PhiLang 2013, University of Łódź
Conditional Utterances and Conditional
Thoughts:
A Radical Contextualist Account
Kasia M. Jaszczolt
&
Chi-Hé Elder
University of Cambridge
1
Conditional utterances in English
if p (then) q
2
No bi-unique correlation between the form of a
conditional expression and the conditional meaning
(i)
Conditional sentences are not the only way to express
conditional thoughts:
(1) Say one word against Margaret Thatcher and David will be offended.
( If you say one word against MT, D will be offended.)
(2) Your money or your life.
( If you don’t give me your money I will take your life.)
3
(ii)
Conditional sentences can be put to a variety of uses
other than to express conditional thought:
(3)
(4)
If you wouldn’t mind, could you close the door?
If that’s a real diamond I’ll eat my hat!
4
A cross-linguistic perspective
Guugu Yimithirr (Australian, QNL): no overt conditionals
(5) The dog might bark. The postman might run away.
Evans & Levinson (2009: 443), after Haviland 1979
5
‘…while perhaps none of the logical connectives are
universally lexically expressed, there is no evidence that
languages differ in whether or not logical connectives
are present in their logical forms.’
von Fintel & Matthewson (2008: 170)
6
Outline
• Conditionals and pragmatic theory: delimiting the object of
study
• Mismatches between forms and meanings in expressing
conditionality and their theoretical consequences
• Various uses of if (ICE-GB)
indirect conditionals
(6) There are biscuits on the sideboard if you want some.
7
• Radical contextualism
• Representing conditional meanings in Interactive Semantics
The diversity of ways of expressing conditional meaning,
as well as the diversity of uses to which conditional if can
be put, are not a problem for a radical contextualist
theory.
8
Conditionals in pragmatics
“…in standard cases to say ‘if p then q’ is to be conventionally
committed to (to assert or imply in virtue of the meaning of ‘if’)
both the proposition that p  q and the Indirectness Condition”
Indirectness Condition: ‘p would, in the circumstances, be a good
reason for q’ GCI
Grice (1967/1989: 58)
9
Common ground
‘supposing p, then q’
10
Cancellable GCI:
‘If he was surprised, he didn’t show it.’
11
‘…a conditional statement, if A, then B, is an assertion
that the consequent is true, not necessarily in the
world as it is, but in the world as it would be if the
antecedent were true.’
Stalnaker (1975/1999: 68)
12
In search for an explanandum and an explanans
• ‘ordinary conditional sentences’ and truth values (e.g. Grice)
• ‘ordinary conditional sentences’ and possible worlds (e.g.
Stalnaker, Lewis, Kratzer, vs. Woods 1997; Edgington 1997)
• ‘ordinary conditional sentences’ and hypothetical thought
(e.g. Evans & Over 2004; Over et al. 2010; Byrne & JohnsonLaird 2010)
13
Extending the scope: two directions
(i) to ‘non-ordinary conditional sentences’
(ii) to conditional thoughts in a non-conditional form
14
i.a. Different roles of the antecedent
(7) If you haven’t heard yet, the Queen attended the funeral.
*Question test:
And what if I have heard?
*Contraposition test:
If the Queen didn’t attend the funeral, you have heard already.
(adapted from Bonnefon & Politzer 2011: 153)
15
i.b. Different speech acts (ICE-GB, Elder)
(8) If you rang her now she’d say yes. (advice)
(9) Be great if you would do that. (request)
16
(10) What we would like to do now is to reformulate the rule so
that if a head word’s complement is missing, then the
corresponding set in the complement list contains the special
sign ‘ind’.
B. Gillon, 2012, ‘Implicit complements: a dilemma for model theoretic semantics’. L&P 35, p. 333.
17
(10) What we would like to do now is to reformulate the rule so
that if a head word’s complement is missing, then [let it be the
case that] the corresponding set in the complement list contains
the special sign ‘ind’.
B. Gillon, 2012, ‘Implicit complements: a dilemma for model theoretic semantics’. L&P 35, p. 333.
18
• hedging
• indication of a speech act type
• conventional expressions of politeness, …
19
ii.a
(11) Give him a treat and he will be your friend for life.
p  Necessarily q >> p  Necessarily q
Klinedinst & Rothschild (2012): lexical ambiguity of and?
20
against conditional sentence as explanandum
21
against conditional sentence as explanandum
against minimalist truth-conditional semantics
as explanans
22
Kratzer 1991/2012: If-clauses restrict the domain of operators
(12)
If the lights in his study are on, Roger is at home
(MUST: the lights in his study are on) (Roger is at home)
‘The history of the conditional is the story of a syntactic mistake.’
