The “Game” of Global Thermonuclear War
(cf. Dr. Strangelove (1963) and WarGames (1983))
launc h
USSR
not lau nch
reta lia te
(U SSR : __ _, US: __ _)
not re taliate
(U SSR : __ _, US: __ _)
US
(USSR: ___, US: ___)
It was US policy – and US strategic military planners
believed the USSR knew this – to not be the first to
“go nuclear” during a time of US/USSR tension.
The “Game” of Global Thermonuclear War
(cf. Dr. Strangelove (1963) and WarGames (1983))
launc h
USSR
not lau nch
reta lia te
(U SSR : __ _, US: __ _)
not re taliate
(U SSR : __ _, US: __ _)
US
(USSR: 0, US: 0)
The two payoff scales are unrelated. They could be in
different units (megadeaths versus $billions). We will not
compare one party’s payoff to the other’s at any point.
The “Game” of Global Thermonuclear War
(cf. Dr. Strangelove (1963) and WarGames (1983))
launc h
USSR
not lau nch
reta lia te
(U SSR : __ _, US: __ _)
not re taliate
(USSR : +10, U S: -12)
US
(USSR: 0, US: 0)
{ launch / not retaliate } is preferred by the USSR to { not launch }
{ not launch } is preferred by the US to { launch / not retaliate }
The “Game” of Global Thermonuclear War
(cf. Dr. Strangelove (1963) and WarGames (1983))
launc h
USSR
not lau nch
reta lia te
(USSR: -2 0, US: __ _)
not re taliate
(USSR : +10, U S: -12)
US
(USSR: 0, US: 0)
USSR: “The Chinese moving in” is worse than “a conventional
(non-nuclear) resolution of the dispute”
The “Game” of Global Thermonuclear War
(cf. Dr. Strangelove (1963) and WarGames (1983))
launc h
USSR
not lau nch
reta lia te
(USSR : -20, US: -1 8)
not re taliate
(USSR : +10, U S: -12)
US
(USSR: 0, US: 0)
Fear of Radioactive Fallout supplanted by fear of Nuclear Winter
US: “Better Red than Dead!”
The “Game” of Global Thermonuclear War
(cf. Dr. Strangelove (1963) and WarGames (1983))
launc h
USSR
not lau nch
reta lia te
(USSR : -20, US: -1 8)
not re taliate
(USSR : +10, U S: -12)
US
(USSR: 0, US: 0)
The USSR asks itself what the US would do in the face of a launch:
The answer is obvious: not retaliate! ( -12 > -18 )
The “Game” of Global Thermonuclear War
(cf. Dr. Strangelove (1963) and WarGames (1983))
launc h
USSR
not lau nch
reta lia te
(USSR : -20, US: -1 8)
not re taliate
(USSR : +10, U S: -12)
US
(USSR: 0, US: 0)
Given the predicted US response, what should the USSR do?
Obviously, launch! ( +10 > 0 )
The “Game” of Global Thermonuclear War
(cf. Dr. Strangelove (1963) and WarGames (1983))
launc h
USSR
not lau nch
reta lia te
(USSR : -20, US: -1 8)
not re taliate
(USSR : +10, U S: -12)
US
(USSR: 0, US: 0)
The US, unhappy with the analysis, asks itself what might happen
if the “not retaliate” option didn’t exist?
The “Game” of Global Thermonuclear War
(cf. Dr. Strangelove (1963) and WarGames (1983))
launc h
USSR
not lau nch
reta lia te
(USSR : -20, US: -1 8)
not re taliate
(USSR : +10, U S: -12)
US
(USSR: 0, US: 0)
The US, unhappy with the analysis, asks itself what might happen
if the “not retaliate” option didn’t exist?
The “Game” of Global Thermonuclear War
(cf. Dr. Strangelove (1963) and WarGames (1983))
launc h
USSR
not lau nch
reta lia te
(USSR : -20, US: -1 8)
not re taliate
(USSR : +10, U S: -12)
US
(USSR: 0, US: 0)
The USSR asks itself what the US would do in the face of a launch:
There’s only one choice: retaliate!
The “Game” of Global Thermonuclear War
(cf. Dr. Strangelove (1963) and WarGames (1983))
launc h
USSR
not lau nch
reta lia te
(USSR : -20, US: -1 8)
not re taliate
(USSR : +10, U S: -12)
US
(USSR: 0, US: 0)
Given the predicted US response, what should the USSR do?
Obviously, not launch! ( 0 > -20 )
The Doomsday Device
(MAD: Mutual Assured Destruction)
launch at tim e of tension
im plem e nt M AD
U SSR
don't la unch
US
don't im p le m ent
(USSR: -20 , US: -18)
... the original gam e ...
(U SSR : 0, US: 0)
(USSR: +10, US: -12)
Predicting that, if the USSR knows that MAD is implemented, they will
choose to “not launch”, the US prefers implementing MAD ( 0 > -12 )
The Doomsday Device
(MAD: Mutual Assured Destruction)
launch at tim e of tension
implem ent M AD
U SSR
don't la unch
US
don't imp le ment
(USSR: -20 , US: -18)
... the original gam e ...
(U SSR : 0, US: 0)
(USSR: +10, U S: -12)
And this kept the world safe from nuclear war until the USSR collapsed
Important Point #1
In a single-person decision problem, the decisionmaker always prefers keeping all options open as
long as possible.
Here (and in many other multi-actor decision
problems), making binding precommitments
(cutting off some options early) can yield superior
results!
Important Point #2
In a single-person decision problem, the decisionmaker always prefers personally-better potential
outcomes to poorer ones.
Here (and in many other multi-actor decision
problems), making some outcomes worse can lead
to superior results! (For example, the U.S. could
elect a crazy, unlimitedly-vindictive leader, for whom
the U.S. payoff of -12 in the original formulation is
actually -30!)