Task 08-01: Authority and Jurisdiction, Use of Force 1. Complete the following Boarding Team Member tasks: A. 1-03 (Authority and Jurisdiction): 1. Demonstrate the ability to explain to the boating public your authority for conducting a boarding. Our job is to enforce applicable maritime laws (MLE): armed intervention by any uniformed Coast Guard personnel and we can make inquiries, seizures of property, searches, arrests, examinations, and inspections over seas and waters where we have jurisdiction. Customs: carry a firearm, make an arrest without a warrant, execute and serve any order, warrant, subpoena, or summons issued under the US, and conduct border searches. Protection and security of Vessels, Harbors, and Waterfront Facilities, including LE Ashore Assistance: either issued or requested. The Coast Guard can also offer services to help other agencies. Coast Guard Investigative Services (CGIS) Special Agents 2. Explain the scope of your responsibilities and the jurisdictional limitations related to the various types of boardings conducted at your unit. Substantive Law: a domestic, foreign, or international law enforced Vessel status/flag: any government vessel, aircraft, vehicle, etc that has sovereign immunity and are not allowed to be boarded, seized, or arrested under any circumstances. Location: determined by the character of the waters where an area is covered. B. 1-04 (Use of Force Continuum): 1. Describe in your own words the Coast Guard’s use of force policy: Under foreign boardings, the coast guard may not use foreign force policies. Force is only reasonably necessary and may be used; but excessive force is forbidden. Force cannot be used where assigned duties can be discharged without it. Although it should be used as a last option and is rarely used, retreat is considered when the LE situation poses a tremendous risk for the personnel involved. We are allowed to use self-defense, non-deadly force, and deadly force. 2. Explain the six levels of the use of force continuum. 1. Officer presence: appearance, demeanor, and verbal/non-verbal communication, drawing a PDW is considered a level 1 use of force. 2. Verbal commands: form of task directions with consequences aimed at the subject. 3. Control techniques: causes a low probability of causing connective tissue damage, lacerations to the skin, or broken bones. 4. Aggressive response techniques: causes a high probability of causing connective tissue damage, lacerations to the skin, broken bones, and irritation to skin, eyes, or mucus membranes by use of kicks, stuns, punches, chemical irritants, and/or take-downs. 5. Intermediate weapons: high probability of causing connective tissue damage, lacerations to the skin or broken bones by using: 12-guage sting-ball munitions, 12-guage rubber-fin stabilized munitions, or expandable baton. 6. Deadly Force: likely to cause death or serious physical injury by using PDW, M16, M.60 or .50 caliber machine guns, shotgun rifles). 2. 3. Explain when it is appropriate to draw a weapon: Only when deadly force is authorized Or there is a reasonable possibility that deadly force may have to be used. 4. Explain and define the elements that must exist prior to the use of deadly force. If there is probable cause that the suspect has committed a felony involving the use or threatened use of deadly force The suspect is armed or poses and imminent threat of death or serious physical injury to another person The suspect has failed to obey an order or halt. 5. Explain the Coast Guard’s policy concerning the use of warning shots by a member of a boarding team: they are only authorized as a warning signal to a vessel to stop and are prohibited in the context in the Use of Force Continuum, including crowd control. Complete the following Boarding Officer Tasks: A. 2-01 (Authority and Jurisdiction): 1. Explain or define the following: Authority: the government’s legal power to act. 14 U.S.C. 89: the Coast Guard can make inquiries, searches, seizures, examinations, inspections, and arrests upon the seas/areas that the Coast Guard has jurisdiction over for the protection, detection, and suppression of the violation of laws. Boarding team members have the authority to board vessels and inspect any documentation, any part of the vessel, and are allowed to make arrests and issue violation/warning tickets. Jurisdiction as it applies to: a. location: jurisdiction over persons, vessels, or aircrafts are determined by the character of waters in or over which they are located. b. person/vessel: warships, military aircraft, and other government aircraft or vessels have immunity; they can only be asked to leave the area. Persons on board may not be boarded, searched, seized, or arrested under any circumstances. c. offense: what the violation is. 2. Define and explain the jurisdictional limitations for those maritime areas