Abstract
The decentralized nature of Chinese environmental management institutions places a
remarkable degree of enforcement authority in the hands of municipal environmental protection
bureaus (EPB’s). These city EPB’s, although technically accountable to higher-level government
agencies and the State Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA), work primarily within the
confines of their respective municipal governments, from whom the EPB’s receive funding,
staffing, and housing allotments; city leadership also appoints EPB directors and other key
positions. Consequently, China’s national environmental goals depend in large part upon the
willingness of municipal governments and their respective EPB’s to implement and enforce
environmental reform. Despite this, much of the current literature focuses either on broad
national policies and trends or on single-issue city comparisons. Our paper describes the
institutional structure, methods, attitudes, and challenges of municipal-level Chinese EPB’s, and
focuses on the case studies of Shanghai and Xiamen. We address issues of status, institutional
development, financing, enforcement, and public consultation channels, paying particular
attention to the role that motivated city leadership can play in successful environmental efforts,
and conclude with recommendations for the future development of municipal Chinese
environmental institutions.
Introduction
Since the adoption of China’s first environmental protection law in 1979, the PRC central
government has developed a vast body of statues, regulations and policies addressing pollution
control, resource conservation, and other environmental issues. Beneath this apparently
environment-conscious legal framework, however, lie the complex institutional interactions and
hierarchies that govern the extent of day-to-day enforcement and enactment of national
environmental standards. In particular, municipal governments enjoy relative autonomy in
addressing local environmental issues. Municipal Environmental Protection Bureaus (EPB’s),
while responsible for implementing national as well as local environmental standards, answer
primarily to their respective city governments, who control the EPBs’ funding, status, and appoint
key EPB administrators.1 Thus, for environmental issues, the “top-down” governmental structure
effectively peaks at the local level. The decentralized nature of Chinese environmental
management requires local support in order to actually achieve and enforce national
environmental priorities. Local governments’ resistance or support of environmental policy plays
a key role in determining the course of local and regional environmental progress, regardless of
overall national trends.
This paper analyzes the institutional structure, methods, attitudes, and challenges of
Chinese municipal EPB’s in managing local-level environmental reform. Within their
institutional structure, we include the EPBs’ internal structure, their vertical and horizontal
relationships to other Chinese governmental organs, and their interactions with non-governmental
entities, business interests, foreign interests, and the general public. Our analysis seeks to provide
a clearer picture of the overall day-to-day efforts taking place among Chinese municipal EPB’s their priorities and perspectives. Throughout our investigation, we also emphasize the key role
William P Alford and Yuanyuan Shen, “The Limits of the Law in Addressing China’s Environmental
Dilemm,” Energizing China. (Harvard University Committee on Environment: Newton, MA, 1998) 415.
1
that motivated, environmentally aware municipal government leadership can play in significantly
improving local environmental quality, in fostering long-term local economic growth, and in
achieving national environmental goals.
Our research focuses on the case studies of two Chinese cities, Shanghai and Xiamen,
and their respective EPB’s. These two cities occupy distinctly different places in China’s
political, economic, and historical development, providing ample opportunities to compare the
contexts of directly-administered municipality vs. special economic zone (SEZ), large vs.
medium-sized city, old vs. new industry, domestic vs. foreign enterprises, etc. Both cities’
geographic locations place them somewhat outside the direct influence of Beijing politics,
allowing relative autonomy in crafting and administering municipal environmental policy.
Additionally, both cities deal with a range of typical Chinese air, soil, and water pollution issues.
Their economic success, along with other factors, has promoted the establishment of more
centralized, influential environmental protection regimes than those found in less-prosperous
regions. As such, both cities’ EPB’s serve as models for the rest of the country in the
development of regulatory institutions and infrastructure. Although each city has unique
circumstances and challenges that define its own particular environmental situation, successful
environmental management in Shanghai and Xiamen seems likely to translate into similar
methods adopted elsewhere in China. Moreover, challenges in cities with better-developed
management structures often hint at more severe problems in the surrounding countryside. We
argue that the current consolidation of management authority within these two municipal EPB’s,
though certainly an improvement, still perpetuates both the susceptibility to local leaders’
interference and the shortage of public accountability and participatory channels that have
restricted environmental progress throughout in China. The lack of uniformly-applied national
environmental standards continues to require local EPB’s, including in Shanghai and Xiamen, to
jockey for status within their local governments, unfortunately leaving aggregate national goals
dependent on the individual EPBs’ enforcement abilities.
We conclude our analysis with a discussion of policies, institutions, and methods that can
effectively enhance local-level environmental efforts, and include recommendations for
municipal, national, and foreign-based environmental interests. We include proposals for those
working within the present city-centered system and long-term proposals for reducing the
environmental disparity among different municipalities and regions.
Literature Review
Most academic literature pertaining to environmental management has come within the
past twenty years, since the advent of the Environmental Protection Law in 1979 and the start of
Deng Xiaoping’s economic reforms. Yet in analyzing the previous literature, a distinct gap arises
between broad descriptions of overall all national trends and narrow, issue-specific local analyses.
Publications during the 1980’s introduced the emerging environmental dilemmas
confronting China; however, due to the infancy of environmental protection agencies during this
period, much of the 1980’s literature lacks relevancy when considering current situations.
In general, the body of Western literature on environmental management in China
focuses on national level administrative bodies and their respective rule-making powers. Studies
such as Michael Palmer’s report on environmental regulation and Mohammed Matouq’s work on
environmental management summarize national trends, with little information on specific locales
and situations.2 The recent World Bank report on environmental priorities in China provides a
comprehensive description of China’s problems, from air pollution to water management to the
use of land resources.3 Their section on environmental management, while clearly presented and
succinct, provides macro perspectives with only a minimal portrait of the local EPB’s role in
environmental implementation. The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars also
2
Mohammed Matouq “A Case-Study of ISO 14001-Based Environmental Management System
Implementation in the People’s Republic of China.” Local Environment. 5.4 (2000): 415-428.
3
The World Bank. “China: Air, Land, Water- Environmental Priorities for a New Millennium” (World
Bank: Washington DC August, 13, 2001).
published a paper in 1998 describing the policymaking landscape in China as it relates to
enforcing environmental regulations and laws.4
The 1990’s also saw an increasing amount of research describing environmental
conditions and management in Chinese municipalities. As western researchers realized the
importance of local environmental enforcement, studies on the issue increased. Yet, much of this
literature tends to concentrate on single issues within Chinese cities, rather than providing an
overall assessment of municipal environmental protection. David Campbell’s 1997 report looks
at environmental implementation in Xiamen by focusing on the cleanup of Xiamen’s Yuandang
Lake.5 The report details the pressures and challenges faced by municipal and EPB leaders when
attempting to rectify serious environmental concerns. His portrayal of the influence polluting
enterprises had on environmental policy enforcement in Xiamen city exemplifies the situation
faced by many Chinese cities. Another issue-specific study is David Massey’s work on the
environmental issues associated with the development of the Wai Gao Qiao free trade zone in
Pudong, Shanghai.6 This study introduces the planning process in Pudong’s new economic
districts and examines how environmental issues arise during this process. Further research on
Shanghai’s environment includes Robert Ward’s wastewater treatment study, with information
regarding discharge fees and water related projects.7 The paper provides insights into how the
Shanghai EPB and environmental workers address major environmental problems.
Recent studies have also described the expanding role of Chinese environmental NGO’s.
In particular, the US Embassy in China has compiled a number of papers in the past five years
“Environmental Policy Making in China”. Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. May 26,
1998.
5
David N.Campbell “The Maoist Legacy and Environmental Implementation in China,” Asian Survey 27
(September 1997): 859-875.
6
David W. Massey “Economic Imperatives vs. Environmental Quality in the Dragon’s Head: the
WaiGaoQiao Free Trade Zone, Shanghai,” Journal of Environmental Planning & Management 40
(September 1997): 661-680.
7
Robert M. Ward.and Wen Liang. “Shanghai Water Supply and Wastewater Disposal,”
Geographical Review. 85 (1995): 141-157.
4
describing the role and formation of NGO’s, as well as their potential influence in environmental
policymaking.8
The most significant contributions toward the issue of Chinese municipal environmental
management have come over the past seven years. One of the most comprehensive reports on
environmental management in China is Xiaoying Ma and Leonard Ortolano’s book on
environmental regulation.9 The book gives an effective evaluation of the many factors
influencing environmental regulations’ implementation. Ma and Ortolano also provide multiple
examples of municipal environmental management systems and the many stresses and pressure
placed upon them in implementing policy.
Additionally, four recent papers offer comparative assessments of Chinese
municipalities’ environmental management systems. The first was Chan et al.’s study in 1995 on
the implementation gap in environmental management in three Chinese cities.10 By describing
various difficulties confronting the cities’ field regulators, Chan addresses the important topics of
institutional strength and status. Another contribution to this body of literature was Abigail
Jahiel’s report on the organization of China’s environmental protection.11 Her report pays close
attention to the EPB’s status, institutional capacity and power-sharing between various bureaus,
and gives an adequate overall analysis of China’s environmental organization. In 1999, Carlos
Lo and Plate Yip produced a study comparing Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA)
regulation in Hong Kong and Shanghai.12 This study provides a telling portrait of the Shanghai
EPB’s lack of public consultation channels, and limited enforcement authority. Finally, the most
“Environmental NGO’s in China: Green is Good, But Don’t Openly Oppose the Party”, U.S. Embassy,
Beijing. December 1997.
9
Xiaoying Ma and Leonard Ortolano, Environmental Regulation in China (Oxford, England: Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers 2000).
10
Chan et al. “The Implementation Gap in Environmental Management in China: The Case of Guangzhou,
Zhengzhou, and Nanjing,” Public Administration Review 55 (July 1995): 333-343.
11
Abigail R Jahiel. “The Organization of Environmental Protection in China,” The China Quarterly 156
(December 1998): 757-787.
12
Carlos Wing-Hung Lo and Plato Kwong-To Yip, “Environmental Impact Assessment Regulation in
Hong Kong and Shanghai: A Cross-City Analysis,” Journal of Environmental Planning & Management 42
(May 1999): 355-375.
8
significant study related to our research was Tang and colleagues’ report on institutional
constraints on environmental management in Guangzhou and Shanghai.13 Their report provides a
critical analysis of the two cities’ environmental systems, addressing the issues of EPB status,
independence, environmental leadership from city leaders, and public interaction.