Kratzer (2012: 106)
23
A corpus-based project on conditionals in
English
No bi-unique correspondence between conditional
constructions and conditional thoughts
– How should conditionals be classified?
– What is the relation between form and content?
– How ‘conditional’ are conditionals? Direct versus
indirect conditionals
– What is the primary intended meaning of conditional
constructions?
24
Classifications of conditionals
•
•
Conditional constructions lend themselves to a variety of
classifications
How to classify conditionals depends on the parameters
being considered
25
Classifications of conditionals (1)
•
Indicative / counterfactual
– Have different truth conditions
– Classified by mood/tense of verb in consequent
(13) If Oswald didn’t kill Kennedy, somebody else did.
(14) If Oswald hadn’t killed Kennedy, somebody else would
have.
(Adams 1970)
26
Classifications of conditionals (2)
• Sweetser (1990)
(15) If John goes, (as a result) Mary will go
(16) If John was there, (it means) Mary was there
(17) If you think about it, Mary must have been there
– Content / epistemic / speech act conditionals
– Correspond to different ‘cognitive domains’
– Concerned with processing
27
Conditional thoughts and conditional utterances
• No bi-unique correlation between form and
content of conditionals
– does not make sense to talk of a category of
conditionals in terms of constructions
– for the category of conditionals, there may not be
much significance of the form p  q
28
Conditional thoughts and conditional utterances
(cont.)
(a) Utterance does not have conditional LF
– Primary intended meaning is conditional
(b) Utterance has conditional LF
– Primary intended meaning is conditional
– Primary intended meaning is not conditional
29
A corpus-based approach
• Corpus-based project on classifying
conditionals
• Great British component of the International
Corpus of English (ICE-GB)
• 300 spoken conversations
• 2000 words per conversation
30
46 percent of conditional utterances use ‘if’
(ICE-GB, Elder 2012)
31
• Narrowing scope to conditional constructions
• Want to look at relation between form and
content
32
2 main types of conditional (Quirk et al 1985)
1. Direct conditionals:
– consequent is conditional on antecedent
2. Indirect conditionals:
– consequent is not conditional on antecedent
(6) There are biscuits on the sideboard if you want some
(Austin 1961)
33
Direct conditionals
(18) If you’d listened to me you’d only be seventy behind
>> You should have listened to me
(19) She’d be terribly offended if we didn’t come and pick her up
>> We’d better go and pick her up
(20) Oh if you hit me one more time I’ll kill you
>> Don’t hit me again
34
Indirect conditionals
(6) There are biscuits on the sideboard if you want some
>> please help yourself
(3) If you wouldn’t mind, could you close the door?
>> please close the door
35
Indirect conditionals
• Consequent is true regardless of truth of antecedent
• Austin (1961): ‘Indirect conditionals’ are not conditional
• Predelli (2009): Antecedent of an indirect conditional is
‘truth-conditionally irrelevant’
Is there any conditional relation between the
antecedent/consequent of an indirect conditional?
36
From indirect to direct conditionals
• Can enrich consequent of an indirect conditional to give a
conditional relationship
(6) There are biscuits on the sideboard if you want some
>> there are biscuits which you may have if you want some
(21) If anyone asks, you’re four years old
>> if anyone asks, say you’re four years old
• Indirect conditional at level of LF may be pragmatically
interpreted as a direct conditional
• Enrichment may have to go beyond extending the extant LF
37
Conditional meaning may not be speaker’s
primary intended meaning
(6) There are biscuits on the sideboard if you want some
>> there are biscuits which you may have if you want some
>> please help yourself (primary meaning)
(21) If anyone asks, you’re four years old
>> if anyone asks, say you’re four years old (primary
meaning)
38
What if there is no uttered consequent?
(22) Now if you’d like to put on your helmet
…that’d be great?
…you’ll be safe?
…the police won’t catch you?
>> put on your helmet (primary meaning)
• There need not be one single intended consequent
recoverable from the context
• At the level of thoughts, there may not be an intention of a
consequent
39
• How far can we legitimately enrich the consequent to show a
conditional relationship between antecedent and
consequent?
• How easy is this enrichment?