applicable to your unit: smtj special maritime territorial juristdiction High seas: begin at the sea-ward edge of the territorial sea; as long as the costal state has not proclaimed an EEZ (Exclusive Economic Zone). Internal Waters: The waters shoreward of the baseline, including all waters on the U.S. international boundary of the Great Lakes. Limitations: force majeure, and peace of the port doctrine Exclusive State Waters: the zone of waters beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea and not extending 200 NM from the baseline. Unenclosed portions of the Great Lakes: Navigable and Territorial Waters of the U.S.: For the purpose of the Federal Water Pollution Act, waters shoreward of 3 NM from the baseline, including internal waters and all other waters subject to federal Constitutional authority. For all other purposes waters shoreward of 12 NM Territorial Sea: force majeure, transit passage, peace of the port doctrine, innocent passage, and assistance entry. Exclusive Economic Zone: from baseline to 200 NM out Customs Waters: from baseline to 12 NM Land or Water not within or between any of the 50 states: internal waters Contiguous Zone: 12 or 24 NM Foreign Territorial Waters: baseline to 12 NM Task 08-02: Maritime Homeland Security (MHS) Missions: 1. State the primary mission areas within the MHS: PWCS Drugs/migrants Defense readiness Other LE activities Task 08-03: Maritime Homeland Security (MHS) Definitions: Define the following terms: Captain of the Port (COPT): within their jurisdiction, enforce port safety, security, and marine environmental protection regulations, including, without limitation, regulations for the protection and security of vessels, harbors, and waterfront facilities, anchorages, warning zones, security zones, regulated navigation areas, deep water ports, water pollution, and ports and waterways safety. Disabling Fire: the firing of ordinance at a vessel with the intent to disable, with minimum injury to the personnel or damage to the vessel. It does not constitute the use of deadly force, and is used only to stop a vessel. Escort: a protective screen of naval or law enforcement vessels and aircraft used to protect a high valued asset(s) from enemy attack. Field of Fire: the area in which a weapon or a group of weapons may cover effectively with fire from a given position. High Value Asset (HVA): any landside or waterside asset that is of high value. May include military and commercial vessels, waterfront or military facilities, submarines or commercial vessels carrying CDC. Intercept Zone (IZ): the outermost area of a security zone (SZ). Normally extends from the outer edge of the RZ away from the HVA an additional 1000 yards. Landslide Security: measures or actions taken that prevent or guard against theft, sabotage, terrorism, and other Federal offenses, and/or belligerent acts on a waterfront facility and the property around it. Limited Access Area (LAA): areas defined in the port, facility, terminal area, or activity boundaries and used to restrict or control movement of vessels, vehicles, persons, or objects within these areas. The establishment of any LAA requires public rulemaking and publication in the Federal Register. Maritime Homeland Security (MHS): A federal law enforcement mission carried out by domestic law enforcement authorities, including the Coast Guard, and conducted in accordance with settled law enforcement procedures, the Maritime Law Enforcement Manual (MLEM), and other applicable law enforcement policies. Department of Defense (DoD) personnel may assist non-DoD law enforcement authorities with MHS law enforcement missions in accordance with Federal Law and applicable DoD and Coast Guard regulations and policies. MHS does not include the physical security of Coast Guard units and property, which shall be conducted in accordance with the Physical Security and Force Protection Program. Maritime Security (MARSEC): is concerned with the prevention of intentional damage through sabotage, subversion, or terrorism. 3 activities that are conducted by the Coast Guard are: port, vessel, and facility security. Non compliant Vessel: a vessel subject to examination that refuses to heave to after being legally ordered to do so. Operational Control (OPCON): transferable command authority that may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of Area Commander. Is inherent in area command (command authority). May be delegated and is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving necessary authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. Operational Security (OPSEC): the process of denying adversaries information about friendly capabilities and intentions by identifying, controlling, and protecting indicators associated with planning and conducting military operations and other activities. Port Waterways and