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For a city to maintain its competitiveness,
governance is arguably extremely important
Good governance refers to not only (1)
relatively clean, transparent, and publicly
accountable government, but also to (2)
political leadership and (3) a political system
operating smoothly with feedback from the
government to the demands of the society
(1) HKSAR does have a relatively clean
government, but whether it is really publicly
accountable remains arguably debatable
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(2) On leadership, in Hong Kong under colonial
rule, leaders were groomed or cultivated by the
British rulers at the society and political level
Famous business elites and social leaders were
appointed by the colonial rulers advisory bodies,
Legislative and Executive Councils
But after July 1997, there has been a tendency of
having the Chief Executives and government
appointing only friends and followers into the
political system (result: the exclusion of political
critics bringing about mutual distrusts)
Former Chief Executive D. Tsang: “There is a
distinction between relatives/friends and nonrelatives/friends”
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(3) On governmental responsiveness as stressed by
David Easton’s system theory, the HKSAR government
does respond to public opinion, but the challenges
are whether (a) such responsiveness is adequate, (b)
whether the political system in Hong Kong is now
flooded with demands and inputs but not sufficient
outputs/responses, and (c) whether the government
is reforming the institutions sufficiently and rapidly
to absorb the growing demands from parties, groups
and younger generations who see the huge income
gap between rich and poor as a sign of an “unhealthy
political system” in Hong Kong after July 1997
Samuel Huntington: institutional reforms can absorb
demand overload so as to maintain political stability
HKSAR appears to lack sufficient institutional reforms
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Ideally political leadership should embrace the
critics, understand their viewpoints and absorb
them in policy formulation processes
This was the strategy of the British colonial rule
in Hong Kong before July 1997
But after July 1, 1997, gradually this cooptation
strategy has been shifted to a more prominent
spoil system – friends and followers are coopted, but critics tend to be excluded from
Executive Council and advisory bodies
Critics have yet been directly elected to LegCo
Results: (1) Political distrusts/confrontations
between the powerful and powerless, (2) public
policies can be easily detached from public
opinion and sentiments
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Compounding the problem of political distrust is
that the Chief Executive and his Principal Officials
Accountability System (POAS) appointees are
structurally and constitutionally bound to be
more loyal to Beijing than to the people of Hong
Kong (their role as a “political sandwich”)
C. Y. Leung is perceived by some critics as “too
red”, “more reddish” than either D. Tsang (civil
servant background) and C. H. Tung (shipping
business background)
The fierce election contest between Leung and
Henry Tang (business) worsened the image of
Leung as a pro-Beijing “loyalist” (even Regina Ip
asked Leung not to be so pro-Beijing publicly)
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In the West, political parties groom leaders,
but in Hong Kong there are limitations: (1)
parties cannot govern Hong Kong; (2) Chief
Executive is not affiliated to parties although
he or she might be supported by parties in CE
elections; (3) parties lack research support
unlike the West although HKSAR parties
conduct research; (4) parties in HKSAR are
less powerful than the POAS appointees
(some of them come from pro-government
parties but may need more time to learn
about how to govern HKSAR with skills)
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The Basic Law of Hong Kong SAR says
nothing about political parties
This means that parties belong to the
operation of “constitutional conventions”:
political habits that can change over time
If so, the underdevelopment of parties
perpetuates the lack of leadership, it can be
argued
But it can also be argued that under the
constraint of the Basic Law, pro-Beijing party
DAB does groom political leaders for HKSAR
(eg: Jasper Tsang, Tam Yiu-chung, etc)
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Affirmative: Yes, because it at least provides
opportunities for appointees (partiesaffiliated or independents without party
affiliation) to learn political skills and become
leaders, because it provides avenues for
poorly performed appointees to (a) publicly
apologize for mistakes, (b) be reprimanded
by the Chief Executive, (c) resign (Anthony
Leung), because they support the Chief
Executive’s policies, and because the POAS
does protect thepolitical neutrality of civil
servants
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Negative: No, because the POAS system
represents a spoil system co-opting friends
and followers of the Chief Executive while
excluding political critics and politically
competent politicians (some pan-democrats
in the opposition camp do show legal
knowledge and political skills), because the
system makes the CE and his supporters
accountable to Beijing rather than to the HK
people, because it does not encourage the
development of political parties that ideally
provide the channel of cultivating political
leaders for HKSAR in the long run
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1. Should political parties be allowed to develop further and fully
through the enactment of political party law?
2. Should we give tax incentives to business people to donate to political
parties?
3. Should we expand the powers of 18 District Councils (DCs) so that
more local politicians learn how to govern DCs (each of which can set up
executive committee for locally elected politicians to manage a district –
like a small Executive Council in each of 18 Districts)?
4. Should we change the POAS system in a way that at least a few
secretaries/undersecretaries come from the democrats elected directly
to Legislative Council (more competent democrats appointed)?
5. Should more political critics be appointed to advisory councils, and
even perhaps the ExCo, so that their views will be heard?
6. Should HKSAR be allowed to directly elect the Chief Executive and the
entire Legislative Council in the long run?
7. Should Beijing trust the people of Hong Kong more so that the double
direct elections as mentioned in 6 above will be achieved?
8. Should pro-Beijing politicians and academics play a more active role
in fostering mutually trustful relations between pan-democrats and
Beijing?
9. Any new solutions that you may suggest??
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Arguably, Hong Kong’s competitiveness depends not just
on economic/financial areas (relatively low tax,
monetary/financial centers), favorable business
environment (positive non-interventionism in the 70s/80s
to a more interventionist policy in 2000s), the rule of law
(protection of intellectual property, of private property, of
individual and groups rights, and of procedural due
processes), legal reforms (like possibility of developing
competition law, persisting in the study of law reforms),
education development (reform, harmony between local
and national identity, the import of talents from mainland),
and improvement in the quality of life (environmental
protection and sustainable development), but also on how
HKSAR manage the political economy of development and
coordination with its neighbors in Pearl River Delta as well
as governance (political leadership, parties development,
constitutional reforms) in the coming decades.
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Hong Kong’s competitiveness perhaps includes at
least seven dimensions:
1. Economic/Financial policies
2. Favorable business environment
3. The rule of law and its related legal reforms
4. Educational development (higher education,
secondary and primary education)
5. Improving the quality of life socially (sustainable
development, better environmental protection)
6. Political economy of development, coordination
and competition with the Pearl River Delta regions
7. Governance (political leadership, political parties,
political reforms)
Governance is and will be a challenge to the political
leaders in the HKSAR in the years to come
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If Hong Kong SAR really has the governance
problems of lacking political leaders and
relatively underdeveloped political parties, as well
as deep mutual distrust between the powerful
and the powerless, what do you think of the
possible eight solutions (see the slide “Possible
solutions if leaders lacking and parties
immature”?
Do you agree or disagree with each solution?
Do you have any other new solution that can and
will help HKSAR’s governance in the coming
decades?
Discuss.