Chapter 11:
Nuclear Nonproliferation and
Safeguards
Jad Hudaib
• Nonproliferation: “The effort to stop other
nations from producing nuclear weapons
or any nuclear explosive devise.”
– Nicholas Tsoulfanidis, The Nuclear Fuel Cycle.
• Safeguards: Policies, procedures, and
controls set up by the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to achieve
nonproliferation.
Nuclear Club
• Original Five:
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United States (1944-1945)
Russia (1949)
United Kingdoms (1952)
France (1960)
China (1964)
• Partial Success
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India (1976)
Pakistan (1998)
North Korea (2005)
Israel (????)
• Honorable Attempts:
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South Africa
Brazil
Libya
Iraq
Iran (in progress)
International Atomic Energy Agency
• Created in 1957, based in Vienna, Austria.
• Autonomous Intergovernmental Organization.
• Reports to UN General Assembly and UN
Security Council.
• Currently 159 Member States (2013)
IAEA cont.
• Composed of a General Conference, Board of
Governors, and Director General.
• General Conference comprises of all member
states and is the policy making body of the
IAEA.
• Board of Governors examines and makes
recommendations to the General Conf.
regarding accounts, and budget of IAEA.
IAEA cont.
• Objectives:
– Providing safe, secure, and peaceful uses
of nuclear technology and science to
nations.
– Ensuring that any nuclear activities that the
IAEA are involved with are not being used
for any military agenda.
IAEA cont.
• Made up of five departments:
– Nuclear Science and Applications
– Nuclear Energy
– Nuclear safety and Security
– Technical Cooperation
– Safeguards
IAEA cont.
• Nuclear Science and Applications: Helps
member countries in the use of atomic and
nuclear radiation in agriculture, medical
programs, industrial applications…etc.
• Nuclear Energy: Promotes the efficient and
safe application of nuclear power for
peaceful means; mostly power generation.
IAEA cont.
• Nuclear Safety and Security: Establish
measures for the protection of people and the
environment from radiation, and to develop
programs for the response to nuclear
accidents.
• Technical Cooperation: Helps nations improve
their scientific and technological abilities for
peaceful uses of nuclear technology.
IAEA cont.
• Safeguards: Carries out its responsibilities
as the world’s inspector in an effort to stop
the spread of nuclear weapons.
• IAEA is the only international Agency with
the responsibility of inspecting nuclear
facilities across the world, to insure the
signed agreements are being followed.
IAEA cont.
• It creates policies to ensure that weapons
materials do not become available the nonnuclear weapon states or terrorist
organizations.
• This information is distributed to member
states in reports known as Information
Circulars.
Non-Proliferation Treaty
• Completed in 1968.
• Original five nuclear weapon states
realized that if more countries develop
nuclear weapon, then the risk of nuclear
accidents will increase.
• The effort to limit NWS resulted in the
NPT.
NPT cont.
• 190 States have currently signed.
• India, Pakistan, and Israel never signed.
• Three Important declarations of the NPT:
1. Nuclear weapon states promise not to
provide weapons materials and technology
to anyone else and to commit to
disarmament.
NPT cont.
2. States with nuclear technology promise
to help others without it, with the idea that
every state should reap the benefits of
nuclear energy.
3. The Treaty recognizes the inalienable right
of every state to utilize nuclear energy for
peaceful purposes.
NPT cont.
• Conferences were held in both 1995 and
2010 to extend and reaffirm the NPT.
Information Circulars
• Informational reports that IAEA distributed
regarding agreements made by member
states.
• 854 have been released.
• Most recent have been about a response
from Iran about the UN’s efforts and
concerns about nonproliferation in the state.
INFCIRC cont.
• Three most important INFCIRC are:
1. INFCIRC/66 (1968): The Agency’s
Safeguards System- Lists the duties
and obligations of the IAEA, and the
procedures and principles of
implementing safeguards.
INFCIRC cont.
2. INFCIRC/153 (1972): The Structure and
Content of Agreements between the
Agency and States Required in
Connection with the Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear WeaponsAgreements should include a guarantee
by the state to accept safeguards set by
the Treaty and the IAEA.
INFCIRC cont.
3. INFCIRC/540 (1997): Model Protocol
Additional to the Agreement(s) between
State(s) and the IAEA for the Application
of Safeguards- States must adhere to:
1. Freely give all information regarding
a State’s Fuel Cycle.
INFCIRC cont.
2. Provide information on the
manufacture and export of devices
using nuclear technologies and
inspection mechanisms for
manufacturing and import locations of
such devices.
