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Socio-technical aspects of water management: the case of Water Users Associations
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(WUAs) in Uzbekistan
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Iskandar Abdullaev- Senior Researcher, Center for Development Studies, Bonn, Germany, e-
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mail: i.abdullaev@uni-bonn.de
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Peter Mollinga- Senior Researcher, Center for Development Studies, Bonn, Germany, e-mail:
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pmollinga@uni-bonn.de
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Ahmad Manschadi- Senior Researcher, Center for Development Studies, Bonn, Germany, e-
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mail: manschadi@uni-bonn.de
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Socio-technical aspects of water management: the case of Water Users Associations
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(WUAs) in Uzbekistan
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Abstract
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This paper describes a socio-technical framework to assess irrigation water management systems
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in the Central Asian state of Uzbekistan. The framework builds on the boundary concept “water
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control” for analyzing water management at the meso and regional levels in a (semi-
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)authoritarian context. In Soviet times water management was generally considered as a
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technical issue (to be) taken care of by the state water bureaucracy. Due to structural changes in
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agriculture in the two post-independence decades, irrigation water management has become a
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political and social issue in Central Asia.
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With the state still heavily present in the regulation of agricultural production, the situation in
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Uzbekistan differs from other post communist states. The water management strategies are still
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strongly ‘soviet’ in approach, being regarded by state actors as purely ‘technical’, because the
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other dimensions, economic, social and political, are ‘fixed’, through strong state regulation.
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However, new mechanisms are appearing in this authoritarian and technocratic framework.
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The socio-technical analysis framework was applied in some selected Water Users Associations
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(WUAs) in northwest Uzbekistan, Khorezm region. The WUAs are becoming arenas of
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interaction for different actors involved in water management. Results of this study help to
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understand changes in water management and their possible consequences for livelihoods of
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different rural groups, highlight water management problems of the study area, and determine
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future research questions. The methodology tested in the Khorezm region is applicable to other
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areas of rural Uzbekistan and irrigated landscapes of Central Asia where more or less (semi-)
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authoritarian policy frameworks apply to agriculture.
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The socio-technical analysis of Khorezm water management highlights growing social
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differences at grass root level in the study Water Uses Associations. The process of social
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differentiation is in its early phases and is still to express itself fully due to strict state control of
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agriculture and social life in general.
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Key words: water management, socio-technical, water control, Uzbekistan, state quota
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Introduction
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Societal problems are multi-faceted and complex. For instance, natural resources management
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(NRM) has several components and dimensions that influence each other. The solution to NRM
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problems requires an understanding of both natural resources systems and their interactions with
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human (management) systems (Mollinga, 2009). Multi- dimensional societal problems require
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changing the “business as usual” approach on NRM research, especially on water resources
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management. The response to growing NRM problems, particularly in the water sector of the
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Central Asia has been one of “normal professionalism” (Chambers, 1988) of water sector
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researchers and engineers. “Normal professionalism” is a standard, disciplinary, limited response
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to problems, which is reproduced in the education system. This has contributed to the
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reproduction and continuation of problems and has been generating limited approaches for
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addressing water management problems.
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Characteristics of an inter- and transdiciplinary approach to complex water resources
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management problems are the following. (1) acknowledges the complexity and heterogeneity of
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problems and organizations, , (2) accepts local context and uncertainty, (3) implies interactive
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action and is inter-subjective, (4) is in most cases action oriented, making linkages across
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disciplinary boundaries (Mollinga, 2008).
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This is especially relevant for Central Asia, where water management in the past decades has
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changed from a centralized, purely technical issue to a debated and contested transboundary,
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socio- political endeavor (Dukhovniy. 2008, Abdullaev. 2000, Abdullaev et al. 2009). The
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disciplinary and government-directed research efforts from the Soviet period do no longer suffice
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for improving water management in modern Central Asia. The old approach no longer applies
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for the following reasons:
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1. Due to the major geopolitical change of the collapse of Soviet Union, both governance and
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management of transboundary water resources between five countries became more of a political
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process. During Soviet times water management was regarded as purely ‘technical’; the other
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dimensions were under strict control from a central point, Moscow, and in this sense given and
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unchangeable. With five sovereign states sharing the central Asian rivers, a new politics has
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emerged.
