Incentives for land users who adopt
environmentally sound land use
management and practices
Law Reform Paper
June 2006
Contents
Executive summary
1
Background ............................................................................................................... 5
1.1
1.2
1.3
2
Incentives for sustainable land use .......................................................................... 6
2.1
2.2
2.3
3
The Environmental Defender’s Office................................................................ 5
PPT funding ........................................................................................................ 5
Development of this law reform paper ............................................................... 6
Background ......................................................................................................... 6
Current Disincentives.......................................................................................... 8
Current Incentives ............................................................................................... 9
Suggestions for Law Reform .................................................................................. 10
3.1
Carbon Trading ................................................................................................. 10
3.2
Native vegetation clearing laws ........................................................................ 12
3.3
Environmental offsets ....................................................................................... 14
3.4
Beyond compliance recognition – e.g. eco-labelling & green tick. .................. 15
3.5
Subsidies and drought relief.............................................................................. 16
3.6
‘One Stop Shop’ ................................................................................................ 17
3.7
Pastoral leases ................................................................................................... 18
3.8
Improved enforcement of environmental laws ................................................. 20
3.9
Incentives for environmental stewardship ........................................................ 21
3.10 Taxes and payments .......................................................................................... 23
3.11 Local Government incentives ........................................................................... 24
Appendix 1
2
Executive summary
The EDO was granted funding from the Law Society WA’s Public Purposes Trust for the
2005/06 year to research “Incentives for land users who adopt environmentally sound
land use practices”. The purpose of this paper is to highlight the laws and programs that
are currently acting as a disincentive to sustainable land use, identify current incentives
that are valuable, and discuss ways in which current disincentives can be removed and
new incentives can be implemented.
Carbon Trading
Carbon trading schemes can include the use of biosequestration as credits to offset carbon
emissions. These programs would encourage landholders to revegetate land or retain
current vegetation. WA participation in a carbon trading system could be brought about
in a number of ways, including ratification of the Kyoto protocol, establishing a national
trading scheme and promoting WA offsets to overseas companies. Some legal structures
would need to be set up to support these options.
Native vegetation clearing laws
Clearing of native vegetation has led to significant environmental degradation and loss of
productive farming land in WA. The native vegetation clearing regulations under the
Environmental Protection Act 1986 (“EP Act”) contain a number of exemptions to the
requirement to obtain permit before clearing native vegetation. A number of these
exemptions are too broad and do not encourage the retention of native vegetation. The
native vegetation clearing system should be changed in a number of ways as outlined in
this paper. Monitoring and enforcement action should also be improved and increased.
Environmental offsets
The EPA’s environmental offsets policy has the potential to be a useful tool provided it is
managed and administered appropriately. An offset should be considered an additional
obligation of a proponent whose project has been approved, where avoidance, mitigation
and rehabilitation will still leave some residual harm to the environment. The EDO only
supports the use of offsets where they are used in the manner discussed in this paper.
Beyond compliance recognition
The establishment of a ‘beyond compliance’ recognition scheme such as an eco-labelling
or ‘Green Tick’ program for sustainable farming within WA could provide farmers with
an added incentive to adopt sustainable land practices. Such a program could be
instituted by government, with the added reward of reduced regulatory monitoring or
reduced licence fees etc for participants.
Subsidies and drought relief
There are a number of perverse subsidies that discourage environmentally sustainable
land management in WA, and a lack of effective subsidies that actually result in modified
behaviour. Drought assistance in particular should assist landholders to prepare for
drought conditions and develop risk management programs before drought occurs. The
exceptional circumstances program administered by the Rural Business Development
3
Corporation should be linked to ongoing standards for sustainable land management.
Cross compliance programs could also be applied to landholders to encourage reduction
of non-point source water pollution from agriculture.
‘One stop shop’
There is confusion amongst landholders as to which legal requirements apply to them and
which agencies could provide assistance. Pastoralists, miners and growers could each
have a central contact point that would advise on all the legal requirements imposed on a
certain user across all departments and would coordinate all government approvals
required by the landholder.
Pastoral leases
A number of elements within pastoral leases have been identified as creating a
disincentive to managing pastoral lands sustainably. A rolling lease term in line with the
South Australian model is considered to be likely to produce better environmental
outcomes for pastoral lands. Lease renewal should be made conditional upon the
adoption by landholders of acceptable Environmental Management System (EMS), which
should be developed using an Ecosystem Management Understanding (EMU) project
process. The existence and maintenance of such an EMS should also facilitate access to
stewardship and / or other incentive payments.
Improved enforcement of environmental laws
Lack of enforcement of environmental laws has been an ongoing concern for the EDO,
and was identified by workshop participants as a strong disincentive to adopting more
sustainable land practices. The EP Act should allow third party prosecutions of
environmental offences. The proposed increase to criminal penalties and introduction of
civil penalties should assist with enforcement.
Incentives for environmental stewardship
There is a growing recognition of the importance of ecosystem services - services created
by the interactions of living organisms with their environment, which provide the
conditions and processes that sustain human life. Support is needed for landholders who
would like to manage their land in a more environmentally sustainable way. There are a
number of incentives that could assist to achieve this aim including government funded
revegetation programs, tax deductibility for expenses incurred in managing land for
conservation purposes, and the re-funding and expansion of the Auction for Landscape
Recovery project.
Taxes and payments
The Heritage of Western Australia Act (1990) provides some useful approaches to
managing taxes and payments imposed on heritage areas. A similar system should apply
to conservation lands within pastoral leases or farmlands.
Local government incentives
Incentives schemes at the local government level can be an effective tool to encourage
private landholders to become partners in conserving biodiversity as part of sustainable
4
land management and farm production. Local councils across rural WA should consider
adopting differential rating schemes to encourage landholders to provide long term
protection for areas of high conservation. Land tax exemptions should be available to
landholders who support the rezoning of their land to conservation under local planning
schemes. Rezoning of the covenanted land to a conservation zone should accompany the
establishment of a conservation covenant.
1 Background
1.1 The Environmental Defender’s Office
The Environmental Defenders’ Office (WA) Inc. (“EDO”) is a not-for-profit community
legal centre providing legal advice, legal education and law reform services on public
interest legal environmental issues. The EDO has been operating since 1995. It offers
legal assistance to individuals, groups and organisations concerned with public interest
environmental legal matters where the individual, group or organisation is unable to
afford private legal assistance. The EDO also participates in and promotes environmental
law reform.
1.2 PPT funding
The EDO was granted funding from the Law Society WA’s Public Purposes Trust for the
2005/06 year to research “Incentives for land users who adopt environmentally sound
land use practices”. The funding was granted to:



Identify and review laws and regulatory processes that act as disincentives for the
adoption of environmentally sound land use management and practices;
Research and report on the ways in which the law can be adapted to encourage land
users to adopt best practices in environmentally sound land management; and
Propose changes to identified legal impediments.
