Indispensability of Judea &
Samaria Mountain Ridges in
the Era of Modern Weaponry
Judea&Samaria (J&S) mountain
ridges - 3,000ft above the Jordan
Valley and 2,000ft above the 8-15
mile coastal plain - constitute the
“Golan Heights" of Jerusalem, Tel
Aviv and Israel’s coastal plain.
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Contents
1. Mideast Turmoil
and Israel’s Security
Requirements
3. US Generals
on J&S mountain 2. Centrality of
ridges ground
barriers
Is High-Tech a
Substitute for
High-Ground?
4. Land ,
Deployment of
Reservists &
Surprise Attack
8. The
Indispensability of
Judea & Samaria
Mountain Ridges
6. Judea &
Samaria vs.
Sinai.
9. Israel's
unique
vulnerability 8.Uniqueness
of Israel's
10. Peace
security
boundaries in
predicament
the Mideast.
The impact of the Tunisia and
Egypt turmoil on Israel’s security
predicament, especially “The
Eastern Front.”
Judea & Samaria (J&S) mountain
ridges - 3,000ft above the Jordan
Valley and 2,000ft above the 8-15
mile coastal plain - constitute the
“Golan Heights" of Jerusalem, Tel
Aviv and Israel’s coastal plain.
The impact of the Tunisia and Egypt
turmoil on Israel’s security
predicament, especially “The Eastern
Front.”
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• Israel’s most vulnerable flank is “The Eastern Front” - the
Jordan Valley and the Judea & Samaria mountain ridges over-towering Israel’s “Soft Belly.”
• The Tunisia/Egypt turmoil reflects the shifty, tenuous,
violent, non-compliant nature of Mideast regimes.
• Obama’s 2011policy of engagement with rogue regimes,
and his announced retreat from Iraq, are perceived – by
rogue regimes - as weakness, thus fueling violence.
• Saddam's regime was perceived doom in 1991, became a
non-conventional threat in 2002 and was eliminated in
2003. When will a brutal regime resurface in Baghdad?
The impact of the Tunisia and Egypt
turmoil on Israel’s security
predicament, especially “The Eastern
Front.”
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• The 1993 Oslo Accord produced unprecedented Palestinian
hate-education, terror and non-compliance.
• The 1989 demise of the USSR triggered illusions of peace,
but the world has become less certain and more violent.
• In 1990 King Hussein supported Saddam’s invasion of
Kuwait. In 1968-70 he provided the PLO a terror platform.
In 1973, 1967 and 1948, King Abdullah and King Hussein
joined wars against Israel in violation of commitments.
• In 1969 and1979, Libya and Iran were abruptly
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transformed from pro-US to anti-US regimes.
The impact of the Tunisia and Egypt
turmoil on Israel’s security predicament,
especially “The Eastern Front.”
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• In 1967, Israel defeated Egypt, Syria and Jordan, producing
a "No Threat" delusion. But, in 1973 Israel barely escaped
annihilation.
• How will the Mideast be impacted by a demise of the
current Hashemite, Yemenite, Saudi or Egyptian regimes?
• Mideast precedents - in the most unstable, unpredictable,
volatile, treacherous and violent region in the world require Israel to possess a uniquely high threshold of
security and be prepared for the worst case scenarios,
including "The Eastern Front Threat."
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The Centrality of Ground
Barriers in Defeating Enemies
Judea & Samaria (J&S) mountain
ridges - 3,000ft above the Jordan
Valley and 2,000ft above the 8-15
mile coastal plain - constitute the
“Golan Heights" of Jerusalem, Tel
Aviv and Israel’s coastal plain.
The Centrality of Ground Barriers in
Defeating Enemies
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• Thousands of tons of daily bombing did not end the wars in
Afghanistan and Iraq. 70% of the bombing was inaccurate.
• Saddam was brought to submission by the US ground
forces.
• Ballistic missiles cause damage, but they don't conclude
wars. An Arab tank battalion in Tel Aviv would be more
significant than thousands of missiles on Tel Aviv.
• The centrality of ground forces suggests the centrality of
ground barriers (geographic depth and topographic edge).
The Centrality of Ground Barriers in
Defeating Enemies
• "Enduring Relevance of Land Power", US Army NEXT
Institute of Land Warfare, Oct. 2003: "Land force (is) the
cornerstone of deterrence...Ground units can both destroy
and occupy...as was demonstrated (in Afghanistan and
Iraq)...Determined adversaries are seldom defeated quickly.