Coastal Security (PWCS): protection of the U.S. Maritime Domain and the U.S. Marine Transportation System from internal and external threats, such as destruction or loss or injury from terrorism, sabotage or other subversive acts. Reaction Zone (RZ): area within a SZ immediately adjacent to the HVA; normally extends 1000 yards from the HVA. Response Boat (RB): refers to the 47’, 41’, 33’, and 25’. They are smaller, quicker, and more maneuverable. Screen Boat (SB): a boat interposed between the HVA and the threat. Security Zone (SZ): designated areas of land, water, or land and water established for such time as the COPT deems necessary to prevent damage or injury to any vessel or waterfront facility; to safeguard ports, harbors, territories, or waters of the US; or to secure the observance of the rights and obligations of the US. Self Defense (Individual and Unit): A. Individual: B. Unit: a commander has the inherent authority and obligation to use all necessary means available and to take all appropriate action to defend that commander’s unit and other US forces within the vicinity from a hostile act to a hostile intent and to ensure the continued safety of US forces or other persons and property they are ordered to protect. US forces may employ such force in self-defense only so long as the hostile force continues to present an imminent threat. Tactical Control (TACON): command authority over assigned or attached forces or commands, made available for tasking, that is limited to the detailed and, usually, local direction and control of movements or maneuvers necessary to accomplish missions of tasks assigned. TACON is inherent in OPCON. TACON may be delegated to, and exercised at any level at or below the area commander. Tactical Reaction Boat (TRB): charged with backing up the SB when it is intercepting/investigating a TOI entering the SZ. Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP): follow a gradual escalation in intensity, from nonharmful means up to and including the possible use of disabling fire. They have potential for causing extreme harm, injury, serious damage, or death but TTP is not intended to be applied as deadly force. Target of Interest (TOI): any contact (vessel or aircraft) that poses a possible threat to a law enforcement unit or protected asset. Vessel Posing and Imminent Threat (VPIT): any vessel whose actions pose an imminent threat of death or serious physical injury to any person. Task 08-04: Threats to Response Boat (RB) Crews: 1. State the types of threats a boat crew may encounter and the potential consequences of each. A. Small boat (either single or multiple) assault with small arms: CONSEQUENCE: may do little damage to steel hull ship, port facility, or shore-side command post and may be easily countered employing the tactics discussed in the manual. B. Explosive-laden small boat (either single or multiple): CONSEQUENCE: could prove a valid and viable threat to a ship or port facility. An explosive-laden small boat, especially not displaying an outward threat to life or property, will probably be the most difficult threat to identify and counter. C. Small boat (either single or multiple) assault with rocket propelled ordinance: CONSEQUENCE: is the greatest type of threat with a rocket propelled ordinance or a “hit and run” assault. This threat should be identifiable since it will take time for the aggressor to sight in a rocket-propelled grenade, and the action of sighting in will be quite obvious to the security forces. D. Placement of IEDs (Improvised Explosive Devices) by either surface swimmers or subsurface by divers: CONSEQUENCE: E. Suicide bomber on ferries, casino boats, passenger vessels, or waterfront areas with a large number of people: CONSEQUENCE: a suicide bomber could cause injury and/or death to activities where there is a large number of people and may be used to divert the attention of the boat crew from their mission. 2. State procedures for a Weapons of Mass Destruction or hazardous material release including appropriate PPE and decontamination. Respiratory protection is vital Don an EEBD or respirator. If both are available, and it is estimated EGRESS can take less than 10 minutes, the EEBD is the better choice. While the respirator can be used for a longer period of time, only the EEBD can be used in an O2 deficient atmosphere. If breathing protection is not available, immediately seek an outdoor area, on the upwind wide of the vessel (and uphill if ashore) of the source of the release. Only use the Tyvek/Tychem suits if immediate egress is not possible and personnel is forced to shelter in place, or if Egress includes crossing an area of contamination (from an area which is not contaminated, but may soon be) If sheltering in place, close windows/doors and secure boat/vehicle/building ventilation. Egress cross wind to exit the