Highway & Motor Carrier Division
Presented to:
SOUTHEASTERN STATES PUPIL TRANSPORTATION CONFERENCE
and
OKLAHOMA ASSOCIATION FOR PUPIL TRANSPORTATION
Sheraton Oklahoma City Hotel
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma
July 11-13, 2011
Presented by:
Bill Arrington
General Manager, HMC
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Highway & Motor Carrier Landscape
Trucking
700K trucking companies in U.S
(incl. 371K intrastate companies)
8.8M trucks operate in the U.S.
(26M Class 1-8 trucks)
51K new motor carriers annually
61K HAZMAT truck companies
80% of U.S. communities depend
on trucks for movement of
commodities
Highway Systems
46,876 miles of interstate highways
160K miles of NHS roads
4M miles of local roads
350 U.S. tunnels over 100 meters in length
582,000 bridges over 20 feet of span
100M commercial vehicles
154M automobiles
200M Licensed Drivers
10M Licensed Commercial Drivers
1.7M HAZMAT Drivers
Motorcoach
$5.6B industry: Scheduled
Charter/Tour
3,200 bus companies
30K buses
118K jobs provided
62K full-time employees
750M passengers annually
95% are small operators
(less than 25 buses)
School Bus
Pupil Transportation Industry
Largest public fleet of vehicles in the
U.S. (@ 500,000 school buses)
24M students transported daily
School buses travel more then 4 billion
miles annually
16,000 School Districts
2,500 private schools
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Highway & Motor Carrier Four Security Pillars
Information Sharing
HighwaySecurity Process
Lessons Learned
Assistance/Compliance
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Highway & Motor Carrier
Public Law 110-53, (9/11 Implementation Act) requirements:
 School Transportation Industry Assessment, Sec. 1538

Scenario-based risk assessment – 64 page report.

TxVxC = Risk

There is currently no credible actionable threat to the school
transportation industry

Forwarded to 46 School Transportation Representatives

Available upon request at: highwaysecurity@dhs.gov
 Regulation requiring Over-the-Road Bus Security
Assessments and Plans, Sec. 1531: This will require
operator-level vulnerability assessments
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Highway & Motor Carrier
School Transportation Industry Assessment
 Findings:

School Buses are relatively easily obtained for use as a potential
weapon.

As weapons, school buses provide a large capacity for explosives
or other weapons and enjoy special, often unchallenged, access.

As targets, school buses are highly vulnerable and if attacked could
have significant consequences and psychological damage.

“Insider threat” is a significant vulnerability (school bus drivers
and/or maintenance workers).

A coordinated, national campaign of attacks could cause widespread secondary effects. Reduced school attendance as well as a
negative resulting economic impact could occur.

School buses are often used as conveyances for persons other
than students at major events and gatherings, which extend the
security problem beyond just pupil transportation.
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Highway & Motor Carrier
School Transportation Industry Assessment
 Recommendations:

Vetting school transportation employees or contractors.

School districts should develop and implement a security planning
process to include assessments, standards/guidelines, training and
periodic exercises.

School transportation security planning and emergency planning
efforts should include the entire pupil transportation system. Most
school emergency plans stop at the school’s door.

School buses are used to transport passengers to many potentially
sensitive targets. They are often afforded unchallenged access.
Venues should be reminded to respectfully challenge a school bus’s
legitimacy and presence to determine if they pose a security risk.

