The Artemis Accords terminally fail.
Matthew Gross, 01-27-2023, "The Artemis Accords: International Cooperation in the Era of
Space Exploration," Harvard International Review, https://hir.harvard.edu/the-artemis-accords/
One potential area of conflict could be the international battle over resource extraction on the
moon. The Artemis Accords establish that when nations engage in mining activities on the
moon, they do not obtain property rights over the extracted materials. These Accords, however,
are not legally binding and are merely a formalized understanding between the parties of the
agreement. The Accords attempt to counter this issue through the creation of “safety zones”
where nations cannot interfere with other nations’ resource extraction activities. While safety
zones might be able to resolve international tensions, they also could be the source of a new
issue. The Accords lack a clear mechanism to designate which nations get what territory. The
distribution of equitable territories with ample resources does not seem to be a process that
naturally lends itself to a neutral outcome. Additionally, some criticize the Artemis Accords for
being too US-centric and possibly leading to unideal outcomes for other nations—with some of
the most ardent opposition coming from China and Russia. As such, the battle for territory on
the moon could resemble conflicts in the South China Sea and in Ukraine as foreign powers
skirmish with each other for additional land and resources. Beyond the potential for conflicts
between international governments, the Artemis Accords neglect another important entity:
private corporations. Elon Musk and Jeff Bezos have made headlines with their space
exploration efforts through their private companies (SpaceX and Blue Origin, respectively).
Previous space agreements have declared that governments are liable for private companies’
activities in outer space. However, this seems to lack coherence in domains such as space travel,
where jurisdictional issues are far more ambiguous. The Artemis Accords shed private
corporations of responsibility and create a scenario in which rogue private entities could violate
the terms of the agreement without facing severe consequences. This might create a scenario in
which an outer space conflict between the United States, China, and Russia becomes
increasingly complicated with the presence of non-state actors that are acting on behalf of their
own interests. Given that the Artemis Accords do not prohibit military action on the moon, the
consequences of an international space conflict extend far beyond diplomatic bickering. Any
potential military conflict would, however, mitigate the power of private corporations, which
presently do not have any military operations. While the Artemis Accords aim to serve as an
important mediator among state actors, the agreements lack an enforcement mechanism for
non-state actors who have their own intentions. The endless possibilities of space can inspire an
overwhelming sense of optimism, but also can generate a multitude of thoughts about the
downsides of space exploration. The final frontier will not necessarily act as an ultimate
peacemaker for nations that have fought many explicit and implicit conflicts against each other.
The Artemis Accords acknowledge this possibility and attempt to resolve these tensions through
negotiated terms and a formalized signatory process, which demonstrates the support of
nations. Good intentions, however, can be marred by pragmatic outcomes and the drive for
power. The struggle between the United States, Russia, and China might not stay contained to
Earth, and their conflict could spill over to outer space. The future of international space
cooperation might be reliant on amending the Artemis Accords or devising a new agreement
altogether.
And there is insufficient funding.
NASA – Office of Inspector General 21—[NASA’S MANAGEMENT OF THE ARTEMIS MISSIONS
(2021). Retrieved 4 February 2023, from https://oig.nasa.gov/docs/IG-22-003.pdf]
Currently NASA’s most ambitious and costly activity, the Artemis program faces schedule,
procurement, technical, and funding risks. This includes procurement of Artemis-related
technologies and space flight hardware using research and development contracts that leverage
commercial capabilities but require a Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) deviation for
acquiring services and hardware. SLS and Orion have also experienced technical challenges in
later development phases as well as the effects of COVID-19 restrictions and severe weather
events. Additionally, the Gateway and HLS Programs received significantly less funding in fiscal
year (FY) 2021 than required to meet NASA’s initial acquisition strategy. As the second in a
series of audits examining NASA’s Artemis plans, this report assessed the Artemis program’s
schedule and projected costs as well as how the Agency’s acquisition and programmatic
approaches facilitate landing astronauts on the Moon. To complete this work, we reviewed
documents, systems, policies, and procedures pertaining to schedule, cost, budget, operations,
acquisition strategy, and program/project management requirements related to Artemis, its
programs, and contactors. We also reviewed contracts, interviewed NASA and contractor
officials, and conducted site visits at SpaceX headquarters in California and its Starbase facility in
Texas. WHAT WE FOUND NASA’s three initial Artemis missions, designed to culminate in a
crewed lunar landing, face varying degrees of technical difficulties and delays heightened by the
COVID-19 pandemic and weather events that will push launch schedules from months to years
past the Agency’s current goals. With Artemis I mission elements now being integrated and
tested at Kennedy Space Center, we estimate NASA will be ready to launch by summer 2022
rather than November 2021 as planned. Although Artemis II is scheduled to launch in late 2023,
we project that it will be delayed until at least mid-2024 due to the mission’s reuse of Orion
components from Artemis I. While the Advanced Exploration Systems (AES) Division—which
includes HLS, Gateway, and next-generation spacesuits—is working on an integrated master
schedule (IMS) for Artemis III that incorporates Exploration Systems Development (ESD) Division
programs—SLS, Orion, and Exploration Ground Systems—the draft version does not include
information on programs critical to Artemis that are outside of AES and ESD. Given the time
needed to develop and fully test the HLS and new spacesuits, we project NASA will exceed its
current timetable for landing humans on the Moon in late 2024 by several years. In addition,
NASA lacks a comprehensive and accurate cost estimate that accounts for all Artemis program
costs. For FYs 2021 through 2025, the Agency uses a rough estimate for the first three missions
that excludes $25 billion for key activities related to planned missions beyond Artemis III. When
aggregating all relevant costs across mission directorates, NASA is projected to spend $93 billion
on the Artemis effort up to FY 2025. We also project the current production and operations cost
of a single SLS/Orion system at $4.1 billion per launch for Artemis I through IV, although the
Agency’s ongoing initiatives aimed at increasing affordability seek to reduce that cost. Multiple
factors contribute to the high cost of ESD programs, including the use of sole-source, cost-plus
contracts; the inability to definitize key contract terms in a timely manner; and the fact that
except for the Orion capsule, its subsystems, and the supporting launch facilities, all
components are expendable and “single use” unlike emerging commercial space flight systems.
Without capturing, accurately reporting, and reducing the cost of future SLS/Orion missions, the
Agency will face significant challenges to sustaining its Artemis program in its current
configuration.
C: Salvaging Relations
India-China relations are drastically improving, ultimately paving the way for heightened
cooperation.
Bejoy Sebastian, 2-26-2023, “An Amicable Reset of India-China Ties Hangs in the Balance,”
Modern Diplomacy, https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2023/02/26/an-amicable-reset-of-indiachina-ties-hangs-in-the-balance/ //Maria
After four years, a high-ranking diplomatic delegation from India travelled to China for the
WMCC border talks. India is the host of two key summits in 2023 – G-20 and SCO – in which
China is a crucial part of. Here, I analyse the odds of a Sino-Indian rapprochement in 2023. On 22
February 2023, senior diplomatic officials from the governments of India and China met each
other in Beijing for the Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination on India-China
Border Affairs (WMCC) talks. The Indian delegation was led by Joint Secretary (East Asia) and the
Chinese side by the Director General of Boundary and Oceanic Affairs, belonging to their
respective foreign ministries. This was the first face-to-face WMCC meeting since the standoff
along the Line of Actual Control in eastern Ladakh began in 2020, and the twenty-sixth such
dialogue since this mechanism came into existence in 2012. The last face-to-face WMCC
meeting was held four years ago, in July 2019. Parallelly, both sides have also held seventeen
rounds of military-level talks since the standoff began in May 2020. The latest WMCC meeting
marks the first bilateral visit from India to China since the fatal Galwan incident of June 2020,
which consequentially put the bilateral ties between the two Asian giants in a downward spiral.
