Samara Klar – Partisanship in a Social Setting
Partisanship in a Social Setting
Samara Klar
Department of Political Science
Northwestern University
Contact: samara@u.northwestern.edu
THIS IS A DRAFT.
PLEASE CONTACT THE AUTHOR TO CITE OR FOR FURTHER DETAILS.
No factor has proven more power in explaining vote choice, issue positions, and
candidate evaluations than one’s partisanship. Yet, virtually all work on the origins and
effects of party identification ignore how social context might condition its application –
that is, not how partisanship affects the choice of discussion partners, but rather how
social context can fundamentally change the influence of partisanship on preferences. In
this paper, I fill that gap with a novel experiment in which I demonstrate that social
settings can overwhelm the impact of partisanship, even among individuals who are
primed to be strong partisans. The central implication is that, going forward, work that
explores how citizens apply their party identification in making decisions must account
for their social context.
Over the past half century, the study of partisanship has provided critical insights
into how individuals’ identifications with a particular political party can color their
perceptions of the world and influence their issue evaluations and policy preferences.
Recent research on partisanship has re-visited the well-known idea put forth by Campbell
et al. (1960: 133) that views partisan identification as a perceptual screen. This more
recent work is done under the guise of work on partisan motivated reasoning (Taber and
Lodge 2006) and it shows that partisanship can dramatically shape how individuals
evaluate information. For example, a Democrat (Republican) may reject a policy
sponsored by a Republican (Democrat) when they would support the exact same policy if
endorsed by Democrats (Republicans) (e.g., Bartels 2002; Redlawsk 2002; Taber and
Lodge 2006; Druckman et al. n.d; Lavine et al. 2012). Lavine et al. (2012) demonstrate
that this partisan bias is particularly powerful when one feels strongly about their partisan
identification.
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Samara Klar – Partisanship in a Social Setting
Yet, over the past sixty years, virtually all research on how partisanship shapes
opinions ignores what has proven to be a critical factor in determining opinions more
generally: social networks (e.g., Berelson et al. 1954; Druckman and Nelson 2003;
Huckfeldt et al. 2004; Mutz 2006; Scheufele et al. 2006; Sinclair 2012). Instead,
partisanship is treated as though it operates in complete social isolation. In this paper, I
correct this omission by incorporating social context into the process by which partisan
identification shapes opinion formation. I show that one’s social setting – whether
composed of ideologically like-minded partisans or a mixed heterogeneous group of
partisans – fundamentally affects how one uses and applies their partisan identification in
evaluating political information and arriving at an opinion. In sum, I find that studying
how partisan identification influences information evaluation and opinion formation
without accounting for social setting may result in a vast mischaracterization of the
influence of partisanship.
I begin in the next section by discussing the known attitudinal consequences of
partisanship, before turning to my hypotheses for how these consequences may differ in
various social settings. I then describe an experimental design by which I varied partisan
strength (a la Lavine et al. 2012) and the composition of social settings (i.e., no social
interactions, homogenous partisan interactions, or heterogeneous partisan interactions).
Perhaps the most overwhelming result I present in this study is that if one compares prior
strength of partisanship against the impact of social settings, it is the latter that dominates
preference formation. I conclude with a discussion of how my results have implications
for the study of partisan identification and public opinion formation in general.
Attitudinal Consequences of Partisanship
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Samara Klar – Partisanship in a Social Setting
Decades of research suggest that partisanship, an individual’s adherence to one
particular political party or platform over another, is highly stable over one’s lifetime
(Green and Palmquist 1994). It continues to be “a powerful and pervasive influence on
perceptions of political events” (Bartels 2002, 120) and subsequent political preferences.
Indeed, an extensive amount of work demonstrates that partisanship influences – among
other things – issue preferences (Jacoby 1988), vote choices (Bartels 2002), evaluations
of the economy (Lewis-Beck et al. 2008), competence of political parties (Gerber and
Huber 2010) and the blame attributed to them (Tilley and Hobolt 2011), and even
assessments as seemingly objective as the color of a candidate’s skin (Caruso et al. 2009).
The powerful influence of partisanship can be attributed to directional motivated
reasoning: a desire to reaffirm preexisting beliefs when processing new information
(Kunda 1990). Psychological theories of cognitive consistency (Festinger 1957) explain
this behavior by arguing that individuals are, above all, interested in reconciling new
information with their existing beliefs. The consequence is that individuals rely on
partisan cues to influence – and even determine – their political preferences (Rahn 1993).
For example, a Democrat who supports President Obama and his Affordable Health Care
Act will not only dismiss criticisms against it but will also be unlikely to tune into any
radio or television programs featuring opponents of the Act, thus shielding himself from
learning any new information that might have the potential to increase his understanding
of the legislation or its alternatives. Democrats and Republicans are similarly likely to
view the economy as doing well under their preferred political administration, even if
they would be unhappy under the same conditions were the opposing party in power
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Samara Klar – Partisanship in a Social Setting
(e.g., Bartels 2002; Druckman et al. n.d.; Lavine et al. 2012).1
Thanks to partisan motivated reasoning, there are at least three distinct attitudinal
responses we might see among individuals who hold a preexisting partisanship. First,
they tend to support the option endorsed by the preferred party, regardless of how
ideologically compatible that option may be (Lavine et al. 2012). Second, partisans may
perceive their own party’s solutions to be highly effective, and to dismiss the opponent’s
ideas as ineffective (Redlawsk 2002, 2004; Gerber and Huber 2010). And, finally, they
are less likely to see out incongruent information that contradicts their priors (Redlawsk
2002). On one hand, partisan motivated reasoning provides helpful cues to guide
decision-making (Druckman 2001), but some see these processes as normatively
problematic. As Lavine and his co-authors explain (2012), this process of partisan
motivated reasoning “raises deeply troubling questions about political representation…
how can an electorate possibly reward or punish an incumbent party if it holds grossly
distorted views of political conditions?” (chapter 5, p. 6).
Scholars have identified several factors that influence the degree to which
individuals engage in partisan motivated reasoning, with a strict focus on individual-level
attributes such as sophistication and prior opinion strength (e.g., Taber and Lodge 2006).
Lavine et al. (2012) show that, among a host of these individual-level factors, the
strongest moderator of partisan motivated reasoning is partisan ambivalence. Partisan
attachments, like attitudes in general, are not strictly unidimensional but contain a
mixture of both positive and negative evaluations (Martinez et al. 2005; Visser et al.
2006). Ambivalence, a distinct component of attitude strength, is defined as the degree to
This coheres with social identity theory – indeed, motivated reasoning should be driven by individuals’
desire to be loyal to and consistent with their own group and maximize difference with the out-group.
Partisan groups clearly are important to political categorization (Smith et al. 2005, Nicholson 2012,).
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Samara Klar – Partisanship in a Social Setting
which an individual holds these conflicting evaluations. As Martinez and his coauthors
explain (2005), an individual who is ambivalent may still “have strong opinions about a
subject and perhaps even know more about it… but nevertheless feel conflicted” (2).