Actions undertaken as part of the project include:





Researching existing legal mechanisms promoting sound environmental land use
management and practices;
Providing legal advice and information to land users about these practices and
incentives;
Providing community legal education through workshops and fact sheets about these
practices and incentives;
Promote law reform proposals relating to environmentally sound land use
management and practices; and
Develop strong networks with land users and relevant government departments who
are best placed to promote these practices and models
This law reform submission forms part of the PPT funded project.
5
1.3 Development of this law reform paper
The EDO has been involved in a study of incentives and disincentives of sustainable land
use for a number of years. In 2004 the EDO produced a publication for the Rural
Industries Research and Development Corporation (“RIRDC”) on EMS in Agriculture
which discussed a number of agricultural incentives and disincentives. During the PPT
project period the EDO conducted further research into the topic, including an analysis of
incentive programs in other states and other countries that could be valuable to WA.
In April 2006 the EDO conducted workshops in Merredin and Kalgoorlie to inform
landholders and the broader community on the current incentives available, and to seek
comments on the incentives and disincentives that are currently in operation that impact
on the way in which landholders manage their land. Ideas were also sought on possible
incentives that could be developed for the future to encourage and support sustainable
land use. Some strong themes emerged from those workshops, and the feedback and
ideas generated have been significantly incorporated into this paper.
The EDO’s desktop research, along with discussions with landholders, has highlighted to
us many opportunities for law reform in this area. The purpose of this paper is to
highlight the laws and programs that are currently acting as a disincentive to sustainable
land use, identify current incentives that are valuable, and discuss ways in which current
disincentives can be removed and new incentives can be implemented.
2 Incentives for sustainable land use
2.1 Background
The 2006 State of the Environment draft report for WA identified the following as very
high or high environmental priorities for WA: introduced animals, weeds, salinisation,
clearing, soil erosion, loss of wetlands, and loss of stream vegetation. 1 These problems
are statewide issues and many can be addressed through more sustainable land use. The
report also states that to address these problems in the agricultural sector, incentive
packages and market-based schemes should be developed to drive land use changes
where necessary.
An estimated 75% of Australia’s dryland salinity is in Western Australia.2 About 1.08
million hectares in the south-west agricultural region are already affected by salinity to
some extent.3 Projections show that without rapid, large scale intervention, including
significant changes to current land use practices, about three million hectares will be
1
EPA, State of the Environment Western Australia report draft 2006 at <www.epa.wa.gov.au>
EPA, n1
3
Nulsen, B., & McConnell, C., Salinity at a Glance. Department of Agriculture, Western Australia,
available at http://agspsrv34.agric.wa.gov.au/environment/salinity/intro/salinity_at_a_glance.htm
2
6
affected by 2010 to 2015-2020 and six million hectares, or 30 per cent of the region, will
be affected before a new groundwater equilibrium is reached. 4
The impacts of salinity are not limited to production losses, but extend to damaging
native ecosystems, public infrastructure and availability of potable water supplies for
urban centres including Perth and Bunbury. For example, about 24,000 km of road, 1000
km of rail and up to 38 rural towns may be affected by damage to buildings, recreation
facilities, and public utilities including water supplies and waste management systems.5
In terms of biodiversity loss, it estimated that salinity in the south west agricultural area
poses a threat of extinction to 450 species of terrestrial plants.6
Inappropriate land use practices have also led to increasing acidification of soils, soil
structure decline and erosion. Soil erosion across the state varies enormously with 1
tonne per hectare per year in the Southern Rangelands (north of the Wheatbelt) to over
13–15 tonnes per hectare per year in the Kimberley, Pilbara and Gascoyne districts.
Some areas of the South West recorded nearly 10 tonnes per hectare per year. In the
rangelands, livestock stocking rates combined with the low vegetation cover has a
significant impact on soil erosion.7
Soil acidity affects two-thirds of Western Australia’s Wheatbelt and costs the farming
community in excess of $70 million annually through lost production.8 Many soils in
Western Australia’s agricultural regions are naturally acidic. However, agriculture
accelerates acidification due to the leaching of nitrogen from the root zone, removal of
produce and use of legumes in rotations.9 Additionally, waterlogging is a problem in
many areas and engineering solutions such as deep drainage pose potential threats to
receiving environments.10 Nutrient enrichment (through fertiliser run off) has also
contributed to increased algal blooms in many south west waterways, including the Swan
River in Perth11. The main contributors to many of these problems include removal of
native deep-rooted native vegetation, tillage practices and over application of fertilizers.
Overgrazing by domestic stock, introduced animals and native animals is currently a
concern across the whole state. Overgrazing can cause deterioration in plant and soil
cover, desertification, wind and water erosion, loss of soil fertility and structure,
4
Nulsen, n3. The estimated time to reach equilibrium varies between zones and catchments in the region,
but it could take as little as 30 years in the southern and western areas, and as long as 50 to 100 years in the
east and north.
5
Stuart-Street, A. (2003) Natural Resource Management Issues in the Agricultural Zone of Western
Australia- South West Region. Resource Management Technical Report 244. Department of Agriculture,
Government of Western Australia, available at http://www.agric.wa.gov.au
6
Stuart-Street, n5.
7
EPA, n1
8
Department of Agriculture, Government of Western Australia available at http://www.agric.wa.gov.au
9
Department of Agriculture, n8.
10
Department of Agriculture, n8.
11
See Swan River Trust available at
http://portal.environment.wa.gov.au/portal/page?_pageid=973,1&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL
7
salinisation, degradation of wetlands and fragmentation of habitat. Most overstocking
occurs in the Rangelands.12
Introduced plants and animals contribute to a decline in biodiversity as well as a
degradation of watercourses and soils across the whole state. Introduced plants push out
native plants and do not provide adequate habitat for native animals. The Swan Coastal
Plain, the northern agricultural area, the Gascoyne–Murchison, the Carnarvon basin and
the Pilbara have high numbers of introduced mammals per bioregion. The Southwest,
Goldfields and Kimberley bioregions have significant numbers of weeds, followed by the
Murchison, Pilbara and Carnarvon bioregions.13
One of the reasons proffered for the lack of uptake of sustainable land practices amongst
landholders is the perceived and actual cost of managing land in a more sustainable way.
As noted in the EDO’s RIRDC report, the existing regulatory system is characterised by a
lack of incentives for environmental stewardship that look beyond short-term profit (or
survival) toward a long-term ethic of custodianship of the land14. Economic and noneconomic incentives are needed to encourage and support landholders to manage their
land in a way that is sustainable in the long term and produces positive environmental
outcomes.
