IMPACT OF TERRORISM IN
INDIA
OBJECTIVES:

intimidate the state and the civil population;

to demonstrate the inability of the State to
protect its civilian population;

generate pressure on the State from its
population to settle with the terrorists; and

create feelings of battle fatigue in the State as
well as its population.
OLD OR ‘CLASSICAL’ TERRORISM:
 REVOLUTIONARY TERRORISM
 SEPERATIST MOVEMENTS
 ETHNIC / RELIGIOUS TERRORISM
ON HUMAN LIVES:
Toll on the casualties suffered more
than the casualties in the four
conventional wars fought by India.
ON THE POLITICAL SCENE

India has lost two leaders to terrorist
attacks, in each case creating a leadership
crisis

Undermining of democratic values and
democratic institutions.
ON THE ECONOMY:

Cost extracted by acts of terrorism on the
Indian exchequer estimated to be more than
Rs.45,000 crores

Increase in budget on agencies involved in
fighting terrorism is 2600 per cent since 1980s

Compounded by the loss to property and impact
on business environment
ON THE SOCIAL FABRIC
The assassination of Prime Minister Indira
Gandhi in 1984 by Sikh terrorists had terrible
reprisal on the Sikh community
The 1993 Mumbai blasts triggered communal
onslaught on the Muslim population of the
city
19 years to bring the insurgency-cumterrorism in Nagaland under control,
20 years to restore normalcy in Mizoram,
14 years to put an end to terrorism in
Punjab.
J&K complicated
“Now, here, you see, it takes all the running you can do, to keep in the same place. If you
want to get somewhere else, you must run at least twice as fast as that!”
[The Queen]
“It was much pleasanter at home, when one wasn’t always growing larger and smaller, and
being ordered about by mice and rabbits.”
[Alice]
Excerpt from Alice in Wonderland by Lewis Carroll
PREVIEW
• SOFT STATE
• STRATEGY. DO WE
HAVE ANY OR DO WE
NEED ONE?
• STRUCTURES
• ISSUES
NATIONAL APPROACH
OF TOLERANCE
PAN INDIA STRIKES POST 2003
Pre 26/11
26/11
Post 26/11
INDIA’S COUNTER TERRORISM
APPROACH
• INADEQUATE
RESPONSE
• SYSTEMIC FAILURE
• LACK OF COHERENT
STRATEGY
• SOFT STATE
SYSTEMIC FAILURE
• LACK OF POLITICAL CONSENSUS
• MULTIPLE INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES
REPORTING TO DIFFERENT AUTHORITY @
• MULTIPLICITY OF POORLY TRAINED AND
EQUIPPED FORCES &
• AMORPHOUS MARITIME & COASTAL
SECURITY
• NON COLLABORATIVE ATTITUDE AND TURF
BATTLE
SYSTEMIC FAILURE
• AIR SPACE AND AVIATION
SECURITY
• CYBER SECURITY
• NARCO TERRORISM
• MEDIA ANARCHY
• GLOBALISED TERROR
NETWORKS
• ANTI TERROR LAWS AND
ENFORCEMENT
SOFT STATE
SOFT STATE
NATIONAL STRATEGY
DO WE NEED
ONE?
NEXT TIME,
DOUBLE THE
NUMBER OF
THREATS !
UN COUNTER TERRORISM STRATEGY
• ADDRESSING THE CONDITIONS
CONDUCIVE TO THE SPREAD OF
TERRORISM
• PREVENTING TERRORIST ACTS
• DEVELOPING STATE CAPACITY TO
COUNTER TERRORISM
• DEFENDING HUMAN RIGHTS
UK COUNTER TERRORISM STRATEGY
(CONTEST)
THE AIM OF THE STRATEGY IS
“ TO REDUCE THE RISK TO THE UK
AND ITS INTERESTS OVERSEAS
FROM INTERNATIONAL
TERRORISM, SO THAT PEOPLE
CAN GO ABOUT THEIR LIVES
FREELY AND WITH CONFIDENCE”
STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK
• PURSUE: TO STOP TERRORIST
ATTACKS
• PREVENT: TO STOP PEOPLE
BECOMING TERRORISTS OR
SUPPORTING VIOLENT EXTREMISM
• PROTECT: TO STRENGTHEN OUR
PROTECTION AGAINST TERRORIST
ATTACK
• PREPARE: WHERE AN ATTACK
CANNOT BE STOPPED, TO MITIGATE
ITS IMPACT
US DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY 2008 STRATEGIC PLAN
• PROTECT OUR NATION FROM
DANGEROUS PEOPLE
• PROTECT OUR NATION FROM
DANGEROUS GOODS
• PROTECT CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE
• STRENGTHEN OUR NATION'S
PREPAREDNESS AND EMERGENCY
RESPONSE CAPABILITIES
• STRENGTHEN AND UNIFY DHS
OPERATIONS AND MANAGEMENT
COMPONENTS OF US STRATEGY
• COUNTER TERRORISM
• BORDER SECURITY
• PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE
AND RECOVERY INCL FOR
NATURAL DISASTER
• IMMIGRATION.
• CYBER SECURITY
SALIENT STRUCTURES
• NCTC REPORTING TO PRESIDENT , DNI AND DHS
• UNITING AND STRENGTHENING AMERICA
PROVIDING APPROPRIATE TOOLS
REQUIRED TO INTERCEPT AND
OBSTRUCT TERRORISM ACT
2001/2005 (PATROIT ACT)
• FOREIGN INT SVL ACT ( FISA
1978/2008)
• JUSTICE DEPT CAN INVESTIGATE ALL CASES
• MIL COMMISSIONS ACT AGAINST ALIENS
• CYBER COMMAND
DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
PROPOSED INDIAN COUNTER TERRORISM
STRATEGY
• Prevent ( EQUALITY; HEARTS AND
MINDS; ROOT CAUSE; IDEA OF INDIA)
• Disrupt (CAPABILITY TO ANTICIPATE
AND RESPOND AT HOME AND ABROAD)
• Secure ( TARGET HARDENING)
• Citizen as Stake Holder (PPP)
• Prepare ( FOR THE INEVITABLE)
• Unity of Approach ( PLURALISM,
DIVERSITY NOTWITHSTANDING)
COMPREHENSIVE COUNTER TERRORISM
STRATEGY ( SMART POWER)
• HARD POWER
– PRO ACTIVE DEFENSE ( APPROPRIATE FORCE, STRUCTURES AND TOUGH
DECISIONS)
– SURGICAL DISCRIMINATORY STRIKE CAPABILITY
– ABILITY TO WAGE WAR AND WIN IT
– ESPIONAGE/COVERT OPS
• SOFT POWER
– PEOPLE (MULTI CULTURE, MULTI RELIGION,
MULTI ETHENIC, MULTI LINGUAL, RULE
OF LAW -A NEW MELTING POT)
– INTERNATIONAL CLOUT AND COOPERATION
– KNOWLEDGE, MEDIA AND ICE
• TECHNOLOGY
– WPNS AND ARMAMENT
– SPACE, NUCLEAR AND CYBER
STRUCTURES
GOVERNMENT RESPONSE
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
UAPA 2008
NATIONAL INVESTIGATION AGENCY (NIA).
NTRO
NATIONAL COUNTER-TERRORISM CENTRE (NCTC)
THE MULTI-AGENCY CENTRE (MAC)
NATIONAL INT GRID ( NATGRID).
CRIME & CRIMINAL TRACKING NETWK
(CCTNS).
• OPERATIONS DIVISION
• STRENGHTEN COASTAL SECURITY
• OTHER MEASURES
CRITIQUE OF NEW STRUCTURES
• DE – POLITICISE TERRORISM. APPLICABILITY
OF LAWS.
• NCTC MAY NOT HAVE BEST OF TALENT. USA
HAS EST IT UNDER AN ACT OF CONGRESS,
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention
Act (IRTPA)
• COMBAT ARM. CRPF REMAINS THE WEAKEST
LINK AND LARGEST FORCE. LEADERSHIP IS THE
KEY.
• CYBER SECURITY
• CBRN CAPABILITY IS SUSPECT
ISSUES
RESTRUCTURING/POLICY ISSUES
• MINISTER FOR INTERNAL SECURITY
• ROLE OF NSA/ CS. REQUIREMENT
OF DNI. CAN A DIPLOMAT DO
JUSTICE TO IS OR TWO NSAs?
• NIA AND CBI TO BE STAUTORY
BODIES LIKE CEC AND CAG ETC.
NEED FOR YOUNG TALENT AND
NOT TO BE HEADED BY ‘DUE TO
RETIRE (SR)’ OFFRS.
• UNIFIED COMMAND IN STATES
WITH MIL ADVISERS.
RESTRUCTURING/POLICY ISSUES
• COASTAL COMMANDS
• CYBER COMMAND
• DEDICATED OFFR CADRE FOR
CRPF: DELINK FROM IPS
• IMP CL B CITIES TO HAVE INF
UNITS EARMK , TRAINED &
EQUIPPED FOR URBAN
TERRORISM TO SP LOCAL
POLICE.
CONCLUSION
• BUILD CAPABILITY AND PREPARE FOR A LONG
DRAWN CAMPAIGN FOR SUPERMACY
SUN TZU’S ADVICE, “IN PEACE PREPARE FOR WAR. THE
ART OF WAR IS OF VITAL IMPORTANCE TO THE STATE. IT IS
MATTER OF LIFE AND DEATH, A ROAD EITHER TO SAFETY OR
TO RUIN. HENCE UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES CAN IT BE
NEGLECTED.”
• INTERNAL SECURITY IS A NATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY THAT
CAN NOT BE WISHED AWAY, DELEGATED OR OUT SOURCED
• ARUN SHOURIE ON MONEY WHEN HE SAID,
“FOR GOD’S SAKE, DON’T KEEP RUNNING TO
MUMMY.”
COASTAL SECURITY
48
Mitigation Efforts taken by Government of
India Post 26/11
• Assigning responsibility for coastal security and maritime
security.
• Designation of Coastal Command.
• Strengthening of marine police stations.
• Sanctioning of additional assets and manpower for the