The gap in literature lies in the lack of comprehensive analysis of a Chinese
municipality’s overall environmental management structure. Most studies have focused either on
national trends and systems or on single-issue municipal management concerns. In modern
Chinese municipalities, the responsibility for environmental protection lies primarily in the hands
of the EPB’s. Thus, a detailed analysis of the municipal EPB’s institutional structure, financing
mechanisms, enforcement and monitoring strategies, interaction with the general public, and
relations with other bureaus and businesses must be conducted in order to fully comprehend the
effectiveness of municipal environmental protection work. This paper aims to provide a more
complete picture of environmental management systems in two major Chinese municipalities.
Methods
This paper incorporates data from a variety of sources. Background information, history,
and statistics come primarily from Western periodicals. Information on current environmental
industry trends and attitudes was obtained from domestic Chinese environmental journals
available in the Shanghai Municipal Library and the Xiamen University Library, as well as
Western sources. Additionally, primary data regarding the Shanghai and Xiamen EPB’s came
from interviews in June and July 2002 with officials and staff from the respective EPB’s. Other
information and perspectives were obtained via interviews with environmental science professors
from Shanghai Jiaotong, Shanghai Tongji, and Xiamen Universities. Most of the professors
Shui-Yan Tang, “Institutional Constraints on Environmental Management in Urban China:
Environmental Impact Assessment in Guangzhou and Shanghai,” The China Quarterly 152 (December
1997): 863-874.
13
interviewed had prior practical experience in positions within city or provincial EPB’s or as
members of advisory committees for their respective city governments. Other interviews
included U.S. consulate officials, Taiwanese business associations, and a university student
environmental group. Our interviews with EPB officials investigated local EPB structure and
attitudes towards various environmental issues, while interviews with other sources focused on
unofficial and public perceptions of the role of the municipal EPB.
Population
GDP
Annual Urban Income
Industrial Production
Primary
Secondary
Tertiary
(millions)
(million RMB)
(RMB)
(billion RMB)
Green Space
(m2 per capita)
Industrial Solid Waste (million tons)
City Wastewater
Shanghai
14
496.084
34,600
495.08
8.55
235.55
250.98
Xiamen
1.26
55.64
11,365
88.15
-
5.5
16.05
9.7
0.04433
Industrial
600 mill. m3
Municipal
m3
1.27 bill.
29.51 mill. tons
126.47 mill. tons
Table 1. General and environmental statistics from Shanghai and Xiamen cities.
Sources: Shanghai EPB Bulletin 2002, Xiamen EPB Bulletin 2001.
Chinese
National Standards
WHO
Standard
Shanghai
Xiamen
Level I
Level II
SO2
0.024
0.024
0.02
0.06
0.05
NO2
0.044
0.022
0.04
0.08
0.04
PM10
0.100
0.061
0.04
0.10
n/a
Table 2. Annual average levels (mg/m3) of major air pollutants
Sources: Shanghai EPB Bulletin 2002, Xiamen EPB Bulletin 2001.
City Descriptions
Shanghai
Historical, Political, and Economic Background
Shanghai’s importance to China’s overall security cannot be overemphasized. As
China’s largest city, with a population of 14 million residents (16 million including the “floating”
population), Shanghai lies at the heart of the Yangtze River delta. The city is a municipality
directly administered by the central government, highlighting its political significance to China’s
leaders. Just as it was prior to the 1949 Communist revolution, Shanghai has become China’s
richest city per capita. In 2000, per capita income reached 34,600 RMB (US$4,180), the middle
level of developed country standards.14 Shanghai’s economic strength rests in its massive
production capacity – in 2001, it accounted for one twelfth of China’s total industrial output, one
fourth of total exports and one eighth of national total financial revenues.15 Shanghai’s future is
of critical importance to China’s national outlook - politically, economically, and strategically.
Shanghai’s rebirth as China’s industrial, commercial, and financial center in the 1990’s
reinvigorated the city and altered its environmental conditions. Despite Deng Xiaoping’s 1978
reforms, emphasis on developing the southeastern regions prevented Shanghai from enjoying the
kind of economic growth seen in Guangdong and Fujian, and it lost much of its former role as the
catalyst for the Chinese economy. The turning point came in the early 1990’s as Deng sought to
reenergize economic reforms stalled by the conservative backlash in the aftermath of the 1989
Tiananmen square massacre. After his renowned “southern tour”, Deng called for massive
central government investment to build Shanghai into a world-class industrial, commercial, and
financial city. Aided by high-ranking former Shanghai officials, including Jiang Zemin as
General Secretary and President, and former mayor Zhu Rongji as Vice-Premier in 1994,
14
15
Shanghai Government website: www.shanghai.gov.cn/gb/shanghai/English/Economy
Ibid.
Shanghai’s political and economic clout expanded rapidly. Deng Xiaoping’s final initiative as
China’s paramount leader had profound consequences for the future of Shanghai.
Signs of Shanghai’s reemergence came from the creation of the Pudong Special
Economic Zone and the breakneck construction projects sprouting across the city. Shanghai
success in building a vast modern urban infrastructure in such a short period astonished
observers. Boasting double digit growth rates and increasing investor confidence, Shanghai
attracted huge sums of foreign investment throughout the 1990’s, including some of the world’s
largest MNC’s. From 1995 to 1999, Shanghai’s average annual GDP growth rate stood at
11.4%.16 The completion of the modern Shanghai Stock Exchange in Pudong furthered
Shanghai’s emerging role as China’s commercial and financial hub.
Shanghai’s economic leap in the 1990’s came at considerable environmental cost,
though. For much of the decade, the focus on economic growth often trumped any concerns
about the steadily-increasing environmental degradation and its potential backlash. Though not
as pronounced as in other Chinese cities, especially those in the central regions, the idea that
economic growth came only with environmental costs permeated government and corporate
leadership’s thinking. Only later, after environmental degradation became more apparent, did
Shanghai leaders begin to acknowledge the potential benefits of sustainable development.
Shanghai EPB
As the city’s economy and environmental problems grew, so did the authority of the
Shanghai Environmental Protection Bureau. The Shanghai EPB (www.sepb.gov.cn) currently
consists of ten departments and is under the management of the Municipal government. The
departments include: Administration Office; Comprehensive Planning; Policy & Regulation;
Science, Technology & and Environmental Standard; Pollution Control; Aquatic Environment &
Ecological Conservation; Environmental Supervision and Project Management; International
16
Ibid.
Cooperation; Personnel; and Supervision. The main EPB office has a staff of 95 and roughly 600
total employees, including the various field agents and office personnel. Total municipal EPB
staff, including subordinate units and district EPB’s, is approximately 2,000, yet this figure is
uncertain due to the various part time officers associated with the bureau.17
Major assignments as set out by the Shanghai EPB seek to clean Suzhou creek and other
major waterways, control air pollution and its sources, increase the amount of urban green space,
rehabilitate old industrial zones, and soon to also restrain agricultural pollution. The EPB has
eliminated the “black and stinking” conditions of Suzhou Creek and has concentrated on
improving sewage management.18 Air pollution arising from coal combustion has been limited in
recent years with the introduction of cleaner coal, but auto emissions continue to be a major
concern. Increasing green space and afforestation has been a major success for the Shanghai
EPB, with per capita green space in the city proper increasing from 1.9 m2 in 1996 to 4.6 m2 in
2000.19
The Shanghai EPB falls directly under the municipal government, which also appoints all
key EPB positions. As in other directly-administered municipalities, Shanghai’s Municipal
People’s Congress creates the bulk of environmental laws and regulations for the city. While the
National People’s Congress also issues environmental laws and regulations, these laws tend to be
general guidelines, leaving the responsibility for implementation primarily in the hands of
China’s provincial and municipal congresses.
Municipal leaders have centralized environmental protection authority under the
oversight of the Shanghai EPB. Tasks include monitoring pollution discharges, enforcing laws
and regulations, actively taking part in major construction projects and environmental cleanups,
conducting environmental impact assessments (EIA’s), and formulating strategies for pollution
prevention and control. Such tasks are often assigned to a specific department in the EPB, but
17
Shanghai Environmental Bulletin, Shanghai Municipal Environmental Protection Bureau. 2002
Ibid.
19
Ibid.
18
cooperation with other departments in the municipal government may also be required. Outside
cooperation often involves such bureaus as the Foreign Trade and Economic Commission (for
implementing the terms of an EIA), the Department of Construction (for the various building
projects throughout the city), and the Department of Industry.
Instruments used for policy implementation and pollution monitoring vary according to
environmental task. For issues such as water pollution, the EPB charges effluent fees based on
the amount and concentration of discharge. The EPB uses other means when fighting sources of
air pollution, including lobbying the Municipal People’s Congress and government to enact
legislation barring high-soot coal and pushing the Department of Transportation to replace old
buses and cars with lower-emission models. Overall, inspections of enterprises, wastewater
treatment plants, vehicles, and other sources of pollution have increased considerably in recent
years, as have the emission standards.
Municipal government leaders also control environmental financing. Investment on the
environment has increased considerably in the late 1990’s, going from 6.88 billion RMB
(US$833 million) in 1996 to RMB 15.29 billion (US$1.85 billion) in 2001.20 Year 2001
environmental spending in Shanghai accounted for roughly 3.09% of GDP, one of highest levels
among major Chinese cities.21 These figures include spending on urban environmental
infrastructure, pollution source control, and major environmental projects, as well as the EPB
annual budget. Besides government funding, the Shanghai EPB collects discharge fees to finance
operations and treatment facilities like wastewater treatment plants.22
Public consultation channels exist in avenues such as an environmental phone hotline, set
up in 2000 to answer complaints and to relay emergency pollution incidents. In 2000, the
Shanghai EPB received around 7,000 complaints mainly dealing with noise and air pollution.
The Shanghai EPB website also lists air quality reviews and publishes environmental news for the
20
Ibid.
Ibid.
22
Shanghai EPB official, Interview by Authors, 1 July 2002, Shanghai.
21
public. Education campaigns and World Environment Day activities are other channels used by
the Shanghai EPB to interact with the public.
Xiamen
Historical, Political, and Economic Background
Fujian’s Xiamen island, once the home of the legendary anti-Manchu resistance fighter
Koxinga, now joins Zhuhai, Shenzhen, and Dalian as a SEPA-designated “Model Environmental
City.” The island’s deep, warm-water port (currently China’s 5th-largest) lacks any silting
problems, and has been a trade hub for centuries.23 Overseas Chinese merchants returning to
Xiamen in the early 20th century displaced the former international concessions’ holdings and
contributed greatly to modernization efforts, especially during the 1920’s.24 Subsequent crossstrait tensions with Taiwan limited local industrial development prior to 1980, when that same
proximity with Taiwan led to Xiamen’s selection as an SEZ. Initial FDI in Xiamen consisted
primarily of Taiwanese investments in light manufacturing, until foreign corporations were
sufficiently confident of Xiamen’s security to expand beyond tentative hotel and restaurant
investments.25
After 1980, Xiamen’s industrial and economic base grew rapidly as new investments
increased and overseas Chinese reestablished former ties to the region. Taiwanese companies
brought additional light manufacturing and later electronics, mainly concentrated within the
designated “Taiwanese Investment Zones” within the Xinglin, Haicang, and Jimei districts.
