No. 01-1447
In the
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
for the
SIXTH CIRCUIT
BARBARA GRUTTER,
Plaint Appellee,
V.
LEE BOLLJNGER, et. al.,
and
Defendants-Appellants,
KIMBERLY JAMES, et. al,
Intervening Defendants.
On appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Michigan
BRIEF OF THE OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY
AND THE OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF LAW
AS AMICI CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS
AND REVERSAL OF THE JUDGMENT BELOW
BETTY D.
MONTGOMERY
Attorney General of
Ohio
FRED
G.
(0023090)
PRESSLEY,
JR.
Porter, Wright, Morris & Arthur,
LPA
41 5. High St., Columbus, Ohio
43215
(614) 227-0611
Special Counsel to
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney
General of Ohio,
The
Ohio
State
University, and
The
Ohio
State
University College of
Law
Counsel for Amici Curiae
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
STATEMENT OF AMICI INTEREST
1
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
2
ARGUMENT
4
CONCLUSION
18
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
20
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
21
i
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASE
Regents of University of California v. Bakke,
438 U.S. 265 (1978)
2-4, 6-13, 18
Smith v. University of Washington, 233 F.3d 1188 (9th Cir., 2000), cert. denied, Smith v.
University of Washington Law School, US. S. Ct. 2001 US. Lexis 4011 (US. May 29,
2001)
5-9
Gratz v. Bollinger, 122 F. Supp.2d 811, 824 (E.D. Mich., 2000)
6-8
Marks v. United States, 430 US. 188 (1977)
8
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 US. 200 (1995)
8
City of Richmond v. L.A. Croson, 488 US. 469 (1989)
8
Hopwoodv. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir., 1996)
9-10
Wessmann v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790, 795-96 (1st Cir., 1998)
9
__
,
__
RULES
FRAP29(a)
FRAP 26.1
1
1
ii
ADDITIONAL AUTHORITIES
William G. Bowen & Derek Bok, The Shape of the River
(1998)
12, 13, 16
Lempert, et al., Michigan 's Minority Graduates in Practice:
The River Runs Through Law School, 25 LAw & SOCIAL
INQUIRY 463 (2000)
16, 17
Sandra Day O'Connor, Thurgood Marshall: The Influence
of a Raconteur, 44 STAN. L. REv. 1217 (1992)
1
iii
STATEMENT OF AMICI INTEREST1
The Ohio State University and its College of Law share with the University of
Michigan Law School the same interest in defending the constitutionality of
race-sensitive admissions policies as a necessary means of achieving meaningful
diversity in its law school classes.
Legal education throughout this nation would be much poorer if minority
individuals had not been given a chance to succeed. Justice O'Connor has
acknowledged being "profoundly influence[d]" by the stories that Justice Marshall
would tell his colleagues based on his "special perspective" as a result of his "life
experiences." Sandra Day O'Connor, Thurgood Marshall: The Influence of a
Raconteur, 44 STAN. L. REv. 1217 (1992) ("Occasionally, at Conference meetings, I
still catch myself looking expectantly for his raised brow and his twinkling eye,
hoping to hear, just once more, another story that would, by and by, perhaps change
the way I see the world.").
This same kind of enriching experience is what the College wishes to impart
to its students by assuring diversity within the student body itself.
1
Amici have secured the necessary consent under FRAP 29(a). In addition, because
amici are instrumentalities of the State of Ohio, the corporate disclosure statement
requirement of FRAP 26.1 and this Court's Rule 26.1 does not apply.
1
Students are enlightened by having peers who come to law school from a wide
variety of backgrounds, just as they and the faculty are enlightened by the diverse
backgrounds of faculty members.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Amici highlight two compelling justifications for the limited consideration of race,
as one factor among many, in the context of a law school's admissions process. First, race
is relevant to securing for all students the educational benefits of the Socratic method, to
elicit diverse opinions and experiences from students with a wide variety of backgrounds.
Second, while LSATs and undergraduate GPAs are a valid (albeit imperfect) predictor of
law school grades, they do not accurately predict a minority applicant's likely success
after graduation.
