Lec. 4
(Seminar on “Sharing Experience on Nuclear Power for Development” in Vietnam)
Emergency Preparedness and Response
against Nuclear Disaster in Japan
January22, 2013
Kenichi Wada
The Japan Atomic Power Company
(JAPC)
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Contents
1. Emergency Preparedness/Response System against
the Nuclear Disaster in Japan
2. JAPC Action Plan for Preparedness/Response
against the Nuclear Disaster
3. Accident Management (AM) Measures at JAPC
4. Enhancing Response Measures against
the Severe Accident at JAPC
(based on Lesson Learned from Fukushima
Dai-ichi Severe Accident )
2
１． Emergency Preparedness/Response System
against the Nuclear Disaster in Japan
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Basic Law concerning Countermeasures against Disasters
・ The Basic Law concerning countermeasures
against disasters was enacted in 1961, following
an experience of massive damages caused by
typhoons, to develop a comprehensive and
schematic system for disaster prevention.
・The disaster countermeasure system has since been
reinforced and improved based on lessons learned
from the Great Hanshin/Awaji Earthquake and
other major disasters.
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Preparedness/Response against Nuclear Disaster
○ Disasters in general
Basic Law concerning
countermeasures against
disasters (enacted in 1961)
◆ Occurrence of a criticality accident at a uranium reconversion
plant operated by JCO Co., Ltd.
Lesson
Learned
(September 30, 1999)
The Special Law on nuclear disaster
countermeasures was enacted as a special law
under the Basic Law concerning
countermeasures against disasters to enable
appropriate response by considering the factors
peculiar to nuclear accidents
(December 17, 1999)
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Main Contents of the Special Law on
Nuclear Disaster Countermeasures
① Speeding up of initial action
② Strengthening of cooperation between
national and local governments
③ Strengthening of the national government’s
emergency preparedness/response system
④ Clarification of the role of the utility
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① Speeding up of Initial Action
・The utility is required to report on any abnormal event.
・ (When the event progresses further), the competent
minister mobilizes initial action and establishes the
Nuclear disaster countermeasures headquarters headed
by the Prime Minister.
(Local governments also establish respective
countermeasures headquarters)
・The national government instructs local governments on
measures necessary for evacuation and other responses.
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② Strengthening of Cooperation between
National and Local Governments
・The national government establishes the Local HQ for
nuclear disaster countermeasures (off-site center) in
the locality.
・The Joint Council on countermeasures against nuclear
accidents is set up inside the off-site center to
strengthen cooperation between national and local
governments.
・Joint training is conducted with the participation of the
national and local governments as well as utilities.
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③ Strengthening of the National Government’s
Emergency Preparedness/Response System
・Government-appointed nuclear accident prevention
officials are stationed full-time at nuclear facility
locations.
・Government-appointed chief of headquarters instructs
related administrative institutions and local
governments on necessary matters, and issues requests
on the dispatching of Self-Defense Forces.
・Technical advice is obtained from the Nuclear
Regulatory Authority.
・A system of rapid on-site mobilization is established.
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④ Clarification of the Role of the Utility
・The utility is required to install radiation measuring
equipment inside the site and disclose records.
・Explicitly defines the reporting obligations.
・The nuclear disaster preparedness/response organization
is set up in each site to implement emergency action
during the disaster.
・The nuclear disaster preparedness/response manager is
assigned to each site.
・The utility is required to establish the action plan in each
site for preparedness/response against the nuclear disaster.
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Enhancing Emergency Preparedness/Response System
(based on Experiences & Lesson Learned gained from
Fukushima Dai-ichi Severe Accident)
< in progress >
・ Clearly identification of widespread evacuation areas and
radiation protection guidelines in the nuclear emergency
・ Reinforcing the environment monitoring in the nuclear emergency
・ Adequate identification and forecasting the effect of released
radioactive materials
・ Establishing a clear division of labor between relevant central and
local organizations
・ Enhancing communication relevant to the accident
・ Enhancing training responding to severe accidents
etc.