Ironically, year 2020 also marked the 70th anniversary of establishment of formal diplomatic
relations between India and China. Following the latest WMCC dialogue, both sides opted to
issue two separate statements, rather than a joint one. The Indian statement contains mention
of discussions of “proposals for disengagement” in the remaining friction points in Ladakh,
namely Depsang Plains and Demchok, which Beijing does not consider as part of the current
standoff. The Chinese statement, on the other hand, gave a different impression and includes
mention of “further easing” the border situation towards the phase of “normalized
management and control”, rather than hinting at the prospect of a complete disengagement or
de-escalation. Friction points – the resolved ones and the remaining ones Of the six friction
points along the LAC in Ladakh, troops were withdrawn from the June 2020 clash site of Galwan
Valley in the weeks following the incident, the north and south banks of Pangong Lake in
February 2021, Patrolling Point-17A of the Gogra-Hot Springs area in August 2021 and Patrolling
Point-15 in September 2022. There are about sixty-five patrolling points along the LAC in
Ladakh. One of the key factors that trigger recurring face-offs along the LAC are the intensified
infrastructure buildup underway on both sides. It is estimated that there are still about twentyfive contested areas along the 3488-km-long LAC, a ground reality complicated by noncongruent perceptions of the border. At a time when both sides are striving to de-escalate the
situation at least in the western sector, the Chinese side have recently upped the ante along
other sectors of the LAC like the eastern sector, wherein transgressions attempts by the
People’s Liberation Army were thwarted by the Indian Army, notably in Yangtse area of Tawang
in Arunachal Pradesh in October 2021 and December 2022. Satellite imagery shows that the
Chinese side have also built rural enclaves with habitable structures in the India-claimed
territories of the eastern sector. Combined with the strategic insecurity posed by Beijing to New
Delhi through its questionable and non-benign engagement throughout India’s neighbourhood –
South Asia and the Indian Ocean region – and in the multilateral forums like the United Nations,
the level of mistrust between the two sides has increased very substantially in the recent past.
While China wants to put the border standoff only at an “appropriate place” in the overall IndiaChina bilateral ties, India wants a complete disengagement of troops from the remaining two
legacy friction points (something that goes back to 2013) as a pre-requisite for the normalisation
of ties. Before the WMCC was set in place in 2012, a series of confidence-building measures,
including a series of border management agreements and protocols, were agreed upon by both
sides in 1993, 1996 and 2005, including the one that prohibits the use of firearms in the border
areas. The Chinese Comprehensive National Power at present may be bigger than that of India’s,
but the reality of being two big nuclear-armed neighbours calls for restraint on both sides,
taking the consequences of an unintended security mishap into account. A fresh opportunity,
amid “security dilemma” Periodic senior officials-level meetings through military and diplomatic
channels are not doing enough to fully de-escalate the situation on the ground, except the
disengagement achieved at four friction points. India is hosting the G-20 and the Shanghai
Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summits in 2023, for which Chinese President Xi Jinping is
expected to participate, among other leaders. This year presents a unique opportunity for the
leaders of both countries to make fresh efforts towards a political solution, including continued
negotiations for new mutually-agreeable buffer zones and workable confidence-building
measures. A Modi-Xi face-to-face meeting on the sidelines of either the G-20 or the SCO summit
will go a long way in minimizing the optics of sabre-rattling towards each other prevailing on
both sides. Chinese strategic analysts, both from within and outside the party-state apparatus,
are highly apprehensive of the prospect of India attempting to internationalise the border
standoff, which would not be in the interest of an amicable resettlement of bilateral ties. On the
other hand, if the Chinese delegation attempts to take on India with a “wolf-warrior” approach,
it will be aptly retaliated by India’s dynamic and vocal foreign minister Dr. S. Jaishankar, which
would eventually derail all possibilities for a Sino-Indian rapprochement in 2023. While India is
part of groupings such as the U.S.-led Quad, which China disapproves of, the former has always
maintained that its participation is not targeted at containing “any specific country”. While
articulating India’s Indo-Pacific vision in the 2018 Shangri La Dialogue in Singapore, Prime
Minister Narendra Modi stated that, “… Asia and the world will have a better future when India
and China work together in trust and confidence, sensitive to each other’s interests…” At
present, a spiral of insecurity, theoretically known as “security dilemma”, is entangling the SinoIndian bilateral ties, as evident from the buildup of tens of thousands of troops and the
continued procurement and deployment of advanced weapon systems on both sides. Despite
the turbulent state of the LAC, the economies of both countries are now closely inter-connected
and is ironically showing an upward trend in terms of bilateral trade, even though New Delhi
had taken strict measures in the last three years such as restricting Chinese investment in
certain strategic sectors of the Indian economy and banning several Chinese mobile
applications. During the forthcoming summit meetings, both sides should be cautious of
mindless blame games and should remain focused on a workable and mutually acceptable plan
of action. Today, India and China are well capable of dealing with each other, militarily or
otherwise. While China is frequently conducting military exercises within its territory and its
neighbourhood in the recent past, sometimes even showcasing its offensive capabilities to the
maximum, India too is ramping up its security cooperation with like-minded countries,
particularly with the United States and other democracies in the Indo-Pacific. While these
engagements are to boost military interoperability and combat preparedness of its armed
forces, it should not give a message that they are directed against China. Likewise, China too
should also stop engaging in provocative actions targeted against Indian interests. Hope Even
though 2022 witnessed Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi and Beijing’s Special Envoy on
Afghanistan visiting India in March 2022 and in August 2022 respectively, it never produced any
substantially positive outcome as far as resetting of bilateral ties is concerned. 2022 also marked
60 years of the 1962 Sino-Indian war and also saw India intensifying the construction of the
strategic 2000-km-long Arunachal Frontier Highway and other key infrastructure projects along
the border areas of Ladakh and Sikkim. The two remaining areas to be resolved in the Ladakh
sector are Depsang Plains, located close to the northern-most tip of Indian-controlled territory
in Ladakh, and Demchok, lying further down south. These two friction points, combined with the
other contested areas along the LAC needs non-bureaucratic, non-legalistic and nonconventional diplomatic maneuverings that goes beyond the currently established mechanisms
of periodic bilateral engagement. Going three-and-a-half decades back in time, in 1988, Rajiv
Gandhi became the first Indian prime minister to visit China after the cataclysmic 1962 SinoIndian war. It was an ice-breaking moment in Indian diplomatic history that paved the way for a
series of confidence-building measures being agreed between the two countries in the following
decades. Likewise, today, India and China needs an intervention from the higher political level to
come out of the perilous state of prevailing “security dilemma”. Even though both Indian Prime
Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping met about 18 times in person from
2014 to the present, including five times in China and four times in India, I won’t completely rule
out the possibility of a diplomatic breakthrough in 2023, taking into account the symbiotic
nature of inter-dependence and inter-connectedness that characterise India-China relations
today.
Global Times 22 confirms:
Global Times, 7-8-2022, "China and India share common interests, will make greater
contributions to the future of mankind: Chinese FM," No Publication,
https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202207/1270058.shtml //Maria
China and India, with common interests and similar legitimate claims, will never go with the
flow, but are destined to uphold strategic persistence and achieve their respective development
and revitalization as well as make greater contributions to the future of mankind, Chinese State
Councilor and Foreign Minister, Wang Yi, said during his meeting on Thursday with Indian
External Affairs Minister, Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, on the sidelines of the Group of 20 (G20)
Foreign Ministers' meeting in Bali, Indonesia. Since March this year, China and India have
maintained communication and exchanges, effectively managed differences, and a momentum
of recovery has been shown in the overall bilateral relations between the two countries that
have common interests and similar legitimate claims, Wang said. Major countries like China and
India will never go with the flow against the backdrop of the changes of a century in the world,
Wang noted. We need to take concrete actions to implement the important consensus reached
by the leaders of the two countries, being each other's partner, not posing a threat to each
other and being a mutual development opportunity, bringing bilateral relations back on the
right track as early as possible, Wang said. According to Wang, China appreciates India's active
support and cooperation in the BRICS Summit and the High-level Dialogue on Global
Development recently hosted by China. China will also support India in hosting the G20 summit
and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization SCO in 2023. Both China and India adhere to the
overall direction of multilateralism and they share many common propositions in safeguarding
peace and security, promoting economic recovery, improving global governance and working
together to fight against COVID-19, Wang said, noting that the two countries should step up
coordination and cooperation to promote more democratic international relations and a fairer
international order, making the growing voices of developing countries to be heard and their
legitimate interests better safeguarded. Jaishankar said that both sides have made positive
progress in maintaining border stability, promoting practical cooperation and facilitating peopleto-people exchanges since his meeting with Wang in March. According to Jaishankar, India looks
forward to a positive, cooperative and constructive relationship with China and it is ready to
work with China to send a clear message to the outside world, to speed up the process to
improve relations, and to turn the consensus and visions of the two countries' leaders into
reality. India thanked China for supporting its hosting of the G20 and SCO next year and will
continue to adhere to strategic independence and an independent stance in international
affairs.