TSA should participate in identifying and developing a mechanism
to facilitate the sharing of appropriate intelligence information with
school officials and should compliment any threat information.
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Highway & Motor Carrier
Assessments
•
HMC Corporate Security Review (CSR) Program designed
specifically for the School Transportation industry
 Total School Transportation CSRs = 42
 State Departments of Education CSRs = 5
Assessment Tools Currently Available:
•
Motorcoach Security and Emergency Preparedness Plan
(SEPP) Self-Assessment, 2005 and the 2003 Volpe Study
•
Surface Transportation Vulnerability Assessment, US DOT,
Volpe Center, October 25, 2001
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Highway & Motor Carrier
Security Plan
Security Plan Guidance:
• National Congress on School Transportation: School Transportation
Best Practices (Adopted May 2010)
• Industry Associations and Common Industry Practices: NSTA Top 25
Security Program Action Items for School Bus Operations (2003)
• TSA Security Action Items (SAIs) for School Transportation
 TSA is working to produce this guidance document in 2011.
 Categories: General Security; Personnel Security; Physical
Security; En-Route Security; and Training and Exercises.
Planning Implementation:
• Company or organization implementing their security plan with the
ability to conduct exercises or drills to test the plan
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Highway & Motor Carrier
Training
First Observer: www.Firstobserver.com (replaces the old Domain
Awareness, Call Center and ISAC programs): 1-888-217-5902
•
School Transportation Module: over 80,000 officials trained
Current HMC Training Initiatives Available:
•
TSA: Counterterrorism Guidebook Flipcharts for School
Bus Operations – Available to order from
www.tsa.gov/highway
•
School Transportation Security Awareness (STSA) – DVD on
www.tsa.gov/highway
•
HMC School Transportation Awareness Brochures and Driver
Tip Cards (www.tsa.gov/highway - documents and reports tab)
•
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Highway & Motor Carrier
Exercises
TSA HMC conducts exercises using the Intermodal Security & Training
Exercise Program (I-STEP): (Truck, Motorcoach, School Bus & Infrastructure)
•
5 exercises conducted (over 50 school districts & some private carriers)
•
Nine Highway total exercises completed in calendar year 2009. Including
the following two School Transportation exercises:
•
•
•
June 2009, Columbus, Ohio
•
July 2009, Greensboro, North Carolina
Conducted or planning ten total exercises for 2010 in the Highway
modes. Including the following three School Transportation exercises:
•
March 2010 in Albany, NY
•
May 2010 in Los Angeles, CA – Los Angeles Unified School District
•
July 2010 in St. Louis, MO
Looking to conduct four School Transportation ISTEP exercise in 2011.
Please contact TSA as soon as possible if you are interested.
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Highway & Motor Carrier
Exercises
TSA HMC I-STEP Results:
•
Best Practices:

The use of Fusion Centers is helpful for disseminating information.

Secondary Emergency (24/7) contact lists are critical for communicating
information.

Annual security training customized for each position in a transportation
agency is common.

There are often established relationships and clear communication chains
between local districts and local law enforcement agencies.

There are a complex web of alternative means of sharing information
(Regional Fusion Centers, First Observer, Association networks, etc).

State sponsored Alert Networks are a good tool for disseminating
information to the school districts.
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Highway & Motor Carrier
Exercises
TSA HMC Lessons Learned from School Bus ISTEP exercises:
•
We looked at school districts both large, medium and small – some
similarities and some differences.
•
33 identified lessons learned included in our summary report. The
following are some of the highlights:

Limited communication capabilities with bus drivers and they lack a reliable method
for reporting activities up the chain.

No clear standard mechanism to successfully share information from federal level
to local schools.

There should be an established process for communicating en-route security
information, without alarming students.

There should be an established timeline or criteria to provide guidance on school
district notification to law enforcement.

States should look at establishing Memorandum of Understandings (MOUs) and
process to use the Video Messaging Service (VMS) for school bus transportation
security incidents.
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Highway & Motor Carrier
Exercises
•
Lessons learned highlights (continued):

There needs to be more awareness of Fusion Center capabilities and authorization
process.

There is limited communication between State Departments of Education and local law
enforcement with the private schools.

Districts should be more proactive in passing information up to the State Departments
of Education.

There should be better methods of information flow between school districts and school
bus contractors. (formal government methods and potential informal commercial
methods such as a transportation network (e.g. “Linked In” and “Facebook) accessed
through cell phones, I Phones, etc.)

There is a lack of communication procedures and working relationships with all venues
to which students go on field trips.

There is limited communication between modes (i.e. motorcoach, school bus, mass
transit).