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2. Post – soviet changes in agricultural policies have brought very serious social changes in rural
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areas. The ensuing social differentiation of the rural population has been captured by different
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research studies (Kandiyoti, 2003, Trevisani, 2008). Therefore, previous research on water
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management when collective farms were the main agricultural producers became irrelevant for
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today. The community of water users has become internally differentiated through the
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emergence of larger and smaller farms
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3. The environmental consequences of the previous “hydraulic mission” (Allan, 2006) have been
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catastrophic for the region (Abdullaev et al., 2009). Therefore, research that speaks to a series of
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problems and concerns, including ecology, equity, and governance, beyond the concept of
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‘development’ in the earlier soviet sense, is needed.
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This paper presents a framework for socio-technical1 analysis of water management and results
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of its application in the Khorezm region, Uzbekistan2. The main element of the framework is the
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boundary concept3 “water control” (Mollinga. 2003, 2008) which was applied to capture three
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interlinked processes in water control: physical, organizational and socio-economic/political.
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Research framework and methodology
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Research Location
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The Khorezm region in Uzbekistan is biophysically representative for the irrigated Amu Darya
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lowlands of Central Asia, which comprise the entire irrigated land (1 060 000 ha) between the
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Tuyamuyun reservoir and the Aral Sea (figure 1). The region well represents those of post-
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independence changes in agriculture. Since 1991, in place of only few hundred collective
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thousands of private farms were organized. The total irrigated area accounts for about 10% of the
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entire Aral Sea Basin (ASB). The total population 1.3 million people living in Khorezm, about
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70% are rural and about 27.5% live below the poverty line (1 US$ per day); unemployment rates
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especially in rural areas, are high (Mueller at al. 2007).
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Socio-technical analysis was borrowed from Mollinga (2003) for describing two interlinked parts of water
management systems: the first is infrastructure and the second is the human factor in managing water.
2 This research has been conducted within the framework of the BMBF (German Ministry of Education
and Research) funded project Economic and Ecological Restructuring of Land- and Water Use in the
Region Khorezm (Uzbekistan): A Pilot Project in Development Research.
3 “Boundary concepts are words that operate as concepts in different disciplines, refer to the same
object, phenomenon, process or quality of these, but carry different meanings in those different
disciplines” (Mollinga. 2008)
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Figure 1. Khorezm region- location of study area (Source: Martius et al. 2008)
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Research Framework
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Socio-technical study of water management was conducted within the framework of the water
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studies of German-Uzbek project in northern Uzbekistan”4. The objective of the work package
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on water management is “to consolidate and adapt the framework for socio-technical analysis of
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water management, intensive application of this framework for studying of field-farm, WUA and
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main system level irrigation management practices, identification of options and approaches on
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restructure of existing water management towards IWRM, developing suggestions of innovations
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on irrigation and drainage management in close consultation with network of stakeholders
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(agricultural producers, WUA officer bearers and relevant government officials), close
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monitoring of the evolution of the drainage and irrigation management approaches at the
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provincial (Khorazm) , national (Uzbekistan) and regional (Central Asia) levels”5.
“This project specifically aims at providing a comprehensive, science-based, plan for restructuring at
three nested intervention levels: policies, institutions, and technologies” (Economic and Ecological
Restructuring of Land- and Water Use in the Region Khorezm (Uzbekistan). A Pilot Project in
Development (Martius et al. 2006. Research Proposal for Project Phase III: Change – Oriented Research
for Sustainable Innovation in Land and Water Use (2007-2010))
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Operational Work plan for work package 320 - Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM) for
Khorezm: BUIS-, WUA and farm-level operation of I&D system in practice (Abdullaev.2008)
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The objective of the work package requires systematic research on understanding and developing
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Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) approaches for improvement of water
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management in close consultation with stakeholders. This requires an inter- and transdiciplinary
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research, because the main target is to address the societal problem of water management and
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this requires great degree of care about local context, action oriented research with contribution
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to the solution of the problem (Mollinga. 2008).
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The socio-technical research includes three dimension of water management (physical,
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organizational and socio-economic-political) and links these with different spheres of water
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management: physical shape of irrigation – drainage system, institutions and organizations and
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social structure- governance. A range of research methodologies such as surveys, measurements,
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data collection, institutional analysis are applied within framework for socio-technical analysis
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(figure 2).
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Figure 2. Research Framework and methodology for socio-technical analysis of water
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management
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The research framework described above was applied to the everyday politics of water
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management in the study sites in Khorezm province, Uzbekistan.
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water management refers to the interactions of different groups on planning, distribution and use
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of water on a daily basis, and looks at these as a process of contestation.