The sufficiency of the "diversity" justification is straightforward: it was the
justification that Justice Powell himself gave for endorsing the Harvard Plan in Regents of
University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). The "success" justification,
however, is no less compelling: it simply was not presented in Bakke itself and, therefore,
has never been considered by the Supreme Court. Justice Powell did note the argument
that race might be a necessary factor in admissions to "cur[e] established inaccuracies in
predicting academic performance," as a result of "some
2
cultural bias in grading or testing procedures." Bakke, 438 U.S. at 306 n.43. But the
argument here is not that the LSATs and undergraduate GPAs ~re '~culturally biasted]" in
the sense of inaccurately underestimating the "academic performance" in law school of
minorities, when compared as a group to whites. Rather, the argument is that LSATs and
GPAs do not predict the ability of minority law graduates, during the course of their
careers, to achieve success in the legal profession to the same extent as white graduates.
Thus, this second, "success" justification is not about remedying societal
discrimination. It is simply about identifying the law school applicants who are most
likely to turn out to be the most successful law school graduates. These include partners of
leading law firms, other prominent practitioners, judges, law professors, and lawyers who
serve in leadership positions in corporations, non-profit organizations, and government
agencies. As this brief describes, it is sometimes necessary to consider the racial
background of minority applicants to determine who is most likely to succeed in the
practice of law.
3
ARGUMENT
I.
The Fourteenth Amendment does not prevent universities from using
race as a factor in the admissions process.
The carefully limited use of race as one of many factors in a public
university's admissions policy in order to achieve a diverse student body is
—
--
permissible under the Fourteenth Amendment. The District Court's decision improperly
applies the Supreme Court's decision in Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S.
265, 311(1978) and should be reversed.
The seminal case on race-conscious admissions policies is Regents of the Univ. of
Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,311(1978). In Bakke, the Medical School at the
University of California at Davis used a race-based quota system for admissions. The
policy was a program of two distinct systems a regular admissions system for
—
non-minority applicants, and a special admissions system strictly for minorities. Id. at
273-75. The minority system waived certain minimum requirements for applicants.
The Bakke opinion was a plurality. The Court ultimately held that the
University's special admissions system violated Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.2 Id. at 269-72. But, the Court also found that universities
2 The
Court came to this conclusion through a majority formed by Justices Powell, Stevens, Burger, Stewart
and Rehnquist.
4
could validly consider race as part of the admissions process.3 Id. at 320. Justice
Powell's opinion was the pivotal vote in both holdings. As described below, his opinion
has subsequently been identified as the narrowest grounds supporting the holdings, and
thus, binding precedent.
The most recent pronouncement on race-conscious admissions programs is Smith v.
University of Washington, 233 F.3d 1188 (9th Cir., 2000), cert. denied, Smith v. University
of Washington Law School. U.S.
__
__
S. Ct. ,2001 U.S. Lexis 4011 (U.S. May 29, 2001). In $.rnfth the United States Court
__
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that race is a permissible factor in law school
admissions. Smith is relevantly identical to the present appeal.
In Smith the University of Washington Law School used race as one criterion
—
among many in its admissions process. The minority status of an applicant was seen as a
—
plus, "so that [the university] could assure the enrollment of a diverse student body."
Smith, 233 F.3d at 1191. The plaintiffs who were white claimed that the University's
—
--
race-conscious admissions policy violated 14th Amendment.4
' The
Court came to this conclusion through a majority formed by Justices Powell, Brennan, White,
Marshall, and Blackmun.
The law school later discontinued its race criterion in response to a state law that regulated admissions
'~
policies for state colleges. Smith, 233 F.3d at 1192. Nonetheless, the plaintiffs' claim sought damages for the
period during which the University actually used race in its admissions policy.
5
The Smith court held that universities may use race as a factor in admissions in
order to promote diversity in law school. Smith held as other courts have held that
—
—
seekingracial diversity in law school is a compelling state interest. Specifically, the Court
held:
[T]he Fourteenth Amendment permits University admissions programs which
consider race for other than remedial purposes, and educational diversity is a
compelling governmental interest that meets the demands of strict
scrutiny of race-conscious measures.
Smith, 233 F.3d at 1200-01 (emphasis added). See also, Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 311(1978) (Opinion of Powell, J.); Gratz v. Bollinger, 122 F.
