task08bc - Boatswainsmate.net

advertisement
Task 08-01: Authority and Jurisdiction, Use of Force
1.
Complete the following Boarding Team Member tasks:
A. 1-03 (Authority and Jurisdiction):
1. Demonstrate the ability to explain to the boating public your authority for conducting
a boarding.
 Our job is to enforce applicable maritime laws (MLE): armed intervention by
any uniformed Coast Guard personnel and we can make inquiries, seizures of
property, searches, arrests, examinations, and inspections over seas and waters
where we have jurisdiction.
 Customs: carry a firearm, make an arrest without a warrant, execute and serve
any order, warrant, subpoena, or summons issued under the US, and conduct
border searches.
 Protection and security of Vessels, Harbors, and Waterfront Facilities, including
LE Ashore
 Assistance: either issued or requested. The Coast Guard can also offer services
to help other agencies.
 Coast Guard Investigative Services (CGIS) Special Agents
2. Explain the scope of your responsibilities and the jurisdictional limitations related to
the various types of boardings conducted at your unit.
 Substantive Law: a domestic, foreign, or international law enforced
 Vessel status/flag: any government vessel, aircraft, vehicle, etc that has
sovereign immunity and are not allowed to be boarded, seized, or arrested under
any circumstances.
 Location: determined by the character of the waters where an area is covered.
B. 1-04 (Use of Force Continuum):
1. Describe in your own words the Coast Guard’s use of force policy:
 Under foreign boardings, the coast guard may not use foreign force policies.
 Force is only reasonably necessary and may be used; but excessive force is
forbidden.
 Force cannot be used where assigned duties can be discharged without it.
 Although it should be used as a last option and is rarely used, retreat is
considered when the LE situation poses a tremendous risk for the personnel
involved.
 We are allowed to use self-defense, non-deadly force, and deadly force.
2.
Explain the six levels of the use of force continuum.
1. Officer presence: appearance, demeanor, and verbal/non-verbal communication,
drawing a PDW is considered a level 1 use of force.
2. Verbal commands: form of task directions with consequences aimed at the
subject.
3. Control techniques: causes a low probability of causing connective tissue
damage, lacerations to the skin, or broken bones.
4. Aggressive response techniques: causes a high probability of causing connective
tissue damage, lacerations to the skin, broken bones, and irritation to skin, eyes,
or mucus membranes by use of kicks, stuns, punches, chemical irritants, and/or
take-downs.
5. Intermediate weapons: high probability of causing connective tissue damage,
lacerations to the skin or broken bones by using: 12-guage sting-ball munitions,
12-guage rubber-fin stabilized munitions, or expandable baton.
6. Deadly Force: likely to cause death or serious physical injury by using PDW, M16, M.60 or .50 caliber machine guns, shotgun rifles).
2.
3.
Explain when it is appropriate to draw a weapon:
 Only when deadly force is authorized
 Or there is a reasonable possibility that deadly force may have to be used.
4.
Explain and define the elements that must exist prior to the use of deadly force.
 If there is probable cause that the suspect has committed a felony involving the
use or threatened use of deadly force
 The suspect is armed or poses and imminent threat of death or serious physical
injury to another person
 The suspect has failed to obey an order or halt.
5.
Explain the Coast Guard’s policy concerning the use of warning shots by a member
of a boarding team: they are only authorized as a warning signal to a vessel to stop
and are prohibited in the context in the Use of Force Continuum, including crowd
control.
Complete the following Boarding Officer Tasks:
A. 2-01 (Authority and Jurisdiction):
1. Explain or define the following:
 Authority: the government’s legal power to act.
 14 U.S.C. 89: the Coast Guard can make inquiries, searches, seizures,
examinations, inspections, and arrests upon the seas/areas that the
Coast Guard has jurisdiction over for the protection, detection,
and suppression of the violation of laws. Boarding team members
have the authority to board vessels and inspect any
documentation, any part of the vessel, and are allowed to make
arrests and issue violation/warning tickets.
 Jurisdiction as it applies to:
a. location: jurisdiction over persons, vessels, or aircrafts are determined
by the character of waters in or over which they are located.
b. person/vessel: warships, military aircraft, and other government aircraft
or vessels have immunity; they can only be asked to leave the area.
Persons on board may not be boarded, searched, seized, or arrested
under any circumstances.
c. offense: what the violation is.
2. Define and explain the jurisdictional limitations for those maritime areas applicable
to your unit: smtj special maritime territorial juristdiction
 High seas: begin at the sea-ward edge of the territorial sea; as long as the costal
state has not proclaimed an EEZ (Exclusive Economic Zone).
 Internal Waters: The waters shoreward of the baseline, including all waters on
the U.S. international boundary of the Great Lakes. Limitations: force majeure,
and peace of the port doctrine
 Exclusive State Waters: the zone of waters beyond and adjacent to the territorial
sea and not extending 200 NM from the baseline.
 Unenclosed portions of the Great Lakes:
 Navigable and Territorial Waters of the U.S.: For the purpose of the Federal
Water Pollution Act, waters shoreward of 3 NM from the baseline, including
internal waters and all other waters subject to federal Constitutional authority.
For all other purposes waters shoreward of 12 NM
 Territorial Sea: force majeure, transit passage, peace of the port doctrine,
innocent passage, and assistance entry.
 Exclusive Economic Zone: from baseline to 200 NM out
 Customs Waters: from baseline to 12 NM
 Land or Water not within or between any of the 50 states: internal waters