Xiamen’s more recent development spares it many of the environmental dilemmas faced by cities
with older, heavy-polluting SOE’s. Still, Xiamen has experienced the blessing and challenge of
rapid, double-digit annual GDP and export growth over the past 20 years,26 particularly since
23
Xiamen Foreign Investment Bureau official, Interview by Authors, 11 July 2002, Xiamen.
James Cook, Lecture, 18 June 2002, Central Washington University.
25
Xiamen University professor, Interview by Authors, 10 July 2002, Xiamen.
26
Ibid.
24
Deng’s 1990 Southern Tour.27 Currently, prominent foreign multinationals with operations in
Xiamen include Kodak, GE, Dell, FDK, Panasonic, Toshiba, Honeywell, and others.28
Xiamen enjoys a great deal of legislative autonomy. In March 1988, Xiamen was granted
provincial-level authority in economic affairs to aid in its development as an SEZ; overall, it
holds sub-provincial government status. 29 In 1994 Xiamen gained a local legislative assembly;30
current EPB officials proudly noted that the first rules issued by the newly independent assembly
were for environmental protection.31 Similar to in Shanghai, the Xiamen People’s Congress sets
local rules, regulations, and industrial standards for the overall city, and holds higher legal
authority than the municipal government, whose ordinances focus mainly on individual cases and
locations.32 Local regulations from either body cannot contradict national laws but they can set
the punishments for breaking them, and can require stricter environmental standards.33 Much of
Xiamen’s regulatory establishment has developed through locally-led initiatives rather than
national or provincial mandate.
Xiamen EPB
The comfortably-equipped Xiamen EPB (www.xmepb.gov.cn) occupies the 17th and 18th
floors of an office building overlooking the scenic Yuandang lake and park area in the city center,
and has developed into one of the most influential city EPB’s in China. Its departments include
Laws & Regulations, Pollution Control, Planning & Development, Monitoring
(www.xmems.org.cn), Public Affairs, and others.34 The main office has 65 employees, part of a
27
Xiamen University professor, Interview by Authors, 12 July 2002, Xiamen.
Xiamen Foreign Investment Bureau official, Interview by Authors, 11 July 2002, Xiamen.
29
Ibid.
30
Ibid.
31
Xiamen EPB official, Interview by Authors, 15 July 2002, Xiamen.
32
Xiamen EPB official, Interview by Authors, 16 July 2002, Xiamen.
33
Ibid.
34
Xiamen University professor, Interview by Authors, 10 July 2002, Xiamen.
28
total of more than 200 city EPB employees. 35 Local district EPB offices supervise the affairs of
the 8 districts within the city, each with departments similar to those at the main office.36
The bureau’s responsibilities are similar to those of the Shanghai EPB. In 2001, the EPB
issued 2136 notifications requesting compliance with environmental laws, of which 247 later
became legal cases.37 Of those, penalties were imposed on 163 units and included fines totaling
675,000 RMB (US$81,700). Four companies were ordered to stop operation. The EPB reviewed
environmental impact reports on 674 city construction projects in 2001, totaling 13.044 billion
RMB (US$1.58 billion) in new development of which 2.94% was earmarked as “environmental
investment.”38 Xiamen EPB regulators collected over 42 million RMB (US$5.1 million) in
pollution fees, in addition to issuing 172 fines totaling 176,500 RMB (US$21,400) and forcibly
collecting 922,000 RMB (US$112,000) in fines from 117 noncompliant sources.39 Finally, the
EPB maintains a phone hotline promising “immediate response” to environmental complaints;40
public complaints to the city EPB via the hotline and the Internet totaled 6,562, mostly
concerning noise and air pollution.41
City leaders, in conjunction with the EPB, have taken steps to promote Xiamen’s
environmentally friendly image, setting aside natural and marine protection areas for the Bailu
white egret and the Chinese white dolphin, as well as developing the Tianzushan and Xiaopin
forest parks. EPB staff manages most affairs within the nature reserves. Within the city proper,
Xiamen’s clean air and abundant green space are a refreshing contrast to most Chinese cities, as
is the government-mandated absence of automobile honking. Restaurants in the city have been
required to switch from oil-burning equipment to natural gas, part of an overall campaign to
35
Xiamen EPB official, Interview by Authors, 15 July 2002, Xiamen.
Ibid.
37
Bulletin of Environmental Status of Xiamen Municipality of 2001, The Environmental Protection Bureau
of Xiamen. 2001
38
Ibid.
39
Ibid.
40
Xiamen University professor, Interview by Authors, 10 July 2002, Xiamen.
41
Bulletin 2001, Xiamen. EPB
36
reduce air pollution in the city center.42 Motorcycles have been conspicuously absent from the
downtown area since the city government reduced and eventually eliminated new registration
permits.43 Total municipal environmental investment in 2001 amounted to 2.22% of city GDP, or
1.234 billion RMB (US$149 million), of which the majority was spent on sewage treatment
facilities and urban environmental infrastructure construction (0.793 billion RMB), along with
industrial pollution prevention (0.103 billion RMB) and other environmental facilities (0.253
billion RMB).44 Not all of the aforementioned investment flowed directly from city coffers,
however - the numbers include projects with a variety of funding sources, including corporate
projects and domestic or foreign loans.
Current environmental challenges facing Xiamen include acid rain (annual avg. pH 4.71),
high fecal coliform levels in beach swimming and shellfish harvesting areas, red tides, and
increasing nitrogen contamination of city drinking water sources.45 In 2001, half of Xiamen’s
public beaches recorded fecal coliform averages at or exceeding the Level IV Chinese standards
(“barely suitable for swimming”), and the EPB recorded four red tides.46 Lead, inorganic
nitrogen, and phosphorus are also problematic water pollutants. The island sits near the mouth of
the Jiulongjiang river, creating a need for Xiamen city officials to coordinate with upstream cities
in mitigating the downstream water pollution effects, similar to Shanghai’s Yangtze River
predicament although on a substantially lesser scale. Major recent environmental projects include
the ongoing cleanup of Yuandang Lake, work to eliminate aquaculture pollution in the more
stagnant mainland-facing western seawaters, public green space expansion, ambient noise
reduction, public transportation and automobile emissions improvements (over 17 million RMB
42
Xiamen University professor, Interview by Authors, 10 July 2002, Xiamen.
“Greener than Green: Xiamen, a Model of Environmental Achievement,” US Embassy, Beijing. January
1999
44
Bulletin 2001, Xiamen. EPB
45
Ibid.
46
Ibid.
43
(US$2 million) invested in 2001 alone), and conversion to liquefied natural gas.47 The EPB has
worked diligently to increase urban green space through tree planting, city parks (often replacing
razed buildings), and “insertion projects” on street corners and medians.48 Wastewater treatment
facilities already in construction will bring Xiamen’s 70% treatment rate49 up to nearly 100%
treatment of municipal wastewater once on line.50
In general, Shanghai and Xiamen differ primarily in matters relating to size - Shanghai’s
population, GDP, and environmental investment are all roughly ten times as large as those of
Xiamen. Historically, too, Xiamen has enjoyed more flexibility in environmental matters due to
its more recent, FDI-driven development and its autonomy under the SEZ system. Both cities
have management structures similar to other Chinese municipalities, and both cities give aboveaverage emphasis to environmental concerns.
Analysis
Environmental Protection Organizational Structure
Municipal environmental protection in China involves both vertical relationships linking
city EPB’s to the State Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA) and provincial, county, and
district EPB’s, and horizontal relationships connecting the EPB’s to other city bureaus and to
EPB’s in other cities (see Figure 1). This structure allows local governments considerable
autonomy.51 The top-down management system effectively peaks at the local level, where city
governments determine budget and enforcement levels. As with other top-down Chinese
governmental organizations, municipal EPB’s can’t force higher-level EPB’s to act or reform, nor
can they issue binding orders to other city bureaus of similar rank.52
47
Ibid.
Xiamen University professor, Interview by Authors, 10 July 2002, Xiamen.
49
Xiamen EPB official, Interview by Authors, 15 July 2002, Xiamen.
50
“Greener than Green,” US Embassy.
51
Tang, “Institutional Constraints,” 863-874.
52
Jahiel, “Organization of Environmental Protection,” 757-787.
48
Much of the EPBs’ enforcement problems relate to their difficulty in convincing their
bureaucratic peers in similar-ranking city departments to cooperate in enforcing environmental
statutes, a situation that often succeeds or fails based on the EPB management’s networking skills
and guanxi (“relationships”).53 Past reforms to the stratified system have focused on raising
EPBs’ bureaucratic status and authority rather than on the EPBs’ financial status.54 Most
recently, the 1988 national administrative reforms issued by the NPC increased SEPA’s rank to
ministerial status and consolidated SEPA functions and responsibilities, reducing interagency
competition for environmental management funds.55 Even today, though, the need to coordinate
environmental efforts among an assortment of similar-ranking local departments complicates the
process of reform substantially. For example, when developing new environmental regulations,
the Xiamen EPB first drafts the desired regulations, then submits them to the municipal legal
department for review, who consults with other city bureaus if needed, after which the
regulations, if approved or revised, may be submitted to the municipal government, who then
issues the regulations.56
Coordination among equal-ranking governmental bureaus in neighboring locales can
often be even more complex, as evidenced by the headaches experienced by participants in the
various new river commissions. Both the 9th and 10th 5-year plans include the formation of
comprehensive river commissions on major rivers, through which cities and provinces along the
major rivers can coordinate pollution, transportation, and other issues.57 An extreme example of
the difficulty of achieving integrated horizontal management in China came in 1994, when
upstream pollution along the Huai River ended in disaster, leaving hundreds of thousands of
downstream residents without water, and thousands more sick with dysentery and other
Tang, “Institutional Constraints,” 863-874.
Jahiel, “Organization of Environmental Protection,” 757-787.
55
Ibid.
56
Bulletin 2001, Xiamen. EPB.
57
Shanghai EPB official, Interview by Authors, 1 July 2002, Shanghai.
