“INCUMBENT PERFORMANCE
AND ELECTORAL CONTROL”
Research Paper by John Ferejohn
BACKGROUND TO PAPER
• Pure theory of electoral competition based on idea that citizens
compare the platforms of two candidates and vote for the
preferred
• Strategies of the candidates are represented by promises of
future performance in office
• Models have been created based on these assumptions, in both
static and dynamic settings
• Models of these sort possess the property that if the set of
alternatives is “large enough” equilibrium platforms rarely exist
STATIC MODELS [MCKELVEY (1975)]
• Does not consider differing
preferences between the
politician and his
constituents
• It is assumed that promises
will be kept by the
officeholder
• A discipline mechanism
may be set in place to
make sure promises are
kept
DYNAMIC MODELS [KRAMER (1977)]
• Assumes that any
challenger will propose a
platform that will defeat the
incumbent
• Incumbent assumes he will
lose the next election
• Voters recognize that any
rational challenger’s
platform would ignore their
preferences while in office
PURPOSE OF PAPER
Previous models show that there is no predictable connection
between voter preferences and public policy
• Author constructs a dynamic model where:
1. Electorate bases their vote on officeholder’s performance
2. Officeholder anticipates this behavior and chooses their
policies
PURPOSE OF PAPER (CONT.)
• Empirical evidence shows that the pure theory of elections only
partially describes electoral behavior
• Recent data shows:
• Voters respond to the performance of incumbents and to
promises of competing candidates
• Economic performance is relevant to the reelection of the
incumbent
ASSUMPTIONS OF THE MODEL
• Voters assume officeholder will act in their own
interests while in office
• Voters will maximize their own welfare subject to the
constraint that officeholders will pursue their own selfinterest
• Voter behavior is constrained by the fact that it must be
in the best interest of the voters at that time
MODELS DEVELOPED IN THE PAPER
• Simple dynamic model only
contains one voter
(homogeneous electorate)
and two or more candidates
• Analyzes the variation
in electoral behavior
• Nonhomogeneous model
contains several voters and
changes the situation
significantly
• Vote based on an
aggregate criterion
rather than
individualistic
MODEL WITH HOMOGENEOUS ELECTORATE
• Voters have more control over officeholders if the value of office is high
• Officeholder is imperfectly monitored by members of the electorate
• Conclusion will hold up in more sophisticated models assuming disinterest in
party reputations
In a two party system:
• Losing office is not as significant as it would be in a multiparty system so
officeholders place less value in interests of electors
• Voter control is decreased if parties cannot distinguish themselves
MODEL WITH NONHOMOGENEOUS ELECTORATE
• Because of differing voter preferences the incumbent is uncontrollable by the
electorate
• Rational individual behavior will lead to an undesirable outcome which will
arise in any model in which voter preferences are sufficiently diverse
• Potential exploitation by the incumbent leads voters to adopt “sociotropic”
rules
• Voting based on aggregate performance
• Thus, induce the incumbent to provide the same level of service as in the
homogenous model
CONCLUSION
• Simple model allows retrospective voting based on incumbent’s
performance
• Complex model requires electorate refusal to vote selfishly
• Further ideas to explore:
• Development of “sociotropic” rules
• Collusion between incumbent and challengers