contamination and stay upwind/uphill. If PPE is not available, anything which covers the skin (skin, foul weather gear) and nose/mouth (wet cloth/rags) will help. Prompt decontamination is vital. Once at the pre-designated decontamination area, personnel will conduct emergency decontamination and promptly seek medical attention (designated TRIAGE or hospital). Task 08-05: Tactical Control 1. Explain the mission of TACON and the relationship between TACON and the RB coxswain: TACON is responsible for the oversight of assigned assets as well as providing guidance as needed. TACON will normally operate from a location remote to the actual operational area. There should be good communication between the TACON and the RB coxswain in effort to maintain situational awareness and provide continual updates to the actual situation. RB coxswains receive orders from TACON when involved in a SAR case. Task 08-06: Operation Pre-Brief and De-brief 1. State the reasons for and importance of the Operational Pre-Brief: It is designed to present the mission’s plans to security forces. This also includes meeting with other applicable parties in effort to understand how the security operation will take place. All questions and problems should be sorted out in this briefing and everyone should know what is expected of them. Also, all personnel should be briefed on UOF rules. 2. State the type of information that should be contained within the Operational Pre-Brief. 3. Mission objectives Summary of current actions Communications (frequencies, secure/non-secure, call signs, code words) Current intelligence on possible threats MARSEC level HSAS (Homeland Security Advisory System) condition Planned routes Security zones (SZ) Fields of fire Assets (afloat, ashore, airborne) Anticipated transit scene Specific duties and responsibilities Timetable of events Specific guidance concerning use of force (UOF) and rules of engagement (ROE) Arming requirements Weapons mounting instructions Administrations and logistics support Operational safety Emergency situations Risk management Watch schedules Land units/support Pier sweep and security Anticipated weather conditions Required personnel protective equipment (PPE) SAR responsibilities/coverage Weapons of mass destruction (WMD) considerations (possible threats, evacuations/shelter in place, and decontamination procedures) State the reasons for and importance of the Operational De-Brief. It is a valuable tool for improving the efficiency and effectiveness of performance. During the planning phase of an operation, it is suggested that time should be allocated for de-briefs to take place. A “mission complete” de-brief with all participants should be conducted at the bare minimum. It is essential that boat crews hold less formal de-briefings as part of the watch-relief process. 4. State the type of information that should be contained within the Operational De-Brief. Discuss the operation, status of current operations, and whether mission objectives are being met. Recap any problems that may have occurred and report any workarounds, or solutions as required. Discuss ways to improve future missions. Task 08-07: Loss of Communications Procedures 1. State the five (5) steps for Loss of Communication: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Try contacting any/all units. Try secondary and tertiary (if available) frequencies, including VHF, HF, and UHF in accordance with the communications plans. Use alternate pre-planned forms of communications. Use loudhailer or siren to contact other units. Used colored smoke, flares, or signal flags that were designated in the communications plan to signal lost communications. Task 08-08: Vessel on Vessel Use of Force 1. State the two principles when force may be applied from CG vessels conducting LAA enforcement operations. A. Force may be applied to compel compliance with a lawful order to stop. B. Force may be applied as self-defense (either individual or unit) 2. Discuss key considerations when enforcing LAAs in congested ports and waterways. 3. The SB will apply escalating force in the form of TTP’s, such as hailing, herding, shouldering, non-lethals, and firing upon, in response to actions of the TOI, if the time permits and the tactic is available and suitable. The SB will attempt to keep the TOI from approaching the HVA using the TTPs identified in the manual. If the SB determines immediately that the vessel poses an imminent threat based on the presence of shouldered weapons, gunfire, etc., then deadly force would be appropriate if necessary to defend life and unit. State the four steps and tactics involved in stopping a Non-Compliant Vessel (NCV) and a Vessel Posing Imminent Threat (VPIT). 1. Command Presence: communicating to the vessel an order to stop using all available means (radio communications, loudhailer, blue light, flag hoist, search lights, message block, and ship’s whistle/siren), maneuvering close aboard the non- 2. 