Ambivalence plays a uniquely important role in the study of how partisanship influences
in preferences. Partisans who are less ambivalent hold more consistently positive
evaluations about their preferred party (Lavine et al. 2012). Their heightened sense of
ingroup membership motivates them to defend their party in the face of counterinformation (Nicholson 2012) and to engage in more partisan motivated reasoning
(Lodge and Taber 2000; Taber and Lodge 2006; Lavine et al. 2012). As a result, partisans
with more consistently positive evaluations of their party “show remarkably little
learning or attitudinal updating during political campaigns or salient policy debates”
(Lavine et al. 2012, Chapter 1, p. 22).
Preference Formation in Non-Social and Social Settings
I. The Effect of Partisan Strength on Motivated Reasoning
Partisan goals motivate individuals to “apply their reasoning powers in defense of
a prior, specific conclusion (Kruglanski and Webster 1996)” (Taber and Lodge 2006,
756), which drives subsequent preferences towards preestablished party allegiances. This
is all the more evident among partisans with strong party attachments, whose consistently
positive evaluations of their party stimulate (a) a powerful preference for party-sponsored
policies and (b) partisan motivated evaluations of political information.
Hypothesis 1a. Overall, strong (i.e., less ambivalent) partisans express a stronger
preference for attitudinally congruent information – i.e. their own party’s policy – than do
weak partisans.
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Samara Klar – Partisanship in a Social Setting
Hypothesis 1b. Overall, strong (i.e., less ambivalent) partisans express perceive their
own party’s policy to be more effective, and the opposing party’s policy to be less
effective, than do weak partisans.
All the while, there is a “social flow” to political information (Huckfeldt et al.
1987) that is highly consequential for preference formation, yet completely neglected in
the study of motivated reasoning. Throughout the course of a day, individuals are
surrounded by others; we are, as Sinclair argues (2012), “social citizens”. Some of our
networks, for example voluntary associations, tend to be homogeneous (Popierlarz and
McPherson 1995; Mutz 2006), while other networks are more commonly quite diverse
(Sinclair 2012). Huckfeldt et al. (2004) argue that “disagreement and heterogeneous
preferences are the rule rather than the exception within the micro -environments
surrounding individual citizens” (p. 17) and further research demonstrates that “the
likelihood of encountering disagreement rises considerably as conversational networks
become larger in size” (Price, Capella, and Nir 2002, 98; also see Granovetter 1973;
Weimann 1982, Bramoulle and Rogers 2010). The degree to which individuals’ networks
are homogeneous or heterogeneous is therefore a subject of some debate, but we can
agree that our environments are highly social. Our varying social groups are often not
formed on the basis of political preference or partisan compatibility (Sinclair 2012), yet
these interactions frequently give way to political conversation nevertheless (Walsh
2004).
Scholarly attention has given considerable attention to the existence of social
settings in so far as their partisan and issue preference composition (for e.g. Mutz 2004;
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Samara Klar – Partisanship in a Social Setting
Huckfeldt 2004) and their effects on participation (Mutz 2002) and persuasion (Sinclair
2012). Yet, beyond these studies, virtually no empirical work has examined how social
setting interferes with an individual’s motivation to reconcile new information with his
partisan allegiances. I will next turn to my hypotheses for how social settings – both
homogeneous and heterogeneous in partisan composition – may do just that.
II. The Effect of Homogenous Groups on Motivated Reasoning
Evidence on the influence of attitudinal homogeneity on preference formation
generally indicates that the like-mindedness of a social setting has a reaffirming effect.
Druckman and Nelson (2003) invite participants to interact in a social setting wherein all
group members are provided with the same issue frame. The authors find that certainty in
this frame is affirmed and crystallized as a result of the homogeneous setting (also see
Druckman 2004). This finding supports observational work on social context, which
similarly demonstrates that discussions without dissent affirm common arguments
reiterated within the group, as homogeneous discussants encourage one another’s mutual
viewpoints (Mutz 2002). Participants in these settings become even more convinced by
their agreed upon preference (see Isenberg 1986: 1141, Mendelberg 2002: 159). This can
be explained by the reinforcement of a common group identity within the group. As the
identity strengthens, it becomes more salient to the group members who then reconcile
their identity with incoming information via directional motivated reasoning (Nicholson
2012; Druckman et al. n.d.).
I thus expect that respondents overall should engage in more partisan motivated
reasoning when discussing political issues in a group composed of partisans who share a
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common partisan identity. The identity will become reinforced in this ideologically likeminded context and partisans will become even more likely to prefer their own party’s
policy and will rate the opponent’s policy as more ineffective, as a result of the likeminded social setting.
Hypothesis 2a: Respondents in homogeneous groups (i.e., groups that include only
fellow partisans) engage in more partisan motivated reasoning and prefer policy solutions
that more closely represents their own party’s policy, as compared with those in nonsocial settings.
Hypothesis 2b: Respondents in homogeneous groups (i.e., groups that include only
fellow partisans) perceive their own party’s policy to be more effective, and the opposing
party’s policy to be less effective, as compared with those in non-social settings.
III. The Effect of Heterogeneous Groups on Motivated Reasoning
In diverse social settings, on the other hand, I expect individuals to respond quite
differently. Observational data suggest that diverse discussion networks provoke more
even-handed and considered electoral choices (Nir 2005). Cross-pressures from within
one’s network causes attitudes to become more ambivalence (Mutz 2002), which in turn
weakens the group cues that guide decision-making (Druckman and Nir 2008).
Druckman (2004) finds that heterogeneous groups effectively introduce new perspectives
and, with Nelson (2003), finds that these groups minimize the influence of preexisting
issue frames over respondents’ evaluations of issues.
I thus expect that heterogeneity of discussion groups have a powerful influence
over prior beliefs. This suggests that respondents who discuss political issues in
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heterogeneous networks should engage in less partisan motivated reasoning than do those
in non-social settings. I expect that respondents in heterogeneous networks will weaken
their partisan identity and become less defensive of their own party’s policy and less
critical of the opponent.
Hypothesis 3a: Respondents in heterogeneous groups (i.e., groups that include other
partisans) engage in less partisan motivated reasoning and prefer policy solutions that
more closely represents the opposing party’s policy, as compared with those in non-social
settings.
Hypothesis 3b: Respondents in heterogeneous groups (i.e., groups that include other
partisans) perceive their own party’s policy to be less effective and the opposing party’s
to be more effective, as compared with those in non-social settings.
IV. The Influence of Partisan Strength Versus The Influence of Social Settings
Hypothesis 1 states that strong partisans engage in more partisan motivated
reasoning but does not take social setting into account. Hypothesis 2 and 3 introduce the
element of social setting to the study of motivated reasoning but do so without
distinguishing between strong and weak party identifiers. An important question that has
yet to be answered (and has yet to be even asked) in existing work is whether the
influence of partisan strength is resistant to the influence of social setting. How does
strength of partisanship drive preference formation in the face of differing social
contexts? No existing theory provides for why one of these elements might overshadow
the other, but there is empirical work that suggests the power of the social setting
dominates the influence of partisan strength.
