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Criminal Procedure Case Digest
Criminal Procedure (San Beda University)
Studocu is not sponsored or endorsed by any college or university
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2G CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
1. ALONTE VS.
SAVELLANO, JR.
G.R. NO. 131652
DATE: MAR. 9, 1998
PONENTE: VITUG, J.
DOCTRINE
There can be no short-cut to the legal process, and
there can be no excuse for not affording an accused
his full day in court.
FACTS
Petitioners Bayani M. Alonte and Buenaventura Concepcion were charged with a
crime of rape. Juvie-lyn Punongbayan, the victim, through her counsel, Atty.
Remedios Balbin, filed with the Office of the Court of Administrator a Petition for
a Change of Venue. During the pendency of the petition for change of venue,
Juvie-lyn, executed an affidavit of desistance. Atty. Casino, on behalf of
petitioners, moved to have the petition for change of venue dismissed on the
ground that it had become moot in view of complainant’s affidavit of desistance.
However, the case was assigned to RTC Manila, with respondent Judge Maximo
Savellano, Jr.
Petitioners were arraigned and both pleaded “not guilty” to the charge. The parties
manifested that they were waiving pre-trial. The proceedings forthwith went on.
Per Judge Savellano, both parties agreed to proceed with the trial of the case on
the merits. According to Alonte, however, Judge Savellano allowed the
prosecution to present evidence relative only to the question of the voluntariness
and validity of the affidavit of desistance. During the trial, Juvie-lyn was
presented by the prosecution, affirming the validity of the voluntariness of her
affidavit of desistance. She moved for the dismissal of the case against both
Alonte and Concepcion. Thereupon, respondent judge said that “the case was
submitted for decision.” Petitioner filed 5 Motion for Early Resolution, in respect
of his application for bail. None of these motions were acted upon by Judge
Savellano.
Alonte could not attend the promulgation of the decision because he was suffering
from mild hypertention. Concepcion claims he did not receive notification of the
proceedings. The promulgation, nevertheless, of the decision proceeded in
absentia. Both petitioners were found guilty of the crime of rape. On the same day,
petitioner Alonte filed a motion for reconsideration. Without waiting for its
resolution, he filed the instant “Ex Abudante Ad Cautelam” for certiorari,
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Prohibition, Habeas Corpus, Bail, Recusation of respondent Judge, and for
Disciplinary Action against RTC Judge. He submits that respondent Judge
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
when he rendered a Decision without affording the petitioner his Constitutional
right to due process of law, particularly, in the conduct and order of trial prior to
the promulgation of a judgment. He further avers that the respondent Judge did
not give the petitioner an opportunity to cross-examine the affiants.
ISSUE/S
WON there was a violation of due process of law
RULING
YES, there was a violation of due process of law. The order of trial in criminal
cases is clearly spelled out in Sec. 3, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court; viz:
Sec. 3. Order of trial – The trial shall proceed in the following order:
a) The prosecution shall present evidence to prove the charge and, in the proper
case, the civil liability
b) The parties may present evidence to prove his defense, any damages, if any,
arising from the issuance of any provisional remedy in the case
c) The parties may then respectively present rebutting evidence only, unless the
court, in furtherance of justice, permits them to present additional evidence
bearing upon the main issue
d) Upon admission of the evidence, the case shall be deemed submitted for
decision unless the court directs the parties to argue orally or to submit
memoranda.
e) However, when the accused admits the act or omission charged in the
complaint or information but interposes a lawful defense, the order of trial may
be modified accordingly.
Judge Savellano has claimed that none of their counsel interposed an intention to
cross-examine rape victim Juvie-lyn Punongbayan, even after she attested, in
answer to respondent judge’s clarificatory questions, the voluntariness and truth of
her two affidavits, the opportunity was missed/not used, hence, waived. That the
rule of case law is that the right to confront and cross-examine a witness is a
personal one and may be waived. It should be pointed out, however, that the
existence of the waiver must be positively demonstrated. The standard of waiver
requires that it “not only must be voluntary, but must be knowing, intelligent, and
done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely
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consequences.” Mere silence of the holder if the right should not be so construed
as a waiver of right, and the courts must indulge every reasonable presumption
against waiver.
The Solicitor General has aptly discerned a few of the deviations from what
otherwise should have been regular course of trial: (1) Petitioners have not been
directed to present evidence to prove their defenses nor have dates therefor been
scheduled for the purpose; (2) the parties have not been given the opportunity to
present rebutting evidence nor have dates been set by respondent judge for the
purpose; and (3) petitioners have not admitted the act charged in the Information
so as to justify any modification in the order of trial. There can be no short-cut to
the legal process, and there can be no excuse for not affording an accused his full
day in court.
This case, in fine, must be remanded for further proceedings. And since the case
would have sent back to the court a quo, this ponencia has carefully avoided
making any statement or reference that might be misconstrued as prejudgment or
as pre-empting the trial court in the proper disposition of the case. The Court
likewise deems it appropriate that all related proceedings therein, including the
petition for bail, should be subject to the proper disposition of the trial court.
ANTONIO, AMICAH FRANCES
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2G CRIMPRO DUE PROCESS IN CRIMINAL LAW
2. PEOPLE V. G.R. NO. 90625
DAPITAN
DATE: 23 May 1991
PONENTE: DAVIDE, JR., J
DOCTRINE
Due process is satisfied if the following conditions are present:
(1) there must be a court or tribunal clothed with judicial power
to hear and determine the matter before it; (2) jurisdiction must
be lawfully acquired by it over the person of the defendant or
over the property which is the subject of the proceeding; (3) the
defendant must be given an opportunity to be heard; and (4)
judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing.
FACTS:
The information was filed with the court a quo against accused-appellant and his
co-accused of the crime of Robbery with HomicideWhen arraigned on 25
November 1986 with the assistance of counsel de oficio, Atty. Magsanoc, accused
entered a plea of not guilty. Later, at the scheduled, new counsel de oficio for the
accused, Atty. Gabriel Alberto of the Citizens Legal Assistance Office (CLAO) of
San Mateo, Rizal, manifested that the accused had expressed to him the desire to
enter a plea of guilty to a lesser offense.
The trial court promulgated its Decision finding them GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT of the crime of ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE,
punishable under Article 294, par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code and sentences him
to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA
In support of the assigned error accused-appellant argues that the imposition over
him of the penalty of reclusion temporal by the trial court is "tantamount to
deprivation of life or liberty without due process of law or is tantamount to a
cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment prohibited by the Constitution" and t was
Fred de Guzman who is still at large who stabbed and hit the head of Rolando
Amil. These facts or circumstances reveal that accused-appellant had a "lesser
perversity than his companion .Thus, the "mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender must be considered" in his favor.
He prays that he be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from twelve
(12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to reclusion
perpetua as maximum.
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ISSUE/S :
1. WON he trial court correctly imposed on the accused the penalty
of reclusion perpetua.
2. WON there is due process in the case at bar.
RULING :
1. YES— As to the appreciation of mitigating circumstances, The Court also agree
with the Solicitor General that since robbery with homicide under paragraph 1 of
Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code is now punishable by the single and
indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua in view of the abolition of the death
penalty, it follows that the rule prescribed in the first paragraph of Article 63 of
the Revised Penal Code shall apply. Consequently, reclusion perpetua must be
imposed in this case regardless of the presence of mitigating or aggravating
circumstances.
Neither is the penalty of reclusion perpetua cruel, degrading, and inhuman. To
make that claim is to assail the constitutionality of Article 294, par. 1 of the
Revised Penal Code, or of any other provisions therein and of special laws
imposing the said penalty for specific crimes or offenses. The proposition cannot
find any support. Article 294, par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code has survived four
Constitutions of the Philippines, namely: the 1935 Constitution, the 1973
Constitution, the Freedom Constitution of 1986 and the 1987 Constitution. All of
these documents mention life imprisonment or reclusion perpetua as a penalty
which may be imposed in appropriate cases. As a matter of fact, the same
paragraph of the section of Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987
Constitution which prohibits the imposition of cruel, degrading and inhuman
punishment expressly recognizes reclusion perpetua.
2. YES. Due process is satisfied if the following conditions are present: (1) there
must be a court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the
matter before it; (2) jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired by it over the person of
the defendant or over the property which is the subject of the proceeding; (3) the
defendant must be given an opportunity to be heard; and (4) judgment must be
rendered upon lawful hearing.
All the requisites or conditions of due process are present in this case. The records
further disclose that accused-appellant was given the fullest and unhampered
opportunity not only to reflect dispassionately on his expressed desire to plead
guilty to a lesser offense which prompted the court to cancel the hearing of 10
February 1987, but also to confront the witnesses presented against him and to
present his own evidence. If indeed accused-appellant had been deprived of due
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process, he would have faulted the trial court not just for failure to apply
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, but definitely for more. Yet, he found it futile to
go any further.
BAE, GEM GERICKA B.
2G CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Hierarchy of courts
G.R. NO. 229781
3. DE LIMA V. GUERRERO
DATE: 10 OCT 2017
PONENTE: VELASCO, JR.,
DOCTRINE
Exceptions to the doctrine on the hierarchy of
the courts.
FACTS
The DOJ filed criminal complaints against senator De Lima after several inquiries
made by the congress regarding the proliferation of drugs inside the New Bilibid
Prison. On the basis of the evidence presented by the DOJ and the complaint
affidavits, Judge Guerrero of Muntinlupa issued a warrant of arrest against
Senator De Lima. The senator then filed a motion to quash the warrant and
pending such motion she also filed a petition for certiorari under rule 65 alleging
that the issuance of the warrant of arrest was with grave abuse of discretion.
ISSUE/S
Whether or not petitioner is excused from compliance with the doctrine on
hierarchy of courts considering that the petition should first be filed with the
Court of Appeals.
RULING
No. Trifling with the rule on hierarchy of courts is looked upon with disfavor by
this Court. It will not entertain direct resort to it when relief can be obtained in the
lower courts. The Court may act on petitions for the extraordinary writs of
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus only when absolutely necessary or when
serious and important reasons exist to justify an exception to the policy.
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Nonetheless, there are recognized exceptions to this rule and direct resort to this
Court were allowed in some instances. These exceptions were summarized in a
case of recent vintage, Aala v. Uy, as follows:
In a fairly recent case, we summarized other well-defined exceptions to the
doctrine on hierarchy of courts. Immediate resort to this Court may be allowed
when any of the following grounds are present:
(1) when genuine issues of constitutionality are raised that must be addressed
immediately;
(2) when the case involves transcendental importance;
(3) when the case is novel;
(4) when the constitutional issues raised are better decided by this Court;
(5) when time is of the essence;
(6) when the subject of review involves acts of a constitutional organ;
(7) when there is no other plain, speedy, adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law;
(8) when the petition includes questions that may affect public welfare, public
policy, or demanded by the broader interest of justice;
(9) when the order complained of was a patent nullity; and
(10) when the appeal was considered as an inappropriate remedy.
Unfortunately, none of these exceptions were sufficiently established in the
present petition so as to convince this court to brush aside the rules on the
hierarchy of courts.
Petitioner's allegation that her case has sparked national and international interest
is obviously not covered by the exceptions to the rules on hierarchy of courts. The
notoriety of a case, without more, is not and will not be a reason for this Court's
decisions. Neither will this Court be swayed to relax its rules on the bare fact that
the petitioner belongs to the minority party in the present administration. A
primary hallmark of an independent judiciary is its political neutrality. This Court
is thus loath to perceive and consider the issues before it through the warped
prisms of political partisanships.
That the petitioner is a senator of the republic does not also merit a special
treatment of her case. The right to equal treatment before the law accorded to
every Filipino also forbids the elevation of petitioner's cause on account of her
position and status in the government.
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Further, contrary to her position, the matter presented before the Court is not of
first impression. Petitioner is not the first public official accused of violating RA
9165 nor is she the first defendant to question the finding of probable cause for
her arrest. In fact, stripped of all political complexions, the controversy involves
run-of-the mill matters that could have been resolved with ease by the lower court
had it been given a chance to do so in the first place.
[CAMPOS, JOHN MICHAEL H.]
2G CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE
[TOPIC] Voluntary Submission
4.
G.R. NO. 168539
People v. Go
DATE: March 25, 2014
PONENTE: PERALTA
DOCTRINE
The act of posting bail and filing motions seeking relief
is tantamount to the submission of your person to the
jurisdiction of the Court.
FACTS
Short Facts:
Henry Go was the chairman and president of the Philippine International Air
Terminals (PIATCO) who unlawfully entered into a concession agreement after
the construction of the NAIA III. The concession agreement that was entered into
by Henry Go substantially amended the previous agreement for the construction
of NAIA III in which the terms of the agreement are more beneficial to PIATCO
while also grossly disadvantageous to the Government of the Philippines.
The Sandiganbayan issued an order that allowed the prosecution 10 days to show
why the case should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over the accused
Henry Go who is a private person.
Petitioner’s Contention:
The Sandiganbayan has already acquired jurisdiction over Go because of his
voluntary appearance and even filed a motion for consolidation when he posted
bail. Furthermore, the Sandiganbayan has exclusive jurisdiction over Go even if
he is a private person because he was alleged to have conspired with a public
officer.
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Respondent’s Contention:
Henry Go’s defense was that the information filed against him do not constitute an
offense under the Anti-graft and corrupt practices act because the operative facts
do not meet the needed requisites for the crime. Furthermore, the deceased
Secretary Enrile was the officer to whom he was alleged to have conspired with,
Go emphasized that he is not a public officer and has not been given the capacity
by any official authority to be a government agent.
Brief Rulings of Lower Courts:
The Sandiganbayan ruled in favor of Henry Go and granted the motion to quash
the information filed on the ground that he is a private person and his alleged coconspirator Secretary Enrile was already deceased before the case was filed.
ISSUE/S
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over Go even if he has
irrefutably posted bail for his provisional liberty.
RULING
YES, the Sandiganbayan has acquired jurisdiction over Henry Go’s case. The SC
ruled that the act of posting bail and filing a motion for Consolidation of Henry
Go’s case already vests the Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over his person. The
SC further ruled that it is well-settled that the act of an accused in posting bail or
in filing motions seeking relief is tantamount to the submission of his person to
the jurisdiction of the court.