3. 4. 4. compliant vessel and remaining clearly visible at all times, increasing the number of LE units on scene, visibly uncovering, readying, and manning weapons (but not pointing weapons at the vessel). Low Level Tactics: block the wind from a non-compliant sailing vessel, use lines, nets, or entanglers, sever fuel lines, deliver fire-fighting water to blow out the sails or flood the engine, physically blocking, perform shouldering maneuver. Higher Level Tactics: 12 gauge munitions are authorized as a non-lethal weapon to be used from cutters to small boats against the operator of the vessel. Requires a CG flag SNO. This tactic should also consider the consequence that the operator can lost control of the vessel and cause further complications, so extreme consideration must be used when deciding to engage in these higher level tactics. Disabling Fire: warning shots may be employed however, it increases risk for danger for other surrounding vessels within the area, and it may require a SNO flag. They should be used in go-fast vessels, and only if the on-scene assets have the capability to deliver disabling fire if the warning shots are ignored; go-fast vessels do not need on-scene assets to have the capability of disabling fire in order to perform warning shots. Warning shots using pistols is prohibited. For the most part, disabling fire is the preferred method and warning shots are not necessary. Weapons appropriate for disabling fire include: service rifles, precision rifles, Remington M870 with 12 gauge copper sabot slugs, mounted automatic weapons (MAW), and deck guns. State the difference in use of force policies/procedures between stopping a Non-Compliant Vessel (NCV) and a Vessel Posing Imminent Threat (VPIT). On-scene units make real-time determinations of whether a TOI is compliant, non-compliant, or poses an imminent threat of death or serious physical injury. So basically, a distinguished decision is made to determine if the vessel is non-compliant or a VPIT. Units are not required to go through the steps in the non-compliant vessel framework before applying force in self-defense. However, you have to go through the steps with VPIT. If the actions of the vessel pose an imminent threat of death or serious physical injury to law enforcement personnel or others (individual self-defense), the CGUOFP (use of force principle) applies. If the vessel threatens a CG LE platform or other US forces in the vicinity (unit self-defense), the general unit self-defense principles of the standing rules of engagement (SROE) apply. Whether applying force in a self-defense situation in accordance with the CGUOFP or the SROE, both sets of rules are based on similar principles for applying force in self-defense, and therefore, the same results are obtained. Task 08-09: Limited Access Areas (LAA) 1. List the five types of LAAs typically used during MHS operations. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Security zones (SZ) Naval Protection Vessel Zones (NPVZ) Restricted Waterfront areas Regulated navigation areas Safety zones Task 08-10: Security Zones (SZ) 1. State why the CG routinely establishes Security Zones. To protect assets, from loss, destruction, or injury from sabotage, or other subversive acts, accidents, or other causes of a similar nature. 2. State why a SZ is an effective tool for controlling movements and limiting access to sensitive areas. Because if provides surface units with a legally enforceable perimeter. It is easily established and contains the “force of criminal law” in CG jurisdictional areas. 3. State who may establish a SZ. Only by the COPT, District Commander, Area Commander, or Commandant. 4. State and describe the five tactical areas of a security zone. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 5. Boundary: outward edge of the SZ and the point at which no person or vessel may cross without permission. Intercept Zone: contained completely within the SZ, where vessels and persons violating the SZ should be interdicted. Reaction Zone: contained completely within the SZ, where vessels that pose an imminent threat of death or serious physical injury are not allowed to enter. Sector: portion of the SZ defined by boundary lines that converge at the asset. Each boundary line is watched over by a response boat. Patrol Area: portion of the SZ and the surrounding area in which a unit conducts enforcement operations State the difference between the Naval Vessel Protection Zone (NVPZ) and a security zone. It is a 500 yard regulated area of water surrounding US naval vessels that is necessary to provide for the safety and security of these US naval vessels. All vessels within this zone should maintain a slow speed to effort to maintain a safe course. No vessel is allowed within 100 yards of the actual naval vessel being protected. A security zone includes land and facilities while the NVPZ only includes the naval vessel and the 500 yards of water around it. 6. State who may authorize movement within the NVPZ. The Coast Guard, the senior naval officer present in command, or the official patrol. 