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Is Pre-Emptive
War Wrong?
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Robert Phillips: “Just War Theory ”
Phillips’ Central Claim
• On the principle that just war requires both justice in going to
war (jus ad bellum) and justice in waging war (jus in bello):
 The killing of enemy combatants is justifiable on
certain conditions.
 The collateral deaths of innocent non-combatants is
justifiable on certain conditions provided their deaths
are not the objective.
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Bellum Justum (Just War)
Just war requires both:
• Jus ad bellum (Justice in going to war); and
• Jus in bello (Justice in waging war).
There can be cases of jus ad bellum without jus in bello, and
vice versa.
• Entering a war justly, and waging it unjustly.
• Entering a war unjustly, but waging it justly.
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Jus ad Bellum (Justice in Going to War)
For an act of going to war to be just, it must be:
I. The Last Resort.
II. Declared by legitimate authority.
III. Morally Justifiable.
A. Defense against aggression.
B. Correction of an injustice that has gone uncorrected by
legitimate authority “in another place”.
C. Reestablishment of a social order which will distribute
justice.
D. Undertaken with the intention of bringing about peace.
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Jus in Bello (Justice Waging War)
For an act of waging war to be just, there must be:
I. Proportionality: The quantity of force employed or
threatened must always be morally proportionate to the
end being sought in war.
II. Discrimination: Force must never be applied in such a way
as to make non-combatants and innocent persons the
intentional objects of attack. The only appropriate targets
in war are combatants.
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Jus in Bello (Justice Waging War)
II. Discrimination
A. The Principle of Double Effect: In a situation where the
use of force can be foreseen to have actual or
probable multiple effects, some of which are evil,
culpability does not attach to the agent if the following
conditions are met:
1. The action must carry the intention to produce
morally good consequences.
2. The evil effects are not intended as ends in
themselves or as means to other ends, good or evil.
3. The permission of collateral evil must be justified by
considerations of proportionate moral weight.
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Jus in Bello (Justice Waging War)
What are the potentially good consequences of waging war?
(From Principle of jus ad bellum)
• Defense against aggression.
• Correction of an injustice that has gone uncorrected by
legitimate authority “in another place”.
• Reestablishment of a social order which will distribute
justice.
• Bringing about peace.
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Jus in Bello (Justice Waging War)
Rarely are the good consequences of waging war not
accompanied by some evil consequences.
What are the potentially evil consequences of waging war?
• Scaring innocent citizens.
• Killing innocent citizens.
• Social upheaval.
• Destruction of private property.
• Destruction of historical property.
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Army Colonel Thought Experiment
Consider a colonel who calls in the order to bomb a civilian
area where insurgents are hiding.
• According to the Principle of Double Effect inherent in Jus
in Bello, how can the colonel avoid culpability for ensuing
evil ends?
• Assume the colonel’s goal is to remove insurgents from the
area so as to improve the lives of citizens.
 Re: Condition 1: Killing the innocents is not the
colonel’s intention.
 Re: Condition 2: The colonel doesn’t kill the innocents,
say, to break the morale of the soldiers, so as to end
the war.
 Re: Condition 3: Presumably, the proportional moral
weight is considerable.
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Killing Enemy Combatants
• “If force is ever to be morally justified, its employment must
be against a target other than a person as such. One must
not be directly seeking the death of another human being
either as such or as means to some further end.” (475)
• Here, Phillips appeals to something like Condition 2 of the
Principle of Double Effect: It’s wrong to kill an enemy
combatant so that I can live.
 It’s evil for a person to be killed even if that person is
an enemy soldier.
 (We might apply the same reasoning to non-war
situations.)
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Killing Enemy Combatants
• So how can it ever be morally justified for a soldier to kill
an enemy combatant?
 Would the soldier not be directly seeking the death of
the enemy, e.g., as a means to self-defense or
victory?
• Phillips’ answer (475): In order for a soldier’s killing an
enemy combatant to be morally justified, the soldier's
intention must be to restrain the combatant, not to destroy
the man.
 The intention is to restrain the combatant.
 How might we plausibly restrain a combatant without
killing the person?
 Wouldn’t the soldier be directly seeking the death of
the enemy, say, as a means to self-defense or to
victory?
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Possible Objection
Utilitarian Perspective: There is no morally relevant
difference between killing in order to restrain a combatant
and killing in order to destroy him.
• The end result of each act is the same.
• Smith & Jones Thought Experiment…
• “A corpse lies before both Smith and Jones—this is the
brute, ultimate fact which no amount of “intentional”
redescription can alter.” (475)
• There is no moral difference here.
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Phillips’ Reply
We can see a morally relevant difference if we think about the
moral basis of the practice of taking prisoners.
• “[F]ailure to take account of intention means that we are
unable to make the difference between doing x in order that y
shall result and doing x knowing that y will result.” (476)
• Jones does x knowing that y will
result.
• Smith does x in order that y will
result.
• “The crucial difference between Smith
and Jones is that the latter is logically
committed to behaving differently
toward those enemy soldiers who
have removed themselves from the
role of combatant than is his
companion Smith.” (476)
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Phillips’ Reply
• If the enemy surrendered, Jones’s intentions would be
fulfilled; Smith’s would not.
• When intentions are to restrain as a means of preservation, it
seems Jones will restrain whenever possible.
• If the enemy surrenders, he is no
longer a combatant.
• “A combatant may change his
status by reverting to a
noncombatant role, but if he
refuses to do so, then much
of the responsibility for what
happens rests with him.” (477)
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Phillips’ Reply
• Force must be directed against the combatant and not
against the man.
• For Jones, it may be the case that the only way to restrain the
combatant is to kill the man.
• “[I]n directing an act of force against an enemy combatant
there should be no intention to kill the person, yet in the case
of the aggressor there is an important sense
in which he may be said to bring his own
death upon himself.” (477)
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Conclusions
1. In a justified war combatants are the objects of attack by
other combatants.
• Use of force is directed toward incapacitation and not
toward killing.
• Combatant deaths may be foreseen, but this is
compatible with the intention to incapacitate.
2. Noncombatant immunity is presupposed.
• Noncombatant deaths may be foreseen but may also be
regarded as collateral damage if they occur in the context
of a justified war.