China’s Next 30 Years: From “Scale Dividend” to “Productivity and Institutional Dividend” Dr. QIN Xiao Chairman, Boyuan Foundation New York, 10 January 2011 1 Agenda 1. The two 30-year periods since 1949 2. The “good old days” are gone: “scale dividend” waning 3. Population aging & deceleration of urbanization Over-drafted globalization and global rebalancing Market reform and price deregulation of production factors Slowdown of China’s potential growth rate The way out: “productivity and institutional dividend” In pursuit of “productivity dividend” Awakening the new “institutional dividend” 2 The two 30-year periods The first period (1949-1978) centrally planned economy primitive industrialization, but rigid, isolated from outside which was proved to be inefficient The second period (1979-2009) reform and opening up high growth, integration with world economy imbalance, and consequential social inequality & injustice 3 The second 30-year period: “Scale Dividend” The characteristics of growth drivers in the past 30 years can be summarized as “scale dividend” Exogenous Endogenous Institutional changes Demographic dividend Market reform Globalization Expand PPF & market demand High saving rate Cheap and sufficient labor Ensure capital and labor supply Scale Dividend 4 The next 30 years: How will it be? Growth drivers, both exogenous and endogenous, demand and supply, will undergo fundamental changes. The next 30 years will not be an extrapolation of the past, but rather a new era with new characteristics: from high speed back to normal from “scale dividend” to “institutional and productivity dividend” China’s economy has experienced its “high growth” phase, and is entering a new phase that will be healthier, more balanced, and more sustainable. 5 Agenda 1. The two 30-year periods since 1949 2. The “good old days” are gone: “scale dividend” waning 3. Population aging & deceleration of urbanization Over-drafted globalization and global rebalancing Market reform and price deregulation of production factors Slowdown of China’s potential growth rate The way out: “productivity and institutional dividend” In pursuit of “productivity dividend” Awakening the new “institutional dividend” 6 China’s population is aging 3.0% 2.5% 2.0% 1.5% 1.0% 0.5% 0.0% -0.5% From 2000 on Growth of working age population has declined, will drop to zero in 2015 and become negative thereafter No. of people over 65: 111 million now; 166 million in 2020; 232 million in 2030; 316 million in 2040, in excess of 20% of the total population total population growth working-age population growth 3.5% 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 From 1980-2010 Working age population growth has outpaced total population growth Abundant labor resources and low dependency ratio generated “demographic dividend” -1.0% Working-age Population Aging Population as % of total 1200 25% millions 1000 20% 800 15% 600 10% 400 5% 200 0 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 0% (Millions) 1980 2010 CAGR Working Age Population 560 918 1.66% Total Population 980 1354 1.08% 7 Data Source: UN Population Prospects, 2008 Revision “Demographic dividend” is diminishing Dependency ratio has reached its lowest point in 2010 and will now increase “Demographic dividend” is diminishing Dependency Ratio 90% 80% 70% 1980, 67% 60% 50% 2015, 40% 40% 30% 2010, 39% 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 Data Source: UN Population Prospects, 2008 Revision “Demographic dividend” diminishing implies a slowing of labor supply growth, increased labor cost, increased household expenditure, decreased saving rate and capital formation, which essentially mean the growth model characterized by low consumption and high investment supported by cheap labor will change. 8 Population migration: China’s urbanization China urbanization rate 50 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 increment of urbanization rate % RHS 2008, 45.68 1.6 1.4 1.2 1 1978, 17.92 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0 Migrant worker as % of total urban employed workers 48% 46.30% 46% 44% 42% 40% 38% 35.10% 36% 34% 32% 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 30% 2002 Migrant workers as a percentage of total urban employment rose significantly, but beginning in 2005 the growth rate slowed urbanization rate % 1978 1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Urbanization rate increased from 17.9% in 1978 to 45.7% in 2008 2001 9 Lewis turning point has been reached Recent labor shortage & wage increase in east coast cities Although some scholars argue there is still surplus labor in rural area, three factors have impeded further migration: (1) institutions (“urban-rural dual residence system”), (2) competency (age, knowledge and skill of rural labor), and (3) urban public goods and services (social safety net, education). Lewis turning point has been reached earlier. Age Structure of Rural Population Wage Growth of Migrant Workers 25% 19.60% 20% 7.20% Data Source: F. Cai 2010 2008 2007 2004 3.40% 2003 0% 8.20% 5.60% 2002 5% 8.60% 2006 7.60% 10% 2005 15% 10 Data Source: NBS Urbanization will decelerate “City development report of China (2010)” published by China Academy of Social Science pointed out urbanization will decelerate in future, with average increase of 0.8-1ppt, instead of 1.35-1.45ppt of the past ten years. Deceleration will imply massive fixed asset investment and infrastructure construction will slow, including road, railway, housing industry & building materials, auto, telecom. This is likely to curb the demand of investment. 