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The central issues of everyday politics looked in this research were:
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The everyday politics of
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the concept of hydraulic property The new arrangements made for operation, use and
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maintenance of the irrigation and drainage infrastructure pre-determines water control
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strategies of the different groups;
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the understanding of collective action. Changing agricultural production systems from
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collective to individual production has made irrigation and drainage network ownership and
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use rights a very central issue of water control. Analysis of the collective action process helps
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to understand how different actors are strategically engaged with each other in the arena of
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the everyday politics of Khorezm water management?
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The everyday politics of water management is understood through application of Long’s actor-
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oriented approach (Long, 2001). Long (2001)’s actor-oriented approach to study social behavior
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and interaction is based” upon the capacity of actors to process their and others experiences and
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act upon them”. For capturing the processes of water control it is very important to select
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specific locales or sites where the everyday politics can be concretely observed. The
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transformations in agriculture and water sector in Uzbekistan after 1990 (Yalcin and Mollinga.
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2007, Trevisani. 2008, Wall. 2006) have created new interfaces or discontinuities in water
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management. The processes that have generated these are the restructuring of the collective
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farms into smaller units, and the establishment of new organizations like Water Users
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Associations (WUAs). WUAs have been created at the former collective farm level in the last
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decade. The uniqueness of WUAs is that they are located at the level where the state meets with
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water users (Veldwisch, 2008; Abdullaev et al., 2008). Four specific interfaces could be
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identified at WUA level: local government-WUA, water management organizations (WMO) -
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WUA, WUA-water users (farmers) and water users –water users (figure 3).
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Figure 3. Four interfaces in the everyday politics of WUA water resources management
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The interface 1 represents everyday interactions between local government officials (in local
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hakimyat) and Water Users Association (WUA). The WUA management are attending to the
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regular meetings with local government officials.
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implementing decisions made by government on agriculture and on water management
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(Wegerich. 2000, Zavgordnyaya. 2006). This interface is therefore understood as relationship
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between higher and lower hierarchical levels, therefore in figure 2 arrows coming from hakimyat
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are bold, arrows from WUA is thin. Because role of WUA in this interface is more of subsidiary
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and secondary: providing information and accepting tasks from hakimyat. In the case study area
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this interface is described how a state quota and water turns (asvak) are implemented.
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The interface 2 is daily interactions between WMO and WUA. It is similar to the interface 1 but
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more of professional interaction. WMO are preparing and controlling water use plans for WUA.
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They are also playing the role of arbiters on water related conflicts between different WUAs and
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between WUA and individual farmers. The ownership of most of the water infrastructure makes
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WMO in interface -2 more leading. However, WMO does not have as strong control over WUA
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as hakimyat have. The interaction between WMO and WUA in the case study is illustrated
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through water turn- asvak implementation.
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Interface 3 represents interaction between water users (farmer) and WUA. This interaction is at
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the core of everyday water management. WUA is on one hand trying to implement decisions of
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local hakimyat and WMO and on the other hand tries to manage water between different farmers
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In Uzbekistan WUAs are still used for
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(cotton-wheat6, commercial) and other water users. In this interface different water users apply
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technical, social and political water control strategies for access to water resources (Veldwisch.
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2008). Interface 4 represents interaction between different groups of farmers, between farmers
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and smallholder land owners and non-irrigation water users.
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Actors7 involved in the everyday politics of water management could be divided into four
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groups: (i) water users, (ii) state bodies, (iii) irrigation and drainage infrastructure, (iv) social
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and natural environment (figure 4). Although this categorization of the actors is helpful, it does
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not present the heterogeneity within each group, e.g. in one water users group there are different
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water uses and users with different water consumption patterns (figure 4).
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Figure 4. Main actors of everyday water management
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It is important to note that in this research human and non- human actors are treated
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symmetrically. Actions and water control strategies of human actors are shaped by the social and
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natural environment and by irrigation and drainage infrastructure, state policies and regulations.
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State quota for cotton and wheat means that the state through its semi- state organizations will sign
agreements with individual farmers for delivering pre-determined amounts of wheat and cotton. The
farmers who are assigned by local government (hakimyat) to grow cotton and wheat should follow strict
rules of growing cotton- wheat: agro technical (when to do sowing, irrigation, fertilization, etc.), land use
(where and how many hectares of which crop to be sown) and administrative (attending to daily meetings,
obeying state authority, etc.). The plan for state quota is determined by the local government (hakimyat)
using land quality (bonitet) grades of the piece of farmland.