INFCIRC cont.
3. Allow, after short notice, IAEA
inspections of all buildings on a
nuclear site.
4. Collection of environmental samples
at the IAEA’s discretion.
Safeguards
• Safeguards: Policies, procedures, and
controls set up by the IAEA to achieve
nonproliferation.
• Safeguard efforts are centered on
international treaties and the activities of
the IAEA.
• Objectives:
1. Timely detection of diversion of nuclear
materials for peaceful activities to the
manufacture of nuclear explosives.
2. Detection of diversion of nuclear materials
or information from one state to another or
to a non-state group for making nuclear
explosives.
3. Deterrence of such diversion because of
the risk of detection.
Safeguards cont.
• Completing these objectives are based on
the verification of the national system of
accountancy and control of nuclear
materials.
• Verification is done by IAEA inspections,
surveillance, and material accountability.
Safeguards cont.
• Following the NPT, nuclear weapon states
follow IAEA Safeguards voluntarily:
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US, UK, France, India: All Civil Facilities
Russia: Not all, yet
China: All imported nuclear facilities
Pakistan: Civilian reactors under restricted
agreement
– North Korea, Israel: No civilian nuclear power
• Agreements: treaties or agreements
between the IAEA and a State for the
application of Safeguards.
• INFCIRC/66-type safeguards agreement —
specifies the nuclear material, non-nuclear
material, facilities and or equipment to be
safeguarded.
• Voluntary offer agreement (VOA) —
between IAEA and a NWS to answer
concerns that Safeguards could lead to
commercial disadvantages.
• Comprehensive safeguards agreement
(CSA) — an agreement that applies
safeguards on all nuclear material in all
nuclear activities in a State.
Compliance with Safeguards
• Every state with a signed agreement with
the IAEA must prove that it complies to the
agreement.
• Use of Nuclear Material accountability.
• Upon inspection, the State must
demonstrate and prove that the
documented material mass at each nuclear
facility match the real inventory.
• The difference between the documented
and real inventory is called material
unaccounted for (MUF).
• MUF= (PB+X-Y)-PE
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PB= beginning physical inventory
X= increases to inventory
Y=decreases to inventory
PE= ending physical inventory
Example
• An Uranium enrichment facility currently
holds 600kg of U, a shipment of 25kg of
U comes in the same day as 3kg of U is
being shipped out to a national lab. IAEA
inspectors come the next day to find
623kg of U on site. What is the MUF and
is it acceptable?
Noncompliance with Safeguards
• “Noncompliance” is found throughout
the founding articles of the IAEA.
• However, not well defined.
• Up to Board of Governors to decide.
• Events that may constitute Noncompliance:
– MUF is high or unexplained: ( mass
measured< documented inventory)
– Nuclear material or nuclear activity has not
been declared.
– Use of nuclear material is not clearly civil, if
there is suspicion that it may be use for military
purposes.
– Military grade nuclear material or information
related to the military use of nuclear material
has been given to a third party.
• In the course of a Noncompliance inquiry
the following questions are asked:
– Does evidence of falsehoods and
concealment exist? Thus indicating the
actions were deliberate.
– What material is involved?
• (natural U, thorium, fissile material…etc)
– What are the activities involved? Can they
lead to enrichment and weapons grade
material?
– Where is the material?
• To declare Noncompliance, according to
INFCIRC/153:
– Nuclear material or activity has not been
declared or that is has been removed from
Safeguards.
– The failure is considered significant.
– The purpose of the nuclear material or
activity is military based or uncertain.
• To remedy Noncompliance, the State
comply to the steps in INFCIRC/153 & 540.
Strategic Nuclear Materials
• Materials safeguards are place on:
– Thorium
– Uranium
– Plutonium
• “Not all isotopes are created equally”
• IAEA classifies materials as:
– Direct Use Materials
– Special Fissionable Materials
– Indirect Use Materials
• Direct Use Material
– Can be use to create nuclear explosive devises
without further enrichment or transmutation
– Pu containing < 80% Pu-238
– Highly enriched Uranium
– U-233
– MOX Fuel
– UNF (used nuclear fuel)
• Indirect use Material:
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All material except Direct use Material
Natural & low enriched Uranium
Depleted Uranium
Thorium
• Special Fissionable Material (Special Nuclear
Material):
– Pu-239, U-233, Uranium enriched in U-233,235
– Other fissionable material determined by BOG
– Doesn’t include source material (U or Th in any
physical or chemical form or ore contain at least
.05% of either
• Effective Kilogram (ekg):
– Max quantity of nuclear materials in “location
outside facility”
– LOF: any installation or location where nuclear
materials used are < 1 ekg
– ekg: determined by:
• Pu weight (kg)
• U enriched > 1%: [weight (kg)]*[enrichment2 ]
• .5%< U enriched < 1%: [weight (kg)]*[.0001]
• U enriched < .5% or Th: [weight (kg)*[.00005]
• Significant Quantity:
– Amount of nuclear material that could possibly
be used to manufacture a nuclear explosive
devise.