Within this context, this paper explores regulatory mechanisms available to address these
problems, particularly those directed towards encouraging sustainable land management
practices through incentives at the State and local government level in Western Australia.
2.2 Current Disincentives
EDO research and discussions with landholders and regional community members has
identified a number of disincentives to sustainable land management currently operating
in WA. Some of these disincentives are an incidental consequence of ineffective or
inappropriate laws. In other cases they result from lack of financial and technical support
or lack of education. Some of these disincentives are highlighted below.
As noted above, the overarching disincentive to adopting environmentally sound land
management practices is the perceived and actual cost of managing land in a more
sustainable way. Many of the law reform suggestions in the next section go towards
addressing this perception or reality.
A recurring theme in our discussions with regional communities was the inability of the
law to prevent environmental degradation. This stemmed from a number of factors
including the lack of regulation of activities that cause environmental harm, the lack of
enforcement of environmental laws generally and the native vegetation clearing laws in
12
EPA, n1
EPA, n1
14
EDO WA. (2004) EMS in Agriculture: Identifying Legal Rights and Responsibilities, RIRDC
13
8
particular, and the perception that penalties for environmental harm do not outweigh the
cost of environmental exploitation.
As noted by numerous commentators in this area, agricultural subsidies that are not tied
to the use of sustainable land practices can, in some cases, act as a disincentive to
sustainable land management. This issue was raised as a serious problem in the regional
workshops. Participants noted that current agricultural subsidies can ‘reward’
landholders who do not manage their land well and ‘punish’ those who are attempting to
farm sustainably and have accrued assets. It was felt that any excess income gained in
high producing years may as well be spent, as an accumulation of non-farm assets
rendered landholders ineligible for subsidies in drought years. In addition, drought
subsidies that assist landholders to bring cattle back on to the land often require
restocking to be done within a certain timeframe, regardless of the capacity of the land to
cope with increased stock after a drought period.
Participants also stated that the legal requirements and responsibilities on land managers
are not clearly defined which leads to confusion as to which laws apply to their particular
circumstance. For example it was perceived that there is an overlap in different
legislation making it very difficult for land managers to identify their responsibilities.
The large number of government agencies that are potentially involved in land
management also makes it difficult for landholders to know where to seek information or
approvals.
2.3 Current Incentives
Participants in our workshops identified only one current type of incentive they found
valuable in assisting landholders to adopt environmentally sound practices; namely grants
for environmental work.
Other incentives that exist in Western Australia, but were not identified by workshop
participants, are summarised at Appendix 1. These include rate reductions offered by
some local governments for conservation zoned land and a land tax exemption that is
available for land held under conservation covenants. It is understandable that these
incentives were not identified in workshops. The use of rate reductions is not
widespread, and the land tax exemption does not provide any additional benefit to
landowners who already have an exemption because their land is used solely or
principally for a rural business.15
15
Land Tax Assessment Act 2002 (WA) s 29.
9
3 Suggestions for Law Reform
As a result of our research on this topic and our discussions with rural communities, a
number of law reform options are presented below. The aim of this section is to address
the disincentives highlighted above and to suggest new incentive programs that can be
adopted. Not all options listed below will necessarily require legislative changes,
however many would benefit from legislative support.
3.1 Carbon Trading
There has been much research and discussion at a State and Federal level over Australia’s
participation in a carbon trading scheme. Carbon trading schemes can include the use of
biosequestration as credits to offset carbon emissions. Participants at our rural
workshops identified access to carbon markets as a highly desirable incentive.
A report considering the opportunities of WA’s land management sector in establishing
terrestrial sinks found that “while growing trees purely for their carbon sequestering
potential is not likely to be commercially viable under current and expected market
conditions, the carbon value could still make a valuable additional contribution to
forestry activities pursued for other reasons, in particular establishment of trees to help
tackle dryland salinity”.16 It noted that large sinks could potentially be developed
through the establishment of trees and saltbush adjacent to and on salinised land.17 Thus
while carbon trading alone may not be profitable for landholders, it can still provide an
incentive to revegetate land.
By establishing a carbon trading scheme that included credits for biosequestration,
landowners could be given a financial incentive to maintain or establish native vegetation
and retain it for a significant period. It would also reward those landholders who are
planting vegetation for environmental reasons. By placing an economic value on living
trees, tracts of native vegetation would no longer be considered by landholders as
‘unproductive land’. This would have obvious additional benefits for the local
environment including riparian protection, fauna habitat, soil protection and salinity
reduction.
In general, carbon trading schemes usually provide that carbon credits can only be
granted for areas that were cleared before 1990 and replanted after 1990, to prevent land
from being cleared and replanted specifically for the purpose of gaining carbon credits.
Some schemes may allow trees to be harvested with requirements for recapturing the
carbon, or may require that vegetation be retained for a certain period of time.
16
Mitchell, C. (2003) Opportunities for the Western Australian Land Management Sector Arising from
Greenhouse Gas Abatement. CRC Greenhouse Accounting, Canberra.
17
Mitchell, n16.
10
Proposals for change
WA participation in a carbon trading system could be brought about in a number of ways.
The most obvious, but least probable option (for the near future at least) is to ratify the
Kyoto protocol, so that overseas players in the international carbon trading market can
gain carbon credits for investing in Australian carbon sinks. This is an option that the
WA Government currently supports, but is obviously unable to bring about without the
support of the Federal Government. Access to the international carbon market could
provide enormous opportunities for Australia due to the large number of international
companies and countries seeking large scale carbon credits.
In the absence of ratification of the Kyoto protocol, Australia could establish a domestic
trading market. This is currently being developed by all State and Territory Governments
in the absence of the Commonwealth Government, and should be strongly pursued by
WA as a priority. Although legislation to establish carbon rights in trees18 has been
enacted in WA, the adoption of a national trading scheme would obviously require
additional legislative structures. The Carbon Rights Act 2003 allows people to purchase
the carbon sequestration potential of an area of vegetation and register that right on the
land title as an interest. In other words, the purchaser of a carbon credit is given certainty
that the carbon rights they are purchasing are legally theirs and can be protected as such.
However the Act is limited to questions of legal ownership. Further legislation is needed
to provide additional support to a trading scheme.
For example, a carbon registry (as mentioned in the WA Greenhouse Strategy) would
need to be developed to provide certification of the amount of carbon credits available in
each parcel of land and to provide a central database of buyers and sellers of carbon
credits. This would reduce or eliminate double selling of credits and would prevent
emitters from falsely claiming that the same carbon credit purchase was offsetting a
number of different projects. Most importantly, a driver is needed to create the demand
for carbon credits, such as a requirement on electricity retailers to reduce emissions or
purchase carbon credits. The Electricity Supply Amendment (Greenhouse Gas
Reduction) Act 2002 (NSW) provides an example of how this can be done.
