Dr Hamdi Chaouk
Cyprus – Jan 2014
Safety Culture
Safety Culture is the set of enduring values and attitudes regarding
safety issues, shared by every member of every level of an organization.
Safety Culture refers to the extent to which every individual and every group
of the organization
is aware of the risks and unknown hazards induced by its activities;
is continuously behaving so as to preserve and enhance safety;
is willing and able to adapt itself when facing safety issues;
is willing to communicate safety issues; and
consistently evaluates safety related behavior.
However
Lack of Safety - Reasons
 Political interferences
 Corruption
 Mismanagement and luck of vision and strategy
 Non autonomous civil aviation
 Lack of private sector participation
 Lack of proper budget and funding
 Lack of efficient human resources
 Unethical well connected and powerful Operators
 Inefficient aviation infrastructure
Civil Aviation Authorities
Some Authorities are:
 Still non compliance with ICAO’s directives
 Subject to political interference in corruptive ways
 Non autonomous or independent (i.e. not capable regulators)
 Weak in enforcing aviation regulations
 Not capable of recruiting capable personnel
 Reluctant to change
AIRLINEs
IATA has made commendable achievements in the aviation industry through:
 Supporting and implementing ICAO guidance and recommendations
 IOSA certification
 Aviation training
 Encouraging privatization and liberalization
 Continuous improvement of airlines operational standards
However, not all airlines are IATA members which means that lots of work is still
required to bond the gap and enhance safety
AIRPORTs
ACI is still basically new compared to IATA and airports are different to
Airlines :
 States still consider airports as national assets especially for the facts that
some airports (capital ones) are somehow profitable
 No international certification of airport operational quality
 Airports are of wide classifications in term of size, purpose, and
complexity of operational types.
 A lots of work are still needed in the area of airports to enhance safety. The
gap is too wide between airline development and airport development
incidents/accidents causes
4% 5%
lighting and marking
runways and taxiways
24%
information
33%
external hazards
Apron
5%
ATC ops/procedures
Aerodromes
3%
26%
Regional Problems
Africa
high accident rate – labor problems – infrastructure
problems - liberalization and privatization difficulties.
Middle East
Lack of growth management – Inefficiency – poor
vision for the planned US$68 billions investment.
Europe
Lack of delivery – micro-management – congestion.
Regional Problems
Russia and CIS
Safety concerns – business practice not in line with Global
standards
United States
Adverse effects due to domestic politics – Weak leadership.
Asia Pacific
Lack of harmonization – Lack of regional aviation
organization. Lack of managing huge growth.
“ The organizational causes of this accident are rooted in the Space
Shuttle Program’s history and culture….
…Cultural traits and organizational practices detrimental to safety were
allowed to develop, including:
• reliance on past success as a substitute for sound engineering
• organizational barriers that prevented effective communication of
critical safety information and stifled professional differences of
opinion …”
Culture is a basic issue in all these
accidents
• Our culture determines what we regard as important
• Our culture determines what we see as normal and
acceptable
• Culture acts as a multiplier on all safety elements
– Plant - equipment
– Process
– People
Safety Culture
The Added Ingredient
• Safety Management Systems and Safety Cases provide a
•
•
•
systematic approach to safety
Safety Management systems are still driven by paper
Minimum standards can be defined but this is not the best
way to obtain the extra benefits
A good safety culture fills in the gaps
• “Sound systems, practices and procedures are not adequate
if merely practised mechanically. They require an effective
safety culture to flourish.”
• So you need Safety Management Systems AND a Safety
Culture
Safety Culture Organizational
Commitment
Safety Values
Safety fundamentals
Going beyond
Compliance
Safety Values (SV): Attitudes and values expressed in words and actions by leadership related to safety.
Safety performance should be actively managed and monitored with the same systematic oversight effort and
attention given to exceeding goals. Such as company finances
Safety Fundamentals (SF): Compliance with regulated aspects of safety such as training requirements,
manuals and procedures, equipment maintenance, and the coordination of activity within and between
teams/units. The organization should encourage safe practices as a way of doing business and provide a solid
framework for the organization, its managers and line employees, to meet those safety requirements.
Going Beyond Compliance (GBC): Priority given to safety in the allocation of company resources even
though they are not required by regulations. This may be reflected in areas such as employee rostering,
scheduling of shiftwork and rest time, providing advanced technology when essential, fatigue management
programs and other scientifically based risk management systems.
Improvements in Safety Performance
Numbers of Incidents
Technology
•
•
•
•
Engineering
Equipment
Safety
Compliance
Systems
•
•
•
•
Time
Integrating HSE
Certification
Competence
Risk Assessment
•
•
•
•
•
Behaviours
Leadership
Accountability
Attitudes
HSE as a profit centre
Culture
Technology may Fail
Status of Aviation in the Middle East
MENA aviation status
• Strong Airports Development Process
• Lack of Human resources in Airports
• Miss-management of financial resources
• Unwillingness to Privatize airports
• Deteriorating Political & security stability
• Large aircraft purchase orders (mainly Gulf states)
• Imbalance in MENA aviation resources management
• Inefficient aviation regulators
MENA airlines ownership
MENA airports ownership
MENA Airports Projects ($68 Billions)
THE END
Thank you