India joining the Accords emboldens China.
Cameron Hickert, 8-14-2017, "Space Rivals: Power and Strategy in the China-India Space Race,"
Schwarzman Scholars, https://www.schwarzmanscholars.org/events-and-news/space-rivalspower-strategy-china-india-space-race/ //Maria
Yet in light of regional power politics, deep technological cooperation – particularly regarding
space tracking capabilities – would be imprudent for the United States. Due to the current
political climate between the U.S. and China in regards to space cooperation, the partnership
with India would appear negatively. This is also true against the backdrop of South China Sea
involvement in which the U.S. is currently a factor, as well as ongoing border disputes between
China and India. Because China sets such a strong emphasis on the power implications of the
regional space order, as well as the reality of the military-civilian dual uses of space technology,
stronger U.S.-India cooperation on this front would almost surely antagonize Beijing. This is in
contrast to India’s approach, which finds a more solid grounding in the economic aspects of the
regional space race. The implications of U.S.-India technological cooperation would be a
heightened risk environment in the region, and potentially a more belligerent China on security
issues; both of these would be negative outcomes for the U.S., and would cause India more risk.
It would also escalate the security and military aspects of the regional space race to a new level,
stirring tensions and undermining the possibility of enhanced regional cooperation in the near
future. Political ramifications outside the region are also possible, as China might seek to block
India from the sort of partnerships it has been developing with Europe and Russia. Although this
would not be a problem as of now – India does not seem intensely focused on space station
access or capabilities – it would crystallize an environment unfriendly to burgeoning Indian
capabilities in the coming decades. Avoiding technological transfer to both China and India
would also enable the U.S. to avoid growing any perceived role in the India-Pakistan
relationship, in which both nations would resent any technological support provided to the
other. U.S. technological assistance to India would irk Pakistan, and the China-Pakistan
relationship could produce anti-American sentiment in India if U.S. technological assistance to
China were to seep into SUPARCO’s hands. Finally, because the space industry in India is still in
its early stages and is tightly interwoven with commercial interests, the risks that U.S.
technology shared in partnership with India then disseminate to actors and areas unfavorable to
the United States is a stark possibility. Favoring people-to-people and political partnerships with
China above technological cooperation with India may appear to undercut positive momentum
built under the U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement, but that is not the case. Similar to its
economy- focused approach to space-related developments, India continues to uphold
economic success as its core goal. This not only means the civil nuclear deal the U.S. Congress
ratified in 2008 may not have earned the U.S. as much pull as some had expected, but also that
India is unlikely to sabotage economic ties with China on behalf of U.S. interests. The year after
the framework for the nuclear deal was announced, China and India declared China-India
Friendship Year. Even after India participated in some military exercises in the South China Sea
upon signing a joint communiqué with the U.S. stating “the importance of safeguarding
maritime security and ensuring freedom of navigation and overflight throughout the region,
especially in the South China Sea,” India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi made it extremely
clear that his first, second, and third priorities were the advancement of India’s economy. The
regional space race in Asia is alive and well, with China and India developing an increasingly fastpaced rivalry. Within this context, there exists clear differences in approaches between the two
nations: China is open in its power-based rationale (including both hard and soft power) for the
space program, which is targeted at both domestic and foreign audiences, while India is much
more circumspect and technical in its official rhetoric and strategy. These dissimilarities make
sense within the frameworks of the existing strengths and shortfalls of each nation’s space
program, and also drive the future aims of both nations as they continue to develop a space
program encompassing military, economic, and scientific characteristics. The U.S., as the global
space superpower, is always a factor in this competitive dynamic, and as such must be
deliberate in its approach.
Indeed, further alignment with the U.S. emboldens China and ruins bilateral relations with India.
Antara Ghosal Singh, 5-4-2022, "China’s Evolving Strategic Discourse on India • Stimson Center,"
Stimson Center, https://www.stimson.org/2022/chinas-evolving-strategic-discourse-on-india/
//Maria
The China-India border standoff that began in May 2020 continues to date at various friction
points in the mountainous terrain of Ladakh in the Himalayas. A deadly clash between Indian
and Chinese troops in the Galwan Valley in June 2020, which was the worst fighting in over four
decades and resulted in fatalities on both sides, has come to define the crisis. Almost two years
into the standoff, there is still little clarity on its fundamental cause. However, a close analysis of
China’s domestic debates on India in the years preceding the Galwan clash and thereafter
provides a clear understanding of the Chinese perceptions that underlay the border crisis. This
analysis also offers clues on the way forward. The standoff reveals China’s policy dilemma over
India. Beijing wants to effectively check a rising New Delhi by asserting its strength and
psychological advantage in bilateral ties. But on the other hand, China is anxious about the
impact of the current crisis on its regional and global geostrategic objectives. New Delhi should
recognize its prominence in Chinese strategic debates and better leverage its position to shape
Beijing’s behavior and extract benefits from it. Executive Summary The China-India border
standoff that began in May 2020 continues to date at various friction points in the mountainous
terrain of Ladakh in the Himalayas. A deadly clash between Indian and Chinese troops in the
Galwan Valley in June 2020, which was the worst fighting in over four decades and resulted in
casualties on both sides, has come to define the crisis. Almost two years into the standoff, there
is still little clarity on its fundamental cause. Much of the existing discourse is unable to provide
a complete picture of or explanation for the development. However, a closer look at China’s
domestic debates and discussions on India in the years preceding the Galwan clash and
thereafter provides a clear and comprehensive understanding of the circumstances that might
have led to the border crisis and also offers clues on the way forward. While situating the
ongoing border crisis within the overarching framework of Chinese foreign policy and global
strategy, this paper makes two key arguments: first, the border standoff in Ladakh is likely the
outcome of an intensifying conflict between two Chinese strategies towards India— its Major
Power Diplomacy (of wooing India to hedge against the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy and making it a
key partner in the Belt and Road Initiative) and its Neighborhood Strategy (of securing a Chinacentered regional order with Beijing as the sole leader or rule-maker in the region). Second, the
standoff reveals China’s policy dilemma over India — on the one hand, Beijing wants to
effectively check a rising New Delhi by asserting its strength and psychological advantage in
bilateral ties. But on the other hand, China is anxious about the impact of the current crisis on
the realization of its various regional and global objectives in the Indian Ocean Region that
necessitates cordial ties with India. In the end, the lesson for India is to look beyond the lens of
the power differential between the two Asian giants when dealing with China. New Delhi should
come to terms with the fact that it has leverage with China due to its increasing strategic value
to Beijing, whether in the realm of China’s foreign policy or its development strategies, and
utilize it to shape Beijing’s behavior and extract benefits from it. Introduction The China-India
border standoff, which began in spring of 2020, continues to date at various friction points in
Eastern Ladakh, notwithstanding the important breakthroughs in February and August 2021,
when troops from both sides mutually withdrew from the north and south banks of the Pangong
Tso and, possibly, also at the Gogra Post.1 Almost two years into the standoff, there is still little
clarity about the fundamental cause of the ongoing crisis at the Line of Actual Control (LAC), the
de-facto border between India and China. Was it a Chinese reaction to India revoking the special
semi-autonomous status of Jammu and Kashmir2 or was it a response to Indian construction of
strategic border infrastructure, particularly the Darbuk-Shyok-Daulat Beg Oldie (DSDBO) Road?3
Was it a Chinese ploy to divert attention from the loss (economic or reputational) inflicted by
the coronavirus pandemic?4 Or was it Beijing’s effort to unilaterally define the border between
China and India along the controversial 1959 claim line, mirroring recent episodes of Chinese
power projection in the entire Indo-Pacific region under the intensified US-China competition?5
While analysts all over the world, including in India, have been vigorously debating the merits of
each of these arguments, some Chinese strategists have sought to craft a propaganda counternarrative, de-emphasizing and de-linking Chinese actions from the situation on the border with
India and thereby providing academic support to the Chinese government’s official stance on
the issue.6 They put the blame squarely on New Delhi, citing the impact of internal political
dynamics like rising Hindu nationalism, a sinking economy, and worsening conditions due to the
coronavirus epidemic as reasons for India’s “aggressive” behavior at the border, which they
argue is in line with deterioration in India’s relations with its other neighbors in the region,
including Pakistan and Nepal.7 As insightful as these arguments are, a major shortcoming in the
present discourse on the ongoing China-India standoff at the LAC is that it is based on isolated
facets of China-India relations, i.e., either the endogenous China-India bilateral differences or
the exogenous regional rivalry or impact of each country’s ties with the United States. Thus,
much of the existing discourse cannot provide a complete picture of or explanation for the
present crisis. However, a closer look at China’s internal debates and deliberations on India in
the years preceding the Galwan clash and thereafter provides a clearer and more