Contiguous Zone: 12 or 24 NM
Foreign Territorial Waters: baseline to 12 NM
Task 08-02: Maritime Homeland Security (MHS) Missions:
1.
State the primary mission areas within the MHS:
 PWCS
 Drugs/migrants
 Defense readiness
 Other LE activities
Task 08-03: Maritime Homeland Security (MHS) Definitions:
Define the following terms:









Captain of the Port (COPT): within their jurisdiction, enforce port safety, security, and marine
environmental protection regulations, including, without limitation, regulations for the protection
and security of vessels, harbors, and waterfront facilities, anchorages, warning zones, security
zones, regulated navigation areas, deep water ports, water pollution, and ports and waterways
safety.
Disabling Fire: the firing of ordinance at a vessel with the intent to disable, with minimum injury
to the personnel or damage to the vessel. It does not constitute the use of deadly force, and is used
only to stop a vessel.
Escort: a protective screen of naval or law enforcement vessels and aircraft used to protect a high
valued asset(s) from enemy attack.
Field of Fire: the area in which a weapon or a group of weapons may cover effectively with fire
from a given position.
High Value Asset (HVA): any landside or waterside asset that is of high value. May include
military and commercial vessels, waterfront or military facilities, submarines or commercial
vessels carrying CDC.
Intercept Zone (IZ): the outermost area of a security zone (SZ). Normally extends from the outer
edge of the RZ away from the HVA an additional 1000 yards.
Landslide Security: measures or actions taken that prevent or guard against theft, sabotage,
terrorism, and other Federal offenses, and/or belligerent acts on a waterfront facility and the
property around it.
Limited Access Area (LAA): areas defined in the port, facility, terminal area, or activity
boundaries and used to restrict or control movement of vessels, vehicles, persons, or objects within
these areas. The establishment of any LAA requires public rulemaking and publication in the
Federal Register.
Maritime Homeland Security (MHS): A federal law enforcement mission carried out by
domestic law enforcement authorities, including the Coast Guard, and conducted in accordance
with settled law enforcement procedures, the Maritime Law Enforcement Manual (MLEM), and
other applicable law enforcement policies. Department of Defense (DoD) personnel may assist
non-DoD law enforcement authorities with MHS law enforcement missions in accordance with
Federal Law and applicable DoD and Coast Guard regulations and policies. MHS does not include
the physical security of Coast Guard units and property, which shall be conducted in accordance
with the Physical Security and Force Protection Program.