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2. JAPC Action Plan for Preparedness/Response
against the Nuclear Disaster
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Contents of JAPC Action Plan
① Nuclear accident preparedness/response system
② Establishing nuclear accident
preparedness/response organization
③ Preparation of a list of parties to be alerted
④ Implementation of education and training for
nuclear disaster preparedness/response
⑤ Implementation of emergency action
⑥ Countermeasures after a nuclear disaster
⑦ Cooperation with other utilities
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Nuclear Disaster Preparedness/Response Organization at JAPC
Emergency Countermeasure Center
＊＊
＊＊
＊＊
＊＊
＊＊
＊＊ Technical Support Center （TSC） Staff at NPS
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Main Duties of Each Team (1/5)
● Headquarters:
・Oversee general management of measures and
activities against the disaster
・Grasp the condition of accident
・Decide on working policy and issue orders to
Working Teams
・Communicate with and notify outside parties
・Collaborate with parties in and out of JAPC
・Decide on the lifting of the state of emergency
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Main Duties of Each Team (2/5)
● Information Team:
・Gather information on the disaster
・Coordinate communication with parties inside
and outside JAPC
・Compile and prepares records
● General affairs Team:
・Acquire personnel, material and equipment and
other items
・(Cooperate with evacuation activities, etc.)
・(Conduct firefighting activities)
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Main Duties of Each Team (3/5)
● Public relations Team:
・Prepare PR-related materials
・Communicate and coordinate with PR-related
institutions
・Respond to media organizations
● Engineering Team:
・Grasp the condition of accident and conduct
evaluation
・Consider measures to prevent the expansion of
the accident
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Main Duties of Each Team (4/5)
● Radiation control Team:
・Measure radiation and radioactivity
・Estimate the range of the radiation impact and
control exposure to radiation
・Eliminate radioactive material
・Conduct action to prevent secondary disaster
● Health and safety Team:
・Conduct action on medical (relief)-related services
・Conduct action to prevent secondary disaster
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Main Duties of Each Team (5/5)
● Maintenance Team:
・Conduct emergency measures required to
prevent the expansion of the disaster
● Operation Team:
・Conduct emergency operational measures
required to prevent the expansion of the disaster
・Maintain the security of nuclear reactor and
ancillary facilities
・Conduct firefighting activities
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3. Accident Management (AM) Measures at JAPC
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Background of AM Implementation
●1979.3 TMI-2 Accident
→Japanese utilities developed the Existing
Emergency Operating Procedure (EOP).
●1992.5 The Statement of the Nuclear Safety
Commission (NSC)
→NSC strongly encouraged the AM implementation
●1992.7 The Request of the Ministry of International Trade
and Industry (MITI)
→MITI requested all the licensees to perform PSA
on internal events and improve the AM measures.
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AM measures in Tokai-2 (BWR)
Function
AM measures
Shutdown
(1)Alternative reactivity control (ARI,RPT)
Water injection into (2)Alternative water injection methods
Reactor and
(3)Automatic reactor depressurization
Containment Vessel
(4)Heat removal methods from containment
Heat removal from
vessel
containment vessel ( Drywell Cooler, Recovery of failed
components of RHR, Hard vent)
(5)Power supply methods
Supply of electric
(High or low voltage power supply from
power
HPCS-DG, Recovery of failed components
of emergency DG)
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AM measures in Tokai-2 (BWR) ： Example
(2)Alternative Water Injection Methods
Condensate Condensate Water
Makeup Water Storage Tank
System
M
Pressure
Vessel
Drywell
M
M
Pedestal
Area
Suppression Pool
M
Fire Fighting
System
Filtered Water
Storage Tank
RHR
System
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AM measures in Tokai-2 (BWR) ： Example
(4) Heat Removal Methods from
Containment Vessel
－Hard Ventｰ
Stack
Reactor Building Ventilation
System
AO
AO
Reactor Building Gas
Treatment System
AO
AO
M
Reactor
Vessel
Rupture
Disk
Drywell
AO
Suppression Pool
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AM measures in Tsuruga-2 (PWR)
Function
Shutdown
Core cooling
Confinement of
radioactive
materials
Support of
Safety function
AM measures
(1)Diversification of core cooling by
secondary system
(2)Use of the turbine bypass system
(3)Alternative recirculation
(4)Cool down and recirculation
(5)Containment cooling by natural convection
(6)Containment cooling by natural convection
(7)Water injection into CV
(8)Forced depressurization of the RCS
(9)Power supply from adjacent unit
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AM measures in Tsuruga-2 (PWR) ： Example
(3)Alternative Recirculation
Containment Spray
Heat Exchanger
Containment
Vessel
Containment Spray Pump
Component
Cooling Water
Steam Generator
Pressurizer
M
M
Reactor Vessel RHR Heat Exchanger
Component
Cooling Water
RHR Pump
Recirculatio
n Sump
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AM measures in Tsuruga-2 (PWR) ： Example
Filtered Water
Storage Tank
(7)Water Injection into CV
Fire Fighting System
Fire Fighting
Pump
Steam
Generator
Containment
Vessel
Pressurizer
Reactor
Vessel
Containment Spray Containment
Heat Exchanger
Spray Pump
Component
Cooling Water
Recirculation
Sump
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Preparation of Emergency Procedures
• AM measures to prevent SA were taken in the
existing procedures.