53
54
illnesses.58 Shanghai participates in the Yangtze River Commission, which Shanghai professors
noted often results in “blame games” through which provinces and cities all deflect blame for
polluting the river, each blaming the others for the problems and insisting that the others bear the
responsibility of paying for cleanup.59 Since Shanghai sits at the downstream mouth of the river,
it receives the full brunt of upstream provinces’ accumulated waste emissions. On a smaller
scale, Xiamen receives a great deal of pollution from upstream sources along the Jiulongjiang
river, and seeks cooperation from upstream cities and the provincial government through a lessprecisely defined “riparian cooperation council.”60,61 river commissions represent positive initial
steps toward broader environmental cooperation, but are also typical situations in which
similarly-ranked organs, whether provincial or municipal, can dodge responsibility in issues
involving multiple jurisdictions within the decentralized Chinese system. Fortunately, as a
member of the Fujian Provincial Congress noted, “Things [with the river commissions] have
noticeably improved over the last few years.”62
Additional coordination difficulties arise when EPB actions conflict with powerful local
departments’ and leaders’ vested interests, particularly in big-budget development projects.
When senior city officials or bureaus support or sponsor a project, even one with potentially
severe environmental impact, the city EPB stands little chance of canceling or relocating the
project.63 Complications also arise when local military officials or military service units and
enterprises hold vested interests in polluting firms.64 Throughout China, municipal EPBs’ lower
bureaucratic status often forces them to consent to environmentally undesirable actions out of
political expediency. In Shanghai, municipal leadership’s emphasis on the pressing need for
Light Rail Transit led the EPB administration to allow construction to begin well before the EIA
Jahiel, “Organization of Environmental Protection,” 757-787.
Shanghai EPB official, Interview by Authors, 1 July 2002, Shanghai.
60
Xiamen University professor, Interview by Authors, 12 July 2002, Xiamen.
61
“Greener than Green,” US Embassy.
62
Xiamen University professor, Interview by Authors, 12 July 2002, Xiamen.
63
Tang, “Institutional Constraints,” 863-874.
64
Ibid.
58
59
process was completed.65 Lo and Yip report that the Shanghai Foreign Investment Commission
recently approved an Upper Huangpu River park before the project EIA had been fully
considered, and that the Pudong New Area government’s environmental stance has weakened
considerably in Pudong’s drive to attract FDI.66 Local leadership’s involvement is not limited to
the EIA process, though. In legal cases, Chinese courts may allow outside individuals including
party committees (often containing prominent local party and government officials), adjudication
committees of senior judges, and “people’s assessors” (two local citizens) to consult with local
judges in local legal cases.67 Chinese municipal leadership maintains powerful official and
unofficial influence in determining the success or failure of local environmental efforts.
Institutional Development
The development of environmental management in Chinese cities over the past twenty
years has experienced a number of advances and setbacks. Early on, the infancy of China’s
environmental management structure limited municipal EPBs’ abilities to effectively influence
environmental conditions. During the 1980’s, the Shanghai and Xiamen EPBs’ development
relied on a number of factors, including the overall power and status of the bureau within the
hierarchy of the municipal government, policy direction and focus, the impact of legal
development, environmental leadership from the mayor and other city officials, and issues
relating to the EPB’s autonomy and independence as a governing entity. Within each factor,
Shanghai and Xiamen differed in their experiences.
Municipal Chinese EPBs’ abilities to effectively implement policy rely on their power
and status within the power-sharing relationships of government bureaus and departments. EPB’s
in China have struggled to gain legitimacy and power due to the departments’ relative infancy
and the role of economic growth in downplaying environmental concerns. China’s economic
65
Ibid.
Wing-Hung Lo, “EIA Regulation,” 355-375.
67
Alford, “Limits of the Law,” 416.
66
transition has pressured local government leaders to create jobs and protect key high-employment
industries to avoid generating social instability. The emphasis on job creation often blinds
leaders to the impending environmental crises facing their regions. As Jahiel notes in her
analysis of organizational power structures, “the importance of rank as a designator of authority
within the matrix of local government organs indicates that powerful government organs can
ignore weaker ones.”68
In the past five years, compared to other Chinese cities, the Shanghai EPB has
experienced an elevation in power and status. A Shanghai EPB official emphasized this point,
describing, “the status of the EPB has definitely risen in recent years, but I still feel it is not high
enough.”69 This rise can be explained by a combination of external and internal factors..
Externally, the upgrading of the national EPA to ministerial status increased local government
attention to building an environmental management structure. As a directly-administrated
municipality, Shanghai leaders were quick to heed such demands from Beijing. Internally,
municipal government investment, in 2000 reaching 3% of overall GDP, expanded the Shanghai
EPB’s operations and gave it greater resources to hire talented staff and build monitoring
systems. Shanghai leaders recognized that the city government needed to provide staff and
finances to match the new environmental mandate without narrowing its agenda.70 Additionally,
the consolidation of environmental protection responsibilities in the hands of the Shanghai EPB
brought the bureau greater authority in implementing policy.
This recent elevation, however, does not entirely avoid the problem of the Shanghai
EPB’s relatively low status in comparison to other bureaus. As Lo notes, “The Shanghai EPB is a
weak agency vis-à-vis those bureaucratic structures in charge of economic and urban
development, and any tough action against proponents will be ineffective without their support
Jahiel, “Organization of Environmental Protection,” 757-787.
Shanghai EPB official, Interview by Authors, 1 July 2002, Shanghai.
70
The World Bank. “China: Air, Land, Water,” 100.
68
69
and co-operation.”71 Municipal departments such as the Foreign Trade and Economic
Commission and the Department of Construction still dwarf the EPB in status and power. An
EPB official related to us the Shanghai EPB’s current efforts to institute new SO2 emissions
regulations – efforts which have been blocked so far by bureaus with connections to local
electrical companies.72
Xiamen has faced similar circumstances in developing its EPB’s institutional capacity
and status. The early 1990’s saw rapid development concurrent with Xiamen’s expanding role as
an SEZ, and city leaders initiated reforms to convert the city into a greener, more environmentally
friendly city. The reforms gave greater administrative authority to the Xiamen EPB. This
elevation in status allowed the EPB greater influence in the foreign investment approval process.
Environmental feasibility research reports must now pass EPB approval for each project, a major
step in preventing pollution.73 As a senior EPB official pointed out, “The fact that every project
must go through environmental impact assessments has contributed immensely in our ability to
control pollution.”74
As in Shanghai, the Xiamen EPB still must negotiate and power-share with other bureaus
in implementing environmental policy. The EPB’s lower status and legal authority within the
municipal government often weakens the Xiamen EPB’s ability to penalize polluting industries.
In such situations, the EPB often brings along a second official from a more powerful department,
like the Department of Industry, to lend greater weight to enforcement. A Fujian Congress
member commented, “If there is a company that exceeds pollution limits consistently, the
government will send not just an EPB official but another official from a more powerful
department. This way the company knows the government means business.”75 The EPB’s
potential allies include local commerce bureaus to revoke a firm’s operating permits, local banks
Wing-Hung Lo, “EIA Regulation,” 355-375.
Shanghai EPB official, Interview by Authors, 1 July 2002, Shanghai.
73
Xiamen Foreign Investment Bureau official, Interview by Authors, 11 July 2002, Xiamen.
74
Xiamen EPB official, Interview by Authors, 15 July 2002, Xiamen.
75
Xiamen University professor, Interview by Authors, 12 July 2002, Xiamen.
71
72
to withdraw loans, and even the Public Security bureau to bulldoze the noncompliant production
site.76 Jahiel emphasizes the importance of such coordination: “[I]n enforcing policy, the
environmental protection apparatus had the support and assistance of the agencies most crucial to
industrial activity.”77
Similar cooperation with other municipal bureaus must occur during the formation of
new laws and regulations. To EPB officials, this diminishes their ability to effectively conduct
environmental protection work. A Xiamen EPB official described this frustration:
During the process of making an article or law, officials from various
bureaus like Urban Planning, Forestry, Transportation must first meet to discuss
the proposals. Thus, the conflict and maneuvering that goes on during these
discussions makes enacting environmental legislation a drawn out process.78
The leadership of the Shanghai and Xiamen mayors and other city leaders in addressing
environmental issues has been a crucial factor influencing the city EPBs’ institutional
development. Under Chinese cities’ top-down form of governance, the attitudes and opinions of
the Mayor’s office become critical when considering the nature of environmental management.
Shanghai and Xiamen city leaders, in essence, rank the importance of environmental protection
within the overall city plans. As in other Chinese cities, each mayor’s office typically tries to
balance its obligations for both economic development and environmental protection.79 Shanghai
and Xiamen’s relative success in strengthening their environmental management systems has
been largely due to the initiatives taken by city leaders. Many of the professors and city officials
that we interviewed singled out the mayors’ offices as being key contributors to the two cities’
expanding environmental agendas.80(Prof & EPB interviews)
Jahiel, “Organization of Environmental Protection,” 757-787.
Ibid.
78
Xiamen EPB official, Interview by Authors, 15 July 2002, Xiamen.
79
Ma and Ortolano, Environmental Regulation in China. 63.
80
Shanghai and Xiamen professors and EPB officials, Interviews by Authors, June-July 2002.
76
77
During the 1990’s, Shanghai’s rapid growth to become China’s commercial, industrial,
and financial center came largely at the expense of environmental concerns and issues. Yet as
environmental problems mounted, city leaders began to recognize the importance of building an
effective environmental management system to reduce the costs stemming from weak
environmental enforcement. In their efforts to build a world-class city, local leaders realized that
neglecting environmental degradation would hinder any potential to achieve those goals. As the
EPB official we spoke to remarked, “the environmental situation in Shanghai changed when top
officials became more aware of environmental problems.”81 Attention from the mayor’s office
brought increased financing and greater responsibility to the city EPB. The significance of the
Shanghai mayor’s views was aptly expressed by a Shanghai environmental professor:
The vision of the city leaders is the most important part in creating a
more environment-friendly city and environmentally clean industries. The
general public just doesn’t have enough impact to change Shanghai’s
environmental conditions.82
In a smaller city with the political and financial independence to set its own course, the
attitudes and views of Xiamen city leaders played an even larger role in creating the city’s present
environmental conditions. In the 1980’s the municipal government hotly debated the relationship
between economic growth and environmental protection.83 Yet, unlike most Chinese cities, the
Xiamen leadership decided in the early 1990’s to incorporate environmental protection into the
overall plans for growth and development. In fact, a consensus grew among government officials
that an environment-friendly city with stricter regulations and standards would facilitate efforts to
attract foreign investment and capital. As David Campbell concludes in his study on Xiamen’s
cleanup of Yuandang Lake, “support from the local political leadership, though difficult to
81
Shanghai EPB official, Interview by Authors, 1 July 2002, Shanghai.
Shanghai Tongji University professor, Interview by Authors, 2 July 2002, Shanghai.