In the absence of either of the above formal trading schemes, there are still opportunities
for WA landholders to gain financial benefits from carbon sinks and offsets. Many
programs, both domestic and international, require or encourage companies to purchase
carbon sinks to offset their greenhouse gas emissions. Many programs do not require the
sink to be in their own state or country. A more immediate option than those above is for
WA to set up a program to provide technical support to landholders who have or are
willing to establish the appropriate areas of vegetation, and link potential buyers and
sellers of carbon credits.19 The Department of Agriculture could promote WA as an
18
See Carbon Rights Act 2003 (WA)
The Department of Agriculture has produced a booklet on carbon rights in WA, however much more
technical support is needed before many landholders would be confident to enter into carbon rights
agreements. See Carbon Rights in WA – A New Interest in the Land, Government of WA, 2005.
19
11
attractive carbon investment option and provide a central point of contact for
international and domestic buyers and WA sellers. To facilitate this, a carbon registry as
mentioned above should be established as soon as possible to ensure that the WA carbon
market is established as a reliable and legally certain carbon investment opportunity.
3.2 Native vegetation clearing laws
It is widely recognised that clearing of native vegetation has led to significant
environmental degradation and loss of productive farming land in WA. The draft 2006
WA State of the Environment report states that land clearing is a major threatening
process for biodiversity in WA and should be a high statewide environmental priority. It
also states that broad scale native vegetation clearing (both direct and indirect) continues
to cause a decline in biodiversity values.
The native vegetation clearing regulations under the EP Act contain a number of
exemptions to the requirement to obtain permit before clearing native vegetation. A
number of these exemptions are too broad and do not encourage the retention of native
vegetation. For example, the regulations allow the re-clearing of land that was cleared
within the previous 10 years if the land had been used for pasture, cultivation or forestry
at any time in those 10 years.20 Native vegetation may have significantly regenerated
within that time and landholders should be encouraged to maintain that vegetation where
it is significant. By providing an automatic exemption, no assessment can be made of the
value of that vegetation before it is cleared again. The nature of this exemption also
makes it difficult to enforce.
Another example is that clearing for a fence line on Crown land is not subject to the 1ha
annual clearing limit to which many of the other exemptions are subject, even though
clearing could potentially be up to 6.5 metres wide for this purpose21 and a similar
exemption exists that is subject to the 1ha annual cap22.
Workshop participants identified lack of enforcement of the native vegetation clearing
laws as one of the biggest disincentives to protecting native vegetation. It was felt that
the clearing laws as they are currently implemented do not discourage landholders from
clearing land illegally. Comprehensive statistics on enforcement of the clearing laws
such as number of complaints, investigations, monitoring and charges are not publicly
available from the Department of Environment and Conservation (“DEC”), although a
media statement is released each time a successful prosecution occurs. Based on media
statements, there has been just one prosecution for illegal clearing since the native
vegetation clearing laws came into force in 2004 (plus one prosecution for illegal clearing
in a catchment under the Country Areas Water Supply Act 1947).
20
Environmental Protection (Clearing of Native Vegetation) Regulations 2004, regulation 5, item 14
Environmental Protection (Clearing of Native Vegetation) Regulations 2004, regulation 5, item 11
22
Environmental Protection (Clearing of Native Vegetation) Regulations 2004, regulation 5, item 10
21
12
Proposals for change
The native vegetation clearing system should be changed in the following ways and for
the following reasons:
Part of Act or
Regulation
Recommended change
Reason
Schedule 6,
Item 9 of the
Act
Delete this exemption
It is unfair to give concessionary
treatment to subdivision approvals,
especially when subdivisions pursuant
to assessed schemes are already the
subject of another exemption in Item 2
Schedule 6,
Items 10, 11
and 12 of the
Act
Reduce the scope of these
exemptions
Burning should not be conducted
without regard to its ecological
impacts unless it is required to avert
imminent damage to life or property
Regulation 5,
Item 3
Delete this “fire
management” temporary
exemption
The requirement to burn “in such a
way as to minimise long term damage
to… environmental values” is beyond
most landholders’ expertise
Regulation 5,
Item 11
Make this exemption for
Crown land fence clearing
subject to 1ha annual limit
As discussed in the main text above
Regulation 5,
Item 14
Remove this exemption
for regrowth
As discussed in the main text above
Regulation 5,
Item 15
Delete fence line
exemption
This issue is already covered by Items
10 and 11
Regulation 5,
Items 16, 17
and 18
Delete exemption for
various types of waterrelated works
Native vegetation principles are not
adequately addressed in the relevant
approvals process
Regulation 5,
Item 24
Delete petroleum-related
temporary exemption
It is unfair to give these particular
landholders concessionary treatment
Regulation 5,
Item 25
Delete mining-related
temporary exemption
It is unfair to give these particular
landholders concessionary treatment
13
The DEC should improve monitoring and increase enforcement action against
landholders who clear land without a permit or otherwise than in accordance with their
permit.
3.3 Environmental offsets
The EPA’s environmental offsets policy23 has the potential to be a useful tool provided it
is managed and administered appropriately. The policy includes the following principles:
-
-
certain environmental assets must be fully protected and conserved and the
Government should never allow their degradation in exchange for environmental
offsets;
environmental offsets should only be considered after all other attempts to
mitigate impacts have been exhausted;
offsets should be used with a goal of achieving a net environmental benefit; and
offsets and impacts should ideally be ‘like for like or better’.
The use of an offset should not be considered as part of the initial assessment and
decision making process to prop up a project that would otherwise be environmentally
unacceptable. An offset should be considered an additional obligation of a proponent
whose project has been approved, where avoidance, mitigation and rehabilitation will still
leave some residual harm to the environment.
For example if a large mining project were being considered where rehabilitation was
known to be unfeasible, a decision about its environmental acceptability should be made
purely based on the project, without consideration of any offsets that may go with it. If it
were decided that the project should go ahead notwithstanding the lack of rehabilitation,
then at that stage, offset conditions should be considered and imposed, i.e. the company
involved should be required to invest in and undertake significant environmental offset
projects in the local area to achieve a net environmental benefit. The decision maker
should not take the offset into account when deciding whether to approve the project.
If offsets are allowed, it is essential that the offset projects are appropriately monitored
and conditions enforced to ensure that the offset is effective.
Proposal for change
The EDO only supports the use of offsets where they are used in the manner discussed
above.
The offset policy, if used in the manner above, should be established as a state
environment policy, and then adopted by whole-of-Government, so that Government
agencies have a consistent approach when considering offsets. The use of offsets as a
23
EPA, Environmental Offsets, Position Statement No.9, January 2006
<http://www.epa.wa.gov.au/docs/1863_PS9.pdf>
14
bargaining tool to make environmentally unacceptable projects acceptable should not be
allowed by any agency.
