Lifetime extension
of ageing nuclear
power plants:
Entering a new
era of risk
Briefing of the report
commissioned
by Greenpeace
www.out-of-age.eu
Briefing of the report commissioned by Greenpeace 1
Contents
Key elements
5
Executive summary
9
Greenpeace’s demands
Ageing damaged outside
wall of the reactor building
at the Belgian nuclear power
plant Tihange
© Alain Vincent/Greenpeace
2 Lifetime extension of ageing nuclear power plants: Entering a new era of risk
17
Briefing of the report commissioned by Greenpeace 3
Key elements
Steam generator
replacement through
a hole cut into the
containment at the
Belgian nuclear power
plant Doel 2, 2004
© electrabel
Electricity companies are currently seeking lifetime extension
of no fewer than 46 old nuclear reactors. The ageing of
nuclear reactors is an urgent issue in most European
countries that operate nuclear power: Belgium, Finland,
France, Germany, Hungary, Netherlands, Slovakia, Slovenia,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine and the United Kingdom.
Out of 151 operational nuclear reactors in Europe
(excluding Russia), 66 are more than 30 years old
and 25 more than 35 years. Seven of them are
even older than 40 years.
image 1: Age of nuclear reactors
in Europe (page 6)
In spite of upgrades and repairs, the overall
condition of nuclear reactors deteriorates in the
long term. The likelihood of an accident and the
amount of potential complications increases.
Nuclear reactors contain components that cannot
be replaced, including the reactor pressure
vessel and the containment, whose condition
deteriorates over time.
While replacement of old components may
reduce some risks, it also introduces new ones:
for example, in some cases large components
are replaced by breaking through the reactor’s
containment, as a result of which the strength of
this vital protective structure is inevitably impaired.
Most reactors for which lifetime extension is being
sought also have their power capacity uprated –
further increasing the stress on the already worn
systems and components.
The increasing stockpile of spent nuclear fuel and
high-level nuclear waste at many power plants,
stored under outdated safety systems, adds a
further layer of risk.
4 Lifetime extension of ageing nuclear power plants: Entering a new era of risk
‘Soft’ factors, such as old-fashioned
organisational structures and the loss of
motivation and know-how as routine sets in and
experienced staff retire, also undermine the overall
safety level of ageing reactors.
Ageing nuclear power stations are far from
meeting the state-of-the-art technological
standards required for new reactors, and it is
impossible to bring them up to those standards
when extending their lifetimes.
In the event of a serious accident involving one
or more nuclear reactors, the current European
nuclear liability coverage is – depending on
country – too low by a factor of between 100 and
1,000 to cover the likely costs. At the same time,
the likelihood of a serious accident happening in
Europe continues to increase as the reactor fleet
grows older.
image 2: Insured (covered) limits in Europe
in case of a nuclear accident (page 7)
Decisions to extend the lifetime of old reactors
stand under pressure from economic and political
arguments, because old reactors have already
amortised their capital costs, making them
relatively cheap to run. However, upgrading them
to a level of safety required for new reactors
(best available technology) would make them
uncompetitive on the electricity market.
Involvement of the public and independent media
can improve the quality of regulatory oversight
of ageing reactors. Moreover, the public has the
right under the Aarhus and Espoo Conventions
to be consulted on political and corporate plans
that include lifetime extension of ageing nuclear
reactors.