Supp.2d 811, 824 (E.D. Mich., 2000) ("a racially and ethnically diverse student body
produces significant educational benefits such that diversity, in the context of higher
education, constitutes a compelling governmental interest under strict scrutiny"). 5 It is
significant to note that a few days prior to briefing, the Supreme Court declined to disturb
the Ninth Circuit's holding. Smith v. University of Washington Law School U.S.
__
__,__
S.
Ct.__ ,2001 U.S. Lexis 4011 (U.S. May 29, 2001).
~ It is worth noting that Gratz comes from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Michigan the same trial cowt that spawned the present appeal. Unlike the opinion on appeal, Gratz
explicitly held that the University of Michigan's undergraduate race-conscious admissions program the
undergraduate version of the admissions program at issue in this appeal furthers a compelling state
—
—
--
interest.
6
Smith went on to find that the University's admissions program was narrowly
tailored to achieve this compelling interest. Thus, it was constitutional. Id. at 1201
(holding that the University's admissions program was a "properly designed and operated
race-conscious admissions program at the law school of the University of
Washington[. and] would not be in violation of Title VI or the Fourteenth
Amendment"). $~ also Gratz, 122 F. Supp.2d at 831 ("the Court is satisfied that the
[University of Michigan's] current [undergraduate] admissions program, under which
certain minority applicants receive a 'plus' on account of their race but are not insulated
from all competition with other applicants, meets the requirements set forth by Justice
Powell in Bakke and is therefore constitutional").
In the present matter, Plaintiff-Appellee will try to escape the conclusions of Smith.
Plaintiff-Appellee will advance three arguments, none of which is sound. First,
Plaintiff-Appellee will argue that this Court should disregard Justice Powell's
opinion in Bakke. Plaintiff-Appellee will argue that the plurality nature of Bakke
negates Justice Powell's opinion. Smith rejected this precise argument after an exhaustive
analysis. Smith reasoned that Supreme Court jurisprudence clearly addresses the value
given to a plurality opinion. Namely, courts must adopt the most narrow position that
7
still supports the outcome of the case. Smith, 233 F.3d at 1200 (citing Marks v.
United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977)). In ~ that "narrowest footing" is Justice Powell's
opinion, which holds that racial diversity in admissions is a compelling state interest.
Smith, 233 F.3d at 1200.
Second, Plaintiff-Appellee will argue that Supreme Court cases after Bakke
prohibit all race-conscious policies. Plaintiff-Appellee may cite to cases such as Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995), and City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson,
488 U.S. 469 (1989). But, this line of cases dealt with minority set-aside programs in
government construction contracts. Thus, they are vastly different from the present case,
which deals with admissions in higher education. See Smith, 233 F.3d at 1200 (rejecting
the argument that Adarand and J.A. Croson prohibit race-conscious admissions policies);
see also, Gratz, 122 F. Supp.2d at 821 (noting that set-aside cases do not apply to the
question of race-conscious admissions programs because "academic freedom~~
—
including "the selection of [a university's] student body" is vastly different from issues
—
contained in minority set-aside cases) (citing Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312 (Opinion of Powell,
J.)). Thus, later Supreme Court cases do not dilute the holding of Justice Powell's opinion
in Bakke.
8
Third, Plaintiff-Appellee will argue that other federal courts have found no
compelling state interest in law school diversity. Plaintiff-Appellee will cite to Hopwood
v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir., 1996) (holding that fostering student body diversity was not
a compelling state interest). This Court should decline to follow ~ for two reasons. First,
the Ninth Circuit explicitly held that Hopwood is fundamentally "flaw[ed]." Smith, 233
F.3d at 1201. After a thorough analysis of Supreme Court precedent, Smith confirmed that
Hopwood "failed to properly apply the teachings" of Supreme Court jurisprudence. Id.
See also Wessmann v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790, 795-96 (1st Cir., 1998) (noting in dicta that
"[i]n the education context, Hopwood is the only appellate court to have rejected
diversity as a compelling interest, and it did so only in the face of vigorous dissent
from a substantial minority of the active judges in the Fifth Circuit"). Second, the Fifth
Carca~t, itseLf recently revisited Hopwood. In Hopwood v. Texas, 236 F.3d 256
(5~ Cit., 2000),6 the Fifth Circuit admitted that since its 1996 decision, courts have
validly held that racial diversity in law schools was a compelling state interest. Id. at
275, n. 69. Thus, other courts of appeals support the holding that racial diversity is a
compelling state interest.
