DIIS Seminar Series on State-Business Relations and Economic Development, Spring 2011 Development coalitions, foreign business and industrial policy in Malaysia. By Peter Wad, DICM/CBDS, CBS Agenda Long waves of economic development: Income-traps and trap-bypassing. Industrial diversification, deepening and upgrading. Long waves of political development: Building state, nation, participation, welfare. The politics of industrialisation: Development coalitions, foreign capital and industrial policy. New Economic Model 2010-2020: A paradigme shift of economic strategy? State-business relations, ’Varieties of Capitalism’ and ’Industrial Relations’: The case of Malaysia. Conclusion Long waves of economic development (Source: Yusuf & Nabeshima (2009) Long waves of economic development (Source: Yusuf & Nabeshima (2009) Tiger Economies under Threat. Washington:WB) Long waves of economic development Income-traps: Malaysia’s GNI/capita and overall poverty. Low-income trap: Malaysia 1960s-1970s? • Incidence of poverty 1970: 49%; 1980: 29% Middle-income trap: Malaysia 2000s? • GNI USD/capita: 2000: 3,450; 2009:7,350 • Incidence of poverty: 2004: 6%; 2009: 4%. High-income trap: Not a trap, a ’Vision 2020’ in Malaysia. A trap of welfare state? Long waves of economic development Industrialisation: conceived as industrial diversification, deepening and upgrading (Lauridsen 2008). Strategic industrial policy aims for improving all aspects. Industrial diversification in Malaysia: Declining importance of agriculture, yet still important export items (e.g. palm oil). Important oil industry. Manufacturing dominates export. Services increasingly important. Long waves of economic development: Industrial diversification (Source: Yusuf & Nabeshima (2009) Long waves of economic development: Industrial diversification (Source: Yusuf & Nabeshima (2009) Long waves of economic development: Industrial deepening (Source:Furby (2005) Evaluating the Malaysian EPZs. Lund: LU) Long waves of economic development: Industrial deepening (Source: IMP3) Industrial cluster development: Penang: Electronics (semiconductors). Shah Alam/Klang Valley: Automotive. Kerteh, East of Peninsular Malaysia: Petrochemicals. Muar, Johore: Furniture. Batu Bahat, Johore: Textile & apperal. Subang, Selangore: Airospace. Long waves of economic development: Industrial deepening (Source: Rasiah 2002, 2003) Industrial clusters require: Human capital formation (education, training). Enabling environment for entrepreneurship. En integrated business network of TNCs, local firms, business associations, politicians, local community. Success: Penang semiconductor industry (foreign TNCs, local machine tool suppliers). Penang Skill Development Centre (PSDC) is a model for regional networking. Failure: The Multimedia Super Corridor (MSC), KL, in IT – so far a failure. Long waves of economic development: Industrial upgrading (Source: Yusuf & Nabeshima (2009) Long waves of economic development: Industrial upgrading (Source: Yusuf & Nabeshima (2009) Long waves of political development: Political development theory (Source:Burnell & Randall 2005) State building Military and administrative structures established. Malaysia: Independence 1957 under cross-ethnic elite coalition (’Alliance’); Confederation 1963. Singapore excluded 1965. Nation building Political culture of national identity & loyalty. Malaysia: Crisis 1969: Ethnic violence after defeat of ’Alliance’ government loosing control of some local states. Participatory institution building Institutions of political democracy & corporatism. Malaysia: Semi-democracy; 1980s King/sultans clipped; crisis 2008 election gave opposition control of several local states. Distributional institution building Redistribution of wealth, welfare. Malaysia: Affirmative policy for Bumiputera population 1971- Conflicting development coalitions (Source: Inspired by Stallings 1978) Develop ment model Ruling ‘Barisan Nasional’ core UMNO MCA & Gerakan MIC PKR Influential DAP Hegemon Political ic influence State bureaucracy, Bumi/Chinese/Indian business elites, middle layers & workers, moderate Muslims Secular urban middle layers & workers, peasant smallholders, orthodox Muslims Develop ment ideology Bumi hegemony Reforma- Classic si, HRs Islam (Justice) (rural) Develop ment policy Bumi affirmative policy since 1971. ‘Vision 2020’ of 1991. ‘New Economic Model’ 2010. Protectio n of elite Indians Leading PAS Ethnoclass alliance Protectio n of elite Chinese Minor pol. Iifl. Oppositional ‘Pakatan Rakyat’ core Less influent. Secular populist/ workers Abandoning Bumi affirmative policy, Human Rights, anticorruption, local level democracy. Strategic Industrial Policy: The stage model of industrialisation: Classic International Division of Labour Industrial Country: UK Commodity I II III Consumer goods