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Samara Klar – Partisanship in a Social Setting
Sinclair (2012) demonstrates that the power of social context is considerable. She
controls for factors that influence an individuals’ choice of social network and, in so
doing, demonstrates that the network itself has a powerful influence on an individual’s
vote choice. Sinclair makes the case that political preferences among individuals in a
common social network become more compatible as a result of the social interaction, but
common preferences do not form the basis of the network a priori – but her work does
not take partisan strength into consideration. Huckfeldt et al. (2004) help in this regard,
arguing that even “strong partisans are not immune to the political messages that are
filtered through networks of political communication” (63). I thus expect that when both
strong and weak partisans find themselves in social settings, the power of the social
setting will overcome the influence of partisanship and will determine the degree to
which motivated reasoning influences preferences. Whereas strong partisans tend to
engage in more partisan motivated reasoning than do weak partisans, I expect that weak
partisans in homogeneous settings will engage in more partisan motivated reasoning than
will strong partisans in heterogeneous settings.
Hypothesis 4a: Weak partisans in homogeneous social settings engage in more partisan
motivated reasoning and prefer policy solutions that more closely represents their own
party’s policy, as compared with strong partisans in heterogeneous networks
Hypothesis 4b: Weak partisans in homogeneous social settings perceive their own party’s
policy to be more effective, and the opposing party’s policy to be less effective, as
compared with strong partisans in heterogeneous networks
In sum, I expect that partisan strength will determine the degree to which
motivated reasoning biases preferences, when social context is not taken into account:
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Samara Klar – Partisanship in a Social Setting
strong partisans will be more biased than will weak partisans, just as previous scholars
find (e.g. Taber and Lodge; Redlawsk; Lavine et al.) (H1). When we look only social
context, homogeneous network discussants will engage in more ideologically driven
motivated reasoning than will those in without groups (H2) and those in heterogeneous
networks will engage in less motivated reasoning (H3). When partisan strength and social
context face each other, however, the influence of the social network will prove
dominant. Weak partisans in homogeneous networks will be more biased that will strong
partisans in heterogeneous networks (H4). I thus expect, overall, that partisanship without
taking social context into account does not provide sufficient information to predict the
degree to which motivated reasoning influences preferences.
Downstream Effects
A final measured outcome in this study has to do with the “downstream effects”
of the various treatment groups. Downstream effects are those residual effects of
experimental treatments that may subsequently influence respondents’ behavior of
attitude (Green and Gerber 2002). One effect that non-social, homogeneous or
heterogeneous social settings may have on discussants is their subsequent interest in
participating in homogeneous or diverse social settings in the future. A known
consequence of strong partisanship as opposed to weak partisanship is a relative
disinterest in seeking out opposing information (Redlawsk 2002). In Redlawsk’s study, in
which respondents are presented with the option to seek out information in isolation,
strong partisans demonstrate a preference for learning information about candidates they
already support. I thus expect to find that my hypotheses hold with respect to downstream
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effects. Strong partisans, as opposed to weak partisans, will prefer a more homogeneous
discussion group for future discussions (H1). Partisans in like-minded social settings will
have a greater preference for like-minded discussion groups, as compared to those in nonsocial settings (H2), and those in heterogeneous settings will prefer a more bipartisan
group (H3). Finally, weak partisans in homogeneous settings will have a greater
preference for homogeneous discussion groups, as compared to strong partisans in
heterogeneous settings who will express a greater preference for bipartisan social settings
(H4).
Experimental Design
Sample
To test these hypotheses, I required (i) a sample population of partisans and (ii)
policy issues for the partisans to discuss in social settings. For participants, I turned to the
undergraduate population at a large Midwestern university between October 2011 and
February 2012. Three hundred and seventy-nine undergraduate students participated in
the study in return for academic course credit. In line with previous experimental work on
partisan behavior (e.g. Levendusky 2010; Druckman et al. n.d.), I excluded the 35
respondents who identified as pure independents (also see Bullock 2011) and I grouped
leaning independents with the party they profess to prefer. Leaners behave like partisans
when it comes to opinions and vote choice (Lascher and Korey 2011; Magleby et al.
2011), justifying this typical approach (which is the norm in studies of partisan elite
influence). This left me with three hundred and forty-four research subjects who
identified as a Democrat, a Republican, or as a leaning independent with a preference for
one of the two parties. Among them, an overwhelming proportion identified as
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Samara Klar – Partisanship in a Social Setting
Democrats (79%) as opposed to Republicans (21%). Homogeneous and non-social
settings were thus comprised of all Democrats, while heterogeneous groups were
comprised of both Democrats and Republicans. The analyses in this study therefore focus
exclusively on responses among Democratic respondents. This limits the generalizability
of the findings to some extent, but there exists neither theoretical nor empirical evidence
to suggest that Republicans would respond differently. The student population has
variance on the characteristics of study and thus provides a suitable sample for this study
(see Druckman and Kam 2011). Students’ political identities are perhaps not as
crystallized as an adult population, and we may therefore see more movement in
preferences among students than we would among an adult sample but, if this is the case,
then these results indicate an upper-bound of the effects one would find in a non-student
sample.
I will now turn to a detailed description of the study, which involves two policy
issues that respondents were asked to evaluate. I will begin by describing these policy
issues, followed by the experimental manipulations of partisan strength and group
composition. I will next outline the precise experimental conditions, and, finally, the
dependent variables that were used to operationalize the results of this study.
Policy Issues
I selected two prominent public policies for participants in this study to evaluate
and consider: energy policy and health care policy. By using two issues, instead of just
one, I was able to test my hypotheses in two different settings, which provides
robustness. I selected energy policy and health care policy as discussion topics because
they are high-profile issues with which most Americans are familiar, including
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Samara Klar – Partisanship in a Social Setting
undergraduate political science students. A brief content analysis of the top five print
newspaper publications in the United States during the one year leading up to this
experiment revealed 1,707 articles that include both the terms “energy policy” and “gas
prices,” and over 3,000 articles that include both the terms “health care policy” and
“health insurance.” This is significantly more coverage than for other policy areas;
articles including the term “immigration policy" numbered at only 401, and articles
including the term “education policy” numbered only 298. By incorporating salient issues
with relevance to young adults, sample bias based on the all-student population is
tempered, since salient issues are more difficult to manipulate with treatments.
Both issues also provide conservative tests of my hypotheses due to the fact that
there are topics about which the population is highly polarized. Whereas less heated
debates (for example regarding less well-known local issues, or even fictitious issues
generated solely for the purpose of the experiment) might allow for more malleable shifts
in opinion, these issues are on which individuals may already have strong opinions;
indeed, Democrats and Republicans are somewhat polarized on these issues, consistently
reporting opposing viewpoints. For example, the Pew Research Center found in 2011 that
83% of Democrats and Independents leaning toward the Democratic party supported
alternative fuels as an energy policy solution. Conversely, favorability among
Republicans and independents leaning toward the Republican party was only 53% during
this same time period.2
2
Pew data available at: http://www.people-press.org/2011/11/10/partisan-divide-overalternative-energy-widens/?src=prc-headline. Similar poll results demonstrate partisan
differences regarding health care. The Kaiser Family Foundation found that, between
October of 2011 and February of 2012 (when this study took place), favorability for
President Obama’s Healthcare Affordability Act ranged from 62% to 66%. Among
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Experimental Manipulations
This study incorporates two unique experimental treatments. First, I employ actual social
interaction into the experimental design. Whereas scholars often rely on self-reports of
social network composition (for e.g. Mutz 2002; Huckfelt and Sprague 2002) or
experimentally manipulate the degree to which respondents anticipate social interaction
but never actually engage in such interaction (Tetlock and Kam 1987; Tetlock 1983;
Groenendyk 2012), this experimental design involves randomly assigned interaction in
small groups. Second, I experimentally manipulate party strength by inducing either
ambivalent or univalent evaluations of the respondent’s preferred party. I am thus able in
this experiment to identify the causal relationship between social context and partisan
motivated reasoning. I now turn to describing each experimental treatment in detail.