• AM measures to mitigate SA were taken in the
procedure and guideline established newly.
• This mitigative procedure introduced the flow
chart form as existing procedures.
• The mitigative guideline introduced the form to
select proper procedure out of various alternatives.
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Organization of AM Activity
Organization of Accident Management Activity
Control Room
Operation Team (operators)
Supports activity
(advice, instructions etc)
TSC Room
Technical Support Center (TSC)
Information Team
Head Office
The Chief of TSC
Members of
( Superintendent)
Head Office
Engineering Team
Radiation control Team
Licensed Engineer of Reactor
Maintenance Team
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Decision Making
●Before Core Damage → Shift Manager
●After Core Damage → Plant Manager
In case of mitigative AM, the chief of TSC
gives advice, instructions, or recognition of
operator’s judgement.
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Education
• Phenomena and plant behavior in the Severe
Accident (SA)
• AM measures
• The outline and the direction about Accident
Management Guideline (AMG)
• Significant sequences of SA events
• Practice coping with supposed representative
SA events
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Training with Simulator
• Compact simulator in our company
→ This simulator has the functions to
simulate the events both before and
after the SA.
• Full scope simulator in the training centers
→ This simulator can
simulate some
AM measures to
operate for the SA .
Full scope simulator
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Integrated Emergency Countermeasure Training
Deploying communication
devices inside the NPS
- Satellite phones
- Transceivers
- Dry battery driven phones
etc.
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4. Enhancing Response Measures against
the Severe Accident at JAPC
(based on Lesson Learned from Fukushima
Dai-ichi Severe Accident )
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Enhancing Measures to the Prevent Hydrogen Explosions (1)
＜Tokai-2 （BWR）＞
・ Install of the vent valves at the top of the Reactor Building
・ Securing measures to open the blowout panels
in the Reactor Building
・ Install of hydrogen
Hydrogen
detector
(under planning)
detectors in the Reactor
Building (under planning)
Reactor
Building
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Enhancing Measures to the Prevent Hydrogen Explosions (2)
＜Tsuruga-2（PWR）＞
・ Securing the electric power supply for the Annulus Exhaust Facility using
the alternative electric power supply vehicles in case of the Station Blackout
・ Install of the passive autocatalytic recombiners in the Containment
Vessel (under planning)
Passive autocatalytic recombiner
Stack
Annulus air ventilation fan
Containment Vessel
(under planning)
Filter
Damper
Steam Generator
Temporary N2 cylinder
(for driving damper )
Emergency Power Center bus
電源車
Temporary connecting cable
Reactor Vessel
Alternative electric power supply vehicle
Annulus
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Enhancing the Environment for the Accident Response
・ Securing the electric power supply for the emergency closed loop
air ventilation system in the Control Room using the alternative
electric power supply vehicles in case of the Station Blackout
(maintaining the radiation shielding function in the Control Room)
etc.
Circulation fan
Inside Building
Outside Building
Control Room
Alternative electric power
supply vehicle
Temporary N2 cylinder
Damper
(for driving damper )
電源車
Damper
Ventilation units
Temporary connecting cable
Air conditioning fan
Emergency circulation fan
Filter units
Emergency Power Center bus
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Enhancing the Radiation Control during the Accident
・Securing tungsten vests, and protective masks, etc. for carrying
out work under high radiation dose conditions
・Establishment of the support system for radiation control staff
by non radiation control staff in emergency
・Establishment of mutual aid system that enable utilities to share
radiation protection supplies among one another when accident
response work is being carried out
company A
company B
The tungsten vest
Sharing of the Dosimeters
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Deploying sufficient Response Equipments
and Supplies in Emergency
・Alternative electric power supply vehicles in case of the Station Blackout
・Large capacity pumps for the alternative water injection into the Reactor
Core and the Spent Fuel Pool, etc.
・Heavy machineries for the removal of debris, etc. to carry out recovery
work promptly
etc.
Operating the large capacity pumps
Removing debris by the heavy
machinery (the wheel loader)
← Operating the alternative electric power supply vehicle
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Never “Fukushima Dai-ichi Severe Accident” Again !
Thank you very much for
your attention
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