Achieving a lasting decision requires the ability to conduct
sustained, multidimensional joint operations. Land forces
provide these qualities...During the Afghan campaign of
2002, precision air strikes were critical, but they neither
annihilated opposition nor finished the enemy...In the
1999 Kosovo operation, the air war created the conditions
for negotiations, but it was the ground forces that created
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the stability that now exists.
The Centrality of Ground Barriers in Defeating
Enemies
In 1995 Bosnia, the threat of airpower did not deter Serbia.
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It took the ground forces to create the conditions for the
Dayton Accords…In 1991, months of strike operations did
not achieve decision. The four-day ground war led to
Iraqi surrender...(In 1989 in Panama), the surrender of
Noriega was the result of soldiers on the ground..."
• The US stations 200,000 GIs (125% increase since 2001) in
overseas military land installations in 120 countries.
• All wars are conventional, requiring ground forces (IndiaPakistan, US-Afghanistan, US-Iraq, US-Panama, Britaincontent ,
Argentina, Ethiopia-Eritrea, Iran-Iraq, Morocco-Mauritania
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Photo: Yehoar Gal
‫ יהואר גל‬:‫צילם‬
Haderah Power Station: A View from J & S
U.S. GENERALS ON J&S
MOUNTAIN RIDGES
Judea & Samaria (J&S) mountain
ridges - 3,000ft above the Jordan
Valley and 2,000ft above the 8-15
mile coastal plain - constitute the
“Golan Heights" of Jerusalem, Tel
Aviv and Israel’s coastal plain.
U.S GENERALS ON J&S
MOUNTAIN RIDGES
• The late Admiral Bud Nance:” The eastern mountain ridge ofNEXT
the
West Bank is one of the world's best tank barriers. Invading tanks
will have to climb a 3,000ft steep slope from the Jordan Valley. The
western mountain ridge, which is a 2,000ft gentle slope, constitutes
a dream platform of invasion to Israel's narrow (8-15 miles) coastal
plain. Control of the West Bank provides Israel the time to mobilize
reservists, which are essential to its survival during a surprise attack.”
• General (ret.) Al Gray, former Commandant, US Marine Corps:
“Missiles fly over any terrain feature, but they don't negate the
strategic significance of territorial depth. The key threat to Israel
will remain the invasion and occupation by armored forces. Military
success requires more than a few hundred missiles. To defeat Israel
would require the Arabs to deploy armor, infantry and artillery into
Israel and destroy the IDF on the ground. That was true in 1948, 1967
and 1973, and it remains true in the era of modern missiles.”
U.S GENERALS ON J&S
MOUNTAIN RIDGES
• Lt. General (ret.) Tom Kelly, Chief of Operations in the 1991 Gulf
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War: "I cannot defend this land (Israel) without that terrain (West
Bank)...The West Bank mountains, and especially their 5 approaches,
are the critical terrain. If an enemy secures those passes, Jerusalem
and Israel become uncovered. Without the West Bank, Israel is only
8 miles wide at its narrowest point. That makes it indefensible."
• 100 retired Generals and Admirals (Oct. 1988, Washington Times):
Israel should not withdraw from J&S, lest it fail to provide security
to its People. It is impossible to demilitarize J&S effectively
• The late Admiral Bud Nance: “I believe if Israel were to move out of
the Golan Heights, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, it would
increase instability and the possibility of war, increase the necessity
to preempt in war, and the possibility that nuclear weapons would be
used to prevent an Israeli loss, and increase the possibility that theback
US
would have to become involved in a war."
U.S GENERALS ON J&S
MOUNTAIN RIDGES
Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of
Staff, Earl Wheeler: The minimum
required for Israel's defense includes
most of the West Bank, the whole of
Gaza and the Golan Heights (June 29,
1967). Wheeler realized that Mideast
peace is based on deterrence.
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Tel Aviv: A view from the Judea & Samaria Mountain Ridges
LAND , DEPLOYMENT OF
RESERVISTS & SURPRISE
ATTACK
Judea & Samaria (J&S) mountain
ridges - 3,000ft above the Jordan
Valley and 2,000ft above the 8-15
mile coastal plain - constitute the
“Golan Heights" of Jerusalem, Tel
Aviv and Israel’s coastal plain.
LAND , DEPLOYMENT OF RESERVISTS
& SURPRISE ATTACK
• The transition from Mideast peace to war is as abrupt and
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unpredictable as is Mideast politics.
• A surprise attack provides Arab regular forces (tanks and infantry)
a 7:1 edge adjacent to the Jerusalem-Tel Aviv-Haifa area. 50 hours
are required to mobilize Israel's reservists (75% of IDF).
