Structural-demographic
causes of political instability
Oil painting Tragic Prelude by J.S. Curry
Obama Faults Spy Agencies’ Performance
in Gauging Mideast Unrest, Officials Say
By Mark Mazzetti
Published: February 4, 2011
Rebellions and Revolutions
Causes of such outbreaks of political
instability may be separated into:
• Structural conditions
– build up slowly and somewhat predictably
– amenable to analysis and forecasting
• Triggering events
– very hard, perhaps impossible to predict
– example: self-immolation of the fruit
vendor that triggered Tunisian revolution
• Focus on: structural conditions
Structural-demographic causes
of political instability
• Popular immiseration and discontent
• Elite overproduction
• State fiscal distress
1. Introduction: The Theoretical
Background
2. Medieval England: The
Plantagenet Cycle (1150-1485)
3. Early Modern England: The
Tudor-Stuart Cycle (1485-1730)
4. Medieval France: The Capetian
Cycle (1150-1450)
5. Early Modern France: The Valois
Cycle (1450-1660)
6. Rome: The Republican Cycle (35030 BCE)
7. Rome: The Principate Cycle (30
BCE-285 CE)
8. Russia: The Muscovy Cycle (14601620)
9. Russia: The Romanov Cycle (16201922)
10. General Conclusions
Plan of the talk
• The dynamics of structuraldemographic variables in the U.S., 1780–
2010
– demography and well-being
– elite dynamics
– socio-political instability
• Modeling the Antebellum Period
• Lessons for today?
General principles from the
structural-demographic theory:
I. Well-Being
• Excessive supply of labor drives down
its price
– consequence: falling living standards for
the commoner (nonelite) population, popular
immiseration and discontent
Immigration: a major driver of labor oversupply
P e rce n ta g e o f p o p u la tio n b o rn o u tsid e th e U .S .
16
In c lu d in g
th e ille g a l
im m ig ra n ts
14
P e rce n t
12
10
8
6
C o l 1 vs C o l 2
4
2
0
1800
1820
1840
1860
1880
1900
1920
1940
1960
1980
2000
Measuring Well-Being
• Economic measures
– real wages
• problematic for XIX c. because of rapidly evolving
basket of consumables
– wages in relation to GDP per capita
• an index of the share of GDP going to workers
• Biological measures
– population stature (average heights)
– average expectation of life
GDP Share Index
1.6
1.4
1.2
1.0
0.8
0.6
0.4
1780
1800
1820
1840
1860
1880
1900
1920
1940
1960
1980
2000
D e m o g ra p h ic c h a ra c te ris tic s
180
63
S ta tu re
(p lo tte d a t a g e = 1 0 )
L ife e x p e c ta n c y
(p lo tte d a t a g e = 3 0 )
60
176
57
174
54
172
51
170
48
168
45
1760
1780
1800
1820
1840
1860
1880
1900
1920
1940
1960
1980
L ife E xp e cta n cy o f 1 0 y-o ld
A ve ra g e H e ig h t
178
Im m ig ra tio n a n d S ta tu re
16
14
180
im m ig ra tio n
s ta tu re
12
176
10
8
174
6
172
A ve ra g e H e ig h t, c m
P ro p o rtio n F o re ig n B o rn
178
4
170
2
0
1780
168
1800
1820
1840
1860
1880
1900
1920
1940
1960
1980
2000
Note: stature is plotted by year when reaching age=10
This 1888 cartoon in Puck attacks businessmen for welcoming
large numbers of low-paid immigrants, leaving the American
workingman unemployed
Demography and Well-Being: summary
• 1780–1830
–
–
–
–
low immigration
GDP share to workers rising
increasing stature
increasing life expectation
• 1830–1920
–
–
–
–
high immigration
GDP share to workers falling (to 1910)
declining stature (to 1900)
declining life expectation (to 1890)
The Antebellum Model
• Purpose: to test the logical coherence
of the argument
 not an empirical test, because data are
used in model construction
 a descriptive, rather than predictive model
• The population component
 Rural population = growth – migration
 Urban population = growth + migration
The Antebellum Model, cont.
Labor dynamics:
• Demand for labor: D = growth at 3% p.a.
• Wage/GDP Index: W = (D/U)β
5
2 .5
4
2 .0
3
1 .5
2
1 .0
1
0 .5
0
0 .0
1790
1800
1810
1820
1830
1840
1850
1860
1870
1880
W a g e /G N P in d e x
P o p u la tio n s, m illio n
R u ra l p o p u la tio n , m ln
U rb a n p o p u la tio n , m ln
w a g e /G N P in d e x (rig h t s c a le )
5
2 .5
4
2 .0
3
1 .5
2
1 .0
1
0 .5
0
0 .0
1790
1800
1810
1820
1830
1840
F ig u re 7 .1
1850
1860
1870
1880
W a g e /G N P in d e x
P o p u la tio n s, m illio n
R u ra l p o p u la tio n , m ln
U rb a n p o p u la tio n , m ln
w a g e /G N P in d e x (rig h t s c a le )
General principles, cont. (elites)
• Low price of labor means not only
immiseration of a large segment of
population, but also enrichment of those
who consume labor – the elites and elite
aspirants
– elite numbers (and appetites) grow
– high rate of upward social mobility
The Antebellum Model, cont.
