Democratic Careening:
Accountability Dynamics Across Asia
Dan Slater
Associate Professor
Department of Political Science
University of Chicago
slater@uchicago.edu
http://home.uchicago.edu/~slater/
Prepared for delivery at
Stanford University
Center for Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law
June 2012
Works Being Reviewed
* Larry Diamond, The Spirit of Democracy: The Struggle to Build Free
Societies Throughout the World (Henry Holt, 2008)
* Nathan Converse and Ethan Kapstein, The Fate of Young Democracies
(Cambridge, 2008)
* Pasuk Phongpaichit and Chris Baker, Thaksin (Silkworm, 2009)
* Mikael Mattlin, Politicized Society: The Long Shadow of Taiwan’s OneParty Legacy (NIAS Press, 2011)
* Christophe Jaffrelot, Religion, Caste, and Politics in India (Columbia, 2011)
* Harold Crouch, Political Reform in Indonesia after Soeharto (ISEAS, 2010)
Thailand as a Motivating Case
“[T]he democratically elected regime of Thaksin Shinawatra in Thailand was
overthrown by a military coup in September 2006 (representing the fourth time
that democracy had collapsed there)….”
Converse and Kapstein (2008: xiii, emphasis in original)
“In many respects, Thaksin was an efficient and responsive prime minister –
but with a dark side. He did not tolerate criticism or opposition, or even the
ponderous constraints of the rule of law, and he set about systematically trying
to eliminate them….More or less like Sharif in Pakistan, Chavez in Venezuela,
Obasanjo in Nigeria, and Putin in Russia, Thaksin was undermining the rule of
law, dismantling constitutional checks and balances, stifling dissent,
delegitimizing opposition, and polarizing the country. Strikingly, in each of
these cases, a once popular elected ruler attempted to diminish or eliminate all
countervailing sources of power in a bid to remain in power indefinitely.”
Diamond (2008: 80, 82)
Is Democratic Collapse an Obsolescing Worry?
“Our research shows that newly democratic states are especially at risk of
reversal during their first five years of existence….Democratizations that took
place before 1980 appear to have faced a substantially larger chance of
reversal than those in subsequent decades….Recent power grabs by the leaders
of such countries as Russia, Georgia, Venezuela, and Bolivia have all set back
the cause of democracy in those nations.”
Converse and Kapstein (2008: xviii, 64, xiv)
“The overall number of democracies more or less stabilized after 1995,” as
“the democratic boom has given way to democratic recession.” Commencing
with Pervez Musharraf’s 1999 coup in Pakistan, “there have been setbacks to
democracy in highly influential states such as Russia, Venezuela, Nigeria, and
Thailand, and democracy is seriously deteriorating in other big, important
countries like the Philippines and Bangladesh.”
Diamond (2008: 6, 12)
From Democratic Survival to Democratic Substance
“For democratic structures to endure – and to be worthy of endurance – they
must be more than a shell.”
Diamond (2008: 292)
“In short, when political arrangements encourage politicians to concentrate
power, or induce them to target specific groups at the expense of broader
social welfare, then democracy is less likely to take root.”
Kapstein and Converse (2008: 36)
•But do effective constraints on arbitrary power and substantive inclusivity of
the populace sustain democracy, or define it?
•Does a weakening of constraints and/or the withering of inclusion predict
democratic failure, or signal it?
•In sum, if a democracy lacks substance, does it make much sense to obsess
over whether it has survived?
Substantive Democracy = Vertical + Horizontal Accountability
“[Democracy] means building institutions of vertical and horizontal
accountability. The premier institution of vertical accountability is a
genuinely democratic election….Other effective agencies of vertical
accountability include public hearings, citizen audits, and a freedom of
information act. In complement, horizontal accountability invests some
agencies of the state with the power and responsibility to monitor the conduct
of other agencies, officials, or branches of government….These include
judiciaries, parliamentary committees, public audits, ombudsmen, electoral
commissions, and not least, countercorruption bodies.
“…[P]oorly performing democracies need better, stronger, and more
democratic institutions linking citizens not just to another but also to the
political process…..[In poorly performing democracies] the people are largely
excluded from effective participation and representation of their interests.