11 Over-drafted globalization: China becomes an export-dependent economy Imbalance in the world economy 1% ~0.45ppt increase per year in the past decade 5% 4% 3% 40% 2008 2006 2004 2002 2000 1998 1996 1994 1992 1990 1988 2000, 3.16% 1986 1984 0% 1980, 0.79% 1982 2% 2006, 35.87% China Export as a % of its GDP 35% 30% 2000, 20.80% 25% 2009, 24.09% 20% 15% 10% 1978, 4.60% 5% Data Source: Bloomberg 2008 2006 2004 2002 2000 1998 1996 1994 1992 1990 1988 1986 0% 1984 Developed economies: overconsumption, high leverage, financial deficit 6% 1982 Emerging economies: trade surplus, foreign reserve, excess liquidity with inflation pressure and asset bubble 7% 1980 2009, 7.63% 8% 1980 China export’s share of world trade volume, as well as China export’s share of its GDP increased dramatically during the last 30 years 1978 China Export’s Share of World Trade Volume 9% 12 Painful global rebalancing The 2008 global financial crisis and consequential global economy recession revealed the imbalance of global economy. This has taught us that globalization cannot treat the imbalance of individual economies as a cost, especially big economies. It is necessary to carefully maintain the balance of both current account and economic structure. The imbalance doesn’t imply an end to globalization. Rather, a new equilibrium between emerging and developed economies will generate a new round of “globalization dividend” Rebalancing requires collaboration between emerging and developed economies. For China, it will be difficult to maintain an exportdependent model. Instead, it should base its growth on its own market. 13 China’s market reform facing bottleneck Market reform and opening up has been a vital driver for China’s economic growth Rural reform in the 1980’s boosted agricultural productivity SOE reform in 1990’s energized industrial development Since China’s participation in WTO, “Made in China” went global In recent years, institutional reform has slowed; market reform has encountered a bottleneck. One problem is the prolonged price regulation of production factors, including capital (exchange rate, interest rate), land (esp. industrial land), labor, energy, mineral resources (tax), public utilities, and may also include environmental costs and safety costs. Price distortion is essentially fiscal subsidies and unfair wealth transfer, which has partly contributed to the “scale dividend” of the last 30 years. 14 Price distortion hard to maintain Investment Spree Resource Misallocation “Renationalization” Imbalanced Structure Price Distortion Underdeveloped Service Sector Low-quality Growth Income Disparity Corruption & Rent-seeking Deregulation would result in a market mechanism to determine real costs and profits, and a fairer distribution of income, whereby market constraints and incentives will facilitate the transformation of China’s growth model. 15 Potential growth: back to normal Without “scale dividend”, potential output growth is set to slow from 9%-10% to around 7%-8%. It may create problems or add costs, e.g. unemployment, inflation, lower corporate earning etc. However, in general, it would be a process leading China back to normal, a healthier growth. Worries about the sustainability of the “China miracle” will also fade. Therefore, it will be essential to China’s development in the next 30 years for China to tackle critical issues properly during the transformation. 16 Agenda 1. The two 30-year periods since 1949 2. The good old days are gone: “scale dividend” waning 3. Population aging & deceleration of urbanization Over-drafted globalization and global rebalancing Market reform and price deregulation of production factors Slowdown of China’s potential growth rate The way out: “productivity and institutional dividend” In pursuit of “productivity dividend” Awakening the new “institutional dividend” 17 In pursuit of “productivity dividend” Total factor productivity (TFP) has been widely used in explaining the long-term trend of economic growth. According to academic literature, although with variation, the basic conclusion is the same: China’s growth relies too much on factor inputs, especially capital inputs. The contribution from TFP has been very low. Other indicators, such as energy and material consumption, technology innovation and patent registration, shows that China underperforms the international benchmark. The theme for the next 30 years is to achieve endogenous growth through improvement of human capital, technical innovation (including resource utilization) and the upgrading of industrial structure from low value-added to high valueadded. 18 Awakening the new “institutional dividend” The key to institutional reform is to transfer government function Let the “invisible hand” do its work administrative approval price control monopoly State Owned Enterprises Strengthen functions in relation to: providing public goods improving legal system and credit system The success in releasing new “institutional dividend” is the key to China’s successful economic transformation in the next 30 years. 19 Thank you! 20