Briefing of the report commissioned by Greenpeace 5
IN MILLIONS €
GERMANY
2500
OLKILUOTO 1
LOVIISA 1
BELGIUM
FORSMARK 1
1200
FINLAND
679
NETHERLANDS
RINGHALS 1
1200
OSKARSHAMN
SPAIN
700
TORNESS 1
HUNTERSTON B1
SWITZERLAND
809
HARTLEPOOL A1
HEYSHAM A1
WYLFA 1
BROKDORF
49
GROHNDE
SIZEWELL B
DOEL 1
HINKLEY POINT B1
EMSLAND
DUNGENESS B1
PENLY
TIHANGE 1
CHOOZ
PALUEL
73
FRANCE
91
DUKOVANY 1
BOHUNICE 3
ZAPOROZHE 1
GUNDREMMINGEN B
FESSENHEIM
BLAYAIS
TEMELÍN 1
NECKARWESTHEIM 2
LEIBSTADT
MOCHOVCE 1
GOESGEN
MUEHLEBERG
BUGEY
GREAT BRITAIN
168
SOUTH UKRAINE 1
BEZNAU 1
BELLEVILLE
CIVAUX
ISAR 2
CATTENOM
ST. LAURENT
CHINON
KHMELNITSKI 1
PHILIPPSBURG 2
NOGENT
DAMPIERRE
CZECH REPUBLIC
ROVNO 1
GRAFENRHEINFELD
GRAVELINES
FLAMANVILLE
BULGARIA
HUNGARY
PAKS 1
112
KRSKO
RUMANIA
ST. ALBAN
CRUAS
336
CERNAVODA 1
GOLFECH
TRICASTIN
RUSSIA
KOZLODUY 5
SANTA MARIA DE GARONA
ASCO 1
163
SLOVAKIA
300
TRILLO 1
ALMARAZ 1
VANDELLOS 2
SLOVENIA
COFRENTES
168
SWEDEN
336
UKRAINE
168
IMAGE 1
IMAGE 2
Age of nuclear reactors in Europe
Insured (covered) limits in Europe in case of a nuclear accident
less than 20 years old
14 european nuclear reactors
are concerned
more than 20 years old
71 european nuclear reactors
are concerned
more than 30 years old
66 european nuclear reactors
are concerned (including 7 more
than 40 years old)
186 BILLION €
source: European Commission, 2013. Public consultation - Insurance and compensation of damages caused by accidents of nuclear
power plants (nuclear liability). Brussels. http://ec.europa.eu/energy/nuclear/consultations/20130718_powerplants_en.htm
GERMANY
2500 MILLIONS €
6 Lifetime extension of ageing nucLear power pLants: entering a new era of risk
ESTIMATED COST BY THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION
OF THE DAMAGES CAUSED BY FUKUSHIMA ACCIDENT
Briefing of the report commissioned By greenpeace 7
Executive summary
Nearly three years on from the Fukushima nuclear disaster,
the 25 oldest nuclear reactors in Europe have all passed
35 years of operation. More than two-thirds of US nuclear
reactors have received extended licences permitting 60 years
of operation, far beyond their original design lifetimes.
We are entering a new era of nuclear risk.
and load cycle exhaustion. Physical ageing of
systems, structures and components is paralleled
by technological and conceptual ageing, because
existing reactors allow for only limited retroactive
implementation of new technologies and safety
concepts. Together with ‘soft’ factors such as
outmoded organisational structures and the loss
of staff know-how and motivation as employees
retire, these factors cause the overall safety
level of older reactors to become increasingly
inadequate by modern standards.
Risks of
nuclear ageing
Dipl.-Ing. Simone Mohr, Dipl.-Ing. Stephan
Kurth, Dr. Christoph Pistner, Dipl.-Ing. Judith
Breuer (Öko-Institut e.V., Darmstadt)
At the time of writing (January 2014) the average
age of European nuclear reactors has reached
29 years. An increasing number are reaching
their design lifetimes of 30 or 40 years. New
nuclear reactor construction in the EU is not
capable of replacing all the reactors that are
approaching the end of their design lifetimes,
and the Fukushima disaster acted as a brake
on new build programmes. Nevertheless we are
seeing an increasing demand for new strategies
to avoid a phase-out of nuclear energy, especially
in countries that have not developed viable
alternatives.
The current strategy of nuclear operators in
much of Europe, including Switzerland, Ukraine
and Russia, is targeted at a combination of
extension of reactor lifetime (also called Long Term
Operation) and power uprating. These factors
taken together may have an important impact on
the safety of the operational reactor fleet in Europe.
image 3: Typical life cycle of a nuclear
power plant (page 10)
image 4: Schematic diagram showing
the progression of nuclear reactor ageing
(page 10)
Fuel pool in French nuclear
power plant Gravelines
© Greenpeace
8 Lifetime extension of ageing nuclear power plants: Entering a new era of risk
The design lifetime is the period of time during
which a facility or component is expected to
perform according to the technical specifications
to which it was produced. Life-limiting processes
include an excessive number of reactor trips
Measures to uprate a reactor’s power output
can further compromise safety margins, for
instance because increased thermal energy
production results in an increased output of steam
and cooling water, leading to greater stresses
on piping and heat exchange systems, so
exacerbating ageing mechanisms. Modifications
necessitated by power uprating may additionally
introduce new potential sources of failure due
to adverse interactions between new and old
equipment. Thus, both lifetime extension and
power uprating decrease a plant’s originally
designed safety margins and increase the risk of
failures.
image 5: Plant power uprating (PPU)
of reactors, source: Öko-Institut (page 11)
Physical ageing issues include those affecting the
reactor pressure vessel (including embrittlement,
vessel head penetration cracking, and
deterioration of internals) and the containment
and the reactor building, cable deterioration,
and ageing of transformers. Conceptual and
technological ageing issues include the inability
to withstand a large aircraft impact, along with
inadequate earthquake and flooding resistance.