– Takes into account unavoidable losses due to
conversion and manufacturing process.
– Not Critical Mass
• INFCIRC/66:
– IAEA demands info regarding materials used
in fission reactors:
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Nuclear grade Graphite, heavy water, deuterium,
zirconium and zirconium alloys
Nuclear Fuel Cycle and Proliferation
• 1970s U.S. conducted study called: the
Nonproliferation Alternate Systems
Assessment Program (NASAP).
• NASAP determined:
– No fuel cycle is 100% proliferation resistant
– Once-through fuel cycle is the most
.proliferation resistant due to the fact that the
weapons grade material is never separated
during the cycle.
Detection of Nuclear Materials
• Cases where detection may be required:
– Border crossing screening ( required of
cargo containers and carriers).
– Screening of materials in transit.
– Searching for and seizing materials at
suspicious locations.
– After a radiological weapon has been
detonated.
• Methods for detection:
– Chemistry (radiochemistry or mass
spectrometry) or radiation based ( detecting
ionizing radiation).
– Destructive or Nondestructive.
– Active or Passive.
• Active Detection Method:
– “Interrogation Method”
– External radiation (neutron or gamma)
irradiates a sample which produces
measurable radiations.
– Radiations produced result from the fission
of fissile material.
– Neutron Sources:
• 14 MeV neutrons from a neutron generator.
• Spontaneous fission of Cf-252 producing fast
neutrons.
• Active Detection Method cont.:
– Photons > 6 MeV are used to initiate
photofission (gamma, fission) reaction.
• Produced as Bremsstrahlung using an electron
accelerator.
– Fissile material is indicated by fission
neutrons and gammas.
• Passive detection Methods:
– Detect:
• Neutrons from spontaneous fission from (alpha,
neutron) reactions in the sample.
• X-rays emitted by decaying fissile isotopes.
– All isotopes under safeguards undergo
spontaneous fission as a mode of decay.
– He-3 counter is used to detect the
neutrons.
• Passive detection Methods cont.:
– Safeguarded isotopes also emit X-rays.
– X-rays are detected by high purity
Germanium crystals.
– Passive methods can experience difficulty
detecting both neutrons and X-rays if the
material is shielded
• Due to the low amount of neutron emission and
soft X-rays.
Proliferation Resistance and
Physical Protection
• Proliferation Resistance (PR):
Characteristics of a nuclear energy system
that prevents the production or diversion of
nuclear materials or technology by the State
in order to acquire any nuclear explosive
devices.
• Physical Protection (PP):
Characteristics of a nuclear energy system
that impedes the theft of materials or the
sabotage of facilities and transportation by
rouge groups.
• International effort led by GEN-IV
International Forum (GIF) to create PR&
PP for nuclear materials in Gen-IV
reactors.
• Intrinsic and Extrinsic measures are used
to improve PR.
• Intrinsic PR features as defined by the
IAEA “ are features that result from the
technical design of nuclear energy
systems, including those that facilitate the
implementation of extrinsic methods.
• Extrinsic methods are features that result
from decisions and policies made by the
host State related to nuclear energy.
• Extrinsic methods supports PR by use of:
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NPT
agreements between the State and the IAEA
Verification processes
AEA Inspections
• PR threats:
– Conceal diversion/acquisition of nuclear
weapon materials.
– Conceal production of nuclear weapon
materials.
– Misuse of declared facilities or materials.
– Production of materials in undeclared
hidden facilities.
• PP threats:
– Theft of nuclear material or information that
can be used for creating nuclear explosive
devices.
– Sabotage of facilities and or transportation
materials by rouge groups.
• Barriers against theft depend on the
material:
– Material characteristics
– Location of materials.
• GIF are currently researching and
developing designs for Gen-IV reactors
that maximize their PR capabilities.
– Safeguards by design.
Questions, comments, general
wonderments?
Sources:
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The Nuclear Fuel Cycle- N.T.
IAEA databases.
INFCIRC: 66,153,540,854
Nuclear News: 11/2013 edition
World Nuclear Association Database
Arms Control Association Database.