Government agencies that are considering offsets as part of their approval processes
should make the required statutory amendments, or at least issue a formal policy
statement, to allow the EPA’s offset principles to direct their offset decisions.
3.4 Beyond compliance recognition – e.g. eco-labelling & green
tick.
The establishment of a ‘beyond compliance’ recognition scheme such as an eco-labelling
or ‘Green Tick’ program (see further below) for sustainable farming within WA could
provide farmers with an added incentive to adopt sustainable land practices. Such a
program would encourage consumers to consider the impacts of their consumption on the
environment, and choose products that are farmed in a more environmentally friendly
way as a result. This would not necessarily require produce to be farmed organically,
rather it would require the landholder to actively engage in sustainable land practices.
Eco-labelled or ‘Green Ticked’ products could be offered at a slightly increased price to
cover the costs of maintaining the program.
An example of a government-run ‘beyond compliance’ recognition scheme (though
directed at companies rather than primary producers) is the US EPA’s “National
Environmental Performance Track” program which rewards facilities that exceed
regulatory requirements and engage in environmental protection. The US EPA reports
that since 2000, Performance Track members have “collectively reduced their water use
by more than 1.3 billion gallons, cut their generation of solid waste by nearly 600,000
tons, and decreased their energy use by more than 8.4 trillion British Thermal Units
(BTUs)-enough to power more than 80,600 homes for a year”.24 Rewards for
participants include reduced regulatory monitoring and public recognition.
An example of a privately-run ‘beyond compliance’ recognition program is the Green
Tick independent sustainability certification based in New Zealand.25 This program
certifies products that are environmentally sustainable so that consumers can make
informed choices about the products they are purchasing.
Proposals for change
Such a program could be instituted by government, with the added reward of reduced
regulatory monitoring or reduced licence fees etc for participants.
24
25
For further details of the scheme see < http://www.epa.gov/performancetrack/about.htm>
See <http://www.greentick.com/index.html>
15
3.5 Subsidies and drought relief
Research and discussions with landholders in WA has highlighted a number of perverse
subsidies that discourage environmentally sustainable land management, and a lack of
effective subsidies that actually result in modified behaviour.
Workshop participants felt that there is a lack of economic support for landholders that
engage in environmental protection, for example wetland protection, and so land
stewardship practices are not encouraged. Suggestions included government subsidies
for cropping systems that reduce environmental degradation in salinity affected areas (for
example lucerne hay and saltbush), and incentives (in the form of subsidies or possibly
tax relief) for landholders who manage weeds and ferals in line with regional objectives.
The EDO notes that landowners have a level of responsibility to maintain the
environment irrespective of the financial support provided by government, and situations
where the activity should be a standard part of land management must be differentiated
from those where added incentive is required.
Perverse agricultural subsidies were also identified, that is, subsidies that are aimed at
alleviating short term hardship for landholders but have the effect of exacerbating long
term problems such as land degradation. An example raised was a drought subsidy that
assists landholders to restock cattle after a drought period. Often restocking must be
done within a certain amount of time regardless of whether the land has recovered
enough to carry that level of stock. There is no ability to delay restocking to allow the
land to recover as the subsidy will only be paid if the landholder restocks quickly.
Another example of the way in which exceptional circumstances subsidies operate
perversely is that landholders who have managed their land and their assets sustainably
for the long term and who are less affected by the exceptional circumstance find it harder
to qualify for government assistance under the means test, whereas landholders who have
not managed their land and assets sustainably will qualify. This operates as a
disincentive to long term sustainable management.
Proposals for change
To address these issues, drought assistance in particular should assist landholders to
prepare for drought conditions and develop risk management programs before drought
occurs. This would improve the viability of sustainable farm businesses by assisting
them to factor in the risk of drought over time, and would remove support from
inefficient operators.26
As has been noted by a number of commentators, another way to address these issues is
to attach environmental conditions to agricultural support policies. Cross-compliance
26
For more discussion of this concept see EDO NSW Submission to the NSW legislative assembly
standing committee on NRM inquiry into disincentives for ecologically sustainable land and water use in
NSW, May 2005 at <www.edo.org.au>
16
mechanisms which tie minimum environmental standards to agricultural support
programs are well established in the United Kingdom, the United States27 and Norway,
and have been implemented more recently in Korea and Switzerland.28
The exceptional circumstances program administered by the Rural Business
Development Corporation should be linked to ongoing standards for sustainable land
management. Regulation could require a record of compliance with a specific process
standard (eg a code of practice or best management practices) before making this subsidy
available to farmers. The rationale is that farmers know in advance that they would not
be able to benefit from a government subsidy in an exceptional circumstance, unless they
comply with the specific process standard all throughout the year. Consequently, this
could act as an incentive for farmers not to rely solely on subsidies and to be more
diligent in maintaining an environmentally sound behaviour.
Cross compliance programs could also be applied to landholders to encourage reduction
of non-point source water pollution from agriculture. A number of programs have been
suggested by commentators, such as a best management practice system under which a
variable charge is imposed on polluters based on the level of pollution abatement they
undertake such that polluters who improve their management practices will receive a
lower or zero charge.29 Another option is to provide farmers with a financial incentive to
adopt a best practice management standard through free advice and a financial subsidy to
assist in the development and implementation of the standard.30
3.6 ‘One Stop Shop’
A strong outcome from the workshops was the desire amongst landholders to have access
to a central entry point within government or ‘one stop shop’ for all approval and advice
queries relating to a certain land use. It was stated that confusion amongst landholders as
to which legal requirements applied and which agencies could provide assistance
provided a barrier to better land management.
27
In the U.S., the Conservation Compliance Program, enacted as part of the 1985 Farm Bill, applies to
croplands classified as highly erodible lands. It requires affected farmers to implement a conservation plan
as a condition for receiving farm program benefits. The program is enforced through random checks to
determine whether farms are in compliance with their approved conservation plans. See Clark, D. &
Downes, D. (1996) What Price Biodiversity? Economic Incentives and Biodiversity Conservation in the
United States. 11 J.Envtl. L. & Litig. 9 at 45. See also 16 U.S.C. 3832 (a)(1)(2005).
28
OECD, Directorate for Food, Agriculture and Fisheries (2003) Agri-environmental Policy Measures:
Overview of Developments at < http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/25/46/18987100.pdf>
29
Gunningham, N and Sinclair D (2004) Curbing non-point pollution: lessons for the Swan-Canning
21EPLJ 181; and Gordon, S (2005) Innovative economic mechanisms for addressing agricultural non-point
source water pollution 22 EPLJ 55
30
Gunningham and Sinclair, n29
17
Proposals for change
Pastoralists, miners and growers could each have a central contact point that would
advise on all the legal requirements imposed on a certain user across all departments and
would coordinate all government approvals required by the landholder. The approvals
themselves would still be administered by each department, but the entry point for the
landholder would be centralised. The central contact point would also provide
landholders with technical assistance and information on the economic and other
incentives available to them.