40
Conditional relationship – some
enrichment/modulation required
(21) If anyone asks, you’re four years old
>> If anyone asks, say you’re four years old
(23) If you’ve ever tried running your own business, it’s very
difficult
>> If you’ve ever tried running your own business, you’ll
know that it’s very difficult
>> Running a business is very difficult
(24) If you’d come round here, we have the Ottomans
>> If you’d come round here, you’ll see we have the
Ottomans
>> Come round here and see the Ottomans
41
‘I invite you to do q (if you want to)’
(25) I can dig the stuff out on it if there’s any interest
>> I offer to dig the stuff out
(26) You can break into the pears if you want to
>> I invite you to have a pear
(27) Do hang your coat up if you’d like to
>> I invite you to hang your coat up
• Weak conditional relationship
• Consequent provides main message
42
‘I’m going to do q (if you’ll let me)’
(28) I’m just going to top up my tea again if you don’t mind
(29) Let me develop the point if I may
(30) I’d really love to tape it from you if you didn’t mind
•
•
•
Weak conditional relationship
If hedges non-propositional (speech act) content
If calls for hearer’s agreement/acquiescence to action
described in consequent
43
Conditional expressed through indirect form
(31) If I remember rightly you had jaundice, didn’t you
>> If I remember rightly, I know that you had jaundice
>> You had jaundice, didn’t you?
• One intended consequent but not stated explicitly
• If hedges propositional content of consequent
44
No explicit conditional relationship
(32) It is still peanuts if you’ll pardon the expression
(33) She was on the plump side, if I may respectfully say so
(34) Very short skirt on if you don’t mind me saying
•
•
•
If used to hedge propositional or non-propositional
content
Cannot retract assertion made in consequent; it is
already ‘out there’
Antecedent calls for hearer’s implicit acceptance
45
Conditional meaning, but no one intended
consequent
(22) Now if you’d like to put on your helmet
>> Put on your helmet
(35) So if you could work on that one
>> Work on that one
(36) If you can hold on just half a minute while I put these
potatoes out
>> Hold on half a minute
•
•
Conventionalised use of if
Primary meaning: do p
46
• Recoverability of the conditional relationship is
independent of whether the conditional meaning is the
primary meaning
• There are different degrees of intentions associated with
conditional meaning
•
How to capture this in semantics?
47
Conditionals in radical contextualism
(9)
Be great if you would do that.
(22)
Now if you’d like to put on your helmet.
(37)
Touch his iPad and he will scream.
48
Conditionals in radical contextualism
Languages without conditional connective:
‘…while perhaps none of the logical connectives are universally
lexically expressed, there is no evidence that languages differ in
whether or not logical connectives are present in their logical
forms.’
von Fintel & Matthewson (2008: 170)
49
Conditionals in radical contextualism
contextualism(s) vs. relativism(s)
50
Conditionals in radical contextualism
• contextualism (one sentence – multiple propositions;
indexicalism vs. free enrichment)
51
Davis (2013):
(38)
If a dangerous object has been found, security should be
summoned.
52
Davis against content relativism and dyadic
contextualism (but not going far enough)
‘If indicative conditionals have anything like the
Stalnaker semantics (…), there is no need to explain
away the fact that if one speaker says ‘If A, C’ and
another says, ‘It is not the case that if A, C’, then they
are disagreeing with each other and one party has to
be wrong. For on such a semantics, the two speakers
are expressing incompatible propositions.’
Davis (2013: 37)
53
Our examples
Overt conditional
(9)
Be great if you would do that.
(6)
There are biscuits on the sideboard if you want some.
(39) If you don’t mind me saying so, you look dreadful in this
frock.
No overt conditional
(40) Snowing? Let’s go skiing.
(37) Touch his iPad and he will scream.
(5)
The dog might bark. The postman might run away.
(Guugu Yimithirr)
54
Various types of conditional thought?
“The varied and numerous uses of ‘if’ in everyday language
(…) all have something in common: the listener is invited to
suppose or imagine a hypothetical state of affairs.”
“Inferences may be deductive, probabilistic, or pragmatic,
with both implicit and explicit cognitive systems playing
their part.”
Evans & Over (2004: 171-172)
55
Changing mental states of the interlocutors;
suppositions
Indicative:
(41) If Jim cheats, he will be found out.
Subjunctive:
(42) If Jim had cheated, he would have been found out.
Interrogative:
(43) Everyone wondered if Jim had cheated.
cf. Byrne & Johnson-Laird 2010; Starr 2011
56
Suppositions as primary or secondary meanings
(22)
Now if you’d like to put on your helmet.