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Actors as used in this paper are taken from actor- network theory (Latour, 1987). Actor Network Theory
tends to speak, in French, of ‘acteurs’ (human actors), and ‘actants’ (non-human actors). Both human and
non-human actors play a role in everyday water management– even when these roles are different.
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Therefore, in this socio-technical research authors do not allocate any pre-determined weight to
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any of the actors.
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Research Methodologies and Techniques
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As indicated in section on research framework WUA is essential arena where different interfaces
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on everyday water management happen. Therefore, in this research WUA has been a central
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focus area for socio-technical analysis of water management. Five WUAs, located in different
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biophysical, social and institutional conditions were selected with aim to get a diverse set of case
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studies (Abdullaev et al., 2008). In this paper authors will present results of socio- technical
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analysis in one study WUA.
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The field research consisted of exploratory and documentary methods. These included semi-
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directive, un /semi structured and group interviews with main actors, studying of project reports,
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data bases, research publications, archives and mass-media materials on both subject and area of
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interest. For observation of the non-human actors walk – through surveys, field walks have been
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used during the research period. For systematizing purposes, the research techniques are divided
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into four groups:
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generation. The participation and observation technique were applied frequently to understand
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the socio-institutional aspects. Attending both formal and informal meetings, socializing through
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friendship and networking were essential methods. The participation in water distribution and
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drainage management activities as observer has improved the quality of the research. The other
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activity which has helped to conduct socio-technical research was the Follow the Innovation
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(FTI)8 activities of the project. In WUA Koshkopir Ashirmat, FTI activities on Strengthening of
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WUAs through Social Mobilization and Institutional Development (SMID) were started during
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the research period. The objective of the innovation is to transform the existing, weak water
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users association (WUA) into a real functioning WUA through social mobilization and
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institutional development approach (SMID). The process of FTI has helped to apply a
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transdiciplinary approach for socio-technical research. A series of stakeholder meetings and
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workshops were organized within the FTI framework where socio-technical aspects of water
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management were discussed with a large group of stakeholders.
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Socio-technical analysis of water management: application of the research framework
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surveys, studies, participation and observation, and expert knowledge
For a detailed report on FTI for WUA component see Abdullaev et al. 2008.
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Water management at grass root levels: socio- technical analysis of water management in WUA
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Koshkopir Ashirmat
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The WUA Koshkopir Ashirmat has 2116 ha of irrigated land. It was organized in place of 14
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brigades of formerly two collective farms (figure 5). The map shows that before the de-
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collectivization (2005) there were 14 brigades, which were growing mostly cotton and rice. In
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2005, in place of former 14 brigades more than 70 individual farms have been established by
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land commission The different colours in figure 4 before the de-collectivization indicate different
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brigades and after different individual farms. The individual farmers have been assigned to grow
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cotton, wheat (50% of individual farmers), vegetables and livestock. The irrigation and drainage
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network, formerly managed by the collective farm has been assigned partly to WUAs (the former
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on-farm canals and pumps) and individual farmers (the tertiary and below level irrigation
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canals).
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Figure 5. Pre and post reform maps of Koshkopir Ashirmat Water Users Association
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(WUA)
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The irrigated areas receive water from the Zeu Yop canal which is fed by the Polvon main canal-
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one of the largest irrigation networks in Khorezm region. Human-made water scarcity due to the
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competition for water resources at the head of the Zeu Yop canal results in abandoning of
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considerable parts of the irrigated agricultural fields in the tail end of the canal –150 to 200
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hectares were not cultivated in 2008. These plots are regarded unsuitable for cultivation at the
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moment by the local hakimyat due to water scarcity.
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The water is delivered to the WUA Koshkopir- Ashirmat through the territory of other three
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WUAs, located upstream of the study area. This situation creates an unsustainable and non-
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reliable water supply. Although the irrigated area within the command system of Zeu Yop canal
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has not been increased since mid 1980's, the water supply to WUAs has become very much
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contested by both WUAs and individual water users along the canal. Hence the main attribute of
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water management in the study area is “constructed water scarcity” (Oberkircher and Ismailova.
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forthcoming). Both water distribution between neighbouring WUAs and within water users of
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the study WUA is skewed and unequal in physical terms. The way water management is
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organized ---is a reflection of the internal social dynamics which has been shaped by a few
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important elements of the everyday water management. These aspects are ownership of irrigation
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drainage infrastructure, formal and informal institutions, agents, resources and emerging
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collective action.