Some reactor types, such as the British advanced
gas-cooled reactors (AGC) and Russian-designed
VVER-440 and RBMK (Chernobyl-type) reactors
suffer specific problems.
Briefing of the report commissioned by Greenpeace 9
IMAGE 3
OLKILUOTO 1
Typical life cycle of a nuclear power plant
LOVIISA 1
FORSMARK 1
Failure Rate
RINGHALS 1
OSKARSHAMN
2
1
Technical Limit
Uncertainties
GROHNDE
DOEL 1
ROVNO 1
GRAFENRHEINFELD
TIHANGE 1
Life Time
GUNDREMMINGEN B
BOHUNICE 3
CHINON
MOCHOVCE 1
ST. LAURENT
LEIBSTADT
BEZNAU 1
Sources : Residual Risk report, 2007, based on IRSN
GOESGEN
MUEHLEBERG
CIVAUX
PAKS 1
KRSKO
IMAGE 4
TYPICAL LIFE CYCLE OF A NUCLEAR POWER PLANT
CRUAS
Schematic diagram showing the progression
of nuclear reactor ageing
Sources : Residual Risk report, 2007, based on IRSN
ASCO 1
Quality / Safety
ALMARAZ 1
Safety standard at the construction date
IMAGE 5
Plant power uprating (PPU) of reactors
1
Date of construction
of the plant
2
1rst Refitting
3
2nd Refitting
Age of the plant
Nuclear power
plant uprated
from 0% to 5%
Nuclear power
plant uprated
from 5 to 10%
Nuclear power
plant uprated
from 10 to 20%
Nuclear power
plant uprated
more than 20%
Source: Öko-Institut
SAFETY OF THE PLANT DEPORTING OF THE AGE
Without refitting
With refitting
without
refitting
with refitting
Safety level when
a plant
Safety
level when ageing effets
Safety level when a plant is
Safety level when ageing effets
is getting older
are
treated
getting older
are treated
Required safety level
Required safety
levelrequirements according
Safety
Safety requirements according
to the state of the scientific
to the state of the scientifiz
and technical knowledge
and technical knowledge
10 Lifetime extension
of ageing nucLear power pLants: entering a new era of risk
Source : Review of selected cost drivers for decisions on continued operation of older nuclear reactors, IAEA, 1999
Briefing of the report commissioned By greenpeace 11
Retrofits already recommended after the
Three Mile Island accident in 1979 and the
1986 Chernobyl disaster have still not been
implemented in every European nuclear power
plant. Ageing management programmes so far
implemented have not been sufficient to avoid the
occurrence of serious ageing effects. Concrete
examples exist where ageing of the workforce
and consequent atrophy of the knowledge
base as staff retire may affect occurrence of
failures, as well as problems with retrofitting
and refurbishment. Furthermore, there are
considerable disparities in the responses of
different operators and regulatory authorities to
identified ageing problems.
Spent fuel storage presents a special risk for
ageing nuclear power plants due to the buildup of large amounts of spent fuel. Examples of
problems include inadequate protection against
external hazards and the risks of a long-term
loss of cooling (due to poor redundancy and
low quality standards in spent fuel pool cooling
systems), both issues illustrated by the Fukushima
catastrophe. The re-racking of spent fuel elements
into more compact storage units to increase
the space available for the larger than expected
amount of spent fuel is a further source of risk.
The Fukushima disaster also highlighted the risk of
an external event compromising multiple reactors
at the same time – a situation hardly any multi-unit
site is prepared for. Sources of common-cause
failures include shared cooling inlets, pumping
stations, pipelines, electricity infrastructure and so
on – issues that were not sufficiently addressed in,
for instance, the post-Fukushima EU Stress Test
of nuclear reactors.
Perceptions of the most suitable locations for
nuclear power plants have also changed over
time. Many older plants are located in highly
populated areas, obviously making emergency
preparedness much more complex than for plants
situated far from population areas, and greatly
increasing the potential for harm.
The EU Stress Test furthermore did not explicitly
cover ageing-related issues. The use of the
original design basis to determine the robustness
of reactors was particularly unsatisfactory,
because design deficiencies and differences
between different reactors were not fully taken into
account. Because beyond design basis events
had not been systematically analysed before,
too little documentation was available and expert
judgement played too large a part.