Interm. goods Capital goods Developing Country: Malaysia 1950s-60s Strategic Industrial Policy: The stage model of industrialisation of NIDL – Primary, Secondary &Tertiary ISI, EOI (DDE?) Industrial Country: Global North I II III Primary Secondary (Tertiary?) Commodity Consumer goods Interm. goods Capital goods Developing Country: Malaysia 1970s-2010 Industrial policies of specific industries Ressource based industry: State acquisition in 1970s. Capitalist nationalisation of plantations & institutional capitalism (GLCs), increasing use of immigrant labour from 1980s. Export diversification & deepening. Development of sector innovation system. Electronics industry: TNCs 1971FDI-led EOI expansion in EPZs (& FTZ/warehouses). Low-cost, labour intensive industry. Anti-union policy. Local linkages in Penang state, limited innovation. Automotive industry: State-TNC alliance 19832004. State-driven national automotive industry (GLCs) with Jap. technology Captured and lost domestic market; export failure (CBU & parts). Foreign TNCs acquire control; Proton in dire straits. Malaysia’s industrialisation strategies Main emphasis Industrial diversification (incl. IMP1 1986-95): Protectionism & Primary ISI 1957-1971 NEP-strategy & FDI-Primary/Secondary EOI 1971-1981. State-NEP (SOEs) & Secondary ISI: 1981-1986. Privatising-NEP & FDI-Secondary EOI: 1986-1991 Industrial deepening (IMP2 1996-2005): Vision 2020 of 1991, privatising, industrial deepening & upgrading aiming for tertiary ISI & EOI: 1991-1997. Crisis and post-crisis governance: Re-nationalisation (GLCs) & re-regulation 1997-2003. Consolidation, priority of balanced regional development, reduction of big development projects 2003-2009. Industrial upgrading (IMP3 2006-2020): Moving up the global value chain. New Economic Model 2010-2020. New Economic Model 2010-2020 (Source: NEAC 2009) New Economic Model 2010-2020 (Source: EPU/PMD 2010) New Economic Model 2010 (Source: NEAC 2010) New Economic Model 2010 (Source: NEAC 2010) The New Economic Model 2010-20 Source: NEAC 2010. Issue 1. Growth Old approach Growth primarily through capital accumulation New approach Growth through productivity 2. State-market Dominant state participation in the economy Private sector-led growth 3. Planning Centralised strategic planning Localised autonomy in decision-making 4. Geography of growth Balanced regional growth Cluster- and corridorbased economic activities 5. Strategic industrial policy Favour specific industries and firms Favour technologically capable industries and firms 6. Export orientation Export dependence on G-3 (US, Europe and Japan) markets Asian and Middle East orientation 7. Labour immigration Restrictions on foreign skilled workers Retain and attract skilled professionals The New Economic Model 2010-20 (Source: EPU/PRD 2010). Role of FDI in New Economic Model Malaysia’s reliance on inward foreign direct investments was strong in the past. FDI’s share of gross fixed capital formation was 14.4 percent annual average 1995-2005, 21.2 percent in 2007, down to 16.8 percent in 2008 and then falling to 3.5 percent in 2009 (UNCTAD WIR 2010, country fact sheet Malaysia). Inward FDI flows do seem to increase again in 2010 due to “government’s planned efforts in the 10th Malaysian Plan, the NEM, and GTP in attracting FDI flows (Rasiah & Govindaraju 2011, 6). But Malaysia’s attractiveness as location for TNC operations relative to its regional competitors has also weakened in recent years. Malaysia may have changed to a net FDI exporter following the shift from inward and outward FDI flows balancing in 2006 into a surplus of USD 8 billion in outward FDI flow in 2008 (double the amount of inward FDI flow). A new and more balanced regime of accumulation will have to be installed enabling the government to reconsider the pro-FDI policy of low wages, low unionism and low labour participation in manufacturing and especially in electronics. Wage trends in East Asian developing countries (Source: Economist 2010-09-04) Average salary increases based on positions for executives and non-executives (1996-2005) (in %). Source: MHR 2008, 32 (after MEF salary surveys). Note: (¤) average own calculations. 