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Contested nature of water infrastructure and its impact on water control strategies
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The transformation of the water system from collective farms to WUAs has brought changes in
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water and drainage infrastructure ownership. The major water control strategies applied by
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different groups are shaped by following aspects of infrastructure ownership.
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1. The existing inter-farm irrigation and drainage network has stayed under control of state
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run water management organizations (WMOs). The reduced workforce and declining
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budgets in mid 1990’s due to the overall economical decline in Uzbekistan have left this
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level virtually unattended by WMOs staff. As a result water users, mostly large farmers,
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have installed different types of pumps along the canal system, practicing technical water
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control, reducing the water shares of the WUAs located in the tail end of the irrigation
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system.
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2. The ownership of the collective farm irrigation network has been distributed between
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WUA and individual farmers. The field and tertiary canals has been assigned to the
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farmers and secondary canals to the WUA. Numerous pumps of the former collective
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farms have been also assigned first to WUAs. However, a few years of operation have
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created problems in payment for electricity, of diesel for pumps and for maintenance.
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Therefore, almost all WUAs in the study region (Khorezm) have re-assigned pumps to
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the individual farmers. The property regime created by transformation of pumps to
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individual farmers has legitimized the wider use of pumps.
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3. The drainage network of the former collective farms has not been specifically assigned to
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WMOs, WUAs or farmers. This has resulted in a plurality in responsibility for operation
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and maintenance of the drainage system. The maintenance of the drainage system at the
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former collective level has been left to the farmers. In quite a few cases they have cleaned
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“their part” of the drainage system. This gave them the claim to the ownership of water in
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the drainage ditches. Furthermore, the farmers claim the right to block the drainage
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system and pump water for their needs whenever the canal water becomes scarce.
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Institutions9 and their implications for water control
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De-collectivization has resulted in a different socio- political situation and led to the formation of
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new and different interest groups in the study area. There are at least three different groups of
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farms in rural Uzbekistan (Trevisani, 2008). The first group of farms is under state quota,
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growing cotton and wheat for the state with 10 to 20 ha of irrigated land per farm .The second
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group produces more commercial crops, such as rice, vegetables and fruits with land sizes
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around 1 ha and less. The third group are smallholder landowners who grow mainly crops for the
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subsistence of their livelihoods. However, the state-quota farms may also grow rice and they
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may have smallholder land in their backyard (Veldwisch, 2008).
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Our research has identified the institutions with direct influence on water management are
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shaping the water control strategies of the actors involved in the process. The institutions are
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both formally and informally embedded in the society (Long. 2001). The formal institutions are
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part of the current state policies, informal institutions are rules, regulations and relationships
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.crafted and established by local people. The informal institutions in study area are shaping also
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behaviour of the formal institutions.
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State- quota
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The state quota for cotton and wheat has the following important implications for water
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management: (i) water is seen as one of the inputs into the cotton- wheat quota production. The
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water management institutions (organizations, water rights, legal documents) are subordinate to
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agricultural planning. The water contracts are prepared only for cotton- wheat farmers and
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WMO, WUA are made responsible during the irrigation season to treat cotton-wheat farmers as
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priority (ii) the state quota system makes possible administrative interferences into the everyday
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Institutions are rules which enable and also restricts human agency. Institutions provide a certain
reliability of expectations for individuals (North. 1990)
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water management. The state quota gives a space and supports to farmers who cultivate state
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quota to apply socio- economic and political water control strategies. They can complain to the
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hakim about the water “scarcity”, they can apply pressure on WMO and WUA managers if water
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is not delivered to their fields on the agreed schedule, they can request for pumps to be installed
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into the drainage system, etc. However, at the same time the state quota system gives
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opportunities for the hakim and state organizations to interfere into WMO and WUA matters. In
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the study WUA, the Council Chairman was replaced two times, once by the provincial hakim
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and the second time by the district hakim. The state quota system also allows for local water
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users to get investments for their irrigation networks. During the 2008 season, WMOs cleaned
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two main canals of the WUA at least a few times and two pumps were installed in the inter-state
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(Uzbekistan-Turkmenistan) drainage canal to pump water for irrigating tail end cotton fields.
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This shows that the state-quota system, while seemingly a top-down, directive system, is actually
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the institution that links demands of the state with needs of state quota farms. However, the state
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planned intervention (state quota) is not accepted or implemented by local actors at face value.
