Does Proportional Representation Foster Closer Congruence Between Citizens and Policy Makers? André Blais Marc André Bodet Composition of Presentation What is our ‘research substance’? Research Background/Why is PR interesting to observe? Research Methodology/How did the authors approach the problem? Conclusion/Remarks/Discussion Teasers What is our ‘research substance’? Electoral system, proportional representation (PR) The influence of PR on the relationship between citizens and policy makers (‘voters and governments’) Does PR foster closer congruence between the views of the citizens and the positions of the government? QUESTION Is PR indeed more likely to induce governments to adopt positions that are close to those of the median voter? OR Does PR with ‘its way of being’ encourage harmony between voters and the governments / legislatures? ANSWER (1) Strong electoral system, low proportionality: the party might deviate from the median voter position if there are more than two parties (in that case ‘there is no clear optimal position for the parties to take’ and ‘parties strive to distinguish themselves ideologically from each other’) (Cox, 1997, Osborne; 1993); in case there are only two parties, each party will maximize its votes by converging to the median voter (Downs, 1957). ANSWER (2) Weak electoral system, high proportionality: because there are more parties and each of them wants to distinguish itself from another, there is no move towards a median voter position; parties move away from the center and the overall distance between parties and voters is not minimized smaller congruence but centripetal process do take place does take place at the government formation stage paradox CSES Dataset 21 countries and 31 elections (1996-2003) direct information about the distance between the voter’s positions and those of governing parties 48.675 respondents (excluding missing values) questionnaire (respondents were asked to place themselves on 0-10 L-R scale and also place 6 major parties on the same scale locating respondents and parties) Research Methodology FIVE HYPOTHESIS H1: PR produces less centrist parties and thus greater diversity H2: PR increases the number of parties in government H3: The greater the diversity in the party system, the weaker the congruence between government and voters H4: The more parties in government the stronger the congruence between government and voters H5: PR has no net effect on the congruence between the government and voters Hypothesis 1 PR Produces Less Centrist Parties and Greater Diversity The choice of an electoral system has a major impact on the survival of small parties Disproportional system: fewer parties which converge to the center in order to maximize their share of votes Proportional system: more parties, less centralized, large range of options for the voter What is the ‘position’ of the parties in PR? H1:Part I (Less or More Centrist?) Median voter as a starting point (a way how parties can min. the distance between themselves and voters table 1) DEPENDANT VARIABLE: centrifugal strength of the party system Goal: to characterize how centrist parties are in a given country Formula: voter’s median placement of each party; compute the average absolute distance of each party from the median voter’s position the higher the distance the less centrist parties (table 1) Interpretation: small average distance more centrist parties, bigger average distance more dispersed parties Hypothesis (part I) confirmed H1: Part 2 (Greater Diversity?) Indicator of diversity: inverse of Alvarez and Nagler’s party system compactness indicator the numerator corresponds to the relative dispersion of party locations on the L and R scale great dispersion, great diversity (choice); small dispersion, smaller diversity (choice); the denominator is voter’s dispersion on the same scale correlation (disproportionality/range of choice/centrifugal strength) tested with least squares regressions (Gallagher’s index) findings: older democracy produce less centripetal party system, less choice more proportional systems provide greater range of ideological options, less centrist parties Hypothesis confirmed Hypothesis 2 PR Increases the Number of Parties in Government in our model the most crucial centripetal moment in a PR system occurs at the time of formation of the cabinet why? PR facilitates a big amount of parties to enter (and survive), also small parties can obtain seats, seldom one party has enough seats to form the government often coalitions outcome: more proportional systems produce more parties and less proportional produce fewer parties hypothesis confirmed (Table 3) Hypothesis 3 and 4 Diversity Hinders Congruence More Parties in Government Fosters Congruence after elections (congruence between voter’s views and the government’s position) author’s approach assumes that a party’s relative share of cabinet seats is an indicator of its relative influence and that the weighted location of the parties forming the government is a valid appx. of the governments overall ideological orientation the cabinets are not always centrist (table 1) distance between voters and cabinets hypothesis confirmed (table 4) Hypothesis 5 PR has no Net Effect on Distance Contradiction: 1. PR leads to more parties and to less centralist parties, smaller convergence BUT 2. PR increases the number of the parties in the government and tends to produce more centralist government and more convergence. Authors conclude that these two effects wash out: effect is nil (table 5) Conclusion In PR voters can choose among parties that are more ideologically dispersed and offer a greater range of choice BUT they are not automatically closer or further from the government. No electoral system is superior when it comes down to convergence towards the median voter to minimize the average distance between the voter and itself. The moment of convergence is different in other electoral systems but ‘the result is the same’. Remarks Measuring average distance / what is ‘small’, what is ‘big’ more responsive government / the most responsive government?