A Mistaken Sense in Consciousness
Chi, Chienchih (冀劍制)
Philosophy in the contemporary world, XI(2), pp.11-15
Abstract
There is a mistaken sense in consciousness or phenomenal property. I propose that as a general
term phenomenal property has no ontological status. When we understand consciousness as
phenomenal properties in general to claim the irreducibility of the mind, we simply fall into a trap
constructed by a mistaken concept.
There are at least four commonly used senses in the concept of consciousness. Different
senses may have different ontological statuses. In one sense, consciousness is supposed to refer
to all qualia or phenomenal properties. We sometimes call phenomenal properties conscious
phenomena or conscious properties. These terms are interchangeable. As a term to refer to the
first-person phenomena, we can simply say that consciousness is phenomenal properties in
general. In this sense, consciousness is irreducible; that is, we cannot use physical concepts to
replace the term consciousness.
The second sense of consciousness is about functional properties, which are about brain
activities that correspond to phenomenal properties in general. We may find something similar in
their functions; then we can use the term consciousness to refer to the shared functions. This is a
reducible sense in consciousness. This means that consciousness in this sense can be clearly
expressed by physical concepts.
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Third, we can also use consciousness to refer to human phenomenal properties. However,
this is not a proper definition in science. We have no adequate reasons to claim that human
consciousness or the human mind is the only possible consciousness or mind in the world. Thus,
when we need a scientific theory of the mind or consciousness, we need to create a theory for all
possible minds or consciousness, not only the human mind.
Another possible main use of consciousness is that it may not refer to any phenomenal
property, but instead to something about what it is like to be conscious. This is a first-person
awareness of the processes of introspection, awareness, knowing, thinking, being, and feeling.
This is also called self-consciousness. When we sleep without dreaming, we stop being
conscious and when we wake up we begin to be conscious. Because of consciousness, we know
what we are doing, feeling, and thinking. This meaning of consciousness is understood through a
first-person viewpoint and it is not supposed to refer to any phenomenal property. I think this
meaning of consciousness is most commonly used in our daily life. In this sense, consciousness
is also reducible. Although it is understood through the first-person viewpoint, it can be
thoroughly explained by third-person or physical concepts. This means that we can use physical
concepts to thoroughly explain consciousness in this sense. It is simply a self-detective
mechanism. The reason why we normally believe that consciousness is not explainable by
physical concepts is not in this mechanism, but in the phenomenal properties. If we understand
consciousness as a self-detective mechanism, it can be thoroughly explained by physical
concepts.
In this paper, I will argue that according to a proper definition of ontology, the most
commonly used irreducible sense in consciousness is a mistaken concept. As a general term,
phenomenal property has no ontological status.
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Scientific theories and natural phenomena
Science is supposed to be theories or explanations of natural phenomena. I assume that if
there is a natural phenomenon, then there is a possible cognitive mechanism that can form a
scientific theory to explain or understand this phenomenon. Thus, if it is impossible for any
possible cognitive mechanism to form a scientific theory to explain something X, then X is not a
natural phenomenon. This definition denies the possibility that there is something in the
ontological world, but that it is totally unrecognizable by any possible cognitive mechanism.
Thus, if we know that there is no possible scientific theory or understanding for X, then we can
reach the conclusion that X is not a natural phenomenon.
What does it mean to say that X is or is not a natural phenomenon? This needs more
explanation. For example, the formula E = MC2 is a scientific theory that expresses a relation
between natural phenomena E (energy), M (mass), and C (the speed of light). We believe that
energy, mass, and the speed of light are natural phenomena. Taking energy as an example, there
are a lot of different types of energies, but we can consider them to belong to the same thing
called energy. There is at least one respect or property that is shared among the different energies,
and we use the general or abstract term energy to refer to this property. Although we may not
find any individual entity that exactly matches the general term, we can still consider the general
term as referring to a natural phenomenon or property. However, if there is no shared property
among different types of energies, then there is no way to consider the general term energy as a
natural phenomenon, which means that the term energy refers to nothing in the world.
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A natural phenomenon plays a causal or functional role in the world. We can create a
scientific theory like E = MC2 to describe its role or relations with other natural phenomena. If
all causal roles can be explained in a theory, then this theory is the complete causal explanation
of the world. This kind of theory is generally believed possible. However, even if we can
produce this kind of theory, we still cannot explain phenomenal properties of the mind.