[SURNAME, FIRST NAME]
2G CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE
Voluntary Submission
5.
Miranda v. G.R. NO. 158763
Tuliao
DATE: 31 March 2006
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PONENTE: CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
DOCTRINE
There is an exception to the rule that filing pleadings seeking
affirmative relief constitutes voluntary appearance, and the
consequent submission of one's person to the jurisdiction of
the court. This is in the case of pleadings whose prayer is
precisely for the avoidance of the jurisdiction of the court,
which only leads to a special appearance. These pleadings are:
(1) in civil cases, motions to dismiss on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, whether or not
other grounds for dismissal are included; (2) in criminal cases,
motions to quash a complaint on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the accused; and (3) motions to
quash a warrant of arrest.
FACTS
Two Informations for murder were filed against SPO1 Wilfredo Leaño, SPO1
Ferdinand Marzan, SPO1 Ruben B. Agustin, SPO2 Alexander Micu, SPO2 Rodel
Maderal, and SPO4 Emilio Ramirez in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Santiago City for the burnt cadavers discovered in Ramon, Isabela. All accused
were convicted and sentenced to two counts of reclusion perpetua except for
SPO2 Maderal who was yet to be arraigned at that time, being at large.
Sometime in September 1999, SPO2 Maderal was arrested. He executed a sworn
confession and identified petitioners Jose C. Miranda, PO3 Romeo B. Ocon, and
SPO3 Alberto P. Dalmacio, a certain Boyet dela Cruz and Amado Doe, as the
persons responsible for the deaths of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao.
Respondent Tuliao filed a criminal complaint for murder against petitioners,
Boyet dela Cruz, and Amado Doe, and submitted the sworn confession of SPO2
Maderal. On 25 June 2001, Acting Presiding Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan issued
warrants of arrest against petitioners and SPO2 Maderal. On 29 June 2001,
petitioners filed an urgent motion to complete preliminary investigation, to
reinvestigate, and to recall and/or quash the warrants of arrest.
In the hearing of the urgent motion on 6 July 2001, Judge Tumaliuan noted the
absence of petitioners and issued a Joint Order denying said urgent motion on the
ground that, since the court did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons, the
motion cannot be properly heard by the court. In the meantime, petitioners
appealed the resolution of State Prosecutor Leo T. Reyes to the Department of
Justice.
A Joint Order was issued reversing the Joint Order of Judge Tumaliuan.
Consequently, he ordered the cancellation of the warrant of arrest issued against
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petitioner Miranda and later on, dismissed the two Informations for murder
against petitioners.
On appeal by respondent Tuliao to the Court of Appeals, the appellate court
ordered the reinstatement of the criminal case as well as the issuance of warrants
of arrest against petitioners Maderal. The Court of Appeals ruled that petitioners
Miranda, Ocon and Dalmacio cannot seek any judicial relief since they were not
yet arrested or otherwise deprived of their liberty at the time they filed their
"Urgent Motion to complete preliminary investigation; to reinvestigate; to recall
and/or quash warrants of arrest."
ISSUE/S
WON a motion to quash a warrant of arrest requires jurisdiction over the person
of the accused
- NO.
RULING
No. Adjudication of a motion to quash a warrant of arrest requires neither
jurisdiction over the person of the accused, nor custody of law over the body of
the accused. Custody of the law is required before the court can act upon the
application for bail, but is not required for the adjudication of other reliefs sought
by the defendant where the mere application therefor constitutes a waiver of the
defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused. Custody of the law
is accomplished either by arrest or voluntary surrender,while jurisdiction over the
person of the accused is acquired upon his arrest or voluntary appearance. One
can be under the custody of the law but not yet subject to the jurisdiction of the
court over his person, such as when a person arrested by virtue of a warrant files a
motion before arraignment to quash the warrant. On the other hand, one can be
subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, and yet not be in the
custody of the law, such as when an accused escapes custody after his trial has
commenced.Being in the custody of the law signifies restraint on the person, who
is thereby deprived of his own will and liberty, binding him to become obedient to
the will of the law.
Custody of the law is literally custody over the body of the accused. It includes,
but is not limited to, detention.
As a general rule, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted
to the jurisdiction of the court. As held in Santiago v. Vasquez, “The voluntary
appearance of the accused, whereby the court acquires jurisdiction over his
person, is accomplished either by his pleading to the merits (such as by filing a
motion to quash or other pleadings requiring the exercise of the court's jurisdiction
thereover, appearing for arraignment, entering trial) or by filing bail. On the
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matter of bail, since the same is intended to obtain the provisional liberty of the
accused, as a rule the same cannot be posted before custody of the accused has
been acquired by the judicial authorities either by his arrest or voluntary
surrender.”
There is, however, an exception to the rule that filing pleadings seeking
affirmative relief constitutes voluntary appearance, and the consequent submission
of one's person to the jurisdiction of the court. This is in the case of pleadings
whose prayer is precisely for the avoidance of the jurisdiction of the court, which
only leads to a special appearance. These pleadings are: (1) in civil cases, motions
to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant,
whether or not other grounds for dismissal are included; (2) in criminal cases,
motions to quash a complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person
of the accused; and (3) motions to quash a warrant of arrest. The first two are
consequences of the fact that failure to file them would constitute a waiver of the
defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person. The third is a consequence of the
fact that it is the very legality of the court process forcing the submission of the
person of the accused that is the very issue in a motion to quash a warrant of
arrest.
In fine, jurisdiction over the person of the accused is deemed waived by the
accused when he files any pleading seeking an affirmative relief, except in cases
when he invokes the special jurisdiction of the court by impugning such
jurisdiction over his person. Therefore, in narrow cases involving special
appearances, an accused can invoke the processes of the court even though there
is neither jurisdiction over the person nor custody of the law. However, if a person
invoking the special jurisdiction of the court applies for bail, he must first submit
himself to the custody of the law.
CASIÑO, RAPHAELLE
2G CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE
VOLUNTARY SUBMISSION
7. ARNOLD ALVA G.R. NO. 157331
vs.
DATE: April 12, 2006
HON. COURT OF
PONENTE: CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
APPEALS
DOCTRINE
Custody of the law is accomplished either by arrest or
voluntary surrender; while jurisdiction over the person of
the accused is acquired upon his arrest or voluntary
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appearance.
FACTS
Petitioner was charged with the crime of estafa defined under Article 315,
Paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, for having defrauded YUMI
VERANGA y HERVERA to the effect that he could process the latter’s
application for U.S. Visa provided she would give the amount of P120,000.00.
After obtaining the amount by means of deceit and inducement, he
misappropriated, misapplied and converted the said amount to his own personal
use and benefit.
On 19 May 1999, petitioner and counsel both failed to appear in court despite due
notice. In his stead, claiming to be petitioner’s representative, a certain Joey
Perez personally delivered to the RTC a hand-written medical certificate
expressing petitioner’s inability to attend the day’s hearing due to hypertension.
However, the RTC issued an Order directing the promulgation of its decision in
absentia and the issuance of a bench warrant of arrest against petitioner for his
failure to appear before it despite due notice.
In its decision dated 25 March 1999, the RTC found petitioner guilty of the crime
of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code.
On appeal before the Court of Appeals, in a Resolution dated 16 October 2001,
the appellate court required petitioner to show cause why his appeal should not be
dismissed it appearing that no new bail bond for his provisional liberty on appeal
had been posted.
On 19 February 2003, the Court of Appeals issued the second assailed
Resolution, disposing of petitioner’s motion.
Petitioner now comes to this Court via a petition for review on certiorari alleging
the honorable court of appeals gravely erred or acted with grave abuse of
discretion when it ruled that the petitioner failed to submit to the jurisdiction of
the court or to the custody of law despite the bail bond posted on May 21, 1999.
ISSUE
WON petitioner failed to submit himself to the jurisdiction of the court or to the
custody of the law despite the posting of the subject bail bond. - YES
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RULING
To diminish the confusion brought about by ostensibly equating the term
"jurisdiction of the court (over the person of the accused)" with that of "custody of
the law", it is fundamental to differentiate the two. The term:
Custody of the law is accomplished either by arrest or voluntary surrender; while
(the term) jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired upon his arrest or
voluntary appearance. One can be under the custody of the law but not yet subject
to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, such as when a person arrested by
virtue of a warrant files a motion before arraignment to quash the warrant. On the
other hand, one can be subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, and
yet not be in the custody of the law, such as when an accused escapes custody
after his trial has commenced.
Moreover, jurisdiction, once acquired, is not lost at the instance of parties, as
when an accused escapes from the custody of the law, but continues until the case
is terminated. Evidently, petitioner is correct in that there is no doubt that the RTC
already acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused petitioner – when he
appeared at the arraignment and pleaded not guilty to the crime charged –
notwithstanding the fact that he jumped bail and is now considered a fugitive.
As to whether or not petitioner has placed himself under the custody of the CA,
we cannot say the same for "being in the custody of the law signifies restraint on
the person, who is thereby deprived of his own will and liberty, binding him to
become obedient to the will of the law. Custody of the law is literally custody over
the body of the accused. It includes, but is not limited to, detention." In the case at
bar, petitioner, being a fugitive, until and unless he submits himself to the custody
of the law, in the manner of being under the jurisdiction of the courts, he cannot
be granted any relief by the CA.
CONTRERAS, AMABEL
2G CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
TERRITORIAL JURISDICTIONs
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8. LUTGARDA CRUZ, Petitioner, v. THE
COURT OF APPEALS, PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES and the HEIRS OF
ESTANISLAWA C. REYES, represented
by MIGUEL C. REYES, Respondents.
DOCTRINE
G.R. NO. 123340.
DATE: August 29, 2002
PONENTE: CARPIO, J.:
If the trial court has jurisdiction over the subject matter
and over the accused, and the crime was committed within
its territorial jurisdiction, it necessarily exercises
jurisdiction over all matters that the law requires the court
to resolve. This includes the power to order the restitution
to the offended party of real property located in another
province
FACTS
The City Prosecutor of Manila charged Cruz with the crime of "Estafa thru Falsification of Public
Document" before the Manila RTC. Petitioner executed before a Notary Public in the City of Manila an
Affidavit of Self-Adjudication of a parcel of land stating that she was the sole surviving heir of the
registered owner when in fact she knew there were other surviving heirs.
The petitioner was later acquitted for the criminal charge. The proposition submitted by petitioner is that
the court, presided by respondent Judge, had no jurisdiction over the property because it is located in
Bulacan — outside the territorial jurisdiction of said court.
ISSUE/S
Does RTC Manila have jurisdiction over the property when the parcel of the land is in Bulacan, outside
the court’s territory – YES.
RULING
In the instant case, the trial court had jurisdiction over the subject matter as the law has conferred on the
court the power to hear and decide cases involving estafa through falsification of a public document. The
trial court also had jurisdiction over the offense charged since the crime was committed within its
territorial jurisdiction. The trial court also acquired jurisdiction over the person of accused-petitioner
because she voluntarily submitted to the court’s authority.
Where the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the person of the accused, and the
crime was committed within its territorial jurisdiction, the court necessarily exercises jurisdiction over
all issues that the law requires the court to resolve. One of the issues in a criminal case is the civil
liability of the accused arising from the crime. Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code provides that"
[E]very person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable." Article 104 of the same Code states
that "civil liability . . . includes restitution."c Although the trial court acquitted petitioner of the crime
charged, the acquittal, grounded on reasonable doubt, did not extinguish the civil liability.
Moreover, if the trial court has jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the accused, and the crime
was committed within its territorial jurisdiction, it necessarily exercises jurisdiction over all matters that
the law requires the court to resolve. This includes the power to order the restitution to the offended
party of real property located in another province.
[CUNANAN, JEAN]
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2G CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE
9. AAA VS.
BBB
[TOPIC] TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION
G.R. NO. 212448
DATE: January 11, 2018
PONENTE: Tijam,. J
DOCTRINE
The jurisdiction of the court is determined by the averments of the
complaint or Information, in relation to the law prevailing at the time of
the filing of the complaint or Information, and the penalty provided by
law for the crime charged at the time of its commission.
FACTS
Short Facts:
The petition commenced when Petitioner AAA and BBB were married on August 1, 2006 in
Quezon City. Their union produced two children: CCC was born on March 4, 2007 and DDD on
October 1, 2009. In May of 2007, BBB started working in Singapore as a chef, where he
acquired permanent resident status in September of 2008. This petition nonetheless indicates
his address to be in Quezon City where his parents reside and where AAA also resided from the
time they were married until March of 2010, when AAA and their children moved back to her
parents' house in Pasig City.
Petitioner AAA filed an Information, pursuant to RA 9262, against respondent BBB for allegedly
causing her mental and emotional anguish by having an illicit relationship with a certain Lisel
Mok in Singapore.
The investigating officer found sufficient basis to charge BBB, and thus a warrant of arrest was
issued against BBB. The latter, however, constantly evaded the warrant of arrest. Consequently,
the case was archived. Some years after, an Entry of Appearance as Counsel for the Accused
With Omnibus Motion to Revive Case, Quash Information, Lift Hold Departure Order and
Warrant of Arrest was filed on behalf of BBB. The RTC granted the motion to quash on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction and thereby dismissed the case. It held that it had no jurisdiction
over the offense charged, it having transpired outside its territorial jurisdiction. Thus,
petitioner AAA filed the instant petition contending that the issue is a pure question of law.
Petitioner’s Contention:
AAA sought direct recourse to this Court via the instant petition on a pure question of law. AAA
posits that R.A. No. 9262 is in danger of becoming transmogrified into a weak, wobbly, and
worthless law because with the court a quo's ruling, it is as if husbands of Filipino women have
been given license to enter into extra-marital affairs without fear of any consequence, as long
as they are carried out abroad. In the main, AAA argues that mental and emotional anguish is
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an essential element of the offense charged against BBB, which is experienced by her wherever
she goes, and not only in Singapore where the extra-marital affair takes place; thus, the RTC of
Pasig City where she resides can take cognizance of the case.
Respondent’s Contention:
BBB contends that the grant of the motion to quash is in effect an acquittal; that only the civil
aspect of a criminal case may be appealed by the private offended party; and. that this petition
should be dismissed outright for having been brought before this Court by AAA instead of the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) as counsel for the People in appellate proceedings. BBB
furthermore avers that the petition was belatedly filed.