Elite dynamics:
• Upward mobility: µ = µ0 (W-1 – 1)
• Elite numbers = pop. growth + µ
W: Wage/GDP Index
Urban Elite/Population
5.0
4.5
4.0
3.5
3.0
2.5
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
0.0
1790
1800
1810
1820
1830
1840
1850
1860
1870
1880
Estimated numbers
(and proportion of
population) of adult
American males with
wealth $10,000 or
greater
millionaires per mln
population
(in constant 1900 dollars)
25
20
15
year
nn
1850 85,000
1860 220,000
1870 365,000
%
1.7
3.1
4.2
10
5
0
1800
1825
1850
1875
1900
1925
1950
General principles, cont.
• Growing elite numbers and appetites
eventually overshoot the productive base
– large segments of the elites find themselves
lacking resources to maintain status
• Since the number of power positions is
limited, segments of elites/elite aspirants
must be denied access to them
• Rise of the counterelites: “surplus” elites
must challenge the established elites, even by
violent means
• As a result, elite overproduction drives up
sociopolitical instability
Number of Representatives in the US Congress
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
1790
1800
1810
1820
1830
1840
1850
1860
1870
1880
P o la riza tio n In d e x: F irst D im e n sio n
1 .0
0 .8
0 .6
0 .4
0 .2
1800
1820
1840
1860
1880
1900
1920
1940
1960
1980
2000
Intraelite conflict
1856. Rep. Preston Brooks beating sen. Charles Sumner with a cane
General principles, cont.
• Popular immiseration and elite overproduction
drive increasing sociopolitical instability
20
P o litica l S tre ss C o m p o n e n ts
MMP
EMP
15
10
5
0
1790
1800
1810
1820
1830
1840
1850
1860
1870
1880
III. Instability
• Political Instability
Event: lethal grouplevel conflict within
a state
• Database: compiled
from historical
sources and computerized searches of
newspapers
P o litica l V io le n ce : M a in T yp e s
160
a ll
rio ts
lyn c h in g s
o th e r
140
e ve n ts p e r 5 y
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
1780
1800
1820
1840
1860
1880
1900
1920
1940
1960
1980
2000
Political violence deaths scaled by population
100
10
1
0
1780
1800
1820
1840
1860
1880
1900
1920
1940
1960
1980
2000
Components of instability: The Urban Riots
~1000 people were killed in riots between 1840 and 1860
Prelude to the Civil War:
A War of Religion
1838
1844-5
1857
21 Missouri Mormon War
(Haun's Mill
massacre, Battle of
Crooked River)
2 Mormon War in
Illinois and the
Mormon Exodus
120 Utah Mormon War
(Mountain Meadows
massacre)
Components of instability: Sectional violence
1855
1 KS
Wakarusa War (Bleeding Kansas)
1856
5 KS
Pottawatomie Massacre (Bleeding Kansas)
1856
5 KS
Battle of Osawatomie (Bleeding Kansas)
1858
5 KS
Marais des Cygnes Massacre (Bleeding Kansas)
1859
6 VA
Harpers Ferry Raid (John Brown)
1858. Kansas. Marais des Cygnes massacre
60
P re d ic te d P S I
O b s e rve d In s ta b ility
S e c tio n a l C o n flic t
In sta b ility In d ice s
50
40
30
20
10
0
1790
1800
1810
1820
1830
1840
1850
1860
1870
1880
The Puzzle of
the American Civil War
• There is no concensus among historians
about the causes of the Civil War
• The role of slavery still debated
• Why did the democratic process fail?
Structural-demographic theory: the key
role of the elites
The American Civil War:
the demographic-structural view
• Established elites: southern
slaveowners, supported by northern
seaboard merchants
• Counterelites: the “capitalists”
(railroads, manufactures, mining, etc)
• Outcome: a social revolution
– the antebellum ruling class destroyed
– replaced with the new Upper Class of
northern “bourgeoisie”
• manufacturers, bankers, wholesalers, corporate
lawyers, top professionals, etc
The “Slave Power”
The southern domination of national politics, 1789-1861
• 12 out of 18 presidential terms
– plus northern “doughfaces” such as Franklin Pierce,
James Buchanan, etc
• >50% of the top government posts
– 51% under John Adams, 56% under Jefferson,
57% under Jackson
• Control of the Senate (but not the House)
– aided by northern “doughfaces”
• 57% of Supreme Court Justices
and economic power:
• 70% of the wealthiest Americans in 1860
• In 1850 there were 300,000 slave owners out
of the total population of 20 mln.
The American Civil War:
(1861-1865)
• not an isolated failure of policy
• but a culmination of demographicstructural trends during 1840s and
1850s:
–
–
–
–
popular immiseration
elite overproduction
elite fragmentation and conflict
increasingly lethal political violence
Lessons for Today?
• Elite overproduction
was a common
predictor of
instability waves in
all historical case
studies examined in
Secular Cycles
Overproduction of youths with
advanced degrees
• Appears to be an
excellent proxy for
elite overproduction in
the modern world
• It is statistically
associated with
revolutionary
situations, e.g.
– revolutions of 1848-49
– USSR collapse in 1991
Egypt: proportion of the cohort aged 20-29
with tertiary education (World Bank data)
A20-29 with tertiary education (%)
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
1960
1965
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
2010