Maritime Security (MARSEC): is concerned with the prevention of intentional damage through
sabotage, subversion, or terrorism. 3 activities that are conducted by the Coast Guard are: port,
vessel, and facility security.
Non compliant Vessel: a vessel subject to examination that refuses to heave to after being legally
ordered to do so.
Operational Control (OPCON): transferable command authority that may be exercised by
commanders at any echelon at or below the level of Area Commander. Is inherent in area
command (command authority). May be delegated and is the authority to perform those functions
of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces,
assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving necessary authoritative direction necessary to
accomplish the mission.
Operational Security (OPSEC): the process of denying adversaries information about friendly
capabilities and intentions by identifying, controlling, and protecting indicators associated with
planning and conducting military operations and other activities.
Port Waterways and Coastal Security (PWCS): protection of the U.S. Maritime Domain and
the U.S. Marine Transportation System from internal and external threats, such as destruction or
loss or injury from terrorism, sabotage or other subversive acts.
Reaction Zone (RZ): area within a SZ immediately adjacent to the HVA; normally extends 1000
yards from the HVA.
Response Boat (RB): refers to the 47’, 41’, 33’, and 25’. They are smaller, quicker, and more
maneuverable.
Screen Boat (SB): a boat interposed between the HVA and the threat.
Security Zone (SZ): designated areas of land, water, or land and water established for such time
as the COPT deems necessary to prevent damage or injury to any vessel or waterfront facility; to
safeguard ports, harbors, territories, or waters of the US; or to secure the observance of the rights
and obligations of the US.
Self Defense (Individual and Unit):
A. Individual:
B. Unit: a commander has the inherent authority and obligation to use all necessary
means available and to take all appropriate action to defend that
commander’s unit and other US forces within the vicinity from a hostile
act to a hostile intent and to ensure the continued safety of US forces or
other persons and property they are ordered to protect. US forces may
employ such force in self-defense only so long as the hostile force
continues to present an imminent threat.
Tactical Control (TACON): command authority over assigned or attached forces or commands,
made available for tasking, that is limited to the detailed and, usually, local direction and control
of movements or maneuvers necessary to accomplish missions of tasks assigned. TACON is
inherent in OPCON. TACON may be delegated to, and exercised at any level at or below the area
commander.
Tactical Reaction Boat (TRB): charged with backing up the SB when it is
intercepting/investigating a TOI entering the SZ.
Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP): follow a gradual escalation in intensity, from nonharmful means up to and including the possible use of disabling fire. They have potential for
causing extreme harm, injury, serious damage, or death but TTP is not intended to be applied as
deadly force.
Target of Interest (TOI): any contact (vessel or aircraft) that poses a possible threat to a law
enforcement unit or protected asset.
Vessel Posing and Imminent Threat (VPIT): any vessel whose actions pose an imminent threat
of death or serious physical injury to any person.
Task 08-04: Threats to Response Boat (RB) Crews:
1.
State the types of threats a boat crew may encounter and the potential consequences of each.
A. Small boat (either single or multiple) assault with small arms:
CONSEQUENCE: may do little damage to steel hull ship, port facility, or shore-side
command post and may be easily countered employing the tactics discussed in the manual.
B. Explosive-laden small boat (either single or multiple):
CONSEQUENCE: could prove a valid and viable threat to a ship or port facility. An
explosive-laden small boat, especially not displaying an outward threat to life or property, will
probably be the most difficult threat to identify and counter.
C. Small boat (either single or multiple) assault with rocket propelled ordinance:
CONSEQUENCE: is the greatest type of threat with a rocket propelled ordinance or a “hit
and run” assault. This threat should be identifiable since it will take time for the aggressor to
sight in a rocket-propelled grenade, and the action of sighting in will be quite obvious to the
security forces.
D. Placement of IEDs (Improvised Explosive Devices) by either surface swimmers or
subsurface by divers:
CONSEQUENCE:
E. Suicide bomber on ferries, casino boats, passenger vessels, or waterfront areas with a
large number of people:
CONSEQUENCE: a suicide bomber could cause injury and/or death to activities where there
is a large number of people and may be used to divert the attention of the boat crew from their
mission.
2.
State procedures for a Weapons of Mass Destruction or hazardous material release including
appropriate PPE and decontamination.