comprehensive understanding of the circumstances that might have led to the ongoing border
crisis and offer important clues on the way forward. India is a country that features concurrently
in all three focus areas of China’s strategic outlay (considered the foundational framework of
Chinese diplomacy), i.e., Major Power Diplomacy,8 Neighborhood Diplomacy, and Developing
Country Diplomacy.9 Chinese strategists, working closely with the Chinese government, often
analyze relations with India through multiple lenses at the same time, namely China-India
dynamics, South Asian geopolitics, China-U.S. strategic competition, and ultimately through the
paradigm of China’s rise. This has produced a large body of rich literature on China-India
relations, mostly in the Chinese language, which remains somewhat under-explored in the
mainstream analysis of dynamics between the two countries. This paper reviews both English
and Chinese language journal publications, news reports, op-eds, interviews, and commentaries
by Chinese strategists and experts on India and South Asia as well as generalists associated with
important Chinese governmental and semi-governmental institutions that influence Chinese
policymaking, to put the present border crisis and its impact into proper perspective.10 While
situating the ongoing border standoff within the overarching framework of Chinese foreign
policy and global strategy, this paper makes two key arguments. First, the ongoing border crisis
in Ladakh is likely the outcome of an intensifying conflict between China’s Major Power
Diplomacy (of wooing India to hedge against the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy and making New
Delhi a key partner in Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and its Neighborhood Strategy (that
of securing a China-centered regional order with Beijing as the sole leader or rule-maker in the
region) vis-à-vis India. Second, the standoff lays bare China’s policy dilemma over India — on the
one hand, Beijing wants to effectively check a rising India by asserting its strength and
psychological advantage over New Delhi. But on the other hand, China is anxious about the
impact of the current crisis on the realization of its various regional and global objectives in the
Indian Ocean Region that necessitates cordial ties with India. China’s pre-Galwan Strategic
Discourse on India Improving ties with all its neighbor’s, particularly India, was officially
determined as one of China’s topmost foreign policy agendas during the 18th National Congress
of the Communist Party of China in 2012. However, there has always been a difference in
opinion within the Chinese strategic community on how to cooperate with India – one section of
the community argues that China needs to induce India into cooperating, preferably by offering
non-core economic incentives and concessions, while others advocate the Maoist philosophy of
cooperation through struggle (以斗争求团结，则团结者存。以妥协求团结，则团结者亡).
This philosophy essentially means that cooperation achieved through the use of force is long-
lasting while that through compromise is fragile and short-term.11 For this group of analysts,
the 1962 border war between China and India is the ideal, which brought decades of peace for
China and thus, they recommend forcing New Delhi to cooperate as a superior option. Even as
China-India interactions have become more high-profile and significant, clashes at the border
became more severe and long-lasting, indicating that two distinct but contradictory schools of
thought dominate China’s India policy. This lack of consensus within Chinese strategic circles
ensured that China’s outreach to India remained episodic at best, marked by alternate periods
of camaraderie and conflict and of hope and despair. For instance, in a symbolic move, Chinese
Premier Li Keqiang chose India as the destination for his maiden foreign visit in 2013, but the
potentially historic trip was overshadowed by an over three-week confrontation between
Chinese and Indian forces on the western part of the border. In the following years, even as
China-India interactions became more high-profile and significant, clashes at the border became
more severe and long-lasting, indicating that two distinct but contradictory schools of thought
dominate China’s India policy.12 The section below explores how both strong optimism and an
equally staunch pessimism towards India coexisted in post-Doklam China, with the pessimistic
school of thought eventually gaining greater ground, particularly in the months leading up to the
Galwan clash. CHINA SOUGHT COOPERATION WITH INDIA AS COMPETITION GREW BETWEEN
FOIP AND BRI After former U.S. President Donald Trump officially introduced the Free and Open
Indo-Pacific (FOIP) strategy at an Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation meeting during his first trip
to Asia in November 2017, the Indo-Pacific became a popular strategic concept globally, though
the idea was originally conceived of by Japanese leader Shinzo Abe. Since then, various
countries such as France, India, and Indonesia have developed their own Indo-Pacific strategies,
with the latest examples being from Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom.
However, China, which has much at stake in the geopolitical churn within the Indo-Pacific, had,
for all these years, maintained a relatively muted stance on the concept officially, with very few
open assessments by high-ranking Chinese officials. Before the October 2020 Wang Yi
statement, asserting that the Indo-Pacific strategy is a “huge underlying security risk” to the
region,13 it was last in 2018 when the Chinese foreign minister spoke on the issue, dismissing
the concept outright by likening it to “sea foam” in the Pacific or the Indian Ocean that would
quickly disappear.14 In the following years, China’s state media stuck to this official stance and
often strove to shrug off the Indo-Pacific or the Quad as a “paper tiger”(纸老虎),15 a
“stillborn,”16 a hollow strategy (虚招多实招少),17 calling it “bubbles in the sun”( 阳光下的泡
沫)18 and predicting that it is “doomed to fail.” (注定会失败).19 However, downplaying the
Indo-Pacific at the official level belied the alarm and attention China accorded to the concept
internally. In China’s domestic circles, the idea pushed a panic button and in popular Chineselanguage discourse, the Indo-Pacific came to be seen as “a big pit dug for China” ( 美国用印太
战略给中国挖了个大坑),20 “the most dangerous geopolitical framework facing China” ( 中国
面临的最危险的地缘框架),21 “a concept more vicious than the island chain containment
theory”22 that poses “an all-round challenge” (全方位挑战)23 to China and neutralizes its every
bid to achieve an overwhelming power advantage in Asia. At the military level, the Indo-Pacific
strategy was seen as potentially targeting the “going out” strategy of the Chinese Navy and a
ploy to block China’s access to the seas by creating a second island chain.24 In the political and
economic realms, Chinese analysts saw FOIP as a way to challenge China’s BRI, deter Chinese
industrial upgradation, attack its development model, and threaten its energy lifeline. Many in
China came to believe that if implemented in its entirety, the Indo-Pacific strategy could force
China into a state of isolation in the affairs of the region and the only way to break through the
isolation would be to make major concessions in regional affairs.25 Some Chinese strategists
even questioned the Chinese government’s evasive or passive attitude towards the Indo-Pacific
and advocated for greater acceptance of the idea, better preparation, active participation, and a
bigger say in the grouping to dilute its adverse effects for China.26 In the Chinese strategic
thinking, the Indo-Pacific concept was not just about the containment of China or maintenance
of “U.S. hegemony” in the Asia-Pacific in a cost-effective way.27 It was also about
acknowledging the rise of India as a counterweight to China. It is argued that if the Asia-Pacific
was centered on China, the Indo-Pacific is centered on India. If the United States is the leading
force of the Indo-Pacific strategy and China the main target country, then India (located at the
junction of Asia, Middle East, and Africa, and sharing a boundary with China), is the main
country the United States depends on to balance Beijing, observed Wu Shichun, President of the
National Institute for South China Sea Studies (NISCSS).28 Ambassador Yuan Nansheng, who
once served as Chinese Consul General in Mumbai, agreed. “Among all the big powers, India
does have the capability to balance China. Given its geographic location and its military strength
(particularly having more than one aircraft carrier), it does have the ability to block the Strait of
Malacca,”29 he argued. Therefore, in the Chinese assessment, the United States, Japan, and
Australia are all seen as relying on India to a certain extent to build pressure on China in the
Indian Ocean, causing a disadvantageous two-front conflict situation for Beijing.30 In the
Chinese conception, India has been the “key variable” (关键变量) which would determine the
success or failure of the Indo-Pacific strategy as “without India, there is no Indo-Pacific.” But
despite many convergences in interest, a U.S.-India alliance was not seen as inevitable by
Chinese strategists. They believed that India remained the weakest link of the Indo-Pacific
grouping or the Quad (which many Chinese strategists refer to as a three-plus one31 and not a
quadrilateral) because of New Delhi’s own “great power complex(大国情结),”32 its
unwillingness to be subservient to the United States, and the complicated history of U.S.-India
relations. Therefore, in the Chinese conception, India has been the “key variable” ( 关键变量)33
which would determine the success or failure of the Indo-Pacific strategy34 as “without India,
there is no Indo-Pacific.”35 A section of the Chinese strategic community also valued India as
the only “fulcrum country”36 that did not originally exclude China from its Indo-Pacific
conception. In this context, Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue
in 2018, where he stated that “India does not regard the Indo-Pacific region as an exclusive club
with limited members targeting any one country”37 was appreciated in China. Some Chinese
strategists even advocated that China should first enhance its relationship with India under the
framework of the Indo-Pacific strategy and then gradually seek to expand cooperation with
other member countries. They argued that the focus should be on integrating and connecting
China’s existing strategies and policies, particularly the BRI, with the Indo-Pacific strategy,
ensuring that China has a greater say or role in shaping the strategy and thereby eliminating its
adverse impact on China.38 Apart from its relevance in China’s hedging strategy against the
FOIP, India, one of the largest markets in the world, with the greatest development potential,
located right next to China, figured prominently in Beijing’s Belt and Road in South Asia, its
Western Development Strategy, its “Liang Yang Chu Hai ( 两洋出海)” or Two Oceans Strategy.