Brief Rulings of Lower Courts:
The novelty of the issue was even recognized by the RTC when it opined that there is still as yet
no jurisprudence on this score, prompting it to quash the Information even as it maintained its
earlier October 28, 2011 ruling that probable cause exists in the case. Calling the attention of
Congress to the arguments on jurisdiction spawned by the law, the RTC furnished copies of the
assailed order to the House of Representatives and the Philippine Senate through the
Committee on Youth, Women and Public Relations, as well as the Committee on Justice and
Human Rights.
ISSUE/S
WHETHER OR NOT Philippine courts exercise jurisdiction over a crime constituting
psychological violence under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262, otherwise known as the AntiViolence Against Women and their Children Act of 2004, committed through marital infidelity,
when the alleged illicit relationship occurred or is occurring outside the country.
RULING
The jurisdiction of the court is determined by the averments of the complaint or Information,
in relation to the law prevailing at the time of the filing of the complaint or Information, and
the penalty provided by law for the crime charged at the time of its commission. Thus, when a
case involves a proper interpretation of the rules and jurisprudence with respect to the
jurisdiction of courts to entertain complaints filed therewith, it deals with a question of law
that can be properly brought to this Court under Rule 45. The court is not called upon in this
case to determine the truth or falsity of the charge against BBB, much less weigh the evidence,
especially as the case had not even proceeded to a full-blown trial on the merits. The issue for
resolution concerns the correct application of law and jurisprudence on a given set of
circumstances, i.e., whether or not Philippine courts are deprived of territorial jurisdiction
over a criminal charge of psychological abuse under R.A. No. 9262 when committed through
marital infidelity and the alleged illicit relationship took place outside the Philippines.
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The place where the crime was committed determines not only the venue of the action but is
an essential element of jurisdiction. It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired
by courts in criminal cases, the offense should have been committed or any one of its essential
ingredients should have taken place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Territorial
jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance
or to try the offense allegedly committed therein by the accused. Thus, it cannot take
jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense allegedly committed outside of that limited
territory. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the
allegations in the complaint or information. And once it is so shown, the court may validly take
cognizance of the case. However, if the evidence adduced during the trial shows that the
offense was committed somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action for want of
jurisdiction.
It is necessary for Philippine courts to have jurisdiction when the abusive conduct or act of
violence under Section 5(i) of R.A. No. 9262 in relation to Section 3(a), Paragraph (C) was
committed outside Philippine territory, that the victim be a resident of the place where the
complaint is filed in view of the anguish suffered being a material element of the offense. In
the present scenario, the offended wife and children of the respondent husband are residents
of Pasig City since March of 2010. Hence, the RTC of Pasig City may exercise jurisdiction over
the case.
The Court ruled in favor of the petitioner. Contrary to the interpretation of the RTC, what RA
No. 9262 criminalizes is not the marital infidelity per se but the psychological violence causing
mental or emotional suffering on the wife.
[GIANAN, AIRA JULIE ]
2G CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE
Jurisdiction of Criminal Courts
10. Guevarra v. Almodovar, G.R. NO. 75256
G.R. No. 75256, 26 January DATE: 26 January 1989
1989
PONENTE: PARAS, J.:
DOCTRINE
The jurisdiction of a court over a criminal case is
determined by the penalty imposable under the law
for the offense and not the penalty ultimately
imposed.
FACTS
Petitioner John Philip Guevarra, then 11 years old, was playing with his bestfriend
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Teodoro Almine, Jr. and three other children in their backyard in the morning of
29 October 1984. They were target-shooting a bottle cap (tansan) placed around
fifteen (15) to twenty (20) meters away with an air rifle borrowed from a
neighbor. In the course of their game, Teodoro was hit by a pellet on his left collar
bone which caused his unfortunate death.
After conducting a preliminary investigation, the examining Fiscal exculpated
petitioner due to his age and because the unfortunate occurrence appeared to be an
accident. The victim’s parents appealed to the Ministry of Justice, which ordered
the Fiscal to file a case against petitioner for Homicide through reckless
Imprudence.
Among the issues raised was that the Honorable Court had no jurisdiction over the
offense charges and the person of the defendant.
This petition was denied which brings the present petition for certiorari.
It is contended by the petitioner that the case against him should have first been
brought before the Lupong Tagapayapa pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1508,
Section 2 (3). He submits that considering his entitlement to a two-degree
privileged mitigating circumstance due to his minority, P.D. 1508 applies to his
case because the penalty imposable is reduced to not higher than arresto menor
from an original arresto mayor maximum to prision correccional medium as
prescribed in Article 365 of the RPC.
ISSUE/S
Whether or not the court has jurisdiction over the case based on the penalty
ultimately imposed upon the petitioner
RULING
No. The jurisdiction of a court over a criminal case is determined by the penalty
imposable under the law for the offense and not the penalty ultimately imposed.
The same principle applies in constructing Section 2(3) of P.D. 1508, which
states:
"xxx
(3) Offense punishable by imprisonment exceeding 30 days, or a fine
exceeding P200.00; . . ."
Expounding on the above provision, a member of the committee that drafted P.D.
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1508 has said:
"The law says ‘punishable,’ not ‘punished.’ One should therefore consider
the penalty provided for by law or ordinance as distinguished from the
penalty actually imposed in particular cases after considering the attendant
circumstances affecting criminal liability."
The foregoing finds support in our jurisprudence as above cited. We therefore rule
that, in construing Section 2(3) of P.D. 1508, the penalty which the law defining
the offense attaches to the later should be considered. Hence, any circumstance
which may affect criminal liability must now considered.
The petitioner, in his arguments, asserts that since P.D. 1508 has not been
complied with, the trial court has no jurisdiction over the case. This erroneous
perception has been corrected long before. As intimated in the case of Royales v.
IAC, 127 SCRA 470, and categorically stated in Ebol Vs. Amin, 135 SCRA 438,
P.D. 1508 is not jurisdictional.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
GIANAN, Steffi Arantxa R.
2G CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE
Republic Act 7691; Criminal Cases covered by Summary
Procedure
11. ATIENZA v.
PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 188694
DATE: February 12 2014
PONENTE: Perlas-Bernabe
DOCTRINE
Metropolitan Trial Courts (MTC), Municipal Trial Courts
(MuTC), and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts (MCTC) shall
have exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses
punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six years.
FACTS
On March 20, 1995, Atibula, a Records Officer and Custodian of the CA Original
Decisions, was invited by petitioner Castro to attend petitioner Atienza’s birthday party. Atienza
introduced Atibula to a certain Dario who later asked Atibula to assist in searching a CA
decision. On March 24, 1995, Atibula was asked by Dario to insert a decision in one of the
volumes of the CA Original Decisions but the former refused. On April 21, 1995, Atienza offered
Atibula P50000 in exchange for Volume 260, but the latter turned down the offer. Volume 266
was later discovered to be missing on May 9, 1995. Atibula encountered Atienza two days later,
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with the former shouting: “putang ina mo, Juaning, pinaharapan mo kami”. The volume was
later returned on May 18, 1995 by Nelson de Castro, claiming Castro asked him to deliver the
volume to Atibula. Upon inspection by Atibula, the returned volume had two new documents
inserted. Upon further inspection, the documents did not bear the original promulgations. Upon
analysis and examination by NBI, it was concluded that Volume 266 was indeed altered, and
that the signatures of the CA Justices in the questioned documents were forgeries. Sometime
in July 1995, a wall in the CA Reporter’s Division was discovered to be broken. Upon
investigation, it was concluded by the NBI that perpetrators gained entry to the office through
the wall, and there was conspiracy to commit the crime of Falsification of Public Document
between Atienza and Dario in view of their concerted efforts through previous or simultaneous
acts and deeds. It was also added that Castro assisted the suspects in the crime by returning
the missing volume.
Atienza, Castro and Dario were later charged before the Office of the Ombudsman for the
following crimes: Falsification of Public Document, violation of Sec. 3(a) of RA No. 3019, and
violation of Sec. 8 of RA No. 6713. The latter two charges were dismissed for insufficiency of
evidence but it was ruled that there existed a probable cause to charge them for Robbery
under Art. 299(a)(1) of the RPC, and Falsification of Public Document under Art. 172(1) in
relation to Art. 171(6) of the same code. The Informations were later docketed before the RTC.
The RTC ruled that the petitioners are guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crimes charged
against them. For the crime of Falsification of Public Document, they were sentenced to suffer
a penalty of 6 months and 1 day, as minimum, to 6 years of prision correccional as maximum.
The CA affirmed the conviction of the petitioners upon appeal, and also denied their motion for
reconsideration.
Hence, the instant petition before the Supreme Court, in which the petitioners also raised that
there is jurisdictional defect for their Falsification case.
ISSUE/S
Whether or not there was a jurisdictional defect for the falsification case.
RULING
YES. Sec. 32 of BP Blg. 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization
Act of 1980, as amended by RA No. 7691, provides that Metropolitan Trial
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall have
exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment not
exceedin
g six years. Falsification of Public Document under Art. 172(1) of the RPC is
punishable by prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods or
imprisonment for 2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 6 years.
In the case at bar, the RTC should not have jurisdiction to take the
Falsification case because the MTC, MeTC, and MCTC have exclusive original
jurisdiction over the case because the offense is punishable with imprisonment of
not exceeding 6 years.
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NOTE: Lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at any stage of
the proceedings
[MISOLA, JOHN DAEDALUS]
2G CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE
PD 1606 as amended by RA 8249; RA 10660
12. Lacson v
Executive
Secretary
G.R. NO. 128096
DOCTRINE
It is the RTC that has the jurisdiction over the case and not
the Sandiganbayan.
DATE: January 20, 1999
PONENTE:
Considering that the petitioner and intervenors are being
charged with murder, a felony punishable under Title VIII of
the RPC, the governing on the jurisdictional offense is not
par a but par b, Sec 4 of R.A. 8249. This par b pertains to
"other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed
with other crimes committed by the public officials and
employees mentioned in subsection a of (Sec 4, R.A. 8249)
in relation to their office." The phrase "other offenses or
felonies" is too broad as to include the crime of murder,
provided it was committed in relation to the accused's
officials functions. Thus, under said par b, what determines
the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction is the official position or
rank of the offender — that is, whether he is one of those
public officers or employees enumerated in par a of Sec 4.
The offenses mentioned in paragraphs a, b and c of the
same Sec 4 do not make any reference to the criminal
participation of the accused public officer as to whether he is
charged as a principal, accomplice or accessory. In enacting
R.A. 8249, the Congress simply restored the original
provisions of P.D. 1606 which does not mention the criminal
participation of the public officer as a requisite to determine
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the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
FACTS
11 persons believed to be members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang, reportedly an
organized crime syndicate which had been involved in a spate of bank robberies in
Metro Manila, where slain along Commonwealth Avenue in Quezon City by
elements of the Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task Group (ABRITG) of
PNP.
After a media expose that what actually transpired was a summary execution (or a
rub out) and not a shoot-out between the Kuratong Baleleng gang members and
the ABRITG, Ombudsman formed a panel of investigators to investigate the
incident. It absolved from any criminal liability all the personnel allegedly
involved. This was modified by a review board which recommended the
indictment for multiple murder against respondents, including herein petitioner
and intervenors. Lacson was among those charged as principal in 11 information
for murder while the intervenors were among those charged in the same
informations as accessories after-in-the-fact.
After conducting a reinvestigation, the Ombudsman filed on March 1, 1996, 11
amended informations before the Sandiganbayan, wherein petitioner was charged
only as an accessory, together with others. One of the accused was dropped from
the case.
The accused questioned the jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan, asserting that the cases
fall within the jurisdiction of RTC pursuant to Sec 2 (paragraphs a and c) of RA
No. 7975. They contend that the said law limited the jurisdiction of
Sandiganbayan to cases where one or more of the “principal accused” are
government officials with SG 27 or higher, or PNP officials with the rank of Chief
Superintendent (Brigadier General) or higher. The highest ranking principal
accused in the amended informations has the rank of only a Chief Inspector, and
none has the equivalent of at least SG 27.
Sandiganbayan admitted the amended information and ordered the cases
transferred to the Quezon City RTC which has original and exclusive jurisdiction
under R.A. 7975, as none of the principal accused has the rank of Chief
Superintendent or higher. The Office of the Special Prosecutor moved for a
reconsideration, insisting that the cases should remain with Sandiganbayan. This
was opposed by petitioner and some of the accused.
While these motions for reconsideration were pending resolution, and even before
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the issue of jurisdiction cropped up with the filing of the amended informations on
March 1, 1996, a House Bill, as well as Senate Bill were introduced in Congress,
defining expanding the jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan. Specifically, the said bills
sought, among others, to amend the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by deleting
the word "principal" from the phrase "principal accused" in Section 2 of RA No.
7975. These bills were consolidated and later approved into law as R.A. No. 8249.
Sandiganbayan denied the motion for reconsideration of the Special Prosecutor.
On the same day, Sandiganbayan issued an addendum wherein it said that it has
competence to take cognizance of the cases. After Justice Lagman wrote the
Resolution and Justice Demetriou concurred in it, but before Justice de Leon. Jr.
rendered his concurring and dissenting opinion, the legislature enacted Republic
Act 8249 and the President of the Philippines approved it on February 5, 1997.
Considering the pertinent provisions of the new law, Justices Lagman and
Demetriou are now in favor of granting, as they are now granting, the Special
Prosecutor's motion for reconsideration. The net result of all the foregoing is that
by the vote of 3 of 2, the court admitted the Amended Informations in these cases
by the unanimous vote of 4 with 1 neither concurring not dissenting, retained
jurisdiction to try and decide the cases.
Petitioner and intervenors, relying on R.A. 7975, argue that the RTC, not the
Sandiganbayan, has jurisdiction over the subject criminal cases since none of the
principal accused under the amended information has the rank of Superintendent
or higher. On the other hand, the Ombudsman, contends that the Sandiganbayan
has jurisdiction pursuant to R.A. 8249.
ISSUE/S
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the accused.
RULING
NO. It is the RTC that has the jurisdiction over the case and not the
Sandiganbayan.