7. State the reasons why you conduct waterway, bridge, and pier inspections. In effort to safely escort a HVA, you need to make sure that not only is the path clear and safe for them to travel but that other things such as bridges and piers are clear and safe as well. It is very easy to dispose or plant something into the HVA’s path by dropping it off a bridge or pier. Furthermore, divers can jump off these objects with possible threats attached to them. 8. State procedures for conducting a Route Inspection prior to the escort of an HVA. The planned transit route should be cleared of all suspicious vessels; security forces should actively patrol the route prior to and actually during the HVA transit. Also, coordination with harbor masters is essential in maintaining communication and safety. Task 08-11: Escorting a Moving High Value Asset (HVA) 1. State positioning and responsibilities of RBs in a: A. Four-Boat Escort: This is the optimum defensive posture for HVA escort. The SZ will be divided into 4 sectors (2 off the bow and 2 off the stern) with one boat in each sector. If a TOI enters the area, then the SB in that sector will intercept with another boat that may act as a TRB from another sector. If the vessel is a VPIT, then the SB will get out of the way and let the TRB intercept for the field of fire. B. Three Boat Escort: Three sectors will be divided where there is two boats, one on either side of the bow, and the third boat will trail behind the HVA. There should be no boats directly in front of the HVAs bow because the vessel probably wont be able to see them. The security zone should cover a 360° circle. If there is a TOI, the SB will intercept as far away from the HVA as possible and another boat will back up the SB as a TRB. C. Three Boat Restricted Channel Escort: The first boat takes position off the bow of the HVA, the second boat trails astern, and the third boat acts as a roving SB and maintains station close aboard the HVA on the other side, depending on the likely threat. D. Two Boat Escort: One of the boats will screen ahead (off-set to port or starboard avoiding the HVAs blind spot) at the edge of the SZ. The second boat will trail astern (offset towards the opposite side of the forward SB). If either boat encounters a TOI, they will immediately intercept without waiting for back-up E. Single Boat Escort: Should never be performed but if it is absolutely necessary, then the SB should move back and forth in front of the HVAs bow. F. Escort with Different Assets: The largest and slowed RB should be stationed ahead of the HVA and the smaller quicker RB should be stationed astern of the HVA 2. State the additional security options that should be considered when conducting a single-boat escort. The HVA will use their radar to detect and classify a TOI. Also, security forces should be embarked on the HVA to detect, classify, and counter TOI’s in areas not covered by the SB. If the TOI moves past the SB, the HVA can serve as the TRB. Task 08-12: Protection of Stationary/Anchored HVAs 1. State positioning and responsibilities of RBs in a: A. Multi Boat Patrol: This is the optimum minimum defense posture with a three boat patrol; 2 boats in the SZ, and one boat in the RZ. The fourth boat should be positioned at a nearby safe haven and serve as a standby and be ready if a threat were to occur, provide on-sight relief, and/or perform other tasks. If conditions warrant, one or two of the boats in the SZ may travel outside the SZ in order to perform an escort in effort to extend the range of interception. B. Two Boat Patrol: One boat will act as the SB and the other the TRB. Both boats will be positioned near the edge of the SZ. Each boat will be designated a sector and both boats will have the same responsibilities as a SB. If a situation arises, one of the boats will move into the RZ and act as the TRB. Both boats should be supported by static weapons placements or receive help from other agencies. C. Single Boat Patrol: Should only be taken as a last resort. The SB should be positioned near the centerline of the SZ D. Anchored HVA: Requires a 360° circle security zone. When anchored, the HVA has it’s own lookout and can therefore, communicate with the RB’s if a threat arises. 