Social Setting Treatment
One month before attending the experimental study, respondents began their involvement
in this study by first completing a brief anonymous survey, in which they provided their
demographic traits, including their political party identification. Based on their selfreported partisanship, I randomly assigned respondents to one of three social setting
conditions: a homogeneous group of 8 Democrats; a heterogeneous group of 4 Democrats
and 4 Republicans; or a non-social setting, in which group members do not interact with
one another. When the respondents were called to the study center, they arrived one
group at a time, without knowing the ideological composition of their group or even that
they would interact with the group at all.
Republicans, on the hand, during this same time period, favorability of the Act ranged
from 11% to 16%. Kaiser data available at: http://www.kff.org/kaiserpolls/healthtracking-poll-interactive.cfm.
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Partisan Strength Treatment
Upon arriving in the survey center, group members each chose an individual computer
terminal to privately complete an anonymous survey. The first question of the survey
primed either a strong partisan affect (for those assigned to a strong partisan condition) or
a weak partisan affect (for those assigned to a weak partisan condition). Modeled on the
priming technique used by Lavine et al. (2012), the strong prime asks respondents to
write some of the reasons for why they prefer their own political party and also to write
some of the reasons why they dislike the opposing party. The weak prime asked
respondents only to write some of the reasons they are dissatisfied with or critical of their
own party (full text of primes are available in Appendix A). Immediately after this prime,
the survey asked respondents to rank the importance of their party identification on a
scale of 1 to 7, with 1 indicating ‘extremely unimportant’ and 7 indicating ‘extremely
important.’ Indeed, upon analyzing these data, I could see that those assigned to the
strong party prime ranked their party identification as significantly more important on a
7-point scale than did those assigned to the weak party prime (4.84 for strong partisans
and 4.52 for weak partisans; p=0.06), demonstrating that this priming technique did have
a statistically significant directional influence on party attachment, as was intended.3
Thus, the manipulation check confirms the success of the party strength manipulation.
Study Procedure
After completing their partisan strength prime, respondents – still seated at their
individual computer terminals – read about the first policy issue: energy policy
3
Due to the directional predictions of the hypotheses, all tests of significance in this
study are one-tailed (Blalock 1979, 163). This is consistent with previous work on
directional shifts in preference formation (for e.g. Druckman and Nelson 2003, footnote
16).
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(specifically, how to decrease the price of gas and become more energy independent).
Information regarding both the Democrats’ and Republicans’ perspectives on these issues
was provided to all respondents and this information was identical across all conditions
(full text of this issue is provided in Appendix B.) After reading about the issue at their
individual computer terminals, respondents assigned to either a homogenous or
heterogeneous group condition gathered with their fellow group members to discuss the
issue and the alternative policy solutions about which they had all just read. Each group
member stated his or her policy preference and then the group was given approximately
five minutes to discuss the issue together. Group members were not explicitly told of
each other’s partisan identities, but were only given as much information about the other
members’ perspectives on politics as they themselves chose to reveal. Group members
were allowed to refrain from commenting, if they so desired.
Following the group discussion, each member returned to his or her individual
computer terminal, which was visually shielded from the others with an opaque glass
barricade so as to ensure privacy. At the computers, each group member completed the
duration of the survey, which included questions asking for their preferred policy solution
and their perceived effectiveness of each of these policy solutions. Finally, they were
asked to describe the level of ideological diversity they would want in a discussion group
were they to discuss this issue with others.
Respondents assigned to non-social conditions endured the same procedure with
one important exception -- they did not engage in any social interaction. Like in previous
work (for e.g. Taber and Lodge 2006, Lavine et al. 2012), respondents merely read the
information about the issues alone and then completed the duration of the survey in
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isolation.
After completing the energy policy survey, respondents then read about one more
policy issue: health care (specifically, how to lower costs and widen coverage to more
Americans; full text of this issue is provided in Appendix B). Once again, homogeneous
and heterogeneous groups gathered to discuss this issue (non-social group conditions did
not). Following the brief discussion, all respondents completed the duration of the survey
privately, which included questions about health policy preference and the perceived
effectiveness of each party’s policy, as well as a question asking the respondent to
identify his preferred discussion group composition in the future.
Conditions
Respondents were thus treated to either a strong or weak partisanship prime, and
to one of three group conditions: homogeneous, heterogeneous, or no group. This 2x3
design provides a 6-condition experimental design that allows me to distinguish the
influence of the two types of social setting, in addition to a non-social setting, across both
weak and strong partisans.
INSERT TABLE 1A
Table 1A displays the 2x2 factorial design and highlights the comparison groups
for Hypothesis 1a and 1b – strong partisans versus weak partisans. Participants in
Condition 1, Condition 2, and Condition 3 were given the strong partisanship prime, so as
to induce a strong partisan attachment. Participants in Condition 4, Condition 5, and
Condition 6 were given a weak partisanship prime, so as to induce a weak partisan
attachment. Hypotheses 1a and 1b expect that, overall, respondents across all ‘strong
partisanship’ conditions will express more partisan motivated reasoning than those in the
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‘weak partisanship’ conditions. The outcome is operationalized by measuring (i) policy
preference and (ii) perceived effectiveness of each party’s policy.
INSERT TABLE 1B
Table 1B illustrates this same experimental design, but now highlights the groups
that are compared in order to test Hypothesis 2 and 3: respondents in non-social,
homogeneous, and heterogeneous groups. Participants in Condition 1 and Condition 4
read about policy issues in isolation and then reported their preferences in an anonymous
survey. Participants in Condition 2 and Condition 5 read about policy issues in isolation
and then discussed the issues in an ideologically homogeneous group before reporting
their preferences in an anonymous survey. Participants in Condition 3 and Condition 6
read about policy issues in isolation and then discussed the issues in an ideologically
heterogeneous group before reporting their preferences in an anonymous survey.
Hypotheses 2a and 2b expect that respondents in homogeneous groups (Conditions 2 and
5) will engage in more partisan motivated reasoning and thus will express a stronger
preference for their own party’s policy and will deem the other party’s policy to be less
effective, as compared to respondents in non-social settings (Conditions 1 and 4).
Hypotheses 3a and 3b expect that respondents in heterogeneous groups (Condition 3 and
Condition 6) will engage in less partisan motivated reasoning and will thus express more
favorability toward the opponents and less bias regarding the effectiveness of the
policies, as opposed to those in non-social settings.