Power and resources are narrowly held, either by a dominant party….or by
multiple elite-based parties that either contest bitterly or, as they did in
Venezuela before the Chavez revolution, collude but do not include.”
Diamond (2008: 300-301)
Advancing Accountability as State-Building
•Effective state institutions are essential if rulers are to be held accountable by
fellow elites (i.e. horizontal accountability) and to act accountably toward the
general populace (i.e. vertical accountability)
•Horizontal: professional and autonomous state agencies for monitoring,
investigating, and punishing malfeasance (e.g. judiciaries and police)
•Vertical: socially embedded state institutions for receiving signals of public
concern, perceiving incipient governance challenges, and providing locally
valued public goods (e.g. Ministries of Agriculture, Health, and Education)
•Periodic selection and sanctioning are necessary but insufficient for vertical
accountability in a substantive sense: ongoing mutual engagement and
information-sharing between state and society are of the essence
Jane Mansbridge, “A ‘Selection’ Model of Political Representation” (2009)
•Workable state as scope condition (Asia > Africa): political parties shape
accountability dynamics in profound – and profoundly divergent – ways
From Quality of Democracy to Accountability Dynamics
Even among self-proclaimed “proceduralists,” the focus of contemporary
research has definitively turned toward considering how to build “a democracy
of maximal quality.”
D. Levine and J. Molina, The Quality of Democracy in Latin America (2011: 7)
“[A]ccountability or, better, the two accountabilities are the key mechanisms that
make the goal of popular sovereignty something other than largely illusory.”
Leonardo Morlino, Changes to Democracy (2012: 224)
Key Shortcomings
(1)Lack of Parsimony (Morlino’s “pentagon”: adding rule of law, participation,
and competition to “the two accountabilities”)
(2)Lack of Dimensionality (Levine/Molina’s “multidimensional continuum”)
(3)Lack of Tension and Tradeoffs (Morlino’s “funnel of causality”)
Accountability Types, the Democratic-Authoritarian Divide,
and the Collapse-Consolidation Axis
Horizontal
Accountability
(Constraints)
Weak
Strong
Strong
Democracy
Democratic
Consolidation
Vertical
Accountability
(Inclusivity)
DemocraticAuthoritarian
Divide
Democratic
Collapse
Authoritarianism
Weak
CollapseConsolidation
Axis
Democratic Collapse and Consolidation vs.
Careening Between Oligarchy and Populism
Horizontal
Accountability
(Constraints)
Weak
Strong
Strong
Democratic
Populist
Democratic
Consolidation
Populist
Domineering
Vertical
Accountability
(Inclusivity)
Oligarchic
Assertion
Democratic
Collapse
Authoritarian
Weak
Oligarchic
Accountability Dynamics from the Perspective of Democratic Theory
Horizontal
Accountability
(Constraints)
Weak
Strong
Strong
Madison
Democratic
Populist
Rousseau
Machiavelli
Vertical
Accountability
(Inclusivity)
Oligarchic
Schmitt
Authoritarian
Weak
Machiavellian Democratic Careening: Thailand
PASUK AND BAKER, THAKSIN
* Authoritarian Backdrop: “bureaucratic polity” allied with monarchy and military
* “Rise of Business”: Electoral oligarchy as post-authoritarian starting point (1980, 1992)
* 1997 Constitution: Formally advances both vertical and horizontal accountability
* Thaksin’s 1st Term (2001-04): attacking constraints more than advancing inclusivity
* Thaksin’s Inclusivist Turn (2004-06): consequence and cause of oligarchic resistance
* Populism Light: Modest levels of urban-rural redistribution, but extreme power abuses
* Yellow vs. Red (2006- ): Warring visions of accountability and democracy are pervasive
* Democracy “Capsizes”: Coup and crackdown aimed to restore constrained electoralism
-- Democrat Party too elitist, regionalist, and ethnic to meet Thaksin’s challenge
* Interpretive Battles: Monarchy as agency of constraint, or feudalistic authoritarianism?