The Sandiganbayan law prior to R.A. 8249 was R.A. 7975. Sec 2 of R.A. 7975
provides:
Sec. 2. Section 4 of the same decree [PD No. 1606, as amended) is hereby further amended to read
as follows:
Sec 4. Jurisdiction — The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases
involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of
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the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the principal accused are officials occupying
the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at
the time of the commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and
higher, otherwise classified as Grade "27" and higher, of the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan,
and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineer, and other provincial department heads;
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city
treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;
(d) Philippine Army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher
rank;
(e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank;
(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in
the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled
corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations;
(2) Members of Congress or officials thereof classified as Grade "27" and up under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
(4) Chairman and members of the Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the
provisions of the Constitution;
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27" or higher under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
b. Other offenses or felonies committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in
Subsection a of this section in relation to their office.
c. Civil and criminal cases files pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2,
14, and 4-A.
In cases where none of the principal accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary
Grade "27" or higher, as presribed in the said Republic Act 6758, or PNP officers occupying the
rank of superintendent or higher, or their equivalent, exclusive jurisdiction thereof shall be vested
in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal
circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129.
The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction on appelas from the final
judgment, resolutions or orders of regular court where all the accused are occupying positions
lower than grade "27," or not otherwise covered by the preceding enumeration.
xxx
xxx
xxx
In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the public
officers or employees, including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations,
they shall be tried jointly with said public officers and employees in the proper courts which shall
have exclusive jurisdiction over them.
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Sec. 7 of R.A. No. 7975 reads:
Sec. 7. Upon the effectivity of this Act, all criminal cases in which trial has not begun in the
Sandiganbayan shall be referred to the proper courts.
Considering that the petitioner and intervenors are being charged with murder, a
felony punishable under Title VIII of the RPC, the governing on the jurisdictional
offense is not par a but par b, Sec 4 of R.A. 8249. This par b pertains to "other
offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by
the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of (Sec 4, R.A.
8249) in relation to their office." The phrase "other offenses or felonies" is too
broad as to include the crime of murder, provided it was committed in relation to
the accused's officials functions. Thus, under said par b, what determines the
Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction is the official position or rank of the offender — that
is, whether he is one of those public officers or employees enumerated in par a of
Sec 4. The offenses mentioned in paragraphs a, b and c of the same Sec 4 do not
make any reference to the criminal participation of the accused public officer as to
whether he is charged as a principal, accomplice or accessory. In enacting R.A.
8249, the Congress simply restored the original provisions of P.D. 1606 which
does not mention the criminal participation of the public officer as a requisite to
determine the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
While there is the allegation in the amended information that the said accessories
committed the offense "in relation to office as officers and members of the
(PNP)," the Court, however, do not see the intimate connection between the
offense charged and the accused's official functions, which is an essential element
in determining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
The stringent requirement that the charge be set forth with such particularity as
will reasonably indicate the exact offense which the accused is alleged to have
committed in relation to his office was not satisfied. The mere allegation in the
amended information that the offense was committed by the accused public
officer in relation to his office is not sufficient. That phrase is merely a conclusion
between of law, not a factual averment that would show the close intimacy
between the offense charged and the discharge of the accused's official duties.
In People vs. Magallanes, where the jurisdiction between the RTC and the
Sandiganbayan was at issue, we ruled:
It is an elementary rule that jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the complaint or
information and not by the result of evidence after trial.
In the case of People vs. Montejo, it is noteworthy that the phrase committed in
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relation to public office "does not appear in the information, which only signifies
that the said phrase is not what determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
What is controlling is the specific factual allegations in the information that would
indicate the close intimacy between the discharge of the accused's official duties
and the commission of the offense charged, in order to qualify the crime as having
been committed in relation to public office.
Consequently, for failure to show in the amended informations that the charge of
murder was intimately connected with the discharge of official functions of the
accused PNP officers, the offense charged in the subject criminal cases is plain
murder and, therefore, within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTC, not
the Sandiganbayan.
[OTADOY, MARY CHRIS]
2G CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE
Jurisdiction of Criminal Courts
13. Edgar
Crisostomo vs.
Sandiganbayan
G.R. NO. 152398
DATE: April 14, 2005
PONENTE: Carpio, J.
DOCTRINE
The test on whether the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
over this case will stand or fall is if the Information allege
a close or intimate connection between the offense charged
and petitioner’s public office.
FACTS
Short Facts:
Renato Suba was brought to the police station on the night of February 13, 1989
for investigation for allegedly hitting the head of a certain Diosdado Lacangan.
After investigation, he was detained alone in the third cell. On the following day
at 5:00 o’clock in the afternoon, he was visited by his brother, Rizalino Suba,
whom he asked to bring him a blanket, toothbrush, clothes and foods. Rizalino left
the municipal jail on February 14, 1989, at almost 5:20 p.m., while his other
brother, Rolando, brought the things to him in jail. Rolando left their house at
about 5:30 p.m. and came back at 6:00 oclock. At that time, Renato was in good
health and in good condition and that he was not complaining anything about his
body. Another detained, Mario Calingayan saw him still alive lying down after
6:00 p.m. when he was about to take a bath. At around 9:00 o’clock of the same
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day, Mr. Baldovino, a barangay councilman, informed the Renato’s family that
they should go to the municipal building as per request of the policemen. Rizalino
Suba, together with his uncle David Suba and Manuel Rollo, a barangay
councilman, arrived at the municipal building at 9:10 p.m. There they saw that the
he was already lying dead on the cement floor outside the cell in the municipal
building. Calingayan was detained with five (5) others at the second cell among
four (4) cells in the jail. The four (4) cells, although having their own separate
doors, made of iron grills and equipped each with a padlock, were always open. It
was up to them whether to close the doors, and any detention prisoner could go to
any cell inside the prison. Petitioner Edgar Crisostomo was the only one on duty
at the time of the death of the victim.
Brief Rulings of Lower Courts:
Only Crisostomo and Calingayan stood trial. The other accused, dela Cruz, Perez,
Anggo, Lumabo and Norberte were at large. The Sandiganbayan found sufficient
circumstantial evidence to convict Crisostomo and Calingayan of murder. The
Sandiganbayan relied on the autopsy and exhumation reports in disregarding the
defense theory that Renato committed suicide by hanging himself with a blanket.
The Sandiganbayan thus held:
Premises considered, accused Edgar Crisostomo and Mario Calingayan are hereby
found guilty of the crime of murder.
ISSUE/S
Whether the respondent Court has the jurisdiction to try the case
RULING
The Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction to try the case. However, the prosecution
failed to prove Crisostomo and Calingayan's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Thus,
we acquit Crisostomo and Calingayan.
Since the crime was committed on 14 February 1989, the applicable provision of
law is Section 4 of PD 1606, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1861 (PD
1861), which took effect on 23 March 1983. The amended provision reads:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise:
(a) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
xxx
(2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and employees in
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relation to their office, including those employed in government-owned or
controlled corporations, whether simple or complexed with other crimes, where
the penalty prescribed by law is higher than prision correccional or imprisonment
for six (6) years, or a fine of P6,000.00: PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that offenses
or felonies mentioned in this paragraph where the penalty prescribed by law does
not exceed prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years or a fine of
P6,000.00 shall be tried by the proper Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial
Court, Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court.
xxx
Crisostomo was charged with murder, the penalty for which is reclusion temporal
in its maximum period to death, a penalty within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. In People v. Montejo, the Court explained that a public officer
commits an offense in relation to his office if he perpetrates the offense while
performing, though in an improper or irregular manner, his official functions and
he cannot commit the offense without holding his public office. In such a case,
there is an intimate connection between the offense and the office of the accused.
If the information alleges the close connection between the offense charged and
the office of the accused, the case falls within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.
Crisostomo would have the Court believe that being a jail guard is a mere
incidental circumstance that bears no close intimacy with the commission of
murder. Crisostomo’s theory would have been tenable if the murdered victim was
not a prisoner under his custody as a jail guard. The function of a jail guard is to
insure the safe custody and proper confinement of persons detained in the jail. In
this case, the Information alleges that the victim was a detention prisoner when
Crisostomo, the jail guard, conspired with the inmates to kill him.
Pelayo, Mary Rose G.
2G CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE
Jurisdiction of Ombudsman
14. Sanchez v.
Demetriou
G.R. NO. 111771-77
DATE: 9 November 1993
PONENTE: CRUZ, J.
DOCTRINE
The Ombudsman is indeed empowered under Section 15, paragraph (1) of
R.A. 6770 to investigate and prosecute any illegal act or omission of any
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public official. However,it is not an exclusive authority but rather a shared
or concurrent authority in respect of the offense charged.
FACTS
the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission requested the filing of appropriate charges against
several persons, including the petitioner, in connection with the rape-slay of Mary Eileen
Sarmenta and the killing of Allan Gomez.chanrobles law library : red
After the hearing, a warrant of arrest was served on Sanchez.
Subsequently, 7 information respondent prosecutors filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Calamba, Laguna, seven informations for the rape and killing of Mary Eileen Sarmenta against
Petitioners and other 6 accused.
The respondent Secretary of Justice subsequently expressed his apprehension that the trial of the
said cases might result in a miscarriage of justice because of the tense and partisan atmosphere
in Laguna in favor of the petitioner and the relationship of an employee in the trial court with
one of the accused. This Court thereupon ordered the transfer of the venue of the seven cases to
Pasig, Metro Manila, where they were raffled to respondent Judge Harriet Demetriou.
the petitioner submits that the proceedings conducted by the Department of Justice are null and
void because it had no jurisdiction over the case. His claim is that it is the Office of the
Ombudsman that is vested with the power to conduct the investigation of all cases involving
public officers like him, as the municipal mayor of Calauan, Laguna.
ISSUE/S:
WON only the Ombudsman had the competence to conduct the investigation- NO
RULING
The Ombudsman is indeed empowered under Section 15, paragraph (1) of R.A. 6770 to
investigate and prosecute any illegal act or omission of any public official. However,it is not an
exclusive authority but rather a shared or concurrent authority in respect of the offense
charged."cralaw virtua1aw library
Petitioners finally assert that the information and amended information filed in this case needed
the approval of the Ombudsman. It is not disputed that the information and amended
information here did not have the approval of the Ombudsman. However, we do not believe that
such approval was necessary at all. In Deloso v. Domingo, 191 SCRA 545 (1990), the Court
held that the Ombudsman has authority to investigate charges of illegal acts or omissions on the
part of any public official, i.e., any crime imputed to a public official. It must, however, be
pointed out that the authority of the Ombudsman to investigate "any [illegal] act or omission of
any public official" (191 SCRA at 550) is not an exclusive authority but rather a shared or
concurrent authority in respect of the offense here charged, i.e., the crime of sedition. Thus, the
non-involvement of the office of the Ombudsman in the present case does not have any adverse
legal consequence upon the authority of the panel of prosecutors to file and prosecute the
information or amended information.
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In fact, other investigatory agencies of the government such as the Department of Justice, in
connection with the charge of sedition, and the Presidential Commission on Good Government,
in ill-gotten wealth cases, may conduct the investigation.
[TANA, JOHMELY CEN]
2G CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE
PD 1606 as amended by RA 8249
15. Ludwig
Adaza vs.
Sandiganbayan
G.R. NO. 154886
DOCTRINE
DATE: July 28, 2005
PONENTE: Carpio-Morales, J.
It is thus apparent that for purposes of acquisition of jurisdiction
by the Sandiganbayan, the requirement imposed by R 8249 that
the offense be “committed in relation” to the offender’s office is
entirely distinct from the concept of “taking advantage of one’s
position” as provided under Arts. 171 & 172 of the RPC.
FACTS
In 1996, when petitioner Ludwig Adaza was the municipal mayor of Jose Dalman, a
project was awarded by the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) to the
Parents and Teachers Association (PTA) of Manawan National High School. When the
project was completed in 1997, PTA failed to receive the last installment payment
therefor. Upon verification, PTA President Felix Mejorada was informed by Hazel
Peñaranda, a cashier, that the check had already been released to the petitioner. The
disbursement voucher showed two signatures – Mejorada’s, which turned out to be
forged, and that of Adaza’s wife. Mejorada then went to the National Bureau of
Investigation in Dipolog City to initiate an investigation.
In 1998, the Office of the Ombudsman found probable cause Adaza and his wife, and
two informations were filed before the respondent Sandiganbayan. The information
relative to the petitioner states “while in the performance of his official duties,
committing the offense in relation to his official function and taking advantage of his
public position, did there and then, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, falsify a public
document.” Sandiganbayan then found Adaza guilty on the information relating to him
alone, while the other, where he was impleaded with his wife, was dismissed. All his
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motions for reconsideration have been denied by the respondent court, hence the present
petition for certiorari.
Adaza averred, among others, that Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the offense
charged (falsification of public documents under par. 1 of Art. 172, in relation with par.
1, Art. 171 of the RPC). He claims that he has been found guilty by the Sandiganbayan
without finding that he took advantage of his official position, more so can it not be said
that he committed the said offense in connection with his office.
ISSUE/S
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the falsification cases filed
against Adaza - NO.
RULING
While the information properly that Adaza was the municipal mayor of Jose Dalman, a
position corresponding to salary grade 27, thus falling under the scope of Sec. 4(B) of
RA 8249, it is imperative to determine whether the offense, as charged, may be
considered as having been committed “in relation to office.” For the Sandiganbayan to
have exclusive jurisdiction, it is essential that the facts showing the intimate relation
between the office of the offender and the discharge of official duties be alleged in the
information.
The offender “takes advantage of his official position” in falsifying a document when (1)
he has the duty to make or to prepare or otherwise intervene in the preparation of the
document; or (2) he has the official custody of the document which he falsifies.
It is thus apparent that for purposes of acquisition of jurisdiction by the Sandiganbayan,
the requirement imposed by R 8249 that the offense be “committed in relation” to the
offender’s office is entirely distinct from the concept of “taking advantage of one’s
position” as provided under Arts. 171 & 172 of the RPC.
Therefore, in the case at bar, as the alleged falsification was not an offense committed in
relation to the office of the petitioner, it did not come under the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. It follows that all its acts in the case are null and void ab initio.
