The concept of nuclear blast windows and their geo

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Defence & Security Series
Author: John Karkazis
Issue D4, December 2006
THE CONCEPT OF NUCLEAR BLAST WINDOWS AND
THEIR GEO-STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS
(extracts)
…………
CONTENTS
“SYNCHRONIZED” BALLISTIC MISSILES ATTACK SCENARIOS
Serial attack scenarios
Multiple attack scenarios
CONCLUSIONS
In this section of the paper we present definitions and preliminary findings regarding the case of
“synchronized” multiple ballistic missiles attack scenarios*1 exploiting nuclear blast impact
capabilities.
*1: This issue is the focal point in the second phase of an ongoing research project of Constantine Porphyrogenetus
International Association titled “The ballistic missile threat in the Middle East. The impact of nuclear blast
windows”
A: Center of nuclear blast window
r: Radius of
-//M: ballistic missile
FIGURE 1. Nuclear Blast Window
First we introduce the notion of the Nuclear Blast Window (NBW) which will have a critical role
in offensive scenarios. NBW is defined as the spherical area centered at the point A of the
explosion of a ballistic missile nuclear warhead having as radius r the “destruction” radius of the
nuclear explosion (figure 2). Within this radius every type of missile is either completely
destroyed or critically diverted from its course failing thus to hit its target.
2
The NBW offers the ballistic missile a safe Time Window to continue its course. The size Tw of
this Time Window is defined by the following formula:
Tw = 2r / (Vb + Vi)
where Vb is the velocity of the ballistic missile and Vi the velocity of the interceptor.
Time Windows for various destruction radii and for Shahab-3 and Shahab-4 ballistic missile
types are presented in table 1. The velocity of the interceptor missile is taken to be 2500 m/sec
whereas the velocity of Shahab-3 and Shahab-4 is taken to be 3700 m/sec and 7000 m/sec
respectively which is approximately equal to the velocity they have when they reach the critical
altitude of 50 km.
Destruction Radius (km):
2.5
5.0
7.5
10.0
12.5
15.0
Time Window for Shahab-3 (sec) :
0.8
1.6
2.4
3.2
4.0
4.8
Time Window for Shahab-4 (sec):
0.53
1.1
1.58
2.2
2.63
3.16
TABLE 1. Nuclear Blast Time Windows
“SYNCHRONIZED” BALLISTIC MISSILES ATTACK SCENARIOS
The scenarios that will be briefly analyzed here are based on the assumption that the offensive
power has the technological capability to control the accuracy of ballistic missile trajectories
within time limits not exceeding a quarter of a second or space limits not exceeding 1 km.
Serial attack scenarios
According to these scenarios the offensive power launches from the same site two ballistic
missiles equipped with nuclear warheads at time instants differing by half the corresponding
Time Window. When the first missile reaches a critical altitude (point A in figure 1) its nuclear
warhead is detonated. At the time of the explosion the second ballistic missile is at point C
(figure 1) that is at the limits of the destruction area. Because of the NBW created by the first
missile the second one will continue its course unobstructed at least for a time equal to the
corresponding Time Window.
The main impact of a NBW regards the destruction (under certain circumstances) of both the
main and the dual interceptor missile increasing thus the possibility of a successful ballistic
missile attack. As an example, in the case of a destruction radius being greater or equal to 7.5
km, if the main interceptor missile at the time of the nuclear blast lies within a time distance of 1
3
sec from the position of the first incoming ballistic (Shahab-3 type) missile then it is destroyed
together with its dual one.
Multiple attack scenarios
According to these scenarios the offensive power creates a NBW through which a number of
appropriately synchronized ballistic missiles (launched from different sites) can continue their
course unobstructed. The trajectories of the ballistic missiles that will pass through the NBW
should be “synchronized” with the trajectory of the missile creating the NBW to such a degree so
as to pass within a distance of 1km or less from the nuclear blast detonation point (point A in
figure 2) and at the same time to lie, at the time of the explosion, at a distance approximately
equal to destruction radius from this point.
Preliminary analysis indicates the existence of two areas, areas A and B in map 7, that could act
as NBW in the case of multiple missile attacks against Israel.
The area A, which is located north of lake Tiberias, can act as a NBW for multiple missile
attacks against all major urban areas in the northern part of Israel, from Hadera to Akko, whereas
the area B, which is located near the city of Salt in Jordan,
can act as a NBW for multiple missile attacks against all major urban areas in the southern part
of Israel, from Tel Aviv to Beer Sheva.
MAP 1. Nuclear Blast Windows in the case of Israel
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CONCLUSIONS
As far as the concept of nuclear blast windows are concerned, although numerical experience is
very limited to draw safe conclusions, if the attacking power could develop technological
capabilities which will ensure appropriate accuracies for synchronized ballistic missile deliveries
then the structure and the strategies of the present defense systems should change dramatically
adjusting to a game theory logic of highly complex combinatorial geometric concepts depicting
the comparative geo-strategic significance of the territorial space of the attacking and defensive
powers.
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