Lecture 22
Strawson on Persons, Minds, and
Bodies; Frankfurt on Persons and the
Will
STRAWSON ON PERSONS, MINDS,
AND BODIES
Strawson’s Second Argument
Strawson’s Second Argument:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
A concept is legitimate only if we can give acceptable individuation
conditions for it, i.e., only if we can say whether two of its instances are
identical or distinct. (Premise)
The only acceptable individuation conditions for the concept of a mind
involve the concept of a person. (Premise)
If the individuation conditions for a concept C1 involve the concept C2,
then C1 depends on C2. (Premise)
The Cartesian holds that the concept of a mind is independent of the
concept of a person. (Premise)
The Cartesian cannot employ the only acceptable individuation
conditions for the concept of a mind. (From 2,3,4)
The Cartesian cannot give acceptable individuation conditions for the
concept of a mind. (From 5)
The Cartesian’s concept of the mind is not legitimate. (From 1,6)
Premise 1
• Premise 1: A concept is legitimate only if we can give
acceptable individuation conditions for it, i.e., only if we can
say when two of its instances are identical or distinct.
• Some examples of individuation conditions:
– A class or set or collection A is identical to another B if and only
if every member of A is a member of B, and vice versa.
– A property F is identical to a property G if and only if every F is
necessarily a G, and every F is necessarily an F.
– A musical group/performer a is identical to a musical
group/performer b if and only if… ?
– A physical object O1 is identical to a physical object O2 if and
only if… ?
Why Do Individuation Conditions
Matter?
• Without acceptable individuation conditions
for minds, the Cartesian cannot justifiably
assert that there is a single mind associated
with a given living, human body, rather than a
thousand minds.
Premise 2
•
Premise 2: The only acceptable individuation conditions for the concept of a mind
involve the concept of a person.
•
These unique, acceptable individuation conditions are…
•
The Anti-Cartesian’s Individuation Conditions for Minds: A mind M1 is identical to a
mind M2 if and only if M1 and M2 belong to the same person.
•
Doesn’t this just push the problem back to the individuation conditions for
persons?
– The anti-Cartesian "does not have to pretend that the question as to what the criteria of
personal identity are is an easy or straightforward question. But he can properly point out that
we have, and know how to use, adequate criteria for ordinary cases; and that we can perfectly
intelligibly discuss how our criteria should be interpreted or adapted for any extraordinary
cases which we might encounter or imagine" (Strawson, Self, Mind and Body, 191).
Premise 3
• Premise 3: If the individuation conditions for a concept
C1 involve the concept C2, then C1 depends on C2.
(Premise)
• Inserting our account of conceptual dependence, the
premise says: If the individuation conditions for C1
involve C2, then a full account of C1 would involve C2.
• Plausible, since individuation conditions are plausibly
part of the “full account” of the concept.
FRANKFURT’S “FREEDOM OF THE WILL
AND THE CONCEPT OF A PERSON”
Frankfurt’s Objection to Strawson
• Strawson’s Account: A
person is a being that has
both physical and mental
properties.
• Frankfurt’s Objection:
There are animals that
have both physical and
mental properties, but
that are not persons.
– Example: The giraffe is tall;
the giraffe is afraid of
spiders.
Does “person” mean “homo sapiens”?
• No:
• The idea of a person should "capture those
attributes which are the subject of our most
humane concern with ourselves and the source
of what we regard as most important and most
problematical in our lives" (6).
• These important attributes could be equally
significant if they belong to other species.
– Apes maybe?
– Vulcans?
Frankfurt’s Account
• A person is a being who
can have second-order
desires (of a certain kind).
• A second-order desire is a
desire for a desire.
– Example: I do not desire
kale when I’m hungry, but I
wish I did; I desire to desire
kale when I’m hungry.
Two Kinds of Second-Order Desire
• Frankfurt maintains that a person is a being who can have secondorder desires of a certain kind.
• Two kinds of second-order desires:
– A second-order desire for an inefficacious desire.
• Example: The physician who desires to desire a narcotic, but who does not
desire to have his desire for the narcotic satisfied.
– A second-order desire for an efficacious desire.
• Example: My desire to desire kale when I’m hungry.
• It’s this second kind of second-order desire that, according to
Frankfurt, is constitutive for personhood.
– Call the second kind of second-order desire second-order volition.
Renton and Sick Boy, the Drug Addicts
• Renton and Sick Boy are drug addicts.
• Renton and Sick Boy both desire to shoot heroin
(they’re addicted to it). But they also desire not to
shoot heroin (they want to quit).
• Renton, the unwilling addict forms a second-order
volition to not shoot heroin—he wants the desire to
not shoot heroin to be efficacious.
• Sick boy, the wanton, has no second-order volition.