The problem of the irreducibility of the mind
In order to explain phenomenal properties scientifically, we encounter the problem of the
irreducibility of the mind. Searle indicates that no matter how we use physical or physiological
concepts to explain, for instance, the feeling of pain, there is always something left unexplained
(Searle 1992, 117). We call these unexplainable mental properties qualia, subjective qualities, or
phenomenal properties. Based on Nagel’s explanation, phenomenal properties are subjective and
physical concepts are objective. Objective concepts do not contain any content that can reduce or
explain subjective concepts. This is why we cannot use physical concepts to thoroughly explain
the mind (Nagel 1986). Because all scientific concepts are objective concepts, we cannot
thoroughly explain the mind with a scientific theory.
Although today’s science is based on a third-person point of view, it is not necessary for
a scientific theory to adopt such a view. The goal of science is to find out the real nature of the
world. If the real nature of the world cannot be described through a certain approach, e.g. a
third-person point of view, then we should use other approaches to grasp it. If we can go beyond
this limitation, there may be hope for us to create a theory to solve the hard problem that is to
ask how the physical can give rise to the mental.1 However, even if such a theory to solve the
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hard problem exists, McGinn argues that the theory is beyond human cognition. This shows that
human cognition has its limitation; there is something that cannot be grasped by human cognitive
mechanisms (McGinn 1989). Chalmers also argues that there is no reducible explanation of
phenomenal properties or consciousness through physical properties or concepts. No set of facts
about physical structure can add up to a fact about phenomenal properties (Chalmers 1996, 118).
This implies that the hard problem is insolvable in a reductive way. Thus, he suggests that a
complete scientific theory, which is also called a true theory of everything or a final theory, will
have both components: physical laws for physical phenomena and psychological laws for mental
phenomena (Chalmers 1995b). Thus, both the physical and the mental are fundamental
components. A new science that can deal with the hard problem should employ a fundamental
law or component for phenomenal properties or consciousness (Chalmers 1995b). Thus, this new
science will not be totally objective or based on a third-person point of view. This approach may
be able to create a solution for the human mind, but it cannot be an adequate solution for all
possible minds. Chalmers’ suggestion cannot be used to create a complete scientific theory of the
mind, which is supposed to explain the mind in general rather than only the human mind. The
reason is that as a general term, phenomenal property has no ontological status.
Reconsider McGinn’s Suggestion
When the solution to a problem is beyond our cognition, is it still possible for us to know
that no possible cognitive mechanism can solve the problem? I believe so. There are other
problems that are beyond human cognition, and we can believe that they are also beyond any
possible cognitive mechanism, because we have reasons to believe that the theory that can solve
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the problem does not possibly exist. For example, can we find an answer to the question of how
many pounds of sugar are equal to a three-foot-tree? We cannot find an answer because there is
no answer. Since there is no answer, there is no theory that can solve this problem. Thus, no
possible cognitive mechanism can create a scientific theory to solve it. Based on the ontological
definition previously mentioned, we can also say that the natural law or natural phenomenon that
is supposed to answer the question does not exist. Thus, the best solution to the problem is to
explain why there is no answer. Thus, we can solve or simply deal with this problem by pointing
out that weight and length are totally different categories to which there is nothing to compare.
Although it is reasonable to believe that human cognition has its limitations, we cannot
reach McGinn’s conclusion simply by finding one question that cannot be answered. If there is a
nature phenomenon that is in principle not understandable by human cognitive mechanisms, then
it is meaningful to claim that human cognition has its limitations. However, if the question does
not correctly ask something about natural phenomena, then what we need to do is to find out
where the question goes wrong. The problem might be in conceptual frameworks that are used to
construct the question or in some of our ontological presuppositions. For example, when we try
to reduce the mental to the physical, we have presupposed that the physical is more fundamental
than the mental, but how can we make such a presupposition and how can we compare their
ontological statuses? The irreducibility between the physical and the mental may only show a
conceptual or epistemological problem rather than an ontological one. If the hard problem is
simply generated from conceptual frameworks, then it is not proper to say that the hard problem
cannot be solved by human cognition. It is better to say that we do not correctly ask a question
about the ontological world. Based on the ontological definition previously mentioned, when we
say that a solution to the hard problem does not possibly exist for any possible cognitive
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mechanism, it means that there is no natural phenomenon that corresponds to the problem. Thus,
there is no scientific theory that can explain the nonexistent phenomenon. Therefore, the solution
or best way to deal with the hard problem may be to try to find out how to avoid the problem or
simply to point out why we encounter it.