• The more advanced the Arab military, the faster and more destructive
is the surprise offensive, the longer it takes to mobilize Israel's
reservists, the more essential are J&S mountain ridges for halting
the invasion. Control of the mountain ridges enables a small Israeli
force to block the invasion until the arrival of reservists
• The slimmer the geographic depth, the less time is available to
mobilize reservists, and the more critical is the control of the
mountain ridges. The demilitarization of J&S would provide Israel
with merely 5-10 hours early warning time (insufficient to mobilize
the reservists), before the invasion could reach Israel's "Soft Belly."
LAND , DEPLOYMENT OF RESERVISTS &
SURPRISE ATTACK
• Most of Israel's reservists reside in the "narrow waistline" of
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Jerusalem-Tel Aviv-Haifa area (70% population, 80% of
infrastructures), which is dominated by the J&S mountain ridges.
The control of J&S determines the time available for the deployment
of reservists and for blocking a surprise invasion.
• Primitive Scud missiles created havoc in Israel’s “Soft Belly” during
the 1991 Gulf War. The more advanced the missiles, the more
vulnerable are population centers and air force bases (which are
crucial for fending off invasion).
• Security arrangements, as a substitute for ground barriers, require
geographic depth, which provides early warning time, should a peace
accord collapse (as happens often in the Mideast). Israel does not
possess such a geographic depth. Ground barriers was tactically
pertinent in 1948. In 2003 - due to modern weaponry - ground
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barriers are strategically critical.
IS HIGH-TECH
A SUBSTITUTE FOR
HIGH-GROUND?
Judea & Samaria (J&S) mountain
ridges - 3,000ft above the Jordan
Valley and 2,000ft above the 8-15
mile coastal plain - constitute the
“Golan Heights" of Jerusalem, Tel
Aviv and Israel’s coastal plain.
IS HIGH-TECH
A SUBSTITUTE FOR
HIGH-GROUND?
NEXT
• High Tech today will always be Low Tech tomorrow. But, High
Ground always remains High Ground.
• One can, eventually, jam any technology. However, one cannot jam
the topographic edge of Judea & Samaria mountain ridges.
• A country does not alter its boundaries in accordance with the
weapon system and technologies de-jour.
• The best US surveillance systems, stationed in the Persian Gulf,
failed to detect Iraq's invasions of Iran (1980) and Kuwait (1990).
• In 1973, Israel's technology detected Egypt's and Syria's plans of
invasion, but the human factor failed to comprehend the data. Ground
barriers, rather than technology, enabled Israel to regroup, stopped
the invasion and prevented Israel’s annihilation
Tel Aviv/Ramat Gan Stock Exchange as Viewed
from the Judea & Samaria mountain ridges
IS HIGH-TECH
A SUBSTITUTE FOR
HIGH-GROUND?
NEXT
• Technology is fallible. Ground barriers enables one to overcome
technological, intelligence and operational fallibility. In 1973, Sinai,
Golan and J&S were the cushion, which spared Israel oblivion.
• US technology could not destroy Iraq's missile launchers in 1991.
• In 1999, "Newsweek" reported that China might have developed a
technology, capable of neutralizing the US Air Force and paralyzing
Taiwan's air defense.
• The supply of advanced technology has been tempered by suppliers,
sometimes leveraged in order to pressure Israel.
• The US does not consider high-tech a substitute for vital land.
Therefore, it operates military land installations in 120 countries.
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Ben Gurion Airport dominated by the
Judea & Samaria mountain ridges
JUDEA & SAMARIA vs.
SINAI
Judea & Samaria (J&S) mountain
ridges - 3,000ft above the Jordan
Valley and 2,000ft above the 8-15
mile coastal plain - constitute the
“Golan Heights" of Jerusalem, Tel
Aviv and Israel’s coastal plain.
JUDEA & SAMARIA vs. SINAI
NEXT
• The Sinai giveaway has constrained Israel's strategic maneuverability
and Israel's potential of concessions in other fronts, including J&S.
• Sinai borders the Negev, but J&S borders Israel's "Soft Belly,"
home for 70% of Israel’s population and 80% of its infrastructures.
• Sinai does not possess a topographic edge over the Negev, while J&S
possess an over-towering edge over Israel's coastal plain.
• The Negev (2/3 of pre-1967 Israel) is sparsely populated, constantly
accommodating most of Israel's reserve maneuvers, and therefore can
absorb a surprise offensive through Sinai. The densely populated
sliver coastal plain is unable to absorb a surprise offensive - through
Judea & Samaria - by a resurrected Eastern Front.
JUDEA & SAMARIA vs. SINAI
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• A demilitarized Sinai (22,000 sqm) accords a 50 hours
early-warning -time for the deployment of Israel's reservists.