Site-specific risks change over time. New
insights into earthquake risk require higher
protection standards which cannot be fully met by
modification of older nuclear power plants. The
lack of emergency preparedness evident during
the Fukushima disaster forces a reassessment
of risks including those of flooding and loss of
external infrastructure. Especially when seen in the
light of the implications of climate change in terms
of extreme weather and sea level rise.
12 Lifetime extension of ageing nuclear power plants: Entering a new era of risk
Economics of
nuclear ageing
Prof. Stephen Thomas
(University of Greenwich)
If the cost of modifications is relatively low, lifeextended nuclear power plants can be highly
profitable to their owners because the capital cost
of the plant (making up most of the cost of a unit
of nuclear-generated electricity) will already have
been paid off, leaving only the operations and
maintenance cost to be paid. Other advantages
to the owner include the fact that the plant is a
known quantity.
The economic risks depend on technical,
regulatory and political factors. In practice, plants
are not retired on the basis of their design life, but
according to these other factors.
In the USA, reactor retirements have mostly been
due to economic reasons (including the prohibitive
cost of repair), though some have been because
of design reasons. In Germany most closures
have stemmed from political decisions, though a
few have been design-related. Elsewhere, reasons
have been mainly economic (France) or technical
and economic (Canada, Spain, the UK), political
(Italy, Sweden) or political and design-related
(Japan, largely in the wake of the Fukushima
disaster).
National regulators are constantly increasing
safety requirements, but for ageing reactors these
can never be set at the level of the best available
technology. For instance, design lessons from
the 1975 Browns Ferry accident were applied
to most designs developed after that, but those
from the 1979 Three Mile Island accident and the
Chernobyl (1986) and Fukushima (2011) disasters
can only be taken into limited account.
Lifetime extension becomes an issue at different
points in a reactor’s life, depending on the country.
In France, where licenses are open-ended, the
decisive moment is the regulatory Periodic Safety
Review (PSR), conducted every 10 years. The
most recent PSR and the post-Fukushima EU
Stress Test prescribed upgrades representing
a total planned investment in EdF’s operational
reactor fleet of around €50bn over the next 30
years. However, there is no clarity as yet about
whether French reactors will receive a 20 yeas lifetime extension as EdF has requested. In the USA,
nuclear reactors operate under a 40-year licence.
Well before the expiry of this licence, if lifetime
extension is desired, a request must be made to
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for a 20year extension. While the first such assessments
took a few months, they are currently taking
several years. So far, all reactors for which this
assessment has been completed have had a
20-year extension granted. Nevertheless three
plants (Vermont Yankee, Kewaunee and Crystal
River) recently closed before lifetime extension
was obtained because of excessive costs in the
context of low electricity prices. San Onofre in
California closed even before an extension was
applied for, because of the cost of repairs.
Very few nuclear reactors have been retired
because they have reached the end of their
licensed or designed lifetime. Much more probable
life-determining factors are: the economics of the
plant; the existence of national phase-out policies;
serious and unexpected equipment failures;
and, for older designs in particular, existence of
design issues that make continued operation
unacceptable. However, in the 15 years since
lifetime extension began to occur, the perception
of the risk of granting a reactor a significantly
longer life has increased. Permission for a reactor
to operate for 60 years appears to be far from a
guarantee that it will actually complete a 60-year
life. A longer permitted lifetime has given utilities a
reason to justify upgrades aimed at improving the
economics of a plant, such as power upgrades.
However, as the risks and costs of lifetime
extension have become clearer, the case for this
additional discretionary investment has weakened.
Briefing of the report commissioned by Greenpeace 13
LIABILITY OF
AGEING NUCLEAR
REACTORS
Prof. Tom Vanden Borre (University
of Leuven), Prof. Michael Faure (University
of Maastricht)
The increasing risk posed by the ageing of nuclear
reactors should be reflected in an increase in
insurance premiums to cover the costs of a
possible nuclear accident. Countries should only
opt for reactor lifetime extension if the provision
to compensate victims, of any accident, is
substantially improved. Suppliers should be
allowed to be held liable for accidents, and plant
operators should face unlimited liability. Such
increased liability will not only be beneficial for the
victims of a nuclear accident but will also have an
important preventive effect.
