IMPACT OF TERRORISM IN INDIA OBJECTIVES: intimidate the state and the civil population; to demonstrate the inability of the State to protect its civilian population; generate pressure on the State from its population to settle with the terrorists; and create feelings of battle fatigue in the State as well as its population. OLD OR ‘CLASSICAL’ TERRORISM: REVOLUTIONARY TERRORISM SEPERATIST MOVEMENTS ETHNIC / RELIGIOUS TERRORISM ON HUMAN LIVES: Toll on the casualties suffered more than the casualties in the four conventional wars fought by India. ON THE POLITICAL SCENE India has lost two leaders to terrorist attacks, in each case creating a leadership crisis Undermining of democratic values and democratic institutions. ON THE ECONOMY: Cost extracted by acts of terrorism on the Indian exchequer estimated to be more than Rs.45,000 crores Increase in budget on agencies involved in fighting terrorism is 2600 per cent since 1980s Compounded by the loss to property and impact on business environment ON THE SOCIAL FABRIC The assassination of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in 1984 by Sikh terrorists had terrible reprisal on the Sikh community The 1993 Mumbai blasts triggered communal onslaught on the Muslim population of the city 19 years to bring the insurgency-cumterrorism in Nagaland under control, 20 years to restore normalcy in Mizoram, 14 years to put an end to terrorism in Punjab. J&K complicated “Now, here, you see, it takes all the running you can do, to keep in the same place. If you want to get somewhere else, you must run at least twice as fast as that!” [The Queen] “It was much pleasanter at home, when one wasn’t always growing larger and smaller, and being ordered about by mice and rabbits.” [Alice] Excerpt from Alice in Wonderland by Lewis Carroll PREVIEW • SOFT STATE • STRATEGY. DO WE HAVE ANY OR DO WE NEED ONE? • STRUCTURES • ISSUES NATIONAL APPROACH OF TOLERANCE PAN INDIA STRIKES POST 2003 Pre 26/11 26/11 Post 26/11 INDIA’S COUNTER TERRORISM APPROACH • INADEQUATE RESPONSE • SYSTEMIC FAILURE • LACK OF COHERENT STRATEGY • SOFT STATE SYSTEMIC FAILURE • LACK OF POLITICAL CONSENSUS • MULTIPLE INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES REPORTING TO DIFFERENT AUTHORITY @ • MULTIPLICITY OF POORLY TRAINED AND EQUIPPED FORCES & • AMORPHOUS MARITIME & COASTAL SECURITY • NON COLLABORATIVE ATTITUDE AND TURF BATTLE SYSTEMIC FAILURE • AIR SPACE AND AVIATION SECURITY • CYBER SECURITY • NARCO TERRORISM • MEDIA ANARCHY • GLOBALISED TERROR NETWORKS • ANTI TERROR LAWS AND ENFORCEMENT SOFT STATE SOFT STATE NATIONAL STRATEGY DO WE NEED ONE? NEXT TIME, DOUBLE THE NUMBER OF THREATS ! UN COUNTER TERRORISM STRATEGY • ADDRESSING THE CONDITIONS CONDUCIVE TO THE SPREAD OF TERRORISM • PREVENTING TERRORIST ACTS • DEVELOPING STATE CAPACITY TO COUNTER TERRORISM • DEFENDING HUMAN RIGHTS UK COUNTER TERRORISM STRATEGY (CONTEST) THE AIM OF THE STRATEGY IS “ TO REDUCE THE RISK TO THE UK AND ITS INTERESTS OVERSEAS FROM INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, SO THAT PEOPLE CAN GO ABOUT THEIR LIVES FREELY AND WITH CONFIDENCE” STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK • PURSUE: TO STOP TERRORIST ATTACKS • PREVENT: TO STOP PEOPLE BECOMING TERRORISTS OR SUPPORTING VIOLENT EXTREMISM • PROTECT: TO STRENGTHEN OUR PROTECTION AGAINST TERRORIST ATTACK • PREPARE: WHERE AN ATTACK CANNOT BE STOPPED, TO MITIGATE ITS IMPACT US DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 2008 STRATEGIC PLAN • PROTECT OUR NATION FROM DANGEROUS PEOPLE • PROTECT OUR NATION FROM DANGEROUS GOODS • PROTECT CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE • STRENGTHEN OUR NATION'S PREPAREDNESS AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE CAPABILITIES • STRENGTHEN AND UNIFY DHS OPERATIONS AND MANAGEMENT COMPONENTS OF US STRATEGY • COUNTER TERRORISM • BORDER SECURITY • PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE AND RECOVERY INCL FOR NATURAL DISASTER • IMMIGRATION. • CYBER SECURITY SALIENT STRUCTURES • NCTC REPORTING TO PRESIDENT , DNI AND DHS • UNITING AND STRENGTHENING AMERICA PROVIDING APPROPRIATE TOOLS REQUIRED TO INTERCEPT AND OBSTRUCT TERRORISM ACT 2001/2005 (PATROIT ACT) • FOREIGN INT SVL ACT ( FISA 1978/2008) • JUSTICE DEPT CAN INVESTIGATE ALL CASES • MIL COMMISSIONS ACT AGAINST ALIENS • CYBER COMMAND DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY PROPOSED INDIAN COUNTER TERRORISM STRATEGY • Prevent ( EQUALITY; HEARTS AND MINDS; ROOT CAUSE; IDEA OF INDIA) • Disrupt (CAPABILITY TO ANTICIPATE AND RESPOND AT HOME AND ABROAD) • Secure ( TARGET HARDENING) • Citizen as Stake Holder (PPP) • Prepare ( FOR THE INEVITABLE) • Unity of Approach ( PLURALISM, DIVERSITY NOTWITHSTANDING) COMPREHENSIVE COUNTER TERRORISM STRATEGY ( SMART POWER) • HARD POWER – PRO ACTIVE DEFENSE ( APPROPRIATE FORCE, STRUCTURES AND TOUGH DECISIONS) – SURGICAL DISCRIMINATORY STRIKE CAPABILITY – ABILITY TO WAGE WAR AND WIN IT – ESPIONAGE/COVERT OPS • SOFT POWER – PEOPLE (MULTI CULTURE, MULTI RELIGION, MULTI ETHENIC, MULTI LINGUAL, RULE OF LAW -A NEW MELTING POT) – INTERNATIONAL CLOUT AND COOPERATION – KNOWLEDGE, MEDIA AND ICE • TECHNOLOGY – WPNS AND ARMAMENT – SPACE, NUCLEAR AND CYBER STRUCTURES GOVERNMENT RESPONSE • • • • • • • UAPA 2008 NATIONAL INVESTIGATION AGENCY (NIA). NTRO NATIONAL COUNTER-TERRORISM CENTRE (NCTC) THE MULTI-AGENCY CENTRE (MAC) NATIONAL INT GRID ( NATGRID). CRIME & CRIMINAL TRACKING NETWK (CCTNS). • OPERATIONS DIVISION • STRENGHTEN COASTAL SECURITY • OTHER MEASURES CRITIQUE OF NEW STRUCTURES • DE – POLITICISE TERRORISM. APPLICABILITY OF LAWS. • NCTC MAY NOT HAVE BEST OF TALENT. USA HAS EST IT UNDER AN ACT OF CONGRESS, Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) • COMBAT ARM. CRPF REMAINS THE WEAKEST LINK AND LARGEST FORCE. LEADERSHIP IS THE KEY. • CYBER SECURITY • CBRN CAPABILITY IS SUSPECT ISSUES RESTRUCTURING/POLICY ISSUES • MINISTER FOR INTERNAL SECURITY • ROLE OF NSA/ CS. REQUIREMENT OF DNI. CAN A DIPLOMAT DO JUSTICE TO IS OR TWO NSAs? • NIA AND CBI TO BE STAUTORY BODIES LIKE CEC AND CAG ETC. NEED FOR YOUNG TALENT AND NOT TO BE HEADED BY ‘DUE TO RETIRE (SR)’ OFFRS. • UNIFIED COMMAND IN STATES WITH MIL ADVISERS. RESTRUCTURING/POLICY ISSUES • COASTAL COMMANDS • CYBER COMMAND • DEDICATED OFFR CADRE FOR CRPF: DELINK FROM IPS • IMP CL B CITIES TO HAVE INF UNITS EARMK , TRAINED & EQUIPPED FOR URBAN TERRORISM TO SP LOCAL POLICE. CONCLUSION • BUILD CAPABILITY AND PREPARE FOR A LONG DRAWN CAMPAIGN FOR SUPERMACY SUN TZU’S ADVICE, “IN PEACE PREPARE FOR WAR. THE ART OF WAR IS OF VITAL IMPORTANCE TO THE STATE. IT IS MATTER OF LIFE AND DEATH, A ROAD EITHER TO SAFETY OR TO RUIN. HENCE UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES CAN IT BE NEGLECTED.” • INTERNAL SECURITY IS A NATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY THAT CAN NOT BE WISHED AWAY, DELEGATED OR OUT SOURCED • ARUN SHOURIE ON MONEY WHEN HE SAID, “FOR GOD’S SAKE, DON’T KEEP RUNNING TO MUMMY.” COASTAL SECURITY 48 Mitigation Efforts taken by Government of India Post 26/11 • Assigning responsibility for coastal security and maritime security. • Designation of Coastal Command. • Strengthening of marine police stations. • Sanctioning of additional assets