INSERT TABLE 1C
Finally, Table 1C shows this same 2x3 factorial, but this time highlights the
groups that are compared in order to test Hypothesis 4. Hypotheses 4a and 4b address the
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interaction of partisan strength and social setting. Whereas strong partisans are expected
to engage in more partisan motivated reasoning, Hypothesis 4a expects that weak
partisans in homogeneous social groups (Condition 4) will engage in more partisan
motivated reasoning than will strong partisans in heterogeneous groups (Condition 3) and
will thus express a greater preference for their own party’s policy. Hypothesis 4b predicts
that weak partisans in homogeneous social groups (Condition 4) will be more biased in
assessing the effectiveness of the two parties’ policies than will strong partisans in
heterogeneous groups (Condition 3) .
Measurement of Effects
For both energy policy and health care, I used three sets of dependent variables to
measure the extent to which partisan motivate reasoning is more evident among strong
partisans versus weak partisans (Hypothesis 1), homogeneous groups versus non-social
(Hypothesis 2) and heterogeneous groups versus non-social (Hypothesis 3), and weak
partisans in homogeneous groups versus strong partisans in heterogeneous groups
(Hypothesis 4). To measure policy preference, I first asked respondents to select their
preferred policy choice. To measure partisan motivation in rating the effectiveness of
each policy, I then asked respondents to rate their own party’s policy according to
effectiveness on a 1-7 scale, and then to do the same for the opposing party’s policy.
Finally, respondents selected their ideal discussion group according to ideological
composition. This provides a test of downstream information acquisition. Those engaging
in partisan motivated reasoning should prefer a group of all Democrats, whereas those
with less partisan motivated reasoning should be more open to hearing information from
the opposing side. All dependent variables are listed below in Table 2.
20
Samara Klar – Partisanship in a Social Setting
INSERT TABLE 2
Analyses & Results
Respondents first read about, discussed, and responded to questions regarding energy
policy, and then they repeated this procedure for health care policy. Given the near
identical results across both issues, I will present these results for both issues together. I
will begin by presenting the results for policy preferences and perceived policy
effectiveness, and then will turn to presenting results for the downstream effects
regarding these two issues.
Hypothesis 1: Strong versus Weak Partisans
I begin with Hypotheses 1a and 1b that suggest, regardless of social interactions,
we should see greater partisan motivated reasoning among strong partisans – that is
preferences more consistent with one’s party when party strength is strong. Recall that all
of the respondents I analyze identify with the Democratic Party and thus in every case the
Republican Party is thus the “other”. Hypothesis 1a states that strong (i.e., less
ambivalent) partisans will express a stronger preference for attitudinally congruent
information – i.e. the Democratic Party’s policy. Figure 1a displays the results across all
conditions for strong and weak partisans (without distinguishing by social setting)
INSERT FIGURE 1A
Figure 1a displays strong and weak partisans’ preferences for energy policy on the left
side and their preferences for health care policy on the right side. The darker blue point
indicates strong partisans’ preferences and the lighter blue point indicates weak partisans’
preferences. Surrounding each point are two horizontal lines indicating the 95%
21
Samara Klar – Partisanship in a Social Setting
confidence interval. Along the y-axis, the response scale ranges from the Republican
policy at the lowest point (“Only invest in drilling for oil” as the energy policy solution
and “Only increase competition” as the health care solution) and the Democratic policy at
the highest point (“Only invest in alternative fuels” as the energy policy solution and
“Only expand subsidies” as the health care solution). The mid-point on the scale
represents equally prioritizing both parties’ policies.
On the left side, Figure 1a indicates that, when it comes to energy policy, strong
partisans are significantly (p<0.01) more in favor of investing in alternative fuels (5.41)
as opposed to drilling for oil, as compared to weak partisans (4.89). On the right side of
the graph, we see that, with respect to health care policy, strong partisans are again more
in favor of their own party’s policy. Strong partisans report a 4.92 on the 7-point scale,
which is significantly (p<0.01) greater than weak partisans (4.54).
Hypothesis 1b expects that strong (i.e., less ambivalent) partisans will perceive
the Democratic party’s policy to be more effective, and the Republican party’s policy to
be less effective, than will weak partisans. Figure 1b displays these accompanying results
for both energy policy and health care.
INSERT FIGURE 1B
On the left side of Figure 1b, we see how strong and weak partisans rate the effectiveness
of the Democratic policy of alternative fuels and the Republican policy of drilling for oil.
Here we can see that strong partisans rate alternative fuels as more effective (5.82) than
do weak partisans (5.66).This difference is directionally in line with what Hypothesis 1b
predicts, though it does not reach conventional levels of statistical significance (p=0.17).
This may be due to the widespread popularity of this particular policy among both strong
22
Samara Klar – Partisanship in a Social Setting
and weak partisans. When it comes to drilling for oil, strong partisans rate this
Republican policy at a low 2.86, which is significantly (p<0.01) less effective than the
perceived effectiveness of this Republican policy among weak partisans, who rate it at
3.32.
On the right side of Figure 1b, we see this same pattern when it comes to health
care policy. Strong partisans rate the Democratic policy of expanding government
subsidies at 5.45, which is significantly (p<0.05) more effective than the weak partisans’
rating of 5.15. Strong partisans perceive the Republicans’ policy of increasing
competition as significantly (p<0.05) less effective (3.99) as compared to weak partisans
(4.34). Overall, I find support for Hypotheses 1a and 1b.
Hypotheses 2 and 3: Homogeneous, Non-Social, and Heterogeneous Settings
I next turn to Hypotheses 2 and 3, which expects differences in partisan motivated
reasoning according to social setting. Here I analyze average responses only by social
setting, without taking partisan strength into account. Hypothesis 2 states that
respondents in homogeneous groups (i.e., groups that include only fellow partisans) will
engage in more partisan motivated reasoning as opposed to those in non-social settings.
This will result in more biased preferences for the Democratic party’s policy (Hypothesis
2a) and a perception that the Democratic party’s policy is more effective, and the
Republican party’s policy is less effective (Hypothesis 2b).
Hypothesis 3 states that respondents in heterogeneous groups (i.e., groups that
include other partisans) will engage in less partisan motivated reasoning as opposed to
those in non-social setting. This will result in a less biased preference for the Democratic
23
Samara Klar – Partisanship in a Social Setting
party’s policy (Hypothesis 3a) and a perception that the Republican party’s policy is
more effective, and the Democratic party’s policy is less effective (Hypothesis 3b).
INSERT FIGURE 2-3A
Figure 2-3A displays responses for the energy policy options on the left side and
the health care policy options on the right side. Here, the dark blue dot indicates
respondents in homogeneous (all Democrat) groups. The white dot indicates respondents
without groups (non-social settings). The purple dot indicates respondents in
heterogeneous groups (ie. a group of 4 Democrats and 4 Republicans). Again the
horizontal bars surrounding each dot indicate the 95% confidence interval.
Looking at the left side of the figure, we can see that those in homogeneous
groups are most biased in favor of the Democratic policy (5.67). Those in non-social
settings are significantly (p<0.01) lower on the 7-point scale (5.09). Respondents in
heterogeneous groups are even closer to the midpoint of the scale. Compared to those in
non-social settings, respondents in heterogeneous groups are significantly (p<0.01) lower
on the scale (4.13).