6 This
case is related to the Hopwood case from 1996. It addresses an appeal from factual issues that were
decided on remand from the 1996 case.
9
II.
Both legal precedent and social evidence established that racial
diversity is critical to elicit experiences from students with various
backgrounds.
An undergraduate college especially will consider a wide variety of factors,
including musical and artistic talent, athletic ability, unusual life
experiences, along with various predictors of academic success and
leadership potential. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317 (Powell, J.). When all of these factors are in
play, applicants will be considered not in isolation of each
other but, instead, according to how they would fit together as the overall
composition of the student body so as to "more likely promote beneficial
educational pluralism." Id. As Justice Powell himself recognized, "this kind of
program treats each applicant as an individual in the admissions process." Id. at 318.
Justice Powell further elaborated on this crucial point:
The applicant who loses out on the last available seat to another candidate receiving
a "plus" on the basis of ethnic background will not have been foreclosed from all
consideration for that seat simply because he was not the right color or had the
wrong surname. It would mean only that his combined qualifications, which
may have included similar nonobjective factors, did not outweigh those of the
other applicant. His qualifications would have been weighed fairly and
competitively, and he would have no basis to complain of unequal treatment under
the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. Thus, Justice Powell fully understood that this kind of admissions program
is constitutional because it does not deny the equal intrinsic worth of any individual
applicant.
10
When a college makes the judgment that a black student would
add diversity, there is no assumption that this student will believe a
certain set of

political or moral ideas just because the student is black. Rather, the
point is

that growing up black can be, for a variety of cultural reasons, a very

different experience than growing up white. Thus, students would benefit
from learning from each other first-hand about these different experiences.
"Integrated education dramatically benefits students of all races, including
white students, by providing a space for people of all races to grow
together." Akhil Reed Amar & Neal Kumar Katyal, Bakke's Fate, 43
UCLA L. Rev. 1745, 1775 (1996).
Justice Powell's understanding of the appropriate use of race in
college admissions was premised on his knowledge of the admissions
policies that Harvard used at the time. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 316. Leading
educators continue to articulate the appropriate consideration of race in
admissions using terms that are substantively equivalent to those used
by Harvard and Justice Powell two decades ago. Indeed, Harvard's
former President, Derek Bok, has joined forces with a former
president of Princeton University, Williams Bowen, to explain the
compelling justifications for Bakke-permissive admissions policies. See
William G. Bowen and Derek Bok, The Shape of the River~ Long-Term
Consequences of Considering
11
Race In College and University Admissions (1998) (hereinafter Bowen & Bok).
In describing the function of the admissions process, these authors point out
that the goal is not simply to identify in rank order those applicants who are
academically most qualified. Instead, "(w]hat admissions officers must decide is
which set of applicants will take the fullest advantage of what the college has to offer,
...
contribute most to the educational process in college, and be most successful in using
what they have learned for the benefit of the larger society." Id. at 277. The authors
further explain the crucial point in words that echo Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke:
It may be perfectly "fair" to reject an-applicant because the college has already
enrolled many other students very much like him or her. There are numerous
analogies. When making a stew, adding an extra carrot rather than one more potato
may make excellent sense and be eminently "fair" if there are already lots of
potatoes in the pot. Similarly, good basketball teams include both excellent shooters
and sturdy defenders, both point guards and centers. Diversified investment
portfolios usually include some mix of stocks and bonds, and so on.
--
--
Bowen & Bok at 278~
The same basic point applies to college admissions. When universities adopt
Bakke-type admissions policies, as described both by Justice Powell and by Bowen
& Bok, the admission process honors and affirms the equal intrinsic worth of each
applicant; all applicants are being judged for
12
purposes of admissions, not according to their intrinsic worth as human beings, but
whether their inclusion in the student body will serve the educational goals of the
university and, ultimately, the well-being of society as a whole. Accordingly, the
limited use of race as one factor among many in an effort to achieve diversity does
not contradict the intrinsic equality of all persons, regardless of race, and thus does not
violate the Equal Protection Clause.
III.
Race is a permissible factor in law school admissions in order to identify
applicants most likely to succeed in the practice of law.