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The implementation of state quota is shaped by the social interests of the different groups. For
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instance, according to the state quota the irrigated lands of the farmers who grow cotton and
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wheat are to be irrigated first. However, when water arrives actually first water is given to the
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smallholder plots where food crops are grown for mostly consumption purposes (wheat,
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vegetables, and fruit trees). This rule is accepted even by state quota farmers. The interviews
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with selected quota farmers reflected that they were made aware by local leadership during
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wedding parties, funeral process (social gatherings) of the fact that most of the local population
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are for giving water to the smallholder plots first. The pumps installed by state WMO to serve
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cotton- wheat areas also used to irrigate non- quota farms and smallholder lands.
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Asvak- Water turns
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The water turn, or asvak in local language, is an institution which existed even before the
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Russians came to the region. The asvak means that each water user group (WUA, village, sub
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canal) and individual water user (farmer, dehkan, household) has a turn in getting water during
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the irrigation season10 in the irrigation schedule. The asvak is applied only if the amount of water
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is not enough to supply water simultaneously to everyone. The asvak has several levels. There is
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In Uzbekistan irrigation season starts from 1st April and continuous until 1st of April. There is so called
winter season, from 1st October until end of March when winter wheat is irrigated, salt leaching is
conducted
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asvak between main canals , asvak between districts, asvak between WUAs and asvak within a
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WUA (between secondary , tertiary canals, between farmers located at the same canal and
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between farmer and dekhans located at the same field channel (arik in the local language).
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Although asvak is generally regarded as a very effective tool for water allocation during water
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shortages, it does not work every time and everywhere. According to the water users (owners of
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individual farmers, surveyed during the research), the asvak institution has become less effective
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in recent years due to the fact that it is planned by the local hakimyat jointly with the WMO, with
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no communication with the water users, villages and WUAs. As a result, the asvak is contested
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constantly by a large group of water users. However, there are some “re-designed”, adapted
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versions of informal asvak in place in every WUA, village and location. Our research shows that
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even in the most water shortage periods and locations, local people apply some sort of water
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turns between different groups. For instance, in spring, the study village received water after a
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long period and the water was given to the family plots first (yu tomarka). However, in the
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summer, the cotton was given the highest priority over other uses. It seems that the informal
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asvak has a very well structured system. The local power structures, such as mahalla leadership,
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former chairman of collective farm and staff of WUAs are supporting this informal-
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unstructured/localized asvak. The asvak is a water control strategy for different groups, e.g.,
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hakims organize asvak in order to fulfil their role as government representative in the area; the
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WMOs because of their role as water management organization of the state, etc. However, asvak
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is frequently interrupted by the same hakim or WMOs because of their own interests (to deliver
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water to some of their clients) or due to the reduced water levels in the canal. Furthermore,
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WUAs, villages and individual water users frequently use technical water control means (e.g.
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permanent or mobile pumps) to disturb official asvak.
362
Mahalla- neighbourhood- village
363
Mahalla or neighbourhood (sometimes also used as village) is a very old institution of Uzbek
364
society. Although for the last decade the role and function of mahalla has been greatly shaped by
365
the state building process (Trevisani. 2007, Kandiyoti. 2003), it is still very much alive and
366
fulfils functions related to the daily life of the local people. Mahalla is a collection of different
367
clans and individuals with few formal and more of local rules in place to bring a more organized
368
system into the people’s everyday lives. Since ancient times, mahalla has been dealing with
369
marriage and divorce issues, feeding people and families in need, settling conflicts and issues
15
370
between families and individuals. For the last decade, mahalla was also given the role of the
371
distribution of social welfare among the most needy. In the water control context, mahalla
372
applied its role as a branch of the state at the village level. According to the Uzbek government
373
system, heads of mahalla’s and the council of mahalla leaders represent the state in the
374
neighbourhoods. Therefore, leaders of the mahalla practice political water control strategies in
375
order to both promote the interests of their neighbourhoods and their own. t. The mahalla, as a
376
part of the state apparatus at the local level also seen by local people as legitimate institution to
377
complain on water related problems. The leader of the mahalla has been also urged by local
378
hakimyat to take bold role in everyday water management at former collective farm level. Due to
379
the weak position of t WUA position of mahalla leader became stronger on water management.