83
Xiamen University professor, Interview by Authors, 10 July 2002, Xiamen.
82
capture, is critical to pollution control efforts in China.”84 The city’s autonomy as an SEZ proved
critical in fostering progressive attitudes among city leaders. According to a top Xiamen EPB
official, “environmental leadership came from the municipal government because they knew a
poor natural environment would hurt the city’s business environment”, a novel idea for Chinese
leaders.85
Some of the Shanghai and Xiamen EPBs’ successes and weaknesses can also be
attributed to their increased autonomy and independence. The Shanghai and Xiamen municipal
governments both enjoy levels of autonomy and independence that reduce outside interference.
The two cities’ greater political and economic status within the Chinese government has been
crucial to their institutional development.
In terms of freedom from outside intervention, especially from the mayor’s office, the
Shanghai EPB enjoys an autonomy that allows considerable power in conducting environmental
protection work. While city leaders still ultimately control the fate of the EPB, the mayor
generally does not interfere with the bureau’s efforts in enforcing or drafting environmental
policies. It is important to note, though, that the Shanghai municipal government can still
obstruct the EPB at will. A Shanghai EPB official noted that the future may bring the bureau
even greater autonomy:
China’s entrance into the WTO will force more openness and
transparency among Shanghai bureaus and companies. This will hopefully
reduce companies’ interference in government policies. There must be a
separation of duties for the bureaus within the Shanghai municipal government.86
Two factors contributed to the Xiamen EPB’s autonomy: the status of the city as an SEZ,
and the elevation of the Xiamen municipal government to sub-provincial status. With a proactive
leadership and the autonomy to implement their agenda, the Xiamen municipal government has
Campbell “Maoist Legacy,” 873.
Xiamen EPB official, Interview by Authors, 15 July 2002, Xiamen.
86
Shanghai EPB official, Interview by Authors, 1 July 2002, Shanghai.
84
85
placed the EPB in a strategic role that allows it to influence the direction of urban planning and
development. In our interviews with EPB officials, the bureau’s involvement with the
environmental legislative process seemed fairly high compared to Shanghai. The sentiments that
local policy makes better policy permeated the EPB and the city as a whole. Further, with the
amount of foreign capital invested into the city, the provincial and central governments have little
reason to threaten Xiamen’s positive investment environment. As previously noted, according to
EPB officials and a Xiamen Univ. professor, the city’s environmental situation has affected its
business environment, and the government is careful not to damage this relationship.
Considering the challenges placed on the Shanghai and Xiamen EPB’s in establishing
effective environmental institutions, both cities have made vast improvements in developing the
bureaus. Compared to other Chinese cities, the development of the Shanghai and Xiamen EPB’s
as reputable institutions within the municipal governments has been noteworthy. Both EPB’s
have benefited from a number of factors in their development, including large amounts of
financing from the municipal government, backing from city leaders in addressing environmental
problems, and the autonomy and independence acquired due to each city’s political and financial
situations. However, as is often the case in China, such advances are relative. The challenges
confronting the Shanghai and Xiamen EPB’s in their overall development are significant and will
require a series of changes. The status of each city’s EPB remains low compared to other bureaus
and departments within the municipal government, especially those related to commerce, industry
and finance. Environmental protection work must often yield to the interests of these more
powerful bureaus. The role of law and legal mechanisms must be strengthened in order to give
the bureau greater enforcement authority in environmental legal disputes.
Financing
In China, funding for city EPB’s comes from municipal governments, not from SEPA,
and is augmented to some degree by pollution discharge fees and consulting service fees. Local
governments dictate the EPBs’ annual budgets, staffing & office allotments, and even vehicle &
employee housing allocations.87 Street-level EPB enforcement and monitoring efficacy is often
limited not by technical demands but simply by the inability to hire sufficient personnel, making
budget control an effective instrument for either promoting or eliminating environmental
enforcement.
EPB financing in Shanghai and Xiamen differs primarily in its scale rather than in its
sources. Both EPB’s noted pollution fees and fines as their primary means of punishing polluting
companies and of supplementing their annual budgets.88,89 However, Xiamen professors felt that
because effluent fees were so low, companies simply “budgeted them in” rather than actually
taking steps to eliminate pollution and avoid the fees.90 Some studies have complained that many
companies consider paying the fees tantamount to a “pollution entitlement,” granting them the
right to pollute at will.91 Although fee collection and other independent funding sources reduce
EPB dependence on the municipal governments, they create perverse incentives under which the
EPB budget actually grows as pollution increases.92 Closure of a heavily-polluting factory would
dry up a source of funding entirely. Questions also arise as to the best use of such funds. One
study indicated that about 80% of effluent fee collections in China are used for pollution control
and improvement projects, supporting the “polluter pays for cleanup” principle.93 Local EPB’s
retain 20% of the fee revenues and all fine collections for administrative budgets, and the
remaining 80%, dedicated to pollution control, goes back out to the fee-paying companies and
others in the form of grants and (most recently) loans to subsidize environmental equipment
Jahiel, “Organization of Environmental Protection,” 757-787.
Shanghai EPB official, Interview by Authors, 1 July 2002, Shanghai.
89
Xiamen EPB official, Interview by Authors, 15 July 2002, Xiamen.
90
Xiamen University professor, Interview by Authors, 10 July 2002, Xiamen.
91
Theodore Panayotou, “The Effectiveness and Efficiency of Environmental Policy in China”. Energizing
China. (Newton, MA: Harvard University Committee on Environment 1998) 415.
92
Tang, “Institutional Constraints,” 863-874.
93
Chan, “The Implementation Gap in Environmental Management in China”, p. 333-343.
87
88
purchases or upgrades.94 Interestingly, though, a senior Shanghai EPB official expressed the
personal opinion that pollution fees should go toward major projects, and that the residents
themselves in polluted areas should help pay for local cleanup.95 Whatever their ultimate
destination, pollution fees constitute a significant funding source for both cities’ EPB’s, and give
a financial incentive to boost enforcement and monitoring.
Big-budget environmental projects proposed by the city EPB’s draw funding from a
variety of sources, primarily with approval and financing arranged directly by the city
government rather than an EPB department.96 The EPB then sees the projects through to
completion, in conjunction with other bureaus.97 The Shanghai EPB’s greater size and budget
allows it to independently direct larger projects than in Xiamen, which would require more
coordination with other city bureaus. Urban infrastructure projects use typical funding methods,
including bond issues, direct funding, and foreign loans. Shanghai has taken steps to introduce
market mechanisms in funding large urban projects; for example, tap water prices were recently
increased by 25-40% to improve water quality and make sewage treatment self-financing.98
Foreign assistance and funding is generally for larger projects, again recruited primarily by the
city governments but with EPB advice. Recent foreign-financed environmental projects in
Shanghai and Xiamen include Australian government and World Bank assistance in Shanghai’s
ongoing Suzhou Creek cleanup99 and French technical aid and concessionary financing for a solid
waste incinerator in Xiamen.100 The World Bank also indicates that municipal governments are
its main counterparts in arranging development projects and technical assistance.101 Depending
on the nature of the project, other governmental units may also get involved. For example, the
Panayotou, “The Effectiveness and Efficiency of Environmental Policy in China”, 415.
Shanghai EPB official, Interview by Authors, 1 July 2002, Shanghai.
96
Xiamen Foreign Investment Bureau official, Interview by Authors, 11 July 2002, Xiamen.
97
Ibid.
98
“Environmental Policy Making in China”, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.
99
Robert M. Ward and Wen Liang. “Shanghai Water Supply and Wastewater Disposal,” Geographical
Review. 85 (1995): p. 141-157.
100
“Greener than Green,” US Embassy.
101
The World Bank. “China: Air, Land, Water”. 128.
94
95
State Development Planning Commission has solicited foreign funding for environmental
projects.102 Coordinating the multifaceted funding options and bureaucratic efforts places
complex demands on even the most skilled city EPBs.
Environmental progress also requires research money, and the municipal EPB’s take an
active role in coordinating and providing research funds. Shanghai EPB officials proudly noted
that their annual research budget had more than tripled from previous levels of 3 million RMB
(US$363,000) annually to 10 million RMB (US$1.2 million) for each of the past two years.103
The expanded budget included a number of research projects that university researchers could bid
for. Overall, environmental research funds come from a variety of sources. Environmental
professors at Shanghai Jiaotong University mentioned looking to the city EPB, SEPA, local
companies, and foreign sources in arranging research funding.104 Student leaders of a university
student environmental NGO in Shanghai enjoyed participating in a competition sponsored by the
BASF company, at which college students presented PowerPoint® oral presentations on
environmental topics.105 The Ministry of Science and Technology has also funded environmental
research and related scientific exchanges.106 Nationally, the disparity in environmental research
funding between leading cities like Shanghai and Xiamen and their countryside counterparts
creates a need to expand inter-agency scientific exchanges. Such exchanges can serve to partially
offset the lack of research dollars and technical expertise in less-developed rural areas.
Environmental Enforcement
Much of a municipal EPB’s responsibility centers around environmental monitoring and
regulations enforcement, activities which occupy a substantial portion of the staff, particularly at
the district-level EPB’s. Environmental efforts worldwide face the predicament of inducing
Jahiel, “Organization of Environmental Protection,” 757-787.
Shanghai EPB official, Interview by Authors, 1 July 2002, Shanghai.
104
Shanghai University professor, Interview by Authors, 29 June 2002, Shanghai.
105
Student Environmental NGO, Interview by Authors, 30 June 2002, Shanghai.
106
Jahiel, “Organization of Environmental Protection,” 757-787.
102
103
unwilling and polluting companies into complying with established standards, and China is no
exception. Low-level field regulators in the Guangzhou, Zhengzhou, and Nanjing EPB’s
expressed frustration in attempting to enforce regulations among a non-environmentally
conscious public.107 Particularly when public support is low, environmental enforcement’s
success depends on local leaders’ attitudes and support. As Jahiel has noted, “Individual
commitment to the environmental cause on the part of EPB officials (and local leaders) can often
play a tremendously important role in policy implementation, independent of whether an area is
rich or poor.”108 EPB’s employ a variety of enforcement methods; usually, the larger, more
technical EPB’s focus on legal and technical solutions, while less well-established, less-funded
EPB’s use education campaigns and other efforts to curry favor with local business and
government elites.109 In addition, recent EPB efforts to expand Cleaner Production (CP) and ISO
14000 certifications promote industrial self-monitoring and oversight, reducing the demands on
EPB staff and resources.110
While in Shanghai and Xiamen, we investigated the EPBs’ perspectives as to which
enforcement methods are most effective. Shanghai officials mentioned penalties (developed at
the EPB’s request) directed specifically at the leadership of polluting organizations.111
Leadership at Shanghai’s Xuyang Wastewater Treatment Plant concurred. Their facility is
inspected twice yearly by the municipal EPB, and every other month by the district EPB (plus
surprise inspections), and they readily acknowledged the possibility of being demoted or
dismissed if the facility failed inspection.112 Senior Xiamen EPB officials also indicated that
individual company or danwei directors can be sued in court under the municipal Financial &
Chan, “The Implementation Gap in Environmental Management in China”, p. 333-343.