A demilitarized J&S (2,200sqm) would accord 5-10 hours,
while 50 hours are required for full deployment .
• Retaking Sinai would be less difficult due to the Negev's
similar topography. Retaking J&S would be extremely
costly due to J&S' topographic edge
• The Sinai giveaway was a calculated risk. A J&S
giveaway might be a lethal gamble.
• A J&S giveaway would transform Jerusalem into an
enclave, connected to the coastal plain by a narrow
5 mile
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corridor, over-towered by the J&S mountain ridges.
THE INDISPENSABILITY OF
JUDEA & SAMARIA
MOUNTAIN RIDGES
Judea & Samaria (J&S) mountain
ridges - 3,000ft above the Jordan
Valley and 2,000ft above the 8-15
mile coastal plain - constitute the
“Golan Heights" of Jerusalem, Tel
Aviv and Israel’s coastal plain.
Ben Gurion Aiport landing strips dominated
by the
Judea & Samaria mountain ridges
THE INDISPENSABILITY
OF JUDEA & SAMARIA MOUNTAIN
RIDGES
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• The eastern mountain ridge of J&S constitutes one of the world's
best tank barriers (a 3,000ft steep slope over the Jordan Valley). The
five roads traversing it are easily controllable by a small regular force.
• The western mountain ridge of J&S (a 2,000ft moderate slope)
constitutes a dream platform of invading the sliver coastal plain, for
the firing of shoulder launched missiles at civilian aircraft, and for
daily terrorism, which would transform the terror reality of the Gaza
area to Jerusalem, Tel Aviv and the entire coastal plain.
• The J&S mountain ridges constitute a platform for air defense,
jamming and surveillance systems, which can reach the Persian Gulf,
and is essential for the "Arrow" anti-missile system. A Jordanian
bomber could reach Israel in 4 minutes from the Jordan Valley,
which is the minimum time required to deploy Israel's interceptors.
THE INDISPENSABILITY
OF JUDE & SMARIA MOUNTAIN
RIDGES
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• J&S mountain ridges prevent Israel's coverage by Arab
surveillance systems, thus enhancing Israel's defensive
and offensive capabilities.
• A J&S giveaway would exacerbate terrorism, dwarfing
the 1994-2003 losses.
• Until 1967, Israel forced Jordan to limit its military force
in J&S to 5,000 soldiers, in order to preclude a lethal
threat. In 2003, there are 40,000 armed Palestinian
terrorists in J&S, which are equal to 4 infantry divisions
.
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THE INDISPENSABILITY OF JUDEA &
SAMARIA MOUNTAIN RIDGES
NEXT
• The Judea & Samaria mountain ridges transform Israel
from a consumer – to a producer - of national security.
J&S mountain ridges enhance Israel's strategic profile in the
USA and in the Mideast. A J&S giveaway would induce
Arab belligerence. Without J&S, Israel wouldn't have been
able to roll back the 1970 Syrian invasion of Jordan, and
would not be able to bomb Iraq's nuclear reactor in 1981.
• The signing of the Oslo Accord radicalized Israeli Arabs.
The current stage of Palestinian terrorism (since 2000) has
exacerbated Arab-Jewish relations. A J&S giveaway would
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further deteriorate Jewish-Arab co-existence.
UNIQUENESS OF
ISRAEL'S SECURITY
PREDICAMENT
Judea & Samaria (J&S) mountain
ridges - 3,000ft above the Jordan
Valley and 2,000ft above the 8-15
mile coastal plain - constitute the
“Golan Heights" of Jerusalem, Tel
Aviv and Israel’s coastal plain.
Ben Gurion airport - a view from the
Mountain ridges of Judea & Samaria
UNIQUENESS OF ISRAEL'S SECURITY
PREDICAMENT
NEXT
• The world expects Israel to yield land, which it scarcely
possess. Israel's area is 0.196% of the area of the Arab
countries, which is 150% larger than the US and 130% larger
than Europe. The West expects the Arabs to accord Israel
peace, which they scarcely accord to one another (Arieh
Stav, the Ariel Center for Policy Research).
UNIQUENESS OF ISRAEL'S SECURITY
PREDICAMENT
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• The geographic depth of J&S, Golan Heights and Sinai
(three times as large as pre-1967 Israel) enabled Israel to
survive the 1973 surprise offensive. The absence of such a
geographic depth would deny minimum security
requirements and would require more preemptive wars.
• Geographically and topographically Israel has a uniquely
limited margin of error during wartime.
• Topographic and geographic inferiority mandates Israel to
transfer war, promptly, to enemy's territory.
