INPO Update CMBG Meeting June 2012 EN/CM Department Staff Engineering and Configuration Management Organizational Chart Liaison Engineers Bob Gambrill Manager Alexis Yost Admin Asst II Scott Hawn Assistant Manager Kris Mertens (Electrabel) Ralph Kothe (Bruce Power) Ivan Hwang (Taiwan Power) Loaned Employees Debbie Williams Section Manager Digital Systems Permanent Employees Bill Nowicki Gary Garrett Bob Burnham ? Ralph Schwartzbeck Shawn Simon Mark Fowler Start Date: June 18 Chris Dickey Craig Faulkner Ben Huck John Titrington Keith Mills Gary Modzelewski Mike Smith Liang Zhao Terry Schuster ? Sr. Evaluator 2012 Focus Areas • Engineering Fundamentals and Technical Conscience • Fuel Reliability • TSG and NATF Coordination • Seismic Preparedness • Digital Project Upgrades 2012 Ongoing Work Efforts • Principles, Objectives, and Criteria Revision • Preparing for Evaluating Cyber Security • Preparing to Evaluate Extended Plant Life • Investigate Increase in Part 21 Reports • INPO Document Updates • Vendor Product Quality Fuel Reliability Long term forecast remains the same: o PWR performance will slowly improve as fuel designs are replaced to eliminate grid-to-rod fretting (target ~ 2015) o BWR performance stable to slightly declining because of debris failures Continued implementation of improved debris filters is in progress INPO performing common cause/review of recent (~last 2 years) BWR fuel failures to determine any additional actions End of 2012 performance estimate remains 90-95% failure free. o 3 plants currently have failures that will be present at the end of the year. 5 New Fuel Reliability Indicator © 2012 Institute of Nuclear Power Operations 6 Seismic Event Preparedness Seismic Instrumentation Event Response Procedures • Short-term • Post-event Walkdown Ralph Schwartzbeck Vertical Spent Fuel Storage Cask Margins Digital Upgrade Projects Digital Project Guidance Modification Testing FMEA Analysis Integration of Digital Equipment Debbie Williams Bill Nowicki Vendor Product Quality Working Meeting in April Collecting Attributes of High Performance Develop Industry Best Practices and incorporate in INPO 90-009 – Conduct of Design Engineering Terry Schuster Ralph Schwartzbeck Temporary Configuration Changes Temporary Configuration Changes INPO Updating Good Practice INPO 85-016, Temporary Modification Control Based on current industry practices, and lessons learned from OE and evaluations Draft is in review with INPO and industry Issue in late 2012 Exelon, Entergy, Dominion, Progress are part of the revision team 11 Temporary Configuration Changes Events • LOOP – Contributed to a Loss of Fire Protection for 9 hours (IER L2-12-27) • IER L4-12-13 Inappropriate Temporary Connection of Non-Seismic Systems/Components to Seismically Qualified Systems • Electrical shocks, fires from temporary power installations • Numerous equipment issues due to problems with temporary equipment cooling 4 AFIs in last Six Months • TCCs with inadequate technical evaluation or not evaluated at all • Staff not aware what constitutes a TCC or the process Engineering staff is the guardian of the plant design 12 Temporary Configuration Changes Temporary Modifications Standards • • • • Equivalent controls as permanent modifications Detailed training Document updates as needed for short-term installation Removal/restoration Procedurally Controlled TCCs • Scaffold, shielding, leak catch/containment • Must have technical evaluation 13 1OCFR21 TRENDS PART 21 NOTIFICATION TREND 15 INPO TREND REVIEW All Part 21s from 2008 to present reviewed Elements captured/compiled including: • • • • Problem (Defect) Type of Error (Design, Manufacture, other/unknown) Error sub-category How the error was discovered Error sub-category created to identify where error occurred or factors influential to the error Non-US Plant Issues (e.g. MOX) removed 16 PART 21 ERROR CATEGORY RESULTS 17 DESIGN ERROR SUBCATEGORY RESULTS 18 CONCLUSIONS Comprehensive plans to prevent equipment failures from Part 21 defects: • • • • • • Review vendor documentation for conformity to requirements Understand how vendors control subvendor performance Inspect vendor and subvendor shops Inspect component against drawings Bench testing components simulating failure modes Perform rigorous post-installation testing under normal and abnormal conditions • Perform routine inspections/testing to confirm desired performance 19 Open Phase Event Big Picture on the Open Phase Event January 30, 2012 Large two unit PWR Mechanical failure of 345 kV under-hung porcelain insulator on SAT A-frame structure Open phase condition Reactor trip 8 Minutes without many safety systems Unusual Event Manual separation of ESF buses 21 Single Line Diagram 22 Insulator Failure Unit 2 Failed Insulator Stack Collapsed C-Phase Bus Fallen Insulators 23 Bus Insulator Fractures 24 Why Was This a Big Deal A nonsafety system failed which caused safety systems to not respond Charging lost to RCP seals Almost every US nuclear plant is affected. This event had not previously been considered as a likely failure mechanism even though a very similar event – that did not result in a plant trip occurred in 2007 2007 Open Phase Event The IER Recs IER Recommendations Include: • Ensure the protection scheme has sufficient sensitivity to detect and automatically respond • If the review identifies vulnerabilities: Determine the interim compensatory actions needed Verify/provide operating procedures to help operators promptly diagnose and respond • Identify long-term corrective actions to provide automatic protection from single-phase open circuit conditions • Issued a 30 day extension to respond. 27