG Farben this was
crucial: they licensed their technology but wanted to remain in complete control over the
production of fertilisers. In the second half of the 1930s, IG Farben also built ammonia plants for
five Japanese companies but again remained in control of fertiliser production, at least until the
outbreak of the Second World War. IG Farben had reached a limit in its exports to Japan because
the market was saturated and because of cartel agreements.32
The capacities of IG Farben's plants at Oppau and Leuna say something of the business
strategy of this company: it wanted to build large plants and extended these plants if exports
markets grew. IG Farben dominated the nitrogen fertiliser industry, and aimed to do so. This
dominance should not be used to downplay the importance of the ammonia processes
engineering contractors developed. Many companies operated plants at much smaller capacities
than IG Farben and they relied on engineering contractors for the technology they needed. The
number of ammonia plants per process gives a better indication of the importance of engineering
contractors in the nitrogen fertiliser industry than the capacities of these plants.
30
Fauser-Montecatini Processes and Plants in the World up to December 31st, 1959. (1960). Milan. P.
Puype, G. Beauchez & M. Jongsma (1979). Van kiem tot korrel. Nederlandse Stikstof Maatschappij N.V.
1929-1979. Kloosterzande: Duerinck-Krachten.
31 Arc Process is Giving Way to Ammonia Synthesis. Chemical & Metallurgical Engineering 1929, 36(8),
481-483. See Schröter 2004, op. cit. for an analysis of the motives of IG Farben and Norsk Hydro.
32 A. Kudo (2000). Dominance through Cooperation: I.G. Farben's Japan Strategy. J. Lesch, Ed. The
German Chemical Industry in the Twentieth Century. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 243-283.
There 272-276, 282-283.
17
The Role of Synthesis Gas and the Technology to Manufacture it.
Tables 4 and 5 point to a large market for ammonia plants in the 1920s and, particularly, in the
1930s. The development of several ammonia synthesis was important for the creation of this
market but the spark for the wide-spread diffusion of ammonia plants and the take-off of the
nitrogen fertiliser industry came from a complementary technology. Again engineering contractors
were crucial in its development.
A crucial step in the manufacture of ammonia was the production of hydrogen and
nitrogen (synthesis gas). Like oxygen, nitrogen could be manufactured by liquefaction of air.
Linde developed this technology at the end of the nineteenth century, followed later by Claude
and others.33 In the early 1920s, a cheap supply of hydrogen was seen as a crucial factor for
ammonia synthesis. Several options were available. Hydrogen could be manufactured by
electrolysis of water, a method that yielded very pure hydrogen but used very large amounts of
electricity. Electrolysis was only viable therefore at sites where cheap hydroelectric power was
available. BASF, and many of the companies that built an ammonia plant in the early 1920s, used
water gas. This gas resulted from passing steam over hot coke and was widely used in the town
gas industry. The purification of the raw gasses was vital however.
Coke oven gas, available in abundance at coke oven plants, also contained hydrogen.
Coke was manufactured by dry distillation of bituminous coal but this process also produced a
gas containing ammonia, hydrogen and several other chemicals. Claude started research on a
process to separate hydrogen from coke oven gas in 1903. He used cooling, a technology which
he knew from his work on the liquefaction of air. Claude was awarded a patent in 1905 but his
work gained momentum when he started research on ammonia synthesis in 1917. At that time
Claude tried another method first but soon switched back to cooling. The first installation using
this process started production in 1922.34
Linde was also interested in manufacturing hydrogen and started research in 1909. Linde
also used cooling but worked with water gas and built installations at companies that used
hydrogen for the hardening of fats and oils, for instance manufacturers of soap. BASF also
acquired a Linde plant to manufacture hydrogen for ammonia synthesis but later substantially
changed and improved the process. In 1914 Linde started development of a process to separate
hydrogen from coke oven gas. In 1921 a pilot plant started and the first industrial plant opened in
1925/26.35
33
For Linde see: Geschichte der Gesellschaft für Linde's Eismaschinen A.-G. Wiesbaden. (1929).
Wiesbaden: Gesellschaft für Linde's Eismaschinen. For Claude see: The Air Liquide Adventure 2002, op. cit.
34 Waeser 1932, op. cit. 42-43. P. Guillaumeron (1949). Liquefaction for Separating Hydrogen From CokeOven Gas. Chemical Engineering (July 1949), 105-110.