All these strategies comprised China’s own version of Indo-Pacific, meant to connect the Pacific
and the Indian Ocean regions and open up an economically viable, major Indian Ocean exit for
China, to overcome its Malacca dilemma and bypass what it calls the U.S. island chain strategy in
the South and East China Seas. It is important to note that all of China’s mega connectivity
initiatives in South Asia under the BRI like the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic
Corridor (BCIM), the China-Nepal-India Trans-Himalayan Corridor, and the 21st Century
Maritime Silk Road, either in their present form or as per plans in the future, include India.39 In
the Chinese conception, even the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, which India publicly
opposes, would in the long-term become a China-Pakistan-India-Iran-Afghanistan-Kazakhstan
Corridor, which along with other Chinese connectivity initiatives in the region would open up
South Asia and form a new trans-Himalayan economic growth zone for China.40 Chinese
strategists well understood that to pursue China’s strategic objectives in South Asia, India’s
cooperation is crucial, due to several factors: 1) the geography of the subcontinent (the fact that
most South Asian countries are not directly connected to China or to each other, and most of
the connectivity options in the region would need to pass through India),41 2) the Indiacentered42 asymmetric power structure (以印度为中心的非对称性安全格局)43 in the region,
3) the various levels of dependency on India among South Asian nations,44 and 4) India’s
advantageous position in terms of closer ties with other great powers operating in the region
like the United States, Japan, and Russia.45 Thus, cooperation with New Delhi under various
frameworks, such as ‘China, India+1,’46 ‘China + SAARC,’ or SCO was seen as the most viable
option for a hassle-free and cost-effective implementation of Beijing’s BRI or Two Oceans
Strategy.47 The year 2018 saw Chinese optimism regarding India reach a crescendo. There were
even some discussions in the Chinese press on whether a compromise could be reached such
that China would support India’s key aspirations like joining the Nuclear Suppliers Group in
return for India hopping onboard BRI. Overall, many Chinese strategists saw (and continue to
see still) India as the “most critical node”48 in the competition between the U.S. FOIP and
Chinese BRI. As a result, they advocated that China should strive to: 1) improve ties with India by
looking for more common ground, reducing the destabilizing factors in the relationship and
ensuring smooth ties;49 2) drive a wedge between India and the other three Quad members
and reduce or restrict the strategic interaction50 between New Delhi and these Indo-Pacific
democracies; and 3) play a role in shaping the Modi government’s strategy towards the IndoPacific, encouraging India to practice non-alignment and strategic autonomy. The year 2018 saw
Chinese optimism regarding India reach a crescendo. The dominant narrative in policy circles
was that China needed to moderate hostility towards India and that “China’s India policy should
not lack warmth and goodwill” because “China-India relations can still be improved” (对印度不
要过于“敌意”，中印关系可以搞好).51 There were even some discussions in the Chinese
press on whether a compromise could be reached such that China would support India’s key
aspirations like joining the Nuclear Suppliers Group in return for India hopping onboard BRI.52
These efforts were part of China’s pursuit for a “new path and new thinking for strategic
coexistence between China and India” (中印战略共处的新路径、新思维). The idea, aptly put
by veteran Chinese historian and Indologist Tan Chung, was: “If China invests in peaches, India
will surely return with plums.” (中国投之以桃，印度必会报之以李).53 However, even as there
was much interest in China to extend an olive branch to India and secure a “China-India Datong”
or a dragon-elephant dance in the face of growing competition between FOIP and BRI, some
sections of the Chinese strategic community remained deeply disgruntled. India’s actions, they
argued, were running counter to Chinese expectations. These expectations are best articulated
by Ye Hailin, director of the Center of South Asia Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social
Sciences, one of China’s most influential think-tanks, in a piece written shortly before the
Galwan clash in June 2020. He argued that an “optimal state of China-India relations” would
mean that the bilateral structural issues between Beijing and New Delhi can be resolved to
China’s satisfaction, that India accepts China’s presence in South Asia (including within India)
under the banner of the BRI, and that India and China join hands to oppose “U.S. bullying” and
build a community with a shared future for mankind.54 However, if this optimal state cannot be
achieved due to the changing international landscape and the geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific, Ye
Hailin argued that a ‘sub-optimal’ state of relations would mean that the structural
contradictions in China-India relations are effectively managed and an outbreak of fierce conflict
between the two sides can be avoided when China does not want it. At the same time, India has
adopted an attitude of tacit acceptance towards China’s South Asia strategy and the
construction of the Belt and Road, at least not publicly obstructing it. In addition, India can
oppose U.S. actions against China on certain occasions, or at least remain neutral.”55
Trade impact
India-China tensions spillover to the Indian Ocean
Gamage 17 (Rajni Gamage is a senior analyst with the Maritime Security Programme at the
Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies,
Nanyang Technological University, Singapore., 11/5/17, “Why the Indian Ocean Must Not
Become Like the South China Sea”, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/why-the-indian-oceanmust-not-become-the-south-china-sea-23028?page=0%2C2) // IA
Rising Strategic Uncertainty in the Indian Ocean The pursuit of contesting regional orders by
major powers has engendered a strategic environment of uncertainty and mistrust in the IndoPacific. As geopolitical developments at land and sea feed off one another, the maritime domain
has been marked as the latest theater of war. These dynamics have been most evident in the
East and South China Seas, where the complexity of issues at hand is telling. A case in point is
China’s construction of military facilities on artificial islands proximate to disputed maritime
areas, against a backdrop of contesting interpretations of international law. As regional and
extra-regional states face a rising China on all fronts, a climate of strategic anxiety prevails in
anticipation of its potential impact on the existing rules-based international order. Such
anxieties inevitably spill over into the Indian Ocean Region and manifest in ways unique to that
part of the world. A rising India with aspirations to global-power status finds its regional
dominance challenged by China’s two-ocean strategy and Belt and Road Initiative. In the
maritime realm, India’s response comprises internal naval and port modernization, and
increased naval engagements and exercises with neighboring littorals and external powers that
have major stakes in the region. This has not, however, had any noticeable effects in tempering
regional anxieties. Heavy maritime traffic in increasingly congested regional waters operate
alongside this tense backdrop.The risk that various surface vessels could collide—whether naval
or commercial—and the risk of submarine accidents is on the rise. A number of regional and
extra-regional states have forward-deployed their navies in the Indian Ocean, independently or
as part of various task forces. There have already been several maritime accidents involving
warships and air crashes in the Persian Gulf and the northern Arabian Sea between regional and
extra-regional navies—some of which escalated politically. The Iranian Navy, for instance, has
confronted its smaller neighbors and the U.S. Navy by conducting high-speed naval maneuvers
and missile firings, and it has used drones to shadow U.S. naval assets. Late last year, an Indian
submarine attempted to enter into waters close to Gwadar Port and was reportedly repelled by
the Pakistan Navy. Miscommunications and misperceptions are likely to result from such
incidents and could escalate very fast to negative political and military expressions. It is against
this setting that a code of conduct (COC) for the Indian Ocean was first proposed.