The principles of nuclear liability, fixed in the
Paris and Vienna Conventions, include strict
liability (liability for loss or damage regardless of
negligence or other culpability); legal channelling
of liability to the nuclear operator, with consequent
exclusion of the supplier’s liability; liability limitation
for the nuclear operator in amount and time;
compulsory coverage by financial security
(insurance); and exclusive jurisdiction in the
country of accident. Newer conventions such as
the Convention on Supplementary Compensation
(CSC) and the Protocols to the Paris and Vienna
Conventions do not alter these principles. None
of the Conventions, however, caters for reactor
ageing issues.
The USA is not party to the Paris or Vienna
Convention. Its Price-Anderson act enables
nuclear operators to pool their liability resources.
It provides for retrospective insurance for a topup sum of liability in the event that an accident
actually occurs. The amounts generated by this
system are substantially higher than those under
the international conventions; but conversely the
nuclear operator’s liability is capped just as it is
under the conventions.
Given that the costs of a nuclear accident are
potentially much higher than those covered in the
limited liability coverage, liability limitation (capping)
effectively gives the nuclear industry a two-fold
subsidy: the limit itself, leading to lower insurance
costs; and either top-up coverage by the state
(in the case of Europe) or the opportunity to
defer a portion of insurance costs to second-tier
retrospective coverage (USA). These legal regimes
thus protect nuclear operators and artificially
decrease their risk costs, potentially creating three
types of distortions:
1. The reduced cost of insurance gives nuclear
energy an artificial competitive advantage because
other electricity generation technologies (and
market operators) have to internalise their full risk;
2. The liability cap reduces an operator’s
economic incentive to reduce the risk of a nuclear
accident.
3. The cap, coupled (in the case of Europe) with
inadequate top-up coverage, may result in a lack
of or insufficient compensation for victims in the
event of an accident.
The increasing risk posed by nuclear ageing
should lead to an increase in operators’ insurance
premiums. With ageing nuclear reactors,
adequate financial security to cover the costs
of a potential accident becomes even more a
necessity. It is important for society as a whole
that objective calculations are made of the
damage that a nuclear accident could potentially
cause, and on that basis alternative systems of
financing the coverage have to be investigated.
It is obviously important to accompany this with
a mandatory financial security requirement for
operators, but the higher resulting costs resulting
from such an analysis should not be a reason to
limit liability. Pooling of the financial security by
operators may be a good alternative to the current
European nuclear insurance pools.
14 Lifetime extension of ageing nuclear power plants: Entering a new era of risk
A new compensation model for nuclear damage
should keep the positive elements of the
international nuclear liability conventions: strict
liability and compulsory liability insurance. It is
especially important that compulsory insurance
protects victims against insolvency of the operator.
Conversely, the conventions, even as revised
by their relevant protocols, allow for only up to
about one per cent of the cost of an accident to
be compensated for. The alternative is obvious:
unlimited liability should be introduced.
Legal channelling of all liability to the operator is
problematic. From the viewpoint of victims it would
be preferable to be able to address a claim against
several persons or corporations, as this would
increase their chances of receiving compensation.
It would also have a preventive effect since all
parties bearing a share of the risk would have an
incentive to avoid damage.
Countries should opt for reactor lifetime extension
only if arrangements for the compensation of
victims in the event of an accident are substantially
improved. A higher level of liability would not only
benefit the victims of a nuclear accident but would
again have an important preventive effect. Pooling
unlimited liability across Europe would encourage
operators to monitor one another, since they
would be reluctant to allow a bad risk into their
system.
In conclusion, there are strong reasons for the
EU’s current state funding of financial security
against a nuclear accident to be replaced by
a collective system funded by the EU nuclear
operators. Reactor lifetime extension should only
be allowed if such an enhanced approach to
nuclear accident compensation is adopted.
Countries considering plant lifetime extension
should end funding part of the liability coverage
with public means, extend liability to suppliers,
and introduce unlimited liability for operators,
while requiring the latter to have third-party liability
insurance coverage or other financial security of
a realistic level in terms of the actual scope for
damage. Several possible financial schemes exist
to fulfil this objective.