Jahiel, “Organization of Environmental Protection,” 757-787.
109
Ibid.
110
The World Bank. “China: Air, Land, Water”. p. 104.
111
Shanghai EPB official, Interview by Authors, 1 July 2002, Shanghai.
112
Xu Yang wastewater treatment plant officials, Interview by Authors, 4 July 2002, Shanghai.
107
108
Taxation Department’s authority when noncompliant.113 However, the Xiamen officials
emphasized mandatory environmental education and training for companies and managers as the
most effective overall enforcement method.114 Other Chinese sources have also stressed the need
to train plant managers in environmental techniques.115 In more difficult situations, when
stopping production at large factories would risk social unrest among the laid off workers, the
Xiamen EPB staff said that a time limit of up to three years was allowable for bringing emissions
into compliance, but stressed that Xiamen rarely if ever deals with situations or industries of such
magnitude.116 Clearly, though, even the EPB’s acknowledge that the primary enforcement
method, pollution discharge fees, is insufficient in deterring or preventing noncompliant
industries from polluting.
In Xiamen as well as in Shanghai, the EPB is increasingly active in enlisting the news
media to raise public awareness and to rally public outcry as an ally against noncompliant and
heavily polluting industries. Xiamen EPB officials move quickly to notify the local media of
noncompliant companies, using social pressure to enforce compliance.117 Nationally, “[SEPA]
officials have told the U.S. Embassy that the campaign to increase public awareness on
environmental issues is part of a deliberate strategy to put pressure on local governments to
enforce environmental regulations,”118 an interesting “bottom-up” approach to the usual top-down
Chinese methods. Access to the media affords national and local EPBs an alternative means of
enforcement, one less subject to local leaders’ personal interference.
As previously mentioned, an EPB’s lower status or priority among the city government
requires it to coordinate efforts with other bureaus, particularly when it desires more severe
methods of enforcement. In Xiamen, approval from the city government is necessary to move or
113
Xiamen EPB official, Interview by Authors, 15 July 2002, Xiamen.
Xiamen EPB official, Interview by Authors, 16 July 2002, Xiamen.
115
Ming-ming Tiao and Hong Liu. “Effective Measure of Environmental Management is Cleaner
Production.” HuanjingBaohu Kexue (Environmental Protection Science). 28 (2002): 44-45.
116
Xiamen EPB official, Interview by Authors, 16 July 2002, Xiamen.
117
Ibid.
118
“Fading of Chinese Environmental Secrecy,” US Embassy.
114
shut down a factory.119 The Shanghai EPB also employs city government assistance in its efforts
to relocate small and medium-sized industries to a common area, where they can be monitored
more closely.120 According to EPB officials, “The mayor’s office isn’t concerned about losing
small companies if they are heavy polluters. Besides, many closed firms later reopen with newer,
cleaner production methods.”121 A Shanghai professor added, “If the mayor’s office wants to
move 50 companies, they can do it. If they want to put a park right where a residential district is
now, they can do it - they have the power.”122 In both Shanghai and Xiamen, the worst polluting
companies are often relocated to outlying districts where their effects on the city’s air and water
quality are less pronounced. The EPBs coordinate with the municipal governments to provide
financial assistance for the moves. Elsewhere in China, EPB’s have also been known to enlist
local party secretaries during disputes to “unofficially” convince particularly belligerent polluters
to stop, although such actions are less common in larger cities.123 The city governmental
apparatus constitutes the most powerful potential ally for EPB’s desiring to raise the bar on local
environmental standards and enforcement measures.
Recently, Environmental Impact Assessments (EIA’s) have developed as a means of
promoting long-term sustainable development during the process of economic growth. Under the
“Three Synchronous” policy, EPB consultation and approval is necessary during planning,
construction, and operation to ensure overall attention to environmental concerns. In Xiamen,
three levels of EIA requirements exist, according to the size of the proposed projects. A Xiamen
city Foreign Investment Bureau official indicated that his department won’t consider a project
until it is O.K.’d by the EPB.124 Potentially problematic new industrial projects are often
119
Xiamen University professor, Interview by Authors, 10 July 2002, Xiamen.
Shanghai EPB official, Interview by Authors, 1 July 2002, Shanghai.
121
Ibid.
122
Shanghai Tongji University professor, Interview by Authors, 2 July 2002, Shanghai.
123
Jahiel, “Organization of Environmental Protection,” 757-787.
124
Xiamen Foreign Investment Bureau official, Interview by Authors, 11 July 2002, Xiamen.
120
relocated to designated city districts better equipped to handle certain wastes.125 In Shanghai, the
municipal EPB’s Department of Supervision and Administration’s eight staff members, mostly
engineers, evaluate EIA’s for 500-600 new projects each year.126 EIA policies, regulations, and
administration follow a formal, agency-dominated legal approach.127 Potential conflicts of
interest arise when EPB-affiliated units dominate the EIA consultation and preparation market,
though. The study by Tang et al. reports that the Shanghai Municipal Academy of Environmental
Sciences, a subsidiary of the city EPB, monopolizes the preparation of EIA reports for all large
and medium projects as well as 70% of small-scale EIA projects.128 Further conflicts arise when
the EIA approval process occurs behind closed doors. A comparison study of the Hong Kong and
Shanghai EIA processes complained that “the lack of avenues for public input has effectively
blocked any form of public participation…and the EIA system in Shanghai is basically a closed
system dictated by the bureaucrats.”129 The study also noted that in contrast to the Hong Kong
system, Shanghai EIA reports are not required to be open for public comment or consultation.
While the formal EIA systems in both Xiamen and Shanghai improve efforts at comprehensive
environmental planning and sustainable development, bureaucratic monopoly over the EIA
processes makes EIA approvals susceptible to interference from outside governmental and
corporate interests.130 Greater transparency would not only allow for proposal of additional ideas,
but would also provide the EPB’s with a powerful public ally.131
Public Consultation Channels
An environmental agency’s ability to effectively implement policy and gain legitimacy
requires clear and open channels with the public so that policy remains relevant to the lives of
125
Ibid.
Tang, “Institutional Constraints,” 863-874.
127
Wing-Hung Lo, “EIA Regulation,” 355-375.
128
Tang, “Institutional Constraints,” 863-874.
129
Wing-Hung Lo, “Environmental Impact Assessment Regulation”, 355-375.
130
Tang, “Institutional Constraints,” 863-874.
131
Wing-Hung Lo, “EIA Regulation,” 355-375.
126
average citizens. While the EPB’s and other Chinese municipal organizations have begun to
understand the importance of public participation in creating good governance, our research in
two of China’s most environmentally aware cities leads us to conclude that the EPB has still not
established effective communication lines with city residents to further the advancement of
environmental policy. Despite the opening of complaint hotlines, educational campaigns, and
advisory committees, regular citizens in both Shanghai and Xiamen are given little opportunity to
be involved with the creation or implementation of regulations designed by the EPB’s.
In developed countries, environmental NGO’s have played an immense role in raising
environmental issues and challenging governments to address specific environmental problems.
In recent years, the Chinese government has begun to open the door for environmental NGO’s to
form due to the government’s awareness of China’s environmental destruction and the relative
ineffectiveness in government agencies ability to raise public awareness.132 Numerous groups,
such as the Beijing-based Friends of Nature, Green Earth Volunteers and other, formed in the
mid-1990’s to mobilize environmental education, promote research on environmental problems,
and create TV programs to call attention to environmental issues.
The general increase in environmental groups has been more limited in Shanghai, though.
Two reasons can explain this occurrence: the centralization of environmental policymaking in the
hands of the Shanghai EPB, and the culture of non-activism and pragmatism among the Shanghai
populace. In addition, the Chinese government sets up multiple barriers to impede public efforts
to form NGO’s. Alford and Shen characterize these obstructions: “[T]he Communist Party
strongly discourages concerned citizens from forming independent nongovernmental groups,
whether focused on the environment or other issues.”133,134 The U.S. Embassy’s Environmental
Section adds: “Individuals or groups that openly question existing government policies are the
“Environmental NGO’s in China: Green is Good, But don’t Openly Oppose the Party”, U.S. Embassy,
Beijing. December 1997
133
Alford, “Limits of the Law,” 416.
134
Lappin, Todd. “Can Green Mix with Red? Environmentalism in China”. The Nation. February 14, 1994.
p193-196.
132
subject of disfavor, although they are not currently being arrested or openly harassed.”(USEmbassy
Green is good but don’t…)
Local governments complicate the registration process for NGO’s by requiring
registration with two different governmental departments and a “ sponsoring danwei”.135 A
Beijing NGO director aptly expresses the registration process’s frustrations, commenting, “For
the time being we can’t find a ‘sponsoring danwei’ at all; therefore we have to register as an
industry, but this way will produce a lot of problems because we will have to contribute funds and
pay taxes”.136 The Chinese government makes every effort to stranglehold opportunities for
forming citizen organizations or any other groups that could threaten their grip on power.
Compared to more politically minded cities like Beijing, Shanghai has in general been
slow to form NGO’s of any sort. Even a Shanghai EPB official we interviewed recognized this
absence when stating, “in Shanghai, NGO’s at the present moment are not very popular and very
few exist compared to other major Chinese cities.”137 An urban development professor from a
major Shanghai university commented on this phenomenon as such:
The kinds of NGO’s in China are not grass roots and are actually semiofficial, especially in Shanghai. Even though the public in Shanghai is becoming
more and more aware of the environment, they have not organized themselves to
deal with these issues. This leads to a more micro approach rather macro in
dealing with environmental problems in Shanghai.138
Still, many see the eventual emergence of more organized environmental groups in
Shanghai as a potential force for affecting future environmental policymaking. Initial steps
toward NGO development include the recent proliferation of university student environmental
groups; Shanghai professors indicated that the city’s university campuses all had environmental
Li, Yong. “China NGO’s Slim Search for Survival,” Caijing 5 July 2002, 25.
Ibid.
137
Shanghai EPB official, Interview by Authors, 1 July 2002, Shanghai.
138
Shanghai Tongji University professor, Interview by Authors, 2 July 2002, Shanghai.