India relies heavily on the Indian Ocean as
Dhruva Jaishankar, 9-12-2016, "Indian Ocean region: A pivot for India’s growth," Brookings,
https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/indian-ocean-region-a-pivot-for-indias-growth/ //IA
The Indian Ocean holds particular importance for India, as the littoral’s most populous country.
Indeed, for the rest of the Ocean’s littoral states, and even those outside the region, India’s
leadership role will be important in determining the strategic future. India is geographically
located at the Ocean’s centre, and has over 7,500 kilometres of coastline. “India is at the
crossroads of the Indian Ocean,” Prime Minister Narendra Modi declared in a speech in
Mauritius in 2015. “The Indian Ocean Region is at the top of our policy priorities.”[7] The Ocean
has long been a key determining factor of India’s cultural footprint, with people, religion, goods,
and customs spreading from India to Africa, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia and vice-versa.
India’s approach after independence was initially defined by the British withdrawal from east of
Suez and Prime Minister Indira Gandhi calls for a zone of peace.[8] Only after the late 1990s,
under the BJP-led government of Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee and the Congress-led
government of Manmohan Singh, did the possibilities of openings in and around the Indian
Ocean come to be seriously contemplated.[9] Today, 95 per cent of India’s trade by volume and
68 per cent of trade by value come via the Indian Ocean.[10] Additionally, 3.28 million barrels
per day—or nearly 80 per cent of India’s crude oil requirement—is imported by sea via the
Indian Ocean. Taking into account India’s offshore oil production and petroleum exports, India’s
sea dependence for oil is about 93 per cent, according to the Indian Navy.[11] India is also the
fourth-largest importer of liquefied natural gas (LNG), with about 45 per cent coming by sea.[12]
Moreover, India is heavily dependent on the resources of the Indian Ocean. India captured 4.1
million tonnes of fish in 2008, placing it sixth in the world and its fishing and aquaculture
industries employ some 14 million people.[13] Fisheries and aquaculture industries are also a
major source of exports. India’s maritime exports grew 55 times in volume between 1962 and
2012 and fisheries exports now account for Rs. 16,600 crore or about $2.5 billion.[14] Mineral
resource extraction is also important. In 1987, India received exclusive rights to explore the
Central Indian Ocean and has since explored four million square miles and established two
mining sites. In 2013, the Geological Survey of India acquired a deep sea exploration ship
Samudra Ratnakar from South Korea, boosting its survey capabilities.[15] In 2014, the
International Seabed Authority issued licenses for the Indian Ocean ridge, opening up new
opportunities for deep seabed mining. This region is estimated to have massive reserves of
manganese, as well as cobalt, nickel, and copper, all of which are scarce on Indian soil. However,
such deep sea exploration will require further investments in remotely operated vehicles and
processing facilities.[16]
A stoppage in trade would be catastrophic
Davis, 2022 The Indian Ocean Region in the 21st Century: geopolitical, economic, and
environmental ties AII https://aii.unimelb.edu.au/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/indian-oceanreport.pdf //IA
The Indian Ocean region’s natural resources remain the basis for much of modern day trade
through the region. The lives of hundreds of millions of people in the littoral of the Indian Ocean
rely upon this trade. Goods as diverse as chickpeas, meat, and coal flow along now wellestablished trade routes. Perhaps most striking, 40 per cent of the world’s offshore oil
production is in the Indian Ocean, and more than twothirds of the world’s oil passes through the
region’s waters. Australia, Indonesia, and South Africa account for more than half of global coal
exports. The regions rich biodiversity and natural beauty has allowed the development of a
tourism sector worth billions.
War impact
Effective cooperation between India and China massively decreases the likelihood of war.
Shivshankar Menon, 12-8-2021, "How India and China Can Keep the Peace," Foreign Affairs,
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2021-12-08/how-india-and-china-can-keeppeace //Maria
Over 100,000 Indian and Chinese troops are preparing to spend another brutal winter
confronting each other at high altitudes along the Indian-Chinese border. A year and a half after
Chinese soldiers seized territory on the boundary, preventing Indian patrols from going where
they had gone for years, both sides have increased military deployments, accelerated the
construction of permanent infrastructure throughout the Himalayas, and asserted control over
disputed areas. There are credible reports of China building new villages in territory India
considers its own. After 13 rounds of military commander talks, there is little sign that the
standoff will end. It remains a matter of speculation as to why China decided to enter and
occupy areas across the Line of Actual Control (LAC), breaking protocols worked out since the
1980s and violating the Border Peace and Tranquility Agreement of 1993. What is clear is that
Beijing’s decisions must have been made at the highest levels for political and strategic, not just
tactical, reasons. China’s military moved on a large scale and at multiple points simultaneously.
The country has framed its actions as a sovereignty issue in official statements and in its new
land border law, passed in autumn 2021. This makes the dispute harder to settle. China
previously described the boundary disagreement as a product of history, leaving room for give,
take, and negotiation. Sovereignty, by contrast, is sacred and inviolable. China’s hardened
stance has changed Indian attitudes. Beijing’s actions on the border have alienated Indian public
opinion, and New Delhi has been driven into self-strengthening and counterbalancing actions
against China. The country is tightening military and security links with Washington, and as part
of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, it is working with Australia, Japan, and the United States
to take a much more active role in maritime Asia. It is fast-tracking trade negotiations with
Australia, the European Union, and the United Kingdom. The prospects of a negotiated solution
between India and China have clearly receded, and the countries’ relations will be more
antagonistic for some time to come. Yet it could be dangerous for India and China to let tensions
over the border lead to a permanent marked deterioration in the bilateral relationship. Such an
outcome raises the risk of military conflict between the world’s two largest countries. Even
rising tensions alone could threaten the states’ shared interests. Though they confront each
other on the border, India and China have complex ties that require stronger communication—
and cooperation. China became India’s top trading partner again in 2020, the same year as the
clashes, and Indian-Chinese trade in 2021 has already broken previous records. The two
countries share an interest in fighting climate change, combating terrorism, and promoting
energy security. Much like the United States and China, India and China must find ways to
manage their competition so they can work together when needed. Indian-Chinese relations will
be more antagonistic for some time to come. This will require that India and China start a
serious dialogue about bilateral issues and seek a new strategic framework for the
relationship—one that can both contain tensions and allow the two sides to find common
ground on international issues such as climate change. But for New Delhi, that dialogue must be
accompanied by restored deterrence on the border, with new measures that can make Beijing
pay for future incursions. Otherwise, the risk of escalating tensions and even outright military
conflict between two nuclear powers will become unacceptably high.
Indo-Sino war escalates into a catastrophic nuclear conflict.
Mizokami 19 (Kyle Mizokami is a defense and national-security writer based in San Francisco
who has appeared in the Diplomat, Foreign Policy, War is Boring and the Daily Beast. In 2009 he
cofounded the defense and security blog Japan Security Watch. “A War Between India and
China: It Could Go Nuclear and Billions Would Die”, The National interest, September 30, 2019,
https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/war-between-india-and-china-it-could-go-nuclear-andbillions-would-die-84501,
Such a war could go nuclear, the impact of which would go beyond China and India. A
hypothetical war between India and China would be one of the largest and most destructive
conflicts in Asia. A war between the two powers would rock the Indo-Pacific region, cause
thousands of casualties on both sides and take a significant toll on the global economy.
Geography and demographics would play a unique role, limiting the war’s scope and ultimately
the conditions of victory. India and China border one another in two locations, northern
India/western China and eastern India/southern China, with territorial disputes in both areas.