57
Conditionals in Default Semantics
 K.M. Jaszczolt, 2005, Default Semantics: Foundations of a
Compositional Theory of Acts of Communication, Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
 K. M. Jaszczolt, 2010. ‘Default Semantics’. In: B. Heine and H.
Narrog (eds). The Oxford Handbook of Linguistic Analysis.
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 215-246.
world knowledge (WK)
word meaning and sentence structure (WS)
merger representation Σ
situation of discourse (SD)
stereotypes and presumptions
about society and culture (SC)
properties of human inferential system (IS)
Fig. 1: Sources of information contributing to a merger representation Σ
Primary meaning:
combination of word meaning
and sentence structure (WS)
merger representation Σ
social, cultural and
cognitive defaults (CD)
world-knowledge defaultspm (SCWDpm)
conscious pragmatic inferencepm
(from situation of discourse, social and
cultural assumptions, and world
knowledge) (CPIpm)
Secondary meanings:
 Social, cultural and world-knowledge defaultssm (SCWDsm)
 conscious pragmatic inferencesm (CPIsm)
Fig. 2: Utterance interpretation according to the processing model of the revised
version of Default Semantics
sources of information
types of processes
61
Mapping between sources and processes
WK
SC
WS
SD
IS





SCWD or CPI
SCWD or CPI
WS
(logical form)
CPI
CD
DS makes use of the processing model and it indexes the components of 
with a subscript standing for the type of processing.
62
‘The imperfect conditional perfection’
Fig. 3.  for ‘If you mow the lawn, I will give you five dollars.’
x y z e1 e2
the speaker (x)
the addressee (y)
the lawn (z)

tf
[e1 → e2]WS
[ACC e1]WS
[ACCrf e2]WS, CD
e1: [y mow z]WS
e2: [x give $5 to y]WS
[e1  e2]CPI 1
63
Compositionality on the level of interaction of
processes (interactive compositionality)
Different from:
Frege’s compositionality
‘Gestaltist’, pragmatic compositionality (Recanati 2004)
Compositionality of thought >> compositionality of language
in Embodied Construction Grammar (e.g. Feldman’s 2010)
64
Conditionals in Interactive Semantics
K. M. Jaszczolt, in progress, Interactive Semantics, Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
65
Representing conditional thought (two dimensions)
1. p  ?PM
‘If you leave the tea on a wobbly table…’
2. p  ?SM
‘If you’d like to put on your helmet.’ PM: ‘Please put your helmet on.’
3. p  q WS, PM
‘If it rains, we will stay at home.’
4. p  q WS, SM
‘If you are hungry, there is food in the fridge.’ PM: ‘Help yourself to food.’
5. p  q , PM
‘Touch his iPad and he will scream.’ PM: ‘If you touch his iPad, he will scream.’
?6. p  q
, SM
‘Please put your helmet on.’ SM: ‘If you put the helmet on, you will be safer.’
66
Fig. 4.  for 1. p  ?PM ‘If you leave the tea on a wobbly table…’
x y z e1 e2
the addressee (x)
tea (y)
wobbly table (z)

[e1 → e2]CD, CPIpm
tf
[ACC e1]WS
[ACCrf e2]CD, CPIpm
e1 :
[x leave y on z ]WS
e2 :
[x spill y] CD, CPIpm
67
Fig. 5.  for 2. p  ?SM ‘If you’d like to put on your helmet.’
PM: ‘Please put your helmet on.’
x y e1 e2
the addressee (x)
helmet (y)

e1 :
e2 :
[the speaker requests e2]CD, CPIpm
[x put on y]WS
68
Fig. 6.  for 5. p  q , PM ‘Touch his iPad and he will scream.’
x y z e1 e2

the addressee (x)
ipad (y)
contextually salient male (z)
[e1 → e2]CD, CPIpm
[ACCtf e1] CD, CPIpm
[ACCrf e2]WS
e1:
e2:
[x touch z’s y]WS, CD, CPIpm
[z scream]WS
69
Conclusions
• The meaning of the utterance is attributable to the result of
the interaction of information coming from different sources
identified in Default/Interactive Semantics.
• The diversity of (i) uses to which conditional if can be put and
(ii) ways of expressing conditional meaning can be
represented in a radical contextualist account (IS).
• The semantics of conditionals is best pursued when
conditional thought is adopted as the object of study, where
such conditional thoughts constitute primary or secondary
meaning of an utterance that is expressed by a conditional or
other sentence form.
70
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