However, while the Sandiganbayan is declared bereft of jurisdiction over the criminal
case filed against Adaza, the prosecution is not precluded from filing the appropriate
charge against him before the proper court.
[VASQUEZ, MARGRETH]
2G
CRIMINAL PD 1606 as amended by RA 8249; RA 10660
PROCEDURE
16.
CENITA
M. G.R. NO. 180010
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CARIAGA
PEOPLE OF
PHILIPPINES
DOCTRINE
vs. DATE: July 30, 2010
THE
PONENTE: CARPIO MORALES
While the negligence of counsel generally binds the client, the Court
has made exceptions thereto, especially in criminal cases where
reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due
process of law; when its application will result in outright deprivation
of the client's liberty or property; or where the interests of justice so
require.
FACTS
Petitioner, as the municipal treasurer of Cabatuan, Isabela with a Salary Grade of 24, was
charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cauayan City in Isabela with three counts of
malversation of public funds, defined under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code.
RTC RULING: GUILTY OF MALVERSATION (No MC)
Branch 20 of the Cauayan RTC, by Joint Decision of June 22, 2004, convicted petitioner in the
three cases:
Criminal Case No. 1293- Php 2,785
Criminal Case No. 1294- Php 27, 627
Criminal Case No. 1295- Php 20,735.13
COURT OF APPEALS RULING: DISMISSED should have been under the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan
By Resolution of May 28, 2007, 4 the Court of Appeals dismissed petitioner's appeal for lack of
jurisdiction, holding that it is the Sandiganbayan which has exclusive appellate jurisdiction
thereon.
“Concomitantly, jurisdiction over the offense is vested with the Regional Trial Court
considering that the position of Municipal Treasurer corresponds to a salary grade below 27.
Pursuant to Section 4 of [Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended by Republic Act No. 8249],
it is the Sandiganbayan, to the exclusion of all others, which enjoys appellate jurisdiction over
the offense. Evidently, the appeal to this Court of the conviction for malversation of public
funds was improperly and improvidently made. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)”
PETITIONER’S CONTENTION:
Petitioner, now admitting the procedural error committed by her former counsel, implores the
Court to relax the Rules to afford her an opportunity to fully ventilate her appeal on the merits
and requests the Court to endorse and transmit the records of the cases to the Sandiganbayan in
the interest of substantial justice.
ISSUE/S
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WON the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the case. YES.
RULING
Section 2 of Rule 50 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 2. Dismissal of improper appeal to the Court of Appeals. . . . .
An appeal erroneously taken to the Court of Appeals shall not be transferred to the appropriate
court but shall be dismissed outright. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
That appellate jurisdiction in this case pertains to the Sandiganbayan is clear. Section 4 of
Presidential Decree No. 1606, 7 as amended by Republic Act No. 8249, so directs:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. — The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all
cases involving:
xxx xxx xxx
In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to Salary Grade '27'
or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military and PNP officers
mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional
trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as
the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg.
129, as amended.
The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments,
resolutions or orders of regional trial courts whether in the exercise of their own original
jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction as herein provided. . . . (emphasis, italics and
underscoring supplied).
Since the appeal involves criminal cases, and the possibility of a person being deprived of
liberty due to a procedural lapse militates against the Court's dispensation of justice, the Court
grants petitioner's plea for a relaxation of the Rules.
For rules of procedure must be viewed as tools to facilitate the attainment of justice, such that
any rigid and strict application thereof which results in technicalities tending to frustrate
substantial justice must always be avoided.
The slapdash work of petitioner's former counsel and the trial court's apparent ignorance of the
law effectively conspired to deny petitioner the remedial measures to question her conviction.
While the negligence of counsel generally binds the client, the Court has made exceptions
thereto, especially in criminal cases where reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the
client of due process of law; when its application will result in outright deprivation of the
client's liberty or property; or where the interests of justice so require. It cannot be gainsaid that
the case of petitioner can fall under any of these exceptions.
Moreover, a more thorough review and appreciation of the evidence for the prosecution and
defense as well as a proper application of the imposable penalties in the present case by the
Sandiganbayan would do well to assuage petitioner that her appeal is decided scrupulously.
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[VILLON, ERIKA PATRICIA]
2G CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
SANDIGANBAYAN
17.
G.R. NO. 229781
DE LIMA v. GUERRERO
DATE: OCT. 10, 2017
PONENTE:
DOCTRINE
FACTS
The Senate and the HOR conducted several inquiries on the proliferation of
dangerous drugs syndicated at the New Bilibid Prison (NBP), inviting inmates
who executed affidavits in support of their testimonies. These legislative inquiries
led to the filing of complaints against Senator Leila De Lima. The cases were
consolidated. The DOJ Panel, headed by Peter Ong, conducted preliminary
hearing, wherein petitioner, filed an Omnibus Motion. Petitioner argued that the
Office of the Ombudsman has the exclusive authority and jurisdiction to hear the
complaints against her. She further contended that the DOJ prosecutors should
inhibit themselves and refer the complaints to the Office of the Ombudsman.
During the hearing, petitioner manifested that she has decided not to submit her
counter-affidavit citing the pendency of her two motions. DOJ Panel, however,
ruled that it will not entertain belatedly filed counter-affidavits, and declared all
pending incidents and the cases as submitted for resolution. Petitioner moved for
but was denied reconsideration by the DOJ Panel. Petitioner filed before CA a
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petition for prohibition and certiorari assailing the jurisdiction of the DOJ Panel
over complaints against her. Meanwhile, in the absence of a restraining order
issued by the CA, the DOJ Panel proceeded with the conduct of the preliminary
investigation and in its Joint Resolution, recommended the filing of Informations
against petitioner. Accordingly, 3 Informations were filed against petitioner. She
was charged for violation of Section 5 in relation to Section (jj), Section 26 (b),
and Section 28 of RA No. 9165.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash mainly raising the that RTC lacks jurisdiction
over the offense charged against petitioner; Petitioner argues that, based on
allegations of the Information, the Sandiganbayan has the jurisdiction to try and
hear the case against her. She posits that the Information charges her not with
violation of RA 9165 but with Direct Bribery. For petitioner, even assuming that
the crime described is a violation of RA 9165, the SB still has the exclusive
jurisdiction to try the case considering that the acts described in the Information
were intimately related to her position as the Secretary of Justice.
The OSG asserted that the RTC has jurisdiction over the offense charged against
the petitioner, including the acts described in the Information against the
petitioner. The Sandiganbayan, so the respondents contend, was specifically
created as an anti-graft court. It was never conferred with the power to try drugrelated cases even those committed by public officials.
ISSUE/S
WON the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction and not the Sandiganbayan
RULING
YES, the RTC has jurisdiction. It should be noted that the petitioner is charged
with violation of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, Sec. 5, in
relation to Sec. 3(jj), Section 26 (b), and Section 28, RA No. 9165 for committing
illegal drug trading. A plain reading of RA 9165, will reveal that jurisdiction over
drug-related cases is exclusively vested with RTC and no other. Sections 20, 61,
62, and 90, mentioned RTC as having authority to take cognizance of drugrelated cases.
The exclusive original jurisdiction over violations of RA 9165 is not transferred to
the SB whenever the accused occupies a position classified as Garde 27 or higher,
regardless of whether the violation is alleged as committed in relation to office.
The power of the SB to sit in judgment of high-ranking gov’t officials is not
omnipotent. The SB’s jurisdiction is circumscribed by law and its limits are
currently defined and prescribed by RA 10660, which amended the PD No. 1606.
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As it now stands, the SB has jurisdiction over the ff:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction – The SB shall exercise the exclusive original
jurisdiction in all cases involving: (a) Violations of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act), RA No. 1379 and Chapter II Sec. 2, Title VII, Book II of
the RPC; (b) other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other
crimes committed by the public officials and employees; (c) civil and criminal
cases filed pursuant to and in connection with EO Nos. 1, 2, 14, and 14-A. Under
Se. 4, Art. XI of the 1987 constitution provides that “The present anti-graft court
known as the Sandiganbayan shall continue to function and exercise its
jurisdiction as now or hereafter may be provided by law.”
It should occasion no surprise, therefore, that the SB is without jurisdiction to hear
drug-related cases. Even Sec. 4(b) of PD 1606, as amended by RA 10660, touted
by the petitioner and the dissents as a catch-all provision, does not operate to strip
the RTCs of its exclusive original jurisdiction over violations of RA 9165.
Likewise of special significance is the proviso introduced by RA 10660 which
states that, “Provided, That the RTC shall have exclusive original jurisdiction
where the information: x x x” The clear import is to streamline the cases handled
by the SB by delegating to the RTCs some cases involving high-ranking public
officials.
ANTONIO, AMICAH FRANCES
2G
CRIMPRO
RA 10660- Jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan
18. DIZON V. G.R. NO. 227577
PEOPLE
DATE: 24 January 2018
PONENTE:
DOCTRINE It is undisputed that petitioner is a low-ranking public officer
having a salary grade below 27, whose appeal from the RTC's
ruling convicting him of six (6) counts of Malversation of Public
Funds Through Falsification of Public Documents falls within the
appellate jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
FACTS:
This case stemmed from six (6) separate Informations filed before the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 42 (RTC), respectively docketed as
Criminal (Crim.) Case Nos. 09-272518 to 23, charging petitioner of the crime
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of Malversation of Public Funds through Falsification of Public Documents.
The prosecution averred that petitioner, being then an employee of the
Manila Traffic and Parking Bureau of the City of Manila with the position of
Special Collecting Officer, was entrusted to collect monthly parking fees from
various establishments, and subsequently, forward such fees, to the City
Treasurer of Manila. In the course of petitioner's employment, several
discrepancies were discovered in the parking receipts which he allegedly
signed and issued, whereby the amounts paid, collected, and remitted as
parking fees do not match with each other. Thus, the City Legal Office of
Manila investigates the Personnel Data Sheet (PDS) of petitioner as basis for
comparison, and thereafter, compared the handwriting on the PDS against the
receipts submitted to her for examination. After her analysis, strong indication
that they were written by one and the same person.
RTC found the accused guilty appealed. RTC took the case to the Court
of Appeals. However, petitioner subsequently noticed that his appeal was
erroneously taken to the CA instead of the Sandiganbayan, which has appellate
jurisdiction over his case pursuant to Section 4 (c) of Republic Act No. (RA)
8249. Thus, to rectify the error, he filed the Motion to Endorse Case to
the Sandiganbayan, as well as the appellant's brief, before the CA.
ISSUE/S :
WON the CA erred in dismissing petitioner's Motion to Endorse.
RULING :
YES. It is undisputed that petitioner is a low-ranking public officer
having a salary grade below 27, whose appeal from the RTC's ruling
convicting him of six (6) counts of Malversation of Public Funds Through
Falsification of Public Documents falls within the appellate jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan, pursuant to Section 4 (c) of RA 8249 (prior to its
amendment by RA 10660), which reads:
Section 4. Section 4 of the same decree is hereby further amended to read as
follows:
xxx xxx xxx
c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order
Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.
"In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary
grade '27' or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military or
PNP officers mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested
in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court and
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municipal circuit trial court as the case may be, pursuant to their respective
jurisdiction as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.
"The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final
judgments, resolutions or orders or regional trial courts whether in the exercise of
their own original jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction as herein provided.
In Quileste v. People, the Court remarked that:
It may be recalled that this case involves malversation of public
funds, punishable under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, committed
by a low-ranking public officer (with salary grade below SG 27). Thus the
case was correctly filed with, and tried by, the RTC, the court that has
exclusive original jurisdiction over the case. Upon Quileste's conviction by
the RTC, his remedy should have been an appeal to the Sandiganbayan,
pursuant to Presidential Decree No. (PD) No. 1606, as amended by Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 7975 and R.A. No. 8249, specifically Section 4 thereof[.] x x
x
Thus, since petitioner's case properly falls within the appellate
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, his appeal was erroneously taken to the
CA.The Court finds that the foregoing error is not primarily attributable to
petitioner, since the duty to transmit the records to the proper court devolves
upon the RTC.
In the case of Ulep v. People, (Ulep) the Court held that it was the trial
court which was duty bound to forward the records of the case to the proper
forum. Thus, in Ulep, the Court granted the plea of the accused therein to
remand the case to the RTC for transmission to the Sandiganbayan: cTDaEH
x x x [P]etitioner's failure to designate the proper forum for her appeal
was inadvertent. The omission did not appear to be a dilatory tactic on her
part. Indeed, petitioner had more to lose had that been the case as her
appeal could be dismissed outright for lack of jurisdiction — which was
exactly what happened in the CA.
The trial court, on the other hand, was duty bound to forward the
records of the case to the proper forum, the Sandiganbayan. It is
unfortunate that the RTC judge concerned ordered the pertinent
records to be forwarded to the wrong court, to the great prejudice of
petitioner. Cases involving government employees with a salary grade
lower than 27 are fairly common, albeit regrettably so.
Indeed, the Court finds no reason why the same ruling should not be made in
this case. In fine, the Court holds that petitioner's Motion to Endorse should be
granted.
BAE, GEM GERICKA B.
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2G CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE
Jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan
G.R. NO. 133289
19. ANTIPORDA JR. V.
DATE: 23 DEC 1999
GARCHITORENA
PONENTE: BUENA
DOCTRINE
The Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction
on civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in
connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14A, issued in 1986. The Sandiganbayan also exercises
civil jurisdiction.
FACTS
Accused Mayor Licerio Antiporda and others were charged for the crime of
kidnapping; the case was filed in the first division of Sandiganbayan.
Subsequently, the Court ordered the prosecution to submit amended information,
which was complied with evenly and the new information contained the place
where the victim was brought.
The accused filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion praying that a reinvestigation be
conducted and the issuance of warrants of arrest be deferred but it was denied by
the Ombudsman. The accused thereafter filed a Motion for New Preliminary
investigation and to hold in abeyance and/or recall warrant of arrest issued but the
same was also denied. Subsequently, the accused filed a Motion to Quash
Amended Information for lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged, which was
ignored for their continuous refusal to submit their selves to the Court and after
their voluntary appearance which invested the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction over
their persons, their motion for reconsideration was again denied.