We note that this has been one of the stated motivations behind the merger of CALM and
DoE31, but the creation of the DEC will not in itself provide the service being sought by
some of our stakeholders due to the need for many landholders to work with the
Department of Agriculture, or the Department of State Development, or other
departments, as the case may be.
3.7 Pastoral leases
A number of elements within pastoral leases have been identified as creating a
disincentive to managing pastoral lands sustainably.
Section 95 of the Land Administration Act requires the Pastoral Lands Board to ensure
that pastoral leases are managed on an ecologically sustainable basis. However, since
this legislation was passed in 1997, the Board has been unable to determine what
constitutes ecologically sustainable management. This inaction on such an important
issue has created uncertainty for all pastoral lessees, and has acted as a strong inhibitor in
achieving sustainable management of pastoral leases.
The Land Administration Act limits the term of pastoral leases to 50 years32. Renewal of
leases is at the discretion of the Minister, on application by the lease holder. The Act
indicates that leases can be passed on to heirs if the leaseholder dies during the term of
the lease, on application to the Minister. The EDO’s RIRDC report states that “where
farmers or graziers own a short term grazing or forestry lease (rather than owning land in
fee simple), producers have indicated that they perceive a particular and inappropriate
disincentive to long-term custodianship of the land, in that there is no financial incentive
to do other than farm for short term profit.”33 This concern was also raised at the
workshops: the restricted tenure of pastoral leases limits the ability of lessees to obtain
finance for investment in infrastructure and improved management of livestock.
However, the EDO has access to information that the major lending institutions do not
consider lease tenure when making decisions; rather, they consider the ability to repay
any loan, which may include cash flow of the business as well as relevant business
acumen.
31
Minister for the Environment, Media Statement 23/05/06
Land Administration Act, section 105(1)
33
EDO, n14
32
18
There is an argument that longer term leases would increase the market value of pastoral
leases. This would result in windfall profits to current owners and increase the purchase
price for future owners. This increased purchase price would, in turn, require greater
returns from the same resource base and thereby increase the potential for overstocking
and consequent land degradation. Also of concern would be the prospect of State
Government having a reduced capacity to intervene in lease management to deal with
such issues.
Arrangements under the South Australian Pastoral Land Management and Conservation
Act may provide a useful model for pastoral land management in Western Australia.
Under that Act, leases can be granted for a term of 42 years; however, continuation of the
lease within the 42 year period is subject to a successful assessment of the condition of
the land every 14 years. The pastoral board can refuse to extend the lease every 14 years
if there has been a breach of a lease condition which is likely to result in degradation of
the land or the lessee has failed to discharge a duty,34 in which case the lease reverts to a
28 year lease until the lease conditions are satisfied.
Pastoral lease renewal could also be subject to the mandatory uptake of better
environmental practices, with financial support from the Government to do so. The
current renegotiation of pastoral leases, and proposed review of the Land Administration
Act may provide opportunities to address these issues. For example, there is potential to
require as a condition of renewal the development and implementation of an
Environmental Management System (EMS) at an acceptable standard. The EMSs
developed in association with the Ecosystem Management Understanding (EMU)
project35 run across the southern rangelands would be a useful model.
Participants at the workshops also stated that pastoral leases did not effectively allow
lease holders to diversify their use of the land to activities that were better suited to the
conditions of individual properties. The “authorised stock” that are allowed to be run on
pastoral leases is confined to sheep, cattle, horses, goats, and stock kept for domestic or
household use. 36 The Act does allow a pastoral leaseholder to apply to the Pastoral
Lands Board for a permit to carry out activities outside the ambit of the standard pastoral
lease; however, the fact that the traditional uses are enshrined in legislation and nontraditional uses require application and consideration by the board may discourage some
leaseholders from pursuing this option. Notwithstanding these requirements, many
pastoral lessees have applied for licences to diversity their activities on their leases; for
example to run ecotourism and farm stays. The Outback Resource Atlas developed by
the Department of Agriculture was designed specifically to facilitate diversification of
pastoral enterprises.
34
Pastoral Land Management and Conservation Act 1989 (SA), sections 25 and 26.
www.emuproject.org
36
Regulation 17C of the Land Administration Regulations 1998
35
19
Proposals for change
On balance, the adoption of a rolling lease term as occurs under the South Australian
Pastoral Land Management and Conservation Act is considered likely to produce better
environmental outcomes for pastoral lands in Western Australia. Lease renewal should
be made conditional upon the adoption by leaseholders of acceptable EMS, preferably
one developed based on the EMU project process. Similarly, an acceptable EMS could
allow access to stewardship payments (we understand this is being considered as part of
stage 3 of the Natural Heritage Trust) and / or incentives such as lease rental reductions.
A broader range of uses, including the farming of native animals where appropriate,
could be provided for in the legislation to allow leaseholders to diversify into activities
that are recognised as having environmental benefits. Similarly, pastoral lease holders
(which in some cases include NGOs and mining companies) should be allowed to reduce
stocking levels or even completely de-stock for conservation purposes.
A final point is that all Acts relating to conservation covenants should be amended to
allow covenants by non-owners (obviously just for the duration of the lease). We
recommend that this reform be achieved in the context of the proposed Biodiversity
Conservation Act, which the conservation sector argues should consolidate all current
conservation covenant programs.
3.8 Improved enforcement of environmental laws
Lack of enforcement of environmental laws has been an ongoing concern for the EDO,
and was identified by workshop participants as a strong disincentive to adopting more
sustainable land practices. Although CALM and DoE have put more focus on
enforcement in recent years, it is felt that there is still a lack of monitoring of
environmental offences generally, and of enforcement action once breaches occur.
Workshop participants stated that the current lack of enforcement was creating “public
apathy and disillusionment”.
The only statistics on enforcement activity available from the former DoE is a year to
date graph (July 2005 – May 2006) showing the number of actions taken within each
enforcement activity type (eg convictions, infringement notice, letter of warning etc)37.
There is no information on the number of complaints received, the amount of monitoring
done, the number of breaches that did not progress to enforcement level etc. Only
finalised criminal prosecutions for each year are listed in the annual report.
As has been noted in other publications, one way of improving enforcement of
environmental law is to allow third party prosecutions (or private prosecutions) of
37
Enforcement actions so far this year have been: 8 convictions, 4 charges preferred, 4 prosecutions, no
proscribed actions, no statutory action/notices, 2modified penalty review, 8 licence review/amendment, 32
letters of warning, 13 infringement notices and 122 Environmental Field Notices. See:
<http://portal.environment.wa.gov.au/portal/page?_pageid=156,878133&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL>
20
environmental offences.38 Until recently, third party prosecutions were allowed in WA
unless specifically excluded by statute. This has now been reversed so that statues must
specifically authorise third party prosecutions.39 In any event, the EP Act only provides
for the CEO, or authorised officers in some cases, to commence actions.
