LECTURE 23
MANY COSMOI
HYPOTHESIS &
PURPOSIVE DESIGN
(SUMMARY AND
GLIMPSES BEYOND)
THE REQUIREMENT OF TOTAL
EVIDENCE
(RTE) IT IS NOT REASONABLE TO BELIEVE
THE CONCLUSION OF AN INDUCTIVELY
STRONG ARGUMENT ON THE BASIS OF
ITS PREMISES UNLESS THE PREMISES
CONTAIN ALL THE KNOWN RELEVANT
EVIDENCE.
(BERNOULLI, J.M. KEYNES, CARNAP)
VAN INWAGEN’S EVOLUTIONARY
MANY UNIVERSES HYPOTHESIS
VAN INWAGEN SUGGESTS A
NATURALISTIC HYPOTHESIS WHICH
HE CLAIMS MAKES THE OBSERVED
EVIDENCE JUST AS LIKELY AS THE
THEISTIC HYPOTHESIS. THEREFORE,
HE CONCLUDES, THE EVIDENCE DOES
NOT SUPPORT DESIGN OVER
NATURAL MECHANISMS.
CHANCE AND AN OBSERVATIONAL
SELECTION EFFECT
NH VI: THE OBSERVED COSMOS IS ONLY ONE
AMONG A VAST NUMBER OF COSMOI.
SUPPOSE ALSO THAT THE OTHER COSMOI ARE
“SCREENED OFF” FROM US.
THIS HYPOTHESIS MAKES IT PROBABLE THAT
SOME COSMOI WILL BE FINE-TUNED. NO
DESIGN IS REQUIRED. MAYBE IT EVEN MAKES
THE DATA MORE PROBABLE THAN THEISM
DOES.
OF COURSE, WE MUST COMPARE
THESE HYPOTHESES ON ALL THE
EVIDENCE (RTE)
THE FINE-TUNING OF OUR
COSMOS DOES NOT BY ITSELF
RENDER THEISM MORE
REASONABLE THAN NATURALISM
(ACCORDING TO VAN INWAGEN).
SUMMARY
(ALL CONCLUSIONS ARE
TENTATIVE)
(1) “WHY IS THERE ANYTHING?”
(a) THE MODAL ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT
FOR THE NECESSITY OF SOMETHING
EXISTING IS THE ONLY ONTOLOGICAL
ARGUMENT THAT WE HAVE JUDGED VALID.
ITS COGENCY DEPENDS ON THE PREMISE “IT
IS POSSIBLE THAT THERE IS A PERFECT
BEING” OR “IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THERE IS A
NECESSARILY EXISTENT INDIVIDUAL."
A COMOLOGICAL ARGUMENT
(b) THE MAIN COSMOLOGICAL ARGUMENT WE
CONSIDERED DEPENDS ON THE PRINCIPLE OF
SUFFICIENT REASON.
(i) QUANTUM MECHANICS SEEMS TO COUNT
HEAVILY AGAINST THE PRINCIPLE OF
SUFFICIENT REASON.
(ii) A METAPHYSICAL ARGUMENT SEEMS TO
SHOW THAT (PSR) IMPLIES THAT ALL
PROPOSTIONS ARE NECESSARY.
THE INHABITANTS OF THE COSMOS
(2) “WHAT RATIONAL BEINGS ARE THERE?” WE
SHOULD REMAIN AGNOSTIC ON THE
QUESTION OF WHETHER THERE ARE OTHER
RATIONAL BEINGS ON OTHER PLANETS.
(3) “WHY ARE THERE RATIONAL BEINGS?” THE
TWO HYPOTHESES THAT WE HAVE CHOSEN
TO CONSIDER ARE: (a) CHANCE (PLUS LAWS
OF NATURE), AND (b) PURPOSIVE DESIGN.
THE FINE-TUNING ARGUMENT
(b) THE “FINE-TUNING” OF OUR COSMOS SEEMS
TO SUPPORT THE HYPOTHESIS OF PURPOSIVE
DESIGN OVER THE ASSUMPTION OF A SINGLE
COSMOS WITH LAWS OF NATURE AS BRUTE
FACTS.
BUT: VAN INWAGEN ARGUES THAT A CERTAIN
VERSION OF THE “MANY COSMOI”
HYPOTHESIS IS JUST AS GOOD.
SO WE DO NOT SO FAR HAVE A
PREFERABLE ANSWER TO “WHY
ARE THERE RATIONAL BEINGS?”
WHAT WE HAVE NOT DONE IS TO CONSIDER THE
TWO HYPOTHESES WITH RESPECT TO ALL THE
EVIDENCE. EVEN IN METAPHYSICS ONE
SHOULD CONSIDER ALL THE EVIDENCE
BEARING ON SUCH QUESTIONS. “KNOCKDOWN” ARGUMENTS ARE RARE.