China attacked both theaters in October 1962, starting a monthlong war that resulted in minor
Chinese gains on the ground. Both countries’ “No First Use” policies regarding nuclear weapons
make the outbreak of nuclear war very unlikely. Both countries have such large populations,
each over 1.3 billion, that they are essentially unconquerable. Like all modern wars, a war
between India and China would be fought over land, sea, and air; geography would limit the
scope of the land conflict, while it would be the air conflict, fought with both aircraft and
missiles, that would do the most damage to both countries. The trump card, however, may be
India’s unique position to dominate a sea conflict, with dire consequences for the Chinese
economy. A war between the two countries would, unlike the 1962 war, involve major air action
on both sides. Both countries maintain large tactical air forces capable of flying missions over
the area. People’s Liberation Army Air Force units in the Lanzhou Military Region would fly
against Punjab, Himchal Pradesh and Uttarakhand and from the expansive Chengdu Military
region against India’s Arunachal Pradesh. The Lanzhou district is home to J-11 and J-11B fighters,
two regiments of H-6 strategic bombers, and grab bag of J-7 and J-8 fighters. A lack of forward
bases in Xinjiang means the Lanzhou Military Region could probably only support a limited air
campaign against northern India. The Chengdu Military Region is home to advanced J-11A and J10 fighters but there are relatively few military airfields in Tibet anywhere near India. Still, China
does not necessarily need tactical aircraft to do great damage to India. China could supplement
its aerial firepower with ballistic missiles from the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Forces. The
PLARF overseas both nuclear, conventional and dual-use ballistic missiles, and could conceivably
move up to two thousand short- and medium-range DF-11, DF-15 and DF-21 ballistic missiles
into positions adjacent to India. These missiles could be used to blitz Indian strategic targets on
the ground, at the cost of making them unavailable for contingencies in the South and East
China Seas. Meanwhile, India’s air forces are in a better position to contest the skies than their
Chinese counterparts. While the war would take place on China’s sparsely manned frontier, New
Delhi is only 213 miles from the Tibetan frontier. India’s air fleet of 230 Su-30Mk1 Flankers,
sixty-nine MiG-29s and even its Mirage 2000s are competitive with or even better than most of
China’s aircraft in theater, at least until the J-20 fighter becomes operational. India likely has
enough aircraft to deal with a two-front war, facing off with Pakistan’s Air Force at the same
time. India is also fielding the Akash medium-range air defense missile system to protect air
bases and other high-value targets. While India could be reasonably confident of having an air
force that deters war, at least in the near term, it has no way of stopping a Chinese ballisticmissile offensive. Chinese missile units, firing from Xinjiang and Tibet, could hit targets across
the northern half of India with impunity. India has no ballistic-missile defenses and does not
have the combined air- and space-based assets necessary to hunt down and destroy the missile
launchers. India’s own ballistic missiles are dedicated to the nuclear mission and would be
unavailable for conventional war. The war on the ground between the Indian and Chinese
armies might at first glance seem like the most decisive phase of the war, but it’s actually quite
the opposite. Both the western and eastern theaters are in rugged locations with little
transportation infrastructure, making it difficult to send a mechanized army through. Massed
attacks could be easily stopped with artillery as attacking forces are funneled through wellknown valleys and mountain passes. Despite the enormous size of both armies (1.2 million for
the Indian Army and 2.2 for the Chinese Army) fighting on the ground would likely be a
stalemate with little lost or gained. The war at sea would be the decisive front in a conflict
between the two countries. Sitting astride the Indian Ocean, India lies on China’s jugular vein.
The Indian Navy, with its force of submarines, aircraft carrier INS Vikramaditya and surface ships
could easily curtail the the flow of trade between China and Europe, the Middle East, and Africa.
It would take the Chinese Navy weeks to assemble and sail a fleet capable of contesting the
blockade. Even then, the blockade would be hard to break up, conducted over the thousands of
square miles of the Indian Ocean. Meanwhile, shipping to and from China would be forced to
divert through the western Pacific Ocean, where such diversions would be vulnerable to
Australian, Japanese, or American naval action. 87 percent of the country’s petroleum needs are
imported from abroad, particularly the Middle East and Africa. China’s strategic petroleum
reserves, once completed sometime in the 2020s, could stave off a nationwide fuel shortage for
up to seventy-seven days—but after that Beijing would have to seek an end to the war however
possible. The second-order effects of the war at sea would be India’s greatest weapon. War
jitters, the shock to the global economy, and punitive economic action by India’s allies—
including Japan and the United States—could see demands for exports fall, with the potential to
throw millions of Chinese laborers out of work. Domestic unrest fueled by economic troubles
could become a major problem for the Chinese Communist Party and its hold on the nation.
China has no similar lever over India, except in the form of a rain of ballistic missiles with highexplosive warheads on New Delhi and other major cities. A war between India and China would
be nasty, brutal and short, with far-reaching consequences for the global economy. The balance
of power and geographic constraints means a war would almost certainly fail to prove decisive.
Both sides have almost certainly concluded this, which is why there hasn’t been a war for more
than fifty years. We can only hope it stays that way.
C: Preserving Peace
India’s will use lunar cooperation to accelerate their military capabilities.
Rajagopalan 22 (RAJESWARI PILLAI RAJAGOPALAN – Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, “India’s Space Priorities Are Shifting Toward National Security,” 9-1-22,
https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/09/01/india-s-space-priorities-are-shifting-towardnational-security-pub-87809) //Bos
India’s aspirations are reflected in its missions to the Moon and Mars. The Indian Space
Research Organization is also working on Gaganyaan, the country’s first human space mission
scheduled for 2023. Though many have questioned these ventures on the grounds that India still
faces enormous developmental challenges, there are several reasons to continue these
ventures. First, space exploration is the logical next step as India’s space program matures and
gains sophistication. Indian space capabilities have grown slowly but steadily, with larger
boosters and more complex space operations. Further space exploration to gain greater
technological competencies would be the next logical step. Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan Dr.
Rajeswari (Raji) Pillai Rajagopalan is the director of the Centre for Security, Strategy &
Technology at the Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi. Second, while these missions may
not have a direct developmental or social benefit, they increase the visibility and profile of the
Indian space program and make it a more attractive partner for collaboration. These missions
also demonstrate New Delhi’s ability to undertake complex projects despite tiny budgets. This
enhances the attractiveness of India’s space launch facilities, which indirectly benefits the
program’s revenue stream and soft power value. Third, undertaking these missions has resulted
in spin-off technological breakthroughs. For instance, India’s deep space communication
capabilities are believed to have benefited because of these missions. India’s first Moon mission
as well as the Mangalyaan mission for deep space communication functions were assisted by
NASA. Together, these missions and developments are seen as important credentials for India to
gain a louder voice on global governance of outer space. GREATER MILITARY FOCUS Military and
security imperatives have also gained greater prominence in Indian thinking about space
utilization. Although New Delhi does not have a declared space policy document, the growing
military orientation can be gleaned from official statements in the Indian Parliament and from
organizations such as the United Nations. India’s approach to space is now driven by a sense of
pragmatism and by national security concerns, as opposed to the morality- and sovereigntyrelated considerations that shaped the program until the 1990s. Given this new motivation as
well as the changing space security conditions, India’s space program has developed credible
launch capabilities and a mix of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, and Earth
observation satellites for military purposes. These growing capabilities should significantly
increase the Indian military’s situational awareness, especially of the areas around the country’s
borders. Some of India’s earliest military satellites, such as the RISAT series, were specifically
meant to do this. Though initially developed in the context of terrorist threats after the 2008
Mumbai attack, these systems have broader utility for all the country’s military services. India
has also deployed communication satellites that allow each branch to better coordinate
operations. This is particularly important for the Navy, given its far-flung operational theaters.
Finally, India’s investment in its own navigation satellite constellation will help all Indian forces,
in all types of operations, to situate themselves without the vulnerability of depending on
foreign navigational satellites.
But their current program fails.