A. Law schools should be able to supplement numerical measures by
considering a variety of other facts about each applicant.
A law school's admissions process is designed to identify the applicants who will
accomplish several objectives: (1) contribute most to the learning environment in the
school's classrooms; (2) benefit most from the education provided by the school;
and (3) best serve the profession of law as educated attorneys. This last criterion is
especially relevant here, since ultimately it matters to society how good a lawyer an
individual turns out to be, not how good a student the individual was in three years
of law school. And while academic success as a law student has some correlation
with eventual success in the practice of law, it is by no means the only relevant
13
factor. Likewise, admission to law school is most certainly not a reward, or
entitlement, for doing well while in college.
There are several reasons why academic performance is not determinative of
future success as a lawyer. First of all, some lawyers over time acquire the skills that
they were unable to exhibit (to the same extent) in their law school exams. Just as we all
know that "the learning curve" differs for different students within the three years of law
school, so too with lawyers after they graduate. In other words, there are attorneys who in
their fourth or fifth year of practice begin to reach, or exceed, the same level of
brief-writing skill that other attorneys were able to attain shortly after leaving law school.
This point is true for white as well as minority attorneys, but (as discussed below) there is
evidence showing that law school grades are particularly problematic in predicting the
future success of minority attorneys.
Moreover, a successful career as an attorney depends not only on the kind of
analytic thinking that law school exams are primarily designed to measure. Especially as
an attorney progresses in a career over time, other attributes maturity, judgment,
—
discretion, and management-type skills (like the ability to supervise junior attorneys or
support staff, and to work well with clients or colleagues) become increasingly
—
important. Although a
14
lawyer's analytic ability is never unimportant, it also never is the sole measure of a
lawyer's ultimate success in the profession.
Consequently, when admitting students to a law school, the school is (or should
be) concerned not merely how these students are likely to perform in their law
school exams, but also how these students are likely to perform as lawyers in the
course of their careers, which often span 40 or 50 years. Although eventual success in
practice is difficult to predict, it is possible for law schools to identify indicia of an
applicant's leadership potential, as well as other evidence that the applicant's grades
during law school are unlikely to capture the full measure of the applicant's potential
as an attorney. It is for precisely this reason that many law schools, like Michigan,
insist upon basing their admission decisions on the whole file of each applicant, rather
than on only the applicant's LSAT score(s) and undergraduate GPA.
The key point then is that, while a law school's use of LSATs and GPAs is valid, it
is also appropriate that a law school supplement its use of these numerical measures
by considering a variety of other facts about each applicant. No law school should be
deprived of the ability to admit these applicants, in its effort to identify those most likely
to succeed in the practice of law, just because one factor (among many) relevant to
predicting the future success of these applicants is their racial background.
15
B.
The Lempert Study confirms that minority Michigan graduates are
successful attorneys to the same extent as white Michigan
graduates.
It is the collective wisdom of American law schools that their minority graduates,
as a group, are equally accomplished in the long run as their white graduates, as a group.
As Bowen and Bok observe in their monumental study of affirmative action,
since starting to admit larger numbers of black students in the late 1960s, the
Harvard Law School has numbered among its black graduates more than one
hundred partners in law firms, more than ninety black alumni/ae with the title of
Chief Executive Officer, Vice President, or General Counsel of a corporation,
more than seventy professors, at least thirty judges, two members of Congress, the
mayor of a major American city, the head of the Office of Management and
Budget, and an Assistant U.S. Attorney General.
William G. Bowen & Derek Bok, The Shape of the River 284 (1998). At trial in this case,
the intervenors introduced into evidence a
systematic study of the minority graduates of the University of Michigan Law School.
This study concludes that "minority graduates do every bit as well as white graduates
when it comes both to their incomes and to their satisfaction with their careers," and
even somewhat better in terms of service to the profession. 14 Tr. 50. The study
shows that, "[r]egardless of minority status, graduates of the 1970s working in law
firms are almost all partners, and those working as lawyers for non-firm organizations
are likely to have supervisory responsibilities." Lempert Study at 443. Moreover, with
respect
16
to graduates from the 1 990s, minority lawyers are making partner and attaining
supervisory status in non-firm settings at rates that are significantly higher than their white
counterparts. Id. at 430.