Coast Guard.
• Creation of Sagar Prahari Bal for the Navy.
• Automatic Identification System (AIS) for fishing vessels
• Chain of coastal radars.
• Joint Operations Centre (JOC).
Responsibilities for Various Maritime
Stakeholders
• IN –Overall Maritime Security including Coastal
Security & Offshore Security.
• CG – Coastal Security in Territorial Waters
including areas to be patrolled by Marine police.
• Director General Coast Guard – Cdr Coastal
Command.
• FOC-in-C
–
C-in-C Coastal Defence.
Responsibilities of Various Agencies
Prior 26/11
High Seas - Navy
Offshore
Security –
Navy/CG
EEZ (200 NM)
Security – Coast
Guard
Contiguous
Zone (24NM)
Customs
Territorial Waters
(12 NM)
Marine Police
No specific responsibility assigned to the IN
Responsibilities of Various Agencies
Post 26/11
Overall Maritime
Security - Navy
Offshore
Security
- Navy
Coastal Security –
Territorial Waters
Coast Guard
DG
Shipping
Marine
police
Port
Authorities
Fisheries
Intelligence
Agencies
Customs
Limitations of New Security Apparatus
• Overlapping Responsibilities.
• Responsibilities without transfer of authority.
• Coastal Command a misnomer. Responsible for only
co-ordination. No command & control function.
• Replication of responsibility dilutes the accountability.
• Distinction between coastal security & coastal defence.
Limitations of New Security Apparatus (Contd)
• Undue focus on shallow waters.
• Does not leverage expanse of sea.
• Coast Guard structured for EEZ Charter.
• IN back to brown water navy!
Limitations of New Security Apparatus (Contd)
• Unregulated nature of Indian fishing.
• Absence of legal regulatory mechanism.
• Fishing Community – a political vote bank.
• Compulsions of fisheries being state subject.
Co-ordination
• Numerous maritime agencies like major & minor
ports, customs, fisheries, DG Shipping, ONGC, IB
and Marine Police under various ministries.
• Each agency has specific charter but bearing on
security.
• Co-ordination between centre & state agencies.
Recommendations
• Clear demarcation of responsiblity,
accountability & jurisdiction for various
agencies.
Recommendations (Contd)
• Legal regulatory mechanism for Indian fisheries
permitting measures like
- Making crossing of IMBL illegal.
- No fishing corridor.
- Prohibited fishing zones around off shore platforms,
VAs/VPs.
- All legal provisions with penalties.
- AIS/transponders for less than 20 mtrs.
- RFID for fishing boats. (Storage of GPS track).
• Centre to exercise powers of regulating fishing beyond 12 nm.
Recommendations (Contd)
• Maritime Domain Awareness.
- Networking of all concerned agencies.
-
Integration of surveillance data of
 LRIT – DG Shipping.
 PANS – Port authorities.
 AIS - National AIS network (DGLL)
 Coastal Radar Chain – ICG
 Tracking Devices Fishing boats – DG shipping/ Fisheries
 Data base of registration of fishing boats
 Data base of other stake holders, Int, marine police, ports etc.
• Maritime Security Advisor.
Question!
ISSUE
• The current arrangement for Coastal Security suffers
from shortcomings such as:– Coast Guard (CG) made responsible to coordinate between
various agencies without authority over them.
– Coastal Security responsibility of the CG has been limited to
territorial waters (12NM) while it has the Statutory Charter &
capability to operate up to the EEZ (200NM).
– Indian Navy has been made overall responsible with the CG
responsible for territorial waters leading to issues of Command
and Control.
• How can the issue of Command and Control between
various agencies be resolved to bring in better efficiency
and accountability?