Prestatiegericht Onderhoud (PGO)
Peter Booij
Manager Contracting
18 th November 2011
Historical perspective
Program PGO
• Targets and means
Contract model PGO
• Contract Structure
•
Requirements & Scope of Works
• Tender principles & award criteria
• Incentives en payment
• Performance en costs
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Present day
1994 1998 2000 2002 2005 2007
OPC/PGO
Alliance: contracts based on
KPI’s and maintenance units
OPC+
Procurement:
Performance based contracts
Outsoursing:
OPC contracts based on input: workplans and maintenance specs
Internal distiction Increase in more business
Management - Operation like attitude contracts based on activities and workplans
Management focus more on RAMS than on cost
2011
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2
Wp
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14
17
16
Contract distribution in
OPC
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5
Strong reduction of costs (25%+)
Reduction of Out of Service Periods
Improve on failure performance
Stabilize the overall quality of the infrastructure
>>>
Mobilize the ‘know how’ of contractors
Compete on smart maintenance not on man hour costst
Manage on infra performance in stead of realized work
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Asset Rail
Strukton
Volker Rail
BAM Rail
Spitzke
In tendering
In preparation
Drenthe
Contract distribution in
PGO - november 2011
Zeeland
Rijn & Gouwe Eemland
Dordrecht
Betuwe
Veluwe
Gelre
Twente
De Peel
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8
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A change in style of requirements:
We used to prescribe the frequency and nature of inspections.
We made agreements on the quantity and nature of maintenance.
We did NOT make an explicit agreement on the performance of the infrastructure
>>> New requirements
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Safety System Requirements
Waarborgen veiligheid
Ontsporingsvrij dragen
Voorkomen mens/dier
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Safety System Requirements
Keep the track within a alignment for x km/h
Prevent defects and electrocution on installations for power supply
Keep switches within safety tolerances
Keep railway crossings fail safe
Etc etc
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Durability: condition in which the Life Cycle Cost are minimal (presumed)
Keep the position overhead wires within certain tolerances
Keep the switches within certain tolerances to prevent ‘wear and tear’
Keep the overall geometry of the track within certain tolerances
Repair all defects on the infrastructure within 3 months.
Etc etc
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Use FMECA to define all possible (underlying) failmechanisms causing possible deviations to the requirements.
Use FMECA to define all MTBF of infrastructure objects
Maintain accordingly to the FMECA results
Use an inspection regime to validate FMECA results
Proof to ProRail that the infrastructure is OK!
Bottom line: PREVENT DEVIATIONS FROM
HAPPENING!
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All track and switches, power supply, signalling, overhead wire, civil structures, telecom
All ‘small’ renewals
All renewals caused by RCF
Contractor is responsible for the quality of all objects until ProRail executes her major renewal plans (5 year forecast is given to contractor)
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In principal: Monthly fixed price payments
no deviations? 105% payment of fixed price
>0 deviations? 75% payment of fixed price, 25% after deviations have been restored in time. Too late? 15% penalty
Small (large) number of deviations throughout the year? Up to 5% bonus (or 10% reduction)
Rather serious safety deviation: 30% penalty
Bonus (or reduction) up to 5% if Urgent Failure performance is going well (bad) throughout the year
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In principal: 5 or 6 years
However : In case of a serious safety incident the contract will end. Contract will be re tendered, contractor is liable for damage
Too much Urgent Failures over a period of years? Contract may end.
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Fixed Monthly Price (85%)
Number of required ‘Out of service periods’ (15%), at least 99,37% availability
Urgent failures (Euro 100/minute reduction on price)
Savings on LCC by postponement of renewals by
ProRail. (reduction on price)
And..
A few price agreements for settlement of future changes in the contract
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Financial targets have been well achieved
Urgent Failure minutes reduced. For example PGO 2: The contractor offers a reduction from 70.000 minutes to 43.000 minutes a year.
Out of service periods: Down by 50 –
75% and no more conflicts with the time table
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