Regarding health care policy, we see this same strong pattern. Those in
homogeneous groups are closest to the Democratic policy (5.06), which is significantly
(p<0.01) higher than those in non-social groups (4.74). There is a significant (p<0.01)
difference as well between those in non-social groups and those in heterogeneous groups
who rate their preferred policy at 4.03. Across both issues, Hypotheses 2a and 3a are thus
both strongly supported. Partisan motivated reasoning is thus clearly contingent upon
social setting. In the company of heterogeneous others, motivated reasoning is drastically
tempered, as compared to settings in which respondents are learning information in
24
Samara Klar – Partisanship in a Social Setting
isolation. When respondents are among like-minded co-partisans, on the other hand, we
can see that partisan motivated reasoning is considerably enhanced.
INSERT FIGURE 2-3B
Turning to Hypotheses 2b and 3b, I report Figure 2-3B, which displays perceived
effectiveness of the Democratic policy and the Republican policy among those in
homogeneous groups (the blue dot on the figure), non-social groups (the white dot), and
heterogeneous groups (the purple dot). On the left side of the figure, we can see the
perceived effectiveness of the Democratic solution to energy policy (alternative fuels) at
the top and the Republican solution to energy policy (drilling for oil) at the bottom. From
the figure, we can see that respondents in homogenous groups perceived alternative fuels
to be significantly (p<0.01) more effective (6.35) than do those in nonsocial groups
(5.59). These perceive drilling for oil to be significantly (p<0.05) less effective (2.75)
than do those in non-social groups (3.12). Hypothesis 2b is thus supported.
Hypothesis 3b expects that respondents in heterogeneous groups will engage in
less partisan motivated reasoning and will therefore perceive their own party’s policy to
be less effective and the opponent’s to be more effective, as opposed to those in nonsocial settings. With respect to energy policy, the left side of Figure 2-3B displays that
this is indeed the case. Respondents in heterogeneous groups rate alternative fuels to be
significantly (p<0.01) less effective (4.74) than those in non-social settings, and they rate
drilling for oil to be significantly (p<0.01) more effective (3.75) that do those in nonsocial settings.
Hypothesis 2b and 3b are also strong supported when it comes to health care
policy. The right side of Figure 2-3B displays the perceived effectiveness of the
25
Samara Klar – Partisanship in a Social Setting
Democratic solution to health care policy (expanding government subsidies) and of the
Republican solution (increasing competition among insurers). Again we see that
respondents in homogeneous groups rate the Democratic policy to be significantly
(p<0.01) more effective (5.57) than do those in non-social groups (5.24). Respondents in
heterogeneous groups rate the Democratic policy to be significantly (p<0.05) less
effective (4.82) than do those in non-social settings. Regarding the Republican policy of
competition, respondents in homogeneous groups perceive it as significantly (p<0.10)
less effective (3.79) than do those in non-social settings (4.14) and those in
heterogeneous settings rate it as significantly (p<0.01) more effective (4.98).
Hypothesis 4: Weak Partisans in Homogeneous Settings versus Strong Partisans in
Heterogeneous Settings
Finally, I turn to Hypothesis 4 to test the interaction between partisan strength and
social settings. Hypothesis 4a predicts that weak partisans in homogeneous networks will
express a strong preference for attitudinally congruent information – i.e. their own party’s
policy – than will strong partisans in heterogeneous networks (Hypothesis 4a). Figure 4a
displays these results. We see the weak partisans in homogeneous groups indicated by the
light blue dot. The strong partisans in heterogeneous groups are indicated by the dark
blue dot. Again the horizontal bars sandwiching the dots indicate the 95% confidence
interval.
INSERT FIGURE 4A
On the left side are policy preferences for energy policy. As indicated in the
figure, here we see a flip in the relative influence of partisan motivated reasoning
between strong and weak partisans, Whereas strong partisans generally showed
26
Samara Klar – Partisanship in a Social Setting
themselves to have the greater bias toward their own party’s policy, here was can see that
weak partisans in homogeneous groups actually report a stronger bias toward the
Democratic policy of investing in alternative fuels than do strong partisans in
heterogeneous groups. Here, where we take social setting into account, we can see that
the weak partisans in homogeneous settings are significantly (p<0.01) more likely to
favor an exclusively Democratic approach to energy policy (5.44), and the strong
partisans in heterogeneous groups report a much more bipartisan preference (4.5).
This novel finding holds across the health care issue as well. Whereas weak
partisans show less of a bias towards the Democratic policy when social setting is not
taken into account, when we examine weak partisans in homogeneous settings, we see a
stark bias (4.89) that is significantly (p<0.05) stronger than the preference shown among
strong partisans in heterogeneous settings (4.35). Hypothesis 4a is thus strongly
supported.
Whereas strong partisans tend to engage in the most partisan motivated reasoning,
which leads to perceiving one’s own party’s policy as the most effective and the
opponent’s policy as least effective, Hypothesis 4 expects that weak partisans in
homogeneous networks will engage in strong partisan motivated reasoning as a result of
their social surrounding. Strong partisans in heterogeneous networks, on the other hand,
will engage in less partisan motivated reasoning, thanks to their ideologically diverse
group. Figure 4b displays the accompanying results.
INSERT FIGURE 4B
On the left side, we see that weak partisans in homogeneous groups (light blue),
in fact, rate the Democratic energy policy solution as significantly (p<0.01) more
27
Samara Klar – Partisanship in a Social Setting
effective (6.31), than do strong partisans in heterogeneous networks (dark blue dot; 4.93).
Conversely, strong partisans in heterogeneous networks rate drilling for oil as
significantly (p<0.10) more effective (3.42) than do weak partisans in homogenous
networks (2.95).
The right side of the figure shows that these findings hold regarding health care
policy. Here we see that weak partisans in homogeneous groups rate the Democratic
health care solution of subsidies as significantly (p<0.05) more effective (5.47) than do
strong partisans in ideologically heterogeneous networks (4.94). When it comes to the
Republican policy of increasing competition, weak partisans in homogeneous networks
rate it as significantly (p<0.05) less effective (3.95) as compared to strong partisans in
heterogeneous setting (4.84). Hypothesis 4a and 4b are thus supported, indicating that the
influence of social settings appears to exert a more powerful effect over partisan
motivated reasoning than does partisan strength alone. Although responses were collected
in isolation and with an assurance of anonymity, it is indeed still possible that the
mechanism at play is one of social pressure, a force that has been shown to boost turnout
among voters (Green, Gerber, and Larimer 2008). Alternatively, it could be that the
discussion within the group is, in fact, has a weakening effect on the partisan identity.
The precise mechanism at work is surely a question that deserves further scholarly
attention.
Downstream Effects
My final dependent variable measures the potential downstream effects of the treatments.
How do partisanship strength, social setting, and the interaction of the two affect
28
Samara Klar – Partisanship in a Social Setting
respondents’ preferences for ideological composition of future discussion groups?
Hypothesis 1 expects that strong partisans will be more likely to prefer a group
with more like-minded respondents (Democrats). Figure 5 displays the results, which
indicate that indeed strong partisans prefer a group with significantly (p<0.01) more likeminded respondents (i.e. fellow Democrats) to discuss energy policy (on the left side of
the figure) and that strong partisans also prefer a group with significantly (p<0.01) more
like-minded respondents to discuss health care policy (on the right side of the graph).