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UNIQUENESS OF ISRAEL'S SECURITY
PREDICAMENT
NEXT
• Unlike other countries - and due to Arab track record Israel can’t afford to lose a war. The Jewish nation was
exiled following its defeat 2,000 years ago. But, in view of
the official daily Arab hate-education, media and clergy,
Jews would not be exiled, should Israel be defeated by the
Arabs... Jews would be massacred!
• Israel's pre-1967 borders were the longest in the world per
sqm, and therefore less defensible. They were 360
kilometers (225 miles) longer than the current borders,
characterized by more complex geography, which requires
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more personnel and hardware
ISRAEL'S UNIQUE
VULNERABILITY
Judea & Samaria (J&S) mountain
ridges - 3,000ft above the Jordan
Valley and 2,000ft above the 8-15
mile coastal plain - constitute the
“Golan Heights" of Jerusalem, Tel
Aviv and Israel’s coastal plain.
Ben Gurion Airport and Israel’s coastal plain
Dominated by the Judea & Samaria mountain ridges
ISRAEL'S UNIQUE VULNERABILITY
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• The width of Israel's coastal plain (8-15 miles) is equal to
the distance between JFK and La Guardia airports in NY.
=
+
ISRAEL'S UNIQUE VULNERABILITY
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• The width of Israel's coastal plain (8-15 miles) is equal to
the length of DFW airport in Texas, to the width of
Washington DC, San Francisco and Miami and to the
distance between Wall Street and Columbia University in
New York .
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ISRAEL'S UNIQUE VULNERABILITY
The width of pre-1967 Israel
(8-15 miles) is less than the
downtown London –
Heathrow Airport distance,
equal to Albert Hall – Tower
of London roundtrip
and the distance between
Bois Du Boulogne - La
Place De La Bastille and
the Kennedy Center - RFK
Stadium in Washington, DC.
:“Can
Israel Survive a Palestinian
State?” Dr. Michael Widlansky
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ISRAEL'S UNIQUE VULNERABILITY
• The late Admiral Bud Nance: "The entire state of Israel
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including the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and the Golan
Heights - is smaller than the gunnery range at Nellis Air
Force Base...Israel is only 9 miles across at is center close
to Tel Aviv. This is scarcely more than the distance from
the Pentagon to Mount Vernon. A modern tank can
traverse this distance in about 15 minutes...With the West
Bank included, Israel is approximately 40 miles across at its
mid-point. Atlanta is more than 40 miles across.
• Israel's area - before 1967 - was just 6 times more than the
largest ranch in Texas, King's Ranch.
• The US declared a 25 kilometer radius area, in Bosnia, back
as a
"killing zone", in order to ensure the safety of its soldiers.
PEACE BOUNDARIES IN
THE MIDEAST
Judea & Samaria (J&S) mountain
ridges - 3,000ft above the Jordan
Valley and 2,000ft above the 8-15
mile coastal plain - constitute the
“Golan Heights" of Jerusalem, Tel
Aviv and Israel’s coastal plain.
Flight time by a Jordanian
combat plane from the
Jordan Valley to Tel Aviv
“Can Israel Survive a Palestinian State?” :
Dr. Michael Widlansky
PEACE BOUNDARIES IN THE
MIDEAST
• The Mideast: 1,400 years of no comprehensive intra-Arab
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peace, no ratification of all intra-Arab borders, no
compliance with all intra-Arab agreements/treaties, not a
single Arab democracy. Is it logical to assume that the
Arabs will accord to the ("infidel") Jewish State that which
they have yet to accord to one another?!
• Peace in the Mideast is Peace through Deterrence .
• The prime test of a Middle East peace accord is its
capability to withstand a worst-case Midast scenarios, such
as an abrupt violation by a concerted unpredictable attack,
including an Arab uprising within Israel. Would Israel be
able to fend off a 1973-like surprise offensive without the
cushions of Sinai, Judea, Samaria and the Golan Heights? ??
PEACE BOUNDARIES IN THE MIDEAST
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• Mideast peace accord is as durable as Mideast politics,
which is the shiftiest, and the most treacherous and tenuous
in the globe.
• Peace accord enhance security as long as the parties adhere
to the agreement. Peace accord undermines security, once
it is violated, as a result of the territorial concessions made.
• “Land for Peace" is logically flawed: While Israel is urged
to concede land in return for peace, would Arab violations
of peace entitle Israel to retrieve land?!
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Second Thought: A US-Israel
Initiative
Written and edited by Yoram Ettinger
Judea & Samaria (J&S) mountain
ridges - 3,000ft above the Jordan
Valley and 2,000ft above the 8-15
mile coastal plain - constitute the
“Golan Heights" of Jerusalem, Tel
Aviv and Israel’s coastal plain.