2. State the additional security options that should be considered when conducting a single boat patrol: They should be supported by floating barriers: shore-side weapons emplacements, armed CG aircraft, non-security CG boats, and/or patrol craft from other law enforcement agencies. Task 08-13: Response Boat Duties (see drawings) 1. What are the duties of the Screen Boat (SB)? They are assigned to protect a HVA (moving or stationary); they are in charge of intercepting an incoming vessel to determine its intent. The SB makes every attempt to herd or shoulder the incoming vessel out of the SZ while maintaining a screening position between the incoming vessel and the protected HVA. 2. What are the duties of the Tactical Reaction Boat (TRB)? They are assigned to protect the HVA (moving or stationary); they are also there to back up the SB when it is intercepting/investigating a TOI entering the SZ. If only 2 SBs are present, both boats may have to take on the role of both jobs as a SB and TRB. Other responsibilities include: 3. Patrolling the Reaction Zone (RZ) Keeping a TOI under observation Taking a Vessel Posing an Imminent Threat (VPIT) under fire Maintaining a position between the intruder and the protected asset at all times What are the duties of the Command and Control Vessel? Command and control vessels are also known as a patrol boat (PB) or a larger cutter. The command and control vessel will meet up with the HVA at the designated pick up point and establish the SZ around the HVA using SBs and TRBs. TACON or the Patrol Commander (PATCOM) may take a position either on the command and control vessel or the HVA itself. THE COMMAND AND CONTROL VESSEL CANNOT FULFILL THE DUTIES OF THE SB, because given it’s larger size, it does not have the same maneuverability capabilities as the SB. Task 08-14: Escorting a Target of Interest (TOI) (see drawings) 1. Explain the purpose for escorting a TOI. The purpose for escorting a TOI through a SZ allows the legitimate flow of commerce to continue while also maintaining control over a transiting vessel. Escorting a TOI enables the SB to prevent the TOI from posing a threat to the HVA until it has safely passed. During the escort, the TOI is to maintain a slow speed. 2. Explain Switching Sectors. This is the preferred method of escorting a TOI. This occurs when two boats meet at the sector boundary; RB1 stays with the escort while RB2 moves to patrol the sector vacated by the RB1 3. Explain Loitering Hand-Off. The RB, that is currently escorting the TOI, meets up with another RB at the sector line where the escort of the TOI is transferred to the new RB. Once the escort has been established by the new RB, the original RB returns to its patrol sector. 4. Explain Drop Back Hand-Off. The RB that is going to assume the escort (RB2) maneuvers alongside the RB that is currently escorting the TOI (RB1). Once in position, the RB2 will continue to stay between the HVA and the TOI while RB1 drops back and returns to the patrol sector. Task 08-15: Basic Response Boat Tactics (see drawings) 1. List the four basic response boat tactical maneuvers. 1. 2. 3. 4. Shadow Tactic Intercept Tactic Herding Tactic Shouldering Tactic Explain the following for each tactic: Shadow Tactic: A. Procedure: You attempt to position yourself between the TOI, which is located outside the SZ, and the HVA while remaining in the SZ. When employing the tactic, the RB maneuvers so that it stays between the TOI and the HVA. B. Benefit: It communicates to the operator of the TOI that you are aware of their presence. It also puts you in a position that gives you a tactical advantage should the TOI suddenly turn towards the protected asset. C. When the tactic should be used: Every time a vessel transits near the SZ. D. Potential dangers to the boat crew: if you get too close to the TOI, you never know what kind of explosives they may have. E. Cautions: make sure that the TOI remains outside the SZ at all times. Intercept Tactic: A. Procedure: The RB will maneuver as quickly as possible between the oncoming TOI and the HVA. The coxswain of the RB should communicate to the TOI and inform them of the boundaries of the SZ and appropriate task direction (by using loudhailer, radio, siren, blue lights, flares, etc). B. Benefit: The intercept course should be as close to bow-on as possible; this will mitigate any speed advantage the TOI has and close in on the TOI at the greatest range from the HVA. Also, the bow-on approach is safer because it shows a narrower profile of your boat and it is away from the engines. C. When the tactic should be used: anytime a vessel enters the SZ. An aggressive approach is preferred because it typically results in a more compliant operator of the vessel. D. Potential dangers to the boat crew: don’t get too close to the TOI because its crew can heave explosives onto the RB. E. Cautions: at first, you don’t know if the TOI poses a threat, is compliant or noncompliant. Herding Tactic: A. Procedure: RB maneuvers alongside the TOI and tries to force the TOI out of the SZ B. Benefit: It prevents a clear line of attack against the protected