Respiratory protection is vital
Don an EEBD or respirator. If both are available, and it is estimated EGRESS can take
less than 10 minutes, the EEBD is the better choice. While the respirator can be used for
a longer period of time, only the EEBD can be used in an O2 deficient atmosphere.
If breathing protection is not available, immediately seek an outdoor area, on the upwind
wide of the vessel (and uphill if ashore) of the source of the release.
Only use the Tyvek/Tychem suits if immediate egress is not possible and personnel is
forced to shelter in place, or if Egress includes crossing an area of contamination (from
an area which is not contaminated, but may soon be)
If sheltering in place, close windows/doors and secure boat/vehicle/building ventilation.
Egress cross wind to exit the contamination and stay upwind/uphill.
If PPE is not available, anything which covers the skin (skin, foul weather gear) and
nose/mouth (wet cloth/rags) will help.
Prompt decontamination is vital.
Once at the pre-designated decontamination area, personnel will conduct emergency
decontamination and promptly seek medical attention (designated TRIAGE or hospital).
Task 08-05: Tactical Control
1.
Explain the mission of TACON and the relationship between TACON and the RB coxswain:
TACON is responsible for the oversight of assigned assets as well as providing guidance as
needed. TACON will normally operate from a location remote to the actual operational area.
There should be good communication between the TACON and the RB coxswain in effort to
maintain situational awareness and provide continual updates to the actual situation. RB
coxswains receive orders from TACON when involved in a SAR case.
Task 08-06: Operation Pre-Brief and De-brief
1.
State the reasons for and importance of the Operational Pre-Brief:
It is designed to present the mission’s plans to security forces. This also includes meeting with
other applicable parties in effort to understand how the security operation will take place. All
questions and problems should be sorted out in this briefing and everyone should know what is
expected of them. Also, all personnel should be briefed on UOF rules.
2.
State the type of information that should be contained within the Operational Pre-Brief.



























3.
Mission objectives
Summary of current actions
Communications (frequencies, secure/non-secure, call signs, code words)
Current intelligence on possible threats
MARSEC level
HSAS (Homeland Security Advisory System) condition
Planned routes
Security zones (SZ)
Fields of fire
Assets (afloat, ashore, airborne)
Anticipated transit scene
Specific duties and responsibilities
Timetable of events
Specific guidance concerning use of force (UOF) and rules of engagement (ROE)
Arming requirements
Weapons mounting instructions
Administrations and logistics support
Operational safety
Emergency situations
Risk management
Watch schedules
Land units/support
Pier sweep and security
Anticipated weather conditions
Required personnel protective equipment (PPE)
SAR responsibilities/coverage
Weapons of mass destruction (WMD) considerations (possible threats,
evacuations/shelter in place, and decontamination procedures)
State the reasons for and importance of the Operational De-Brief.
It is a valuable tool for improving the efficiency and effectiveness of performance. During the
planning phase of an operation, it is suggested that time should be allocated for de-briefs to take
place. A “mission complete” de-brief with all participants should be conducted at the bare
minimum. It is essential that boat crews hold less formal de-briefings as part of the watch-relief
process.
4.
State the type of information that should be contained within the Operational De-Brief.



Discuss the operation, status of current operations, and whether mission objectives are being
met.
Recap any problems that may have occurred and report any workarounds, or solutions as
required.
Discuss ways to improve future missions.
Task 08-07: Loss of Communications Procedures
1.
State the five (5) steps for Loss of Communication:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Try contacting any/all units.
Try secondary and tertiary (if available) frequencies, including VHF, HF, and UHF in
accordance with the communications plans.
Use alternate pre-planned forms of communications.
Use loudhailer or siren to contact other units.
Used colored smoke, flares, or signal flags that were designated in the communications
plan to signal lost communications.
Task 08-08: Vessel on Vessel Use of Force
1.
State the two principles when force may be applied from CG vessels conducting LAA
enforcement operations.
A. Force may be applied to compel compliance with a lawful order to stop.
B. Force may be applied as self-defense (either individual or unit)
2.
Discuss key considerations when enforcing LAAs in congested ports and waterways.