135
136
NGO’s or similar student associations.139 With the decreasing role of government intervention
throughout China, a gap will emerge for NGO’s and other public groups to fill. A former EPB
official and professor remarked on this trend, “NGO’s in Shanghai are not visible presently, yet in
the future I see the government giving up more responsibility and functions to NGO’s in dealing
with environmental problems.”140
Similar sentiments permeated Xiamen when researching the role or lack thereof of
environmental NGO’s. As a smaller city than Shanghai, Xiamen has fewer opportunities for
citizen groups to form. Despite this, many professors point to the high environmental awareness
of Xiamen citizens as being the major influence in creating one of China’s most environmentally
friendly cities. A professor from Xiamen University still saw the role of the public and NGO’s as
relatively weak compared to that found in Western countries, with Xiamen’s environmental
protection responsibility instead lying primarily in the hands of the municipal government.141 In
talking with two EPB officials, rarely did they mention the role of NGO’s or citizen groups, but
instead related information on EPB-sponsored educational campaigns and other contacts with the
public, again revealing Xiamen’s top-down approach to environmental management.
In terms of policy creation and implementation, both cities lacked any substantial form of
public consultation. The growing usage of EIA in Shanghai and Xiamen occurs mostly behind
closed doors, away from public scrutiny, and the EIA regulatory process operates in a “black
box” manner without any transparency or public involvement.142 As such, major construction
projects are often reviewed without involving any mechanisms for public input.
The main advancement in enhancing public consultation channels in China has been the
creation of environmental hotlines and websites that respond to complaints and provide air
quality figures and other data. The establishment of Shanghai’s environmental hotline in 2000
139
Shanghai University professors, Interview by Authors, 30 June 2002, Shanghai.
Former EPB official/Shanghai professor, Interview by Authors, 2 July 2002, Shanghai.
141
Xiamen University professor, Interview by Authors, 10 July 2002, Xiamen.
142
“Environmental Impact Assessment Regulation in Hong and Shanghai: A Cross-City Analysis”. Journal
of Environmental Planning & Management. May 1999, Vol.42. p.355-375.
140
opened EPB officials to the concerns and complaints of common citizens. Such connections
should improve the relevancy of EPB policies. In Xiamen, the EPB’s website often lists major
environmental projects to inform the public and bring attention to major issues. The relationship
built through these channels has spurred citizens to pressure EPB officials to address specific
environmental problems.143 One example involved the creation of a bird sanctuary off the coast
of Xiamen island. In this case the publicity resulting from a Japanese photographer’s published
photos of Xiamen’s white egrets, the leadership of a concerned returning overseas Chinese
gentleman, and numerous calls and complaints from Xiamen citizens eventually convinced the
Xiamen municipal government and EPB to set aside a nature reserve.144 In both cities, the trend
of greater environmental awareness among citizens and the opening of communication between
the EPB and the public have improved overall environmental conditions.
In instances where the municipal EPB is unwilling to help, local citizens do have various
means of legal recourse, but awareness remains extremely low. Besides unofficial awareness
campaigns and public demonstrations, which risk political repercussions or police action, citizens
can appeal to their city governments or legal bureaus to require the EPB to enforce the relevant
local, provincial, or national laws. Chinese environmental law does allow for potential civil
litigation against egregious polluters, but the courts usually insist that only individuals directly
affected by the pollution will be heard.145 An informative article from Beijing, written by Wang
Can-zhu of the Chinese University of Political Science and Law’s Pollution Victim Assistance
Center (Zhongguo Zhengfa Daxue Wuran Shouhaizhe Falü Bangzhu Zhongxin), relates examples
of the Center’s lawyers’ efforts to broker solutions when local EPBs refuse to assist pollution
143
Xiamen University professor, Interview by Authors, 12 July 2002, Xiamen.
Xiamen EPB official, Interview by Authors, 11 July 2002, Xiamen.
145
Alford, “Limits of the Law,” 421.
144
victims.146 Overall, though, the lack of awareness of such means of recourse often forces
pollution victims to silently endure their hardships.147
In China, the media is an emerging force for pressuring local governments and
scrutinizing their policies. While the Shanghai and Xiamen media, especially TV programs, have
paid more attention to recent environmental problems, much of the reporting tends to be directed
by the EPB or other government agencies to support their own objectives. A typical EPB view on
this subject is expressed in a Yongan EPB official’s writing, “Every capable agency must
disseminate all pertinent information and goals through newspapers, TV, broadcasts, and all
available media outlets.”148 Thus, environmental news becomes a tool for the EPB rather than a
servant of the public. A Shanghai EPB official remarked that regulations are often given out
through the media.149 In Xiamen the situation is no different. A top official with the Xiamen
EPB saw the media as a great way of focusing popular attention on a particular environmental
problem or project. While the media’s heightened attention to environmental problems has
increased public awareness, the centralization of power in the hands of the Shanghai and Xiamen
EPB’s has made media reporting primarily a tool for their own causes. There continues to be a
lack of in-depth environmental reporting that can have a resounding public and governmental
impact.150
Another growing trend evident in both cities was the increasing role advisory committees
and think tanks play in generating policy and making decisions on specific EPB projects. Though
not necessarily a public organization in the conventional form, most of these groups contain a
majority of non-governmental members. In Shanghai think tanks and advisory groups have
Can-Fa Wang, et. al. “Settlement of Environmental Disputes in China and Environmenal Enforcement
Supervised by the Public,”Hungjing Baohu (Environmental Protection). 295. (2002): p. 5-8.
147
Ibid.
148
Chen Wei. “Practices and Thinking on Integrated Management of Urban Environment in Yong an City”.
China Environmental Management (February, 2002) 42.
149
Shanghai EPB official, Interview by Authors, 1 July 2002, Shanghai.
150
“Environmental Policy Making in China”. Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.
146
played an increasing role in shaping policy. One frequent environmental advisory committee
member commented on the committees’ role:
Because of the top down nature of the Chinese government, scholars
often like to consult government officials to stress the importance of
environmental protection. I myself along with the many thinks tanks I’ve been
involved with have shaped Shanghai government policy. With Shanghai’s
wealth of universities and scholars, environmental conditions have been helped
tremendously.151
As in other cases, the smaller size of Xiamen decreases the number of institutions involved in
advisory roles, but the trend still exists in the city. Much of the advising and research
consultation comes from Xiamen University and its Environmental Science Research Center. For
example, the Xiamen University College of Oceanography and Environmental Science’s Coastal
Sustainable Development Center, a joint project with the municipal government, teaches city
leaders and others about sustainable development issues.152
In the last decade, the EPB’s in Shanghai and Xiamen have shown greater concern for
involving public opinion in environmental protection work. With the establishment of hotlines,
websites, and media outlets, the EPB’s has a much better recognition of the public’s role than in
previous years. Even with these options in place, public consultation channels remain fairly weak
in Shanghai and Xiamen. Environmental policymaking is still centralized in the hands of
bureaucrats that work behind closed doors. Only after government decisions have been made
does the public get involved, typically as a means of policy promotion. Despite the arrangements
to include the public on various levels, its involvement has had a limited impact on the decisionmaking process, and the accountability of the system has remained weak.153 If such conditions
persist, the institutional capabilities of the Shanghai and Xiamen EPB’s may weaken. Without
151
Shanghai Tongji University professor, Interview by Authors, 2 July 2002, Shanghai.
Xiamen University professor, Interview by Authors, 10 July 2002, Xiamen.
153
Wing-Hung Lo, “EIA Regulation,” 355-375.
152
public support and open discussion on current policy, the work of EPB’s can easily be
undermined by the changing tides of local politics.154
Comparison Shanghai vs. Xiamen
The two cities of Shanghai and Xiamen differ in many regards. Most importantly,
Shanghai dwarfs Xiamen in scale, with significantly greater population and its associated
pressures. Differences in environmental quality in the two cities result not from better/worse
management structures but primarily from the scope of the industrial and social pressures they
face. As the financial and industrial hub of China, Shanghai leaders must balance environmental
concerns with a broader and more powerful range of demands, both economic and civic, than
those in Xiamen. Both cities have developed centralized, influential EPB’s during the course of
their economic growth, devoting considerable shares of GDP to the environment. Shanghai
spends a greater percent of its GDP on environmental investments (3.09% vs. 2.22%),155,156
although a senior Shanghai EPB official insisted that “greater investment doesn’t necessarily
equal greater emphasis - it often just means that there are more problems around to clean up.”157
Shanghai’s more numerous and more severe environmental problems are compounded by the
greater extent of older industries and SOE’s. Macro scale cleanup efforts in Shanghai often
involve massive outlays of capital and staffing resources, and take on greater political and media
visibility - especially given the current national leadership roles of former Shanghai mayors.
In national and regional affairs, Shanghai wields considerably more political clout, is
more closely integrated with other major northern and Yangtze River cities, and receives a great
deal more attention from the Western press. Both cities, though, serve as “showcase cities” in
China in their respective economic and environmental efforts. As a large, directly administered
Tang, “Institutional Constraints,” 863-874.
Shanghai EPB Bulletin 2002.
156
Xiamen EPB Bulletin 2001.
157
Shanghai EPB official, Interview by Authors, 1 July 2002.
154
155
municipality, Shanghai has more direct control over its internal affairs, whereas the Xiamen SEZ
also reports to the Fujian provincial government, and is subject to provincial laws.
Industry in Xiamen developed almost from the ground up since 1980, and the Xiamen
city leadership stepped in early to promote clean, sustainable development in the city center.
During Xiamen’s explosive economic growth as an SEZ, city leaders had little reason to interfere
with the city’s environmental image - the city had never depended on heavy-polluting industry,
and the flood of incoming FDI opportunities afforded a degree of selectivity in approving new
projects. Public consultation and input in Xiamen have attained dramatic improvements over
most Chinese cities, but work still remains. Xiamen’s environmental situation is also enhanced
by its island location - although it is only a bridge away from the mainland, the inlets, hillsides,
and seas limit the density of development and provides a buffer zone from the more heavilypolluting industries in its mainland districts. Its island scenery and climate provide additional
incentives to promote tourism and investment via an environment-friendly, “tropical paradise”
image. Xiamen’s smaller size, SEZ designation, and relative political and geographic isolation
afford it a more experimental status in environmental efforts, in which it has successfully climbed
to a deserved rank of “Model Environmental City” in China.
Recommendations
As already discussed, municipal governments in China face a number of challenges in
improving their overall environmental management systems. Both national level bodies and
foreign groups can also provide valuable assistance in such efforts. Currently, China finds itself
at a critical juncture in its economic and environmental development, with modernizations in both
fields being rapidly implemented. Our recommendations are meant to provide short- and longterm strategy options for the many parties involved in Chinese municipal environmental
management.