asset. C. When the tactic should be used: When a TOI is in the SZ and previous attempts to stop or reroute the vessel have failed. D. Potential dangers to the boat crew: Do not get too close to the TOI because they have the potential to heave explosives onto the RB. E. Cautions: The operator of the TOI is obviously non-compliant or doesn’t understand the orders the RB is instructing the TOI to do. Shouldering Tactic: A. Procedure: showing force by physically trying to force a TOI to stop or change course. This is considered a Step II tactic for vessel-on-vessel use of force (UOF) policy for non-compliant vessels. DO NOT RAM THE VESSEL. B. Benefit: removes TOI out of SZ. C. When the tactic should be used: when the non-compliant vessel has disobeyed an order to leave the SZ, but does not pose an imminent threat of death or serious physical injury. D. Potential dangers to the boat crew: Can lead to unintentional structural damage, vessel capsizing, or bodily injury (to both the suspect and CG vessel) E. Cautions: Coxswains should consider every aspect before performing this maneuver by considering the vessel’s size and design as well as the current weather conditions. Task 08-16: Weapons Engagement 1. State the factors that will constrain an RB in their ability to engage hostile targets. 2. Lack of mobility in narrow/shallow waterways Effects of tides and currents Stability of patrol craft Distance to the target Danger of collateral damages to friendly forces Firing arcs of installed weapons on patrol craft Under what circumstances can a target be engaged without a prearranged clear field of fire? A target can be engaged if the target poses an imminent threat of death or serious physical injury (e.g. if the target draws a weapon or proceeds to come towards you in a threatening matter. 3. Who can approve a field of fire? TACON only can authorize orders; coxswains have the authority to proceed with those orders and instruct the crew on what to do next. Task 08-17: Weapons Command and Control 1. Define the following weapons commands, who can authorize the command and state the appropriate response to each command if applicable: Command Weapons Tight Given By TACON authority Response and Actions “Weapons tight aye” Gunners make certain that their weapons are clear Gunners train weapons in a safe direction away from the targets in a non-threatening manner. “Weapons free aye” After the order is given, the coxswain has the authority to open fire when ready “Weapons stowed aye” Weapons are not loaded and the chambers are clear Weapons are placed on safe, locked in the ready-air position, with universal gun mount locking pins in place. “Weapons ready aye” Gunners have positive control of weapons Universal gun mount locking pins are removed Weapons may be loaded at the discretion of the boat coxswain, but rounds are not chambered Weapons are placed on safe Gunners may ensure weapons are not trained upwards to the sky when friendly aircraft are operating in the area *NOTE: Training weapons at a target is an act of aggression* “Mount XX on target and tracking.” (OR) “Mount XX unable to bear” Gunners train weapons on target Weapon made ready to fire Weapons may be placed on safe at the discretion of the gunner “Open fire aye” Gunners direct weapons at target and commence firing, if field of fire is clear. “Check fire aye” Gunner momentarily stops to check effect of fired rounds. Gunner will resume fire if target continues to threaten “Cease fire aye” All gunners cease firing immediately Gunners retain positive control of weapons Gunners train weapons on target Weapons Free TACON authority Weapons Stowed Coxswain Weapons Ready Coxswain Surface/Air Action, Port/Starboard Coxswain Open Fire Coxswain Check Fire Coxswain Cease Fire Coxswain Task 08-19: Use of Automatic Weapons 1. State how and why an automatic weapon should be fired. Automatic weapons should be fired in short bursts (less than 10 rounds). This will enable observation of where the rounds are hitting so that corrections can be made between bursts. 2. State how the “roll” of the RB should be utilized in firing and automatic weapon. When Dead-In-The-Water (DIW), the gunners should train their weapons on the target and use the natural roll of the boat to control elevation in vectoring rounds into the target. 3. State the safety concerns associated with ricochet from an automatic weapon. Machine gun rounds tend to ricochet upward when they hit the water due to weapons being employed so close to the surface of the water, as well as populated areas downrange in the port security/harbor defense environment. 4. State the relation between RB speed and sea state regarding mounted weapon stability. In calm seas, proceeding at slow speed (5-10 knots) may be the most stable, while small waves may make a moderate planning speed (20-25 knots) a better platform.