The biggest difference between minority and white graduates from Michigan is
that minorities are more likely to serve in government. This phenomenon results from the
fact that "a higher proportion of minority alumni have been elected or appointed to
judgeships, political office, or high-level administrative positions." Id. at 443. "A
remarkable 13% of all minority graduates of the 1970s serve as judges, political officials,
or government agency managers (in comparison to 4% of white alumni); and 5% of the
minority graduates of the 1980s serve in such positions (compared to no white
alumni)." Id. at 428.
Thus, with good reason, the study summarizes its core findings this way:
By any of our study's measures Michigan's minority alumni are, as a group,
highly successful in their careers. Although, as a
 group, they entered Michigan with lower LSAT scores and lower GPAs than other
students, in their jobs immediately after law school and in their jobs today,
Michigan's minority alumni are professionals fully in the mainstream of the
American economy. They are well represented in all sectors of the legal profession.
They are successful financially, leaders in their communities and generous donors
of their time to pro bono work and nonprofit organizations.
17
Id. at 401. Moreover, despite "on average, lower grades in law school
than their white counterparts," Michigan's minority alumni are "fully as
successful as Michigan's white alumni when success is measured by
—
self-reported career satisfaction or contributions to the community." Id. at
496. "Controlling for gender and career length, they are also as successful
when success is measured by income." Id. at 496-97.
This Court should not issue a decision in this case that would
jeopardize the ability of Ohio State, or other law schools within this circuit,
to admit minority students capable of leadership and professional
achievement. Instead, this Court should uphold the authority of law schools
like Michigan and Ohio State to consider an applicant's race as one factor
among many in precisely the way described in the Harvard Plan and as
specifically contemplated by the Supreme Court's reversal in Bakke.
IV.
CONCLUSION
In summary, the Fourteenth Amendment allows universities to
use race as a factor in the admissions process. Recent federal appellate
cases have held precisely that. In fact, both legal precedent and social
evidence establishes that racial diversity is critical to elicit experiences
from students with various backgrounds. Moreover, race must be a
permissible factor in law school admissions in order to identify
applicants most likely to succeed
18
'a
in the practice of law. Toward that end, this Court should REVERSE the decision of the
District Court.
Respectfully submitted, BETTY D. MONTGOMERY
Attorn
neral of Ohio
FRED G. PRESSLEY, JR. (0 3 90)
Porter, Wright, Morris & Art ur, LPA
41 South High Street
Columbus, Ohio 43215
(614) 227-2000
Special Counsel to
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General of
Ohio,
The Ohio State University, and
The Ohio State University
College of Law
Counsel for Amici Curiae
May 31, 2001
19
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
I hereby certify that the foregoing brief complies with FRAP 32(a)(7)(B) by
containing 4,120 words.
6
Fred G. Pressley, Jr.
20
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that two copies of the foregoing brief, entitled "Brief of the
Ohio State University and the Ohio State University College of Law as Amici Curiae
in Support of Defendants-Appellants and Reversal of the Judgment Below," were
served by First Class Mail, postage prepaid, on May 31, 2001, upon the Clerk and the
following:
David
H.
Herr, Esq.
Esq.
Kirk
0.
Kolbo,
Maslon, Edelman,
Borman & Brand
300 Norwest Center
90 South Seventh Street
Kobiljak
Suite 230, Superior Place
20300 Superior Street
Taylor, Ml 48180
Minneapolis, MN 55402
Michael E. Rosman, Esq.
Hans F. Bader, Esq.
Center for Individual
Rights
th
1233
20 Street,D.C.
N.W.20036
Washington,
Philip J. Kessler, Esq.
Leonard M. Niehoff, Esq.
Butzel Long
350 South Main Street
Suite 300
Ann Arbor, MI 48104
George B. Washington,
Esq.
Eileen R. Scheff, Esq.
Miranda K. Massie, Esq.
One Kennedy Square
Suite 2137
Detroit, MI 48226
John H. Pickering, Esq.
John Payton, Esq.
Stuart F. Delery, Esq.
Craig Goldblatt, Esq.
Brigida Benitez, Esq.
Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering
2445 M Street, N.W.
Washi ,D.C. 20037
Fred G. Pressley, Jr.
COWMBUS/892 180 v.03
Kerry L. Morgan, Esq.
Pentuik, Couvrer &
21