INSERT FIGURE 5
Hypothesis 2 expects that those in homogeneous groups (across both partisan
groups) will prefer more of a like-minded discussion group in the future, as compared to
those in non-social settings and Hypothesis 3 states that respondents in heterogeneous
groups will prefer a more diverse discussion group. Figure 6 displays these results, which
indicate that this is indeed the case. The left side of Figure 6 illustrates the fact that,
regarding energy policy discussions, respondents in homogeneous groups prefer a
significantly (p<0.01) more like-minded group (4.57) than do those in non-social settings
(4.23). Respondents in heterogeneous groups prefer a significantly (p<0.01) more diverse
group in the future (3.63).
INSERT FIGURE 6
These findings hold when it comes to health care (see the right side of Figure 6), Again,
those in homogeneous groups preferred the most Democratic group in the future (4.34;
p<0.01) and those in heterogeneous groups preferred a much more diverse discussion
group to discuss health care (3.72; p<0.01).
29
Samara Klar – Partisanship in a Social Setting
Finally, Hypothesis 4 challenges the notion that partisan strength and group
composition are independently sufficient for explaining the influence of partisan
motivated reasoning on attitudes and preferences. Hypothesis 4 expects that weak
partisans in homogeneous groups will in fact prefer a more like-minded discussion group
than will strong partisans in heterogeneous groups. Figure 7 illustrates that this is indeed
the case.
INSERT FIGURE 7
Weak partisans who have discussed these issues only with like-minded partisans
are likely to do so again. On the left side of the graph, we see they prefer a significantly
(p<0.01) more like-minded group to discuss energy policy (4.34) and health care policy
(4.2; p<0.05).Strong partisans who have discussed these issues in the company of
counter-partisans, on the other hand, state a preference for diversity in their future
discussions regarding energy policy (3.74) and health care policy (3.90).
Summary of Results
To be sure, partisan strength exerts an important influence over the degree to
which individuals engage in partisan motivated reasoning (Hypothesis 1). In addition, I
find that the composition of a social setting plays a distinct and important role in this
same process (Hypotheses 2 and 3). I furthermore tested the joint influence of both forces
and find that social setting overwhelms partisan strength to determine how partisan
motivated reasoning influences preferences (Hypothesis 3). In Table 3, I provide a
summary of all of my results by hypothesis and dependent variable.
INSERT TABLE 3
30
Samara Klar – Partisanship in a Social Setting
My three hypotheses were subject to three distinct tests: (1) a series of preference-related
questions regarding energy policy; (2) a series of preference-related questions regarding
health care policy; and (3) question regarding the respondents’ ideal ideological
composition of future discussion groups. Hypothesis 1 was supported in all cases, but one
where it was near significant. When it came to the respondents’ perception of how
effective alternative fuels are as an energy policy solution, the difference between strong
and weak partisans was directionally in line with Hypothesis 1 but was not significant
(p=0.17), potentially due to the fact that alternative fuels are widely popular among all
participants, regardless of partisan strength. However, for the rest of the 7 dependent
variables, Hypothesis 1 was strongly supported. Hypotheses 2, 3, and 4 were strongly
supported by all 8 dependent variables.
Conclusion and Discussion
Partisanship – arguably the most consequential determinant of our political
preference and behavior – has long been studied in both observational and experimental
settings as though it operates distinct from the social environment within which an
individual finds himself. In reality, many of our social settings form for non-political
reasons (Sinclair 2012) and lead to political discussion nonetheless (Walsh 2004). Instead
of exerting an influence that is independent of social setting, the effects of partisanship
are in fact highly contingent on environment.
My experimental study demonstrates that partisan strength and social setting are
not independently sufficient for revealing the influence of partisan motivated reasoning
over political preferences and evaluations. Their interaction, in fact, reverses several
known implications that have yet to be challenged in existing research. While strong
31
Samara Klar – Partisanship in a Social Setting
partisanship is, on its own, a reliable predictor of partisan motivated reasoning, I
demonstrate that weak partisans indeed engage in more partisan motivated reasoning than
do strong partisans when their social settings overshadow their partisan strength.
Motivated reasoning is therefore dependent on at least one additional factor
(environment) that scholars have neglected for over half a century.
As with experimental work of this nature, this study has several limitations having
to do with the logistics of the execution. Most notably, the results of this study only apply
to Democrats, given the skewed demographics of the population under study. Therefore,
they may be differences in how a Republican sample might respond to the experimental
conditions. There is no theoretical or empirical evidence to support any difference in
processes of motivated reasoning between these two partisan groups, but only future
work will be able to answer this question. The length of the discussion group –
approximately five minutes – will surely be amended in future work, so as to determine
whether longer interactions might eventually shift opinions back to where they began, or
might change the results in some other way. Other questions for further research will
address the over-time effects of these treatments. Similarly how would repeated
exposures influence opinions? An additional question has to do with the composition of
the heterogeneous groups. These groups consisted of 4 Republicans and 4 Democrats, but
were otherwise relatively homogeneous in terms of sociodemographic traits. There was
considerable gender diversity but minimal racial or ethnic diversity. These layers of
heterogeneity may potentially influence motivated reasoning in different ways. This
avenue for research is ripe for pursuit.
32
Samara Klar – Partisanship in a Social Setting
Our society is indeed increasingly diverse, a growing subset of the population
who are more multi-racial, multi-ethnic (Pew Research 2008, 2010), and multi-linguistic
(U.S. Department of Education 2011) than ever before. Modernization of communication
technologies and geographic mobility draws people into larger and more increasingly
diverse networks (Gonzalez and Brown 2006) and Americans are now more likely than
ever before to multiple social and political groups. As networks get larger, they do
become more diverse. For these reasons, the study of preference formation is stifled as
long as it is conducted in isolated settings. The experimental study that I present in this
paper is a pioneering attempt to uncover the consequences of social settings – both
homogeneous and heterogeneous in nature – on our political attitudes and behaviors.
These outcomes simply cannot be effectively understood so long as we only conduct our
studies in contexts of isolation, for the political world takes place in the company of
others. This study provides an important illustration of why that matters for the way we
think about politics.
33
Samara Klar – Partisanship in a Social Setting
Appendix A
Strong Partisanship Prime:
These days, Democrats and Republicans in Washington represent very different
policy platforms. Regardless of whether you prefer the Democrats or the Republicans,
please take a few minutes to think about why you choose to prefer that party, as opposed
to the other party. In the space below, please write 3 or 4 things you especially like about
the political party that you like best.
[text entry box]
Now please take another few minutes to consider your biggest criticisms against
the opposing political party. What do you dislike about the other party? In the space
below, please write 3 or 4 things you especially dislike about the party you do not prefer.
[text entry box]
Weak Partisanship Prime:
These days, many Americans are fed up with partisan bickering and are frustrated
with both political parties – including their own. Many Americans express a desire for
more cooperation in politics and have complaints about even their preferred political
party. Regardless of whether you tend to prefer the Democrats or the Republicans, what
frustrates you about your preferred party? In the space below, please write 3 or 4 of your
biggest criticisms or complaints against your preferred political party.