380
Qarindosh- relatives- clan
381
During the soviet era, the central state in Moscow attempted to modernize Central Asian
382
republics by eliminating the clan system. However, at present there are many elements of clan
383
networks in all five states of the region (Collins. 2004). According to Collins (2004), the clans
384
are an “informal institution”, with unwritten rules, norms and social conventions. The clans are
385
network for social and political exchange between their members (Collins. 2004). The clans are
386
one of those institutions which apply social power for controlling access to the resources for its
387
members (van Dijk. 1993). The clan system in the study area re-emerged due to the fact that
388
members of a few families have been very successful in the state system. This successful uplift
389
into the highest political levels of the country has nurtured a clan system around nuclear families
390
of those successful family members. Now members of the clan are claiming their right for
391
getting access to the different resources and for special treatment because of their status within
392
the state apparatus. Members of the strongest clan in the study area also keep a few important
393
positions within the local set up. The research have revealed that the clans apply socio- political
394
water control, i.e. the leaders of the clans apply pressure on the hakimyat, the WMO, WUA and
395
electricity companies for getting water to their location and fields of their clients/members.
396
Actors and their resources
397
In study WUA Koshkopir Ashirmat, authors have studied role of three main actors on everyday
398
water management. The three selected actors are mainly those of leading actors, who has very
399
strong both official and informal positions within village (table 1). The table 1 is presenting
400
official and informal positions of the three selected actors.
16
401
Table 1. Actors and their positions within the community in WUA Koshkopir Ashirmat
# leaders
Positions
1 Chairman of rural council + his circle (relatives, classmates,  official status as village council
former collective farm management)
head
2
3

relative of high
official

farmer, who owns land
level state
Former manager of collective farm + his allies (relatives, 
classmates, people whom he worked during the collective
farm)

Son of long served collective
farm chairman ( son of Rais)

Head of a crucial network of
existing
managers
and
authority

Relative of
academician
Chairman of MTP and his group
The manager was chairman
(rais) for years
a high level
402
403
WUA is not capable fully utilize its role as major water management unit at the village level due
404
to the limited financial and staff capacities. Therefore, other people than the WUA staff are
405
taking the lead in water management. E.g., the above listed leading actors use the WUA as a
406
platform to promote their candidates for the position of WUA Council Chairman, using their
407
positions within official status they also participate in everyday water management.
408
The leading actors commonly apply the following types of resources: (i) regulatory resources-
409
their access to decision making on water allocation, (ii) information resources- access to
410
information regarding water allocation and distribution, (iii) professional resources - links with
411
water management organizations (or individual bureaucrats in the water sector), (iv)
412
administrative resources - access to local government office (hakimyat), and (v) technological
413
resources- access to technologies and infrastructure on water network. The application of the
414
different resources depends on the position (socio-political network) and agenda of the actors
415
(table 2)
17
416
Table 2. Main actors and their resources in WUA Koshkopir Ashirmat
Main actors
Resources
MTP chairman
 access to crucial information
 ability to influence state quota resources distribution
 access to the resources (money) of clan distribution of
mechanical hardware to the farmers
 access to the water distribution decisions , asvak list of
both WMOs and internal (WUA)
Rural Council chairman
 access to and distribution of state social security
package ( payments for poor families, money for
support children)
 access to the resources (money) of clan
 influence on land distribution decisions
 has most important say on internal asvak
Former collective farm chairman




access to clan resources
access to the decisions by Mahalla leaders
His personal links with his former friends
Kinship relations with most of villages’ “respected
people”
417
418
419
Collective action
The physical attributes and features of the irrigation system of WUA make collective action the
420
prerequisite for everyday water management. Any group or individual water user alone is not
421
capable of managing the irrigation system which was originally designed and built for water
422
supply to large collective farms. The main irrigation canals of WUA Ashirmat have no single
423
water regulation gate, because during collective farm days water was taken to the irrigated field
424
by 12 large pump units. These pumps require both a workforce and financial inputs for
425
operation. Only if the farmers work together they can afford the pumping costs. After the de-
426
collectivization pumps were transferred to the WUAs. At the end of the irrigation season, the
427
WUA evenly distributed the pump costs among its large farmer members. Smallholders did not
428
pay for the cost of pumping. The large farmers charged their share of costs on pumping against
429
state credits paid for the cotton or wheat quota. However, in most cases the payments were
430
delayed and the WUA was fined for non-payment. In year 2007, the WUA have assigned the
431
operation and maintenance of the 12 pumps to the cotton-wheat farmers who have access to the
432
state credits and subsidized inputs. The assignment of the pumps to the individual farms helped
433
the management of the WUA to reduce their debt to the Electricity Company, and it led to the
434
formation of water users groups around the “privatized” pumps.