The classification and filtering of information makes it difficult to compile a picture of the
common threat.
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Highway & Motor Carrier
Exercises
• Lessons learned highlights (continued):

Formalize a process for law enforcement and fusion centers to pass higher level threat
information against schools and school transportation to proper school districts.

There is a need to improve the communications between state governments, county
and local districts.

There are inconsistent communications processes and procedures from the district
level down to the schools.

There are no formal procedures for communicating information between adjacent
districts.

Some districts have multiple law enforcement, municipal, or county jurisdictions to deal
with which are difficult to manage.

Many school districts and school bus contractors need to strengthen relationships with
local law enforcement (LE) so they may easily discuss and improve current school bus
safety plans.

Schools are hesitant to report incidents that may reflect poorly upon the school district,
preventing local LE from supporting school districts during incidents.
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Highway & Motor Carrier
Exercises
•
Lessons learned highlights (continued):

There is a limited capability and no standardization of school bus security on property.

There is a lack of standardization of school bus tracking and identification systems.

School districts need to apply for Department of Homeland Security (DHS) grants that
would enable them to upgrade physical security measures on school bus lots, thereby
increasing the security of school buses while unattended.

TSA should better inform school districts about the First Observer program and the
training benefits it offers so that school bus security protocols can be improved upon
and made more effective.

Each school district should require National Incident Management Systems (NIMS) and
Incident Command System (ICS) training for employees filling school administrative and
school bus operator roles so that they are more effective working within an ICS
structure during an incident.

Each school district should create an ICS plan based upon NIMS and ICS principles to
increase their ability to secure and control critical systems, infrastructures and facilities
during an incident.
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Highway & Motor Carrier
Exercises
•
Lessons learned highlights (continued):

A threat level chart with Force Protection measures should be developed specific to
school bus transportation.

All state and federal agencies should provide more recommendations on
prevention/protection activities when disseminating intelligence in order to guide further
district actions.

There is a lack of driver training for identifying, recording and reporting suspicious
activity.

There is a lack of standard communications procedures for drivers to report progress.

There is a lack of transit agency representation in the Emergency Operation Center
(EOC) and/or Incident Command Post (ICP).

There is a lack of clarity on authority to designate evacuation resources.

The procedures for communicating emergency information from government officials
and emergency managers to bus operators lack efficiency.
HMC has completed a 2009-2010 Summary Report for School Transportation exercises.
Available upon request at: highwaysecurity@dhs.gov
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Highway & Motor Carrier
Information Sharing
•
Government Coordinating Council (GCC) – Government Entities
•
Sector Coordinating Council (SCC) – Private Industry

Work on Policy, Planning & Programs using GCC/SCC Joint Working Groups

Quarterly Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council (CIPAC) meetings
•
School Transportation officials sit on both the GCC (NASDPTS) and SCC
(NSTA)
•
Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN) HMC Portal
•
HMC Tele-Conference Calls – Quarterly with each sub-mode
•
HMC webpage: www.tsa.gov/highway
•
HMC Email: highwaysecurity@dhs.gov
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Highway & Motor Carrier POCs

Bill Arrington, General Manager
Highway & Motor Carrier Security Division
Office: (571) 227-2436
Cell: 202-253-9239
Email: william.arrington@dhs.gov



Ray Cotton, Assistant General Manager
Highway & Motor Carrier Security Division
Office: (571) 227-4237
Email: ray.cotton@dhs.gov
Steve Sprague, Branch Chief
Programs and Initiatives Branch
Office: (571) 227-1468
Email: steve.sprague@dhs.gov
David Cooper, Branch Chief
Assessments and Measures Branch
Office: 571-227-2609
Email: david.cooper1@dhs.gov

Phil Forjan, Branch Chief
Enforcement and Compliance
Branch
Office: (571) 227-1467
Email: phil.forjan@dhs.gov

Paul Pitzer, Branch Chief
Policy and Planning Branch
Office: 571-227-1233
Email: paul.pitzer@dhs.gov
Website: http://www.tsa.gov/highway
Email: highwaysecurity@dhs.gov
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