ISSUE/S
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan, which has no jurisdiction over the offense
charged in the original information, subsequently acquire such jurisdiction by the
simple expedient of amending the information to supply, for the first time,
jurisdictional facts not previously averred in the original information?
RULING
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No (but in this case it was held that Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the case
because of estoppel). The original Information filed with the Sandiganbayan did
not mention that the offense committed by the accused is office-related. It was
only after the same was filed that the prosecution belatedly remembered that a
jurisdictional fact was omitted therein.
However, we hold that the petitioners are estopped from assailing the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan for in the supplemental arguments to motion for
reconsideration and/or reinvestigation dated June 10, 1997 filed with the same
court, it was they who challenged the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court over
the case and clearly stated in their Motion for Reconsideration that the said crime
is work connected (and therefore Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the case).
It is a well-settled rule that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to
secure affirmative relief against his opponent, and after obtaining or failing to
obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction.
We therefore hold that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the case because
of estoppel and it was thus vested with the authority to order the amendment of
the Information.
See also: Rule 110, Section 14 of the Rules of Court.
[CAMPOS, JOHN MICHAEL H.]
2G CRIMINAL PROCEDURE [TOPIC] P.D. 1606 as amended by R.A. 8249;
RA 10660
20.
People v. Go
G.R. NO. 168539
DATE:
March 25, 2014
PONENTE: PERALTA
DOCTRINE
FACTS
Short Facts:
Henry Go was the chairman and president of the Philippine International Air
Terminals (PIATCO) who unlawfully entered into a concession agreement after
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the construction of the NAIA III. The concession agreement that was entered into
by Henry Go substantially amended the previous agreement for the construction
of NAIA III in which the terms of the agreement are more beneficial to PIATCO
while also grossly disadvantageous to the Government of the Philippines.
The Sandiganbayan issued an order that allowed the prosecution 10 days to show
why the case should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over the accused
Henry Go who is a private person.
Petitioner’s Contention:
The Sandiganbayan has already acquired jurisdiction over Go because of his
voluntary appearance and even filed a motion for consolidation when he posted
bail. Furthermore, the Sandiganbayan has exclusive jurisdiction over Go even if
he is a private person because he was alleged to have conspired with a public
officer.
Respondent’s Contention:
Henry Go’s defense was that the information filed against him do not constitute an
offense under the Anti-graft and corrupt practices act because the operative facts
do not meet the needed requisites for the crime. Furthermore, the deceased
Secretary Enrile was the officer to whom he was alleged to have conspired with,
Go emphasized that he is not a public officer and has not been given the capacity
by any official authority to be a government agent.
Brief Rulings of Lower Courts:
The Sandiganbayan ruled in favor of Henry Go and granted the motion to quash
the information filed on the ground that he is a private person and his alleged coconspirator Secretary Enrile was already deceased before the case was filed.
ISSUE/S
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has exclusive Jurisdiction over Henry Go who
is a private person but a co-conspirator of a public officer.
RULING
YES, the Sandiganbayan has exclusive jurisdiction over Henry Go even if he is a
private person because he is a co-conspirator of a public officer. The SC ruled that
P.D.1606 as amended by RA 8249 provides that the Sandiganbayan is a special
criminal court that has exclusive jurisdiction over all cases involving the Antigraft and corrupt practices act. Furthermore, this jurisdiction includes private
individuals who are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the
violating public officers.
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In the case at bar, Henry Go is being charged in conspiracy with Secretary Enrile.
Therefore, they should have been charged before and tried jointly by the
Sandiganbayan. However, because Secretary Enrile died before the case, and
therefore joint trial cannot be done anymore. However, it still does not divest the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over Henry Go.
[SURNAME, FIRST NAME]
2G CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE
P.D. 1606 as amended by Republic Act 8249; Republic Act
10660 – Sandiganbayan
21. People v
Benipayo
G.R. NO. 155573
DATE: April 24, 2009
PONENTE: NACHURA, J.
DOCTRINE
Uniformly applied is the familiar rule that the jurisdiction of
the court to hear and decide a case is conferred by the law in
force at the time of the institution of the action, unless a latter
statute provides for a retroactive application thereof.
FACTS
Two cases of libel are filed against Alfredo L. Benipayo, then Chairman of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC). One was because of a speech delivered a
speech in the "Forum on Electoral Problems: Roots and Responses in the
Philippines" held at the Balay Kalinaw, University of the Philippines-Diliman
Campus, Quezon City(CASE A) and the other was when respondent, as
COMELEC Chair, and COMELEC Commissioner Luzviminda Tangcangco were
guests of the talk show "Point Blank," hosted by Ces Drilon and televised
nationwide on the ANC-23 channel(CASE B). (See Notes for Details of these
Libel Cases) Both cases are filed by the City Prosecutor with the RTC of QC
Branch 102 and 101 respectively.
CASE A:
Respondent moved for the dismissal of the case on the assertion that the trial court
had no jurisdiction over his person for he was an impeachable officer and thus,
could not be criminally prosecuted before any court during his incumbency; and
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that, assuming he can be criminally prosecuted, it was the Office of the
Ombudsman that should investigate him and the case should be filed with the
Sandiganbayan.
The trial court issued the challenged Order dismissing the case and considering as
moot and academic petitioner’s motion to inhibit. While the RTC found that
respondent was no longer an impeachable officer because his appointment was not
confirmed by Congress, it ruled that the case had to be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction considering that the alleged libel was committed by respondent in
relation to his office—he delivered the speech in his official capacity as
COMELEC Chair. Accordingly, it was the Sandiganbayan that had jurisdiction
over the case to the exclusion of all other courts. On motion for reconsideration,
the trial court adhered to its ruling that it was not vested with jurisdiction to hear
the libel case.
CASE B:
Respondent also moved for the dismissal of the information raising similar
arguments that the court had no jurisdiction over his person, he being an
impeachable officer; and that, even if criminal prosecution were possible,
jurisdiction rested with the Sandiganbayan. The trial court issued the assailed
Order dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
respondent. The RTC, in the further denied petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration.
ISSUE/S
WON the RTC has jurisdiction over the libel cases - YES
RULING
Yes. Uniformly applied is the familiar rule that the jurisdiction of the court to hear
and decide a case is conferred by the law in force at the time of the institution of
the action, unless a latter statute provides for a retroactive application thereof. The
applicable law is still Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, which categorically
provides that jurisdiction over libel cases [is] lodged with the Courts of First
Instance (now Regional Trial Courts).
Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended by Republic Act No.
4363 is explicit on which court has jurisdiction to try cases of written
defamations, thus:
The criminal and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations as
provided for in this chapter, shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the
court of first instance [now, the Regional Trial Court] of the province or city
where the libelous article is printed and first published or where any of the
offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense xxx.
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For, although RA 7691 was enacted to decongest the clogged dockets of the
Regional Trial Courts by expanding the jurisdiction of first level courts, said law
is of a general character. Even if it is a later enactment, it does not alter the
provision of Article 360 of the RPC, a law of a special nature. Moreover, from the
provisions of R.A. 7691, there seems to be no manifest intent to repeal or alter the
jurisdiction in libel cases.
Lastly, in Administrative Order No. 104-96 issued 21 October 1996, this Court
delineated the proper jurisdiction over libel cases:
"Libel cases shall be tried by the regional trial courts having jurisdiction over
them to the exclusion of the metropolitan trial courts, municipal trial courts in
cities, municipal trial courts and municipal circuit trial courts."
Since jurisdiction over written defamations exclusively rests in the RTC without
qualification, it is unnecessary and futile for the parties to argue on whether the
crime is committed in relation to office..
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the consolidated petitions for review on
certiorari are GRANTED. Criminal Cases Nos. Q-02-109406 and Q-02-109407
are REINSTATED and REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
CASIÑO, RAPHAELLE
2G CRIMINAL PROCEDURE PD 1606 AS AMENDED BY RA 8249; RA
10660
23. HANNAH EUNICE D.
SERANA vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and
PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
DOCTRINE
G.R. NO. 162059
DATE: January 22, 2008
PONENTE: REYES, R.T., J.:
It is P.D. No. 1606, as amended, rather than
R.A. No. 3019, as amended, that determines
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
FACTS
Petitioner Hannah Eunice D. Serana was a senior student of the University of the
Philippines-Cebu. She was appointed by then President Joseph Estrada as a
student regent of UP, to serve a one-year term.
The petitioner is registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission - the
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Office of the Student Regent Foundation, Inc. (OSRFI). One of the projects of the
OSRFI was the renovation of the Vinzons Hall Annex. President Estrada gave
Fifteen Million Pesos (P15,000,000.00) to the OSRFI as financial assistance for
the proposed renovation. However, the renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex failed to
materialize. The succeeding student regent consequently filed a complaint for
Malversation of Public Funds and Property with the Office of the Ombudsman.
The petitioner moved to quash the information and posited that the
Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over her person. As a student regent, she was
not a public officer since she merely represented her peers, in contrast to the other
regents who held their positions in an ex officio capacity. She added that she was a
simple student and did not receive any salary as a student regent.
The Sandiganbayan denied her motion for lack of merit.
ISSUE
WON the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the petitioner as she contended that
she was not a public officer. - YES
RULING
Petitioner UP student regent is a public officer. It is not only the salary grade that
determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan also has
jurisdiction over other officers enumerated in P.D. No. 1606.
In Geduspan v. People, the Court held that while the first part of Section 4(A)
covers only officials with Salary Grade 27 and higher, its second part specifically
includes other executive officials whose positions may not be of Salary Grade 27
and higher but who are by express provision of law placed under the jurisdiction
of the said court.
Hannah Serana falls under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as she is placed
there by express provision of law. Section 4(A)(1)(g) of P.D. No. 1606 explicitly
vested the Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over Presidents, directors or trustees,
or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or
educational institutions or foundations. Petitioner falls under this category. As the
Sandiganbayan pointed out, the BOR performs functions similar to those of a
board of trustees of a non-stock corporation. By express mandate of law, Hannah
Serana is, indeed, a public officer as contemplated by P.D. No. 1606.
CONTRERAS, AMABEL
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2G CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE
RA 8369
24. PEOPLE OF THE
G.R. NO. 162144-54
PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,vs.
HON. MA. THERESA L. DELA DATE: November 13, 2012
TORRE- YADAO,
PONENTE: ABAD, J.:
DOCTRINE
…in vesting in family courts exclusive original jurisdiction
over criminal cases involving minors, the law but seeks to
protect their welfare and best interests. For this reason,
when the need for such protection is not compromised, the
Court is able to relax the rule.
FACTS
In the early morning of May 18, 1995, the combined forces of the Philippine National Police's
Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task Group composed of Task Force Habagat, Traffic
Management Command, Criminal Investigation, and National Capital Region Command killed
11 suspected members of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang along Commonwealth Avenue in Quezon
City. On October 12, 2003 the parents of two of the victims submitted birth certificates showing
that they were minors. The prosecution amended the informations to show such minority and
asked respondent Executive Judge Ma. Natividad M. Dizon to recall the assignment of the cases
to Branch 81 and re-raffle them to a family court. The request for recall was denied. On
November 12, 2003 Judge Yadao issued an order, denying the prosecution’s motion for re-raffle
to a family court on the ground that Section 5 of R.A. 8369 applied only to living minors.
ISSUE/S
Does the family court have jurisdiction over the subject matter when the minors involved, in
this case, are already dead? –NO.
RULING
The Court is not impermeable to the provisions of Section 5 of R.A. 8369, that vests in family
courts jurisdiction over violations of R.A. 7610, which in turn covers murder cases where the
victim is a minor. Thus: Sec. 5. Jurisdiction of Family Courts. – The Family Courts shall have
exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases:
a) Criminal cases where one or more of the accused is below eighteen (18) years of age but not
less than nine (9) years of age, or where one or more of the victims is a minor at the time of the
commission of the offense: Provided, That if the minor is found guilty, the court shall
promulgate sentence and ascertain any civil liability which the respondent may have incurred.
Undoubtedly, in vesting in family courts exclusive original jurisdiction over criminal cases
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involving minors, the law but seeks to protect their welfare and best interests. For this reason,
when the need for such protection is not compromised, the Court is able to relax the rule. In
several cases, for instance, the Court has held that the CA enjoys concurrent jurisdiction with
the family courts in hearing petitions for habeas corpus involving minors.
Here, the two minor victims, for whose interests the people wanted the murder cases moved to a
family court, are dead. As respondents aptly point out, there is no living minor in the
murder cases that require the special attention and protection of a family court. In fact, no
minor would appear as party in those cases during trial since the minor victims are represented
by their parents who had become the real private offended parties.
[CUNANAN, JEAN]
2G CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE
25. BUREAU OF
CUSTOMS V.
DEVANADERA
[TOPIC] R.A 9282
G.R. NO. 193253
DATE: SEPTEMBER 8 2015
PONENTE: PERALTA, J
DOCTRINE
It is the duty of the courts to consider the question of jurisdiction
before they look into other matters involved in the case, even
though such question is not raised by any of the parties Although the
question of jurisdiction over the subject matter was not raised at
bench by either of the parties, the Court will first address such
question before delving into the procedural and substantive issues of
the instant petition.
After all, it is the duty of the courts to consider the question of
jurisdiction before they look into other matters involved in the case,
even though such a question is not raised by any of the parties.
Courts are bound to take notice of the limits of their authority and,
even if such question is neither raised by the pleadings nor
suggested by counsel, they may recognize the want of jurisdiction
and act accordingly by staying pleadings, dismissing the action, or
otherwise noticing the defect, at any stage of the proceedings.
Besides, issues or errors not raised by the parties may be resolved by
the Court where, as in this case, the issue is one of jurisdiction; it is
necessary in arriving at a just decision; and the resolution of the
issues raised by the parties depend upon the determination of the
unassigned issue or error, or is necessary to give justice to the
parties.