Briefing of the report commissioned by Greenpeace 15
Greenpeace demands
POLITICS, PUBLIC
PARTICIPATION AND
NUCLEAR AGEING
Ir. Jan Haverkamp (Greenpeace, Nuclear
Transparency Watch)
There are various routes by which the public
can influence decisions on the lifetime extension
of nuclear reactors. Nuclear safety is the most
obvious consideration, but economic or political
arguments can play an overriding role, as for
example during the German discussions on a
nuclear phase-out. A high level of transparency
(requiring public and media access to information)
and public participation in decisions around ageing
nuclear reactors can help to ensure the priority of
nuclear safety. In Europe (excluding Russia, which
is not considered here because it is not a party
to the Aarhus and Espoo Conventions), reactor
lifetime extension decisions have been recently
concluded, are currently under consideration or
will come under consideration in the coming three
years in Belgium, the Czech Republic, France,
Spain, Hungary, the Netherlands, Sweden,
the UK, Switzerland and Ukraine. The point at
which lifetime extension of a nuclear reactor
becomes necessary for its continued operation is
determined by the length of its operating licence
(in countries where these are time-limited); or,
in the case of an unlimited operating licence,
by the national regulator after a periodic safety
review, or on the basis of a political decision.
The potential cost of upgrades, the likely cost
recovery time, and the operator’s ownership
status and political influence can all act to reduce
the priority accorded to nuclear safety during
lifetime extension decisions. The independence
of nuclear regulators is an important factor in
counterbalancing such pressures. Public access
to information (transparency) as guaranteed
under the Aarhus Convention can also help, as
can public participation and provisions to ensure
that account is taken of critical public opinion.
Referenda are a less clear-cut instrument.
Public participation under the Aarhus and
Espoo Conventions and their implementing
EU Directives can also influence decisions on
the future of a country’s ageing reactor fleet
during strategic environmental assessment of
national energy policies. A recent decision by the
Espoo Convention Implementation Commission
furthermore makes an environmental impact
assessment including public participation
compulsory for decisions concerning nuclear plant
lifetime extension. Citizens of states party to these
conventions also have avenues of legal recourse
when they are not sufficiently included in these
decision processes.
Greenpeace is concerned about the new era of nuclear risk
we are currently entering. It therefore demands the following
urgent actions from european governments and nuclear
regulators:
# Phase out nuclear power and enhance the
development of renewable energy and energy
efficiency. The Greenpeace / EREC Energy
[R]evolution scenario1 shows that this is possible
while at the same tackling climate change.
# Clear, binding and ambitious climate and
energy targets on EU and national level.
This includes for 2030 a reduction of carbon
emissions by at least 55% (compared to 1990),
a share of renewable energy in the total energy
consumption of at least 45% and a reduction
of final energy consumption by 40% (compared
to 2005). Nuclear power has no place in these
targets.
# Close reactors that are older than their initial
design lifetime immediately. Greenpeace calls
on nuclear regulators not to grant any lifetime
extensions beyond that point.
# Implement a fundamental reform of the nuclear
liability regime. The ageing nuclear fleet puts
citizens at an ever-increasing risk. Currently,
profits are privatised while the risks are
socialised. Nuclear liability legislation must be
based on the needs of potential victims. Liability
must be strict and unlimited in time and scope,
it must stipulate liability of suppliers as well
as operators, and ensure full insurance of all
potential costs of an incident or accident.
# Guarantee the independence of nuclear
regulators and implement feedback
mechanisms in the form of full transparency and
public participation, in order to guard against
pressure from economic and political interests to
compromise on nuclear safety.
# Insist that the level of technical risk reduction of
operational nuclear reactors is set according to
best available technologies (BAT). Reactors that
cannot meet this standard should be closed.
# Ensure that when the process of preparation for
lifetime extension, or a periodic safety review
or other inspection, reveals a reactor to need
a safety upgrade, the reactor’s operation is
halted until the necessary upgrade has been
implemented.
# Ensure full transparency and full public
participation in decision-making, including
in transboundary Strategic Environmental
Assessments of national energy strategies
that make provision for lifetime extension
of old nuclear reactors; and transboundary
Environmental Impact Assessments preceding
all lifetime extension decisions for old nuclear
reactors.
1See: http://www.energyblueprint.info
16 Lifetime extension of ageing nuclear power plants: Entering a new era of risk
Briefing of the report commissioned by Greenpeace 17
Gravelines nuclear power plant, France
© Greenpeace / Micha Patault
18 Lifetime extension of ageing nuclear power plants: Entering a new era of risk
Briefing of the report commissioned by Greenpeace 19
Greenpeace is an independent global campaigning
organisation that acts to change attitudes and behaviour,
to protect and conserve the environment
and to promote peace.
Published in March 2014
by Greenpeace Switzerland
Heinrichstr. 147
B.O. Box, 8031 Zurich, Switzerland
For more information contact:
cedric.gervet@greenpeace.org
www.out-of-age.eu
20
Lifetime extension of ageing nuclear power plants: Entering a new era of risk