and manpower for the Coast Guard. • Creation of Sagar Prahari Bal for the Navy. • Automatic Identification System (AIS) for fishing vessels • Chain of coastal radars. • Joint Operations Centre (JOC). Responsibilities for Various Maritime Stakeholders • IN –Overall Maritime Security including Coastal Security & Offshore Security. • CG – Coastal Security in Territorial Waters including areas to be patrolled by Marine police. • Director General Coast Guard – Cdr Coastal Command. • FOC-in-C – C-in-C Coastal Defence. Responsibilities of Various Agencies Prior 26/11 High Seas - Navy Offshore Security – Navy/CG EEZ (200 NM) Security – Coast Guard Contiguous Zone (24NM) Customs Territorial Waters (12 NM) Marine Police No specific responsibility assigned to the IN Responsibilities of Various Agencies Post 26/11 Overall Maritime Security - Navy Offshore Security - Navy Coastal Security – Territorial Waters Coast Guard DG Shipping Marine police Port Authorities Fisheries Intelligence Agencies Customs Limitations of New Security Apparatus • Overlapping Responsibilities. • Responsibilities without transfer of authority. • Coastal Command a misnomer. Responsible for only co-ordination. No command & control function. • Replication of responsibility dilutes the accountability. • Distinction between coastal security & coastal defence. Limitations of New Security Apparatus (Contd) • Undue focus on shallow waters. • Does not leverage expanse of sea. • Coast Guard structured for EEZ Charter. • IN back to brown water navy! Limitations of New Security Apparatus (Contd) • Unregulated nature of Indian fishing. • Absence of legal regulatory mechanism. • Fishing Community – a political vote bank. • Compulsions of fisheries being state subject. Co-ordination • Numerous maritime agencies like major & minor ports, customs, fisheries, DG Shipping, ONGC, IB and Marine Police under various ministries. • Each agency has specific charter but bearing on security. • Co-ordination between centre & state agencies. Recommendations • Clear demarcation of responsiblity, accountability & jurisdiction for various agencies. Recommendations (Contd) • Legal regulatory mechanism for Indian fisheries permitting measures like - Making crossing of IMBL illegal. - No fishing corridor. - Prohibited fishing zones around off shore platforms, VAs/VPs. - All legal provisions with penalties. - AIS/transponders for less than 20 mtrs. - RFID for fishing boats. (Storage of GPS track). • Centre to exercise powers of regulating fishing beyond 12 nm. Recommendations (Contd) • Maritime Domain Awareness. - Networking of all concerned agencies. - Integration of surveillance data of LRIT – DG Shipping. PANS – Port authorities. AIS - National AIS network (DGLL) Coastal Radar Chain – ICG Tracking Devices Fishing boats – DG shipping/ Fisheries Data base of registration of fishing boats Data base of other stake holders, Int, marine police, ports etc. • Maritime Security Advisor. Question! ISSUE • The current arrangement for Coastal Security suffers from shortcomings such as:– Coast Guard (CG) made responsible to coordinate between various agencies without authority over them. – Coastal Security responsibility of the CG has been limited to territorial waters (12NM) while it has the Statutory Charter & capability to operate up to the EEZ (200NM). – Indian Navy has been made overall responsible with the CG responsible for territorial waters leading to issues of Command and Control. • How can the issue of Command and Control between various agencies be resolved to bring in better efficiency and accountability?