Pasricha 21 (Anjana Pasricha – VOA, “India Looks to Enhance Military Capabilities in Space,” 627-21, https://www.voanews.com/a/south-central-asia_india-looks-enhance-militarycapabilities-space/6207536.html) //Bos
India is looking to expand its military capabilities in space, according to analysts. “Geopolitics is
the primary driver for India to focus on the military aspects of its space program,” said Rajeswari
Pillai Rajagopalan, director of the Center for Security, Strategy and Technology at the Observer
Research Institute in New Delhi. “It has to respond to the growing capabilities in space of China,
with which time and again border disputes have flared. India has recognized that if it does not
step up, it will lose out on using space assets for military purposes,” he told VOA. An Indian antisatellite weapon test conducted two years ago to demonstrate that it could shoot down
satellites in space was the country’s first significant step to give a military profile to its space
program. With that test, India became the fourth country, after China, Russia, and the United
States, to demonstrate anti-satellite capability. India’s anti-satellite test came 12 years after
China conducted one in 2007. While for years India’s space program focused on civilian space
applications and space exploration, China’s demonstration of its capacity to bring down
satellites became a “wake-up” call for the country about the kind of space security threats that
it will need to address, say analysts. “It was essentially a deterrence mechanism, a message to
the adversary that we have developed counter space capabilities,” said Ajay Lele, senior fellow
at the Manohar Parrikar Institute of Defense Studies and Analyses in New Delhi. “India is in a
peculiar situation. Two adversaries on its border are nuclear weapon states. And as one of them,
China, has developed significant counter space capabilities, so India too wants to be prepared in
the event there is weaponization of space in future.” In 2019, India established the Space
Defense Agency to develop the country’s space strategy. According to domestic media reports,
India is developing sensors and satellites along with ground stations to aid defense forces with
space assets. “This is being done because 24 by seven if you have to monitor an area to analyze
developments more closely, you need many more satellites,” according to Lele. The current key
focus, analysts said, is on enhancing surveillance capabilities of sensitive areas from space assets
from a military perspective. India’s concerns center both on its Himalayan borders with China,
where disputed borders between the two have sparked military tensions, and on the Indian
Ocean region, where China has been increasing its influence. Last year, New Delhi and Beijing
were involved in a months-long military standoff sparked by Indian accusations that Chinese
troops had encroached into its territory in a remote mountain area of Ladakh in the western
Himalayas during the winter, when the ice-covered area is largely inaccessible. New Delhi
analysts had questioned why India could not detect the alleged Chinese incursions earlier
through satellite imagery. It is only in recent years that India got communication and
reconnaissance satellites dedicated to the armed forces – the first one went to the navy which
has to guard a long coastline. “Demand is only growing,” Pillai said, “But India’s space agency’s
ability to keep up with this demand is an issue.” There are demands to enhance space assets for
the military, particularly as China develops more sophisticated counter space technologies such
as cyber warfare. “India has a very basic satellite program. Also, in terms of numbers, it has very
few satellites compared to countries like China and the United States,” according to Manoj
Joshi, a distinguished fellow at the Observer Research Foundation. “So in an environment where
satellites can be disabled or neutralized, the military would want to have the ability to rapidly
replace them,” he said. However, India’s defense-related space capabilities are still nascent
because of budget limitations. “India is constrained for resources. Its defense budget has been
declining compared to gross domestic product in recent years,” Joshi said.
The Artemis Accords increase India’s technological and funding capacities.
Ramanathan, 21
(Aditya, Aditya Pareek, Nitansha Bansa, “India and the Artemis Accords”, Takshashila Issue Paper
2021 – 01, 07-29-2021,
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/618a55c4cb03246776b68559/t/623060e18f0ff4552955f
271/1647337698479/India-and-the-Artemis-Accords.pdf)
Opportunities 1. The Artemis programme provides India an opportunity to collaborate on space
activity with both the US, a major spacefaring state, as well as other emerging spacefarers. This
could: a. boost India’s own lunar exploration programme, b. create opportunities for cofinancing of lunar projects c. increase its access to critical space technologies, d. and bring
commercial opportunities. 2. The Artemis programme presently includes the other three
member states of the Quad (the US, Australia, and Japan). It provides an opportunity to deepen
technological cooperation within this informal grouping and provide a basis for increasing
technology sharing through bilateral or plurilateral agreements in the future. For example, India
could benefit from Japan’s expertise in avionics and sample return, as well as established USAustralian facilities for space monitoring.52
A strong Indian space program threatens war with Pakistan.
Shah, Akash. 2023. “Deterrence under Surveillance: Indian Space-Based ISR Capabilities and
Pakistan’s Nuclear Deterrence”. Journal of Security &Amp; Strategic Analyses 8 (2):07-26.
https://doi.org/10.57169/jssa.008.02.0201. //Maria
Deterrence is a dynamic concept that keeps evolving and corresponds to the adversary's
abilities. Furthermore, mutual vulnerability plays a pivotal role in deterrence stability. The
asymmetry between India and Pakistan extends to the realm of space as well, and the space
programs of both countries are not even close for comparison. Hence Indian strategic assets are
not constantly under surveillance by Pakistan's space-based ISR resources. Pakistan's nuclear
doctrine and strategic posture are also not oriented around counterforce or first strike, so India
does not face the same vulnerability to balance the deterrence. India's quest for a constellation
of dual-use and military-specific space fleets alongside extensive ballistic missile defence and
delivery systems such as nuclear-capable supersonic cruise missiles does not correspond to NFU
or credible minimum deterrence. And once the Indian space program reaches the intended level
of maturation, along with the technical collaboration with countries like France, Israel and the
USA, Pakistan's delivery systems and launch sites will be under round- the-clock surveillance.63
It also boosts India's confidence in a first strike against these installations to prevent Pakistan
from striking back during a high-tension standoff. Considering the technological and capacity
challenges, Pakistan will likely face the 'use it or lose it' dilemma. Rather than the stated
intentions or objectives, the capabilities define the deterrence response. As Pakistan has never
believed in India's NFU commitment, the cumulative outcome could be drastic. The overall
impact of India's strategic build-up, including space based ISR capabilities and complimented by
supersonic missiles and ballistic missile defence, will immensely impact the strategic stability in
South Asia. Conclusion The Indian space program is far ahead in terms of potential and intended
objectives compared to Pakistan’s space program. It is clear from the existing space assets and
plans that it intends to utilize space as a force multiplier in enhancing its offensive and defensive
capabilities. So far, Pakistan has managed to deter India from committing to large-scale war, as
seen in 1948, 1965 and 1971, proving that nuclear deterrence has worked. However, India
believes that Pakistan’s nuclear parity is an obstacle since it can no longer coerce its arch-rival
and neighbor. The shadow of a nuclear war has made conventional advantage insignificant. To
break the strategic [gridlock] paralysis, the force posture that includes a vast network of various
categories of satellites in space suggests that India may execute the first strike against the
strategic assets of Pakistan to break its resolve or diminish its nuclear capability. India's stated
nuclear posture is 'No First Strike"; however, the force build-up suggests that India is building up
its capabilities to target as much of Pakistan’s strategic assets as possible in a preemptive strike
and layering up its major cities with Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) shields to protect them from
remnant nuclear warheads. Satellites are key components in this design as they are
instrumental in surveillance, reconnaissance and intelligence gathering about Pakistan's nuclear
assets. They also have a crucial role in early warning and missile interception. Consequently, it
creates first-strike instability since Pakistan would have to lower its nuclear threshold per the
'use it or lose it' dilemma, thus increasing the probability of a nuclear conflict in South Asia.
Shah confirms:
Shah, Akash. 2023. “Deterrence under Surveillance: Indian Space-Based ISR Capabilities and
Pakistan’s Nuclear Deterrence”. Journal of Security &Amp; Strategic Analyses 8 (2):07-26.
https://doi.org/10.57169/jssa.008.02.0201. //Maria
The growth of the Indian military space program, along with its great interest and investment in
supersonic cruise missiles and ballistic missile defense program, indicates that India is building
up its First Strike potential against Pakistan's strategic assets and installations. The
developments will tremendously impact deterrence stability in South Asia as they will increase
the likelihood of a nuclear escalation in the future.
A war between the two would be disastrous.
Alan Robock et al., 2019, " How an India-Pakistan nuclear war could start—and have global
consequences," Routledge, https://climate.envsci.rutgers.edu/pdf/IndiaPakistanBullAtomSci.pdf
//Maria
This article describes how an India-Pakistan nuclear war might come to pass, and what the local
and global effects of such a war might be. The direct effects of this nuclear exchange would be
horrible; the authors estimate that 50 to 125 million people would die, depending on whether
the weapons used had yields of 15, 50, or 100 kilotons. The ramifications for Indian and
Pakistani society would be major and long lasting, with many major cities largely destroyed and
uninhabitable, millions of injured people needing care, and power, transportation, and financial
infrastructure in ruins. But the climatic effects of the smoke produced by an India-Pakistan
nuclear war would not be confined to the subcontinent, or even to Asia. Those effects would be
enormous and global in scope.