3.
The SB will apply escalating force in the form of TTP’s, such as hailing, herding,
shouldering, non-lethals, and firing upon, in response to actions of the TOI, if the time
permits and the tactic is available and suitable.
The SB will attempt to keep the TOI from approaching the HVA using the TTPs
identified in the manual.
If the SB determines immediately that the vessel poses an imminent threat based on the
presence of shouldered weapons, gunfire, etc., then deadly force would be appropriate if
necessary to defend life and unit.
State the four steps and tactics involved in stopping a Non-Compliant Vessel (NCV) and a Vessel
Posing Imminent Threat (VPIT).
1.
Command Presence: communicating to the vessel an order to stop using all
available means (radio communications, loudhailer, blue light, flag hoist, search
lights, message block, and ship’s whistle/siren), maneuvering close aboard the non-
2.
3.
4.
4.
compliant vessel and remaining clearly visible at all times, increasing the number of
LE units on scene, visibly uncovering, readying, and manning weapons (but not
pointing weapons at the vessel).
Low Level Tactics: block the wind from a non-compliant sailing vessel, use lines,
nets, or entanglers, sever fuel lines, deliver fire-fighting water to blow out the sails or
flood the engine, physically blocking, perform shouldering maneuver.
Higher Level Tactics: 12 gauge munitions are authorized as a non-lethal weapon to
be used from cutters to small boats against the operator of the vessel. Requires a CG
flag SNO. This tactic should also consider the consequence that the operator can lost
control of the vessel and cause further complications, so extreme consideration must
be used when deciding to engage in these higher level tactics.
Disabling Fire: warning shots may be employed however, it increases risk for
danger for other surrounding vessels within the area, and it may require a SNO flag.
They should be used in go-fast vessels, and only if the on-scene assets have the
capability to deliver disabling fire if the warning shots are ignored; go-fast vessels do
not need on-scene assets to have the capability of disabling fire in order to perform
warning shots. Warning shots using pistols is prohibited. For the most part, disabling
fire is the preferred method and warning shots are not necessary. Weapons
appropriate for disabling fire include: service rifles, precision rifles, Remington
M870 with 12 gauge copper sabot slugs, mounted automatic weapons (MAW), and
deck guns.
State the difference in use of force policies/procedures between stopping a Non-Compliant Vessel
(NCV) and a Vessel Posing Imminent Threat (VPIT).