The level of penalties for environmental damage was also raised as a concern. Penalties
for environmental offences in WA are the lowest in Australia. The threat of enforcement
of environmental offences is not particularly persuasive when the penalties imposed do
not outweigh the economic benefit of the environmental exploitation. For example the
penalty of $2000 under the Soil and Land Conservation Act for failing to seek approval
to construct a deep drain is not seen to outweigh the benefit of constructing the drain.
Proposals for change
The EP Act should allow third party prosecutions of environmental offences. Third party
rights would encourage compliant behaviour because it would allow the community to
monitor and enforce breaches that degraded the environment. In effect, the community
would be empowered to take action on behalf of the environment. The risk of spurious
action would be very low, due to the cost and time involved in initiating a court action
and the current provisions for frivolous or vexatious litigants.
The recently announced proposal to add civil penalty provisions to the EP Act may assist
in increasing enforcement action as a ‘conviction’ will be easier to secure which will
hopefully encourage the DEC and others to take action in a higher number of cases.40
The recently announced increase in penalty rates under the EP Act may also go some way
to addressing these issues.41 Penalties in other Acts containing environmental offences
should also be increased.
It was also suggested in the workshops that fines for non-compliance with environmental
laws should directly fund sustainable land use initiatives.
3.9 Incentives for environmental stewardship
It is widely recognised that revegetation is required in many parts of WA, particularly in
the Wheatbelt, to reduce environmental degradation and improve agricultural output.
There is a growing recognition of the importance of ecosystem services. These are
services created by the interactions of living organisms with their environment, which
provide the conditions and processes that sustain human life, for example, purifying air
and water, detoxifying and decomposing waste, renewing soil fertility, regulating climate,
38
EDO, n14
Criminal Procedure Act 2004, section 20(5)
40
Minister for the Environment, Media Statement 28/05/06
41
Minister for the Environment, n40
39
21
mitigating droughts and floods, controlling pests, and pollinating plants.42 These services
are taken for granted by the wider community and destroyed through inappropriate land
management.43
Although the costs are often borne by the individual landholder, the benefits of
maintaining ecosystem services often flow to surrounding landholders and the
community in general. Mechanisms are required to assist and encourage environmental
stewardship.
A national incentive program that has been successfully trialled in WA is the Auction for
Landscape Recovery (ALR) project. It is one of 11 market-based instrument pilot
projects conducted across Australia from 2003-2005, jointly funding by the Australian
and State Governments. The ALR successfully created a competitive market in which
landholders tendered to provide biodiversity conservation services. A total pool of
$200,000 was available to private landholders submitting single, multiple or joint tenders
for on-ground works focusing on biodiversity conservation measures. A review of the
program suggested that the auction was two to three times more efficient, in economic
terms, than a fixed price scheme.44
Currently, expenses incurred to manage land used for conservation purposes are not tax
deductible (unless the landowner is carrying out a business on that land), while expenses
incurred in managing land used for primary production will be tax deductible. In
addition, there are specific tax rebates for landcare operations for land used for primary
production, but not for land used for conservation.45 This discourages landowners from
converting land to conservation use, and from actively managing land that is used for
conservation because of the loss of tax deductibility for expenses.46
In Costa Rica, incentives are provided by the state to promote forestry renewal activities
and reforestation. The incentive program recognises the benefits ‘provided by forests and
cultivated forests which positively effect the protection and improvement of the
environment.’ Payments are based on the premise of compensating private forest owners
to preserve their forestry ecosystems for a given time period since these provide a series
of environmental services for Costa Rican society. These environmental services are
recognised as: reduction of greenhouse effect gases, protection of water for urban and
rural use, biodiversity protection, and scenic beauty.47
42
Salzman, J. (2005) Creating Markets for Ecosystem Services: Notes from the Field. 80 N.Y.U.L. Rev.
870, at 872
43
EDO n14
44
WWF-Australia, Auction for Landscape Recovery Final Report, October 2005 at
<http://wwf.org.au/ourwork/land/auctions>
45
Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) 40-630
46
EDO NSW, n26
47
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) (2004) Latin American Network for Technical Cooperation in
Watershed Management (REDLACH) Electronic Forum on Payment Schemes for Environmental Services
in Watersheds at 16.
22
Support is needed for landholders who would like to revegetate part of their property but
who are discouraged by the initial outlay and ongoing management costs. In conjunction
with carbon trading discussed above, there are a number of incentives that could assist to
achieve this aim.
Proposals for change
Government funded revegetation programs could be established for drainage basins and
property boundaries, in cooperation with NRM groups. Seed collection and propagation
projects could be partially resourced by re-skilling/education programs and volunteer
programs. As in the Costa Rican example above, landholders could be provided with
payments or tax relief calculated per hectare if they maintain vegetation or revegetate
their land48. A ‘consumer pays’ revegetation program could be established by imposing a
levy on wheat sales and directing the excess into a fund to pay for revegetation in priority
areas.
Expenses incurred in managing land for conservation purposes, whether by a
conservation trust or private landowner, should be tax deductible and eligible for landcare
rebates whether or not the expenses are incurred in the course of earning income.
The Auction for Landscape Recovery project should be provided with new, recurrent
funding and be expanded to apply to other parts of WA that are experiencing serious
environmental degradation.
Once rehabilitated areas have been established, they should be protected by a
conservation covenant under the CALM (now DEC), National Trust or Soil and Land
Conservation programs. This will ensure that the area will receive ongoing management
and will prevent future owners of the property from clearing the area, leading to a
reoccurrence of the original environmental problems.
3.10 Taxes and payments
The Heritage of Western Australia Act (1990) provides some useful approaches to
managing taxes and payments imposed on heritage areas. These provisions allow the
‘heritage use’ to be taken into account when determining taxes and payments that apply
to areas under a heritage agreement (which is similar to a conservation covenant). A
similar system could apply to conservation lands within pastoral leases or farmlands.
Section 33 of the Heritage Act provides for conservation assistance for owner/occupiers
of Heritage listed properties. It states that the Council may provide or arrange for
financial, technical or other assistance as an incentive for the conservation and
presentation of a place of cultural significance. Assistance may include a
recommendation for the remission of rates and taxes, and/or enter into an agreement to
48
This option was also raised in the paper by the Vic Catchment Management Council/DSE, Ecosystem
Services though Land Stewardship Practices: Issues and Options, 2003
23
make grants, pay subsidies, lend moneys or otherwise provide or arrange for assistance or
incentives to any person for any purpose that will facilitate the recording, conservation or
presentation of that place.
