CNC’s Contribution to an Integrated
Approach
to
Nuclear Safety, Security and Safeguards
Mike Griffiths CBE
Chief Constable
Civil Nuclear Constabulary
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Scope
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Historical Context
Strategic Context
Mission and Concept of Operations
Integration
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Where have we come from ?
The United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority
Constabulary (UKAEAC) was formed on 1st April 1955.
With an initial strength of 320. It took over responsibility
for policing all UKAEA establishments.
UKAEAC officers were deemed to be Crown Servants
for the purposes of Section 54 of the Firearms Act
1968. This put them on the same footing as Home
Office police forces with regard to firearms.
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Powers of the CNC set out in the Energy Act
2004
• Any place when escorting nuclear materials in transit.
• Any place when pursuing or detaining subjects who
have unlawfully removed or interfered with materials
guarded by the CNC, or have been reasonably
suspected of being guilty of doing so.
• Civil nuclear sites.
• Land around such sites up to 5 km from the
boundary.
• Transhipment points when safeguarding such nuclear
materials.
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What Do We Do?
The CNC's primary function is to:
• Provide armed protection to licensed nuclear
sites not used wholly or mainly for defence
purposes.
• Safeguard the transportation of nuclear
materials in the UK and in transit worldwide.
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What We Don’t Do
• Routine reporting of crime
• Respond to general duty Police incidents
• Public Order
However if on counter terrorist patrol within
our jurisdiction CNC Officers encounter an
incident ,the Officers will deal with it until
the host force has the ability to take control
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The Strategic Context
• Central Government, the Office for Nuclear
Regulation (ONR), site operators and the
CNC continually monitor threats to nuclear
sites and wider UK security.
• The CNC, is under the strategic direction of
the DECC; it assigns dedicated teams of
armed response officers to the UK's civil
nuclear power plants and storage sites.
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The Environment
• Operating environment is the public space
• Risk – Political, Reputational and
Catastrophic
• DECC Sec of State owns the Risk
• Regulator – both safety and security
• An integrated approach?
• Who pays and for what?
• Overarching Governance.
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Environment and Influences
• National Security Risk Assessment and high
priority risks
• CONTEST – Protect and Prepare
• Industry issues, e.g. New Build and
decommissioning, NISR 2003, NORMS,
NSSPs, security enhancement programmes
• Altering policing landscape
External and Independent Audit
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HMIC
ONR
IPCC
KPMG
NAO
• DECC
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Mission
• In partnership with the civil nuclear industry,
national security agencies and regulatory
bodies, the CNC will DETER any attacker
whose intent is the theft or sabotage of
nuclear material, whether static or in transit,
or the sabotage of high consequence
facilities…..
Mission (cont.)
• …If an attack occurs, the CNC will DEFEND
that material and those facilities and DENY
access to them. If material is seized or high
consequence facilities are compromised, the
CNC will RECOVER control of those facilities
and regain custody of the material.
The Onion Principle
Vetting
Physical Security
Security Staff
CNC
SSCR
HSA
VA
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Where do we fit In ?
Physical Security
Fence
CCTV
Lighting
Alarms
Security staff
HSA Entry
Control
SSCR
Threat Definition ,Target Identification
CNC
Internal, external high
visibility Patrols
Tactical Doctrine
Concept of
Operations
Graded Response (14)
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CNC Core Role
•
Armed Response at those site to which it is
deployed:
– Prevent unauthorised access to nuclear
material and counter the threat of theft of
material or sabotage to facilities.
– Denial of access, find and fix, pro-active
engagement.
– Rapid armed response and recovery if
necessary.
– Concept of Operations
Generic Gold Strategy
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6.
7.
8.
Maintain the security of NM
Maximise the safety of site workforce
Maximise the safety of police officers
Minimise the risk to site intruders
Develop intelligence
Arrest suspected offenders
Secure & preserve evidence
Return to normality
What We Provide
Operational Firearms Commanders.
• Provide direction and control of incidents.
• Control Post incident procedures
• Objective overview ensuring proportionate and lawful response.
Collect and collate intelligence
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Close working relationship with site staff.
Provide off site intelligence picture
Feed intelligence in to Op. Lightning.
Intel reports processed and disseminated by in house SB.
On Site Knowledge
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Knowledge of locations of VA’s
Alternative routes in to HCVA’s
Officers competency tested.
Bespoke F/A training to defeat postulated threat.
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What We Provide
IRT Capability
• Immediate recovery of lost materials.
Strategic Escort Group
• Specialist teams that provide on board
armed protection of nuclear cargo during
overseas operations or road movements.
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Integration
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Threat to Industry
C2 Structures
Safety on Site
The Changing Environment
Security Incident Overlapping to Safety
Incident
• Safety to Security
• Impact on Operations
• Build in Security from the Start
Integration
CNC within the
Security
Envelope
Safety with
Resilience
Safeguards
and Hazard
Reduction
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CNC’s Contribution to an Integrated
Approach
to
Nuclear Safety, Security and Safeguards
Mike Griffiths CBE
Chief Constable
Civil Nuclear Constabulary
22