On-scene units make real-time determinations of whether a TOI is compliant, non-compliant,
or poses an imminent threat of death or serious physical injury. So basically, a distinguished
decision is made to determine if the vessel is non-compliant or a VPIT.
Units are not required to go through the steps in the non-compliant vessel framework before
applying force in self-defense. However, you have to go through the steps with VPIT.
If the actions of the vessel pose an imminent threat of death or serious physical injury to law
enforcement personnel or others (individual self-defense), the CGUOFP (use of force
principle) applies.
If the vessel threatens a CG LE platform or other US forces in the vicinity (unit self-defense),
the general unit self-defense principles of the standing rules of engagement (SROE) apply.
Whether applying force in a self-defense situation in accordance with the CGUOFP or the
SROE, both sets of rules are based on similar principles for applying force in self-defense,
and therefore, the same results are obtained.
Task 08-09: Limited Access Areas (LAA)
1.
List the five types of LAAs typically used during MHS operations.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Security zones (SZ)
Naval Protection Vessel Zones (NPVZ)
Restricted Waterfront areas
Regulated navigation areas
Safety zones
Task 08-10: Security Zones (SZ)
1.
State why the CG routinely establishes Security Zones.
To protect assets, from loss, destruction, or injury from sabotage, or other subversive acts,
accidents, or other causes of a similar nature.
2.
State why a SZ is an effective tool for controlling movements and limiting access to sensitive
areas.
Because if provides surface units with a legally enforceable perimeter. It is easily established and
contains the “force of criminal law” in CG jurisdictional areas.
3.
State who may establish a SZ.
Only by the COPT, District Commander, Area Commander, or Commandant.
4.
State and describe the five tactical areas of a security zone.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
5.
Boundary: outward edge of the SZ and the point at which no person or vessel may cross
without permission.
Intercept Zone: contained completely within the SZ, where vessels and persons violating
the SZ should be interdicted.
Reaction Zone: contained completely within the SZ, where vessels that pose an
imminent threat of death or serious physical injury are not allowed to
enter.
Sector: portion of the SZ defined by boundary lines that converge at the asset. Each
boundary line is watched over by a response boat.
Patrol Area: portion of the SZ and the surrounding area in which a unit conducts
enforcement operations
State the difference between the Naval Vessel Protection Zone (NVPZ) and a security zone.
It is a 500 yard regulated area of water surrounding US naval vessels that is necessary to provide
for the safety and security of these US naval vessels. All vessels within this zone should maintain
a slow speed to effort to maintain a safe course. No vessel is allowed within 100 yards of the
actual naval vessel being protected. A security zone includes land and facilities while the NVPZ
only includes the naval vessel and the 500 yards of water around it.
6.
State who may authorize movement within the NVPZ.
The Coast Guard, the senior naval officer present in command, or the official patrol.
7.
State the reasons why you conduct waterway, bridge, and pier inspections.
In effort to safely escort a HVA, you need to make sure that not only is the path clear and safe for
them to travel but that other things such as bridges and piers are clear and safe as well. It is very
easy to dispose or plant something into the HVA’s path by dropping it off a bridge or pier.
Furthermore, divers can jump off these objects with possible threats attached to them.
8.
State procedures for conducting a Route Inspection prior to the escort of an HVA.
The planned transit route should be cleared of all suspicious vessels; security forces should
actively patrol the route prior to and actually during the HVA transit. Also, coordination with
harbor masters is essential in maintaining communication and safety.
Task 08-11: Escorting a Moving High Value Asset (HVA)
1.
State positioning and responsibilities of RBs in a:
A. Four-Boat Escort: This is the optimum defensive posture for HVA escort. The SZ will
be divided into 4 sectors (2 off the bow and 2 off the stern) with one boat in each sector.
If a TOI enters the area, then the SB in that sector will intercept with another boat that
may act as a TRB from another sector. If the vessel is a VPIT, then the SB will get out of
the way and let the TRB intercept for the field of fire.
B. Three Boat Escort: Three sectors will be divided where there is two boats, one on either
side of the bow, and the third boat will trail behind the HVA. There should be no boats
directly in front of the HVAs bow because the vessel probably wont be able to see them.
The security zone should cover a 360° circle. If there is a TOI, the SB will intercept as far
away from the HVA as possible and another boat will back up the SB as a TRB.
C. Three Boat Restricted Channel Escort: The first boat takes position off the bow of the
HVA, the second boat trails astern, and the third boat acts as a roving SB and maintains
station close aboard the HVA on the other side, depending on the likely threat.
D. Two Boat Escort: One of the boats will screen ahead (off-set to port or starboard
avoiding the HVAs blind spot) at the edge of the SZ. The second boat will trail astern
(offset towards the opposite side of the forward SB). If either boat encounters a TOI, they
will immediately intercept without waiting for back-up
E. Single Boat Escort: Should never be performed but if it is absolutely necessary, then the
SB should move back and forth in front of the HVAs bow.
F. Escort with Different Assets: The largest and slowed RB should be stationed ahead of
the HVA and the smaller quicker RB should be stationed astern of the HVA
2.
State the additional security options that should be considered when conducting a single-boat
escort.
The HVA will use their radar to detect and classify a TOI. Also, security forces should be
embarked on the HVA to detect, classify, and counter TOI’s in areas not covered by the SB. If the
TOI moves past the SB, the HVA can serve as the TRB.
Task 08-12: Protection of Stationary/Anchored HVAs
1.
State positioning and responsibilities of RBs in a:
A. Multi Boat Patrol: This is the optimum minimum defense posture with a three boat
patrol; 2 boats in the SZ, and one boat in the RZ. The fourth boat should be positioned at
a nearby safe haven and serve as a standby and be ready if a threat were to occur, provide
on-sight relief, and/or perform other tasks. If conditions warrant, one or two of the boats
in the SZ may travel outside the SZ in order to perform an escort in effort to extend the
range of interception.
B. Two Boat Patrol: One boat will act as the SB and the other the TRB. Both boats will be
positioned near the edge of the SZ. Each boat will be designated a sector and both boats
will have the same responsibilities as a SB. If a situation arises, one of the boats will
move into the RZ and act as the TRB. Both boats should be supported by static weapons
placements or receive help from other agencies.
C. Single Boat Patrol: Should only be taken as a last resort. The SB should be positioned
near the centerline of the SZ
D. Anchored HVA: Requires a 360° circle security zone. When anchored, the HVA has it’s
own lookout and can therefore, communicate with the RB’s if a threat arises.
2.
State the additional security options that should be considered when conducting a single boat
patrol:
They should be supported by floating barriers: shore-side weapons emplacements, armed CG
aircraft, non-security CG boats, and/or patrol craft from other law enforcement agencies.
Task 08-13: Response Boat Duties (see drawings)
1.
What are the duties of the Screen Boat (SB)?
They are assigned to protect a HVA (moving or stationary); they are in charge of intercepting an
incoming vessel to determine its intent. The SB makes every attempt to herd or shoulder the
incoming vessel out of the SZ while maintaining a screening position between the incoming vessel
and the protected HVA.
2.
What are the duties of the Tactical Reaction Boat (TRB)?
They are assigned to protect the HVA (moving or stationary); they are also there to back up the SB
when it is intercepting/investigating a TOI entering the SZ. If only 2 SBs are present, both boats
may have to take on the role of both jobs as a SB and TRB. Other responsibilities include:




3.
Patrolling the Reaction Zone (RZ)
Keeping a TOI under observation
Taking a Vessel Posing an Imminent Threat (VPIT) under fire
Maintaining a position between the intruder and the protected asset at all times
What are the duties of the Command and Control Vessel?
Command and control vessels are also known as a patrol boat (PB) or a larger cutter. The
command and control vessel will meet up with the HVA at the designated pick up point and
establish the SZ around the HVA using SBs and TRBs. TACON or the Patrol Commander
(PATCOM) may take a position either on the command and control vessel or the HVA itself. THE
COMMAND AND CONTROL VESSEL CANNOT FULFILL THE DUTIES OF THE SB,
because given it’s larger size, it does not have the same maneuverability capabilities as the SB.
Task 08-14: Escorting a Target of Interest (TOI) (see drawings)
1.
Explain the purpose for escorting a TOI.
The purpose for escorting a TOI through a SZ allows the legitimate flow of commerce to continue
while also maintaining control over a transiting vessel. Escorting a TOI enables the SB to prevent
the TOI from posing a threat to the HVA until it has safely passed. During the escort, the TOI is to
maintain a slow speed.
2.
Explain Switching Sectors.
This is the preferred method of escorting a TOI. This occurs when two boats meet at the sector
boundary; RB1 stays with the escort while RB2 moves to patrol the sector vacated by the RB1
3.
Explain Loitering Hand-Off.
The RB, that is currently escorting the TOI, meets up with another RB at the sector line where the
escort of the TOI is transferred to the new RB. Once the escort has been established by the new
RB, the original RB returns to its patrol sector.
4.
Explain Drop Back Hand-Off.
The RB that is going to assume the escort (RB2) maneuvers alongside the RB that is currently
escorting the TOI (RB1). Once in position, the RB2 will continue to stay between the HVA and
the TOI while RB1 drops back and returns to the patrol sector.
Task 08-15: Basic Response Boat Tactics (see drawings)
1.
List the four basic response boat tactical maneuvers.
1.
2.
3.
4.
Shadow Tactic
Intercept Tactic
Herding Tactic
Shouldering Tactic
Explain the following for each tactic:

Shadow Tactic:
A. Procedure: You attempt to position yourself between the TOI, which is located outside
the SZ, and the HVA while remaining in the SZ. When employing the tactic, the RB
maneuvers so that it stays between the TOI and the HVA.
B. Benefit: It communicates to the operator of the TOI that you are aware of their presence.
It also puts you in a position that gives you a tactical advantage should the TOI suddenly
turn towards the protected asset.
C. When the tactic should be used: Every time a vessel transits near the SZ.
D. Potential dangers to the boat crew: if you get too close to the TOI, you never know
what kind of explosives they may have.
E. Cautions: make sure that the TOI remains outside the SZ at all times.

Intercept Tactic:
A. Procedure: The RB will maneuver as quickly as possible between the oncoming TOI and
the HVA. The coxswain of the RB should communicate to the TOI and inform them
of the boundaries of the SZ and appropriate task direction (by using loudhailer, radio,
siren, blue lights, flares, etc).
B. Benefit: The intercept course should be as close to bow-on as possible; this will mitigate
any speed advantage the TOI has and close in on the TOI at the greatest range from
the HVA. Also, the bow-on approach is safer because it shows a narrower profile of
your boat and it is away from the engines.
C. When the tactic should be used: anytime a vessel enters the SZ. An aggressive
approach is preferred because it typically results in a more compliant operator of the
vessel.
D. Potential dangers to the boat crew: don’t get too close to the TOI because its crew can
heave explosives onto the RB.
E. Cautions: at first, you don’t know if the TOI poses a threat, is compliant or noncompliant.

Herding Tactic:
A. Procedure: RB maneuvers alongside the TOI and tries to force the TOI out of the SZ
B. Benefit: It prevents a clear line of attack against the protected asset.
C. When the tactic should be used: When a TOI is in the SZ and previous attempts to stop
or reroute the vessel have failed.
D. Potential dangers to the boat crew: Do not get too close to the TOI because they have
the potential to heave explosives onto the RB.
E. Cautions: The operator of the TOI is obviously non-compliant or doesn’t understand the
orders the RB is instructing the TOI to do.