As previously noted, Shanghai and Xiamen have benefited from a number of internal and
external factors in developing relatively effective EPB’s and environmental management. In the
ongoing process of development, a host of issues could promote further improvements. In both
Shanghai and Xiamen, the EPB’s must open more channels for public consultation. Public
participation now mainly consists of opportunities for citizen complaints or to pressure polluting
industries. As Carlos Lo and Plato Yip note, “the involvement of the public has had limited
impact on the decision-making process and the accountability of the system has remained
weak.”158 Rather than involving the public only after policy is already created, the Shanghai and
Xiamen EPB’s should actively engage their residents during formation of policies and projects.
This includes public participation in the EIA approval process so that local residents understand
how future projects will affect them. The EPB’s could also allow districts and small communities
to meet to discuss any pressing environmental problems, encouraging local stewardship over
local conditions. The city EPB’s can play a major role in promoting a shift from a passive public
to actively engaged participation in environmental issues. Environmental NGO’s constitute a
powerful potential EPB ally, but will require assistance in their development. The potential
impact of increased citizen participation is described in Alford and Shen’s statement, “in the short
term, increased citizen involvement supplements the limited resources and power of
environmental officialdom. In the longer term it could develop into a check on inappropriate
alliances between local cadres and local capital.”159 In order to achieve this, the Shanghai and
Xiamen EPB’s must increase the transparency and public accountability of their respective
departments.
Enforcement and monitoring of polluting industries, while improving in both Shanghai
and Xiamen, lacks an effective arrangement of incentives and regulations capable of changing
Wing-Hung Lo, Carlos; et al. “Environmental Impact Assessment Regulation in Hong Kong and
Shanghai: Cross City Analysis”. Journal of Environmental Planning & Management. May 1999. Vol 42.
p.355-375.
159
William P Alford and Yuanyuan Shen, “The Limits of the Law in Addressing China’s Environmental
Dilemma,” Energizing China. (Newton, MA: Harvard University Committee on Environment 1998).
158
overall pollutions discharges. In meetings with both Shanghai and Xiamen EPB officials,
especially those in Shanghai, we found the current system of effluent fees to be insufficient to
force companies to change business practices. Instead, pollution fees serve more as an EPB
funding source than as pollution deterrents. Chinese pollution fees and monetary fines generally
remain less than the long-term costs of actually installing or operating pollution control
equipment.160 Only full-cost pricing of resources, with environmental taxes or charges that reflect
the entire environmental, economic, and social costs of pollution, can effectively deter polluting
enterprises, and such a system requires fees based on mass or volume of pollutants discharged,
rather than concentration limits that allow for simple dilution.161 Volume- and mass-based
pollution fees, even if inadequately low, at least provide a financial incentive for polluting firms
to make incremental reductions.162 Further implementation of such fee systems will be necessary
if pollution charges are to effectively penalize severely polluting industries.
Both cities’ EPB’s may also gain support for their respective environmental agendas by
taking advantage of the popular and media emphasis on the environment in conjunction with the
upcoming Beijing 2008 Olympics, which will likely enhance near-term funding and educational
opportunities.
Another opportunity for the Shanghai and Xiamen EPB’s to improve environmental
protection work is to promote legal development and awareness. With greater local respect for
the law and the legal process, the Shanghai and Xiamen EPB’s will gain a powerful tool for
enforcing regulations and rules. City leadership may be more supportive of environmental law
and enforcement if they were made better aware of nearby environmental disasters or crises,
particularly if site visits could be arranged. China’s integration into the WTO and the binding
agreements therein will provide new national emphasis on transparency, rule of law, and
Richard A. Carpenter. “Foreign Assistance for China’s Environment?” Environmental Science
Technology 24 (1990): 784-786.
161
Panayotou, “Effectiveness and Efficiency of Environmental Policy in China,” 432-472.
162
“Greener than Green,” US Embassy.
160
accountability. The EPB’s in Shanghai and Xiamen can and should use these trends as an
opportunity to strengthen the legal authority of their rules and regulations. The current role of
Chinese environmental law involves what a leading Xiamen EPB official referred to as “a
motivation to force companies to be more environmentally friendly.”163 Strengthening the rule of
law will transform EPB regulations from being a motivator to being the final arbiter of
environmental practices.
As noted earlier, environmental conditions and management in Shanghai and Xiamen do
not reflect the dire situations in many Chinese cities. Due to Shanghai and Xiamen’s political and
economic good fortune, the status of the EPB and environmental protection work sits much
higher than in other regions. An effective strategy to elevate environmental protection work in
Chinese cities would be to increase financing to environmental agencies and associated projects.
Increased funding to EPB’s in poorer regions will help attract better personnel and encourage the
availability of technological solutions when conducting environmental protection work. “Sister
city” programs and exchanges among municipal EPB’s in eastern and western China can promote
greater administrative and technical skill in less-developed regions. As noted by Theodore
Panayotou, “Experimentation in a few demonstration or testing sites is followed by gradual
extension of implementation toother cities, and, eventually, to the entire nation.”164
One of the most pressing issues for Chinese municipal EPB’s concerns their overall
departmental status and relationship to the mayor’s office and other powerful local interests. City
leaders will often hinder environmental protection in the interest of protecting polluting industries
and the money and resources they provide. Jahiel’s study accurately describes this situation,
stating, “since environmental organs are so dependent on local governments, they must take these
governments’ concerns into account when regulating industry.”165 Municipal EPB’s must have
sufficient authority to carry out policies and regulations. For this, the EPB rank within the overall
163
Xiamen EPB official, Interview by Authors, 16 July 2002, Xiamen.
Panayotou, “Effectiveness and Efficiency of Environmental Policy in China,” 432-472.
165
Jahiel “Organization of Environmental Protection,” 757-787.
164
municipal government hierarchy must be on a par with other major bureaus like the Departments
of Industry, Foreign Trade and Investment, and others. Administrative ranking is critical for
government agencies to effectively implement policies, and an elevated EPB ranking will actively
contribute to better municipal environmental protection efforts. Such an elevation must first
come from the mayor’s office, though. As both the Shanghai and Xiamen EPB’s noted, without
the leadership of prominent city officials, the EPB’s would not have had the resources needed to
achieve recent gains. The EPB’s administrative ranking “in great part reflects the local
leadership’s perception of the importance of the unit (EPB) within the local government.”166
Thus, municipalities must appoint environmentally conscious leaders in order to improve the
administrative capacity of environmental agencies.
On a national level a number of improvements can be made. The vertical and horizontal
relationships of environmental agencies should be strengthened. Coordination between SEPA
and provincial and municipal EPB’s in particular needs to be enhanced. This vertical relationship
is often damaged by the control local governments hold over environmental agencies. With
greater SEPA discretion in financing and appointing directors for provincial and municipal
EPB’s, local government bureaus’ and other competing groups’ interference would be reduced.
This requires raising the political clout of the SEPA in Beijing, a difficult task considering the
abundance of issues facing the central government. Fortunately, signs of improvement are seen
in the recent stipulation that new appointments to provincial and major municipal EPB
directorships must receive SEPA’s endorsement.167 Such changes will reduce EPB directors’
dependence on local governments. Financial ties linking EPB directors to SEPA, possibly
involving salary percentages or bonuses, would enhance vertical accountability. SEPA and other
environmental agencies should also promote recruitment of capable EPB directors from outside
166
Ibid
The World Bank, China: Air, Land, Water - Environmental Priorities for a New Millennium.
(Washington D.C.: The World Bank, August, 13, 2001)
167
regions when necessary in order to develop a core of well-educated, environmentally adept
directors rather than the local EPB bureaucrats that are more prone to local manipulation.
Horizontally, more communication and dialogue needs to occur between municipal EPB’s,
especially those in nearby regions. For issues such as water pollution, more dialogue among
EPB’s would limit a municipality’s ability to dump pollution problems downstream to other
regions. Additionally, better horizontal relations can facilitate consultation and advisement from
stronger EPB’s like those in Xiamen and Shanghai. Open communication between EPB’s will
improve policymaking and organizational capacity regionally as well as locally.
Regulations and standards for environmental agencies should also involve more
coordination as well as nationalization. SEPA should push more national campaigns for
environmental issues, working through the many levels of EPB’s to implement such policies.
Without evenly-applied national enforcement, even environmentally conscious city officials
might still approve a heavily polluting project, if the project would simply move a few miles
away into an environmentally lax neighboring city if rejected.
A number of opportunities also exist for foreign companies and organizations to improve
environmental management in Chinese cities. As foreign companies gain greater access to
China’s markets via the new WTO agreements, environmental corporations will have
opportunities to sell advanced environmental technologies to Chinese companies seeking to
improve pollution controls. China still lacks many high-technology environmental industries, but
foreign companies can help fill this gap. As the World Bank notes, with China’s WTO accession,
increased foreign competition could prompt consolidation of local firms and increase investments
in new technology.”168 For foreign companies operating in China, providing their Chinese
counterparts with examples of pollution control and preventative measures will substantially
contribute toward improving municipal environmental quality. Xiamen EPB officials frequently
mentioned the practices of Kodak and Dell as being models for Chinese companies in terms of
168
Ibid
environmental controls.169 Such models place pressure on Chinese firms to improve their
environmental control mechanisms and allow firms like Kodak to offer consultation and advising
services.
The preceding recommendations include both short- and long-term, micro- and macroscale goals. Long-term macro-level goals naturally require significant effort to implement.
Readjusting SEPA’s role and the vertical relationships among EPB’s demands widespread
political support, something not easily achieved in Chinese politics. Our suggestions for
Shanghai, Xiamen and other municipal EPB’s offer more short-term, specific goals, while those
described for national organizations involve a longer, macro approach.
Conclusion
Given the current autonomy afforded to local Chinese municipal governments in
determining and implementing environmental policy, additional research emphasis on local-level
interactions and institutions is needed. Our study has addressed issues of municipal EPBs’ status,
institutional development, financing, enforcement methods, and public consultation channels, and
has focused primarily on the case studies of two major Chinese cities – the directly-administered
Shanghai municipality and the Xiamen SEZ. In both cities, as elsewhere in China, municipal
governmental leadership plays a key role in determining each city’s environmental future and the
effectiveness of its local EPB. Future improvements in Chinese municipal environmental
management will require further increases in municipal EPB authority and funding, as well as
strengthening of vertical and horizontal relationships within the national environmental apparatus,
allowing for increased effectiveness in implementing overall national policy.
169
Xiamen EPB official, Interview by Authors 16 July 2002, Xiamen.
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