18
435
The other reason for collective action is that the water discharges of the big and old pumps are
436
much higher than the irrigation needs of the largest farmers (e.g. 100 ha). The pumps were
437
designed for irrigation of a brigade (>200 ha). Therefore, in one run pumps are able to deliver
438
water to two or three farmers or dozens of smallholders. Therefore, irrigation was organized by
439
groups of smallholders from the same mahalla. During the field work authors have witnessed
440
frequently when the farmers of the same tertiary canal/pump worked often together for irrigating
441
their crops. The other collective action was on maintenance of the irrigation and drainage
442
network. Due to the huge size of canals and drainage network, large machinery and a large
443
workforce is needed. Again this cannot be provided by a single water user. Therefore, in most
444
observed cases during the field research, the resources of farmers and smallholders were joined
445
for maintenance of the irrigation and drainage network. The collective action is promoted by
446
institutions listed above; the active role is taken by mahalla and clans.
447
The water users also act as group (collective action) on appealing to the hakim and other state
448
organizations to request release of water for their area. E.g., in 2008, around 20 farmers and local
449
smallholders from WUA Koshkopir Ashirmat visited at least two times both the provincial and
450
district hakim to appeal for water for their fields. This indicates that water users has capacity to
451
form a group is a resource for organizing the exertion of pressure.
452
The collective action observed during the socio-technical analysis potentially could be an option
453
for strengthening of WUA. Water users at different channels managed by different WUAs
454
presently only form collective action groups for short periods, until they receive water into their
455
areas. Carefully planned social mobilization activities by WUA management may help to turn
456
this temporary collective action into more systematised water users groups (Abdullaev et al.
457
Forthcoming).
458
The findings of the field research suggest that many familiar aspects of contested canal irrigation
459
management as documented in the international literature (Mollinga. 2003) are starting to find
460
their location specific expression in Uzbekistan.
461
462
Lessons Learnt: outcomes of socio- technical research and conclusions
The process of the social differentiation of agricultural producers is in its early phases and is still
463
to express itself fully due to strict state control of agriculture and social life in general. However,
464
the different groups started to apply physical and socio-economic water control strategies for
465
getting access to water. People are increasingly using means of social control for getting access
19
466
to water resources. For example, the farmers with larger irrigated land and higher incomes can
467
afford to buy diesel or electric pumps for organizing irrigation of their fields. They usually allow
468
neighbouring farmers and smallholders to use water, but only if they pay for the cost of operation
469
of the pump. The smaller land owners and weaker groups are not represented in WUA structures
470
at present. The standard bylaws of WUAs establish membership on the base of land ownership,
471
i.e. only heads of the registered farm units can become a member. However, most of medium (up
472
to 1 ha) and smallholder (less than 0.5 ha) water users are not registered as farm units. This
473
already creates inequality and the WUA consequently is not representing all water users of the
474
area. Therefore, it is very important to have a mechanism for inclusion of small farming units,
475
water users using water for other purposes (e.g., fishing, construction/brick making), and the
476
households who depend on the irrigation network for their water for daily uses (domestic water
477
use.). In this study WUA, there are three lakes where people catch fish. Many families use the
478
irrigation network for household water use. However, they are not members of WUA. On paper,
479
the water plan (the allocation schedule) provides access to water for these types of water users as
480
well. In practice, however, the daily water distribution is a different process. Water distribution
481
in comparison with allocation is a more decentralized process, because of the huge irrigation
482
network and many actors involved at each level. The national and regional levels, although
483
playing an important role in water management issues, have no real instruments to implement
484
local-level water distribution. The water is distributed from main canal to Water Users
485
Associations (WUAs) by canal managers and operators, who are responsible for operating the
486
gates and regulation infrastructures. Although they are state employers, in response to local
487
social pressure they tend to downplay national and regional policies and instructions. Therefore,
488
although the water allocation processes in Uzbekistan a very structured, hierarchical process, its
489
implementation (water distribution) often becomes a daily struggle for “water control”
490
(Mollinga. 2008, 2003)). This struggle is patterned primarily as a struggle between cotton-wheat
491
farmers and other water users (Abdullaev et al. 2008).
492
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