Under section 35 the owner or occupier of any place that is the subject of a heritage
agreement may apply to the Valuer-General for a revaluation to take into account the
effect of a heritage agreement.
Section 36 states that where it appears to the Heritage Council, in relation to any place
that is subject to a heritage agreement, that the use or continued use of that place is not
economically feasible; and its conservation is thereby endangered, the Council may make
a report to the Minister recommending that:




all or part of the tax payable by the owner under the Land Tax Assessment Act
2002 that is attributable to that place is remitted;
all or part of the Metropolitan Region Improvement Tax payable by the owner,
under the Planning and Development Act 2005 is remitted;
all or part of any relevant local government rates or charges in respect to the place
are remitted; and / or
all or part of any relevant rates or charges for water in respect to that place be
remitted
The relevant Minister or local government must be consulted in each case.
A further discussion of possible options for local government rates is in part 3.11 below
Proposals for change
The provisions above should be adopted to apply to conservation covenants managed by
the Soil and Land Commissioner, the National Trust and the former CALM (now DEC).
They should also be included in the proposed scheme to allow for conservation covenants
under the Environmental Protection Act 1986.
3.11 Local Government incentives
Incentives schemes at the local government level can be an effective tool to encourage
private landholders to become partners in conserving biodiversity, particularly remnant
vegetation, as part of sustainable land management and farm production.
Under the Local Government Act 1995, differential rates may be imposed on the basis of
the purpose for which the land is zoned; the predominant purpose for which the land is
held or used, as determined by the local council, and any other characteristic or
combination of characteristics prescribed.49 These differential rates are currently being
49
Local Government Act 1995 s. 6.33
24
used in the Shire of Serpentine-Jarrahdale and the Shire of Busselton to allow for
differential rating of land of high conservation value.
The Serpentine-Jarrahdale Shire has adopted a differential rating system that provides
owners of land within a “conservation zone” with reduced rates. Landholders who have
retained native vegetation or a wetland on their land that is of high conservation value
can request that the land be rezoned as “conservation”. The zoning can apply to all or
part of the land. Areas zoned as conservation in the local planning scheme are rated at
half the rate of rural zoned land where the original zoning of the land was rural. Where
the original zoning is not rural, rate relief is assessed on a case-by-case basis. The
landholder is required to manage the land in a sustainable way to ensure its values are
protected. So for example, grazing or clearing would not be allowed. The landholder
must develop an environmental management plan that is considered by the Shire before
the land is rezoned to conservation.50
Although this scheme does not guarantee protection of the land in perpetuity as the
zoning could be changed at a later date by the council, it does bind future property
owners to protect the area while it remains a conservation zone.
This type of differential rating scheme has only been adopted by two councils to date,
despite the fact that legal mechanisms are already in place. No legislative amendment
would be required to establish this scheme in other councils as it is already provided for
in the Local Government Act, and therefore the main requirement would be an
amendment to the relevant local planning scheme.
Proposals for change
Local councils across rural WA should consider adopting differential rating schemes to
encourage landholders to provide long term protection for areas of high conservation.
Alternatively, provisions to allow conservation zones in all local government areas could
be included in the model scheme text to provide consistency across the state. The State
Government should provide assistance to lower resourced councils that would suffer
from a financial burden from this type of rate reduction.
While conservation zones attract reduced rates, they do not attract land tax exemptions.
Land that is held under a conservation covenant issued by CALM (now DEC) or the
National Trust is exempt from land tax. Conservation zone incentives could be further
enhanced if land tax exemptions were available to landholders who allowed the rezoning
of their land to conservation under local planning schemes.
In addition, conservation covenants, while providing protection in perpetuity, do not
affect the zoning of land and can be extinguished or varied by planning schemes where
there are legitimate planning grounds. To strengthen conservation covenants, rezoning of
the covenanted land to a conservation zone should accompany the establishment of a
Info Note PS07- “Conservation Zones” <http://www.sjshire.wa.gov.au/data/ps07.pdf> and Shire of
Serpentine-Jarrahdale Town Planning Scheme No.2.
50
25
conservation covenant. Provision to establish this link could be affected through
amendments to the model scheme text so that all local councils provided their
constituents with access to this incentive. However, the ability to establish conservation
zones without the need for a conservation covenant should be retained.
26
Appendix 1: Examples of grant programs providing support for sustainable land
management
Program
Auction for Landscape Recovery
pilot project (Avon CC and
others)
Biodiversity Conservation Grants
(City of Cockburn)
Availability
Avon NRM region
Annual funding
Up to $200,000 available to
private landholdersi.
Swan NRM region
Busselton Biodiversity Incentive
strategy (Shire of Busselton)
South West NRM region
Community Conservation Grants
(Environment Minister)
Threatened Species Network
Grants Program (WWF)
Statewide
Denmark Conservation Appeal
South coast NRM region
Envirofund grants (NHT)
Landcare Australia (Dept of
Agriculture)
Nature conservation covenant
program (CALM/DEC)
Statewide
Statewide
Priority projects and devolved
grants schemes (NRM regional
groups)
Wetlands Conservation program
Statewide
$15,000 annual funding, with a
maximum of $1,500 for
individual landowners and $3,000
for joint applications.ii
$78,500iii annual funding, with a
50% rate rebate (if a conservation
covenant is put in place); or a
30% rebate (signing a
management agreement.
$50,000 annual funding. Each
grant ranges from $500- $5000.iv
$500,000 nationally. Individual
projects may receive up to
$50,000v.
No set amount - based on
donations receivedvi
Up to $5, 000vii
Various corporate-sponsored
grants available.viii
- Up to $500 for legal costs
incurred to check the covenant.
- In certain cases, up to $1500 per
km of fencing.
- Waives fees for voluntary
covenants (save $2,500-$3,000)
- Initial management costs to
repair damaged land. ix
Significant grants for projects that
meet NRM priorities.
Statewide
Statewide
Statewide
Grants are up to $15,000.
i
Pilot program that may be repeated
http://www.cockburn.wa.gov.au/Council_Services/Environment/Landowner_Biodiversity_Grant/?c=5
iii Based on spending for the 2004-05 financial year http://www.nrm.gov.au/publications/regional-report/0405/pubs/chapter10.pdf
ivAs at 13/07/2005, http://www.naturebase.net/news/NewsData/html/1121241242.html
v http://wwf.org.au/ourwork/species/tsngrants/
vi Current in 2004 http://www.ntwa.com.au/environment/denmark.pdf ,
vii http://www.nht.gov.au/envirofund/index.html
viii http://landcareaustralia.com.au/page.asp?pID=86
ix As at April 2006 http://www.naturebase.net/orc/pdf/partnership_book_april2006.pdf
ii
27