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 1996 2005 (¤) Exec utive 8.70 9.20 6.18 5.75 7.27 7.03 6.05 5.97 5.89 5.91 6.80 Nonexec utive 8.10 8.58 6.22 6.00 6.80 6.68 5.89 5.66 5.26 5.69 6.49 NEM and labour market reforms (NEAC 2010) Policy purpose Possible policy measures Re-skill the existing labour Upgrade skills of the bottom segment of the Malaysian labour force force through continuing training and education. Establish a labour safety-net for displaced workers. Industry to partner with government ‘Contineous Employment Training’ (CET) Formalise international quality standards and certification of skills. Remove labour market distortions constraining wage growth Allow wage levels to be reflective of the skill level. Protect workers, not jobs, through a stronger safety net, while encouraging labour market flexibility. Reduce reliance on foreign labour Raise pay through productivity gains, not regulation of wages. Enforce equal labour standards for local and foreign labour. in encouraging Revise legal and institutional framework to facilitate hiring and firing. Use a levy system to achieve targets for unskilled foreign labour in line with sectoral needs. New Economic Model 2010 (Source: NEAC 2010) State-business relations: Evans’ transformation theory: The Korean case Transformation of state-business relationships: Phase 1 Big state Phase 2 Big state Autonomy Embeddedness Small business Phase 3 Phase 4 State Neo-dev. state SMEs Big business Global business Global business Labour Transformation theory of state-business relations: The Malaysian case (inspired by Bonn Juego, AAU) Transformation of state-business relationships: Phase 1 (1957-69) Small state Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4? (1990s-2000s) Authoritarian Developmen developmentalist Authoritarian Liberalism talist state state Capital TNCs Small business & foreign resource exporters GLCs,TNCs & Bumi SMEs Small Chinese business Social group Small Chinese business Capital Social group Varieties of capitalism and IR: LME, CME, HME and Malaysia (inspired by Schneider, various articles) LME Domestic business structure Foreign business presence Organised labour power Workforce qualification CME Corporate Corporate competition networking HME (LA) Malaysia Private Conglomerates/PLCs High TNC presence High Medium Medium to weak High Weak Gov. Linked Conglomerates/GLCs High TNC presence in mfg Weak High High Low Low Varieties of capitalism LME, CME, HME and Developmentalist (D)ME (Malaysia 1971-2010) LME CME HME (LA) Domestic business structure Foreign business presence Organised labour power Workforce qualifications Income inequality Corporate competition High Corporate networking Medium Private conglomerates Strong TNC presence Medium High Weak DME Malaysia 1971-2010 Gov. Linked conglomerates Strong TNC presence in mfg Weak High High Low Low Medium Low High Medium Redistribution Low/Medium Medium/High Low Selective high State-market Market Mixed Market State Majoritarian president with PR legislatures Majoritarian PM and legislatures. Constitutional (Malay) monarchy and Bumi affirmative institutions Political system Majoritarian PR president/PM; PR president/PM; legislature majoritarian/proporti onal legislature Varieties of capitalism & labour markets: LME, CME, HME and Malaysia Source: Schneider 2009, 562 (LME, CME, LA). Malaysia: Union density (own calculation); Job tenure: MHR 2008, 28; Labour market regulation index: Botero et al. 2004, 1663 (Malaysia 1997); Informal economy (percent of households surveyed 2006): DOS 2009. LME 28 CME 45 HME (LA) 15 Malaysia 9 Job tenure (years) 5.0 7.4 3.0 3 Labour market regulation index Informal economy (percent) 1.0 1.4 1.8 0.6 13 17 40 14 Union density (%) Industrial relations: From ’high control’ to ’high commitment’ system (source: Todd, Lansbury, Davis 2004) Varieties of capitalism: Transition of Malaysia to LME or CME Liberal market High income countries LMEs Coordinated market CMEs Middle-income countries HMEs DMEs Informal MEs ? Low income countries Conclusion: Malaysia - success and failure Advantages: Sustained economic growth per capita. Sustained industrialisation. Poverty alleviation. Political stability & semi-democratic political system. Planning for technological transition. Defending Third World interests internationally. Drawbacks: Dual economy Low-tech industries TNC & FDI dependence Weak R&D Weak policy implementation Strong executive power and weak judiciary system. Civil society exists, but it is controlled or suppressed. If Malaysia stalls halfway, why? Colonialism: established an export-sector for raw material & a multi-ethnic society. Resource abundance. Post-colonialism: Mainstream to start ISI. Potential civil war: prevented by authoritarianism and NEP (incl. FDI-driven EOI) /ethno-nationalism. Internal pressures contained. Political-economic cycles: adaptation during recession and upgrading during boom. External economic, not security vulnerability. Political structure: the hegemonic party prevails among the ethnic majority and includes other parties in a broad developmental, cross-ethnic coalition (Malaysia Inc., Vision 2020, NEM). Co-optation or repression of civil society groups (religious communities, trade unions, NGOs). Development model: ‘authoritatian-developmentalist’ with limited relative autonomy and embedded in ethnonationalism. Soft repression of organised labour. Appendix: Systemic vulnerability – Malaysia (Doner, Riche & Slater 2005)