Two types of scientific theories of the mind
There are two types of scientific theory of the mind. One is called causal reduction, in
which we may use physical concepts to thoroughly explain mental properties in the functional or
causal respect. The causal reduction is believed to be easier than the hard problem.2 If we do not
adopt eliminative materialist views to deny the existence of any phenomenal property, it seems
that there is no problem in believing that consciousness or phenomenal properties can correspond
to brain processes.3 Thus, an understanding of the brain could result in a scientific theory of the
mind or consciousness in the causal or functional respect. I will call this the scientific theory of
the mind F, or simply call theory F.
The other type is a scientific theory of the mind that can thoroughly explain the mind not
only in its functional respect, but also in its phenomenal respect. In order to create such a theory
we must either solve the hard problem, or as Chalmers suggests, adopt the non-reductive strategy
that we should give fundamental laws to the mental. Either theory can be considered a complete
theory of the mind because neither one is supposed to leave phenomenal properties unexplained.
I will call this kind of theory the scientific theory of the mind P, or simply theory P. Thus, theory
P can thoroughly explain the mind both in the functional and phenomenal respects.
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Theory P does not possibly exist
Suppose we have already produced theory F. This means that we can use third-person
physical concepts to thoroughly explain first-person mental concepts in the functional or causal
respect. With this theory, we will know which physical structure can correspond to a phenomenal
property in a cognitive mechanism. Although we have not produced this theory yet, based on
today’s knowledge, it would be reasonable to believe that the following statements are true in
theory F:
1. Different types of phenomenal properties correspond to different physical structures.
It is reasonable to believe that different types of phenomenal properties like red and sour
correspond to different physical structures. Take the human brain as an example: evidence shows
that there are different areas corresponding to different types of phenomenal properties. The
same area may not be able to produce or correspond to different types of phenomenal properties.
In addition, based on first-person knowledge, we cannot find anything similar between a taste
and a color in their phenomenal properties. It is reasonable to believe that if both of them can
correspond to physical structures, the structures must be different, or systematically different.
However, physical structure is probably not a good term for describing the physical
aspect that corresponds to phenomenal properties. Dynamic physical process is probably a better
one because it is highly possible that phenomenal properties correspond to dynamic brain
processes. As Edelman and Tononi indicate, each phenomenal property or called quale
corresponds to a different state of the dynamic core, which can be differentiated from billions of
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other states within a neural space comprising a large number of dimensions (Edelman and
Tononi 2000, 157). However, in order to develop a scientific theory of the mind, we are
discussing phenomenal properties in general rather than only human phenomenal properties.
Using physical structure can describe more general phenomena. We can still use physical
structure to mean structures that can produce dynamic physical processes. Since different
physical components may produce different dynamic physical processes that may correspond to
different phenomenal properties, we have one more reason to believe this statement.
2. There are infinite possible systematically different physical structures that can correspond
to phenomenal properties.
When we know which physical structure corresponds to which phenomenal property in a causal
explanation, we should know how to create a new physical structure that can correspond to a
new type of phenomenal property. Thus, it is reasonable to believe that the number of physical
structures that can correspond to different types of phenomenal properties could be infinite.
3. There are infinite types of possible phenomenal properties.
Because different physical structures that can correspond to different types of phenomenal
properties could be infinite, there could be infinite possible phenomenal properties.
It seems reasonable to believe that all of the statements above are correct. Then, we can have the
following argument:
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Suppose we create a computer being whose cognitive mechanism can produce a physical
structure that corresponds to a phenomenal property C that is not possessed by human beings. Do
we think that theory P must include the property C?
If so, because C could be any possible phenomenal property, theory P must include all
possible phenomenal properties. However, there is no such theory or there is no such cognitive
mechanism that can produce such a theory. We can make a thought experiment to show this.