ROBIN COLLINS ON OBJECTIONS
TO THEISM AS ACCOUNTING FOR
FINE-TUNING (AS OPPOSED TO A
SINGLE COSMOS NATURALISTIC
HYPOTHESIS)
• OBJECTION 1: MORE FUNDAMENTAL LAWS
OBJECTION. “THERE MAY BE MORE
FUNDAMENTAL LAWS THAT EXPLAIN FINETUNING.” RESPONSE: THIS ONLY RAISES THE
QUESTION OF THE BEST EXPLANATION FOR
THE EXISTENCE OF SUCH LAWS YIELDING
FINE-TUNING.
OBJECTION 2
“OTHER FORMS OF LIFE MIGHT BE ABLE TO
EXIST EVEN IF THE CONSTANTS WERE NOT
FINE-TUNED.”
RESPONSE: SOME OF THE FINE-TUNINGS
COULD NOT BE CHANGED SO AS TO PERMIT
ANYTHING COMPLEX. EVEN IF WE
CONTEMPLATE FAR-OUT POSSIBILITIES, IT IS
NOT REALLY RELEVANT TO THE PRESENT
PROBABILITY COMPARISON.
OBJECTION 3
“THE ANTHROPIC PRINCIPLE OBJECTION”: IF
THE LAWS, CONSTANTS, AND CONDITIONS
WERE NOT SUCH AS TO PERMIT LIFE, WE
WOULDN’T BE HERE TO ASK THE QUESTION.”
RESPONSE: ALTHOUGH THIS IS TRUE, IT DOES
NOT REALLY RESPOND TO THE ARGUMENT.
CF. “THE FIRING-SQUAD ANALOGY”
OBJECTION 4
THE “WHO DESIGNED GOD?” OBJECTION: THE
THEISTIC HYPOTHESIS POSTULATES A BEING
WHO MUST BE MORE COMPLEX THAN THE
COSMOS IN WHICH WE FIND OURSELVES. SO
WE ARE TRYING TO EXPLAIN COMPLEXITY
WITH MORE COMPLEXITY.
RESPONSE: WE ARE NOT TRYING TO EXPLAIN
COMPLEXITY, ONLY WHY THERE IS FINETUNING.
OBJECTION 5
THE “NO PROBABILITY” OBECTION: THERE IS
NO MEANINGFUL WAY TO ESTIMATE THE
PROBABILITIES INVOLVED IN OUR FINAL
EVALUATION.
RESPONSE: NUMERICAL PROBABILITIES ARE
NOT POSSIBLE IN MANY CASES. STILL WE CAN
AND DO JUDGE WHETHER ONE THING IS
MORE LIKELY THAN ANOTHER. (CF.
“EPISTEMIC PROBABILITY”)
COLLINS ON MANY-COSMOI
ROBIN COLLINS ALSO DISCUSSES MANYCOSMOI HYPOTHESES AND POINTS OUT
SOME DIFFICULTIES. HIS MAIN
OBJECTION APPEALS TO SOMETHING
LIKE (PSR) (A WEAK VERSION PERHAPS):
HOW COULD WE EXPLAIN COSMOIGENERATING MECHANISMS OR THE
EXISTENCE OF VAST NUMBERS OF
COSMOI?
THE NATURALISTIC RESPONSE
WE HAVE TO END OUR EXPLANATIONS
SOMEWHERE. THE EXISTENCE OF A COSMOIGENERATING MECHANISM OR A VAST
NUMBER OF COSMOI IS JUST A BRUTE FACT.
A THEISTIC REJOINDER: MY HYPOTHESIS IS
SIMPLER AND BETTER EXPLAINS MANY OTHER
FEATURES OF THE COSMOS: THE OBJECTIVITY
OF ETHICS, CONSCIOUSNESS, RATIONALITY,
THE EXISTENCE AND BEAUTY OF THE LAWS OF
NATURE, AND THE NECESSITY OF LOGIC AND
MATHEMATICS.
A THOROUGH EVALUATION OF THE
TWO HYPOTHESES IS A LARGE TASK
(NH*) THERE ARE A LARGE NUMBER OF
COSMOI, EITHER GENERATED BY SOME
NATURAL MECHANISM OR WHICH JUST EXIST
AS A BRUTE FACT. NATURAL LAWS AND
CHANCE CAN EXPLAIN FINE-TUNING.
EMPLOYING THE RESOURCES OF EVOLUTION,
NATURAL LAWS AND CHANCE CAN EXPLAIN
THE OBSERVED FEATURES OF LIVING
(INCLUDING RATIONAL) CREATURES.
A THEISTIC HYPOTHESIS
(TH) THERE IS A PERFECT BEING WHO FREELY
CHOSE TO CREATE THE COSMOS AND ALL ITS
LAWS, WHICH LATTER ARE FINE-TUNED TO
PERMIT THE EXISTENCE OF LIFE.
THE TOTAL-AVAILABLE-EVIDENCE COMPARISON
OF THESE INVOLVES MANY OTHER AREAS OF
PHILOSOPHY
ASSIGNMENT
• READ CHAPTER 10, “THE
NATURE OF RATIONAL BEINGS:
DUALISM AND PHYSICALISM”