Shouldering Tactic:
A. Procedure: showing force by physically trying to force a TOI to stop or change course.
This is considered a Step II tactic for vessel-on-vessel use of force (UOF)
policy for non-compliant vessels. DO NOT RAM THE VESSEL.
B. Benefit: removes TOI out of SZ.
C. When the tactic should be used: when the non-compliant vessel has disobeyed an order
to leave the SZ, but does not pose an imminent threat of death or serious
physical injury.
D. Potential dangers to the boat crew: Can lead to unintentional structural damage, vessel
capsizing, or bodily injury (to both the suspect and CG vessel)
E. Cautions: Coxswains should consider every aspect before performing this maneuver by
considering the vessel’s size and design as well as the current weather
conditions.
Task 08-16: Weapons Engagement
1.
State the factors that will constrain an RB in their ability to engage hostile targets.






2.
Lack of mobility in narrow/shallow waterways
Effects of tides and currents
Stability of patrol craft
Distance to the target
Danger of collateral damages to friendly forces
Firing arcs of installed weapons on patrol craft
Under what circumstances can a target be engaged without a prearranged clear field of fire?
A target can be engaged if the target poses an imminent threat of death or serious physical injury
(e.g. if the target draws a weapon or proceeds to come towards you in a threatening matter.
3.
Who can approve a field of fire?
TACON only can authorize orders; coxswains have the authority to proceed with those orders and
instruct the crew on what to do next.
Task 08-17: Weapons Command and Control
1.
Define the following weapons commands, who can authorize the command and state the
appropriate response to each command if applicable:
Command
Weapons Tight
Given By
TACON authority
Response and Actions
“Weapons tight aye”
 Gunners make certain that their
weapons are clear
Gunners train weapons in a safe
direction away from the targets in a
non-threatening manner.
“Weapons free aye”
 After the order is given, the
coxswain has the authority to open
fire when ready
“Weapons stowed aye”
 Weapons are not loaded and the
chambers are clear
 Weapons are placed on safe, locked
in the ready-air position, with
universal gun mount locking pins in
place.
“Weapons ready aye”
 Gunners have positive control of
weapons
 Universal gun mount locking pins
are removed
 Weapons may be loaded at the
discretion of the boat coxswain, but
rounds are not chambered
 Weapons are placed on safe
 Gunners may ensure weapons are
not trained upwards to the sky when
friendly aircraft are operating in the
area
*NOTE: Training weapons at a target is
an act of aggression*
“Mount XX on target and tracking.”
(OR) “Mount XX unable to bear”
 Gunners train weapons on target
 Weapon made ready to fire
 Weapons may be placed on safe at
the discretion of the gunner
“Open fire aye”
 Gunners direct weapons at target
and commence firing, if field of fire
is clear.
“Check fire aye”
 Gunner momentarily stops to check
effect of fired rounds. Gunner will
resume fire if target continues to
threaten
“Cease fire aye”
 All gunners cease firing immediately
 Gunners retain positive control of
weapons
 Gunners train weapons on target

Weapons Free
TACON authority
Weapons Stowed
Coxswain
Weapons Ready
Coxswain
Surface/Air Action,
Port/Starboard
Coxswain
Open Fire
Coxswain
Check Fire
Coxswain
Cease Fire
Coxswain
Task 08-19: Use of Automatic Weapons
1.
State how and why an automatic weapon should be fired.
Automatic weapons should be fired in short bursts (less than 10 rounds). This will enable
observation of where the rounds are hitting so that corrections can be made between bursts.
2.
State how the “roll” of the RB should be utilized in firing and automatic weapon.
When Dead-In-The-Water (DIW), the gunners should train their weapons on the target and use the
natural roll of the boat to control elevation in vectoring rounds into the target.
3.
State the safety concerns associated with ricochet from an automatic weapon.
Machine gun rounds tend to ricochet upward when they hit the water due to weapons being
employed so close to the surface of the water, as well as populated areas downrange in the port
security/harbor defense environment.
4.
State the relation between RB speed and sea state regarding mounted weapon stability.
In calm seas, proceeding at slow speed (5-10 knots) may be the most stable, while small waves
may make a moderate planning speed (20-25 knots) a better platform.
Download