Suppose alien 1 possesses cognitive mechanism K that can produce theory P, which can
thoroughly explain phenomenal properties. In this case, we can ask whether alien 1 knows what
it is like for human beings to be in pain. If the cognitive mechanism K is similar to human
beings’ mechanism, then alien 1 knows what it is like for human beings to be in pain. However,
because theory P is beyond human cognition because human beings do not possess the property
C, it should also be beyond cognitive mechanism K. Thus, alien 1 cannot create or understand
theory P. But if the cognitive mechanism K is not similar to human’s, then alien 1 does not know
what it is like for human beings to be in pain. Thus, alien 1 cannot still create or understand
theory P, which is supposed to include an explanation of human phenomenal properties. The
other possibility is that the cognitive mechanism K includes human cognition. In this case, there
will be no problem. But, can the cognitive mechanism K include all different physical structures
that correspond to all types of phenomenal properties? Since the possible types of phenomenal
properties could be infinite and a cognitive mechanism cannot include infinite different
structures that correspond to all infinite types of phenomenal properties, the cognitive
mechanisms that can subjectively explain all possible phenomenal properties do not possibly
exist. Based on the discussions above, we can conclude that theory P does not possibly exist, or
the mechanism K that can generate or understand theory P does not possibly exist. It is not only
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beyond human cognition as McGinn suggests, but also beyond all possible cognitive
mechanisms.
However, if we do not think that theory P must include the property C, then theory P
cannot explain some possible phenomenal properties. In this situation, the scientific theory is not
a general theory, which cannot be called a scientific theory or at least cannot be called a
complete theory.
There are two ways to grasp all possible phenomenal properties. One is to include all of
them in a cognitive mechanism, by which to form a theory. But, we have showed that it is
impossible. The other way is to grasp a shared property among them. If we consider phenomenal
property as a general term, there may be something we can grasp among different types of
phenomenal properties. Based on their shared features, we can use the general term to create a
theory. However, we may only grasp something in the functional respect, but not in the
phenomenal respect. Thus, a complete scientific theory of the mind may only explain their
functional respects and ignore the phenomenal respects.
Based on the discussion above, we can conclude that theory P does not possibly exist or
the cognitive mechanism that can understand or produce theory P does not exist. Since a theory
can only exist in a cognitive mechanism, if such a mechanism does not possibly exist, then it is
the same to say that the theory does not possibly exist.
The general or abstract term phenomenal property is supposed to grasp some common
features among different phenomenal properties like pain, sour, red, and etc. However, they do
not have any phenomenal similarity, but only functional similarity. The general term phenomenal
property can only refer to something functional rather than phenomenal. Thus, when we try to
produce a scientific theory to generally solve the hard problem, we try to reduce something non-
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existent into the physical world. As a general term, phenomenal property has no ontological
status. When we use the concept consciousness in this sense, it is a mistaken concept. However,
the hard problem for individual phenomenal properties is still a meaningful problem. We still do
not know how to reduce red to science of vision, but it needs different considerations, which are
not a concern of this paper.
Notes
1. Chalmers distinguishes the problem of consciousness or the problem of the mind into two
parts: easy problems and the hard problem. The easy problems are about mental functions and
the hard problem is about phenomenal properties (Chalmers 1995a).
2. For example, Searle believes that “consciousness is a causally emergent property of the
behavior of neurons, and so consciousness is causally reducible to the brain processes” (Searle
1992, 116). In addition, Nagel believes it is not irrational to hope that people will be able to
observe the operation of the brain and say, with true understanding, “That’s what the experience
of tasting chocolate looks like from the outside” (Nagel 1998, 337).
3. I say, phenomenal properties correspond to brain processes rather than phenomenal
properties are generated from brain processes because I do not want to presuppose that the
physical is more fundamental than the mental. We can temporarily put them in a parallel position
without presupposing which one is more fundamental than the other.
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Works Cited
Chalmers, David. 1995a. “Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness.” Journal of
Consciousness Studies 2 no. 3 (1995): 200-19.
Chalmers, David. 1995b. “The Puzzle of Conscious Experience.” Scientific American (December
1995): 62-68.
Chalmers, David. The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1996.
Edelman, Gerald and Giulio Tononi. A Universe of Consciousness: How Matter Becomes
Imagination. New York: Basic Books, 2000.
McGinn, Colin. 1989. “Can We Solve the Mind-Body Problem?” Mind 98 no. 891 (July 1989):
349-66.
Nagel, Thomas. The View from Nowhere. New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986.
Nagel, Thomas. 1998. “Conceiving the Impossible and the Mind-Body Problem.” Philosophy 73
no.285 (July 1998): 337-52.
Searle, John. The Rediscovery of the Mind. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1992.
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