Madisonian Democratic Careening: Taiwan
MATTLIN, POLITICIZED SOCIETY
* Parallels with Thailand: Blue vs. Green street battles instead of Yellow vs. Red (2000-08)
* Historical Argument: Authoritarian legacies key to “politicized society” (polarization)
* Authoritarian Party Formation: Intense KMT-DPP polarization over “regime cleavage”
* Unlike Thailand: KMT as cross-class/ethnic juggernaut across national territory
* Socially Suffusing Parties: Problematic for Mattlin, partisanship poisons social life
* Felicitous Authoritarian Legacies: Land reform (1949-53) and Taiwanization (1970s - )
* Nature of Transition: Taiwan truly democratizes, avoids Thai-style oligarchic electoralism
* DPP rule (2000-08): Populism stymied by cross-class, cross-ethnic rival in KMT
* Madisonian Conflict: DPP-style presidentialism against KMT-backed parliament, courts
* KMT Restoration: Cross-class party can return to power through elections, not a coup
Rousseauian Accountability Struggles: India
JAFFRELOT, RELIGION, CASTE AND POLITICS IN INDIA
* Puzzle: Why has the “silent revolution” of the lower classes (1990 - ) been so silent?
-- Mandal Commission on caste (1990s-) and NREGA on rural poverty (2006-)
* Oligarchic Origins: Congress dependent on rural, upper-caste notables (1940s – 1970s)
* Mixed Legacies: Little land reform (Thailand), but cross-class national party (Taiwan)
* Nationalism and Ambedkarism: Inclusive impulse unlike Thailand, Philippines, Pakistan
* “Plebeianization”: Congress’ increased inclusion of OBCs, a la KMT’s Taiwanization
-- “votebank politics” includes the poor but alienates upper classes (Thailand)
* Historic Regional Differences: “Hindi Belt” a latecomer to “silent revolution”
* National Scale and Complexity: Populism harder to organize as majoritarian movement
* Variation Across Time: Indira as Schmitt-style authoritarian, or Machiavellian democrat?
* Variation Across Space: Modi’s populism in Gujarat, Mayawati’s populism in UP
Rousseauian Accountability Struggles: Indonesia
CROUCH, POLITICAL REFORM IN INDONESIA AFTER SOEHARTO
* Puzzle: Surprising reform headway despite weak institutions and inclusivity (1998 - )
-- direct presidential elections and anti-corruption institutions as key reforms
* Inclusive Legacies: Nationalist revolution, “Marhaenisme,” cleavage-based mass parties
* Oligarchic Tendencies: Patronage-based Golkar party, “money politics” ubiquitous
* Contingent Collusion: “Party cartel” threatens vertical accountability (1999-2004)
* Wahid’s Quixotic Domineering: (2000-01): An informative Machiavellian moment
* “Accountability activism”: Advances in constraints contingent upon protest, pressure
* India Lesson: National scale and social complexity help prevent majoritarian populism
-- but elitist “vote-buying” alienates the masses from democracy (contra India)
* Thailand Lesson: Oligarchic elites spawn populist backlashes, possibly in 2014
* Taiwan Lesson: “Regime cleavage” tumultuous, but its absence can stymie inclusivity
The Origins of Accountability Dynamics:
Toward a Comparative-Historical Framework
Colonial and
Authoritarian
State-Building
Displacement of
Feudal Oligarchies
Thorough
Partial
Limited
Type of
Transition from
Authoritarianism
Democratic
(Taiwan, Korea)
Contested
(India, Indonesia)
Character of
Initial Democratic
Party System
Strongly
Programmatic,
Socially Rooted
Intermediate
Rootedness;
Clientilism > Cleavages
Narrowly
Clientilistic and
Weakly Rooted
Predominant
Mode of
Democratic
Careening
Madisonian
(DemocraticPopulist)
Rousseauian
(DemocraticOligarchic)
Machiavellian
(OligarchicPopulist)
Oligarchic
(Thailand, Philippines)
Democratic Careening:
Accountability Dynamics Across Asia
Dan Slater
Associate Professor
Department of Political Science
University of Chicago
slater@uchicago.edu
http://home.uchicago.edu/~slater/
Prepared for delivery at
Stanford University
Center for Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law
June 2012