[text entry box]
34
Samara Klar – Partisanship in a Social Setting
Appendix B
Full Text of Energy Policy Information:
Many Americans are concerned with our country’s dependence on foreign oil and
our rising gas prices. Republicans and Democrats have offered distinct approaches to
improving energy policy. While these policies are not entirely at odds with each other,
the government will likely prioritize one policy over the other.
The Republican approach makes it easier for companies to receive permits to drill
for oil off the coast of the US (most significantly oil-rich Alaska). The argument is that
easing the application process for drilling will increase oil production. It will remove the
nearly endless regulations that oil producers must overcome, many of which have no
apparent positive role -- it is widely agreed that these excessive regulations do not protect
the environment. Easing restrictions would expand US energy supply, create American
jobs, and help to lower gas prices.
The Democratic approach encourages the use of domestically produced
alternative fuels (for example, wind and solar power) and increases incentives for
designing more efficient vehicles and buildings. The argument is that many savings
would come from accelerating electric vehicle adoption and tightening fuel efficiency
standards. Government would provide assistance to companies working to improve the
efficiency and gas mileage of gas-powered cars and trucks. Emphasizing alternative
energies would reduce our demand for oil and generate new jobs in renewable energy
development.
Full Text of Health Care Policy Information:
Many Americans are concerned with the rising costs of health care and limited
access to health insurance. Republicans and Democrats have offered distinct approaches
to lowering these costs and improving care. While these policies are not entirely at odds
with each other, the government will likely prioritize one policy over the other.
The Republican approach seeks to increase access to healthcare and to reduce
costs by increasing competition among insurance providers. This plan proposes to give
Americans a tax credit they can use to purchase their preferred plan from a provider they
have selected in the market. In addition, this plan would allow individuals to purchase
coverage across state lines. This would increase competition among health insurance
providers, thus lowering costs.
The Democratic approach seeks to increase access to healthcare and reduce costs
by giving government a greater role in the provision of coverage. This plan requires large
businesses to provide healthcare to their employees, or else to pay a tax that would go
into a government fund. Individuals without coverage from their employer would be
allowed to receive coverage from the government. This plan would allow the government
to subsidize health insurance, thus lowering the cost for the individual.
35
Samara Klar – Partisanship in a Social Setting
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Samara Klar – Partisanship in a Social Setting
TABLES
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Samara Klar – Partisanship in a Social Setting
Table 2. Dependent Variables
Question
When it comes to energy policy, how
do you think the government should
prioritize its efforts?
Response scale
1=Only prioritize drilling for oil
2=Mostly prioritize drilling for oil
3=Slightly prioritize drilling for oil
4=Equally prioritize drilling for oil and
expanding alternative fuels
5= Slightly prioritize alternative fuels
6=Mostly priority alternative fuels
7=Only prioritize alternative fuels
How effective is drilling for oil as an
1=Extremely ineffective
energy policy solution?
2=Mostly ineffective
3=Slightly ineffective
4=Neither ineffective nor effective
5=Slightly effective
6=Mostly effective
7=Extremely effective
How effective is investing in alternative 1=Extremely ineffective
fuels as an energy policy solution?
2=Mostly ineffective
3=Slightly ineffective
4=Neither ineffective nor effective
5=Slightly effective
6=Mostly effective
7=Extremely effective
In the future, if you were to discuss
1=A group of all Republicans
energy policy a group, what kind of
2=A group of mostly Republicans
group would you prefer?
3=A group of slightly more Republicans
4=An equal mix of Republicans and
Democrats
5=A group of slightly more Democrats
6=A group of mostly Democrats
7=A group of all Democrats
When it comes to health care policy,
1=Only increase competition among insurers
how do you think the government
2=Mostly increase competition among insurers
should prioritize its efforts?
3=Slightly increase competition among
insurers
4=Equally increase competition among
insurers and expand government subsidies to
cover costs
5= Slightly expand government subsidies to
cover costs
6=Mostly expand government subsidies to
cover costs
7=Only expand government subsidies to cover
costs
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Samara Klar – Partisanship in a Social Setting
How effective is increasing competition 1=Extremely ineffective
among insurers a health care policy
2=Mostly ineffective
solution?
3=Slightly ineffective
4=Neither ineffective nor effective
5=Slightly effective
6=Mostly effective
7=Extremely effective
How effective is investing expanding
1=Extremely ineffective
government subsidies to cover costs as 2=Mostly ineffective
a health care policy solution?
3=Slightly ineffective
4=Neither ineffective nor effective
5=Slightly effective
6=Mostly effective
7=Extremely effective
In the future, if you were to discuss
1=A group of all Republicans
energy policy a group, what kind of
2=A group of mostly Republicans
group would you prefer?
3=A group of slightly more Republicans
4=An equal mix of Republicans and
Democrats
5=A group of slightly more Democrats
6=A group of mostly Democrats
7=A group of all Democrats
43
Samara Klar – Partisanship in a Social Setting
Table 3. Summary of Results
Energy Policy Energy
Priority
Oil
Effectiveness
Alternative
Effectiveness
Health Policy Health
Priority
Competition
Effectiveness
Subsidies
Effectiveness
Downstream
Energy
Effects
Group
Health
Group
Hypothesis
1a and 1b:
Strong
Partisans vs.
Weak
Partisans
Hypothesis 2a
and 2b:
Homogeneous
Groups vs. No
Groups
Hypothesis 3a
and 3b:
Heterogeneous
Groups vs. No
Groups
Supported
Supported
Supported
Hypothesis 4a
and 4b:
Weak Partisans in
Homogeneous
Groups vs. Strong
Partisans in
Heterogeneous
Groups
Supported
Supported
Supported
Supported
Supported
Not
significant
Supported
Supported
Supported
Supported
Supported
Supported
Supported
Supported
Supported
Supported
Supported
Supported
Supported
Supported
Supported
Supported
Supported
Supported
Supported
Supported
Supported
Supported
Supported
44
Samara Klar – Partisanship in a Social Setting
Figure 1a.
Note: Brackets surrounding each dot indicate 95% confidence interval.
45
Samara Klar – Partisanship in a Social Setting
Figure 1b.
Note: Brackets surrounding each dot indicate 95% confidence interval.
46
Samara Klar – Partisanship in a Social Setting
Figure 2-3A
Note: Brackets surrounding each dot indicate 95% confidence interval.
47
Samara Klar – Partisanship in a Social Setting
Figure 2-3B
Note: Brackets surrounding each dot indicate 95% confidence interval.
48
Samara Klar – Partisanship in a Social Setting
Figure 4a.
Note: Brackets surrounding each dot indicate 95% confidence interval.
49
Samara Klar – Partisanship in a Social Setting
Figure 4b.
Note: Brackets surrounding each dot indicate 95% confidence interval.
50
Samara Klar – Partisanship in a Social Setting
Figure 5.
Note: Brackets surrounding each dot indicate 95% confidence interval.
51
Samara Klar – Partisanship in a Social Setting
Figure 6.
Note: Brackets surrounding each dot indicate 95% confidence interval.
52
Samara Klar – Partisanship in a Social Setting
Figure 7.
Note: Brackets surrounding each dot indicate 95% confidence interval.
53