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FACTS
Short Facts:
The petition commence On January 30, 2007, Commissioner Napoleon L. Morales of petitioner
Bureau of Customs (BOC) issued Audit Notification Letter (ANL) No. 0701246,3 informing the
President of OILINK that the Post Entry Audit Group (PEAG) of the BOC will be conducting a
compliance audit, including the examination, inspection, verification and/or investigation of all
pertinent records of OILINK's import transactions for the past three (3)-year period counted
from the said date. Private respondent UNIOIL Petroleum Philippines, Inc. is engaged in
marketing, distribution, and sale of petroleum, oil and other products, while its co-respondent
OILINK International, Inc. is engaged in manufacturing, importing, exporting, buying, selling, or
otherwise dealing in at wholesale and retails of petroleum, oil, gas and of any and all
refinements and byproducts thereof.
When the Legal Service of the BOC rendered a Decision finding that OILINK violated Section
IV.A.2(c) and (e) of CAO 4-2004, it declined to furnish the Audit Team copies of the required
documents, despite repeated demands. OILINK INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION to pay the
equivalent of twenty percent (20%) ad valorem on the article/s subject of the Importation for
which no records were kept and maintained as prescribed in Section 2504 of the Customs
Code in the amount of PHP Two Billion Seven Hundred Sixty-Four Million Eight Hundred FiftyNine Thousand Three Hundred Four and 80/100 (Php 2,764,859,304.80)
A Hold Order against all shipments of OILINK for failure to settle its outstanding account with
the BOC and to protect the interest of the government pursuant to Section 1508 of the TCCP.
Rochelle E. Vicencio, Corporate Administrative Supervisor of UNIOIL, citing the existing
Terminalling agreement dated January 2, 2008 with OILINK for the Storage of UNIOIL's
aromatic process oil and industrial lubricating oils collectively, base oils requested District
Collector Suansing Jr. to allow it to withdraw base oils from OILINK's temporarily closed
Terminal. Commissioner Morales granted the request of UNIOIL to withdraw its base oils
stored at OILINK's terminal/depot based on the Terminal ling agreement between the two
companies
In a complaint-affidavit dated December 15, 2008, Atty. Balmyrson M. Valdez, a member of the
petitioner BOC's Anti-Oil Smuggling Coordinating Committee that investigated the illegal
withdrawal by UNIOIL of oil products consigned to OILINK, valued at P181,988,627.00 with
corresponding duties and taxes in the amount of P35,507,597.00 accused the private
respondents of violation of Sections 3601 and 3602.
Arman A. De Andres, State Prosecutor of the Department of Justice (DOJ), recommended the
dismissal of the complaint-affidavit for lack of probable cause. The Resolution was approved by
public respondents Assistant Chief State Prosecutor Pedrito L. Ranees and Chief State
Prosecutor Zuflo. On automatic review, the Resolution was affirmed by then Secretary of
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Justice Raul M. Gonzales. Dissatisfied, the BOC filed a motion for reconsideration which was
denied by the public respondent, the Acting Secretary of Justice Agnes VST Devanadera. In the
Resolution dated March 26, 2010, the CA dismissed outright the petition due to procedural
defects
Petitioner’s Contention:
The Petitioner seriously erred when it denied the motion for reconsideration solely on the
ground that, allegedly, it did not receive the second and complete copy of the petition,
containing the verification and certification against forum shopping, also when the law and
jurisprudence when it affirmed its 26 march 2010 resolution, dismissing the petition on
account of mere technicalities. Also, when the honorable court of appeals committed serious
error when it did not look into the merits of the case, where it was clearly established that
there is probable cause to indict respondents for trial for violation of section 3601 and 3602 in
relation to section 2530, paragraphs (e), and section 3604 (d), (e), (f), and (h) of the TCCP, as
amended
Respondent’s Contention:
OILINK expressed its willingness to comply with the request for the production of the said
documents, but claimed that it was hampered by the resignation of its employees from the
Accounting and Supply Department. OILINK also averred that it would refer the matter to the
Commissioner of Customs in view of the independent investigation being conducted by the
latter.
Brief Rulings of Lower Courts:
The Legal Service of the BOC rendered a Decision finding that OILINK violated Section IV.A.2(c)
and (e) of CAO 4-200 when it refused to furnish the Audit Team copies of the required
documents, despite repeated demands. The Office finds herein respondent liable for violating
Sections IV.A.2 (c) and (e) of Customs Administrative Order No. 4-2004, and a DECISION is
hereby rendered ordering OILINK INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION to pay the equivalent of
twenty percent (20%) ad valorem on the article/s subject of the importation for which no
records were kept and maintained as prescribed in Section 2504 of the Customs Code in the
amount of Pesos: Two Billion Seven Hundred Sixty-Four Million Eight Hundred Fifty-Nine
Thousand Three Hundred Four and 80/100 (PHP 2,764,859,304.80). Ordering the Bureau of
Customs to hold the delivery or release of subsequent imported articles to answer for the fine,
any revised assessment, and/or as a penalty for failure to keep records. This is without
prejudice to the filing of a criminal case or any appropriate legal action against the importer in
order to protect the interest of the government and deter other importers from committing
the same offense.
ISSUE/S
Whether or not the court of appeals has certiorari jurisdiction over the resolution of the acting
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secretary of justice, affirming the dismissal of the complaint-affidavit for violation of provisions
of the TCCP due to lack of probable cause
RULING
The Court rules in negative.
The elementary rule is that the CA has jurisdiction to review the resolution of the DOJ through
a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court on the ground that the Secretary of
Justice committed grave abuse of his discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction.
However, with the enactment of the Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9282, amending R.A. No. 1125 by
expanding the jurisdiction of the CTA, enlarging its membership and elevating its rank to the
level of a collegiate court with special jurisdiction, it is no longer clear which between the CA
and the CTA has jurisdiction to review through a petition for certiorari the DOJ resolution in
preliminary investigations involving tax and tariff offenses.
The foregoing notwithstanding, while there is no express grant of such power, with respect to
the CTA, Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides, nonetheless, that judicial
power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by
law and that judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
It would not be amiss to point out that a court which is endowed with a particular jurisdiction
should have powers which are necessary to enable it to act effectively within such jurisdiction.
These should be regarded as powers which are inherent in its jurisdiction and the court must
possess them in order to enforce its rules of practice and to suppress any abuses of its process
and to defeat any attempted thwarting of such process.
Thus, this Court has held that "while a court may be expressly granted the incidental powers
necessary to effectuate its jurisdiction, a grant of jurisdiction, in the absence of prohibitive
legislation, implies the necessary and usual incidental powers essential to effectuate it, and,
subject to existing laws and constitutional provisions, every regularly constituted court has
power to do all things that are reasonably necessary for the administration of justice within the
scope of its jurisdiction and for the enforcement of its judgments and mandates." Hence,
demands, matters or questions ancillary or incidental to, or growing out of, the main action,
and coming within the above principles, may be taken cognizance of by the court and
determined, since such jurisdiction is in aid of its authority over the principal matter, even
though the court may thus be called on to consider and decide matters which, as original
causes of action, would not be within its cognizance. In this regard, Section 1 of RA 9282 states
that the CTA shall be of the same level as the CA and shall possess all the inherent powers of a
court of justice. WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED.
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[GIANAN, AIRA, JULIE]
2G CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE
Republic Act 8293 - Intellectual Property Code
26. Samson v. Daway, G.R. NO. 160054-55
G.R. Nos. 160054-55, 21 DATE: 21 July 2004
July 2004
PONENTE: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
DOCTRINE
Jurisdiction over the instant criminal case for unfair competition is
properly lodged with the Regional Trial Court even if the penalty
therefor is imprisonment of less than 6 years
FACTS
Two informations for unfair competition under Section 168.3 (a), in relation to Section 170, of
the Intellectual Property Code (Republic Act No. 8293), were filed against petitioner Manolo P.
Samson, the registered owner of ITTI Shoes. ITTI Shoes allegedly distributed, sold and/or
offered for sale CATERPILLAR products such as footwear, garments, clothing, bags,
accessories and paraphernalia which are closely identical to and/or colorable imitations of the
authentic Caterpillar products and likewise using trademarks, symbols and/or designs as would
cause confusion, mistake or deception on the part of the buying public to the damage and
prejudice of CATERPILLAR, INC.
Petitioner challenged the jurisdiction of the trial court over the offense charged. He contended
that since under Section 170 of R.A. No. 8293, the penalty of imprisonment for unfair
competition does not exceed six years, the offense is cognizable by the Municipal Trial Courts
and not by the Regional Trial Court, per R.A. No. 7691.
ISSUE/S
Whether or not the MTC had jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases for violation of
intellectual property rights
RULING
No, the RTC has jurisdiction over unfair competition.
Under Section 170 of R.A. No. 8293, which took effect on January 1, 1998, the criminal penalty
for infringement of registered marks, unfair competition, false designation of origin and false
description or representation, is imprisonment from 2 to 5 years and a fine ranging from
P50,000.00 to P200,000.00.
Corollarily, Section 163 of the same Code states that actions (including criminal and civil)
under Sections 150, 155, 164, 166, 167, 168 and 169 shall be brought before the proper courts
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with appropriate jurisdiction under existing laws, thus
The existing law referred to in the foregoing provision is Section 27 of R.A. No. 166 (The
Trademark Law) which provides that jurisdiction over cases for infringement of registered
marks, unfair competition, false designation of origin and false description or representation, is
lodged with the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court).
We find no merit in the claim of petitioner that R.A. No. 166 was expressly repealed by R.A.
No. 8293.
Notably, the aforequoted clause did not expressly repeal R.A. No. 166 in its entirety, otherwise,
it would not have used the phrases parts of Acts and inconsistent herewith; and it would have
simply stated Republic Act No. 165, as amended; Republic Act No. 166, as amended; and
Articles 188 and 189 of the Revised Penal Code; Presidential Decree No. 49, including
Presidential Decree No. 285, as amended are hereby repealed. It would have removed all doubts
that said specific laws had been rendered without force and effect. The use of the phrases parts
of Acts and inconsistent herewith only means that the repeal pertains only to provisions which
are repugnant or not susceptible of harmonization with R.A. No. 8293.7 Section 27 of R.A. No.
166, however, is consistent and in harmony with Section 163 of R.A. No. 8293. Had R.A. No.
8293 intended to vest jurisdiction over violations of intellectual property rights with the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, it would have expressly stated so under Section 163 thereof.
Moreover, the settled rule in statutory construction is that in case of conflict between a general
law and a special law, the latter must prevail. Jurisdiction conferred by a special law to Regional
Trial Courts must prevail over that granted by a general law to Municipal Trial Courts.
In the case at bar, R.A. No. 8293 and R.A. No. 166 are special laws conferring jurisdiction over
violations of intellectual property rights to the Regional Trial Court. They should therefore
prevail over R.A. No. 7691, which is a general law. Hence, jurisdiction over the instant criminal
case for unfair competition is properly lodged with the Regional Trial Court even if the penalty
therefore is imprisonment of less than 6 years, or from 2 to 5 years and a fine ranging from
P50,000.00 to P200,000.00.
In fact, to implement and ensure the speedy disposition of cases involving violations of
intellectual property rights under R.A. No. 8293, the Court issued A.M. No. 02-1-11-SC dated
February 19, 2002 designating certain Regional Trial Courts as Intellectual Property Courts. On
June 17, 2003, the Court further issued a Resolution consolidating jurisdiction to hear and
decide Intellectual Property Code and Securities and Exchange Commission cases in specific
Regional Trial Courts designated as Special Commercial Courts.
GIANAN, Steffi Arantxa R.
2G CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE
Court Martial
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27. GONZALES
v. ABAYA
G.R. NO. 164007
DATE: August 10 2006
PONENTE: Sandoval-Gutierrez
DOCTRINE
R.A. No. 7055 did not divest the military courts of
jurisdiction to try cases involving violations of Articles 54
to 70, Articles 72 to 92, and Articles 95 to 97 of the
Articles of War as these are considered "service-connected
crimes or offenses." In fact, it mandates that these shall be
tried by the court-martial.
FACTS
321 soldiers, including the petitioners, surrendered to the authorities after the Oakwood
Mutiny on 2003. The DOJ recommended the filing of the corresponding Information against
them. Meanwhile, AFP Chief of Staff Gen. Abaya ordered the arrest and detention of the
soldiers and directed the AFP to conduct its own separate investigation. On August 5 2003, the
DOJ filed before the RTC an Information for coup d’etat against the soldiers. The DOJ was
later directed by the RTC on August 13 2003 to conduct a reinvestigation. On the same date,
Gen. Abaya created a Pre-Trial Investigation Panel tasked to determine the propriety of filing
with the military tribunal charges for violations of the Articles of War under CA No. 408. The
charges are violation of Article 63, 64, 67,96, and 97. After DOJ’s reinvestigation, probably
cause was only found against 31 soldiers instead, including the petitioners. On the other hand,
the Pre-Trial Investigation Panel recommended that those charged with coup d’etat before the
RTC should not be charged before the military tribunal. RTC also issued an order declaring all
charges before the court martial against the accused are not service-related and are absorbed.
Col. Magno, as OIC of the Judge Advocate General’s Office, reviewed the findings of the PreTrial Investigation Panel and recommended instead that 29 officers, including petitioners, be
prosecuted before a court martial for violation of Article 96 (conduct unbecoming an officer and
a gentleman). Col. Magno’s recommendation was approved by the AFP top brass. Petitioners
then filed before the Supreme Court a petition for prohibition praying that respondents be
ordered to desist from charging them with violation of Article 96.
Petitioners maintain that the offense for violation of Art. 96 is not service-connected but
is absorbed in the crime of coup d’etat. The Solicitor General, representing respondents,
argued however that under RA No. 7055, Art. 96 is a service-connected offense and falls under
the jurisdiction of the court martial.
ISSUE/S
Whether or not the court martial has jurisdiction over the petitioners.
RULING
YES. Sec. 1 of RA No. 7055 reads:
SEC. 1. Members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and other persons subject to military
law, including members of the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Units, who commit crimes
or offenses penalized under the Revised Penal Code, other special penal laws, or local
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government ordinances, regardless of whether or not civilians are co-accused, victims, or
offended parties, which may be natural or juridical persons, shall be tried by the proper civil
court, except when the offense, as determined before arraignment by the civil court, is serviceconnected, in which case, the offense shall be tried by court-martial, Provided, That the
President of the Philippines may, in the interest of justice, order or direct at any time before
arraignment that any such crimes or offenses be tried by the proper civil courts.