35 Waeser 1922, op. cit. 429, 434. Waeser 1932, op. cit. 47. For the first plant see also: F. A. F. Pallemaerts
(1929). Synthetic Ammonia Plant at Ostend. Industrial & Engineering Chemistry 21(1), 22-29
18
There were many coke oven plants in the 1920s, particularly in Europe. Through the work
of Claude and Linde, coke oven gas was soon viewed as an interesting source of hydrogen.
Several other engineering contractors and engineering works followed the example of Linde and
Claude and developed processes to extract hydrogen from coke oven gas. As typically not very
technologically capable firms, the availability of technology through engineering contractors gave
coke companies an option to start large scale manufacture of fertilisers. The market for nitrogen
fertilisers was growing (see graph 1, above) so many coke companies decided to enter the
fertiliser industry. By 1925 the expansion of ammonia capacity was primarily based on coke oven
gas (see table 6) and this trend continued in the following years. The nitrogen fertiliser industry
took off, fuelled by hydrogen from coke oven gas.
In the development of the nitrogen industry, engineering contractors played a crucial role.
They developed ammonia processes they did not want to keep proprietary but sold to many
companies in stead. Other engineering contractors developed technology to extract hydrogen
from coke oven gas, opening up a large market for ammonia plants. Engineering contractors
enabled the nitrogen fertiliser industry to take off.
Table 6. Sources of hydrogen for ammonia plants under construction around the world in
approximately 1925.
Source of hydrogen
Number of plants
Coke oven gas
Water gas
Electrolysis
Other
9
3
2
2
Source: F. A. Ernst & M. S. Sherman (1927). The World's Inorganic Nitrogen Industry. Industrial &
Engineering Chemistry 19(2), 196-204. There table 3, 199.
Engineering Contractors and the Chemical Industry.
The activities of engineering contractors have been scarcely noticed in the historical literature on
the development of ammonia technology. Most studies analyse this story from the perspective of
BASF. The government-run projects of the First World War and the work of engineering
contractors have received far less attention, and their importance has been downplayed. This
article has tried to re-adjust this by taking up an industry perspective, focussing on the diffusion of
ammonia technology across countries and firms.
Through an industry perspective it is clear that it was not BASF but its followers that
enabled the development of a large scale nitrogen fertiliser industry. Particularly engineering
contractors played a crucial role as they made ammonia synthesis processes available to many
companies. Linde and Claude opened up a market for these processes when they developed
methods to extract hydrogen from coke oven gas. Linde and Claude, and the many alternatives
19
developed by engineering works and other companies, gave operators of coke oven plants an
opportunity to diversify. There were many coke oven plants and, as the market for fertilisers was
growing, many chose to enter the fertiliser industry. Coke companies had the necessary raw
materials in abundance but typically lacked the technological capabilities to develop their own
fertiliser processes, making engineering contractors an interesting source of technology. As a
result, the nitrogen fertiliser industry took off: between 1927 and 1936, capacity increased more
than five-and-a-half times to well over three million tons of nitrogen per year. (See table 3,
above.)
The importance of engineering contractors for the fertiliser industry has been clouded by
looking at capacity figures. The size of BASF, and later IG Farben, was enormous, effectively
dwarfing all other fertiliser manufacturers. Many of the new entrants into the fertiliser industry
acquired technology from engineering contractors to supply domestic markets and consequently
built much smaller plants than IG Farben. BASF, and later IG Farben, was largely focused on
exports, and built its installations as large as possible.
The act of making technology available had far reaching consequences. It broke the
original innovator's monopoly. By the early 1930s the effects were also being felt on the market.
Prices fell as the supply of fertilisers increased and many countries closed their borders for
imports to protect their industry. IG Farben was particularly hurt. A very large part of its turnover
came from fertilisers and the German market was not large enough to absorb all inland
production.36 IG Farben became the driving force to establish an international nitrogen fertiliser
cartel. These efforts succeeded in 1930 but the cartel stabilised only after 1932, remaining in
place until the outbreak of the Second World War.37 The effects of the widespread diffusion of
ammonia technology by engineering contractors were softened to some extent in this way.
36
See Plumpe 1990, op. cit. 223-243.
For the history of this cartel see: R. Lachmann-Mosse (1940). Die Stickstoffindustrie und ihre
internationale Kartellierung. Zürich: Lang. Dissertation, Universität Zürich. H. G. Schröter (1991).
Privatwirtschaftliche Marktregulierung und Staatliche Interessenpolitik. Das internationale Stickstoffkartell
1929-1939. H. G. Schröter & C. A. Wurm, Eds. Politik, Wirtschaft und internationale Beziehungen: Studien
zu ihrem Verhältnis in der Zeit zwischen den Weltkriegen. Mainz: Philipp von Zabern, 117-137.
37