As used in this Section, service-connected crimes or offenses shall be limited to those defined in
Articles 54 to 70, Articles 72 to 92, and Articles 95 to 97 of Commonwealth Act No. 408, as
amended.
In imposing the penalty for such crimes or offenses, the court-martial may take into
consideration the penalty prescribed therefor in the Revised Penal Code, other special laws, or
local government ordinances.
The said provision provides that if the offense is service-connected, then the
offending soldier shall be tried by a court martial, unless the President of the
Philippines directs before arraignment that any crimes be tried by the proper civil
court instead. The second paragraph of the same provision also specified the
violations of the Articles of War that are triable by court martial, which include
Article 96.
Violation of Article 96 is ruled to be service-connected as it is specified by
RA No. 7055 to be as such. Furthermore, the charge concerns the alleged violation
of the soldiers’ solemn oath as officers to defend the Constitution and the dulyconstituted authorities as they cause dishonor and disrespect to the military
profession. Thus, the charge has a bearing on their professional conduct or
behavior as military officers.
RTC then practically amended the law which vests the court martial the
jurisdiction over service-connected crimes or offenses because of its declaration,
constituting grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
R.A. No. 7055 did not divest the military courts of jurisdiction to try cases
involving violations of Articles 54 to 70, Articles 72 to 92, and Articles 95 to 97 of
the Articles of War as these are considered "service-connected crimes or
offenses." In fact, it mandates that these shall be tried by the court-martial.
[MISOLA, JOHN DAEDALUS]
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2G CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE
Jurisdiction Determined by Allegations in the Complaint or
Information
28. People v
Ocaya
G.R. NO. L-47448
DATE: May 17, 1978
PONENTE: Teehankee, J.
DOCTRINE
The questioned order is null and void. Respondent judge
wrongfully dismissed the case before him in disregard to the
elemental rule that jurisdiction is determined by the
allegations of the information and that the offense of serious
physical injuries charged in the information had duly vested
his court with jurisdiction.
FACTS
A charge of serious physical injuries was filed against private respondents for
assaulting Mrs. Lolita Ares, a mother who was then still on the 12th day from her
child delivery, wrestling her to the ground and thereafter throwing and hitting her
with a fist-size stone at the face.
The records do not show that arraignment or trial on the merits has been held
much less that warrants for the arrest of the accused had been issued. After
scanning the records and noting that the medical certificate stated that the injuries
would require medical attention from 7 to 10 days and therefore may either be
slight or less serious physical injuries only contrary to the victim’s affidavit that
she was incapacitated from her customary labor for more than 30 days and the
fiscal’s findings as to the prominent scar left on the victim’s face as a result
"which considerably deforms her face" (as duly alleged in the information), the
trial judge dismissed the information for lack of jurisdiction.
The decision of his ruling stated that what governs in the filing of a physical
injury case is the certificate issued by the physician regarding the duration of
treatment, and not what the victim declares because the same is self-serving.
A motion for reconsideration was filed but denied. The judge evaluated the case
without having heard the parties or their witnesses (particularly the physician who
issued the medical certificate) nor having received their evidence and ruling
against the deformity alleged in the information on the basis of his perception
from a reading of the medical certificate and the fiscal’s written resolution finding
proper basis for the filing of the information.
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Hence, the petition was filed.
ISSUE/S
Whether or not the trial judge was correct in dismissing the case on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction.
RULING
NO. The Supreme Court ruled that the questioned order is null and void.
Respondent judge wrongfully dismissed the case before him in disregard to the
elemental rule that jurisdiction is determined by the allegations of the information
and that the offense of serious physical injuries charged in the information had
duly vested his court with jurisdiction.
The Court finds that respondent judge committed a grave abuse of discretion in
precipitately dismissing the case for alleged lack of jurisdiction on the mere basis
of his totally wrong notion that what governs in the filing of a physical injury case
is the medical certificate regarding the duration of treatment and "not what the
victim declares because the same is self-serving."cralaw virtua1aw library
It is elemental that the jurisdiction of a court in criminal cases is determined by
the allegations of the information or criminal complaint and not by the result of
the evidence presented at the trial, much less by the trial judge’s personal
appraisal of the affidavits and exhibits attached by the fiscal to the record of the
case without hearing the parties and their witnesses nor receiving their evidence at
a proper trial.
It is equally elementary that the mere fact that evidence presented at the trial
would indicate that a lesser offense outside the trial court’s jurisdiction was
committed does not deprive the trial court of its jurisdiction which had vested in it
under the allegations of the information as filed since" (once) the jurisdiction
attaches to the person and subject matter of the litigation, the subsequent
happening of events, although they are of such a character as would have
prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first instance, will not operate to oust
jurisdiction already attached."
Indeed, the Solicitor General has aptly commented that "the dismissal of the case
had only resulted in duplication of work and wasted time in the remand of records
when respondent trial judge dismissed the instant case for want of jurisdiction,
when it could have immediately proceeded to arraign the accused and try him."
[OTADOY, MARY CHRIS]
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2G CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
When injunction may be issued to restrain
criminal prosecution
29. Arkoncel vs. Court of First
Instance of Basilan City
L-27204
DATE: August 29, 1975
PONENTE: Aquino, J.
DOCTRINE
The general rule is that injunction or
prohibition does not lie to restrain a criminal
prosecution.
FACTS
Short Facts:
Casimiro V. Arkoncel, a lawyer serving as OIC of the Basilan Branch of the Board
of Liquidators,
was charged with qualified theft (5000 coconuts) in the Basilan City CFI together
with his laborers
Lachica, Hasi, A. Inid and G.Inid. The Fiscal, after certifying that he had
conducted the proper preliminary investigation, added "that the accused were duly
subpoenaed but failed to appear". According to him, when Arkoncel appeared in
court and was about to be arrested, the arrest was not effected because of the
latter's supplication that the case be settled and, if it could not be settled, that he be
allowed to go home so that he could prepare the requisite bail bond. Instead of
posting bail, Arkoncel filed the instant special civil action of prohibition in order
to enjoin his prosecution. He alleged that he was denied due process because he
was not subpoenaed to appear at the preliminary investigation. In two subpoenas,
he was required to appear at the preliminary investigation. He did not appear at
the scheduled hearings. A hearing already set was postponed at the instance of
Atty. Bautista, who presumably appeared for Arkoncel. Atty. Bautista informed
the Fiscal that he had requested the Manila office of the Board of Liquidators to
furnish him certain data relevant to the case. The hearing was postponed for three
weeks. After the expiration of that period Arkoncel and Bautista did not get in
touch with the Fiscal.
ISSUE/S
Whether or not Arkoncel's prosecution can be enjoined
RULING
No. This case falls within the general rule that injunction or prohibition does not
lie to restrain a criminal prosecution. It does not fall within the exceptions where
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the prosecution may be enjoined (a) for the orderly administration of justice, (b) to
prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an oppressive and vindictive
manner, (c) to avoid multiplicity of actions, (d) to afford adequate protection to
constitutional rights, and (e) where the statute relied upon is unconstitutional or
was declared void. The reason for the general rule is that the accused has an
adequate remedy at law by establishing as a defense to the prosecution that he did
not commit the act charged, or that the statute, on which the prosecution is based,
is void, and, in case of conviction, be taking an appeal. Public interest requires
that criminal acts be immediately investigated and prosecuted for the
protection of society. There is another reason which justifies the dismissal of the
petition. Arkoncel did not exhaust his remedies. He did not raise in the lower court
the alleged lack of due process. He came to this Court without first filing in the
lower court a motion to quash or asking for a reinvestigation. His contention in
this Court that his prosecution was merely an act of harassment, while he was in
the lawful performance of his duties as a government officer, is a factual
allegation that has no basis in the record. It is controverted by the respondents. He
should have raised that issue in the lower court. The rule is that in a preliminary
investigation conducted by the provincial or city fiscal, or state attorney, it is
sufficient if the accused was given a chance to be heard (Sec. 14, Rule 112 of the
Rules of Court). In this case, Arkoncel was afforded an opportunity to appear at
the preliminary investigation. He waived his appearance. A "preliminary
investigation may be done away with entirely without infringing the constitutional
right of an accused under the due process clause to a fair trial".
Pelayo, Mary Rose G.
2G CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE
When injunction may be issued to restrain criminal prosecution
G.R. No. 123504
30. SAMSON V.
GUINGONA, JR DATE: December 14, 2000
PONENTE: PARDO, J.
DOCTRINE
As a general rule, the Court will not issue writs of prohibition or injunction
preliminary or final, to enjoin or restrain, criminal prosecution. With more
reason will injunction not lie when the case is still at the stage of
preliminary investigation or reinvestigation. However, in extreme cases, we
have laid the following exceptions:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
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(1) when the injunction is necessary to afford adequate protection to the
constitutional rights of the accused; (2) when it is necessary for the orderly
administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions;
(3) when there is a prejudicial question which is subjudice; (4) when the
acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority; (5) where the
prosecution is under an invalid law; ordinance or regulation; (6) when
double jeopardy is clearly apparent; (7) where the Court has no jurisdiction
over the offense; (8) where it is a case of persecution rather than
prosecution; (9) where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by
the lust for vengeance; and (10) when there is clearly no prima facie case
against the accused and a motion to quash on that ground has been denied
FACTS
On July 13, 1995, at about 8:05 p.m., at Scout Reyes Street, Barangay Paligsahan, Quezon City,
patrolmen of the Central Police District Command posted at the intersection of Scout Reyes
Street and Mother Ignacia Street flagged a taxicab, with Datu Gemie Sinsuat as passenger.
Instantly, the patrolmen shot Datu Sinsuat, a son of politician from cotabato, in different parts of
the body, inflicting upon him multiple gunshot wounds, causing his death.
After investigation, an information for murder against petitioners and other police officers,
except Nestor Tiotioen and Edwin Villanueva, who turned state witnesses.
the trial court ruled that there was probable cause for the arrest but ordered the Chief State
Prosecutor, Department of Justice or his Assistant Prosecutors to reinvestigate the case. 1aw
1ibrary
Petitioners did not file any motion for reconsideration of the order. However, before the
Department of Justice could conduct a reinvestigation, petitioners filed with the Supreme Court
the instant petition to enjoin respondents from further proceeding with the reinvestigation of the
case or from resolving the same.
ISSUE/S:
WON the Court may enjoin the Secretary of Justice from conducting a reinvestigation of the
charges against petitioners as ordered by the trial court for determination of probable cause.NO
RULING
Petitioners’ plea for injunction to restrain the reinvestigation of the criminal case against them is
not legally permissible.
As a general rule, the Court will not issue writs of prohibition or injunction preliminary or final,
to enjoin or restrain, criminal prosecution. With more reason will injunction not lie when the
case is still at the stage of preliminary investigation or reinvestigation. However, in extreme
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cases, we have laid the following exceptions:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(1) when the injunction is necessary to afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of
the accused; (2) when it is necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid
oppression or multiplicity of actions; (3) when there is a prejudicial question which is
subjudice; (4) when the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority; (5) where the
prosecution is under an invalid law; ordinance or regulation; (6) when double jeopardy is
clearly apparent; (7) where the Court has no jurisdiction over the offense; (8) where it is a case
of persecution rather than prosecution; (9) where the charges are manifestly false and motivated
by the lust for vengeance; and (10) when there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused
and a motion to quash on that ground has been denied
Petitioners have not shown that the case at bar falls within any of the recognized exceptions
above set forth. Petitioners only rely on the probability that a reinvestigation may result in the
remand of the case to the court and the issuance of a warrant of arrest.cralaw : red
We find petitioners’ plea for a writ of injunction or temporary restraining order utterly without
merit. As a rule, we do not interfere in the conduct of preliminary investigations or
reinvestigations and leave to the investigating prosecutor sufficient latitude of discretion in the
exercise of determination of what constitutes sufficient evidence as will establish probable
cause for the filing of information against an offender
[TANA, JOHMELY CEN]
2G CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE
Jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan
G.R. NO. 133289
31. ANTIPORDA JR. V.
DATE: 23 DEC 1999
GARCHITORENA
PONENTE: BUENA
DOCTRINE
The Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction
on civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in
connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14A, issued in 1986. The Sandiganbayan also exercises
civil jurisdiction.
FACTS
Accused Mayor Licerio Antiporda and others were charged for the crime of
kidnapping; the case was filed in the first division of Sandiganbayan.
Subsequently, the Court ordered the prosecution to submit amended information,
which was complied with evenly and the new information contained the place
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where the victim was brought.
The accused filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion praying that a reinvestigation be
conducted and the issuance of warrants of arrest be deferred but it was denied by
the Ombudsman. The accused thereafter filed a Motion for New Preliminary
investigation and to hold in abeyance and/or recall warrant of arrest issued but the
same was also denied. Subsequently, the accused filed a Motion to Quash
Amended Information for lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged, which was
ignored for their continuous refusal to submit their selves to the Court and after
their voluntary appearance which invested the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction over
their persons, their motion for reconsideration was again denied.
ISSUE/S
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan, which has no jurisdiction over the offense
charged in the original information, subsequently acquire such jurisdiction by the
simple expedient of amending the information to supply, for the first time,
jurisdictional facts not previously averred in the original information?
RULING
No (but in this case it was held that Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the case
because of estoppel). The original Information filed with the Sandiganbayan did
not mention that the offense committed by the accused is office-related. It was
only after the same was filed that the prosecution belatedly remembered that a
jurisdictional fact was omitted therein.
However, we hold that the petitioners are estopped from assailing the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan for in the supplemental arguments to motion for
reconsideration and/or reinvestigation dated June 10, 1997 filed with the same
court, it was they who challenged the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court over
the case and clearly stated in their Motion for Reconsideration that the said crime
is work connected (and therefore Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the case).
It is a well-settled rule that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to
secure affirmative relief against his opponent, and after obtaining or failing to
obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction.
We therefore hold that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the case because
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of estoppel and it was thus vested with the authority to order the amendment of
the Information.
See also: Rule 110, Section 14 of the Rules of Court.
[CAMPOS, JOHN MICHAEL H.]
NOTE: KULANG NA DIGEST SA MOD 1
6, David v. Agbay, G.R. No. 199113, 18 March 2015
22, Soller v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 144261-62, 9 May 2001
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